Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

ON THE SIMPLICITY OR COMPOSITION OF A CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION

Up to this point we have put off this difficulty, lest we seem to force the students to address it. Although resolving it contributes to understanding the proposition, it nonetheless belongs to and depends on Book III of On the Soul; hence we shall touch on it briefly here. The difficulty consists in determining whether a categorical proposition in the mind is one simple concept or an aggregation of several.

We are not speaking of the act of judgment, or assent falling upon the enunciation itself. For this is a simple quality and a single act, by which the intellect does not compose, but judges about things already composed, saying: “So it is.” Thus an act of judgment is posited in God and the angels, but composition is not. We are speaking, then, of the enunciation that precedes judgment, that is, of an enunciation apprehended but not judged. We ask whether there are many acts in the mind that form the enunciation, or whether the enunciation is formed by a single act alone, resulting from the comparison and composition of several simple concepts.

The authors are divided on this point. Some think that, just as in the third operation of reasoning there is no quality or concept resulting from the propositions that constitute a syllogism, but the propositions themselves ordered among one another, so an enunciation is not a simple quality but several ordered concepts. Others say that an enunciation is formed by some concept that orders simple concepts, or by one act arising from them, which not only directs and orders the simple concepts but represents the whole proposition. Others posit four acts: three representing the subject, predicate, and copula in themselves, and a fourth directing and ordering those concepts; the proposition formally consists in this fourth act, while the others are presupposed.

For the resolution, WE MUST PRESUPPOSE, from St. Thomas, that the intellect’s second operation, in which an enunciation is formed, produces a concept or word distinct from the simple concepts produced by the first operation. Hence the concept produced by the second operation has not only a distinct ordering, but also a distinct representation from that of the concepts of the first operation. This is clear from On the Soul III, lect. 11,¹ Metaphysics VI, last lecture,² Opusculum 13,³ and Quodlibet 5, art. 9,⁴ where he says: “According to the Philosopher in On the Soul III, there are two operations of the intellect. One is called the understanding of indivisibles (that is, simple apprehension), by which the intellect forms a definition or concept of something uncomplex. The other operation is that of the intellect composing and dividing (that is, composition or division), according to which it forms a word. Each of these things constituted by the intellect is called a word of the heart; the first is signified by an uncomplex term, the second by speech.” The reason is that a distinct representation and ordering is found in the second operation, which is not found in the first; therefore, there is also a distinct concept. The antecedent is proved because in the second operation one thing is attributed and united to another, which does not happen in the first, where simple concepts are apprehended. Therefore, this union and attribution can be represented; consequently, it is represented in a distinct way and by a distinct concept from that by which things are represented in themselves and without attribution in the first operation.

WITH THIS PRESUPPOSED, I ANSWER: It is more probable that, according to St. Thomas, the concept of the second operation by which an enunciation is formed is one act and one concept, not only by unity of order but by unity of quality; the opposite view, however, is also probable.

Cajetan holds the first view in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 7, § In respond. ad 2; the Ferrarien in Summa contra Gentiles, ch. 55, § Ad horum evidentiam; Master Soto in the chapter on the proposition; and other Thomists. St. Thomas’s cited passage in Summa contra Gentiles supports it when he says that “when several things are taken as united in some way, they are understood together. For a continuous whole is understood all at once, not one part after another; similarly, a proposition is understood all at once, the predicate not first and the subject afterwards, because all the parts are comprehended under one species of the whole.” Note the causal force. If, then, both predicate and subject are known through one species that comprehends them, it is not incompatible for a proposition to be formed by one concept that is one in entity. If a proposition can be represented by one impressed species representing the whole, why could it not be represented by one expressed species? Speaking per se, one species calls for one concept, unless we use it inadequately. See the holy Doctor, Metaphysics VI, last lecture,⁵ and Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 4, and q. 58, a. 2.

First, you may say that St. Thomas is speaking of a judging proposition, or of assent itself, not of an enunciation.

Second, you may say that he speaks of one concept or species by unity of order, not unity of entity, since in Summa theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 7, ad 2, he says “that we understand predicate and subject together insofar as they are united in the order of one affirmation; and in the same way free choice can be moved at once toward two things, insofar as one is ordered to the other.” But it is clear that the will is moved by two acts and only by unity of order, and is not simply one act; therefore, the same holds for the intellect when it understands predicate and subject.

BUT AGAINST the first solution is this: judgment or assent is not composed of predicate and subject, but falls upon an enunciation already composed, saying, “So it is,” as we proved above. St. Thomas, however, is speaking of that whole which is composed of predicate and subject, and says that it becomes one, as is clear in the cited passage of Metaphysics VI, where he says that “when the intellect forms a composition or division from simple concepts, it understands both as one, insofar as something one is made from them.”⁶ Therefore, St. Thomas is speaking of the enunciation itself, as it is formed and composed of predicate and subject, not of judgment, which does not form the proposition but falls upon and judges the proposition once formed. Finally, when he says in Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 9, ad 3, that the species of a mountain and of gold form in us the species of a golden mountain, and that the concept of a species is formed from the concept of genus and difference, he is clearly speaking of a concept one in entity. For such a concept represents a species consisting of genus and difference, such as human being. St. Thomas speaks in the same way about the formation of a proposition, which, he says, can be understood as the whole is understood all at once, like a house, and not as its individual parts are understood separately, as is clear in the cited passages, especially Metaphysics VI. Therefore, he is speaking of a species or concept one in entity, as the concept of a house is one whole.

