Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae Tomus I: De Christo Legato Divino, De Ecclesia Christi, De Fontibus Theologicis

ARTICLE I.

ON THE TEACHING OFFICE OF THE COLLEGE OF BISHOPS.

Cf. Bellarmin, On Councils; D. Bouix, On the Pope, where he also treats the ecumenical council, Paris 1868–1870; L. Hefele, History of the Councils, Introduction (also in French, Paris 1907); Wilmers, On the Church, 391 ff.; J. M. A. Vacant, The Ordinary Teaching Office of the Church and Its Organs, Paris 1887.

Prop. XXXVII. The doctrine of faith is infallibly proposed through the daily exercise of the ecclesiastical teaching office, when the bishops, scattered throughout the world and united with the Supreme Pontiff, unanimously teach what must be held with firm assent.

304. Position of the question. The bishops under the Supreme Pontiff constitute the apostolic teaching office, always living in the Church (above, no. 270 ff.). Nevertheless, although each bishop is an authentic teacher in his own diocese, individual bishops are not infallible; rather, the entire teaching Church, taken together, is infallible (above, no. 280).

Now the bishops can exercise the office of teaching in two ways. Either each teaches the faithful in his own diocese in the ordinary way, immediately by himself or mediately through parish priests and his other assistants; or the bishops meet in an extraordinary way to consult and decide matters of faith and morals, as happens in councils. First, then, we must ask whether the bishops exercising their ordinary teaching office in their dioceses are infallible if, all together with the Roman Pontiff, they teach the same thing as something everyone must hold with firm assent. Union with the Roman Pontiff is required, because without it there is no teaching office instituted by Christ. The agreement of all is required, because if they disagree among themselves, they do not constitute an authority. Yet moral agreement between most of them and the Pontiff suffices, because these are the teaching Church, not the few who dissent from the college and its head. The doctrine must also be proposed as certain and to be held with absolute assent, since mere probability does not exclude the truth of the contrary doctrine.

The bishops’ consensus concerning a doctrine may be either explicit or tacit. Explicit consensus is manifested: a) in pastoral letters or similar public writings by which bishops propose a true doctrine to the people or censure a false doctrine; b) by publishing or approving catechisms and other doctrinal books; c) in sermons and instructions given by a bishop. Other modes are already more extraordinary: d) the celebration of a provincial synod, whose acts are not to be promulgated until they have first been approved in Rome; hence these acts have great authority, but are not infallible documents. Still, the Church’s consensus can easily be established by comparing various provincial councils; e) sometimes, when asked by the Supreme Pontiff, bishops express their opinion on a dogmatic question, as happened, for example, in preparing the definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. This procedure closely approaches the action of a council, from which it differs insofar as the bishops in this way do not receive jurisdiction over the universal Church.

Tacit consensus obtains when bishops know that a doctrine is commonly taught in their dioceses and do not contradict it. For they must resist a theological doctrine they judge contrary to the principles of faith. An error that has not yet spread widely and is not dangerous may indeed be tolerated for a time as a prudent concession; but this can in no way be done if an error spreads so widely that it becomes dangerous unless resisted (cf. St. Augustine, Letter 55, ch. 19, no. 35).

305. Argument 1. From Christ’s institution.

Christ instituted the apostolic teaching office in such a way that he sent it into the whole world to preach and obliged everyone to accept its teaching. But everyone cannot be obliged to accept the teaching office’s doctrine throughout the world unless this teaching office is infallible. Therefore, the teaching office spread throughout the world is infallible, at least when taken collegially; and since it is established that individual bishops are not infallible, all of them together, when they agree on sacred doctrine, are infallible.

306. Argument 2. From the conviction of the Church.

The Church has always been convinced that bishops teaching unanimously are infallible in handing down and explaining sacred doctrine. But the Church could not err in this fundamental doctrine. Therefore, this conviction is true.

Proof of the major. According to the testimony of the holy Fathers, apostolic doctrine is preserved intact in the Church through the unbroken succession of bishops. St. Ignatius of Antioch: “The bishops established throughout the regions of the earth are of one mind with Jesus Christ; hence you must concur with the bishop’s judgment, as indeed you do” (Ephesians 3, 2 ff.). St. Irenaeus: While bishops remain in the unity of the Church, “we must obey those who have succession from the apostles, who, together with their episcopal succession, received the sure charism of truth according to the good pleasure of the Father” (Against Heresies 4, 26). Tertullian: The apostles founded Churches, “from which the other Churches thereafter borrowed, and continue daily to borrow, the stock of faith and seeds of doctrine, so that they may become Churches.” How, then, will the individual Churches prove the truth of their doctrine? “Let them unfold the order of their bishops” back to the apostles. But those Churches “which, though much later and established only in our own day, produce no apostle or apostolic man as their founder, are nonetheless considered no less apostolic, because they conspire in the same faith through kinship of doctrine” (On the Prescription of Heretics 20, 32). The whole work On Prescriptions rests on the supposition that the Church spread throughout the world cannot hand down any doctrine other than the true and apostolic one. Because of this conviction, the ancients investigated episcopal successions so carefully (above, no. 271). “For this same norm of apostolic teaching,” says Pope St. Simplicius, “persists through its successions” (Denz. no. 160).

The Church of our own time thinks no differently. On this matter Pius IX says: “Even if the question concerned that submission which is to be made by an act of divine faith, it would still not have to be limited to those things defined by the express decrees of ecumenical councils or of the Roman Pontiffs and this See, but would also extend to those things which are handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary teaching office of the whole Church, dispersed throughout the world” (Denz. no. 1683). The First Vatican Council teaches the same (session 3, chapter 3; Denz. no. 1792).

Therefore, unless the whole Church has erred about the rule of faith—which is impossible—the doctrine of faith is infallibly proposed through the daily exercise of the ecclesiastical teaching office.

307. Argument 3. From the absurdity of the contrary opinion.

If the whole Church could err in its ordinary teaching office, it would not have been infallible during the first three centuries, but could have corrupted apostolic doctrine; for the first universal council was held at Nicaea in 325. Even in later times, centuries often lie between individual councils, for example, between the eighth council, held at Constantinople in 870, and the ninth, held at the Lateran in 1120; and between the Council of Trent, concluded in 1563, and the Vatican Council, concluded in 1870. Councils cannot always be held. During the intervening periods, therefore, the Church could err, and then a council would have to be convened to repair the damage. It is surely impermissible to imagine this; for in that case Christ’s promise would not be fulfilled: “Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the age” (Mt 28:20).

The nature and purpose of the Church require that it be infallible in the ordinary exercise of its teaching office, because it must always lead people to the knowledge of truth and ward off heretical doctrines. For this reason the Church has always claimed the right to judge definitively about heresies even outside an ecumenical council, for example, about the doctrines of Pelagius, Berengarius, and Jansenius. Heretics who appealed against their condemnation to a council were often rejected; St. Augustine already says that no council was required to condemn the Pelagians (Against Two Letters of the Pelagians 4, 12, no. 34).

308. Objection I. Individual bishops are not infallible. But multiplication or addition does not change the quality of things. Therefore, many bishops, or even all of them, are not infallible either.

I answer. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: A mere addition does not change the quality of things, I grant the minor; if the addition is joined to another element not present in the individuals, I deny the minor. And I distinguish the consequence: The mere number of bishops, taken by itself, does not change their doctrinal quality, I grant the consequence; it does not change it insofar as there is in the college of bishops an element not present in each individual, I deny the consequence.

This element is principally the assistance of the Holy Spirit, by which not each bishop becomes infallible, but the whole college, morally one in proposing doctrine, becomes infallible.

Besides, even if we consider the matter purely in the natural order, it is not true that the testimony of many people, whether historical or doctrinal, is as fallible as the testimony of individuals. For if this were true, all moral certainty would collapse, since it rests precisely on the multitude of agreeing witnesses. Thus, although the physical quality of things is not changed by mere addition, this is not to be transferred without qualification to the moral order, as is explained in philosophy. Tertullian rightly says on our question: “Come now, suppose all the [Churches] have erred; suppose the apostle was deceived …; suppose the Holy Spirit had no regard for them … allowing the Churches in the meantime to understand and believe differently from what he preached through the apostles: is it at all likely that so many and such great Churches would have erred into one faith? Among many [diverse] outcomes, there would not be just one result; the doctrine of the Churches would have varied in error. But what is found to be one among many is not an error, but a tradition” (On the Prescription of Heretics 28).

309. Objection II. The bishops are not an apostolic college unless united with the Roman Pontiff. But bishops can separate themselves from the Roman Pontiff. Therefore, at least on this supposition, the Church spread throughout the world would no longer be infallible.

I answer. I grant the major. I deny the minor, at least if it is understood to mean that all bishops, or so great a part of them, could separate themselves from the Supreme Pontiff that the teaching Church would in fact cease to exist. For the Church is indefectible, and the apostolic teaching office will teach people until the end of the world. Individual bishops can become schismatics, but not so great a part of them that the apostolic teaching office would cease to exist. It cannot, however, be exactly determined how large this part would be.

310. Objection III. It is fitting for individual people and for the whole human race to draw ever closer to the truth through many errors and changing opinions, not only in secular matters but also, and especially, in religion, rather than to possess immutable truth from the beginning and pass it from hand to hand as something to be contemplated with sterile admiration. Therefore, in the same way, the Church spread throughout the world—not only the bishops but the whole Christian people—develops a dogmatic doctrine that is relatively true and must continually be corrected and perfected.

I answer. This is the doctrine of the modernists, condemned by the Church (Denz. nos. 2006, 2083, 2095), and it is a fancy from which even sound common sense recoils: as if there were no immutable truths, but everything constantly flowed. This opinion is far more absurd when it concerns truth revealed by God, because what God has said to be true can never become false. Nevertheless, Christians do not contemplate truth revealed by God idly; rather, each strives, according to his own condition, to understand it ever more perfectly and to turn it to the uses of religious life. In this way there is true progress, which does not consist in overturning or distorting what has been handed down, but in increasing its understanding and perfecting its use.

Prop. XXXVIII. Ecumenical councils teach infallibly not only in canons directed against heretics but also in chapters, insofar as they propose in them a doctrine to be held by all; not, however, in disputations and arguments added merely for the sake of explanation.

311. Position of the question. a) If bishops from the whole world (ἐκ τῆς οἰκουμένης), summoned by the Supreme Pontiff, meet to deliberate and decide matters pertaining to faith and morals, such an assembly is an ecumenical or universal council. Twenty such councils are counted: 1. Nicaea I (325); 2. Constantinople I (381); 3. Ephesus (431); 4. Chalcedon (451); 5. Constantinople II (553); 6. Constantinople III (680–681); 7. Nicaea II (787); 8. Constantinople IV (869–870); 9. Lateran I (1123); 10. Lateran II (1139); 11. Lateran III (1179); 12. Lateran IV (1215); 13. Lyons I (1245); 14. Lyons II (1274); 15. Vienne (1311–1312); 16. Constance (1414–1418); 17. Florence (1438–1445); 18. Lateran V (1512–1517); 19. Trent (1545–1563); 20. Vatican (1869–1870). Of these councils, Lateran I, II, and III and Lyons I do not deal with dogmatic matters. The Council of Carthage of 418 (Milevis) and the Second Council of Orange of 529 are provincial in themselves; nevertheless, their canons have the same force as the teaching of ecumenical councils because they were universally received.

b) For a council to be universal by reason of its convocation, all bishops who actually govern particular Churches must be invited, but not necessarily those who have been consecrated bishops but do not actually possess jurisdiction, since they are not presently pastors of Christ’s flock. If the bishops of only one province or region are called, it is clear that the council is not ecumenical. It suffices that morally all are invited, even if some cannot be invited because of an impediment. Nor must each one necessarily be invited individually; a public and universal invitation, which can come to each person’s notice, is in itself sufficient, even if by chance it does not reach some, since the exercise of the ecclesiastical teaching office according to God’s will cannot depend on such accidents.

