Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

St. Thomas divided complete speech in On Interpretation I, lect. 7,¹ into prayer, address, wish, question, and statement, because all of these produce a complete sense. Here, however, we deal only with statements, which are more perfect than the others and especially useful for explaining truth, the logician’s aim. We take “statement” and “proposition” to mean the same thing, as is customary among the learned, although they can connote different aspects: “proposition” adds the sense of being proposed or assumed for drawing an inference.

Concerning the statement, then, WE INQUIRE what common feature categorical and hypothetical statements share.

Some think that a proposition is the act of judgment itself (for they do not distinguish it from the act of judging), because this act is properly capable of truth and falsity. They think that being significant of truth or falsity belongs only to a written or spoken proposition. Others, distinguishing judgment from the statement on which judgment is made and directed, think that the essence of a proposition in general consists in stating absolutely the connections or incompatibilities of things; being significant of truth or falsity follows as a property. Others say that this essence consists in stating strictly one thing of another; because this is found only in a categorical statement and not in a hypothetical one, they exclude the hypothetical from the notion of a statement. They say that to state is “to signify that something is or is not.” It follows that a statement is true or false; for a proposition has this not by the force of its signification, but because the thing signified or stated is or is not as the proposition says. Still others make the essence of a proposition consist in its being affirmative or negative speech.

I SAY FIRST: A judgmental proposition must be distinguished from a statement, and judgment can in itself come later and follow upon a statement.

This assertion is taken from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae II–II, q. 173, a. 2, and De Veritate, q. 12, a. 7,² who says that at times someone is given light for judging, and at other times for receiving and ordering or composing pre-existing species. But the composition or ordering of pre-existing species is a statement-making composition, since it is the composition of some signified complex truth, on which judgment can be made. Therefore, a statement is distinct from judgment, because light can sometimes be given for judging and sometimes for composing.

The conclusion is proved by REASON: Judgment is the intellect’s assent concerning something capable of such judgment. But only a complex truth signified by a statement is capable of such judgment. Therefore, the act of judgment is distinct from the formation of a statement.

The major premise is clear, because judgment is that by which the intellect is determined through assent, affirming that something is or is not so; this is what it is to judge. But it cannot assent or pronounce that something is or is not so except concerning something complex, joined to a verb, as experience shows; and this is a statement. Therefore, a statement is formed first and then judged. This is also clear because we often apprehend and form statements about doubtful things without any judgment, as when we say, “The stars are even-numbered,” or “A treasure is in this place,” although we do not know how to judge or determine these things assertively. Therefore, a statement is one thing and judgment another.

It is true, nevertheless, that because a statement is constituted by a verb, which has the power to join its extremes and express them, a statement and an assertive judgment are formed by a single act. Thus, sometimes statement and judgment are formed by one act, as when I say, “A human being is an animal,” expressing through the word “is” both the joining and the assertion, or assent. At other times they are separate, because “is” is taken precisely in the sense of joining, not asserting.

I SAY SECOND: The notion or essence of a statement in general consists in its being complete speech (this distinguishes it from incomplete speech), expressing a complex object on which judgment can be made (this distinguishes it from other complete speeches that cannot express an object of judgment, such as forms of address, questions, and the like); from this it follows that it signifies truth or falsity.

So says St. Thomas in On Interpretation I, lect. 7,³ defining a statement as “speech in which there is truth or falsity.” Truth is said to be in the mind as in a subject, where “in the mind” means the same as “in the mind’s judgment.” For truth is not immediately in the faculty itself, but in an act of the faculty, and not in an act other than judgment.

