Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

IT ASSUMES that every discipline has an order: that is, every science that treats its subject matters scientifically must begin neither by chance nor at will with this or that subject. For in this way it will produce confusion, not clarity, which depends above all on the order of treatment. The order of an art or science is like the order of nature: they begin from what is more imperfect and easier and are completed or brought to an end in what is more perfect. Therefore, just as nature does, teaching begins from what is more common—that is, what pertains to more things—and from what is simpler and better known to us. But what is not better known to us, but is so in itself because of its great perfection, and is called better known by nature, that is, of a nobler and more knowable nature—such as God and spiritual things—does not begin cognition in its execution, although it is not easier to know. See Physics q. 1 on this.

THEREFORE I SAY FIRST: It pertains per se to logic to direct all three operations of the intellect, namely simple apprehension, composition, and reasoning.

No one doubts this about the second and third operation, but some doubt it about the first. Yet it follows clearly from Aristotle and St. Thomas, who says in Posterior Analytics 1, lecture 1,¹ “One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisibles, or of incomposites, insofar as it conceives what a thing is; and the teaching Aristotle gives in the book Categories is ordered to this operation.” The holy Doctor states the same no less clearly in On Interpretation 1, lecture 1,² where he distributes the order of Aristotle’s books on logic according to these three operations of the intellect.

You may say that St. Thomas … etc. See above, p. 86, a. 3.

I SAY FINALLY: Within it … signifies a relation.

This conclusion depends on what is to be said in the following article. For now it is gathered clearly from St. Thomas, On Interpretation 1, lecture 1,³ where he says that terms, or simple expressions, can be considered in three ways: either insofar as they signify simple thoughts absolutely, and in this way they pertain to the book Categories; or “according to the account by which they are parts of an enunciation, and in this way they are treated in this book, and are therefore handed down under the account of noun and verb, whose account it is to signify something with or without time, and other such things that pertain to the account of expressions insofar as they constitute an enunciation”; or, finally, insofar as a syllogistic order is constituted from them, and in this way they pertain to the books of the Prior Analytics. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, a term or simple expression pertains to the first operation insofar as it is a part of an enunciation and is ordered to composing it. Therefore, if we rightly begin from the direction of the first operation (as has been proved), we must begin from the term in general, as signifying the account of a compositive part.

The reason is proved: In the Summulae we treat matters pertaining to logical form, or prioristic resolution; but in logic we treat matters pertaining to matter and posterioristic resolution, because in every art form is prior to matter. For this reason Aristotle called the books in which he treated the form of the syllogism the Prior Analytics, and those in which he treated its matter the Posterior Analytics. Therefore, in the present work we must treat a term or simple expression insofar as it pertains to the prioristic part and regards the construction and making of an enunciation and syllogism; hence we must treat the term in relation to what it constructs or into which the constructed whole is resolved. Therefore we must treat the term first insofar as it regards an enunciation, before treating it as it regards a syllogism, because an enunciation precedes a syllogism, being a part of it. For although the absolute consideration of a thing usually precedes its relative consideration, in the order of a particular treatise or end the relative consideration can precede the absolute one. Therefore we appropriately begin with the term according to its function or relation of making an enunciation, and afterwards will treat it under the relation of a syllogistic extreme.

OBJECTIONS ARE ANSWERED

Against the first conclusion you object: Simple apprehension is not capable of logical art or of a mode of knowing; therefore logic has no right or direction over it.

The antecedent is proved: Simple apprehension is called simple because it has nothing of art and is borne toward its proposed object as naturally as an external sense. For just as sight, for example, when a color is presented to it, sees it without any art or direction and cannot err in seeing it, so the first operation, when a human being, for example, or any other simple object is presented to it, conceives it without needing art and without risk of error. Therefore it in no way pertains to the dialectician to direct it.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is distinguished: it is not capable of logical art by way of composition and division—this is granted; by way of distinction and coordination—it is denied.

For there is a twofold art, a twofold mode of knowing, and a twofold error: one is compositional or divisional, consisting in attributing one thing to another or separating one from another; the first operation is not capable of this, since it is simple apprehension that excludes all composition. The other is a distinctive and coordinative art or mode of knowing, as when we distinguish higher from lower degrees, the intention of genus from that of species, common from particular, concrete from abstract; the first operation needs this art. For since many things are usually apprehended in it in a confused and entangled way, to unfold, coordinate, and distinguish them according to their different intentions is an art required for a mode of knowing, namely for definition and division, which are usually made according to the intention of genus and difference, etc. But correcting errors of simple apprehension on the part of the nature or thing apprehended pertains to the metaphysician; on the part of form and second intention—for example, on the part of genus and difference, concrete and abstract, and the like—it pertains to the logician.

A second argument is made against the second and third conclusions: The term as we teach it is neither simpler nor more imperfect, nor better known to us; therefore one should not begin from it.

