Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Prima Pars Artis Logicae

The order of teaching requires that, having explained the essence or nature of the proposition, we begin to explain its properties. We shall treat first the properties of its parts in this question, and then the properties of the proposition as a whole in itself in the next. The properties of the parts are supposition, ampliation, and the like; those of the whole are opposition, conversion, and equipollence.

We defined supposition in the text as “the taking of a term for something of which it is verified according to the requirement of the copula.” For its precise explanation, therefore, THREE questions must be investigated: First, concerning its genus, how it is understood that supposition is a taking. Second, concerning its difference, how a term is verified according to the requirement of the copula. Third, whether supposition is found only within a proposition.

First difficulty. Regarding the first point, “taking” in the definition of supposition means the passive use or ordering of the intellect by which it uses some term, or orders and compares it in relation to something.

It is clear that supposition is distinguished from signification: the signification of a term is permanent and one, while its supposition can vary while the same signification remains, because the former depends on imposition, which does not change, and the latter on the application and use of the intellect, by which it applies and uses a term. Since this taking is a passive use of the term that supposits and is taken, it necessarily requires an active taking, which is nothing other than an act of the intellect ordering and comparing the term itself and consequently denominating it not only as known, but also as thus directed, applied, and taken. The very relation of reason in which the intention of supposition formally consists is founded on this passive taking.

Second, taking as such is common to the many and various intentions founded upon taking, such as the character of predicate and subject, and the character of ampliation, restriction, appellation, and the like. All these are founded upon some taking by the intellect, that is, some ordering and comparison by which it compares a term according to different considerations and characters: either by comparing one term with another under the character of subject and predicate, which are relations of that of which something is said and that which is said of something; or under the character of application, by which the signified content of one term determines that of another, as in appellation; or by comparing a term with that for which it stands, as in supposition; or with those things to which it is extended or from which it is restricted, as in ampliation and restriction. Therefore, this taking by the intellect, which is posited as the genus of supposition, is nothing other than the intellect’s ordering of a term—not so that it may signify (for this is done by imposition, not by the taking of a term), nor so that it may construct a proposition absolutely (for that belongs to the term’s exercise in the character of a part), but so that it may be coordinated and applied, according to different relations and uses, with other terms and with the whole proposition.

BUT AN OBJECTION IS RAISED, because if taking is common to every intention founded on the intellect’s passive use, such as the intention of predicate and subject, appellation, ampliation, and so on, then taking should have been placed as the genus in the definitions of all these intentions, and not only in the definition of supposition. Indeed, it should have been placed in the definition of sign, since a sign too is taken for what it signifies and stands for. Or, if taking is not the genus with respect to these, neither is it with respect to supposition.

It is also confirmed: in the proposition “The divine essence is the Father,” the expression “divine essence” is taken for the Father, yet it does not supposit for him; therefore, the definition is bad. The major premise is proved because if it were taken for the Son, or the Holy Spirit, or the whole Trinity, the proposition would be false; therefore, it is taken for the Father alone. The minor premise is proved: if it supposits for the Father, this proposition could be conceded: “The divine essence generates,” since it supposits for the Father, who generates, just as “a human being walks” is conceded because Peter walks, for whom “human being” supposits, although it does not directly signify Peter, just as the divine essence does not directly signify the Father.

It is confirmed a second time: in a closed book a term supposits, since a written proposition is found there; therefore, supposition too is found there. Yet the term is not passively taken by the intellect there, as though in act, because it is not actually known. Therefore, the essence of supposition does not consist in the intellect’s actual use and taking.

We answer that in the case of other properties or intentions founded on the intellect’s passive use, “taking” is always understood. For example, when one says “Appellation is the application of the formal signified content,” the sense is that it is an applicative taking. When one says that ampliation is an extension, an extensive taking is understood. “Taking” is expressed more readily in supposition than in the other cases because, since it is the first among these logical properties belonging to a term within a proposition, its common character could be expressed by no other name. The other properties, however, which are like additions that extend, restrict, modify, and so on, can be expressed by other names. A sign is not taken or made to stand for what it signifies by the kind of taking of which we speak here; it stands for it only by presenting or signifying it through imposition or representation. Here, however, we are speaking of a taking of the signifying term that is, as it were, applicative and ordering it to some use of the intellect.

To the first confirmation we answer that, as St. Thomas says in Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 5, ad 4, the divine essence does not supposit for the Father by reason of its mode of signifying (which is especially considered in the verification of an utterance), since it is signified as abstracted from the persons; but by reason of identity and supreme simplicity it can supposit for the Father or be verified of him. Therefore, when identity is signified by the verb “is,” the divine essence is taken and supposits for the person by reason of identity. But when a notional act proper to a person is signified, the expression “essence” does not supposit for the person, because identity is then not signified, but rather the person’s property, from which “essence” abstracts by its mode of signifying.

To the second confirmation we answer that in a closed book a proposition, supposition, and the other logical properties are found as it were in a sign not actually known; therefore, those intentions are present there only virtually, not actually. One must not, however, concede in the same way that a sign is there virtually and not formally, because the writing itself in the closed book is formally imposed in itself to signify, just as spoken words are. Thus, although the writing does not actually represent, it is actually imposed, and is therefore actually a sign, since the actual essence of a sign does not consist in the actual exercise of representing: a sign is said to be representative, not representation. Supposition, however, is founded on the intellect’s actual application and use. Although the relation of reason of a sign found in a closed book does not actually exist unless it is actually known, the book is nevertheless denominated a sign from the imposition itself and the proximate foundation of this relation. We shall say more about this in Logic, q. 21.

