Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

John of St. Thomas

Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

John of St. Thomas (1589–1644)

First published 1930

Prima pars artis Logicae (formal logic) of the Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus of John of St. Thomas (Joannes a Sancto Thoma), from the Reiser edition (Marietti, Turin, 1930), Reiser tomus I, pars prima.


Praefatio I: Preface

Praeludium I: IN WHICH THE EXERCISE AND PRACTICE OF DIALECTICAL DISPUTATION ARE PROPOSED

Praeludium II: DIVISION, ORDER, AND NECESSITY OF THE ART OF LOGIC

Liber I: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: DEFINITION OF THE TERM

Caput II: DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF THE SIGN

Caput III: ON CERTAIN DIVISIONS OF TERMS

Caput IV: ON OTHER DIVISIONS OF TERMS

Caput V: ON THE NAME

Caput VI: ON THE VERB

Liber II: ON THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE SECOND OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: ON EXPRESSION IN GENERAL AND ITS DIVISION

Caput II: ON THE MODE OF KNOWING

Before treating the principal perfect expression, which is the proposition, we must treat the method of knowing. For although many things pertaining to the method of knowing are found in the third operation of the intellect, namely argumentation, other such things are found in the second operation, and some pertain even to imperfect expression. Therefore the method of knowing in general is not restricted to perfect or imperfect expression; accordingly, before treating perfect expression specifically, it is fitting to treat the method of knowing in general, which can be found in both perfect and imperfect expression.

Therefore the method of knowing in general is defined as “an expression that makes something unknown manifest.” Note that making manifest is one thing and signifying another. For although a sign seems to make the thing signified manifest to a power, the making manifest of which we now speak is different from signifying absolutely. “Manifest” is taken in two ways: first, as opposed to obscure; second, as opposed to unknown and not presented to a cognitive power. In the first sense, manifestation occurs through something better known and clearer, by which that obscurity is removed. Thus, to make something unknown manifest in our intellect pertains to the method of knowing, provided that this is done by means of an expression. For manifestation by a formal rationale that makes something manifest in a simple way—for example, the authority of a speaker making credible things manifest—is not a method of knowing, because it is not an expression or complex explanation, that is, one ordered to knowledge and having an inferential mode. In the second sense, manifestation occurs through some means or instrument that presents to us an object that was not presented; in this way, making manifest pertains to a sign or representation, speaking generally.

When, then, something unknown or obscure needs to be explained by an expression that explains it and removes that obscurity, such an expression is called a method of knowing, because every manifestation is called knowledge or is ordered to knowledge. Two things can be made manifest to the intellect by an expression: something incomplex or some complex truth. An incomplex thing, such as man, heaven, or earth, is explained by definition with respect to the obscurity of its quiddity, or by division with respect to the confusion of the parts or of the multitude contained in some thing. A complex truth, if obscure or doubtful, is made manifest by proof. Proof is made by reasoning and consequence, and thus is argumentation.

Hence the method of knowing is adequately divided, on the part of the things that can be made manifest, into definition, division, and argumentation. For this reason, definition and division are sometimes said to pertain to the first operation, or simple apprehension, by reason of their object, which they make manifest: something incomplex.

Caput III: ON DEFINITION

Caput IV: ON DIVISION

Caput V: ON ARGUMENTATION

Caput VI: ON THE PROPOSITION OR ENUNCIATION

Caput VII: ON THE DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION

Caput VIII: ON THE MATTER OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput IX: ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE PROPOSITION AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY ARE TO BE TREATED

Caput X: ON SUPPOSITION

Caput XI: ON THE DIVISIONS OF SUPPOSITION

Caput XII: RULES OF SUPPOSITION

Caput XIII: ON RELATIVES

Caput XIV: ON AMPLIFICATION, RESTRICTION, AND ALIENATION

Caput XV: ON APPELLATION

Caput XVI: ON OPPOSITION

Caput XVII: ON THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR THE SPECIES OF OPPOSED PROPOSITIONS AND THE RULES FOR RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL OPPOSITIONS THEMSELVES

Caput XVIII: ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput XIX: ON THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS

Caput XX: ON MODALS

Caput XXI: ON THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, OPPOSITION, AND EQUIVALENCE OF MODALS

Rotuli I: TABLES OF COMPOUND MODALS

Rotuli II: TABLES OF DIVIDED MODAL PROPOSITIONS WHOSE DICTUM CONCERNS A COMMON TERM

Caput XXII: ON THE REDUCTION OF MODALS TO THEIR DE INESSE PROPOSITIONS

Caput XXIII: ON HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITIONS

Caput XXIV: ON EXPONIBLES

Liber III: ON THE THIRD OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT

Caput I: ON CONSEQUENCE AND ITS DIVISION

Caput II: ON INDUCTION

Caput III: ON THE ORDER AND MODE OF RESOLVING TERMS BY ASCENT AND DESCENT

Caput IV: ON THE SYLLOGISM AND ITS MATTER AND FORM

Caput V: ON THE DIVISION OF THE SYLLOGISM ACCORDING TO MATTER AND FORM

Caput VI: ALL THREE FIGURES AND MODES OF SYLLOGISMS ARE EXPLAINED

Caput VII: ON THE REDUCTION OF IMPERFECT SYLLOGISMS TO PERFECT ONES

Caput VIII: ON THE EXPOSITORY SYLLOGISM

Caput IX: ON THE MODE OF FINDING THE MIDDLE TERM

Caput X: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE WHOLE ART OF SYLLOGIZING RESTS

Caput XI: ON THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE GOODNESS OF CONSEQUENCE RESTS UNIVERSALLY

Caput XII: ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DEFECTS OF A BAD CONSEQUENCE

Caput XIII: ON PARTICULAR DEFECTS

Circa I: CONCERNING THE SYLLOGISM.

