Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

The point of this difficulty arises from the very definition of improper, or metaphorical, supposition: “taking a term for that which it signifies improperly and by transference.” We see this happen with spoken terms, because one term is transferred to supposit for something other than what it directly signifies, on account of some agreement, likeness, or comparison with that thing; for every metaphor is founded on some comparison or likeness.

We therefore ask whether the ultimate mental concept itself, which is a natural likeness of some thing, contains a basis for being applied to what it does not signify naturally and properly, but to something with which it can have a metaphorical likeness or comparison. For example, in the familiar proposition, “The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered,” for there to be improper supposition in the mind, the concept of a real lion—which is a natural and express likeness of a lion—would have to supposit and be applied to Christ, whom it does not signify properly and directly. For if it supposited for a real lion, the proposition would be false. But to supposit improperly for Christ, it must not represent him just as directly as it represents a real lion; otherwise that concept would be equivocal, and its supposition for Christ would not be improper but proper for both Christ and the lion, since it would represent both properly and naturally, just as an equivocal name supposits properly for each of its significates.

THE DIFFICULTY, THEREFORE, IS whether the concept of a real lion is sufficient for improper supposition, since it can at least connote Christ obliquely as like a lion; or whether a distinct concept is required for supposition, one that directly represents Christ with a connotation to a real lion, representing Christ not absolutely but as compared with a lion.

On this point, AUTHORS are divided. Some simply and absolutely acknowledge that improper supposition exists, because they think that in the metaphor just described the concept of a real lion represents Christ connotatively, under a certain analogy and likeness to a lion, in the first way. Others think that this concept of a real lion neither represents Christ nor supposits for him, but that a different concept is formed, representing Christ with some comparison and connotation to a real lion in the second way; thus it supposits properly for Christ by reason of the thing signified, with a connotation to the lion.

NEVERTHELESS, I SAY BY WAY OF A RESOLUTION that this second opinion, understood in the sense of St. Thomas, seems simply more probable, and many Thomists follow it; the first opinion is not without probability, however.

The FIRST PART is drawn from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 10, where he says: “When we name God by participation, we understand by the name ‘God’ something that has a likeness to the true God.” But God by participation is God metaphorically, just as Christ is metaphorically a lion. Therefore, when we hear the name “God” used metaphorically, we understand something that has a likeness to the true God; and by the name “lion” used metaphorically, we understand something that has a likeness to a real lion. Thus, the concept is not that of a real lion, but a distinct concept, namely, of what has a likeness to a real lion; this is the concept of Christ with a certain connotation to a lion.

The basis is taken from what has been said. For this metaphorical supposition cannot be made true of what is a real lion, but of what is like a lion. No real lion of the tribe of Judah is found, nor does the phrase supposit for one any more than if someone said “a corporeal angel” or “a roaring human being.” It supposits and is made true only of what is like a lion. But the concept of a real lion cannot be the concept of what is like a lion, because, as was said, we form one concept of a real lion and another of what is related comparatively as though it were a real lion. Therefore, if the supposition is made true of this second thing, and not of the first, this second concept supposits, not the first. For the supposition to be improper, the concept of a real lion would have to supposit for what is not a lion but is like a lion, without signifying it properly, just as the word “lion” is drawn to supposit for what is not a lion but is like one.

This is confirmed because the concept of a real lion signifies by natural representation only a real lion, under which Christ is not included, and the property of strength, to which Christ is likened because he can be compared with it; by reason of this comparison, he is named by the name of that to which he is compared. But this comparison presupposes another concept representing Christ as compared with a lion, not absolutely; for there is no comparison of something with itself. Hence analogues used metaphorically are said to involve two concepts, as we will say in Logic II, q. 13, a. 5; and God known connotatively or comparatively in relation to creatures is expressed by a concept different from the concepts of creatures. Therefore, since supposition takes and substitutes a term for some thing that is predicated or made the subject, and not for what it connotes obliquely—even if the thing can be named from what it connotes—the mental concept of a real lion does not supposit for Christ, although Christ is connoted by it. Rather, the concept of Christ as compared with a lion supposits, and this concept does not supposit improperly.

