Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

IT ASSUMES that every discipline has an order: that is, every science that treats its subject matters scientifically must begin neither by chance nor at will with this or that subject. For in this way it will produce confusion, not clarity, which depends above all on the order of treatment. The order of an art or science is like the order of nature: they begin from what is more imperfect and easier and are completed or brought to an end in what is more perfect. Therefore, just as nature does, teaching begins from what is more common—that is, what pertains to more things—and from what is simpler and better known to us. But what is not better known to us, but is so in itself because of its great perfection, and is called better known by nature, that is, of a nobler and more knowable nature—such as God and spiritual things—does not begin cognition in its execution, although it is not easier to know. See Physics q. 1 on this.

THEREFORE I SAY FIRST: It pertains per se to logic to direct all three operations of the intellect, namely simple apprehension, composition, and reasoning.

No one doubts this about the second and third operation, but some doubt it about the first. Yet it follows clearly from Aristotle and St. Thomas, who says in Posterior Analytics 1, lecture 1,¹ “One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisibles, or of incomposites, insofar as it conceives what a thing is; and the teaching Aristotle gives in the book Categories is ordered to this operation.” The holy Doctor states the same no less clearly in On Interpretation 1, lecture 1,² where he distributes the order of Aristotle’s books on logic according to these three operations of the intellect.

You may say that St. Thomas … etc. See above, p. 86, a. 3.

I SAY FINALLY: Within it … signifies a relation.

This conclusion depends on what is to be said in the following article. For now it is gathered clearly from St. Thomas, On Interpretation 1, lecture 1,³ where he says that terms, or simple expressions, can be considered in three ways: either insofar as they signify simple thoughts absolutely, and in this way they pertain to the book Categories; or “according to the account by which they are parts of an enunciation, and in this way they are treated in this book, and are therefore handed down under the account of noun and verb, whose account it is to signify something with or without time, and other such things that pertain to the account of expressions insofar as they constitute an enunciation”; or, finally, insofar as a syllogistic order is constituted from them, and in this way they pertain to the books of the Prior Analytics. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, a term or simple expression pertains to the first operation insofar as it is a part of an enunciation and is ordered to composing it. Therefore, if we rightly begin from the direction of the first operation (as has been proved), we must begin from the term in general, as signifying the account of a compositive part.

The reason is proved: In the Summulae we treat matters pertaining to logical form, or prioristic resolution; but in logic we treat matters pertaining to matter and posterioristic resolution, because in every art form is prior to matter. For this reason Aristotle called the books in which he treated the form of the syllogism the Prior Analytics, and those in which he treated its matter the Posterior Analytics. Therefore, in the present work we must treat a term or simple expression insofar as it pertains to the prioristic part and regards the construction and making of an enunciation and syllogism; hence we must treat the term in relation to what it constructs or into which the constructed whole is resolved. Therefore we must treat the term first insofar as it regards an enunciation, before treating it as it regards a syllogism, because an enunciation precedes a syllogism, being a part of it. For although the absolute consideration of a thing usually precedes its relative consideration, in the order of a particular treatise or end the relative consideration can precede the absolute one. Therefore we appropriately begin with the term according to its function or relation of making an enunciation, and afterwards will treat it under the relation of a syllogistic extreme.

OBJECTIONS ARE ANSWERED

Against the first conclusion you object: Simple apprehension is not capable of logical art or of a mode of knowing; therefore logic has no right or direction over it.

The antecedent is proved: Simple apprehension is called simple because it has nothing of art and is borne toward its proposed object as naturally as an external sense. For just as sight, for example, when a color is presented to it, sees it without any art or direction and cannot err in seeing it, so the first operation, when a human being, for example, or any other simple object is presented to it, conceives it without needing art and without risk of error. Therefore it in no way pertains to the dialectician to direct it.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is distinguished: it is not capable of logical art by way of composition and division—this is granted; by way of distinction and coordination—it is denied.

For there is a twofold art, a twofold mode of knowing, and a twofold error: one is compositional or divisional, consisting in attributing one thing to another or separating one from another; the first operation is not capable of this, since it is simple apprehension that excludes all composition. The other is a distinctive and coordinative art or mode of knowing, as when we distinguish higher from lower degrees, the intention of genus from that of species, common from particular, concrete from abstract; the first operation needs this art. For since many things are usually apprehended in it in a confused and entangled way, to unfold, coordinate, and distinguish them according to their different intentions is an art required for a mode of knowing, namely for definition and division, which are usually made according to the intention of genus and difference, etc. But correcting errors of simple apprehension on the part of the nature or thing apprehended pertains to the metaphysician; on the part of form and second intention—for example, on the part of genus and difference, concrete and abstract, and the like—it pertains to the logician.

