Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

In the definition of the verb, all that remains is to explain what it means to signify with time and to abstract from time, since all the other expressions in the definition of the noun have been explained.

I SAY, FIRST: A verb, not only an adjectival verb but also a substantive verb, has a concept distinct from its extremes.

Everyone grants this concerning an adjectival verb. Some recent writers deny it concerning the substantive verb, saying that the verb “is” merely explains the agreement of its extremes and, in enunciations, signifies a connection that has no special concept distinct from the extremes. St. Thomas, however, holds the contrary view in On Interpretation I, lecture 5,¹ saying that Aristotle said the verb “is” consignifies composition because it does not signify composition principally but consequently. For it signifies what first falls under the intellect in the mode of actuality absolutely. The term “is,” taken simply, signifies actually to be. Since the actuality principally signified by the verb “is” is the actuality of every form, whether substantial or accidental, when we wish to signify any form as inhering in a subject, we signify this by the verb “is”; consequently, it signifies composition. Likewise, in Sentences I, dist. 8, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2,² he says “that ‘was’ and ‘will be’ signify essence in the mode of act and consignify time.”

Therefore the holy Doctor attributes a proper concept to the verb “is”; the union, however, is signified consequently and belongs to the verb’s mode of signifying, not to the thing signified. For it cannot be that the participle of “is,” namely, “being,” has a proper concept by which it signifies entity as such, while the verb “is,” from which it is derived, has no proper concept.

I SAY, SECOND, following St. Thomas in On Interpretation I, lecture 4,³ that to signify time as a thing signified is one thing; this is done by the nouns “time,” “day,” “year,” and “month.” To signify the relation of one time to another is another; this is done by adverbs such as “yesterday,” “today,” “tomorrow,” and the like. Another is to connote time, that is, to signify something with the determination of a time in which it occurs. Thus “lunch” signifies a midday meal, connoting the time at which it occurs; “dinner” signifies an evening meal, and so on.

Finally, to signify with time is proper to a verb: it means signifying an action or passion as in the process of coming to be, or in the mode of flux and motion. Motion and action are measured by time, as is said in the Physics; motion is that by reason of which other things are measured by time. For time is, as is said there, the number of motion, and so on. (Substance, in itself and according to the mode of substance, is not measured by time, but only insofar as it is subject to motion and change.)⁴ Hence a verb is said to signify with time because it signifies in the mode of motion and flux—that is, what amounts to the same thing, an action or passion in the process of coming to be. A noun, however, signifies without time because it signifies in the mode of substance, as something standing per se or indicating something that stands per se. There is no noun that signifies motion, action, or passion as in the process of coming to be, as can be seen in “I run” and “running.” They signify the same running, but “I run” signifies it as coming to be and being exercised, while “running” signifies it as, so to speak, already done and in the mode of substance.

To abstract from or be absolved from time means nothing other than that the verb unites the extremes without restricting them to stand for the temporal difference it signifies. This is clear in propositions of eternal truth, such as “A human being is an animal” and the like. In these, although the verb signifies with time—and this is so intrinsic and essential to a verb that it can never be absolved or dispensed from it, since it belongs to the verb by the force of its proper signification, distinguishing it from a noun—it nevertheless does not unite the extremes dependently on time. Thus it was true before all time to say, “A human being is an animal.” These and similar propositions are therefore called eternal truths not because they have a positive eternity and duration, but because they do not depend on time or rest on it, and, if necessary, are not changed through it. “When the true perishes,” Augustine said, “truth does not perish.”⁵ For a verb to be absolved from time, then, is for it to signify a truth that does not depend on time. If the truth signified by the verb does not depend on time, neither will the union of the extremes depend on time. Therefore, insofar as the verb unites the extremes, it does not depend on time; this is to be absolved from time with respect to the exercise of uniting or joining extremes that have an intrinsic connection, not a contingent and temporal one that depends on time. The verb nevertheless always signifies with time, because it must signify in the mode of action, flux, or motion, even in propositions of eternal truth, since we understand things eternal and independent of time through the mode of time. Thus, even when the union or joining of the verb is absolved from time, or does not depend on time on the side of the extremes to which it applies, we still understand it according to the mode of time. It therefore signifies with time as regards its mode of signifying, even though it is absolved from time as regards the union and relation of the extremes.

THE OBJECTIONS ARE ANSWERED.

First it is objected: Many verbs do not signify in the mode of motion and flux; therefore they do not signify with time.