Second difficulty. To answer the second difficulty posed at the outset, which concerns the difference of supposition—namely, that it is “a taking for something for which it is verified”—we must note that, as we said,¹ the verification of a term differs from the verification of a proposition. A proposition can fail to be verified, as in “A human being is a stone,” and yet its terms truly supposit and are verified. Thus the verification of a proposition is taken according to whether the thing itself exists or does not exist, as signified by the proposition’s being or not being. To verify a supposing term, however, it suffices that what it supposits for can be found and designated according to the requirement of the copula and verb to which it is applied in supposing, as we explained more fully in the cited place. This verification or designation can sometimes be made by sense, if the thing can be demonstrated to the senses, or by the intellect, if it is hidden or considered in the abstract, as we said there. Indeed, sometimes demonstration cannot be made immediately in the term itself, but only mediately, by resolving it. For example, when I say “Every human being is an animal,” I should not demonstrate something that is “every human being”; rather, after resolving that universal into its singular instances—“This human being is an animal, and that one,” and so on—one can demonstrate of each: “This is a human being.”

Given this, some recent authors do not admit supposition in this sense: that a term must be verified for something according to the requirement of the copula. It remains for us only to prove that it must be admitted in this way.

AND THE FOUNDATION IS this: there are propositions with a subject that does not supposit, namely, when some restriction or a term incompatible with it is added to a term, as in “A corporeal angel moves” or “A created God understands.” The terms “angel” and “God” do not supposit, because there is no corporeal angel or created God. This is because, for a term to stand for something, it must not be impeded or opposed by anything, so that it can stand for that thing. Likewise, if it is incompatible with a copula to find what a term stands for, the term cannot stand for it while that copula remains. For example, if you say “Adam exists” or “The Antichrist existed,” there is no such Antichrist that existed, nor such Adam who exists; therefore, the term cannot stand for him. Verification of the term according to the copula is therefore required for standing or supposition: that is, what the term supposits for must be findable and designable according to the signification of that copula.

BUT YOU WILL SAY: In some propositions the subject supposits and is not verified according to the copula; therefore, and so on.

The antecedent is proved first in false propositions such as “Adam exists” and “The Antichrist existed.” Those propositions are false because their predicates do not belong to the things for which their subjects supposit; otherwise, we would not understand the proposition’s falsity unless we knew what the predicate is incompatible with or does not belong to. Therefore, the subject supposits for something. Also, in the proposition “A chimera will exist,” “chimera” supposits, since it is amplified by the verb “will exist,” and ampliation is an extension from lesser to greater supposition; yet it is not verified according to the copula that a chimera will ever exist. Therefore, supposition and ampliation can stand without verification. Second, in optative and imperative propositions terms can supposit, because they are said determinately of something, and yet they are not verified according to any copula, since there is none there. Finally, in propositions of eternal truth, such as “A human being is an animal,” the term cannot be verified by demonstrating it with the pronoun “this” at some temporal difference, since the verb is released from all time; therefore, supposition without verification is given.

It is confirmed: verification of a term is made by a proposition distinct from the one in which the term supposits, as we said. Therefore, such verification cannot belong to the constitutive and essential difference of supposition.

We answer: the antecedent is denied. To the first proof we say that those propositions are false precisely because they have a subject that does not supposit: according to that copula, nothing is found for which the subject supposits. Falsity does not always require that a term supposit for something to which the predicate does not belong; it suffices that it does not supposit—that is, that nothing is found under that copula—and yet a predicate is affirmed of it. In “A chimera will exist,” either there is no ampliation properly speaking, because there is no true supposition, or, if there is ampliation, it should not be taken as a greater extension of supposition, but as an extension of supposita or times to which ampliation is made, whether or not the term supposits.

To the second proof we answer that in optative utterances and so on, terms supposit according to the requirement of the copula. In optatives, if they concern the future, the term on the subject side is verified for something that exists or will exist. For example, if you say “Would that Peter become just,” “Peter” supposits for Peter, who exists or will exist. If it concerns the past, as in “Would that he had been just,” it supposits for one who exists or existed, and so on. In imperatives it supposits for something present: if you say “Peter, do this,” “Peter” must supposit for the one present to whom the command is given; the same applies to vocatives and so on. Thus an utterance containing a copula suffices for supposition, according to whose requirement the term can be found and demonstrated. In this way we understand that supposition occurs only in a proposition, taking “proposition” to mean every utterance consisting of a copula. In natural supposition, where truth abstracts from time, verification of the supposing subject is not demonstrated to the senses but to the intellect, because it is verified according to the existence expressed by a verb abstracting from time. For example, if you say “Peter is a human being,” “Peter” supposits by demonstrating Peter to the intellect in himself, as when one says “that which is Peter,” with “is” abstracting from time. When I say “A human being is an animal,” one demonstrates to the intellect that which is a human being in itself, not according to an individual or universal state.

To the confirmation we answer that verification of the term does not constitute supposition insofar as it is made, as it were, in signified act and demonstrated through another proposition; rather, verification in exercised act takes place in the very proposition in which the term supposits, and is afterwards made clear and proved in a distinct proposition.

Third difficulty. To the third difficulty posed at the outset, we answer that a term in no way supposits outside a proposition or utterance containing a copula, according to whose requirement the taking of the term can be verified.