A second argument is made against the second and third conclusions: The term as we teach it is neither simpler nor more imperfect, nor better known to us; therefore one should not begin from it.

The minor is proved with respect to its first part: a term can still be resolved into other things simpler and more imperfect, of which it consists, namely signification, voice, and syllables. Therefore one should first treat sign, syllables, and voice rather than the term. With respect to the second part, it is proved that utterance and proposition are better known than a term; therefore a term is not better known to us. The antecedent is proved: a proposition is a whole in relation to a term, which is its part; therefore at least by confused cognition a proposition is better known than a term, since in this cognition the whole is better known than the part, as is said in Physics 1.⁴ Again, a term is defined through a proposition, since a term is a part of a proposition; therefore even by distinct cognition a proposition is better known than a term. The consequence is clear, since the defining expression makes and manifests the thing defined, and so must be clearer and better known than it. For if we did not first know the proposition, how would we define a term through it? Aristotle confirms this in Prior Analytics 1, ch. 1,⁵ defining proposition first and then term. Therefore one should begin from proposition before term.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is denied. To the proof of the first part, the antecedent is distinguished: a term is resolvable into other things whose treatment pertains to logic—the antecedent is denied; into things presupposed as treated by other arts or sciences—it is granted. Therefore a term is not simpler by absolute simplicity—this is granted; by logical simplicity, or simplicity pertaining to logic—it is denied.

For voice, signification, and syllables, which are compositional elements of a term, do not pertain to the dialectician. The natural philosopher treats voice, the grammarian syllables, and the commonwealth treats conventional signs with respect to their institution, while politics treats them with respect to human communication. If the logician treats sign at all, either the treatment is borrowed from other sciences or it treats sign as the foundation of a second intention, of term, utterance, and so on. Thus logical resolution properly stops at the term as constructive of proposition and syllogism; further resolution of a term, namely into voice, signification, and the like, is not a matter of logical inquiry. A sculptor likewise stops at the wood from which he makes a statue, although wood and bronze are resolved into matter and form not by art but by nature.

To the proof of the second part, the antecedent is distinguished: a proposition is better known than a term by confused cognition—this antecedent is granted; by distinct and scientific cognition—it is denied. Therefore one must begin with proposition, and not with term—the consequence is denied, because we do not begin in the scientific order and with distinct cognition, which presupposes confused cognition of the whole.

From this the answer to the second proof is clear. For in order to define a part through its relation to a whole as an extrinsic term, or to define a term through its relation to a proposition, it suffices to know the whole itself, or proposition, confusedly; scientific and distinct knowledge is not required.

And when it is urged that the defining expression must be better known than the thing defined, the same distinction is made: better known by simple and confused cognition—it is granted; by distinct and scientific cognition—it is denied. For when color is defined by its relation to sight, one need not first know sight definitely and scientifically; it suffices to know it confusedly. This doctrine is especially true of things defined by their relation to something extrinsic, which are called in Metaphysics 7 definitions by addition.⁶ For the relation to that thing is intrinsic to the thing defined; the extrinsic thing to which it is related is not. Thus a perfect and distinct cognition of that extrinsic thing is not required. In a word, when something is defined, it suffices that its defining features be better known with respect to whether it is, not with respect to what it is.

To the confirmation from Aristotle, the answer is to turn it against the argument. For if the Philosopher, when about to treat the syllogism, first touched upon its proximate and remote matter, which are propositions and terms, into which the syllogism is resolved as its final elements, then when we proceed by way of composition and in the scientific and distinct order, we ought to begin from the term, even though confused knowledge of the syllogism and proposition with respect to whether they are is presupposed.

Finally, an argument is made: Every science begins from universals; therefore logic should begin not from the term but from that in which term and proposition agree in the logical genus, namely, from second intention in general. This also accords with the way the Philosopher begins in the Physics: he begins from mobile being in general, then explains its individual parts in the books On the Heavens, On Generation, On the Soul, and so forth. Therefore logic should likewise begin from logical being, that is, from second intention, and then descend to its parts.

It is confirmed because the mode of knowing itself is easier to know than a term: the mode of knowing facilitates and prepares the way to knowing, since it is an instrument of knowing. Therefore one ought first to treat the mode of knowing as that which is easier or facilitates science, and then the particular knowable objects, namely term, utterance, and so forth.