c) The right to convene a council belongs only to the Supreme Pontiff, both because all bishops throughout the world are subject to him alone and because he alone can grant bishops jurisdiction over the universal Church. Nothing prevents him from entrusting the execution of this task to others, even to secular rulers. The ancient Christian emperors convened several ecumenical councils. If they did so with the consent of the Supreme Pontiff, they acted rightly; if without his consent, they acted wrongly, and those councils were not ecumenical by reason of their convocation, but became ecumenical through the subsequent acceptance and approval of the Supreme Pontiff. These questions pertain rather to ecclesiastical history. The dogmatic question is undoubtedly settled (cf. Denz. no. 740). The Supreme Pontiff can also grant the right to attend a council and exercise quasi-episcopal jurisdiction there to cardinals who are not bishops and to other clerics.

d) By reason of its celebration, a council is ecumenical if enough bishops are present for the whole teaching Church to be truly represented. It is especially necessary that the Supreme Pontiff preside, either personally or through his legates. But the legates represent the Pontiff only insofar as they carry out his instructions. If the number of bishops is too small to represent the whole Church, the decrees may nevertheless become universal if the other bishops accept them. It is not necessary that all the bishops in a council agree unanimously for a definition to be infallible. Since individual bishops are not infallible, there can be differing opinions among them. On the other hand, sometimes a question must necessarily be decided. Therefore, the contrary opinion of certain bishops cannot make a definition impossible. Otherwise, the Church, whether dispersed throughout the world or assembled in a council, could scarcely ever decide a dogmatic question and effectively uproot the contrary error. What part of the council, then, is the infallibly teaching Church? Without doubt, the Supreme Pontiff together with the bishops who agree with him, because the others are without that head which is essential to the apostolic teaching office. In many councils there were dissenting bishops. Thus, at Nicaea Secundus and Theonas; at Constantinople I, thirty-six Macedonians. At Trent more than fifty Fathers disliked the decree on the invalidity of clandestine marriages; at the Vatican Council, quite a few bishops resisted the definition of the Supreme Pontiff’s infallibility. Nevertheless, the decrees of these councils were recognized as valid by the whole Church. Besides, the best theologians have always taught that a definition is valid even if only a minority of bishops agrees with the Supreme Pontiff in defining (e.g. Canus, On Theological Places 5, 9, 2; Bellarmin, On Councils I, 18, section “They object secondly”; Benedict XIV, On Synods 13, 2, 3).

e) The decrees and definitions of a council must be approved by the Supreme Pontiff, because only together with the head does the college of bishops constitute the apostolic teaching office and have the power to exercise jurisdiction over the universal Church. The Pontiff confirms the acts of the council: a) either by rendering a judgment in the council itself, orally or in writing, personally or through legates conveying his definite judgment; b) or by later adding an express confirmation to the acts of the council; c) or simply by receiving and permitting the acts of the council to be promulgated.

312. Proof of part I. An ecumenical council is infallible when defining a doctrine to be held by all. For the teaching office instituted by Christ is infallible collegially. But in a council the bishops collegially define that a doctrine must necessarily be held by all. Therefore, in this judgment they are infallible; otherwise, Christ and the Holy Spirit would have abandoned the Church, the gates of hell would have prevailed against it by leading the entire ecclesiastical teaching office into error, and the Church would have ceased to be the pillar and foundation of truth.

This has always been the conviction of the Church. St. Athanasius says of the Council of Nicaea: “The word of the Lord, uttered through the ecumenical Synod of Nicaea, remains forever” (Letter to the Africans, no. 2). St. Leo the Great says of the decrees of ecumenical councils that God “confirmed them with the irrevocable assent of the whole brotherhood” (Letter 120, ch. 1). “Therefore, if there are any who dissent from what has been established from heaven, let them be left to their own opinions and depart from the unity of the Church with the perversity they have chosen” (Letter 162, ch. 2). St. Gregory the Great says of the five councils held up to his time: “I confess that I receive and venerate four councils, just as I do the four books of the holy Gospel: Nicaea, in which the perverse doctrine of Arius was destroyed; Constantinople, in which the error of Eunomius and Macedonius was convicted; the first council of Ephesus, in which the impiety of Nestorius was judged; and Chalcedon, in which the wickedness of Eutyches and Dioscorus was rejected. With complete devotion I embrace and preserve them with the fullest approval, because in them, as in a square stone, the structure of holy faith rises; and whoever does not hold to their solidity, whatever sort of life and action he may display, even if he seems to be a stone, nevertheless lies outside the building. I likewise venerate the fifth council … Whoever thinks otherwise, let him be anathema” (Book I, Letter 25).

The councils themselves hold this same conviction, since they anathematize those who refuse to accept a defined doctrine, that is, separate themselves from the universal Church. For example, Nicaea says: “The Catholic Church anathematizes these people” (Denz. no. 54). A particular council may also sometimes pronounce anathema, but in itself this means only: “We sever ecclesiastical communion with those who teach otherwise.” Ecumenical councils, however, cast the anathematized person out of the Church, which certainly ought not to be done if they could err in their definitions (cf. Denz. no. 658).

Councils are infallible in themselves, not through the consent of the Church that hears them, as the Gallicans and others once wished (cf. Collect. Lac. VII, 1520 ff.). For the Church that hears is not established to teach but to learn. Hence those who refused to receive the definitions of councils have always been considered heretics. Here the saying of St. Cyprian applies: “Even if a stubborn and proud multitude of those unwilling to obey departs, the Church does not depart from Christ; they are the Church: the people united to their priest and the flock clinging to their shepherd” (Letter 66, no. 8; [ed. Hartel]). Above (no. 235) we already heard that the Church is governed by the bishops alone.

A council is infallible through the assistance of the Holy Spirit (cf. above, no. 285). It does not receive new revelations, but draws from Tradition the doctrine to be defined. Therefore, investigation of the handed-down doctrine is required. Yet neither this study nor the learning or talent of the bishops is the foundation of infallibility; it is the Holy Spirit, who helps and guides the bishops so that they find the truth and define what they have found. Hence a definition must undoubtedly be accepted, because the Holy Spirit does not permit a definition unless it is absolutely true, even if the reasons for which individual bishops agreed were perhaps insufficient. The Church does not demand belief in whatever the arguments perhaps prove, but in whatever infallible authority requires.

313. Proof of part II. Councils teach infallibly not only in canons but also in chapters, insofar as they propose in them a doctrine to be held by all. Certain recent theologians, and—what is surprising—even Denzinger himself in the preface to the Enchiridion (p. VII), think that chapters and, in general, everything apart from the canons do not fall under the definition or contain infallible doctrine. This opinion is plainly contrary to the councils’ own intention. In the preamble to its decree on justification, the Council of Trent says that the Synod “intends to set forth for all the faithful the true and sound doctrine of justification itself, which Christ Jesus, the Sun of Justice, the author and perfecter of our faith, taught, the apostles handed down, and the Catholic Church has always preserved under the prompting of the Holy Spirit; it strictly forbids anyone henceforth to believe, preach, or teach anything other than what is established and declared in this present decree.” Likewise, in the preamble to its decree on the most holy Eucharist: “The holy synod, handing down that sound and sincere doctrine concerning this venerable and divine sacrament of the Eucharist which the Catholic Church has always retained, instructed by our Lord Jesus Christ himself and his apostles and taught by the Holy Spirit, who daily suggests to her all truth, and which she will preserve to the end of the age, forbids all the faithful henceforth to dare to believe, teach, or preach about the most holy Eucharist otherwise than is explained and defined in this present decree.” The Council often repeats similar statements (cf. Denz. nos. 810, 882, 910). The First Vatican Council speaks in the same way, for example, in session 4, chapter 3: “This is the doctrine of Catholic truth, from which no one can deviate without loss of faith and salvation” (Denz. no. 1827).

Besides, the same theologians have always taught this so commonly that the contrary opinion of a few must be considered negligible. Scheeben calls this opinion absurd (Dogmatics I, no. 562), Kleutgen wholly arbitrary and plainly refuted by the councils’ very procedure (Theology of the Past I², no. 50), and others simply reject it as false (e.g. Tanquerey, On the Church¹³, no. 966; Wilmers, On the Church, proposition 68). Besides, it is clear that Christ did not attach the Church’s infallibility to any special manner of speaking; nor does the nature of the matter require anything other than that the council’s intention to define be unmistakably expressed. In symbols received by the Church and in its ordinary teaching office, the doctrine must necessarily be accepted by all even if no anathemas are added. The Council of Florence uses no canons in its decree of union with the Greeks, and yet defines a doctrine to be held by all (cf. Denz. no. 691 ff.). Therefore, we must say that a council defines when it signifies this in clear words.

314. Proof of part III. Disputations, arguments, and similar material found in the acts of councils are not infallible definitions, although they are not for that reason to be despised. For one who argues does not use authority, but tries by reasons to convince another’s intellect. Likewise, one who says something by the way or wishes to explain the sense of a doctrine to another with various illustrations is not considered to be using all the authority he has in that matter. A council can indeed define that a particular argument drawn from the sources of revelation must be accepted by all as valid. But if this is what it intends, this intention must be expressed in clear words. Thus, when it declares nothing of this sort, such an intention must not be presumed.

The common opinion of theologians is clearly stated by Bellarmin: “In councils, most of the acts do not pertain to faith. The disputations that precede are not matters of faith, nor are the reasons that are added, nor the things brought forward for explanation and illustration; only the bare decrees themselves are, and not all of them, but only those proposed as matters of faith. For sometimes councils define something not as certain but as probable, as the Council of Vienne, which decreed that it should be held as more probable that infants receive grace and virtues in baptism [Denz. no. 483] … When a decree is proposed as a matter of faith, it is easily recognized from the council’s words. For they always say that they are explaining the Catholic faith, or that those who think the contrary are to be considered heretics, or—most commonly—they pronounce anathema and exclude from the Church those who think the contrary. When they say none of these things, it is not certain that the matter is of faith. Finally, in the very decrees of faith, not the words but only the sense pertains to faith; for it is not heretical to say that some word in the canons of councils is superfluous or incorrectly placed, unless a decree was expressly made about the very word, as when at the Council of Nicaea they decreed that the word ὁμοούσιον be accepted, and at Ephesus the word θεοτόκον” (On Councils 2, 12, section “The fourth point”). Melchior Canus (On Theological Places 5, 5), Cajetan (Commentary on I, q. 61, a. 3, ad 3), Gregory of Valencia (I, disp. 4, q. 12, point 2), Suárez (On the Angels I, 3, 14), and others teach similarly; their words are found in Wilmers (On the Church, 400 ff.).

315. Objection I. St. Gregory of Nazianzus writes: “If I must speak truly, I am so disposed in mind that I avoid every assembly of bishops, for I have seen no council end happily and successfully, nor one that brought about the removal rather than the addition and increase of evils” (Letter 130 to Procopius). Therefore, St. Gregory does not seem to have thought that councils define dogmatic matters infallibly.

I answer. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For St. Gregory is not speaking at all of dogmatic definitions of ecumenical councils, but of various assemblies in which the Arians tried by force and fraud to overturn the doctrine defined by the Council of Nicaea and to plot against Catholic bishops. Such assemblies included those at Tyre, Seleucia, Ariminum, Milan, and others. Gregory is therefore referring to gatherings of this sort, at which, because of the intervention of emperors who favored the Arians, it was not truly possible to act in a conciliar manner.

316. Objection II. St. Augustine says: “The councils held in each region or province yield without any hesitation to the authority of plenary councils held throughout the whole Christian world; and plenary councils themselves are often corrected by later ones, when some experience of events reveals what was hidden and makes known what was obscure” (On Baptism 2, 3). But plenary councils that can be corrected are not infallible. Therefore, according to St. Augustine, plenary councils are not infallible.

I answer. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: Plenary councils are not infallible if their dogmatic definitions can later be overturned, I grant the minor; but I deny that this is St. Augustine’s meaning. If things previously left doubtful or undefined are later defined, or new disciplinary laws are established, I deny the minor.