THE REASON IS TAKEN FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, because supposition is not standing for something according to the mere character of signification (for then it would clearly be found outside a proposition); rather, with signification presupposed, a term stands for something according to its application and relation to another. For it truly to supposit, therefore, what it supposits for must be found and capable of being designated in this way; otherwise, if it is neither found nor designable, it cannot be applied in such a standing-for. That what the term supposits for can be found or designated is established by demonstrating it through a copula, because by reason of a verb it is established that the thing is or is not, or that what a term supposits for is found. A term must therefore necessarily be joined to a verb, so that with respect to it what the term is taken for can be found and demonstrated. Moreover, a term can stand for something with respect to one copula and not another. For example, if you say “Adam existed,” “Adam” supposits with respect to the past. If you say “Adam exists,” it does not supposit, because he is not found and consequently is not verified with respect to the present. Sometimes supposition also varies according to the copula taken not absolutely, but with respect to the predicate. For example, in “A human being is a noun” and “A human being is a species,” “human being” does not supposit by reason only of the copula “is,” as signifying present time; rather, it is understood to supposit materially in one and simply in the other, because the predicate joined to the term by that copula requires it. Therefore, different species of supposition can be taken in relation to different copulas.

BUT YOU WILL OBJECT: A term outside a proposition truly has the character of a term and a part; therefore, it expresses a relation to the verb, by joining with which it can compose; therefore, it has the character of supposition, just as it has a proximate potency for composition. For just as a term signifies potency, not act, for composing, so too for supposing, especially since supposition is a property of a term and consequently is not separated from it, either within or outside a proposition.

It is also confirmed, because outside a proposition a term expresses a relation to a verb or to another term. First, in imperfect utterances, as when you say “Peter, white” or “a just human being,” where one term can be taken in relation to another. Why should it be taken only in relation to a verb? Also, in complete non-enunciative utterances, which truly and properly contain a verb, though they do not enunciate but command, wish, and so on.

It is confirmed a second time: if a term supposits only within a proposition because it stands for something according to the requirement of the verb, it follows that all true affirmative propositions are essential. This is clear in the proposition “Peter runs,” which is true because according to the requirement of the copula it supposits for a running Peter. But it is essential to say of a running Peter that he runs; therefore, this is an essential proposition.

We answer the principal argument: there is a difference between the character of a term and the character of supposition. The intention of a term is only the intention of a part and the substitution of signification. Neither is founded on the actual exercise of signifying or composing, but on the ability and potency to compose or signify. For the character of a part is not the character of what is composing, but of what is compositive; similarly, the character of a sign is that of what is significant, not what is signifying. The intention of supposition, however, results from the intellect’s actual determination and passive use of a term, which it determines and applies, whether in the mind, in speech, or in writing, for this or that for which it is verified. Therefore, before the intellect’s actual application, this determination is not given. As to the claim that supposition is a property of a term, I answer that supposition is not a property of a term in every state, but only insofar as it is applied within a proposition, just as it is a property of a heavy thing to rest not absolutely, but at the center.

To the first confirmation we answer that outside a proposition a term expresses a relation to a verb or predicate in the manner of a part capable of composing, not in the manner of an act determined and made to stand for something that is truly found to stand for it. For it cannot be established that it truly stands for something in this way unless it is established with respect to a verb that it is found. Hence there is no supposition in imperfect utterances that do not contain a verb, because what is needed to verify and designate how a term truly and properly supposits is not yet given. This is evident because when terms are joined without a verb, as in “A white human being,” that complex is indifferent to every kind of supposition. From it one can form material supposition by saying “A white human being is a complex expression”; formal supposition by saying “A white human being scatters vision”; simple supposition by saying “A white human being is predicable of many”; natural supposition by saying “A white human being is colored”; or accidental supposition by saying “A white human being walks.” Since it is indifferent to all species of supposition, it clearly has none in act and is not determined and verified by reason of a copula. We have already said that supposition can be found in non-enunciative utterances containing a verb.

To the second confirmation we answer that although in that proposition “Peter” supposits identically for a running Peter, the proposition is not essential. For an essential proposition requires more than the identity of subject and predicate on the side of the supposited thing and its supposition; it also requires a necessary connection and relation of the terms, which is an identity, as it were, formal. Thus in the accidental propositions mentioned there is indeed a true conjunction and union between predicate and subject, but it is not necessary. Although they supposit for the same thing, they do not do so under the formality of the necessary connection required for an essential proposition, as would be formally signified on the subject side by saying “A running Peter runs.” For then the proposition would be essential, because the relation of the terms would signify not only the foundation of truth but intrinsic necessity.

The point of this difficulty arises from the very definition of improper, or metaphorical, supposition: “taking a term for that which it signifies improperly and by transference.” We see this happen with spoken terms, because one term is transferred to supposit for something other than what it directly signifies, on account of some agreement, likeness, or comparison with that thing; for every metaphor is founded on some comparison or likeness.

We therefore ask whether the ultimate mental concept itself, which is a natural likeness of some thing, contains a basis for being applied to what it does not signify naturally and properly, but to something with which it can have a metaphorical likeness or comparison. For example, in the familiar proposition, “The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered,” for there to be improper supposition in the mind, the concept of a real lion—which is a natural and express likeness of a lion—would have to supposit and be applied to Christ, whom it does not signify properly and directly. For if it supposited for a real lion, the proposition would be false. But to supposit improperly for Christ, it must not represent him just as directly as it represents a real lion; otherwise that concept would be equivocal, and its supposition for Christ would not be improper but proper for both Christ and the lion, since it would represent both properly and naturally, just as an equivocal name supposits properly for each of its significates.

