Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

We now undertake, in the following three articles, to explain the definition of the name given above, which is essential and explains the generic accounts of a logical sign and the differential accounts by which a name differs from discourse, a verb, and adverbs: “a vocal sound signifying by convention” (these phrases have already been explained in the definition of a term), “without time” (this will be explained in the definition of the verb), and “no part of which signifies separately, finite, and in the straight case.”

SOME among the more recent authors abandon Aristotle on this point and say that some names are truly names even if they have parts that signify, such as equiferus, respublica, proconsul, and other compounds, whose parts truly and properly signify separately. Therefore this part of the definition is false.

THE OPPOSITE, however, is expressly stated by Aristotle in On Interpretation I, the chapter on the Noun,¹ where he says: “In the name ‘equiferus,’ ‘ferus’ signifies nothing per se, just as in the expression ‘equus ferus.’” The Holy Doctor says the same there in lecture 4.² He gives the reason, which we reduce to this form: A name says of itself one and simple concept. For if it said several, it would not be one name but several names. Therefore, even if a name is composed of parts that otherwise signify, none of them must signify separately, insofar as it exists within the name.

The consequent is proved: When words that otherwise signify are taken up to compose one name, they do not enter into the composition of that word as components that contribute one signification from their own significations; rather, they receive another imposition, distinct from the one by which they were first imposed, so that they have a signification distinct from the first one they had. Therefore, they do not compose the name insofar as they formally signify; therefore they do not signify separately, because they were imposed as conjoined and received their signification as conjoined. Hence, even if each word loses its first signification, the compound still signifies. For example, “res” and “publica” separately signified “a public thing.” They are joined in the word “respublica” and, as thus conjoined, were imposed to signify a state or common government through one simple concept. Thus neither signifies separately, nor does a name result from them separately. For it is one thing to combine words to receive a new imposition, and another to construct a complex and composite concept from their significations. When they are combined for this latter purpose, they are combined as formally signifying; but not when they are combined to signify anew some simple concept that the individual parts do not signify.

FROM THESE POINTS, THE ARGUMENT IS ANSWERED: The parts of the names “equiferus,” “respublica,” etc., signify separately. The claim is distinguished: they signify separately as it were materially and per accidens, granted; formally, denied. That is, they signify when taken in themselves, but not in relation to composing that word to which a new signification of a simple concept is to be imposed. Under this formality they are not combined as signifying and as previously imposed to signify, but as capable of receiving a new imposition, materially, as though their first imposition and signification did not obtain. For example, in the name “dominus,” the parts “do” and “minus” signify separately, but they do not compose that term as parts that separately signify.

YOU WILL OBJECT: In words such as “proconsul,” “prorex,” and the like, the signification of both parts is considered so that the signification of the name results; therefore, the prior signification formally enters into the name’s composition. The antecedent is proved: “Proconsul” is the same as “vice-consul,” where the signification of “pro” and “consul” is not lost but is rather considered so that the office of a vice-consul is signified. Therefore, they enter as signifying.

Following St. Thomas in the place cited above, the answer distinguishes the antecedent: the signification of both parts is considered as the origin and occasion for imposing the compound to have another, simple signification distinct from the first one the parts had—this is granted; the signification of a part is considered as being preserved partially within the name—this is denied.

For this, note that one thing is that from which a name is imposed, and another is what the name signifies. In imposing names, one considers the etymology and origin of some prior signification. This does not contribute to composing the name’s signification, but to originating it, because the imposer took it as an occasion to impose that signification. For example, lapis (“stone”) is said to derive from “hurting the foot”; providentia (“providence”) from pro and videntia; propheta (“prophet”) as if from procul fans; proconsul from pro and consul; respublica from res and publica. These are nevertheless distinct impositions, and one is not a part of the other, but its origin or occasion. Thus these names have their etymology from other words, but they are not composed of those words’ partial significations.

THE SECOND ARGUMENT: A complex name is truly a name and yet has parts that signify separately; therefore the phrase “no part of which, etc.” is wrongly posited. The major premise is proved: A complex term is truly a term; therefore a complex name is truly a name.

The answer denies the major premise. The antecedent of the proof is granted and its consequent denied. The difference is that in a term the account of a part is considered formally and principally: we find composite parts, as an arm is a part of a human being, yet it is composed of hand, fingers, sinews, etc. A complex term is therefore one term because it is one part, even if it is composite and complex. In a name, however, the account of a part is not principally and formally considered, but the account of the name is: namely, that it be a mark and designation of a thing, for this is why it is called a name. We use names to designate, make known, and distinguish things. A complex name, then, is not one name but several, because it is not one mark and designation but several; thus it will be one term, but not one name.

OBJECTION: An equivocal name is one name and yet signifies many things, as is clear from its definition. Therefore, even if a complex name signifies many things, it will still be a name and one name.

The answer is that an equivocal word is one name by reason of one significant vocal sound. For in concrete terms of accidents, unity of subject gives unity simply and individually, although the forms are several; just as a subject having color and heat is not several “such-things,” but one “such-thing,” as is said in Logic, question 13, article 2.