IT IS ANSWERED by distinguishing the antecedent: every science begins from universals, whether in predicating or in composing or causing—this antecedent is granted; from universals in predicating alone—it is denied. A term, however, is the most universal thing in composing: it composes all logical instruments, utterance, proposition, syllogism, and even the mode of knowing itself, and so on. Yet it is not always necessary to begin from what is more universal in predicating, as when it has no special difficulty insofar as it is conceived in general, but is explained through its parts; for the mode of knowing in general has no difficulty other than what is explained through its parts. As to the order observed by the Philosopher in the Physics, we say that the same order is observed in logic. Just as the natural philosopher first treats mobile being as an object in general, yet begins scientifically from the principles and elements constituting mobile being, namely matter and form, so logic treats the mode of knowing or logical form, which is second intention in general, as its object, yet begins scientifically from its first and simplest constitutive element, which is the term.

To the confirmation it is answered that the mode of knowing as scientific, to be known and defined distinctly as a thing to be known as an object, is no easier to know than a term, since the term is a part of it, and distinct and scientific cognition of a composite begins from cognition of its parts. But the mode of knowing as a condition or instrument of knowing in its exercise, and as that by which one knows, is easier than a term and prepares the way to it, just as it does to all objects that must be known scientifically. For this purpose, however, it is not necessary to know the mode of knowing itself quidditatively and scientifically beforehand, but only by a certain imperfect and confused cognition, as the whole is known in relation to its parts. In sum: a teaching that begins scientifically from the term also begins to know scientifically the mode of knowing itself, proposition, and syllogism, because scientific cognition of these begins with distinct cognition of their parts, and the first part of them is the term.

In the disputes … etc. See above, p. 89 b 32.

I SAY FIRST: It belongs to the essential notion of a logical or artificial term that it signify by convention, if it is spoken or written, but not if it is a concept.

This conclusion is common among dialecticians, who follow Aristotle in defining all the logical instruments—the syllogism, speech, noun, verb, and so on—by significant words. St. Thomas follows this view in On Interpretation I, lect. 1,¹ treating the definition of the noun, and at the end of lect. 6² treating the definition of speech. He excludes words that signify naturally, although Plato thought otherwise in the Cratylus,³ because speech and its parts are not natural things but certain artificial effects; hence they must signify artificially, or by convention, just as all artificial things are caused by human will and reason. Words lacking signification, however, represent only naturally and not by convention, and so do not of themselves belong to the construction of speech.

The REASON for the conclusion follows: a non-signifying word, such as “blitiri,” can represent nothing to the mind that needs the direction of art and contributes to reasoning. Therefore, of itself it does not belong to a logical instrument.

The consequence is clear, because every logical instrument must serve some direction and art of reason, since, as was said, the formal notion of Logic is to concern the direction of reason so that the intellect may proceed without error. Whether a non-signifying word can be taken by Logic per accidens to compose speech, we will say in the arguments.

That a term must signify by convention and not naturally is proved first as follows. Here the term is defined in general, so as to include every part of speech, even the copula or verb; this is what we understand by the name “term.” But no word naturally represents the copula of other things (if you deny this, identify one). Therefore, at least as regards the copula, a term requires signification by convention. Further, the copula signifies by convention; therefore, it cannot of itself join extremes that represent naturally. For how could the verb “is” join two sights or two groans? Thus, for there to be logical art, signification by convention is required both in the verb and in the extremes joined by the verb, and consequently in the term, which is common to them all. For if non-signifying writing—for example, a line drawn with a pen—does not compose logically, neither will a non-signifying word.

I SAY SECOND: The ultimate formality of an enunciative term is that it be a part of an enunciation, from which a simple proposition is made—not only as subject and predicate, but according to a more common notion that includes the verb and other parts, such as pronouns, adverbs, prepositions, and the like.

This conclusion is common among the Thomists, Peter of Spain, Soto, Báñez, and others. It is proved first from the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas in On Interpretation I, ch. “On Enunciation,”⁴ where Aristotle, explaining how noun and verb are excluded from speech, says: “Noun and verb, then, are only an expression, since it is not to say that someone enunciates something by a voice signifying in this way.” Explaining these words there in lect. 8, § He excludes it from unity,⁵ St. Thomas says: “Noun and verb, then, are only an expression: an expression, that is, not an enunciation; and it seems from his manner of speaking that he himself imposed the name ‘expression’ to signify the parts of an enunciation.” Therefore, the Philosopher gave noun and verb a common name, namely, that they are only “expressions”; and, St. Thomas says, he imposed this name “to signify the parts of an enunciation.” Therefore, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, “expression,” or “term,” signifies the character of a part of an enunciation, common to noun and verb, in which they agree and by which they pertain to the present inquiry. The holy Doctor explicitly says this in On Interpretation I, lect. 1,⁶ where he says that “simple expressions are considered insofar as they are parts of an enunciation, and thus they are treated in this book, etc.” A term or expression is therefore very well defined as a part of an enunciation, or “that from which a simple proposition is made”; for if the logician considers a term as a part, he must define it generally by its being a part. This is rightly its constitutive formality, since, when every other formality is set aside, a term or expression is understood to remain if it is conceived under the character of a part of an enunciation.