THE DIFFICULTY, THEREFORE, IS whether the concept of a real lion is sufficient for improper supposition, since it can at least connote Christ obliquely as like a lion; or whether a distinct concept is required for supposition, one that directly represents Christ with a connotation to a real lion, representing Christ not absolutely but as compared with a lion.

On this point, AUTHORS are divided. Some simply and absolutely acknowledge that improper supposition exists, because they think that in the metaphor just described the concept of a real lion represents Christ connotatively, under a certain analogy and likeness to a lion, in the first way. Others think that this concept of a real lion neither represents Christ nor supposits for him, but that a different concept is formed, representing Christ with some comparison and connotation to a real lion in the second way; thus it supposits properly for Christ by reason of the thing signified, with a connotation to the lion.

NEVERTHELESS, I SAY BY WAY OF A RESOLUTION that this second opinion, understood in the sense of St. Thomas, seems simply more probable, and many Thomists follow it; the first opinion is not without probability, however.

The FIRST PART is drawn from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 10, where he says: “When we name God by participation, we understand by the name ‘God’ something that has a likeness to the true God.” But God by participation is God metaphorically, just as Christ is metaphorically a lion. Therefore, when we hear the name “God” used metaphorically, we understand something that has a likeness to the true God; and by the name “lion” used metaphorically, we understand something that has a likeness to a real lion. Thus, the concept is not that of a real lion, but a distinct concept, namely, of what has a likeness to a real lion; this is the concept of Christ with a certain connotation to a lion.

The basis is taken from what has been said. For this metaphorical supposition cannot be made true of what is a real lion, but of what is like a lion. No real lion of the tribe of Judah is found, nor does the phrase supposit for one any more than if someone said “a corporeal angel” or “a roaring human being.” It supposits and is made true only of what is like a lion. But the concept of a real lion cannot be the concept of what is like a lion, because, as was said, we form one concept of a real lion and another of what is related comparatively as though it were a real lion. Therefore, if the supposition is made true of this second thing, and not of the first, this second concept supposits, not the first. For the supposition to be improper, the concept of a real lion would have to supposit for what is not a lion but is like a lion, without signifying it properly, just as the word “lion” is drawn to supposit for what is not a lion but is like one.

This is confirmed because the concept of a real lion signifies by natural representation only a real lion, under which Christ is not included, and the property of strength, to which Christ is likened because he can be compared with it; by reason of this comparison, he is named by the name of that to which he is compared. But this comparison presupposes another concept representing Christ as compared with a lion, not absolutely; for there is no comparison of something with itself. Hence analogues used metaphorically are said to involve two concepts, as we will say in Logic II, q. 13, a. 5; and God known connotatively or comparatively in relation to creatures is expressed by a concept different from the concepts of creatures. Therefore, since supposition takes and substitutes a term for some thing that is predicated or made the subject, and not for what it connotes obliquely—even if the thing can be named from what it connotes—the mental concept of a real lion does not supposit for Christ, although Christ is connoted by it. Rather, the concept of Christ as compared with a lion supposits, and this concept does not supposit improperly.

From this it follows that when someone conceives the proposition “The Lion has conquered,” the concept of a real lion need not be destroyed by adding the phrase “of the tribe of Judah.” Rather, the intellect forms another concept of Christ insofar as he has a connotation and comparison to the concept of a real lion. Thus the first concept, of a real lion, is not related as a thing that supposits, but as what terminates Christ’s comparison and connotation to itself.

The SECOND PART OF THE CONCLUSION, which some Thomists also hold, following Master Soto, Summulae II, ch. 10, note 3, is based on this: supposition does not require the signification of some thing, but an ordering and application by the intellect, even for something the term does not signify, when the term is applied to what its signified thing resembles. It is enough that it signify something at least secondarily, so that it has the capacity to be substituted and to supposit for that thing by the intellect, and not only for what it signifies directly and formally. A common term, for example, signifies individuals secondarily and materially, yet supposits for them; a connotative term supposits for the substrate it merely connotes; and an analogue supposits for its analogates, even if the analogy is metaphorical attribution. This will be explained further in the arguments.

THE ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED.

First, it is argued that it is possible for a concept to signify something improperly; therefore, it is possible for it to supposit improperly.

The consequent is clear, since the whole reason for denying improper supposition is the denial of improper signification in a concept.

The antecedent is proved by all concepts that represent things not as they are in themselves but in the likeness of something else, and not through their own species but through others. Thus, we know God and angels through sensible things, a being of reason through a real being, and one analogate through the concept of another analogate. Therefore, there is no incompatibility in a concept signifying improperly.

This is confirmed by connotative and common terms, which supposit for the individuals they signify connotatively and obliquely. Therefore, the concept of a real lion will also be able to supposit for Christ, signified connotatively and obliquely. The same holds of transference, which occurs in a mental concept, since it is a certain logical property—a second intention—and is nevertheless defined as a diversion from proper to improper supposition. Thus, it is supposed that improper supposition truly exists in the mind.