Before Augustine’s time only two plenary councils had been held: Nicaea (325) and Constantinople I (381), to which one may add Sardica (343). Now Constantinople did not correct—that is, rectify—the doctrine of Nicaea, but confirmed it; moreover, it expressly defined the divinity of the Holy Spirit against the Macedonians, about which Nicaea had said nothing explicitly (cf. Denz. nos. 54, 85 f.). Sardica, however, defined nothing about faith, but established that Arian bishops were to be deposed (Kirch, Enchiridion, no. 464). Therefore, no dogmatic corrections of earlier councils were made at these councils, unless “correction” means a more explicit definition. But since Augustine says councils are often corrected, he seems rather to have been thinking of those assemblies mentioned in the preceding objection, which can be called plenary councils insofar as many bishops from East and West gathered at them. In those assemblies, later ones indeed often corrected earlier ones, until all false and ambiguous formulas had been removed. But these were not ecumenical councils in the sense explained in the thesis.

317. Objection III. Vincent of Lérins says: “In the Catholic Church itself we must take great care to hold that which has been believed everywhere, always, and by all” (Commonitorium 2, 5; Kirch, no. 742). Therefore, if some bishops contradict one another in a council, nothing can be defined.

I answer. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. Vincent is not explaining how the definitions of councils are to be made, but how individual Catholics should act if doubt arises about the true sense of Sacred Scripture; he says that heretics introducing new doctrines contrary to what has always, everywhere, and by all been believed are not to be heard. He therefore establishes a positive norm, not an exclusive one, as if truth could not be found by another means. For he continues: What if universality is lacking? “Then one must take care to cling to antiquity.” What if some disagree within antiquity itself? “Then one must take the utmost care to prefer the decrees of a universal council to the rashness or ignorance of a few …” What if nothing of this kind is found? Then one must consult reliable teachers, “who nevertheless remain in the communion and faith of one Catholic Church … and whatever … all together, with one and the same consent, are found openly, frequently, and persistently to have held, written, and taught, he should understand that he too must believe without any doubt” (Kirch, no. 743 ff.). Thus, among the means of knowing the truth, the decrees of a universal council are mentioned without any restriction. This is also clear from what he says at the end of the Commonitorium about the Council of Ephesus, in which Nestorius was condemned by two hundred Fathers as “contrary to antiquity,” while Cyril was approved as “in agreement with antiquity.” There he also appeals to “the authority of the Apostolic See,” and to Popes Sixtus and Celestine, who defended holy antiquity.

318. Objection IV. According to Catholic teaching, the Supreme Pontiff can infallibly define dogmatic questions. Therefore, ecumenical councils are superfluous.

I answer. I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For, notwithstanding the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff, councils have many benefits: 1. All the bishops together are better suited to investigate revealed truth; for since the assistance of the Holy Spirit does not remove the need to investigate Tradition, bishops gathered from throughout the world are very well suited to decide this preliminary question. 2. Through the proceedings and discussions of a council, bishops gain fuller knowledge of matters and become better prepared to propose and defend defined doctrines. 3. Although a conciliar definition is neither more infallible nor more binding than a pontifical definition, it has a certain greater external force, because it is made with greater solemnity and more visibly manifests the mind of the whole Church; thus, by the nature of the matter, it has a certain greater power to secure the Church’s peace and unity and to overcome its adversaries. In this external respect it can be said that the Pontiff’s judgment is confirmed by the consent of a council.

Scholium. Whether there is one or a dual subject of infallibility.

319. On this matter there are two probable opinions among theologians. Some think that the assistance of the Holy Spirit is present to the Supreme Pontiff in such a way that from him it extends to the bishops who agree with him, so that in reality there is only one immediate subject of infallibility. Thus, for example, Wilmers (On the Church, 438). Others think there is a dual, inadequately distinct subject, such that the bishops under the Supreme Pontiff constitute a subject of infallibility through the assistance of the Holy Spirit granted to the whole college, independently of the Pontiff’s infallibility when he defines by himself alone. Thus, for example, Franzelin (On Tradition and Scripture⁴, 109 f.). This second opinion seems preferable. For: a) Vatican I teaches that the Supreme Pontiff “possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals” (session 4, chapter 4; Denz. no. 1839). Here, then, the Pontiff’s infallibility is compared with the infallibility of the whole teaching Church; this comparison would be less fitting if, even in the whole teaching Church, the Pontiff alone were the immediate subject of infallibility. b) Before the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff was defined, this infallibility could be denied without heresy, and many denied it; but even then it was heretical to deny the infallibility of the whole teaching Church. Therefore, there seem to be two subjects of infallibility. c) Christ’s promises to the college of apostles (Mt 28:20) and to St. Peter (Mt 16:18) are also distinct. — In any case, there is not a great difference between these two opinions. For those who admit only one subject of infallibility principally intend to exclude the opinion of those who claim that bishops separated from the Supreme Pontiff are infallible, or who regard bishops and the Pontiff as coordinate. Those who hold that there is a dual, inadequately distinct subject also exclude this opinion.

Everyone agrees that bishops in councils are true judges and render authoritative judgments, as is clear from the formula commonly used in antiquity: “I have subscribed while defining.” This also applies when a matter already defined is defined again, as has often happened in councils. For authoritative speech does not require that someone be independent of the truth, but that he be able by his judgment to impose upon others the obligation to accept what is established. If a theologian proves a doctrine from the definitions of councils, no one is obliged to accept the doctrine on account of the theologian’s authority. But if a later council again defines the doctrine of an earlier council, all must accept that doctrine on account of the authority of the later council no less than of the earlier one.

ARTICLE II.

ON THE TEACHING OFFICE OF THE SUPREME PONTIFF.

Cf. Bellarmin, On the Roman Pontiff, book 4; Cl. Schrader, On Roman Unity, Paris 1878; Palmieri, On the Roman Pontiff, theses 25 f.; J. M. A. Vacant, Theological Studies on the Constitutions of the Vatican Council, Paris 1895; Wilmers, On the Church, 409 ff.

Prop. XXXIX. The Roman Pontiff, speaking ex cathedra, possesses the same infallibility as the teaching Church.

320. Position of the question. This thesis was not only defined but also explained in session 4, chapter 4 of the First Vatican Council: “We teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, acting in the office of pastor and teacher of all Christians, he defines by his supreme apostolic authority a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, through the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith and morals, and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not by the consent of the Church” (Denz. no. 1839).

Therefore: a) The definitions of the Roman Pontiff are infallible in themselves, not because the bishops or all the faithful agree, but because the Pontiff himself is infallible when defining, through the assistance of the Holy Spirit (cf. what was said above, no. 312, about a council). Objectively, the Church’s consensus is indeed never absent, since the Church does not think one thing and its head another; nevertheless, the Pontiff’s infallibility is not derived from the Church but from the Holy Spirit.

b) The Pontiff is infallible when he speaks ex cathedra (cf. Mt 23:2), that is, when, exercising the highest degree of a teacher’s authority, he imposes on the universal Church the obligation of holding a defined doctrine with absolute assent. The Supreme Pontiff always has the supreme teaching authority in the Church, but he does not necessarily always use it when he proposes some doctrine. Several pontiffs, such as Benedict XIV, published theological works as private teachers. These are therefore to be considered works of theologians like others. The Pontiff uses greater authority when he preaches sermons, since preaching revealed doctrine is part of the episcopal office. He also uses greater authority when he gives an answer after a bishop has asked him about a doctrine; nevertheless, by that very act he does not intend to oblige the whole Church. Indeed, even when the Supreme Pontiff sends encyclicals to the whole Church and deals in them with dogmatic questions, we must not suppose that he intends to define all these questions infallibly. His intention to define must undoubtedly be manifested in the very words, although no particular formulas are required (cf. Franzelin, On Tradition⁴, 110 f.; Choupin, Value of the Doctrinal and Disciplinary Decisions of the Holy See, Paris 1907, 24 ff.).

c) The Supreme Pontiff is personally infallible, not because this prerogative was given for his personal benefit, since its beneficiary is the whole Church, but because it belongs to him alone and cannot be delegated to others; and it belongs not to the Roman See as distinct from the person occupying it, but to each Pontiff reigning at a given time (cf. above, no. 296). Therefore, with respect to infallibility, the Apostolic See is the same as each individual Pontiff. On this matter Vatican I says: “To fulfill this pastoral office, our predecessors have always labored tirelessly to spread the saving doctrine of Christ among all peoples of the earth, and with equal care have watched over its sincere and pure preservation wherever it had been received. For this reason, the bishops of the whole world, sometimes individually, sometimes gathered in synods, following the longstanding custom of the Churches and the form of the ancient rule, especially referred to this Apostolic See the dangers that arose in matters of faith, so that the damage to faith might be repaired especially there where faith cannot suffer defect. The Roman Pontiffs, as the condition of times and circumstances suggested, sometimes by convening ecumenical councils or by ascertaining the mind of the Church dispersed throughout the world, sometimes through particular synods, and sometimes by employing other aids supplied by divine providence, defined as to be held those things which, with God’s help, they recognized to be in agreement with the Sacred Scriptures and apostolic traditions. For the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter so that, by his revelation, they might disclose a new doctrine, but so that, with his assistance, they might religiously guard and faithfully explain the revelation handed down through the apostles, or the deposit of faith” (session 4, chapter 4; Denz. no. 1836).

What we said above (no. 314) about matters on which councils do not define infallibly must be applied to pontifical definitions.

321. Argument 1. From Sacred Scripture.

The Supreme Pontiff has those prerogatives which were conferred by Christ upon St. Peter as primate. But the prerogative of infallibility in teaching was conferred upon St. Peter as primate. Therefore, the Supreme Pontiff, as St. Peter’s successor in the primacy, has the same prerogative of infallibility.

The major premise was proved above (no. 286 ff.). As an apostle, Peter indeed had various prerogatives in common with the other apostles, which were extraordinary and temporary, like the apostolic office strictly speaking itself. These, then, did not pass to the Roman Pontiffs, such as receiving new revelations, having the gift of tongues, and other charisms. But those things that pertain to Peter as the foundation of the Church and the shepherd of Christ’s whole flock constitute an ordinary office that is to remain perpetually in the Church (above, nos. 193 ff., 220).

Proof of the minor. a) In Mt 16:18 f., Christ established Peter as the future foundation of the Church, so that the gates of hell could not prevail against it; and he promised Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven, so that those who do not follow Peter may be excluded from the kingdom. But if Peter, using this supreme authority, could lead the whole Church into error concerning revealed doctrines, he would not be a firm foundation but could overthrow the Church, which would then be overcome by the gates of hell. Therefore, Peter cannot lead the Church into error, but is infallible in teaching. Likewise, if Peter, using the keys of the kingdom of heaven, could impose on the Church the obligation to hold a false doctrine, Christ would have obliged everyone, under penalty of losing salvation, to follow a false doctrine. But this is repugnant. Therefore, Peter cannot use the supreme power of the keys to teach error, but infallibly teaches the truth.

b) In Jn 21:15 ff., Christ appointed Peter as his vicar and supreme shepherd to feed his whole flock, whom all the sheep must follow as Christ himself. But it is repugnant to think that Christ entrusted his flock to a shepherd who could feed it with the poison of error. Therefore, Peter can feed Christ’s flock only with the wholesome food of truth; that is, he is infallible in teaching.

c) In Lk 22:32 Christ says to Peter: “I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail; and when you have turned again, strengthen your brethren.” The argument is as follows: Christ gave Peter the command to strengthen his brethren in faith, and prayed for him that his faith would not fail in carrying out this office. But Christ’s command and prayer were efficacious. Therefore, Peter strengthens his brethren in faith in such a way that his faith never fails; that is, he is infallible in handing down the doctrine of faith. For if he erred, he would not strengthen his brethren, but would lead them away from the truth of faith, and his own faith would fail.

Christ willed that the apostles should not begin exercising the apostolic teaching office until after they had received the Holy Spirit (Lk 24:49; Acts 1:8). Therefore, Peter too began his ordinary office as supreme teacher only from the day of Pentecost; what he said or did before then does not pertain to this ordinary office. From Acts chapter 2 through chapter 12 we see Peter exercising this office of teaching and governing.

