Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

Those who assert that the essence of a term consists only in its account of terminating syllogistic resolution assign two divisions to a term: one per se, by which it is divided into a prioristic and posterioristic term, since only this twofold resolution is given; the other accidental, namely an accident into its subjects, by which the term is divided into major and minor extreme.

Those, however, who establish the quidditative and formal account of a term in its account as a part divide it essentially according to the different specific account of the part composing an utterance or proposition. What this division is must now be investigated.

THEREFORE I SAY FIRST: A syllogistic term, as such, is not divided by an essential division according to the termination of prioristic or posterioristic resolution.

THE BASIS IS THIS: A twofold and opposed essence cannot belong to one and the same thing. But the termination of prioristic and posterioristic resolution belongs to one and the same simple term. Therefore these two terminations are not essential differences essentially dividing a term.

The minor is proved: the same term, for example human being, insofar as it grounds a necessary connection with its proper properties or essential predicates, grounds demonstrative posterioristic resolution; with respect to contingent predicates it grounds topical resolution. But insofar as it regards universality or particularity, affirmation or negation, it grounds prioristic resolution, which is wholly based on “being said of all” and “being said of none,” from which the various modes and figures of syllogistic form receive their termination. Therefore all these respects can belong to the same term, and so they do not divide it essentially, but are different respects and formalities found in the same term.

I SAY SECOND: An enunciative term is divided essentially into noun and verb, and into categorematic and syncategorematic. The other divisions, although they divide a term according to a different account of sign, on the part of the thing signified, do not divide the essential account of the term itself as a part of a proposition.

THE FIRST PART of this conclusion is proved: an enunciative term formally consists in the account of a part that composes and resolves a proposition, as was said above; therefore that which divides a term per se and essentially is what divides the account of a part per se and essentially. Further: categorematic and syncategorematic, noun and verb, differ essentially in the account of a part; therefore the division of a term into these members is an essential and per se division.

The minor is proved: those things differ essentially in the account of a part that differ in the way they compose a whole, for the essence of a part is to be compositive of a whole. But categorematic and syncategorematic, noun and verb, differ essentially in the way they compose an enunciation. Therefore they differ essentially in the account of a part and term. The minor is proved: by its own essence, the categorematic is a principal part that signifies something per se, while the syncategorematic is a part that modifies and signifies in some way; hence St. Thomas said in On Interpretation 1, lecture 1,¹ “these syncategoremata are more bindings of parts than parts.” The minor is therefore true with respect to this part. Its second part is clear, since the noun composes as an extreme, while the verb is a copula and union; but to compose as an extreme and as a copula is by nature to have the account of part in different ways, and therefore also the account of term. For the specific distinction of parts in the account of a part is taken according to their different relations and different ways of composing the whole to which they are ordered, as is clear in foot, eye, and ear, which differ in species in the account of a part, whatever may be the case as to whether they also differ in species in the account of substance. Therefore the different way of composing an enunciation found in noun and verb makes them differ essentially in the account of part and term.

THE SECOND PART of the proposed conclusion—that the other divisions of terms are not essential but accidental and do not divide a term in the account of part, but in the account of sign—is clear by examining them. For the division of a term into mental, spoken, and written is according to different subjects and different modes of signifying. The mental term signifies naturally, while the spoken and written terms signify conventionally; this is material with respect to the very essence of a term, which consists in a second intention and the relation of a part. The division into univocal and equivocal, common and singular, connotative and absolute, of first intention or of second intention, is also accidental, because all these divisions are made on the part of the different thing signified or different modes of signifying, not according to a different orderability of one sign to another or to the whole composite under the account of a part. Indeed, these are rather divisions not of a logical sign—that is, a sign ordered to the construction and composition of discourse and judgment, and productive of logical operations—but of a grammatical or political sign, that is, a sign insofar as it signifies different things. Therefore the whole diversity belongs on the part of what is signified or signification. These divisions do not essentially diversify a logical sign or term, since all these terms differ precisely on the part of what is signified, which is material with respect to the different way of composing a proposition or syllogism. In a human body, for example, flesh, bones, and sinews differ in the account of a part because they compose in different ways; but the fact that this part, nose or ear, has a particular shape or color does not essentially vary the account of a part. Thus the logical whole, which is a proposition, regards nouns or extremes as its principal parts, out of which it is formed and on which it rests as on bones; the verb is its union or sinew, and syncategoremata are its bindings and modes. But whether they signify univocally, equivocally, commonly, or singularly is material to their account as parts of a proposition.

I SAY FINALLY: The division of a term into predicate and subject, and into major and minor extreme, is not essential but accidental.

IT IS PROVED: Being predicate or subject, major or minor extreme, can belong to the very same term; therefore these are not differences or members that essentially divide the account of a term.