WE ANSWER: The antecedent is denied. To the proof we say that concepts representing things not as they are in themselves but through alien species are improper concepts on the side of their mode of representing, not on the side of the thing represented, even though it is known in the likeness of another thing. For example, the concept we form of God or of angels is called a proper concept of God on the side of the thing known, because it is attributed and appropriated to God alone; but on the side of the mode of knowing, God is not known in his own proper mode, as he is in himself. The same holds of the other concepts mentioned in the argument. Improper supposition, however, requires that the term not signify properly the thing for which it supposits, on the side of that thing; for supposition is for the thing signified, not for the mode of signifying. If an analogue is metaphorical by attribution, it does not involve one concept but two. Therefore, one concept does not supposit improperly for the other; each supposits for its own significate.¹

To the confirmation we answer that a connotative or common term supposits for what it connotes, and not only for what it signifies formally, because what it connotes is signified as a thing, subject, or supposit. Hence it can supposit for it by proper supposition, since it is signified not metaphorically but properly, even if materially. In metaphors and other rhetorical figures, however, what is connoted is presented as the term of a comparison, because every metaphor is made through some formal or virtual comparison. Thus it pertains, as it were, to a connotation on the side of the mode of signifying, not on the side of the thing signified; it does not supposit for that thing. Rather, another concept is formed that signifies the thing properly, with a connotation to that through which the metaphor is expressed. As for what is said about transference, we deny that it occurs in the ultimate concept, since a concept cannot be transferred here without being destroyed. That second intention of a word or a non-ultimate concept is what makes the diversion or transference of signification true.

Second, it is argued: The propositions “The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered” and “Christ has conquered” are not synonyms but signify in different ways. But in the proposition “Christ has conquered,” Christ is signified properly. Therefore, in the other proposition the same thing cannot be signified properly; otherwise the propositions would be identical in every respect.

If it is said that in one proposition Christ is signified properly, absolutely, and without any relation, but in the other properly with some relation and connotation, the objection is: If the signification in “The Lion has conquered, etc.” is not proper absolutely, then neither is its supposition proper absolutely, because proper supposition is founded on proper signification. Therefore, for the supposition to be proper absolutely, it must be founded on signification that is proper absolutely.

This is confirmed because when I first hear the two terms “The Lion has conquered,” the concept of a real lion is represented to me. When the phrase “of the tribe of Judah” is added, that prior concept of a real lion is not destroyed within the proposition. Therefore, it remains in the proposition as before. So it does not supposit for itself, since the proposition would be false; therefore, it supposits for Christ, whom it does not signify properly. Thus it supposits improperly. That the concept of a real lion is not destroyed is clear: if it were destroyed, Christ would not be conceived in relation to a lion, but in himself absolutely, without relation, since the concept of a lion, from which this connotation is drawn, would not remain. The propositions “Christ has conquered” and “The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered” would then be the same.

WE ANSWER with the solution already given, which is taken from the words of St. Thomas quoted above,² that “when we name God by participation, we understand what has a likeness to the true God.” Likewise, when we name Christ as a lion, we understand what has a likeness to a real lion; on the side of the thing signified, this is a proper concept of Christ.

To the reply we say that a concept of Christ known connotatively, not altogether absolutely, is proper to Christ on the side of the thing signified, although not on the side of the mode of signifying, since he is signified with a certain connotation and relation to another. Proper or improper supposition is not considered on the side of the mode of signifying, whether proper or improper, but on the side of the thing signified, whether properly or improperly. For the term is substituted and supposits for that thing as for a supposit. For the same reason, Christ is signified immediately as the thing signified, although under a relational and connotative mode, with another as the term of comparison.

To the confirmation we answer that it is not necessary for the concept of a real lion to be destroyed. But when the phrase “of the tribe of Judah” is added, it is applied in a different way, because a concept is formed of Christ as compared with a real lion in respect of his strength or properties. Thus the concept of a real lion remains as the term of this comparison and connotation, not as providing the term’s supposition on the side of a thing improperly signified.

Finally, it is argued: If the concept of a real lion is formed first, when I begin to hear the proposition, and afterward I form a concept of Christ, not absolutely but related and connoted to a real lion, then the proposition is formed through reasoning, insofar as from comparing one thing with another we infer that this metaphor intends to signify Christ. But if it is formed through reasoning from propositions as premises, then these propositions will first be formed: “The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered,” “He is not a real lion but one who has a likeness to a real lion,” and “Therefore Christ, as having such a likeness, has conquered.” But then the first proposition in the premises, “The Lion has conquered, etc.,” before it yields the conclusion, does not supposit for a real lion, since it would then be false. Therefore, at that point the concept of a real lion supposits improperly for Christ, which is the point at issue.

WE ANSWER that since in these metaphors the intellect uses a certain circuit and comparison to signify things, it can also use reasoning to gather the meaning of such a metaphor, especially when it does not fully grasp the metaphor at the outset and needs reasoning to understand it. Therefore, even if reasoning occurs here, we answer the objection as follows: in that reasoning the first proposition, which is assumed as a premise—“The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered”—does not function formally but materially, and is replaced by another proposition in the ultimate concept, namely, “The spoken proposition ‘The Lion of the tribe of Judah has conquered’ is proposed.” This is not made true according to the signification of a real lion, but according to the signification of what has a likeness to a real lion—that is, Christ—and so on. This is the reasoning formed for these metaphors: the proposition represented metaphorically is assumed as though it were the major premise; since it is not made true in its proper sense, reasoning is used to see in what sense it can be made true. Thus, when a metaphorical proposition is taken as the major premise before the metaphor has been fully understood by reasoning, that proposition is not in an ultimate concept but in a non-ultimate concept, which represents the spoken proposition. The intellect then reasons about its sense; when it finds that it is made true metaphorically, it forms in the mind an ultimate concept of the one who has a likeness to a real lion—that is, Christ. This concept supposits in the conclusion, and its supposition is proper.³

Concerning simple supposition, whose definition we gave in the text,¹ there is usually a difficulty about how it is distinguished from the other suppositions, and first from natural supposition. For it seems that simple supposition also signifies a necessary connection and relation between terms. When I say, “A human being is a species,” it is simple supposition because it gives this sense: “A human being conceived by a proper or common concept is a species.” But the predicate “species” belongs essentially to the common concept of human being; therefore it signifies an essential connection of the terms. Another difficulty is that the definition of simple supposition also seems to fit natural supposition, as when a definition is predicated of what is defined, for example, “A human being is a rational animal.” The term “human being” is taken for its immediate signification, which it signifies per se and formally in that way. For it is human being, not Peter or Paul as an individual, that is defined. Therefore the definition of simple supposition also fits natural supposition, in which a definition is predicated of what is defined.