From this it follows that when someone conceives the proposition “The Lion has conquered,” the concept of a real lion need not be destroyed by adding the phrase “of the tribe of Judah.” Rather, the intellect forms another concept of Christ insofar as he has a connotation and comparison to the concept of a real lion. Thus the first concept, of a real lion, is not related as a thing that supposits, but as what terminates Christ’s comparison and connotation to itself.

The SECOND PART OF THE CONCLUSION, which some Thomists also hold, following Master Soto, Summulae II, ch. 10, note 3, is based on this: supposition does not require the signification of some thing, but an ordering and application by the intellect, even for something the term does not signify, when the term is applied to what its signified thing resembles. It is enough that it signify something at least secondarily, so that it has the capacity to be substituted and to supposit for that thing by the intellect, and not only for what it signifies directly and formally. A common term, for example, signifies individuals secondarily and materially, yet supposits for them; a connotative term supposits for the substrate it merely connotes; and an analogue supposits for its analogates, even if the analogy is metaphorical attribution. This will be explained further in the arguments.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, it is argued that it is possible for a concept to signify something improperly; therefore, it is possible for it to supposit improperly.

The consequent is clear, since the whole reason for denying improper supposition is the denial of improper signification in a concept.

The antecedent is proved by all concepts that represent things not as they are in themselves but in the likeness of something else, and not through their own species but through others. Thus, we know God and angels through sensible things, a being of reason through a real being, and one analogate through the concept of another analogate. Therefore, there is no incompatibility in a concept signifying improperly.

This is confirmed by connotative and common terms, which supposit for the individuals they signify connotatively and obliquely. Therefore, the concept of a real lion will also be able to supposit for Christ, signified connotatively and obliquely. The same holds of transference, which occurs in a mental concept, since it is a certain logical property—a second intention—and is nevertheless defined as a diversion from proper to improper supposition. Thus, it is supposed that improper supposition truly exists in the mind.

WE ANSWER: The antecedent is denied. To the proof we say that concepts representing things not as they are in themselves but through alien species are improper concepts on the side of their mode of representing, not on the side of the thing represented, even though it is known in the likeness of another thing. For example, the concept we form of God or of angels is called a proper concept of God on the side of the thing known, because it is attributed and appropriated to God alone; but on the side of the mode of knowing, God is not known in his own proper mode, as he is in himself. The same holds of the other concepts mentioned in the argument. Improper supposition, however, requires that the term not signify properly the thing for which it supposits, on the side of that thing; for supposition is for the thing signified, not for the mode of signifying. If an analogue is metaphorical by attribution, it does not involve one concept but two. Therefore, one concept does not supposit improperly for the other; each supposits for its own significate.¹

To the confirmation we answer that a connotative or common term supposits for what it connotes, and not only for what it signifies formally, because what it connotes is signified as a thing, subject, or supposit. Hence it can supposit for it by proper supposition, since it is signified not metaphorically but properly, even if materially. In metaphors and other rhetorical figures, however, what is connoted is presented as the term of a comparison, because every metaphor is made through some formal or virtual comparison. Thus it pertains, as it were, to a connotation on the side of the mode of signifying, not on the side of the thing signified; it does not supposit for that thing. Rather, another concept is formed that signifies the thing properly, with a connotation to that through which the metaphor is expressed. As for what is said about transference, we deny that it occurs in the ultimate concept, since a concept cannot be transferred here without being destroyed. That second intention of a word or a non-ultimate concept is what makes the diversion or transference of signification true.

Second, it is argued: The propositions “The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered” and “Christ has conquered” are not synonyms but signify in different ways. But in the proposition “Christ has conquered,” Christ is signified properly. Therefore, in the other proposition the same thing cannot be signified properly; otherwise the propositions would be identical in every respect.