The interpretation that Christ’s words in Luke refer to Peter as head of the Church is not a recent invention. St. Cyril of Alexandria explains them as follows: “And when you have turned again, strengthen your brethren, that is, be a support and teacher of those who come to me through faith” (Commentary on Luke 22:32). St. Leo the Great says of the same words: “We rightly rejoice, giving thanks to our everlasting King, our Redeemer, that he gave such power to the one whom he made chief of the whole Church, so that whatever is rightly done and rightly arranged through us even in our own times is to be attributed to his works and his governance, to him to whom it was said: ‘And you, when you have turned again, strengthen your brethren’” (Sermon 4, 4). St. Theodore the Studite writes to Pope St. Paschal: “Christ our God said to you: ‘And when you have turned again, you will strengthen your brethren.’ Behold the time, behold the occasion; help us, you who were appointed by God for this” (M PG 99, 1153).

322. Argument 2. From the consensus of the Church.

From the earliest centuries, many distinguished Catholic men, the Supreme Pontiffs themselves, and finally also ecumenical councils have implicitly or explicitly acknowledged that the Roman Pontiffs cannot err when defining questions of faith and morals. But this constant consensus of the Church is a sure argument for the truth. Therefore, the Roman Pontiffs are infallible when they define matters of faith and morals ex cathedra.

Proof of the major. a) St. Irenaeus says: “By indicating the tradition which the Church, the greatest, most ancient, and universally known Church, founded and established at Rome by the two most glorious apostles Peter and Paul, has received from the apostles, and the faith announced to human beings, which has come down to us through the succession of bishops, we confound … [the heretics]. For it is necessary that every Church—that is, the faithful from every side—agree with this Church on account of its more powerful preeminence, since in it the tradition from the apostles has always been preserved by those from every side” (Against Heresies 3, 3, 2). St. Cyprian says of certain schismatics: “They dare to sail and carry letters from schismatics and profane people to the Chair of Peter and to the principal Church, from which priestly unity arose, without considering that these are Romans whose faith was praised by the preaching apostle, and to whom perfidy cannot gain access” (Letter 59, no. 14 [ed. Hartel]). St. Ambrose says: “Where Peter is, there is the Church; where the Church is, there is no death but eternal life” (On Psalm 40, no. 30). He praises his brother Satyrus because he refused to communicate with a bishop unless he “agreed with the Roman Church” (On the Death of His Brother 1, 47). He writes to Pope Siricius: “We have recognized in the letter of Your Holiness the vigilance of a good shepherd, who faithfully guards the gate entrusted to you and watches over Christ’s flock with pious care, worthy to be heard and followed by the Lord’s sheep … Those whom Your Holiness has condemned, know that they too have been condemned among us according to your judgment” (Letter 42). St. Augustine says that his judgment and that of the provincial councils in the case of Pelagius received perfect firmness through the Apostolic See: “Two councils have already sent their decisions on this case to the Apostolic See. Replies have also come from there. The case is finished; would that the error might also sometime be finished” (Sermon 131, no. 16; Kirch, Enchiridion, no. 672). St. Jerome writes to Pope Damasus: “I do not know Vitalis, I reject Meletius, I am ignorant of Paulinus. Whoever does not gather with you scatters; that is, whoever is not of Christ is of Antichrist” (Letter 15, 16). From later centuries, hear St. Thomas: “The publication of the Creed belongs to the authority of the one whose authority it is finally to determine matters of faith, so that all may hold them with unshaken faith. This belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, to whom the Church’s greater and more difficult questions are referred” (2, 2, q. 1, a. 10).

b) St. Boniface I says: “It has never been permitted to discuss again what was once established by the Apostolic See” (Letter 13; Denz. no. 110; cf. no. 109). St. Celestine I appeals to “the inviolable decrees of the Apostolic See” (Letter 21, no. 11; Denz. no. 139; cf. no. 129). St. Leo the Great had condemned the error of Eutyches in a letter to Flavian; on this matter he writes to the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon that his judgment must be upheld, since “it has been declared most clearly and lucidly in the letter which we sent to the bishop Flavian of blessed memory what is the pious and sincere confession concerning the mystery of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Letter 93, 2). Eutyches had tried to draw St. Peter Chrysologus to his side, but he replies: “In all things we exhort you, venerable brother, to attend obediently to what has been written by the most blessed pope of the city of Rome, for blessed Peter, who both lives and presides in his own see, provides the truth of faith to those who seek it” (Letter 25 among the letters of St. Leo the Great). To end the Acacian schism, St. Hormisdas prescribed a profession of faith, which was received by all the Eastern bishops and by the eighth ecumenical council, act 1. In this profession it says: “The first safeguard is to preserve the rule of right faith and in no way to depart from the decrees of the Fathers. And because the sentence of our Lord Jesus Christ, who says, ‘You are Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church,’ cannot be set aside, what was said is proved by the actual facts, because in the Apostolic See the Catholic religion has always been preserved without blemish … We also receive and approve all the letters of blessed Pope Leo, which he wrote concerning the Christian religion; as we have said, in all things we follow the Apostolic See and proclaim all its decrees. Therefore I hope to merit being in the one communion with you which the Apostolic See proclaims, in which there is the complete and true integrity and perfect solidity of the Christian religion” (Denz. nos. 171 f.). St. Leo IX, writing to Michael Cerularius after citing Mt 16:18 and Lk 22:31, continues: “Will anyone, then, be so mad as to dare to think in any way that the prayer of him whose will is power is empty? Have not the inventions of all heretics been rejected, refuted, and overcome by the See of the Prince of the Apostles, namely the Roman Church, both through Peter himself and through his successors, and have not the hearts of the brethren been strengthened in the faith of Peter, which has not failed until now and will not fail to the end?” (Denz. no. 351). — When some began to deny the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, this contrary doctrine was repeatedly condemned. Sixtus IV condemned proposition 7 of Peter of Osma: “The Church of the city of Rome can err” (Denz. no. 730). Alexander VIII condemned this proposition: “The assertion about the authority of the Roman Pontiff over an ecumenical council and his infallibility in deciding questions of faith is futile and has been overturned so many times” (Denz. no. 1319).

c) The Fathers of the Council of Ephesus, after receiving the letters of Pope Celestine, by which Nestorius was condemned, said: «Compelled by the sacred canons and by the letter of our holy father and fellow minister Celestine, bishop of the Roman Church, and repeatedly overcome by tears, we have necessarily come to this mournful sentence against him [Nestorius]» (Hardouin I, 1471). At the Council of Chalcedon, after the doctrinal letter of Pope Leo the bishop was read, the bishops said: «We all believe thus; the orthodox believe thus; anathema to him who does not believe thus. Peter has spoken in this way through Leo» (Hardouin II, 306). At the Third Council of Constantinople, the bishops said of Pope Agatho: «The prince of the apostles contended together with us; for we had him as our supporter, an imitator and successor of his see, and one who illuminated the divine sacrament through his letters … And through Agatho, Peter was speaking» (Denz. n. 288 note 2). We have just heard that the Fourth Council of Constantinople received the formula of Pope Hormisdas. The Second Council of Lyons accepted a profession of faith containing the following: «The holy Roman Church also holds supreme and full primacy and authority over the whole Catholic Church … And just as it is bound to defend the truth of faith before all others, so, if any questions about faith arise, they ought to be defined by its judgment» (Denz. n. 466). The Council of Florence: «We define that the holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff hold primacy over the whole world … and that to him, in blessed Peter, full power was handed over by our Lord Jesus Christ to feed, rule, and govern the universal Church» (Denz. n. 694). But the Roman Pontiff does not have full power to feed the Church unless he has the same power to define dogmatic matters that an ecumenical council has. Therefore, the Council of the Vatican established by a solemn definition only a doctrine long recognized by the Church.

Alexander VIII therefore rightly condemned the fourth article of the Gallican clergy: «Even in questions of faith, the chief part belongs to the supreme Pontiff, and his decrees pertain to each and every Church; nevertheless, his judgment is not irreformable unless the Church’s consent is added» (Denz. n. 1325). For this reason Tournely, who was not permitted to teach the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff on account of the «Gallican liberties», says: «It must not be concealed that, in the great mass of testimonies gathered by Bellarmine (De rom. pont. 4, I sqq.) and others, it is difficult not to recognize the certain and infallible authority of the Apostolic See or Roman Church; but it is far more difficult to reconcile them with the declaration of the Gallican clergy, from which we are not permitted to depart» (De rom. pont. q. 5, a. 3).

323. Objection I. From the words that Christ is reported in the Gospels to have spoken to S. Peter to the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is such a long way that no one reading those texts simply would suspect that they concern the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. But arguments drawn from so far away are ineffective. Therefore, that biblical argument is worth nothing, or at least not much.

I answer. I distinguish the major: those words do not explicitly speak of the Roman Pontiff, I concede the major; the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is not implicitly contained in those words, I subdivide the major: unless it were clear from the Gospels that Christ founded a spiritual kingdom in which ordinary offices must endure until the end of the world, I concede the major; if the perpetuity of the Church and of the ordinary ecclesiastical offices instituted by Christ is acknowledged, I deny the major. I distinguish the minor: arguments drawn from what is said implicitly are ineffective for those who lack sufficient intelligence or knowledge to penetrate them, I concede the minor; otherwise, I deny the minor. Rationalists and Modernists ridicule these arguments only because they themselves assume as certain that Christ did not think of founding a Church that would endure through many future ages. We, on the contrary, together with the whole Christian tradition, assume that the perpetuity of the Church is clearly taught in Scripture.

324. Objection II. The arguments drawn from the tradition of the first centuries to prove the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff are quite ambiguous; on the other hand, it is evident that many rebelled against the decisions of the Roman Pontiffs and thus in practice denied their infallibility, such as Hippolytus, Tertullian, Novatian, Cyprian, and others. Therefore, the Church is by no means in agreement about the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: the earliest testimonies are ambiguous, that is, not as explicit as the testimonies of later centuries, and many rebelled against the Pontiffs’ decisions and became heretics or schismatics if they were obstinate, I concede the antecedent; those testimonies do not sufficiently attest the Pontiff’s infallibility in light of the circumstances of things and times, and those who obstinately rebelled against the Pontiffs remained Catholics, I deny the antecedent. I distinguish the consequence: the Church is not in agreement if heretics and schismatics are also included under the name “Church”, I concede the consequence; if only Catholics are understood, I subdivide the consequence: there was not always agreement equally explicit, I concede the consequence; there was not always true and sufficiently manifested agreement, I deny the consequence.

We concede development in the understanding and application of doctrine; we deny substantial change in doctrine. Among those who rebelled against the Roman Pontiff, some were obstinate and others were not. Hippolytus was reconciled with the Church before his death. Novatian and the Novatians were expelled from the Church, as were Tertullian and the Montanists. Cyprian was not moved by a heretical or schismatic mind, but thought that in a doubtful matter, on which no doctrinal decision had been made, each bishop should be left free to follow his own opinion. Besides, he was reconciled with Pope Sixtus, though the particular facts have not come down to us (cf. Praelect. dogm. VI, 234 sqq.). The Church recognized the authority of the supreme Pontiff, for example, in condemning Pelagianism, Nestorianism, and Monophysitism (cf. Wilmers, De eccl. 417 sqq.).

325. Objection III. The infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is an excessive power by which all free inquiry and all genuine science are destroyed. But God should not be thought to have given a human being such power. Therefore, the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff should not be admitted.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: infallibility would be an excessive power if the Pontiff could define at will whatever he wished, I concede the antecedent; if, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the Pontiff can rightly propose and explain only the truth revealed by God, I deny the major. I also deny that science and scientific inquiry are destroyed in this way; for it is not of the nature of science that it must be able to err without restraint and contradict what is true, whether divinely revealed or otherwise certain. I distinguish the minor: God should not be thought to have given a human being the power to define at will whatever pleases him, I concede the minor; God should not be thought to have given human beings, in the matter of eternal salvation, a teacher who, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, infallibly presents them with a norm of truth and goodness, I deny the minor. And I deny the consequence. Only those who reject all divine revelation can consequently declaim against the Pontiff’s infallibility as an enemy of scientific freedom. Those who believe that God gave us revelation thereby concede that permission to err is limited; for whether they recognize Sacred Scripture, the consensus of the Church, or Pontifical definitions as an infallible norm of truth, they submit to an authority from which they cannot depart without abandoning the faith. Besides, definitions made ex cathedra are relatively few, so a very broad field for scientific industry remains open even in theological inquiry.