A second difficulty is whether simple supposition can be found in a singular term, as when I say, “Peter is an individual.” A singular term does not seem to have an immediate signification distinct from a mediate one, by reason of which it could supposit simply; rather, it has only one adequate signification for which it supposits singularly. On the other hand, just as in the term “human being,” when a term of second intention is predicated of it, simple supposition occurs because it does not pass to mediated significations (for “A human being is a species; therefore Peter is a species” does not follow), so likewise, when a predicate of second intention is predicated that belongs not to nature in common but only to an individual, it also supposits simply. Thus this also does not follow: “Peter is an individual and is not predicable of many; therefore a human being is an individual and is not predicable of many.”

Finally, in propositions whose subject is incompatible with a predicate of second intention, as “Peter is a species” or “A human being is an individual,” the subject ought to supposit simply, since the predicate is a term of second intention and does not pass to mediated significations. Yet the subject is not taken for what it first and per se signifies, since the concept of the predicate is incompatible with the concept of the subject and consequently does not appeal to that subject’s own proper and per se concept. Therefore, and so on.

A BRIEF ANSWER TO THESE DIFFICULTIES begins by distinguishing simple supposition from material and personal supposition. It differs from material supposition because simple supposition is for the thing itself signified, not for the name signifying it; it differs from personal supposition because it supposits only for the immediate signification and in no way for the mediate one. We should keep in view St. Thomas’s teaching in De potentia, q. 9, a. 4,² that a name signifies in two ways: one way formally, another materially. The formal signification is that for the signifying of which a name was imposed principally; the material signification is that in which the account signified by the name is preserved and found. Thus the name “human being” signifies human nature, but that nature is preserved in an individual. For there to be simple supposition, then, the term must supposit for one signification, namely, the immediate one, in such a way that it cannot pass or descend to the mediate one; for if it can pass to both, it does not remain simple but is, as it were, a twofold supposition, corresponding to two significations. This occurs only with predicates of second intention in relation to their subject or foundation. For if the predicates are real, they can for that very reason be found on the side of the thing and consequently in some individual, not only in the nature. Therefore it does not suffice for simple supposition that a predicate belong to the immediate signification of a name; it must belong to that signification with some precision that excludes the other.

To the first difficulty, then, we reply that the proposition is in no way essential. For propositions to be essential, the necessary connection and relation must be signified by the force of the terms themselves, not by the force of some application or state in which a term is clothed or applied, unless that application or state is expressed in the proposition. In that case the term expressing the state can signify a necessary connection with the predicate, as in “A white human being disperses sight.” Although the subject is verified of a white human being and supposits for one, the term “human being” itself does not signify the whiteness, which is what essentially belongs to dispersing sight; therefore this proposition is not essential. But “A white human being disperses sight” is essential. Likewise, if you say, “A human being is a species,” although it is verified of a human being conceived in common, the proposition is not essential, because the term “human being” itself does not explain that it is conceived in common. But if the proposition says “a human being conceived by a common concept,” then “is a species” is predicated essentially of it; it gives this sense: “A human being, insofar as it is a species, is a species.”

To the objection on the other side we say that although a definition belongs to a term by reason of its nature and quiddity, it is not simple supposition, because the definition does not belong to the nature, its immediate signification, in such a way that it could not also belong to the person or individual in which that nature is found. Indeed, just as quiddity and nature descend to individuals, so too does the definition. Although when a human being is defined it is not Peter who is defined immediately and according to individuation, Peter is defined mediately according to his nature and quiddity.

To the second difficulty we reply that simple supposition can also be found in a singular term, since it has an immediate and a mediate signification, but in the inverse order from a common term. In a common term, the immediate signification is the nature, and the mediate signification is the person to whom that nature belongs. In singular terms, however, the immediate signification is the person or individual, and the mediate signification is the nature of which that person is constituted. Thus a person is defined as “an individual substance of a rational nature.” The immediate and direct signification is substance, or the individual supposit; the mediate or indirect signification is nature. Therefore all predicates that signify the second intention of singularity produce simple, not personal, supposition in a singular term. For example, when it is said of Peter that he is a lower thing subordinated to an atomic species, predicable of one and not of many, an individual, and so on, the consequence from a singular term to a common term is valid, as the argument says.

To the third difficulty we reply that either position can be maintained in those propositions: the subject supposits either simply or personally.

The first view is explained as follows: By the very fact that the subject is joined by the copula to a term of second intention according to the requirement of that copula, it makes, as it were, an appeal to stand under the account of its own immediate and proper concept. Although the predicate is incompatible with the subject, this proves only that it does not belong to it and thus makes the proposition false; it does not prove that the subject fails to supposit according to the requirement of that copula and predicate. The proposition “Peter, as conceived by a proper concept, is a species” therefore has this sense and is false. Likewise, in “A human being is a stone,” the term “human being” supposits: although the predicate does not belong to it, a human being can nevertheless be found and pointed out according to the requirement of the verb “is.” Otherwise it is not clear what supposition the subject “Peter is a species” has, if it does not supposit simply, since personal supposition does not fit with respect to that predicate of second intention.