The antecedent is proved: The verb “is” does not signify an action but being, like “being” itself, its participle. “I have,” “I possess,” “I rest,” and similar verbs signify no motion or action, but rather the opposite of action and motion; therefore they do not signify with time.

WE REPLY from what has been said by distinguishing the antecedent. That the verbs “is,” “I have,” “I possess,” and so on do not signify action or motion on the side of the thing signified: granted. That they do not signify it according to their mode of signifying: denied. For a verb to be verified as signifying with time, it is not required that the thing signified by the verb be an action, motion, passion, or process of coming to be; rather, it must signify in the mode of motion or time—that is, in the mode of something passing and according to the relation of present, past, or future. Thus the verb “is,” and the others listed in the argument, signify the act of being and their significations as subject to the present and passing into the past; in this way they signify with time according to their mode of signifying.

Second, it is objected to prove that a verb is not absolved from time: A verb signifies the very copula and union of the extremes. But the verb’s signification never changes; therefore neither does the union made by the verb. Therefore either the union always depends on time and so is not absolved from it, or the verb’s signification changes.

It is confirmed, first: The verb always unites by the force of its signification through some temporal difference, whether present, past, and so on. Therefore it restricts the extremes to stand and be verified according to the temporal difference it signifies, since they are united according to its requirement. Therefore it is never absolved from time.

It is confirmed, second: If a verb is absolved from time, all affirmative propositions in which the verb is absolved from time will be false. The consequence is proved: They will concern a subject that does not supposit; but an affirmative proposition with a subject that does not supposit is false; therefore. The major is proved: Supposition must be verified in relation to the copula. For example, if you say, “A human being is an animal,” it must be verified of a human being by saying, “This is a human being,” while pointing to a human being. But if it abstracts from time, one cannot point out that this is a human being, as is evident before a human being was created; therefore the supposition is not verified.

WE REPLY to the argument by distinguishing the major. That a verb signifies the copula and union of the extremes immediately, principally, and directly: denied. That it does so consequently: granted. That the verb’s signification does not change: granted as the minor. Therefore the union does not change: the consequence is denied, because union or composition cannot be understood without the extremes that are united and composed; it depends on them as regards the exercise of uniting. Thus, according to the connection of the extremes, the resulting union depends on time or is independent of time, according as the extremes do or do not depend on time.

To the first confirmation we distinguish the antecedent. That a verb always unites through some temporal difference on the side of the mode of signifying: granted. That it does so on the side of the thing signified, the thing united, or the union resulting in the extremes: denied. Therefore it restricts the extremes, and so on: the consequence is denied, because the union is rather drawn to the mode of the extremes it unites. If these do not depend on time, the union cannot restrict them or unite them dependently on time, although it signifies and unites according to its mode of signifying in relation to some temporal difference, since it cannot fail to signify with time.

To the second confirmation we reply by denying the consequence and its proof up to the major, which we distinguish as follows. It must be verified by saying, “This is a human being,” when a human being is pointed out with respect to the intellect: granted. When a human being is pointed out to the senses, or as existing in time: denied. For this supposition is natural, and its verification does not occur by pointing to a subject existing in time, but to the essence of a human being, when I say, “A human being is a human being insofar as that can be found in all individuals.”

YOU WILL ASK: Can the verbs “was” and “will be,” which are oblique cases of the verb “is,” be absolved from time? It seems that they can, because the verb “is,” since it is not equivocal, signifies not two actualities but one; therefore, just as “is” is absolved, so are “was” and “will be.” That they cannot be absolved is proved as follows: the proposition “Adam was a human being” would then be an eternal truth, although it is false with respect to the time before Adam was created.

WE REPLY with two solutions. The first denies that those oblique cases can be absolved from time, because “was” and “will be” restrict their signification only to the future or the past, which cannot abstract from time as “is,” or the account of the present, can. What is present can be signified as not passing away but always present, as are things that do not depend on time, such as the duration of God and the angel. But the past, on the side of the thing signified, essentially signifies passing and temporal succession itself; hence the union resulting from it always depends on time. This does not happen because the verb “is” has different significations or is equivocal, but because “was” and “will be” depart from the signification of the present verb. Many other verbs, such as “to exist” and “to be moved,” also cannot be absolved from time.

The second solution affirms that “was” and “will be” can be absolved from time, as St. Thomas discusses in Sentences I, dist. 8, q. 2, a. 3.⁶ They are attributed to God, as when it is said that God was from the beginning: “The Word was with God”; “God will be forever,” and so on. In that case one should say that the proposition “Adam was a human being” was true before Adam was created, taking “was” not to mean that he had existed, but that those two extremes had been connected.