If you ask whether this consideration of a part includes all parts of an enunciation or only the principal ones, we answer that “term” or “expression” can be taken in two ways: in a general, broad, common sense, or in a restricted, more determinate sense. In the first way, “term” includes every kind of part insofar as it is a part, including adverbs, pronouns, and other syncategorematic terms. These are more connections among the parts of speech than parts of speech themselves, just as nails and similar things are not parts of a ship but connections among its parts, although they are commonly called parts of the ship, since they help compose it in one way or another. But if “term” is taken in the second way, in a strict sense, it includes only the principal parts of speech, noun and verb, to which the others are reduced: pronouns are included under nouns, and participles under verbs. Observe, however, that although the verb joins the extremes of a proposition like a union or bond, while syncategorematic terms are called connections among parts, they do so in different ways. The verb connects by signifying something after the manner of an action or motion, and can function as the predicate in a proposition, as when I say, “Peter runs” or “Peter is.” Syncategorematic terms connect by signifying in some way and not something; hence, strictly speaking, they cannot function as predicate and subject as noun and verb can, which are called the principal parts of speech. For this reason Aristotle treated only those, as St. Thomas says in the cited place; this whole doctrine is his, since he intended to treat simple speech, which necessarily requires a noun and a verb.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, it is argued against the first conclusion: “Blitiri” is a term, but it is not a significant word; therefore, the term is wrongly defined this way.

The antecedent is proved: It has the ultimate and essential difference of a term, namely, being part of a simple proposition; for it is part of “Blitiri is not scindapsus” and “Blitiri is trisyllabic.” It also supposits in the proposition by material supposition. Therefore, it is a term.

WE ANSWER: The antecedent is denied. In the proof, the antecedent is distinguished: that it is a part or composes a proposition materially is granted; formally and significantly is denied.

A term and the other logical instruments can be taken in two ways: objectively, for the things signified themselves, and this is materially; or formally, for the signs we use because we cannot bring the things themselves into the schools, and this is significantly. When, then, a proposition or speech is made from non-signifying words, that word stands materially for itself, as in material supposition, for example, when I say, “Man is a noun,” or “man is a word.” These words stand for themselves because they represent themselves to the senses; hence they do not need signification, but self-representation (for then we have brought the thing into the schools), which supplies the place of signification. For signification is not of itself but of another: a sign represents something other than itself, not itself. Strictly speaking, therefore, signification is required for the artificial composition of Logic; accidentally, however, it can use representation when it forms speech not about the things signified but about the words themselves, as in the argument. In that case the words compose materially, not formally.

OBJECTION: Speech composed from “blitiri” is formally speech; therefore, “blitiri” formally composes it.

The consequence is clear, since a whole that is formally a whole requires parts that are formally parts. The antecedent is proved: That is formally speech which produces the sense of speech in the hearer’s mind. Such is “Blitiri is not scindapsus.” Therefore. Moreover, Aristotle formed his demonstrations from the letters A, B, C alone, which signify nothing as an expression or term. Nor did he require all the parts of speech to be significant; he said that speech is “that some of whose parts signifies separately.” Therefore, non-signifying words formally compose speech and syllogism, and speech does not require all its parts to be significant.

WE ANSWER the first proof as follows. First, in keeping with what was said, the formality of speech, since it is a whole, consists in composition. Thus, for it to be formal speech, it is enough that composition be formally present, even if it is supplied not by the signification of the extremes but by their representation. It is supplied by the verb “is,” by which the very composition of speech is signified formally. Thus speech is formal by the formality of composition, which is taken from the verb, not by the formality of the extremes, since these compose only materially and representatively. But if all the parts were non-signifying words, it would not be speech either formally or at all.

We answer second that non-signifying words do not by themselves compose speech formally and artificially; they do so by reason of a significant word understood there, as when I say, “Blitiri is not scindapsus,” with the understood meaning, “The word ‘blitiri’ is not the word ‘scindapsus.’” Here “word” is the term that composes formally, while “blitiri” stands only objectively and materially. This is simply the true and certain solution.