326. Objection IV. Roman Pontiffs have taught various errors. Therefore, they are not infallible.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: Roman Pontiffs ever defined an error ex cathedra, I deny the antecedent; they erred when they did not define ex cathedra, I pass over the antecedent, because that is not relevant to our question. I distinguish the consequence: Roman Pontiffs are not infallible when they define ex cathedra, I deny the consequence; when they do not define, I pass over the consequence.

It may be useful briefly to review the errors commonly attributed to the Pontiffs.

1. Pope Liberius is said to have subscribed to the Sirmian formula, which was Arian or semi-Arian.

I answer. If he subscribed, he defined nothing, but did so only under compulsion, to escape unjust harassment (S. Athan., Hist. arian. 41; Kirch, Enchir. n. 377). But certainly he did not subscribe to the first formula of the year 351; otherwise, he would not have been kept in exile until 358. He did not subscribe to the second formula, which alone is manifestly heretical, but expressly condemned it (Sozom., H. E. 4, 15; Kirch n. 846). Therefore, if he subscribed at all, he subscribed to the third formula, which is indeed ambiguous but can be understood in a Catholic sense (see the three formulas in Hardouin I, 702, 706, 710). Liberius always required Arians returning to the Church to profess the Nicene faith (Socrates, H. E. 4, 12; Kirch n. 777 sqq.). What Jerome and others recount about Liberius’s lapse is explained by the slanders the Arians spread about him. Most writers consider the fragments of Hilary (Kirch n. 497) spurious. See the judgment of S. Anastasius I about Liberius at Denz. n. 93.

2. Pope Vigilius first resisted the condemnation of the «Three Chapters», later condemned them, withdrew the condemnation, and finally agreed to the condemnation. Therefore, he erred in one or another case.

I answer. The question about the Three Chapters was no longer whether to condemn Nestorianism, which had already been condemned, but whether to condemn three writings by Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas in which that error was contained. The question was whether it was opportune to condemn those writings. In resolving this practical question, Vigilius showed a certain inconsistency, but he defined no false doctrine ex cathedra. This matter plainly has no bearing on the question of the Roman Pontiff’s infallibility.

3. Pope Honorius taught that in Christ there was only one will, and for this error he was condemned among the heretics.

I answer. Honorius defined nothing ex cathedra. «We ought not to proclaim a definition of one or two operations» (Denz. n. 252). Moreover, he taught nothing false, for he established that the two natures were unconfused, «joined in one Christ by natural unity, operating and acting through the communion of one with the other, the divine nature doing the things of God and the human nature performing the things of the flesh; we do not teach that the nature of God was converted into man or the human nature into God, whether by separation, confusion, or conversion, but we confess the distinctions of the natures intact» (ibid.). He teaches a unity of wills that is not physical but moral, insofar as Christ’s human will does not resist the divine will, «because our nature was indeed assumed by the divinity, not our fault: it was the nature created before sin, not the nature corrupted after transgression» (Denz. n. 251).

Honorius was indeed condemned in the thirteenth session of the Third Council of Constantinople. After condemning Sergius and others, it continues: «Together with these, we have foreseen that Honorius, who was pope of ancient Rome, must also be cast out of the holy Catholic Church of God and anathematized, because we found in his writings to Sergius that in all things he followed his mind and confirmed his impious doctrines» (Kirch n. 976).

But this council did not attain the dignity of an ecumenical council except through confirmation by Leo II. He, however, does not condemn Honorius for having taught heresy, but for not having resisted it firmly, «because he did not extinguish, as befitted apostolic authority, the flame of heretical doctrine as it began, but by negligence fostered it» (Kirch n. 979). Ioannes IV, who had been a confidant of Honorius, says that the error of Monothelitism was «entirely alien to the mind of the Catholic father» (M PL 80, 603; cf. Denz. n. 253).

4. Pope Felix III condemned the formula, «One of the Trinity was crucified»; Ioannes II approved it.

I answer. Felix rejected it when understood in a heretical sense, because Peter the Fuller and others used it to profess Monophysitism (M PL 58, 903 sqq.). But later, when some monks opposed it in a Nestorian sense, Ioannes II approved it in a Catholic sense (Denz. n. 201; cf. 222, 255, 1463).

5. Pope Zacharias condemned the doctrine that the antipodes exist.

I answer. No definition ex cathedra was made on this matter. When Virgilius was accused of teaching that another world existed beneath the earth, with other people, another sun and another moon, so that a wholly different human race lived there, S. Zacharias wrote to S. Boniface, bishop of Mainz, to investigate the case and «if it becomes clear that he professes that another world and other people exist beneath the earth, or another sun and moon, after consultation with the Church, expel him, deprived of the honor of the priesthood». He added that he had written for Virgilius to be sent to him and to answer for his doctrine (M PL 89, 946 sq.). No harm came to Virgilius; rather, he became bishop of Salzburg and after his death was enrolled among the saints by Gregory IX.

6. Nicholas III taught that the Lord Christ, possessing absolutely nothing, was an example of perfect poverty. «We say that the renunciation of ownership of all things, not merely individually but also in common, is meritorious and holy for God’s sake; Christ, showing the way of perfection, taught this by word and confirmed it by example» (Const. «Exiit, qui seminat» in 6 Decret. l. 5, tit. 12, c. 3). John XXII, on the contrary: «We declare by this perpetual edict, with the counsel of our brothers, that the assertion that our Redeemer and Lord Jesus Christ and his apostles owned nothing, either individually or in common … is henceforth to be considered erroneous and heretical» (Const. «Cum inter nonnullos»; Denz. n. 494).

I answer. There is no true disagreement between these two Pontiffs on this matter; for Nicholas III also teaches that Christ possessed certain things. Indeed, after the words quoted, he continues: «Let no one think that what is sometimes said, that Christ had a purse, is an obstacle to this … For Christ both did and taught works of perfection, and also did things that were lowly, as is sometimes shown by his flight and by his having a purse; but he did both perfectly, being perfect, so that he might show the way of salvation to the perfect and the imperfect alike.» These Pontiffs differ in their opinions about a matter that does not pertain to faith but to speculative philosophy: ownership of things consumed through use. This has nothing to do with our question.

7. Stephen VI ordered those ordained by Pope Formosus to be reordained.

I answer. Stephen defined nothing on this matter, but acted wrongly. The Pontiffs’ infallibility does not exclude wrongful acts.

8. Benedict XII defined that the blessed in heaven see the essence of God before the Day of Judgment. John XXII had earlier denied this.

I answer. John XXII himself declared that he had defined nothing on this matter, but had spoken only «by way of discussion and not of determination, nor even of holding the position; and we wish our words to be understood in this way and no other» (cf. Praelect. dogm. IX, 585).

9. In the constitution «Aeternus ille», Sixtus V decreed «by the fullness of apostolic power» that the authentic edition of the Vulgate «must be considered without any doubt or controversy to be this very edition which we now publish for reading in all the Churches of the Christian world, corrected as well as could be done …; we decree that it is to be received and held as true, legitimate, authentic, and undisputed in all public and private disputations, readings, sermons, and explanations». But this edition was faulty, so that it was soon withdrawn and reissued after many corrections had been made.

I answer. This constitution of Sixtus V was never published and therefore lacks canonical authenticity, as X. Le Bachelet has shown (Études 126 [Paris 1910] 752 sqq., or in Bellarmin et la Bible Sixto-Clémentine, Paris 1911). Nor does Sixtus V assert that his edition is so perfect that no further corrections can be made with the authority of the Apostolic See; he simply says that it is an authentic edition. Immediately after the work was printed, he himself began to make various corrections, but, overtaken by death, he could not bring the work to completion. Nor did he attribute to the edition any other authenticity than Trent attributed to the Vulgate. Thus, if there are texts whose genuineness cannot certainly be proved by the decree of Trent, such as the Comma Johanneum, their genuineness cannot be proved with certainty by the constitution of Sixtus V either.

10. Finally, Paul V and Urban VIII erred significantly by approving the decrees of the Inquisition concerning Galileo’s system, thinking that it was a matter of faith that the sun moves around the earth.

I answer. Since decrees of the Roman Congregations, even when approved by the Supreme Pontiff, are not definitions of the Pontiff himself speaking ex cathedra, this matter does not touch on Pontifical infallibility. Nor has any Catholic theologian ever taught that the Roman Congregations are infallible. The history of the Galileo case is not to be treated in dogmatic theology (cf. A. Müller, Der Galilei-Prozeß, Freiburg 1909).

These examples are enough. Bellarminus proposes and discusses many other objections (De rom. pont. 4, 8 sqq.), some of which rest on false documents, while others are so trivial that they do not deserve mention. Many are no longer repeated today, and many solutions have become easier and simpler through the progress of scholarship than they were in Bellarmine’s time.

327. Corollary. On the Syllabus of Pius IX. If it is uncertain whether a Pontifical document contains a definition ex cathedra, there arises no obligation to believe or hold with the firmest assent the things it says. The Syllabus of Pius IX may serve as an example. Some say that it is a definition ex cathedra. So says Cardinal Mazzella (De relig. et eccl. 822). Others think that it is not in itself a definition, but that each of its propositions was condemned on other occasions by the Supreme Pontiff speaking ex cathedra. So says Rinaldi (Il valore del Sillabo, Roma 1888, 7 sqq.). Others think it became an infallible norm by the adhesion of morally all Catholic bishops. So says Hurter (Comp. theol. I, n. 513). Others think it is a norm, though not infallible, that is nevertheless authentic and was prescribed by the Supreme Pontiff to the whole Church, which all must follow. So says Choupin (Valeur des décisions doctrinales et disciplinaires du Saint-Siège, Paris 1907, 121 sqq.). Theologians agree that this last is the least that must be admitted (cf. De Groot, Summa apologet.³, 634 sqq.).

Scholium. On the authority of the Roman Congregations.

328. Congregations are colleges of cardinals appointed to direct and discuss particular matters and decide them in either an administrative or judicial form. This entire institution received its form through the constitution «Immensa» of Sixtus V, but was reorganized by the constitution «Sapienti consilio» of Pius X. The principal Congregation is the «Holy Office» (formerly the «Inquisition»), the supreme tribunal of faith, which judges heresies, suspect doctrines, and crimes connected with heresy. Its president is the Supreme Pontiff himself, who presides only at the Thursday sessions. Only the cardinals, not the consultors or others, have a decisive vote. The Congregation of the Index is in a way the Holy Office’s deputy; it examines books and prohibits those in any way contrary to sound doctrine or good morals. Through ordinary power received from the Supreme Pontiff, the Holy Office can make laws for the whole Church within certain limits in matters of faith and morals. But because it is not infallible, its decisions are not in themselves irreformable, unless the Supreme Pontiff formally makes them his own—that is, defines them ex cathedra—or unless they are received everywhere in such a way that they pass into the profession of the whole Church. Simple approval, that is, an order to promulgate a decree of the Holy Office, is not enough to make the decree infallible.

Therefore, the decisions of the Holy Office cannot be held by divine faith or by any absolutely firm assent. On the other hand, they cannot simply be rejected, nor is respectful silence alone sufficient; since the Congregation teaches with canonical authority, internal assent must be given (Denz. n. 1684). For assent is due not only to infallible authorities but also to all true and legitimate authorities, with that degree of internal assent which corresponds to the degree of authority. The Holy Office is a religious authority of the highest grade below infallible authority. Therefore its decisions must be assented to with religious assent, that is, with an assent whose motive is authority—not divine authority, but human authority, though it is the highest religious authority, legitimately established in the Church. To resist it is to resist God; to submit to it is to submit to God. For this reason this submission is said to be made through religious assent. This assent is conditional insofar as it includes the tacit condition, “unless the decision is later found to be erroneous.” Therefore, if solid and sufficient grounds for doubt appear, assent is prudently suspended; but in the absence of such grounds the decisions of the Holy Office must be followed. Hence this proposition of the Modernists, which is the eighth proposition of the decree «Lamentabili», was rightly condemned: «Those who hold the condemnations issued by the Sacred Congregation of the Index or other sacred Roman Congregations in no account are to be considered free from all blame» (Denz. n. 2008).