THE REASON FOR THIS ASSERTION IS that this account explains how a statement differs from the other kinds of speech, what the categorical and hypothetical have in common, and how they signify truth or falsity. Therefore, we should stand by this definition, since it explains everything a statement has: namely, that it signifies a complex object, either through a verbal copula that joins predicate and subject in categorical statements, or through a hypothetical copula that joins categorical statements. Judgment is made of either kind of complex, and truth and falsity are found in judgment. For speech on which no judgment, assent, or dissent can be made is not a statement. This is what the authors meant who said that a statement is speech that states the connections or incompatibilities of things, or affirmation and negation. If they meant anything else, we do not agree.

I SAY THIRD: Truth and falsity, insofar as they are the actual exercise of conformity or nonconformity, are accidents of a proposition and of judgment.

This is clear from Aristotle, who says in the chapter on substance⁴ that “the same speech, while remaining the same, can change from true to false.” For example, when I say, “Peter is sitting,” the statement is true while he is sitting and false while he is not sitting; yet the proposition remains the same, because it says and signifies the same thing. Therefore, the substance of a statement does not change when its truth or falsity changes. Truth and falsity are thus only accidents that follow upon signifying a complex object on which judgment can be made, and in which the essence of a statement consists. We discuss these matters more fully in vol. 2, part I, disp. 2,⁵

I SAY FINALLY: One proposition is not formally truer than another; fundamentally, however, it can be more certain and firm.

THE REASON IS: Truth consists in something indivisible and does not admit of more and less; therefore, one proposition is not truer than another.

The antecedent is proved: Truth consists in adequation or conformity to the being or nonbeing of a thing. But there is no middle or range between being and nonbeing, since they are contradictorily opposed. Therefore, a proposition’s conformity to being, and its correspondence to it insofar as it departs from nonbeing and does not conform to it—or conversely—admits of no more and less. The same holds of any relation that consists in something indivisible, such as equality: however one departs from it, one falls away from equality or conformity.

Firmness and certainty, however, which are the foundation of truth, are taken from the fact that a thing has firmer causes of its being or of its connection. Here there is more and less, as is clear. Thus God is the supreme truth because he is supremely firm; and created truths are firmer the more necessary they are.

OBJECTION: The indivisible adequation in created truths is caused by and participated from God. Therefore, such truth exists more in God than in creatures, even with respect to what is indivisible; thus one truth is formally greater than another in him.

We grant the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. If “greater” means greater on the side of the range of the object to which truth is directed, it is denied; if it means greater on the side of certainty and firmness, or on the side of being, dependence, and the participation of one thing in another, let it pass. Thus, participated truth is always less than unparticipated truth. But because both concern being or nonbeing, there is no range or more and less in this respect; this belongs to the object and to truth’s correspondence to it. That truth, which thus reaches being and departs from nonbeing, is more perfect, firm, and unchangeable does admit of more and less. Yet there is never more or less in the being or nonbeing that truth concerns, whether the truth is created or divine. Equality is likewise participated from the equality in God; created equality is less in its perfection and being, or in its character as a being, but not in the indivisibility of truth—that is, in not departing from the point of equality and conformity to its term. For if it departed from that point in any way, it would be inequality.

THE OBJECTIONS ARE ANSWERED.

First, an objection is raised against the first conclusion: If a statement existed before judgment, it would be true or false in its signification. But before judgment there is no truth or falsity. Therefore, statement and judgment are not distinct.

The major premise is proved: The essence of a proposition consists in signifying truth or falsity; therefore, if a statement exists before judgment, it will signify truth or falsity.

The minor premise is clear from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 16, a. 2, and De Veritate, q. 1, a. 3,⁶ and Metaphysics VI, at the end,⁷ who expressly asserts this. It also follows from reason: by merely apprehending a statement, no one is said to be mistaken or to know. Otherwise, anyone who apprehended something false without assenting to it would have a false intellect, which is absurd; for God apprehends many false things without being deceived.