The answer to the remaining proofs is clear from this. Regarding the first, about the letters A, B, C, we say that they either function materially there, or that “the word A” and “the word B” are understood, or that A and B naturally signify those first elements and letters, as is clear from the preposition “a” or “ab.” Regarding the definition of speech, St. Thomas answers in On Interpretation I, lect. 6,⁷ that the Philosopher did not intend non-signifying words to compose speech formally together with the verb, but that at least some part of speech must signify something, that is, as a categorematic term, even if the rest signify only in some way as syncategorematic terms.

Second, it is argued against the second conclusion: The formality of a part differs from that of an extreme. But a term is an extreme of a proposition, as Aristotle says in Prior Analytics I, ch. 1, defining a term as “that into which a proposition is resolved.”⁸ Therefore, the ultimate formality of a term is wrongly said to consist in its character as a part.

The major premise is proved: The notion of a part is more universal than that of an extreme. A part is preserved in that which composes a whole; an extreme, however, is that which contains and closes off the whole, so that the whole does not extend beyond it and it functions as a principal part. Therefore, the major premise is true.

WE ANSWER by explaining the minor premise: Aristotle there spoke of the syllogistic term, not the enunciative term with which we are concerned here. The former consists in being an extreme; the latter consists in being a part and includes all parts of speech, even the less principal ones. The reason is that an enunciative term is ordered only to constructing truth in an enunciation, whereas a syllogism, or syllogistic term, is ordered to inference. Truth is composed not only from the extremes but also from the joining verb, adverbs, or negations, on which the truth of a proposition often depends. Since, then, we are treating the term as ordered to composing an enunciation, we take it generally, to include every part of an enunciation. But syllogistic inference is not considered as true, but as inferring; it therefore requires only three terms: two that are extremes in the conclusion to be inferred, and a third that serves as a middle, proving and inferring and joining by inference. This can belong only to subject and predicate. Hence only the extremes of a proposition are syllogistic terms. The Philosopher spoke of these in the cited passage, whereas we do not; we use the term in a broader sense.

Finally, it is argued: Being a part of a proposition belongs to things other than a term; therefore, a term is not well defined by the notion of a part.

The consequence is clear, because a definition cannot belong to things other than what is defined. The antecedent is proved: This belongs to a proposition and to speech, since a proposition composes a syllogism and another hypothetical proposition, which essentially consists of categorical propositions.

If you say that a term composes a simple proposition, whereas a categorical proposition composing a hypothetical one composes a composite proposition, namely, a hypothetical one, the objection is: A categorical proposition also composes another simple proposition. The proof: “Man is an animal and true” is a certain simple categorical proposition and is composed from “Man is an animal.” Therefore, a categorical proposition too is a part composing a simple proposition.

If you say that a proposition composes another not as a part in itself, primarily, and essentially, as a term does, but accidentally and secondarily, the objection is: A syllogism and a hypothetical proposition are composed of propositions in themselves; therefore, propositions are parts composing and constituting them in themselves.

WE ANSWER all these points with this distinction: A proposition can compose another proposition, simple or composite; distinguish: in itself—denied; accidentally—granted. Therefore, that being a part, which is the notion of a term, belongs to a proposition—the consequence is denied, because a term composes a simple proposition in itself, not accidentally.

This is explained as follows: Some things are parts in themselves and are ordered in themselves to the composition of a whole; others have in themselves the character of a whole, and if they are ever ordered to compose another whole, this is not in itself but accidentally. For example, a person’s bones and flesh are parts of that person in themselves and are ordered in themselves to composing the person. But a human being, because in himself he has the character of a whole, is not ordered in himself but accidentally to composing another whole, such as an army. The same is true of a house: it is a whole in itself, and if it composes a city, it does so accidentally. In the same way, in logical artifacts, terms are parts in themselves and are ordered in themselves to composing a simple proposition, because they do not have another essence already constituted (for this is how we understand “from which a simple proposition is made,” the difference of a term). But because a proposition is a whole in itself, if it sometimes composes another proposition, it is not ordered to this in itself but accidentally, since this does not constitute it in its essence.

To the final reply, we answer that according to Aristotle, in the chapter on enunciation,⁹ a hypothetical proposition and a syllogism have unity of conjunction or order, not unity simply, as a categorical proposition does. Composites or wholes composed only by conjunction and order can be composed of parts that are not parts in themselves and primarily, but accidentally and materially, as an army is composed of many people and a city of many houses.

YOU WILL ASK: As was said above from St. Thomas, a term can be considered in three ways: as belonging to the categories, as a part of a proposition, and as a part of a syllogism. Why, then, is it not defined according to a common notion covering all these formalities and considerations?