The same applies to decrees which the Supreme Pontiff issues not by virtue of his supreme authority, and to decrees of other ecclesiastical superiors who are authentic but not infallible teachers (cf. above, n. 280). Intellectual obedience extends much more widely than the sphere of divine faith and infallible certainty (cf. Wilmers, De eccl. 441 sqq.; Choupin, Valeur des décisions 24 sqq., 56 sqq.).

ARTICLE III.

ON THE OBJECT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL TEACHING OFFICE.

Cf. Franzelin, De tradit. thes. 12, schol. 1, princip. 2; Wilmers, De ecclesia prop. 73 sqq.; L. Choupin, Valeur des décisions doctrinales et disciplinaires du Saint-Siège, Paris 1907; Palmieri, in the prolegomenon to De rom. pont. § XL, and other authors in their treatises on the Church.

Proposition XL. The Church is infallible in defining revealed doctrine.

329. Position of the question. The ecclesiastical teaching office no longer receives new public revelations from God, such as the apostles received, but has the duty faithfully to preserve and explain the doctrine revealed to the apostles and proposed by them. S. Paul admonishes Timothy: «Hold to the pattern of sound words which you heard from me … Guard the good deposit … What you heard from me through many witnesses, entrust to faithful people who will be able to teach others also … You have followed my teaching … Continue in what you have learned and have been entrusted with, knowing from whom you learned it» (2 Tim 1:13 sq.; 2:2; 3:10, 14). «Even if we or an angel from heaven should preach to you anything beyond what we preached to you, let him be anathema. As we said before, and now I say again: If anyone preaches to you anything beyond what you received, let him be anathema» (Gal 1:8 sq.). The apostles alone were the instruments for immediately receiving divine revelation; all others had to learn from the apostles and continue in what they had learned, so that they might thus be «built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets» (Eph 2:20). The apostolic kerygma contains the whole of revealed doctrine (cf. Rom 16:17; Col 2:7; Iud v. 3).

The Church has always taught that no new revelations are to be expected after the death of the apostles, but that we must persevere in the doctrine handed down. S. Irenaeus: «We ought no longer to seek the truth from others, when it is easy to receive it from the Church, since the apostles poured into it in fullest measure, as into a rich treasury, all that belongs to the truth, so that anyone who wishes may draw from it the water of life. For this is the entrance to life, while all the rest are thieves and robbers. Therefore we ought to avoid them, but to love and hold fast with the greatest diligence to the things of the Church and the tradition of truth» (Contra haer. 3, 4, 1). S. Augustinus: The bishops «held what they found in the Church; what they received from the fathers, they handed on to their children» (Contra Iulian. 2, 34). Vincentius Lirinensis: «Guard the deposit, that is, what was entrusted to you, not what you discovered; what you received, not what you invented; a matter not of ingenuity but of doctrine, not of private usurpation but of public tradition» (Commonit. 22). S. Caelestinus I: The faith «fully and clearly handed down to us by the apostles requires neither addition nor diminution» (Ep. ad Nest.; Mansi IV, 1027 sq.). Cf. above, n. 306. Theologians unanimously teach the same, for example S. Thomas: «Our faith rests on the revelation made to the apostles and prophets, who wrote the canonical books, not on any revelation that may have been made to other teachers» (I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2). After other councils, the same was taught by the Council of Trent and the Council of the Vatican (Denz. nn. 783, 1787, 1798, 1800). This proposition of the Modernists was condemned: «The Revelation which constitutes the object of Catholic faith was not completed with the apostles» (Decr. «Lamentabili» 21; Denz. n. 2021).

With this established, it is clear what a dogmatic definition is. It is nothing other than an authentic and solemn declaration that a doctrine belongs to the divine revelation handed down by the apostles. For a dogma, taken in the strict sense, requires two things: a) divine revelation and b) the Church’s solemn proposal. What God revealed was always contained, either explicitly or implicitly, in the Church’s preaching. But as the needs of the times required, now certain truths, now others were emphasized, while others in the meantime receded somewhat from view. Moreover, many things were at first simply believed; later, objections, doubts, and differing opinions arose, until the Church defined what was contained in revelation. Thus progress here consists chiefly in greater certainty about the fact of revelation with respect to this or that particular doctrine.

330. Argument 1. From Christ’s promise.

Christ promised the Church infallibility in proposing revealed doctrine (above, nn. 188, 220, 280 c). But in defining revealed doctrine, the Church exercises in the most solemn manner, and in a way that binds everyone gravely, the office entrusted to it by Christ. Therefore, if ever, then especially it teaches infallibly; and this holds whether the definition is made by a council or by the Supreme Pontiff alone. It does not matter whether a purely theoretical doctrine is proposed, which is defined as something to be believed, or whether a practical doctrine pertaining to morals is established. For the doctrine of morals is also revealed; and if the Church proposed as honorable and to be observed something that is dishonorable and to be avoided, it would thereby err in faith. Nor is the Church infallible only insofar as it teaches what must be held; it is infallible also insofar as it condemns opposed errors. For whoever can teach infallibly what is true according to divine revelation can thereby also teach infallibly that its contradiction is false.

331. Argument 2. From the Church’s conviction.

The Church itself must know when it is infallible; for it would be useless if the Church knew that it was infallible but did not know when and in what matters. But the Church especially judges itself to be infallible when it defines what is revealed by God and what is contrary to revealed truth. For it declares that it is necessary for salvation to believe the things so defined, and it anathematizes those who refuse to believe them (cf. above, n. 313). Therefore, the Church is infallible in defining revealed doctrine. The Holy Fathers and theologians have always recognized this, as is clear from what was said above in Propositions XXXVIII and XXXIX. This thesis was condemned: «The Roman Pontiffs and ecumenical councils … have erred even in defining matters of faith and morals» (Denz. n. 1723).

332. Argument 3. From the Tridentine profession of faith.

All bishops and many others specified in the Council of Trent (sess. 25, c. 2 de reform.), in the bull of Pius IV «Iniunctum nobis», and in the bull of Pius V «In sacrosancta» make this profession under oath: «I unhesitatingly receive and profess everything handed down, defined, and declared by the sacred canons and ecumenical councils, and especially by the most sacred Council of Trent; at the same time, I likewise condemn, reject, and anathematize all things and every heresy contrary to them that have been condemned, rejected, and anathematized by the Church» (Denz. n. 1000). But the entire episcopate, or the whole teaching Church, cannot bind itself under oath to receive without hesitation defined matters and to anathematize condemned contrary doctrines unless the definitions are infallibly true. Therefore, the Church infallibly defines revealed truths and condemns contrary errors.

333. Objection I. If what the Church has defined is fixed immutably forever, nothing remains but the bare and unfruitful consideration and repetition of defined matters. But this conflicts with the character of the human intellect, which is always striving toward what lies further ahead. Therefore, such immutable definitions must not be admitted.

I answer. I deny the major. For immutable definitions have two benefits: a) By believing the defined matters, we gain merit before God and grow in faith; b) when doubt is removed, we have a firm foundation from which we can safely advance both to learn more and, if practical truths are at issue, to conform our conduct rightly.

This is the Modernists’ aberration of mind: they think that in a life that is truly life, everything must necessarily flow and nothing be stable and enduring. Certainly God himself is at once the highest life and supremely stable; and if there is a divine principle in the Church, the Church will share both in God’s life and in his immutability. It will manifest life through faith, hope, charity, and the other related virtues; it will possess immutability by cleaving to the first and highest truth and good. In fact, ecclesiastical definitions have been an incentive for the faithful to cultivate theological learning with greater zeal and pursue holiness more securely, as happened, for example, after the Council of Trent. Divine faith requires that what is believed be objectively true; but what is objectively true is always true. Therefore, the Council of the Vatican (sess. 3, de fide et ratione, can. 3) says: «If anyone says that, as science progresses, a meaning is at some time to be attributed to the dogmas proposed by the Church other than that which the Church understood and understands, let him be anathema» (Denz. n. 1818; errors of the Modernists, ibid., nn. 2079 sq., 2094).

334. Objection II. What was sufficient for salvation before is still sufficient for salvation now. But formerly it was not necessary for salvation to believe explicitly all those things that were defined by later councils. Therefore, even now it is not necessary for salvation.

I answer. I distinguish the major: What was sufficient for salvation before by necessity of means is still sufficient for salvation now by necessity of means, I concede the major; things that were not necessary before cannot later become necessary by precept, I deny the major. I concede the minor. I distinguish the consequence: Not everything defined by councils must be believed by necessity of means, I concede the consequence; not everything must be believed by necessity of precept, I subdivide the consequence: not everything explicitly by everyone, I concede the consequence; not everything at least implicitly by everyone, I deny the consequence.

Certain principal truths, such as the existence of God who rewards the good and the evil, must be believed by all adults, because this faith is an absolutely necessary means of attaining salvation. Other things must be believed by divine precept, so that someone who culpably neglects this precept is worthy of punishment for the sin committed. The treatise on faith and moral theology deal with the individual matters to which these two kinds of necessity apply. Many things defined by councils are necessary to believe by necessity of precept. This necessity of precept exists only when the precept is known. So long as there was discussion and doubt about the precept in relation to particular doctrines, these doctrines did not have to be believed explicitly. The precept exists, however, once the definition of a council removes the doubt. Yet not even everything defined must be explicitly believed by everyone; for among such things are some subtler matters which those who hold the Church’s teaching office must know, but not the ordinary people. Thus, from the Church’s beginning, everyone had to believe explicitly certain fundamental truths, and implicitly everything God revealed and the Church proposes for belief. This obligation has always been and remains the same; but some things were later proposed explicitly that had earlier been believed implicitly, and thus there has been some extension of the material object. This is an increase in understanding and progress in knowledge, a great intellectual good, with which the burden of believing more things explicitly cannot be compared—if it deserves to be called a burden at all.

On this matter, among other things, Vincentius Lirinensis says in the Commonitorium: «O wondrous change of circumstances! The originators of the same opinion are judged Catholics, but their followers heretics; the teachers are acquitted, their disciples condemned; the authors of the books will be children of the kingdom, but their defenders are received by hell» (ch. 6). Yet he proclaims this change of circumstances as something to rejoice in, explaining Paul’s words to Timothy: «Let it be understood that, when you [Timothy] explain it, what was formerly believed more obscurely is made clearer; let posterity rejoice through you in what antiquity venerated without understanding» (ch. 22). «It is right that those ancient doctrines of heavenly philosophy be explored, refined, and polished as time goes on; but it is wrong that they be cut down or mutilated. They may indeed gain clarity, light, and distinction, but they must retain their fullness, integrity, and proper character» (ch. 23). «Will there, then, be no progress of religion in the Church? Let there indeed be progress, and very great progress. For who is so envious of people, so hateful to God, as to try to prevent this? But it must be genuine progress in the faith, not a change … Understanding, knowledge, and wisdom ought to grow and make vigorous progress, both for each person and for all, both for one person and for the whole Church, through the stages of ages and centuries, but only within their own kind, that is, in the same dogma, the same meaning, and the same judgment» (ch. 23; cf. Denz. n. 1800).

335. Objection III. If the Church’s definitions make certain with infallibility what was formerly doubtful, Christians today have better knowledge of revealed matters than the theologians of the Middle Ages, those theologians better knowledge than the Holy Fathers, and the Holy Fathers better knowledge than the apostles. But in this way knowledge of revelation would have been very meagre and imperfect from the beginning, which does not seem admissible.

I answer. I distinguish the major: Christians today have better knowledge than the apostles, I deny the major; than others who lived after the apostles, I subdivide the major: they know certain particular doctrines as revealed with greater certainty, I concede the major; we penetrate and apply theoretically and practically the whole scope and force of revealed religion better than the Holy Fathers and the Doctors of the Church, I deny the major. From this the answer to the minor is clear.