The antecedent is clear: every term (except syncategoremata and a verb insofar as it exercises the function of copula) that can be a subject can also be a predicate. For the essence of a term is found outside a proposition, and there the term has the capacity to be made a subject and to be predicated. But in fact being assumed within a proposition as predicate or subject, major or minor extreme, is something accidental and pertaining to the term’s actual exercise as a component; it can belong to the same term at the intellect’s discretion. Therefore these members do not diversify a term essentially.

You will object first against the second conclusion: sign is the genus of term; therefore terms that differ essentially in the account of sign differ all the more essentially in the account of term.

The antecedent is clear from what was said above: the expression “signifying conventionally” is placed in the definition of a term in the place of the genus.

The consequence is proved: members that divide some genus essentially cannot divide or diversify only accidentally a species composed from that genus. But mental and spoken, common and singular, and so on divide sign, the genus of term, essentially. Therefore they cannot divide or diversify a term only accidentally. The minor and the consequence are clear. The major is evident from an example: if animal, which is the genus of human being, were divided or diversified essentially by some members, it would be necessary for those same members to diversify human being and horse essentially. And so forth.

IT IS ANSWERED, by distinguishing the antecedent: sign is the genus of term if sign is considered absolutely and most universally—this antecedent is denied; if sign is considered insofar as it is subject to logical intention, that is, orderable to the operations of reason, the antecedent is granted. The consequence is distinguished in the same way: terms that differ essentially in the account of sign according to the account by which sign is the genus of term differ in the account of term—this consequence is granted; according to the absolute account of sign, it is denied.

For an explanation, observe this fine doctrine. In artifacts, whether real or of reason, matter is said to be a genus or to be put in place of a genus. Matter can be considered in two ways: either in itself and absolutely, or as entering into the order and line of an artifact. For example, stone, wood, gold, and silver are the matter of an artifact for a natural philosopher, namely, a statue, and consequently its genus. But they are not matter or genus absolutely and considered precisely according to their essential predicates, for then the division of a statue into wooden, stone, and golden (or according to different kinds of stone or wood) would be an essential division, which no one will say; these are material with respect to the account and diversity of a statue. Stone, wood, and so forth are therefore the matter and genus of a statue insofar as they are subject to an artificial form and enter into an artificial order. For natural and artificial things do not belong to the same genus; thus species of artificial things do not have matter considered in itself and absolutely, and as something natural, for their genus, but matter insofar as it enters into such an order. Hence matter, and a division or diversity of matter considered in itself, does not essentially vary an artifact.

Likewise, a term is a kind of logical artifact: sign is its matter and is therefore placed in the position of genus. But sign is not its matter when considered according to the common account of sign and absolutely, but insofar as it is subject to a logical artificial form. Hence mental, spoken, common, singular, and so on do not vary a term or sign essentially insofar as sign is the genus of term, but only materially, just as gold, stone, and wood do not vary a statue or the genus of a statue essentially, but only materially and accidentally. Therefore terms are distinguished accidentally as predicates, just as a statue is golden, wooden, or stone.

A second argument is made: propositions are distinguished in species according to a different thing signified or a different truth that they signify; therefore terms are too.

The consequence is proved: a term is ordered per se to a proposition; therefore a term ordered per se to a proposition distinct in species will be a term distinct in species. Therefore, in the end, terms are essentially diversified by signification.

It is confirmed: definitions of terms differ; different logical intentions are found in them; and one common term cannot become singular. Therefore terms are essentially distinguished, for these are signs of an essential distinction.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is distinguished: propositions are distinguished in species according to a different thing signified, etc., in the formal account of proposition and logical art—this is denied; in the account of representation and sign—it is granted. The consequence must be distinguished in the same way. For propositions and terms are distinguished according to signification materially, not formally or in their artificial form. Thus a term is not ordered per se, totally, and adequately to one determinate proposition only, but to any proposition that can be made from such a term, just as prime matter is ordered to any corruptible form.

As to the first part of the confirmation, the answer is by distinction: definitions of terms differ by an accidental diversity—this antecedent is granted; by an essential diversity—it is denied. For the definitions mentioned are descriptive and explain only what is accidental to a term as such, even if it is essential to a term of that kind. For example, a human being is defined insofar as white, as that which scatters vision. This definition is accidental to a human being in itself, but essential to a human being insofar as white. Thus the definitions of a connotative, common, singular, and so on term are accidental to a term in itself and in general, but essential to a term as connotative, singular, and so on. These terms include the account of term as a subject, just as white includes body and snub includes nose, not as a genus. The same answer applies to the second part of the confirmation: the intentions of terms are accidental to a term, but essential to a term of that kind. To the third part, the antecedent is granted and the consequence denied: one human being cannot become another, yet it does not follow that they are distinguished in species.