We answer that a term, insofar as it belongs to the categories, is taken for the things signified themselves, as they are ordered in a category according to higher and lower degrees. Insofar as it belongs to a proposition or syllogism, it is taken for a sign or significant voice. Thus it cannot be defined by one definition, since a sign and a thing are not one and the same. Or, even if it could be defined this way, that is not relevant here, where we treat only the term insofar as it precisely belongs to logical form and prioristic resolution.

YOU WILL ASK FINALLY: Why is a term defined more specifically and only as a part of a proposition rather than of a syllogism, since it also composes a syllogism most formally? For without the verb, at least, no conclusion would be inferred and no syllogism would exist.

We answer that the verb composes and is required for a syllogism presuppositively, by reason of the enunciation, not by reason of inference. For it is not required to join the extremes by way of inference and proof, but by way of enunciation. Since an enunciation is presupposed to a syllogism, the verb is presupposed as well, but not formally.

On p. 106 b 32.

THE REPLY: The antecedent is denied. In proof of it, the antecedent is granted, because not everything is enumerated there adequately. The consequent is distinguished: “Therefore a spoken word does not signify a thing through a concept as its formal rationale or as its primary and immediate signified,” is granted; for the formal rationale of signifying in a spoken word is imposition, and in a concept it is likeness. “It does not signify a thing through a concept as its principal signifier, of which the spoken word is a substitute and as it were an instrument,” is denied. For a spoken word signifies a concept because it is substituted in its place, to supply what the concept cannot reach, namely, to make it manifest externally both to itself and to others. Thus a spoken word is as it were a substitute representing both its principal, which it serves (the mental word, from which, as St. Thomas says in question 4 of De Veritate, article 1, reply 7,¹ it participates in being and signification), and that to which it is ordered, namely, the thing signified. Thus spoken words signify the concept as the principal signifier, but the thing as what is directly signified. Spoken words represent things as conceived specifically and in exercise; that is, the “as” states a condition, for things are represented as conceived, but not by taking “as” reduplicatively to mean the state in which they are known. Spoken words sometimes also signify things as subject to the intention and state they have in the mind. Then the intention itself is as it were the thing represented, as with logical intentions such as species, genus, etc.

For the second proof, etc., p. 107 a 28.

Concerning the second point, namely, what spoken words signify principally, things or concepts, the reply is that they signify principally things, unless perhaps the thing signified is itself a concept or its intention.

THE REASON IS that the concept itself is ultimately and principally ordered to representing the thing itself, of which it is an intentional likeness. Therefore a spoken word, which is only an instrument of the concept in representing and makes the concept itself sensible, will be principally ordered to representing those same things, since it serves the concept precisely for this purpose.

YOU WILL OBJECT, FIRST: An instrument regards its principal, from which it is moved, more than the effect it produces. Therefore, from the fact that a spoken word is an instrument of the concept, it is inferred rather that it signifies the concept principally and the thing less principally, the thing that it makes intelligible or knowable.

The reply distinguishes the antecedent: “An instrument considered in its account of operating and acting” is granted; “in its account of representing” is denied. For a representational instrument, such as a spoken word, has as the principal source of its representation a concept that is also representative of a thing. To manifest that representation to others, the concept substitutes a spoken word for itself; thus the principal signified of both is the thing itself. Hence St. Thomas says in question 9 of De Potentia, article 4,² that “that is signified formally by a name to which it was principally imposed, just as the name ‘man’ was imposed to signify what is composed of body and rational soul.”

SECOND OBJECTION: The divine Word represents the Father, who is the principle expressing the Word, more principally than creatures, which are things expressed and represented by it. Therefore an external word, or spoken word, will also represent its expressing principle, namely, the concept, more principally than the thing it signifies and expresses.

The first reply is: Let the antecedent pass, and the consequent is denied, because a spoken word is not a natural expression of its principle, as the Word or concept is, but is imposed and principally ordered to signifying that which the concept naturally represents, namely, things. The inference from one case to the other is therefore unsound.

The second reply is that a concept or word represents principally its principal and formal object, because it is an expression of its formal principle, which is the impressed species representing the object of which it is formally the species. In divine things this is the Essence and the Persons. Creatures, however, are a secondary and material object and are therefore not represented principally by the Divine Word. It does not follow from this that an external word, or spoken word, represents the concept more principally, because the concept is not the formal object represented, but the principal signifier of the thing.

Those who assert that the essence of a term consists only in its account of terminating syllogistic resolution assign two divisions to a term: one per se, by which it is divided into a prioristic and posterioristic term, since only this twofold resolution is given; the other accidental, namely an accident into its subjects, by which the term is divided into major and minor extreme.