WE ANSWER: We grant the major premise and distinguish the minor: Before judgment, there is no truth or falsity as asserted and judged—this is granted; as signified and apprehended—this is denied. St. Thomas does not deny that truth exists in a statement by way of representation, but only by way of assent. Indeed, in On Interpretation I, lect. 7, he says:⁸ “Truth is properly found in the second operation and in its sign, which is a statement.” Merely from truth apprehended or represented, the intellect is not called mistaken or knowing, deceived or false; this follows only from truth judged, when it assents or agrees with deception or truth.

Second, an objection is raised: Judgment, which for us is an act distinct from statement, has the function of expressing truth and falsity, as when we assent to a proposition by saying, “That is so.” Therefore, the definition of statement applies to things other than what is defined, or judgment and statement are the same. Further, the words “truth or falsity” express truth or falsity, yet they are not a statement. Therefore, the definition does not fit. Further, a definition ought to explain the nature of a thing determinately. But “truth or falsity” is something under a disjunction and is indeterminate. Therefore, statement is not correctly defined in this way, especially since some propositions are determinately true, such as those about natural things.

WE ANSWER: We distinguish the antecedent. If it means that judgment expresses truth or falsity as a complex or as a copula and union of extremes on which judgment can be made, it is denied; if it means that judgment expresses truth or falsity assertively, by way of assent, it is granted. The first is the proper essence of a proposition; the second can also belong to judgment. Although the intellect sometimes performs both together, signifying the connection of the extremes and at the same time asserting being or nonbeing—for example, when I say, “A human being is an animal,” the word “is” signifies both the joining of the extremes and the intellect’s assertive assent—sometimes the signification of assertion is separated from the signification of joining the extremes, as when judgment is suspended after a statement has been uttered. What we say about joining the extremes in a categorical statement applies in the same way to the joining of categorical statements in a hypothetical one.

To the second proof we answer that the words “truth or falsity” signify nominally, not as a complex statement on which judgment can be made.

To the third proof we answer that, on the side of the complex object, a statement always has a determinate signification, but the truth that follows from it can vary while the speech itself remains unchanged. This truth or falsity does not belong to the essence of a statement.

As for the added point about propositions that are determinately true or false, their determinate essence is not taken from determinate truth, but from the determinate object signified, whose connection is of such a nature that truth follows from it immutably. Therefore, “to signify truth or falsity” is not to be understood precisely—that is, as requiring that the disjunction of truth and falsity be found precisely in every proposition—but accommodatively: by the force of the signified object, it can result at one time in truth and at another in falsity. Thus it is not inappropriate to define something by opposites, not as though both belonged to it at once, but because it is capable of them successively, as substance is said to be capable of contraries.

Third, an objection is raised: Signifying truth or falsity, even on the side of representing a complex object, cannot be the essence of a statement. Therefore, it is defined inappropriately.

The antecedent is proved: A representation of a complex object in the mind can never be false, but is always true, like simple apprehension, because it is a natural representation. St. Thomas therefore said in Summa theologiae I, q. 17, a. 3, that in simple apprehension there can be truth but not falsity, because it is a natural representation and likeness, which can never be made unlike its object but always remains like it. Therefore, a statement cannot be unlike what it states, because it signifies it naturally.

WE ANSWER: The antecedent is denied. To the proof we say that there is a wide difference between a natural likeness of a simple object and a likeness of a complex object by way of composition. Since a statement’s likeness results and is formed through the composition of several things, and not through the object’s natural impression, deception can result in the composition itself, insofar as one thing is attributed to another to which it does not belong. For this reason St. Thomas also admits in the same definition that deception and falsity can occur, in Summa theologiae I, q. 17, a. 3. A likeness of a simple object, however, since it is directed to the object by its own natural impression and does not arise from any composition, cannot be false; it is capable only of the natural adequation of representation. Moreover, a statement can represent the very assent of judgment, not only the joining of the extremes; for this reason it is capable of falsity if the assent itself is false.

ARTICLE TWO, which appears above on p. 150 b, is missing from the Lyon edition; ARTICLE THREE, which appears above on p. 157, is numbered second in the Lyon edition.