If it is said that in one proposition Christ is signified properly, absolutely, and without any relation, but in the other properly with some relation and connotation, the objection is: If the signification in “The Lion has conquered, etc.” is not proper absolutely, then neither is its supposition proper absolutely, because proper supposition is founded on proper signification. Therefore, for the supposition to be proper absolutely, it must be founded on signification that is proper absolutely.

This is confirmed because when I first hear the two terms “The Lion has conquered,” the concept of a real lion is represented to me. When the phrase “of the tribe of Judah” is added, that prior concept of a real lion is not destroyed within the proposition. Therefore, it remains in the proposition as before. So it does not supposit for itself, since the proposition would be false; therefore, it supposits for Christ, whom it does not signify properly. Thus it supposits improperly. That the concept of a real lion is not destroyed is clear: if it were destroyed, Christ would not be conceived in relation to a lion, but in himself absolutely, without relation, since the concept of a lion, from which this connotation is drawn, would not remain. The propositions “Christ has conquered” and “The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered” would then be the same.

WE ANSWER with the solution already given, which is taken from the words of St. Thomas quoted above,² that “when we name God by participation, we understand what has a likeness to the true God.” Likewise, when we name Christ as a lion, we understand what has a likeness to a real lion; on the side of the thing signified, this is a proper concept of Christ.

To the reply we say that a concept of Christ known connotatively, not altogether absolutely, is proper to Christ on the side of the thing signified, although not on the side of the mode of signifying, since he is signified with a certain connotation and relation to another. Proper or improper supposition is not considered on the side of the mode of signifying, whether proper or improper, but on the side of the thing signified, whether properly or improperly. For the term is substituted and supposits for that thing as for a supposit. For the same reason, Christ is signified immediately as the thing signified, although under a relational and connotative mode, with another as the term of comparison.

To the confirmation we answer that it is not necessary for the concept of a real lion to be destroyed. But when the phrase “of the tribe of Judah” is added, it is applied in a different way, because a concept is formed of Christ as compared with a real lion in respect of his strength or properties. Thus the concept of a real lion remains as the term of this comparison and connotation, not as providing the term’s supposition on the side of a thing improperly signified.

Finally, it is argued: If the concept of a real lion is formed first, when I begin to hear the proposition, and afterward I form a concept of Christ, not absolutely but related and connoted to a real lion, then the proposition is formed through reasoning, insofar as from comparing one thing with another we infer that this metaphor intends to signify Christ. But if it is formed through reasoning from propositions as premises, then these propositions will first be formed: “The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered,” “He is not a real lion but one who has a likeness to a real lion,” and “Therefore Christ, as having such a likeness, has conquered.” But then the first proposition in the premises, “The Lion has conquered, etc.,” before it yields the conclusion, does not supposit for a real lion, since it would then be false. Therefore, at that point the concept of a real lion supposits improperly for Christ, which is the point at issue.

WE ANSWER that since in these metaphors the intellect uses a certain circuit and comparison to signify things, it can also use reasoning to gather the meaning of such a metaphor, especially when it does not fully grasp the metaphor at the outset and needs reasoning to understand it. Therefore, even if reasoning occurs here, we answer the objection as follows: in that reasoning the first proposition, which is assumed as a premise—“The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered”—does not function formally but materially, and is replaced by another proposition in the ultimate concept, namely, “The spoken proposition ‘The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered’ is proposed.” This is not made true according to the signification of a real lion, but according to the signification of what has a likeness to a real lion—that is, Christ—and so on. This is the reasoning formed for these metaphors: the proposition represented metaphorically is assumed as though it were the major premise; since it is not made true in its proper sense, reasoning is used to see in what sense it can be made true. Thus, when a metaphorical proposition is taken as the major premise before the metaphor has been fully understood by reasoning, that proposition is not in an ultimate concept but in a non-ultimate concept, which represents the spoken proposition. The intellect then reasons about its sense; when it finds that it is made true metaphorically, it forms in the mind an ultimate concept of the one who has a likeness to a real lion—that is, Christ. This concept supposits in the conclusion, and its supposition is proper.³