The second view is explained by saying that the subject can supposit personally. Although the predicate is of second intention, it is not signified to belong to the subject but to be incompatible with it; it is incompatible with the subject even on the side of the thing. Therefore, when a predicate of second intention is incompatible with the subject, it need not make that subject supposit simply, since it is incompatible with the subject even under personal supposition and in its mediate signification, which is on the side of the thing.

Concerning the other species and divisions of supposition, their rules, both for absolute and relative terms, many sophisms and consequences are usually multiplied. If they were treated here in detail, this work would grow without limit. We therefore omit them for now and shall indicate the principal points in the next question, article 3.

At present we should note concerning alienation whether propositions in which the subject is alienated from the predicate are in a contingent, remote, or necessary matter, as when I say, “A human being is painted,” or “A human being is dead.” For if the subjects are alienated, they do not supposit for a real human being, but for a painted or dead human being, of whom it is said essentially that he is dead or painted.

WE REPLY that the predicate “painted” or “dead” can be taken in two ways: participially, or with the force of a verb, and nominally, or with the force of a noun. Taken participially, the proposition “A human being is dead” is verified through the ampliation of the subject to a real human being, not through alienation. For by ampliation we say of a real human being that he is dead, that is, has died or ceased to exist; this is said of a real human being because it gives this sense: “The human being who existed before no longer exists, but has ceased to exist.” Likewise, if one says, “A human being is painted,” taken participially it gives this sense: “A real human being is depicted in a painting, whether or not that human being now exists.” In this sense these propositions are in contingent matter, because the predicates are accidents of their objects. Although they are present with the corruption of the subject, this does not involve corruption of the essential concept, but only of existence, which does not remove accidental predication, as will be said in the chapter on Accident in the Predicables.³ If, however, the proposition is considered without ampliation, precisely according to the force of its terms, it is in remote matter, since the terms “human being” and “dead,” or “human being” and “painted,” are incompatible: something cannot be a human being and dead. But if “dead” is taken nominally, it makes an alienation of the subject; for “dead human being” means the same as “corpse of a human being,” and “painted human being” means “painting of a human being.” It is clear that the predicate is verified necessarily of a subject alienated in this way, because the alienation leaves the term, as it were, in an alien signification—that is, as a human corpse or a painting of a human being—of which “dead” and “painted” are said essentially. In that case, therefore, the proposition is in natural matter.

Before proposing the difficulties, I ASSUME three things. First, the common understanding of the intellect, when it uses a term, can apply two terms to one another in two ways. First, by a simple application in a general way: what has the character of form is applied to what has the character of matter and subject. This is called a simple and absolute application because it is made not through a relation or modification, but absolutely and simply. Second, one term can be applied to another not absolutely and simply, but through some relation, modification, or formality of one to the formality of the other. By reason of this, one is verified of the other precisely as it stands under that modification and not otherwise; if it is varied or changed, the consequence is vitiated. We call this kind of application appellation in a special sense, as when I say, “Peter is a great doctor,” where greatness is not applied to Peter absolutely but with respect to medicine.

Second, it follows from this that the view of some recent writers is false: they define appellation as a denomination by which one term denominates another, and preserve it in the application by which the formal aspect of one term is applied to the material aspect of another, as in “A human being sits,” “A human being runs,” and so on. But this view confuses the general application of a predicate to a subject with the special logical property called appellation. This is clearly false. The application and use of a term occur in different ways when a predicate is applied simply and absolutely to a subject taken materially, and when it is applied only as it stands under some relation and modification. This pertains to signifying truth in different ways; a variation of this kind makes a consequence defective and invalid. Therefore appellation, or this special kind of application, must receive special consideration in logic and introduces a special logical property, which we call appellation. For example, this does not follow: “Peter is a great doctor; therefore Peter is great absolutely.”

Third, the rules of appellation set out in the text must be recalled, both those concerning real appellation and those concerning appellation of reason.¹ A special difficulty is added in real appellation concerning numerical terms when they are added to a substantive or an adjective. When a numerical term is added to a substantive term, it is said to number supposits by reason of the form; appellation therefore intervenes, because supposits are not numbered unless they are numbered according to the multiplication of forms. The rule does not say that forms are numbered, but that supposits are numbered by reason of forms. Thus the supposits must be numbered, and the forms themselves must be the reason for numbering; if there are not several supposits, the rule does not apply. It concerns substantial form according to its natural mode—that is, as bringing its supposit with it and subsisting. Thus, for there to be three human beings, three humanities are required; for there to be three gods, three deities. For adjectives to be numbered, however, it suffices that the supposits be multiplied, even if the forms added are not multiplied and only their denomination is. For example, if one whiteness were in several supposits, they would be called several white things, because this plurality results not from multiplication of whiteness but from multiplication of its addition and denomination.

THEREFORE, against the first rule one can argue that appellation occurs even if the terms are not placed on the side of the same extreme; therefore the rule is false.

