Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae
John of St. Thomas (1589–1644)
First published 1930
Prima pars artis Logicae (formal logic) of the Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus of John of St. Thomas (Joannes a Sancto Thoma), from the Reiser edition (Marietti, Turin, 1930), Reiser tomus I, pars prima.
Praefatio I: Preface
Praeludium I: IN WHICH THE EXERCISE AND PRACTICE OF DIALECTICAL DISPUTATION ARE PROPOSED
Praeludium II: DIVISION, ORDER, AND NECESSITY OF THE ART OF LOGIC
Liber I: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Caput I: DEFINITION OF THE TERM
Caput II: DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF THE SIGN
Caput III: ON CERTAIN DIVISIONS OF TERMS
Caput IV: ON OTHER DIVISIONS OF TERMS
Caput V: ON THE NAME
Caput VI: ON THE VERB
Liber II: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE SECOND OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT
Caput I: ON EXPRESSION IN GENERAL AND ITS DIVISION
Caput II: ON THE MODE OF KNOWING
Caput III: ON DEFINITION
Caput IV: ON DIVISION
Caput V: ON ARGUMENTATION
Caput VI: ON THE PROPOSITION OR ENUNCIATION
Caput VII: ON THE DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION
Caput VIII: ON THE MATTER OF PROPOSITIONS
Caput IX: ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSITION AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE TO BE TREATED
Having explained the nature of propositions, their division, and the diversity of their matter, the order of teaching next requires us to treat the properties of the proposition. Some properties follow the extremes or parts of the proposition themselves; others follow the proposition as a whole. There are five properties of the parts of a proposition that belong to them only insofar as they are within the proposition: supposition, amplification, restriction, alienation, and appellation. The properties that follow the proposition as a whole are three: opposition, conversion, and equipollence.
These properties can be found both in propositions de inesse and in modal propositions. Therefore, we shall treat first the properties of the extremes of a proposition, then the properties of the proposition as a whole; and first in propositions de inesse, then in modal propositions.