Against the second solution, Cajetan aptly observes in his commentary on that passage of Summa theologiae I-II that free choice is not moved by one act toward God and sin, even if it is moved at once, because one is the reason for the other. The example of the intellect, however, says more than is needed, because it also asserts unity of act. So Cajetan. Hence St. Thomas gave the example of the intellect, in which things are represented by one act or concept, to show that it is not incompatible for the will to be moved at an instant by two ordered acts, just as from premises it is moved to a conclusion at the same instant, but not by the same act. The cited passages show that St. Thomas posited unity of species or concept, not merely simultaneity in time or order.

The foundation is taken from what has been said: the intellect can comprehend several things under the character of one through a single concept or species having unity of representation. Therefore, since the second operation forms a new concept that regards several things under the unity of one composite having the character of a whole, it has adequate grounds for representing them by one concept or species. Certainly, when one thing is known with a connotation and relation to another, both can be understood under that relation by one concept one in entity, although it includes several things objectively as united. This is clear when an accident is represented concretely, as “white,” connoting a body, or a whole connoting its parts; and, on the opposing view, when it represents one term—for example, the subject—not absolutely but as fitting the predicate, and the copula as joining the two. For unless it represents them in this way, the intellect will never unite them, even by unity of order. If, then, several united things can be represented by one concept one in entity, one directly and the other by connotation as the term of a relation, why could one concept formed compositionally from several presupposed concepts not represent the whole composite, united and made one? Why should we not attribute to the concept of the second operation, which is more perfect, what belongs to a concept of the first operation representing several things as one, and even to external vision seeing several things in one act of sight? Finally, one science, which is one habit in entity according to St. Thomas’s view (Summa theologiae I-II, q. 54, a. 4, c. and ad 3), suffices to attain discursively all the conclusions of that science, as we shall show in Logic, q. 28, a. 2. Therefore, the same concept suffices representationally to attain all the terms enclosed under one composition in the manner of one.

THE OBJECTIONS FOR THE OPPOSITE VIEW ARE ANSWERED.

Nevertheless, the opposite view is also probable.

AND ITS FIRST FOUNDATION is taken from this: our intellect is formally compositive, not merely objectively; that is, it not only apprehends a complex object (for an angel does this too), but apprehends through several acts and concepts what an angel apprehends by one act. Therefore, it should not be said that it forms a proposition by one concept, for then it would not formally compose or formally compare one thing with another, but would do so only virtually. St. Thomas, however, explains this composition of the intellect by way of comparison, not by way of physical unity, as is clear in Metaphysics VI,⁷ where he says “that the composition or division by which the intellect joins or divides its concepts is only in the intellect, not in things; for it consists in a certain comparison of concepts, whether the two things are the same in reality or different.” He could not have expressed more clearly that composition and division consist not in one simple quality, but in many concepts ordered and united. The same is drawn from Summa theologiae I, q. 58, a. 4, ad 1, where he says that there is no composition and division in angels, although there is a multitude of concepts, because not every multitude causes composition, but only a multitude in which one thing is attributed to another, which is not found in an angel. Therefore, composition cannot be achieved by the simple formation and production of one concept, but by the attribution and composition of one thing to another. He says the same in On Interpretation I, lect. 3,⁸ that truth and falsity are found in composition only insofar as the intellect compares one concept with another. And in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 12, he says that our intellect represents God through diverse concepts, representing that diversity through the plurality of subject and predicate. Therefore, subject and predicate are not represented by the one concept by which the proposition is formed. Finally, speech is that which is subordinated to several concepts, and is distinguished in this way from a term; therefore, it is not subordinated to only one concept.

SECOND, although a syllogism is composed of several propositions in the manner of one, it is not formed by one quality, but by several ordered among themselves. The same is true of a hypothetical proposition, which is one only by unity of order. Why, then, would a categorical proposition not be sufficiently formed by coordinating and comparing the concepts of which it consists? Finally, a spoken proposition is composed of several words; therefore, so is a mental proposition. The consequence is proved because St. Thomas proves that there is composition in the mind from the fact that there is composition in spoken words.⁹

FINALLY, it follows that the character of the verb or copula, and the character of subject and predicate, would not formally be in the intellect, because one concept one in entity cannot be what something is said of, what is said, and the copula by which it is said. It also follows that the same concept could be intuitive and abstractive knowledge, clear and obscure, as when I say, “A stone is not an angel, or is not God”: I see the stone clearly, but do not see the angel or God; I apprehend them obscurely. Finally, in negative propositions, as when I say, “A human being is not wood,” one species cannot represent human being and wood to me, since one is denied and separated from the other. Therefore, several species must concur, and consequently several concepts.

