Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

The first division of the term is into mental, vocal, and written. The mental term is a cognition or concept from which a simple proposition is made¹. The vocal term was defined above, chapter 1. The written term is writing that signifies by convention, from which a simple proposition is made.

The mental term, if we attend to its various essential species, is divided according to the objects from which the species of cognitions are taken. Thus we do not treat here the division of those objects, but treat only certain general conditions of cognitions or concepts, by which various modes of knowing are distinguished. Note that the simple cognition is divided here, that is, cognition belonging only to the first operation; for we are treating the division of the mental term, and the term pertains to the first operation. Hence no cognition pertaining to reasoning or composition is included in this division of cognitions, for none of these is a term or simple apprehension. Likewise, all practical cognition and cognition that expresses an ordering to the will are excluded, because the will is not moved by the simple apprehension of a term, but by composition, or judgment concerning the suitability of a thing, as we shall say in the book On the Soul².

Therefore, cognition, which is simple apprehension, or the mental term, is divided FIRST into intuitive and abstractive cognition. This division embraces not only intellectual cognition, but also that of the external senses, which are always intuitive cognitions, and that of the internal senses, which are sometimes intuitive and sometimes abstractive. Intuitive cognition is cognition of a present thing. I say “of a present thing,” not of a thing presented to the very power: for being present pertains to the thing in itself, as it is outside the power; being presented pertains to the thing as objected to that power, which is common to every cognition. Abstractive cognition is cognition of an absent thing, understood in the opposite way to intuitive cognition.

SECOND, cognition is divided on the part of the concept into ultimate and non-ultimate concept. The ultimate concept is the concept of the thing signified by the term, as the thing that is a man is signified by the vocal sound “man.”

THIRD, the concept is divided into direct and reflexive. A reflexive concept is that by which we know that we know, and thus has as its object some act, concept, or power within us. A direct concept is that by which we know some object outside our concept, and do not reflect upon our cognition, as when a stone or a man is known.

The second division of the term belongs more properly and principally to the vocal term, and thus the term is divided into univocal and equivocal. A univocal term is one that signifies its significates by the same concept, as the word “man” signifies all men insofar as they agree in the same concept of human nature. This is understood as the same concept simply, not merely one proportionally, as with analogues, which are called one at least by proportion, as we shall say in Logic, question 13. An equivocal term is one that signifies its significates not by the same concept but by several, that is, not insofar as they agree in some way, even proportionally, but insofar as they differ, as canis signifies an animal and a constellation³. And therefore there is no equivocation in the ultimate concept of the mind, as we shall say in the cited place of Logic, article 2, because a concept is a natural likeness, and if it is one, what it represents is one; but if it reaches several things, it does so insofar as they agree in some one aspect, which is proper to univocals. Therefore this division properly concerns the vocal term, in which equivocation is found, that is, unity of sound with a plurality of significations, because signification is by convention, not natural. See also what is said in Logic, question 23, article 4, concerning the second argument.

And note that Aristotle defines equivocals in the Antepredicaments as “those whose name is common, while the account signified is diverse”⁴, because that definition was given of the things signified by an equivocal or univocal name, which are called equivocated equivocal things, that is, things signified equivocally. But here we have defined terms that signify equivocally or univocally; these are called equivocal signifiers, that is, terms signifying equivocally or univocally.

The equivocal is divided into equivocal by chance and equivocal by intention. The first is equivocal simply, and the definition given applies to it. The second is an analogue, and is that which signifies its significates as one according to a certain proportion, and not simply, as “healthy” said of an animal and of an herb. We treat these in Logic, questions 13 and 14.

Here note two rules for analogues. First: An analogue taken in itself stands for its more familiar signification; thus, when one says “man” and adds nothing that restricts or determines it, it stands for a living man, not a painted one. Second: In analogues or equivocal terms, subjects are such as their predicates or restrictions allow; that is, when a name signifies several things, it is determined to stand for one of them according to the requirement of the predicate or restriction. Thus, if you say, “A dog barks,” it stands for a dog that is an animal. We explain these rules in Logic, question 13, article 2.

The third division of the term is into categorematic and syncategorematic, as if one were to say in Latin, signifying or predicative, and consignifying. A categorematic term is one that signifies something in itself. Here “in itself” must be joined with “something”: that is, it signifies something represented as something in itself, not as an adverb or modification, but as a certain thing, as when I say “man.” A syncategorematic term is one that signifies in some manner, such as the adverb quickly or easily, or the sign “every” or “some,” and so on. It is said to signify in some manner, not because it does not truly and properly signify, but because its signified content is not represented as a thing in itself, but as a mode of a thing, that is, by exercising a modification of another thing.