The antecedent is clear: In “A white thing is intense,” “A white thing disperses sight,” and “Christ, as man, is a creature,” there is appellation to the subjects from the side of the predicate. For the sense is that Christ is a creature by reason of his humanity; otherwise, if the predicate were applied to the supposit, the proposition would be false. Likewise, in “This white thing is intense,” a defective consequence can arise from a mere variation of appellation, as when one says, “This white thing is intense; this white thing is similar; therefore what is similar is intense.” This consequence is invalid solely through a defect of appellation; therefore this shows that appellation intervenes. When one says, “A white thing disperses sight,” the sense is that it does so by reason of the formal aspect signified in “white”; otherwise the proposition would not be essential.

The same argument can be made about “The essence is generating in divine things.” This proposition is false because “generating” is applied to the signification of essence, not to its material and identical signification. For if it were applied to the identical and material signification of the divine essence, the proposition would be true: it would be verified of the Father, who is identically the divine essence.

This is confirmed because the rule does not hold for appellation of reason. When I say, “A human being is a species,” appellation intervenes, yet the terms are not placed on the side of the same extreme; therefore the rule does not hold for real appellation either.

WE REPLY that the rule is understood of formal and express appellation, not appellation that is, as it were, virtual and equivalent. When I say, “A white thing disperses sight,” “A white thing is intense,” and so on, how an application is made or signified to be made is one thing, and how something is verified in reality is another. On the side of the mode of signifying, the application of one term to another is not signified by appellation; only the simple application of predicate to subject is signified. But since the proposition cannot be verified except through some formal account belonging to the side of the subject, it is said to have appellation virtually and equivalently. Thus in these and similar consequences there is a defect of appellation that is, as it were, virtual, arising from a variation between two supposits, as it were, signified on the side of the subject: the white thing insofar as white and the white thing insofar as similar. These are as it were two logical supposits, although materially and physically there is one; changing from one to the other changes the consequence. Express appellation, however, is signified and posited only as the rule says, when the terms are placed on the side of the same extreme. In the proposition “The essence generates,” there is no appellation but a simple application of predicate to subject. Since the subject does not signify a person or supposit for one but signifies only the essence, the proposition is false. Although the essence is identically and materially the same as the person, this identity is on the side of the thing signified, not in the mode of signifying of the term “essence.” Since it does not signify a person² a personal act is not verified of it.

To the confirmation we reply that the rule speaks only of real appellation, not appellation of reason. For when a predicate is of second intention and is said of a first intention or its foundation, to which it belongs, the subject or foundation itself is signified under a state capable of that intention: the state of precision and intellectual apprehension, under which alone such a predicate can belong to it. Since it signifies that precision on the side of the subject, it is posited sufficiently to produce appellation, because appellation signifies the agreement of one term with another under a certain precision or restriction. This does not apply to other terms that produce real appellation.

Second, it is argued: A numerical term added to a substantive does not always number supposits by reason of forms; therefore the rule is false.

The antecedent is proved: If the divine Word assumed three human natures, they would not be called three human beings but one human being, as St. Thomas determines in Summa theologiae III, q. 3, a. 7. Yet several substantial forms would be numbered; therefore the rule is false.

This is confirmed: Conversely, if three persons assumed the same humanity, they would be called three human beings, and only one in a qualified sense, as St. Thomas says in the same place, a. 6. Therefore the substantive is now numbered not by reason of forms but by reason of supposits, even though they have one substantial form.

WE REPLY that in that case there would not be three human beings, because there would not be three supposits. The rule does not say that a substantive is pluralized when forms, but not supposits, are multiplied; it says that supposits are numbered by reason of forms, which is entirely true. But multiplying substantial forms does not suffice unless supposits are also multiplied, even though the forms themselves are the reason for the multiplication, because in that case the forms do not bring supposits with them and do not subsist in themselves in their connatural mode.

To the confirmation we reply that in that case St. Thomas says the three persons would be one human being in a qualified sense and simply several, as is clear in Summa theologiae III, q. 3, a. 6, ad 1: “For it could not be argued from the fact that the three persons are one human being that they are simply one; nothing prevents saying that human beings who are simply many are one in some respect, as one people.” Therefore, if three persons assumed one nature, they would simply be called three human beings. For them to be simply one, the unity of substantial form does not suffice when that form does not bring a supposit with it but comes to several supposits and has, as it were, the mode of a connotative term. Thus both plurality and unity in substantial forms are understood according to substantial forms existing in a substantial mode—that is, as bringing their subsistence and supposit with them—not as being drawn to an alien supposit or supposits and as it were taking on the laws and mode of connotative terms.

But why, YOU WILL ASK, are the three persons now simply called one God, and not several gods by reason of one nature, whereas in that case they would not be called one human being by reason of one human nature, but several human beings?

We reply that the difference consists in this: although the divine nature is in three persons, it is as perfect in the account of substantial form as if it were in only one person and brought its supposit with it. Therefore, with respect to the three persons, the divine nature does not take on the account of a connotative term, since it is not drawn to the persons as those who assume it and give being to the nature; rather, it has being of itself and thus exists simply and substantially, independently of the persons. Since unity follows being, if it has being perfectly of itself, it brings unity of itself. Human nature, by contrast, although substantially united to the persons, does not have in itself the whole perfection of substance or take on the mode of substantial form, but exists in a quasi-connotative way, receiving substantial being from the persons themselves. It is therefore not in a perfect state of giving substantial unity simply, independently of the persons, because it has being not of itself but from the persons. The divine nature, however, independently of the persons, is one God on account of the infinite perfection of such being and divine substance. See Cajetan, Summa theologiae III, q. 3, a. 6, at the end of the article.

The arguments that could be made against the rule of appellation of reason are the same as those brought forward in the preceding article when treating simple supposition. See them there.