These are the points that make this view probable, but they do not prove it conclusively. Hence, maintaining the first view, we answer them as follows:

TO THE FIRST FOUNDATION: We can say in one word that a proposition is not formed by the unity of several entities and the composition of an ordering of concepts, but by forming one thing from several presupposed things, from whose comparison a third species or concept is formed and results; just as the species of a golden mountain is formed from the species of mountain and gold. This species, however, is one not by unity of order but by unity of entity. The way of forming one species from several things compared and collated with each other is very different from the simple concept and species of an angel. For an angel not only has a concept simple in entity, but that concept is not formed from several things compared and collated with one another. Rather, by its natural efficacy and indivisible light, it represents one thing and thereby represents all that belongs to it, since it proceeds by comprehension, not by collation. Thus we do not deny that, in all the passages of St. Thomas, comparison and collation of concepts are required to form a proposition. We say, however, that from such formation and collation one word or concept is produced, which is the term proceeding through the second operation, in the way St. Thomas himself says in Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 9, ad 2, that the species of a golden mountain is formed from the species of mountain and gold. And in q. 13, a. 12, it is expressly said “that our intellect represents the plurality of divine notions through the plurality of predicate and subject, but represents unity or identity through composition.” Clearly, then, besides the plurality of the concepts of subject and predicate, he posits unity or identity, in which composition itself consists. Since this identity and unity of composition is formed from the comparison of several things, as though worked out and formed by the intellect’s art, presupposing several things, and does not represent them all by the first and natural efficacy, it is very different from the concept of an angel. The angel’s concept is simpler and more effective in representing a proposition because it is not formed and produced from several things presupposed and previously understood.

TO THE SECOND, we answer that the case of a hypothetical proposition or syllogism differs from that of a categorical proposition. A categorical proposition is what the second operation of our intellect forms primarily and in the first instance. Therefore, since that operation produces a word and concept distinct from the first operation, it must form such a composition by producing one quality, and not merely join things by unity of order without producing a new concept. Afterwards, however, to join several categorical propositions already formed, or to move from one to another by reasoning, it suffices to order the propositions among themselves; there is no need to produce another quality in the manner of one representation, ordering, or transition from one thing to another, which requires plurality. We can further investigate the reason for this from St. Thomas’s teaching in Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3, where he teaches that the intellect’s composition is a sign of the identity of the things composed. For the intellect does not attribute one thing to another except by representing the identity by which predicate and subject are united in one thing, signified in the manner of something that has. “And according to this notion of identity,” says St. Thomas, “our intellect composes one thing with another by predicating.” St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 12, that this identity occurs in both accidental and substantial predicables, and that this unity or identity is represented through composition. From this we infer that, in the composition made through the identity of the extremes or the removal of identity, there is an adequate basis for representing all those parts as identified by one representation, just as the parts are represented by the species of the whole. This is what happens in a categorical proposition. In a hypothetical proposition, and still less in a syllogism, there is no predication of one thing of another and no identity of extremes; rather, several propositions are ordered among themselves. Therefore, there is no basis for attributing to them anything but unity of order among the propositions.

As to what is added about the composition of spoken words, we answer that words represent only through imposition. No single word, however, is imposed to represent an entire proposition; therefore, we must signify the mind’s composition through the continuation and ordering of words. In the mind, the intellect understands predicate and subject together, as we said above from St. Thomas, but not through continuation. Thus when St. Thomas proves composition in the mind from the composition of words, he is speaking of composition on the side of the thing signified, not on the side of the representing concept. For although in both speech and mind one thing is attributed to another, in the mind the species of the whole is formed, in which those parts are attributed; in speech it is not formed in this way.

TO THE FINAL OBJECTION we answer that the first difficulty does not follow in any way. Predicate, subject, and copula are formally given both antecedently to the formation of the proposition, when the proposition is formed from the coordination and comparison of those concepts of noun and verb, and in the concept or species itself once formed, in which predicate, subject, and copula are represented through the character of the identity and unity of the whole. This is just as mountain and gold are represented in the species of a golden mountain, and windows and columns in the species of the whole house, and so on.

To the second point I say that it is not incompatible for the same quality formed from several things to represent something intuitively and abstractively with respect to different things, namely, predicate and subject, but not with respect to the same thing. Second, intuitive and abstractive knowledge are found only in simple cognitions, not in composition or reasoning itself. Thus diverse cognitions, intuitive and abstractive, clear and obscure, are presupposed. In composition itself, however, only the attribution of one thing to another and their identity or difference is considered; under this aspect, they are brought together in one concept of identity or difference, although apprehensive and simple knowledge is never both clear and obscure with respect to the same thing. The fact that diverse impressed species can concur presuppositionally in one proposition does not prove that one third species or concept representing them in the manner of one whole cannot be formed, just as from the diverse species of gold and mountain one species and concept of a golden mountain is formed. For just as the intellect can divide things that are united, it also commonly unites diverse things in one concept.