Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

Authors hold various opinions about the definition of the term¹, according as they consider in it different relations or functions: whether as a part that in some way composes an expression, or as a principal part and only in the manner of an extreme, or as that which terminates the resolution of a proposition and syllogism, or in the manner of predicate and subject.

These considerations are indeed true, and all have a place in the term; but we must see which one explains the nature of the term more fittingly, as it concerns our present purpose. For since our mind proceeds by resolution in the sciences, and especially in Logic—which Aristotle² calls Analytics because it is resolutive—it must be possible to identify the ultimate element or term of this resolution, beyond which no resolution is carried out by the art, just as in natural generation prime matter is the ultimate principle of resolution. Otherwise, either one would proceed to infinity or there would be no perfect resolution. And because the terminus of resolution and the principle of composition are one and the same, that which is the ultimate element into which logical composites are resolved is also called the first element from which the others are composed.

With this in view, we say that here we treat the term under the notion of the ultimate element at which every resolution of logical composition terminates, including that of the proposition and expression itself, since it is fitting to begin from this as from what is first and simplest. Although Aristotle in the Prior Analytics I³ defined a term as that “into which a proposition is resolved, as into predicate and subject,” nevertheless there he did not define the term in its full breadth, but in a restricted sense, insofar as it serves the construction and composition of a syllogism. In that composition, a syllogism consists of three terms insofar as they are extremes in propositions and take on the role of a syllogistic part, that is, an inferential one. Elsewhere, Aristotle considered the term under a more universal notion, as common also to noun and verb—not under the word “term,” but under the word “expression”—insofar as it has the order of that which composes an enunciation, not the role of that which infers in a syllogism. Hence St. Thomas, in his commentary on On Interpretation I, lecture 8, § Excludes⁴, explaining Aristotle’s statement, “Let the noun and verb, then, be an expression alone”⁵, says: “And it seems from his manner of speaking that he himself imposed this name to signify the parts of an enunciation.” Therefore, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, there is some common notion belonging to the parts of an enunciation, which the Philosopher calls an expression and we call a term, because every resolution terminates in it—not only that of the syllogism, but also that of the enunciation, which is composed of simple elements and consequently resolved into them. In the same place, lecture 5, § Shows⁶, St. Thomas says that sometimes “noun” is taken insofar as it commonly signifies any expression, including the verb itself. And at the beginning of Opusculum 48⁷, he calls terms “parts of an enunciation.” It is from this most common sense of “term,” then, as the ultimate element of all logical resolution, that we say one must begin and give its definition.

Thus the term, or expression, is defined not merely as an extreme of a proposition, or as predicate and subject, but by something more common, namely, “that from which a simple proposition is made”; or rather, imitating Aristotle, who defines noun, verb, and expression by means of utterances because these are signs better known to us, it is defined as “a vocal sound significant by convention, from which a simple proposition or expression is made”⁸. But insofar as it includes the mental and written term, it will be defined as “a sign from which a simple proposition is made.”

Sign or significant vocal sound is said to exclude non-significant vocal sounds, such as blitiri, just as Aristotle excluded them from noun and verb. And since every term is a noun, verb, or adverb, if none of these is a non-signifying vocal sound, it is not a term⁹, as I shall show more fully in the question on this matter. By convention is said to exclude vocal sounds that signify naturally, such as a groan. From which a simple proposition is made is said to exclude the proposition or expression itself, which is not the first composing element but something composite as a whole; and if it ever composes something, it composes not a simple proposition but a hypothetical one.

Whether, however, the term outside a proposition is actually a part with respect to the essence and role of a part, although not with respect to the exercise of composing, we shall say below, question 1, On the Term, article 3.