Defectus I: COMMON DEFECTS.

Caput XIV: ON FALLACIES

Liber IV: THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE DISPUTED TO ILLUSTRATE CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES OF THIS TEXT

Quaestio I: ON THE TERM

Articulus I: WHETHER DIALECTIC BEGINS WITH THE TERM IN THE RIGHT ORDER OF DOCTRINE

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE ENUNCIATIVE TERM IS GOOD, AND IN WHAT ITS FORMALITY CONSISTS

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE SYLLOGISTIC TERM IS GOOD, AND WHAT ITS FORMALITY IS

Articulus IV: WHAT THE DEFINED THING OF A TERM IS, AND FOR WHAT IT SUPPOSITS

Articulus V: WHETHER WORDS SIGNIFY CONCEPTS OR THINGS FIRST

Articulus VI: WHETHER THE TERM HAS ANY ESSENTIAL DIVISION

Quaestio II: ON THE NAME

Articulus I: HOW THAT CLAUSE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: „NO PART OF WHICH SIGNIFIES SEPARATELY”

Articulus II: WHETHER THE INFINITE NAME IS RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF A NAME

Articulus III: WHETHER THE OBLIQUE CASES ARE RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF A NAME

Quaestio III: ON THE VERB

Articulus I: WHAT IT IS TO SIGNIFY WITH TIME AND TO BE FREED FROM TIME

Articulus II: WHETHER A VERB CAN BE MADE INFINITE WITHIN A PROPOSITION

Quaestio IV: ON EXPRESSION AND THE MODE OF KNOWING

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF EXPRESSION IS GOOD AND WHAT ITS DEFINED THING IS

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DEFINITION IS RIGHTLY GIVEN

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DIVISION AND WHAT PERTAINS TO DIVISION ARE RIGHTLY GIVEN

Quaestio V: ON ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: WHEREIN THE NOTION OF ENUNCIATION CONSISTS, AS IT ABSTRACTS FROM CATEGORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL ENUNCIATION

Articulus II: WHETHER A CATEGORICAL ENUNCIATION IS SOME SIMPLE QUALITY AND CONCEPT IN THE MIND, OR FORMALLY COMPOSITE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DIVISION INTO HYPOTHETICAL AND CATEGORICAL IS ESSENTIAL AND UNIVOCAL

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE DIVISIONS INTO AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE, UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR, ARE GOOD AND ESSENTIAL

Quaestio VI: ON SUPPOSITION AND THE OTHER PROPERTIES OF THE PARTS OF AN ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF SUPPOSITION IS GOOD

Articulus II: WHETHER IMPROPER SUPPOSITION IS FOUND IN THE ULTIMATE CONCEPT OF THE MIND

Articulus III: WHAT IS TO BE NOTED CONCERNING THE OTHER SPECIES OF SUPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PROPERTIES

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE RULES OF APPELLATION GIVEN IN THE TEXT ARE TRUE

Quaestio VII: ON THE OPPOSITION AND CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS

Articulus I: WHETHER CONTRADICTORY OPPOSITION IS THE GREATEST OF ALL OPPOSITIONS

Articulus II: WHETHER THERE CAN BE CONTRADICTORIES THAT ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY TRUE OR FALSE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE RULES OF CONVERSION ARE RIGHTLY ASSIGNED

Quaestio VIII: ON CONSEQUENCE AND THE SYLLOGISM

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOOD AND BAD CONSEQUENCE IS RIGHTLY ASSIGNED

Articulus II: WHETHER INDUCTION IS A FORMAL CONSEQUENCE

Articulus III: WHETHER THE CONCLUSION BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SYLLOGISM, OR ONLY THE PREMISES

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE SYLLOGISM IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO PERFECT AND IMPERFECT

Appendix I: TO THE SECOND PART OF THE SUMMULAE

Quaestio I: ON THE TERM

Articulus I: WHETHER DIALECTIC BEGINS WITH THE TERM IN THE RIGHT ORDER OF DOCTRINE

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF THE ENUNCIATIVE TERM IS GOOD AND IN WHAT ITS FORMALITY CONSISTS

Articulus III: WHETHER WORDS SIGNIFY CONCEPTS OR THINGS FIRST

Articulus IV: WHETHER THE TERM HAS ANY ESSENTIAL DIVISION

Quaestio II: ON THE NAME

Articulus I: HOW THAT CLAUSE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: „NO PART OF WHICH SIGNIFIES SEPARATELY”

Articulus II: WHETHER AN INFINITE NAME IS A NAME

Articulus III: WHETHER OBLIQUE CASES ARE RIGHTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE ACCOUNT OF THE NAME

Quaestio III: ON THE VERB

Articulus I: WHAT IT IS TO SIGNIFY WITH TIME AND TO BE ABSOLVED FROM TIME

Articulus II: WHETHER A VERB CAN BE INFINITIZED WITHIN A PROPOSITION

Quaestio IV: ON EXPRESSION AND THE METHOD OF KNOWING

Articulus I: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF EXPRESSION IS GOOD, AND WHAT IT DEFINES

Articulus II: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DEFINITION HAS BEEN RIGHTLY GIVEN

Articulus III: WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF DIVISION AND THE MATTERS PERTAINING TO DIVISION HAVE BEEN RIGHTLY GIVEN

Quaestio V: ON ENUNCIATION

Articulus I: IN WHAT THE ACCOUNT OF ENUNCIATION IN GENERAL CONSISTS

Appendix II: At the end of all the illustrations

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