One or another recent theologian has thought that the apostles and the first Christians had scarcely any deeper knowledge of revealed religion beyond a few fundamental dogmas, so that in this way they could learn many things from the Holy Fathers, and the Fathers in turn from later theologians (cf. Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit V, n. 583). But this opinion is false and rests on the false assumption that a deeper understanding of revealed matters in the Church is solely the fruit of natural powers and human labor. The Holy Spirit, however, was promised to the Church to lead it into all truth. The Holy Spirit illuminated the apostles in a wholly singular manner, never repeated later; thereafter he illuminated the Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church, though to a lesser degree.

Therefore, the following should be established: a) It is clear from the New Testament Scriptures that very many dogmas were proposed from the beginning. In positive theology all dogmas are proved from Scripture and the Fathers. Therefore, knowledge of revelation was certainly not meagre from the beginning. b) As for the apostles, their writings show, and the Church has always been convinced, that under the influence of the Holy Spirit they understood revealed matters better than anyone after them, even if perhaps they differed among themselves in the greater or lesser degree of infused light, and even though they did not yet possess the technical terms of later times or a scientifically developed system of theology. Therefore, in matters of faith and morals, the apostles could have learned from the Holy Fathers or theologians only some external form and method (cf. Ioann. Chrysost., Hom. 26 in 2 Cor.; S. Ambros., Sermo 5 in Ps. 118, n. 38; S. Aug., In Io. tract. 18, 36, 97; Suarez, De fide disp. 2, sect. 6, n. 10; De Lugo, De fide disp. 3, sect. 5, n. 67; Franzelin, De trad. thes. 25, n. III).

From what has been said, it follows that something can be a dogma in itself, that is, a truth divinely revealed, without being a dogma for us, because we are not certain that it has been revealed. If a dogma is contained in Sacred Scripture or in other theological sources so clearly that there can be no doubt about it without a definition of the Church, it is a dogma of divine faith. A dogma that is explicitly proposed for belief by a definition of a council or the Supreme Pontiff is a dogma of defined faith. In a broader sense, everything that the Church proposes to be held absolutely can be called a dogma; but according to usage, “dogma” refers only to a truth formally revealed. In Sacred Scripture the word dogma signifies a law, whether divine or human (Act 16:4; 17:7; Lc 2:1; Eph 2:15; Col 2:14 in the Greek text).

Proposition XLI. The Church is infallible in establishing theological conclusions.

336. Position of the question. Even in dogmatic definitions in the strict sense, the object defined is not rarely purely divinely revealed only to this extent: certain technical terms are chosen to express revealed truth appropriately; these terms, as such, are not revealed by God but are chosen by the Church under divine assistance, for example, ὁμοούσιος and transubstantiation. For since right doctrine cannot be preserved without a correct manner of speaking, the Church, in order to guard the deposit of faith intact, must infallibly choose an appropriate mode of expression by which the faithful may profess revealed truth in the proper way, because «through the words someone speaks, he professes his faith, and therefore, if his manner of speaking about matters of faith is disordered, corruption of the faith may follow from it» (S. Thomas 2, 2, q. 11, a. 2 ad 2). Thus, even though the terms defined by the Church are not revealed by God, they are nevertheless infallibly correct (cf. Denz. n. 1529).

The human element is even more involved in theological conclusions. In these, not only are the terms invented by human beings, but a truth is involved that is not revealed by God but known naturally. A proposition revealed by God can be used as the major premise of a syllogism, while a naturally known truth is placed in the minor premise, so that from one premise that is not revealed but naturally certain, a conclusion follows. Such a conclusion is theological: it is revealed by God not immediately and formally, but mediately and virtually. For example: God the Son is the Word of the Father. But a word proceeds from the intellect. Therefore, the Son proceeds from the intellect of the Father. The major premise is revealed; the minor premise is not revealed but naturally certain. Therefore, the conclusion is theological.

Theological conclusions can be made either by private teachers or by ecclesiastical authority. Here we are dealing with conclusions established by the Church, whether such truths are positively established as matters to be held, or false doctrines that conflict mediately with revealed truth are condemned negatively. For example, this thesis is positively established: «Reasoning can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and human freedom» (Denz. n. 1650). More often, philosophical errors hostile to faith are condemned.

The subject of infallibility is the same as we indicated above (nn. 304 sqq.), and the conditions are the same.

337. Argument 1. From the Church’s office of preserving the deposit of faith intact.

The Church received infallibility in order to preserve the deposit of faith intact (above, nn. 187 sq., 220, 280 c, 329). But the Church cannot effectively preserve the deposit of faith intact unless it can infallibly establish theological conclusions. Therefore, the Church is infallible in establishing theological conclusions.

Proof of the minor. The deposit of faith can be destroyed or injured by errors in the natural order. Suppose a philosopher asserts that the natural power of the intellect can investigate every truth of every order; consequently, the revealed doctrine of the mysteries of faith is denied. Or suppose a philosopher denies that God’s existence can be known with certainty by reasoning; this assertion destroys the possibility of supernatural faith. In fact, over the course of time, philosophers have put forward many errors with which revealed truths plainly cannot stand. Therefore, unless the Church can infallibly judge the truth or falsity of natural doctrines connected with revealed truths, it is unequal to preserving and handing on the deposit of faith intact.

338. Argument 2. From the Church’s doctrine and practice.

The Church has often shown, in theory and in practice, its conviction that it can judge infallibly doctrines that are mediately connected with revelation. But the Church knows how far its infallibility extends. Therefore, the Church is infallible in judging theological conclusions.

Proof of the major. Hadrian I condemned Adoptionism (Denz. nn. 299, 309 sqq.), although nothing about it is immediately revealed. Martin V ordered those suspected of the errors of Wyclif and Hus to be asked whether they believed the condemnation of Wyclif’s forty-five articles and Hus’s thirty articles to be true and Catholic, «that is, that the aforesaid forty-five articles of John Wyclif and thirty articles of John Hus are not Catholic, but that some of them are notoriously heretical, and some erroneous …» (Denz. n. 661). Therefore, the Church has the power not only to condemn heretical articles that are immediately opposed to revealed truth, but also erroneous ones that are only mediately opposed to it. Moreover, the Church condemned Traditionalism (Denz. nn. 1622 sqq., 1649 sqq., 1634, 1790), Ontologism (Denz. nn. 1659 sqq.), and the false systems of Hermes, Günther, and others (Denz. nn. 1634 sqq., 1655 sqq.). By its decrees against these false systems, it demanded absolute intellectual obedience, as is also clear from the oath prescribed against Modernism. Therefore, unless we wish to say that the Church in these matters exceeded the limits of its authority, we must admit that its authority extends to these objects. Although various of these ecclesiastical judgments did not issue from tribunals that are infallible in themselves, they became infallible through the subsequent consent of the whole teaching Church.

Pius IX teaches that it is not enough for Catholics to «receive and venerate the dogmas of the Church; it is also necessary that they submit … to those points of doctrine which, by the common and constant consensus of Catholics, are held as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions opposed to those points of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, nevertheless deserve another theological censure» (Denz. n. 1684). The Council of the Vatican, sess. 3, c. 4, teaches: «Moreover, the Church, which together with the apostolic office received the mandate to guard the deposit of faith, also has the right and duty given by God to proscribe knowledge falsely so called, lest anyone be deceived by philosophy and empty fallacy. Therefore, all the Christian faithful are not only forbidden to defend as legitimate conclusions of science such opinions known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, especially if they have been rejected by the Church; they must rather hold them absolutely to be errors that present a deceptive appearance of truth» (Denz. n. 1798). That this refers not only to conclusions immediately contrary to revealed doctrine, but also to those mediately opposed to it, is clear from the end of the canons on faith and reason, where the following is found: «Since it is not enough to avoid heretical depravity unless those errors also be diligently avoided that approach it more or less closely, we admonish all to observe also the constitutions and decrees by which such perverse opinions, not expressly enumerated here, have been proscribed and prohibited by this Holy See» (Denz. n. 1820). Finally, various propositions of the Modernists pertaining to this matter were condemned. Proposition 5: «Since the deposit of faith contains only revealed truths, the Church has no right whatsoever to pass judgment on assertions of the human sciences.» Proposition 7: «When the Church proscribes errors, it cannot demand from the faithful any internal assent by which they embrace its judgments.» Proposition 24: «An exegete is not to be reproved who advances premises from which it follows that dogmas are historically false or doubtful, provided he does not directly deny the dogmas themselves» (Denz. nn. 2005, 2007, 2024).

Thus, although our thesis has not yet been solemnly defined, the following canon 9 of the schema on the Church of Christ was prepared at the Council of the Vatican: «If anyone says that the infallibility of the Church is restricted only to matters contained in divine revelation, and does not extend also to other truths necessarily required for the deposit of revelation to be guarded intact, let him be anathema» (Collect. Conc. Lac. VII, 577). A definition was not reached. Therefore, for now, our thesis is to be considered at least a theological conclusion, which is not only recognized as certain by theologians but has also been approved and confirmed, though not defined, by the doctrine and practice of ecclesiastical authority. At the Council of the Vatican it was expressly declared that the Fathers did not intend in the meantime to decide whether the Church’s infallibility in these matters was a dogma of faith or only a theologically certain truth (Collect. Lac. VII, 414 sqq.).

339. Objection I. The Church is infallible only within the scope of revealed matters, which are its proper object. But when it judges matters that are not revealed but pertain only to natural knowledge, it does not remain within the scope of its proper object. Therefore, it is not infallible when judging these matters.

I answer. I distinguish the major: the Church is infallible only concerning revealed objects, if this means only those that are revealed immediately and formally, I deny the major; if it also means those that are revealed mediately and virtually, I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: if the Church judged natural matters unconnected with revelation, it would not remain within the scope of its proper object, I concede the minor; but the Church does not judge these matters. When it judges natural matters that are connected with revealed matters, and insofar as they are so connected, it does not remain within the scope of its proper object, I deny the minor. And with this distinction in place, I deny the consequence.

340. Objection II. Nothing can be believed by divine faith except what has been formally revealed by God, either explicitly or implicitly. But if the Church infallibly defines theological conclusions, these conclusions, although not formally revealed, would nevertheless have to be believed by divine faith. Therefore, the Church cannot infallibly define theological conclusions.

I answer. I grant the major and deny the minor: Theologians do dispute this matter, but the opinion of those who say these conclusions are not to be believed by divine faith but are to be held by ecclesiastical faith seems preferable (cf. Praelect. dogm. VIII, no. 256). Although the Holy Spirit preserves the Church from error in defining theological conclusions, this does not happen through a new revelation. Therefore, since God did not propose these conclusions from the beginning as his testimonies, and since the Church discovers them by the use of natural reasoning, these doctrines cannot be counted as the formally revealed word of God, but are something intermediate between revealed truth and natural truth. If a theologian assents to them because he himself sees the force of the argument, his assent is scientific. If we assent because the Church authoritatively proposes these conclusions, it is ecclesiastical faith, whose proximate motive is the human authority of the Church, rendered infallible by divine assistance. For this reason theologians usually make this distinction: revealed truths are believed; theological conclusions are held, even though in theological questions the word “believe” is used sometimes in a broader and sometimes in a stricter sense.

341. Objection III. The natural sciences have their own principles and norms. But if the Church judged the natural sciences, it would become their principle and norm. Therefore, the Church cannot judge them.

I answer. I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: the Church becomes an internal and positive norm, I deny the minor; it becomes an external and negative norm, I subdivide the minor: in all matters, I deny the minor; in some matters that are connected with revealed truths, I grant the minor. And I distinguish the conclusion: the Church cannot judge the natural sciences in all matters and as an internal norm, I grant the conclusion; in matters in which revelation is touched upon, and as an external norm, I deny the conclusion.

This is the doctrine of the Council of the Vatican: The Church “certainly does not forbid these disciplines from using their own principles and their own method, each within its own sphere; but while acknowledging this just freedom, it carefully ensures that they do not adopt errors by contradicting divine doctrine, or, by transgressing their proper limits, seize and disturb matters of faith” (session 3, ch. 4; Denz. no. 1799).

Scholium. On doctrinal censures.