Those, however, who establish the quidditative and formal account of a term in its account as a part divide it essentially according to the different specific account of the part composing an utterance or proposition. What this division is must now be investigated.

THEREFORE I SAY FIRST: A syllogistic term, as such, is not divided by an essential division according to the termination of prioristic or posterioristic resolution.

THE BASIS IS THIS: A twofold and opposed essence cannot belong to one and the same thing. But the termination of prioristic and posterioristic resolution belongs to one and the same simple term. Therefore these two terminations are not essential differences essentially dividing a term.

The minor is proved: the same term, for example human being, insofar as it grounds a necessary connection with its proper properties or essential predicates, grounds demonstrative posterioristic resolution; with respect to contingent predicates it grounds topical resolution. But insofar as it regards universality or particularity, affirmation or negation, it grounds prioristic resolution, which is wholly based on “being said of all” and “being said of none,” from which the various modes and figures of syllogistic form receive their termination. Therefore all these respects can belong to the same term, and so they do not divide it essentially, but are different respects and formalities found in the same term.

I SAY SECOND: An enunciative term is divided essentially into noun and verb, and into categorematic and syncategorematic. The other divisions, although they divide a term according to a different account of sign, on the part of the thing signified, do not divide the essential account of the term itself as a part of a proposition.

THE FIRST PART of this conclusion is proved: an enunciative term formally consists in the account of a part that composes and resolves a proposition, as was said above; therefore that which divides a term per se and essentially is what divides the account of a part per se and essentially. Further: categorematic and syncategorematic, noun and verb, differ essentially in the account of a part; therefore the division of a term into these members is an essential and per se division.

The minor is proved: those things differ essentially in the account of a part that differ in the way they compose a whole, for the essence of a part is to be compositive of a whole. But categorematic and syncategorematic, noun and verb, differ essentially in the way they compose an enunciation. Therefore they differ essentially in the account of a part and term. The minor is proved: by its own essence, the categorematic is a principal part that signifies something per se, while the syncategorematic is a part that modifies and signifies in some way; hence St. Thomas said in On Interpretation 1, lecture 1,¹ “these syncategoremata are more bindings of parts than parts.” The minor is therefore true with respect to this part. Its second part is clear, since the noun composes as an extreme, while the verb is a copula and union; but to compose as an extreme and as a copula is by nature to have the account of part in different ways, and therefore also the account of term. For the specific distinction of parts in the account of a part is taken according to their different relations and different ways of composing the whole to which they are ordered, as is clear in foot, eye, and ear, which differ in species in the account of a part, whatever may be the case as to whether they also differ in species in the account of substance. Therefore the different way of composing an enunciation found in noun and verb makes them differ essentially in the account of part and term.

THE SECOND PART of the proposed conclusion—that the other divisions of terms are not essential but accidental and do not divide a term in the account of part, but in the account of sign—is clear by examining them. For the division of a term into mental, spoken, and written is according to different subjects and different modes of signifying. The mental term signifies naturally, while the spoken and written terms signify conventionally; this is material with respect to the very essence of a term, which consists in a second intention and the relation of a part. The division into univocal and equivocal, common and singular, connotative and absolute, of first intention or of second intention, is also accidental, because all these divisions are made on the part of the different thing signified or different modes of signifying, not according to a different orderability of one sign to another or to the whole composite under the account of a part. Indeed, these are rather divisions not of a logical sign—that is, a sign ordered to the construction and composition of discourse and judgment, and productive of logical operations—but of a grammatical or political sign, that is, a sign insofar as it signifies different things. Therefore the whole diversity belongs on the part of what is signified or signification. These divisions do not essentially diversify a logical sign or term, since all these terms differ precisely on the part of what is signified, which is material with respect to the different way of composing a proposition or syllogism. In a human body, for example, flesh, bones, and sinews differ in the account of a part because they compose in different ways; but the fact that this part, nose or ear, has a particular shape or color does not essentially vary the account of a part. Thus the logical whole, which is a proposition, regards nouns or extremes as its principal parts, out of which it is formed and on which it rests as on bones; the verb is its union or sinew, and syncategoremata are its bindings and modes. But whether they signify univocally, equivocally, commonly, or singularly is material to their account as parts of a proposition.

I SAY FINALLY: The division of a term into predicate and subject, and into major and minor extreme, is not essential but accidental.

IT IS PROVED: Being predicate or subject, major or minor extreme, can belong to the very same term; therefore these are not differences or members that essentially divide the account of a term.