The minor is proved with respect to its first part: a term can still be resolved into other things simpler and more imperfect, of which it consists, namely signification, voice, and syllables. Therefore one should first treat sign, syllables, and voice rather than the term. With respect to the second part, it is proved that utterance and proposition are better known than a term; therefore a term is not better known to us. The antecedent is proved: a proposition is a whole in relation to a term, which is its part; therefore at least by confused cognition a proposition is better known than a term, since in this cognition the whole is better known than the part, as is said in Physics 1.⁴ Again, a term is defined through a proposition, since a term is a part of a proposition; therefore even by distinct cognition a proposition is better known than a term. The consequence is clear, since the defining expression makes and manifests the thing defined, and so must be clearer and better known than it. For if we did not first know the proposition, how would we define a term through it? Aristotle confirms this in Prior Analytics 1, ch. 1,⁵ defining proposition first and then term. Therefore one should begin from proposition before term.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is denied. To the proof of the first part, the antecedent is distinguished: a term is resolvable into other things whose treatment pertains to logic—the antecedent is denied; into things presupposed as treated by other arts or sciences—it is granted. Therefore a term is not simpler by absolute simplicity—this is granted; by logical simplicity, or simplicity pertaining to logic—it is denied.

For voice, signification, and syllables, which are compositional elements of a term, do not pertain to the dialectician. The natural philosopher treats voice, the grammarian syllables, and the commonwealth treats conventional signs with respect to their institution, while politics treats them with respect to human communication. If the logician treats sign at all, either the treatment is borrowed from other sciences or it treats sign as the foundation of a second intention, of term, utterance, and so on. Thus logical resolution properly stops at the term as constructive of proposition and syllogism; further resolution of a term, namely into voice, signification, and the like, is not a matter of logical inquiry. A sculptor likewise stops at the wood from which he makes a statue, although wood and bronze are resolved into matter and form not by art but by nature.

To the proof of the second part, the antecedent is distinguished: a proposition is better known than a term by confused cognition—this antecedent is granted; by distinct and scientific cognition—it is denied. Therefore one must begin with proposition, and not with term—the consequence is denied, because we do not begin in the scientific order and with distinct cognition, which presupposes confused cognition of the whole.

From this the answer to the second proof is clear. For in order to define a part through its relation to a whole as an extrinsic term, or to define a term through its relation to a proposition, it suffices to know the whole itself, or proposition, confusedly; scientific and distinct knowledge is not required.

And when it is urged that the defining expression must be better known than the thing defined, the same distinction is made: better known by simple and confused cognition—it is granted; by distinct and scientific cognition—it is denied. For when color is defined by its relation to sight, one need not first know sight definitely and scientifically; it suffices to know it confusedly. This doctrine is especially true of things defined by their relation to something extrinsic, which are called in Metaphysics 7 definitions by addition.⁶ For the relation to that thing is intrinsic to the thing defined; the extrinsic thing to which it is related is not. Thus a perfect and distinct cognition of that extrinsic thing is not required. In a word, when something is defined, it suffices that its defining features be better known with respect to whether it is, not with respect to what it is.

To the confirmation from Aristotle, the answer is to turn it against the argument. For if the Philosopher, when about to treat the syllogism, first touched upon its proximate and remote matter, which are propositions and terms, into which the syllogism is resolved as its final elements, then when we proceed by way of composition and in the scientific and distinct order, we ought to begin from the term, even though confused knowledge of the syllogism and proposition with respect to whether they are is presupposed.

Finally, an argument is made: Every science begins from universals; therefore logic should begin not from the term but from that in which term and proposition agree in the logical genus, namely, from second intention in general. This also accords with the way the Philosopher begins in the Physics: he begins from mobile being in general, then explains its individual parts in the books On the Heavens, On Generation, On the Soul, and so forth. Therefore logic should likewise begin from logical being, that is, from second intention, and then descend to its parts.

It is confirmed because the mode of knowing itself is easier to know than a term: the mode of knowing facilitates and prepares the way to knowing, since it is an instrument of knowing. Therefore one ought first to treat the mode of knowing as that which is easier or facilitates science, and then the particular knowable objects, namely term, utterance, and so forth.

IT IS ANSWERED by distinguishing the antecedent: every science begins from universals, whether in predicating or in composing or causing—this antecedent is granted; from universals in predicating alone—it is denied. A term, however, is the most universal thing in composing: it composes all logical instruments, utterance, proposition, syllogism, and even the mode of knowing itself, and so on. Yet it is not always necessary to begin from what is more universal in predicating, as when it has no special difficulty insofar as it is conceived in general, but is explained through its parts; for the mode of knowing in general has no difficulty other than what is explained through its parts. As to the order observed by the Philosopher in the Physics, we say that the same order is observed in logic. Just as the natural philosopher first treats mobile being as an object in general, yet begins scientifically from the principles and elements constituting mobile being, namely matter and form, so logic treats the mode of knowing or logical form, which is second intention in general, as its object, yet begins scientifically from its first and simplest constitutive element, which is the term.

To the confirmation it is answered that the mode of knowing as scientific, to be known and defined distinctly as a thing to be known as an object, is no easier to know than a term, since the term is a part of it, and distinct and scientific cognition of a composite begins from cognition of its parts. But the mode of knowing as a condition or instrument of knowing in its exercise, and as that by which one knows, is easier than a term and prepares the way to it, just as it does to all objects that must be known scientifically. For this purpose, however, it is not necessary to know the mode of knowing itself quidditatively and scientifically beforehand, but only by a certain imperfect and confused cognition, as the whole is known in relation to its parts. In sum: a teaching that begins scientifically from the term also begins to know scientifically the mode of knowing itself, proposition, and syllogism, because scientific cognition of these begins with distinct cognition of their parts, and the first part of them is the term.