The antecedent is clear: every term (except syncategoremata and a verb insofar as it exercises the function of copula) that can be a subject can also be a predicate. For the essence of a term is found outside a proposition, and there the term has the capacity to be made a subject and to be predicated. But in fact being assumed within a proposition as predicate or subject, major or minor extreme, is something accidental and pertaining to the term’s actual exercise as a component; it can belong to the same term at the intellect’s discretion. Therefore these members do not diversify a term essentially.

You will object first against the second conclusion: sign is the genus of term; therefore terms that differ essentially in the account of sign differ all the more essentially in the account of term.

The antecedent is clear from what was said above: the expression “signifying conventionally” is placed in the definition of a term in the place of the genus.

The consequence is proved: members that divide some genus essentially cannot divide or diversify only accidentally a species composed from that genus. But mental and spoken, common and singular, and so on divide sign, the genus of term, essentially. Therefore they cannot divide or diversify a term only accidentally. The minor and the consequence are clear. The major is evident from an example: if animal, which is the genus of human being, were divided or diversified essentially by some members, it would be necessary for those same members to diversify human being and horse essentially. And so forth.

IT IS ANSWERED, by distinguishing the antecedent: sign is the genus of term if sign is considered absolutely and most universally—this antecedent is denied; if sign is considered insofar as it is subject to logical intention, that is, orderable to the operations of reason, the antecedent is granted. The consequence is distinguished in the same way: terms that differ essentially in the account of sign according to the account by which sign is the genus of term differ in the account of term—this consequence is granted; according to the absolute account of sign, it is denied.

For an explanation, observe this fine doctrine. In artifacts, whether real or of reason, matter is said to be a genus or to be put in place of a genus. Matter can be considered in two ways: either in itself and absolutely, or as entering into the order and line of an artifact. For example, stone, wood, gold, and silver are the matter of an artifact for a natural philosopher, namely, a statue, and consequently its genus. But they are not matter or genus absolutely and considered precisely according to their essential predicates, for then the division of a statue into wooden, stone, and golden (or according to different kinds of stone or wood) would be an essential division, which no one will say; these are material with respect to the account and diversity of a statue. Stone, wood, and so forth are therefore the matter and genus of a statue insofar as they are subject to an artificial form and enter into an artificial order. For natural and artificial things do not belong to the same genus; thus species of artificial things do not have matter considered in itself and absolutely, and as something natural, for their genus, but matter insofar as it enters into such an order. Hence matter, and a division or diversity of matter considered in itself, does not essentially vary an artifact.

Likewise, a term is a kind of logical artifact: sign is its matter and is therefore placed in the position of genus. But sign is not its matter when considered according to the common account of sign and absolutely, but insofar as it is subject to a logical artificial form. Hence mental, spoken, common, singular, and so on do not vary a term or sign essentially insofar as sign is the genus of term, but only materially, just as gold, stone, and wood do not vary a statue or the genus of a statue essentially, but only materially and accidentally. Therefore terms are distinguished accidentally as predicates, just as a statue is golden, wooden, or stone.

A second argument is made: propositions are distinguished in species according to a different thing signified or a different truth that they signify; therefore terms are too.

The consequence is proved: a term is ordered per se to a proposition; therefore a term ordered per se to a proposition distinct in species will be a term distinct in species. Therefore, in the end, terms are essentially diversified by signification.

It is confirmed: definitions of terms differ; different logical intentions are found in them; and one common term cannot become singular. Therefore terms are essentially distinguished, for these are signs of an essential distinction.

IT IS ANSWERED: The antecedent is distinguished: propositions are distinguished in species according to a different thing signified, etc., in the formal account of proposition and logical art—this is denied; in the account of representation and sign—it is granted. The consequence must be distinguished in the same way. For propositions and terms are distinguished according to signification materially, not formally or in their artificial form. Thus a term is not ordered per se, totally, and adequately to one determinate proposition only, but to any proposition that can be made from such a term, just as prime matter is ordered to any corruptible form.

As to the first part of the confirmation, the answer is by distinction: definitions of terms differ by an accidental diversity—this antecedent is granted; by an essential diversity—it is denied. For the definitions mentioned are descriptive and explain only what is accidental to a term as such, even if it is essential to a term of that kind. For example, a human being is defined insofar as white, as that which scatters vision. This definition is accidental to a human being in itself, but essential to a human being insofar as white. Thus the definitions of a connotative, common, singular, and so on term are accidental to a term in itself and in general, but essential to a term as connotative, singular, and so on. These terms include the account of term as a subject, just as white includes body and snub includes nose, not as a genus. The same answer applies to the second part of the confirmation: the intentions of terms are accidental to a term, but essential to a term of that kind. To the third part, the antecedent is granted and the consequence denied: one human being cannot become another, yet it does not follow that they are distinguished in species.