342. Since doctrinal censures have often been mentioned in what precedes, it is useful to add a few things about them.

a) A doctrinal censure is a qualification by which a proposition is marked as in some way opposed to faith or good morals. If a censure proceeds from the ecclesiastical teaching office, it is judicial; if it is made by private theologians, it is purely scholarly. Moreover, theologians are not permitted to censure propositions whose discussion is freely permitted to Catholic theologians by ecclesiastical authority (Denz. no. 1216). Pontifical censures, because they are pronounced as having perpetual validity for the universal Church, make it necessary to consider the censured propositions false, even if this is not expressed in the words of the censure. For one must not suppose that the Church would perpetually forbid a doctrine that is objectively true from ever being proposed as true. Only when propositions are censured solely because of their manner of speaking (an economic censure) can it happen that it is later permissible to defend them, because the manner of speaking varies at different times.

Sometimes censures are issued so that a separate censure is attached to each proposition (e.g. Denz. nos. 1501 ff.). Sometimes many propositions are condemned in globo, that is, various censures are added, at least one of which applies to each proposition, though it is not specified which one; this must be inferred from the subject matter (e.g. Denz. no. 1080). Sometimes many censures are attached to one proposition; these should not be regarded as synonyms, but signify that the propositions sin against sound doctrine in several ways (a cumulative or categorical censure; e.g. Denz. nos. 1092 ff.).

b) The meaning of the individual censures:

A heretical proposition is one that directly opposes a revealed truth proposed by the Church. It is not required that the person who put it forward be subjectively a heretic.

A proposition is called proximate to heresy if it is not absolutely certain but almost certain to be opposed to a revealed truth, or if its contradictory is held by almost unanimous consent to be revealed.

A proposition is said to smack of heresy if, although it absolutely admits of a good meaning, it nevertheless presents a heretical meaning more readily, especially in view of the circumstances of the people and the times. If the indication is less serious, it is said to be suspected of heresy.

A proposition is called erroneous or an error in faith if it either opposes a doctrine that is objectively revealed but has not been defined by the Church or received by common consent as revealed, such as the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin once was; or opposes a theological conclusion received unanimously. It is called proximate to error if its contradictory is most probably true.

A proposition is said to sound bad if, by using ambiguous or unsuitable words, it can easily be misunderstood. A deceptive proposition attempts to insinuate a false meaning through words that sound correct; in this art Jansenius and the Jansenists excelled (cf. Denz. no. 1517).

A rash proposition, strictly speaking as an ecclesiastical censure, is one that, in a matter that is not certain, departs from the common opinion of the Fathers and theologians without sufficient reason, whether by affirmation or denial. Its rashness lies in disregarding serious authority in theological matters. If someone merely puts forward a new opinion that perhaps has a solid foundation but has not yet been sufficiently considered, this is merely negative or relative rashness, which is not an ecclesiastical censure.

A scandalous proposition is one that gives occasion for spiritual ruin, as if someone were to say that frequent use of the sacraments brings about more disadvantages than benefits.

A proposition is offensive to pious ears if its manner of expression violates the reverence due to sacred things.

What a blasphemous, schismatic, seditious, or injurious proposition is, is sufficiently clear in itself.

c) To find the true doctrines opposed to censured opinions, one must consider whether the rejected proposition was rejected absolutely or modally (cf. Denz. no. 1080), whether it is a universal or particular proposition, whether the condemnation was made in a composite or divided sense (cf. Denz. nos. 1184, 1186), and whether the doctrine itself was censured or only the wording. Not infrequently, the contrary opinion cannot be established with certainty by logic alone. In that case, one must turn to documents relevant to clarifying these censures, such as the allocutions of Pius IX for interpreting his Syllabus (Denz. no. 1700; cf. Schiffini, On the Infused Virtues, no. 193 ff.).

Proposition XLII. The Church is infallible in judging dogmatic facts.

343. Position of the question. In a broader sense, a dogmatic fact is a fact so connected with a dogma that if the fact stands, the dogma stands, and if the fact falls, the dogma falls. For example, the definitions of an ecumenical council are valid only if the council was legitimate; hence the legitimacy of the council is a dogmatic fact.

In a stricter sense, it is a doctrinal fact, consisting in the fact that orthodox or heterodox doctrine is contained in a certain book. The Church’s judgment concerning this dogmatic fact involves two questions: (a) whether the doctrine in question is contained in a book or in certain words (the question of what is, or the question of fact); (b) whether this doctrine is or is not in conformity with right faith (the question of what it is like, or the question of right). The Church does not judge the purely subjective sense that the author of a book had in mind, but the sense expressed in words. This dogmatic fact is what is in question. Therefore, the proposition means that the Church can infallibly judge what sense words have, and whether this sense is orthodox or heterodox.

344. Argument 1. From the history of Jansenism.

The supreme ecclesiastical authority declared against the Jansenists that it could condemn propositions from a book in the sense intended by the author and impose upon everyone the duty of accepting this decision with an internal and irrevocable assent of the mind. But in this way the Church declared itself infallible in judging dogmatic facts. Therefore, it is infallible in this matter.

Proof of the major premise. In the constitution “Cum occasione” (1653), Innocent X condemned five propositions from the book of Jansenius entitled Augustinus (Denz. nos. 1092 ff.). Then the Jansenists said that these propositions had indeed been rightly condemned, but were not found in Jansenius’s book, or at least had not been condemned in the sense intended by Jansenius. But Alexander VII, in the constitution “Ad sacram beati Petri sedem” (1656), declared: “We declare and define that those five propositions… were condemned in the sense intended by that same Cornelius [Jansenius]” (Denz. no. 1098). In the constitution “Regiminis apostolici” (1664), he prescribed that this formula be subscribed: “I, N., submit to the apostolic constitution of Pope Innocent X, dated 31 May 1653, and to the constitution of Pope Alexander VII, dated 16 October 1656, and with a sincere heart reject and condemn the five propositions excerpted from the book of Cornelius Jansenius entitled Augustinus, in the sense intended by that same author, as the Apostolic See condemned them through the said constitutions; and thus I swear” (Denz. no. 1099). Then the Jansenists said that by virtue of these constitutions they were indeed bound to “respectful silence,” but not to internal assent. Clement XI destroyed this evasion in the constitution “Vineam Domini” (1705), declaring that “the respectful silence by which obedience is owed to the apostolic constitutions mentioned above is by no means sufficient; rather, the sense of the book of Jansenius condemned in the five propositions aforesaid, which their words convey as stated above, must be rejected and condemned by all the faithful, not only with the mouth but also with the heart, as heretical; nor may anyone lawfully subscribe to the aforesaid formula with any other mind, intention, or belief” (Denz. no. 1350). Since these apostolic constitutions, the whole Catholic Church has always held and still holds those five propositions, in the sense intended by Jansenius, to be heretical. Therefore, the Church clearly manifested its conviction that its infallibility extends to judging dogmatic facts; and since the Church cannot err in this matter, the Church—that is, the supreme pontiff or an ecumenical council—is truly infallible in delivering such a judgment.

345. Argument 2. From the Church’s perpetual tradition.

Many centuries before Jansenism, ecclesiastical authority often approved statements of various writers as orthodox or condemned them as heterodox, and did so in such a way that everyone had to submit to this judgment. But this manner of acting shows that the Church has always been convinced that it can infallibly judge the doctrine of a writer as it is found in his writings, that is, dogmatic facts.

Proof of the major premise. For example, the Council of Ephesus approved the anathemas of St. Cyril of Alexandria against Nestorius (Denz. nos. 113 ff.); the Second Council of Constantinople condemned the writings of Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas in favor of Nestorius (Denz. nos. 224 ff.); the Fourth Lateran Council condemned the treatise of Abbot Joachim and approved the contrary statements of Peter Lombard on the Trinity (Denz. nos. 431 f.); the Council of Constance prescribed that everyone suspected of the errors of Wyclif and Hus be asked “whether he believes that the condemnations of John Wyclif, John Hus, and Jerome of Prague, made by the sacred General Council of Constance concerning their persons, books, and documents, were rightly and justly made, and are to be held and firmly asserted as such by every Catholic” (Denz. no. 659). Many similar examples could be given, clearly showing the mind of the Church on this matter (cf. Wilmers, On the Church, 464 ff.).

346. Argument 3. From the end of the infallible teaching office.

The Church’s infallibility was granted so that the deposit of faith might be preserved intact. But this end cannot be attained unless the Church is infallible in judging dogmatic facts. Therefore, the Church is infallible in this matter.

Proof of the minor premise. If the Church is not infallible in this matter, anyone could spread doctrines opposed to revelation with impunity and escape the Church’s judgment on the ground that the Church is not infallible in judging the meaning of its words. Therefore, in this way the Church could not effectively guard against people learning and holding false doctrines as true, since people are taught by words and writings. In fact, whenever a judgment is made about the truth or falsity of a doctrine, a judgment is also made about the words in which the doctrine is expressed, because a doctrine cannot be presented otherwise than in a human way. Hence, one who cannot judge the correctness of words cannot judge the correctness of doctrine (cf. 1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 1:13; 2:16; St. Thomas, II–II, q. 11, a. 2, ad 2).

347. Objection I. Once the Church’s infallibility in judging the doctrine itself is presupposed, it is sufficient for the Church to list suspicious books and thus indicate that the faithful are not to read them. Therefore, it is not required that the Church be infallible in the question of fact, whether the doctrine proposed in a book is false or true.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. Although it can often suffice for a book to be entered in the Index of Forbidden Books, nevertheless, when the matter concerns a most grave dogma of faith, this is often not sufficient to preserve the unity of faith. For many people, although they will not read forbidden books out of obedience, will nevertheless retain inwardly the judgment that the doctrine handed down in the book is good, and perhaps will even express this judgment aloud, as many cases show. But in this way the necessary unity of faith would not be preserved. Therefore, the Church generally places books dangerous to the faith only in the Index of Forbidden Books; but when there is greater danger and fundamental errors are involved, it goes further and formally condemns the doctrine contained in the books.

348. Objection II. What the sense of a proposition is belongs to the art of grammar, not to faith and morals. But the object of ecclesiastical infallibility is only matters of faith and morals. Therefore, the sense of a proposition does not pertain to the Church’s infallibility.

I answer. I distinguish the major: the sense of a proposition, if we consider only the mere composition of words, belongs solely to the art of grammar, I grant the major; if we consider the theological or other sense expressed by the words, it belongs solely to grammar and cannot pertain to faith and morals, I deny the major. I distinguish the minor: the object of ecclesiastical infallibility is only doctrines, without regard to the words in which they are expressed, I deny the minor; it is doctrines together with the right way of expressing them, I grant the minor; and with the distinction granted, I deny the conclusion. If this were not so, the Church would not even know whether the words in which it expresses doctrine were correct. But just as the Holy Spirit helps it by his assistance to express right doctrine in the right way when defining it, so he also helps it infallibly to judge whether the doctrine of another, expressed in words, is true or false.

349. Objection III. Certain holy Fathers and ancient theologians taught that councils are infallible in matters of faith but can err in a question of fact. Therefore, at least those Fathers and theologians did not admit our thesis.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: those Fathers and theologians taught that the Church can err concerning non-dogmatic facts, I grant the antecedent; concerning dogmatic facts, I deny the antecedent.

Some of the things usually cited in particular are the following:

a) Pope Pelagius II, in Letter 5, which is Letter 3 to the bishops of Istria, who were rebelling against the condemnation of the Three Chapters and appealing to a letter of Leo the Great concerning the Council of Chalcedon, says in no. 19: “We are clearly granted permission to reconsider whatever was done there [at Chalcedon] concerning persons outside matters of faith. For the special concern of synodal councils is the faith. Therefore, Leo teaches that there is no obstacle to recalling to judgment anything done apart from the faith” (MPL 72, 733). Nevertheless, since the whole letter of Pope Pelagius was written to show that the condemnation of the Three Chapters had been rightly made, this letter is rather an argument for our thesis. Leo the Great had refused to approve what the legates had done beyond their mandate. Pelagius, however, says that after the sixth session at the Council of Chalcedon they were no longer dealing with matters of faith but with private affairs of individuals: “If, then, the profession of faith was completed in the sixth session,… if blessed Leo objects to the matters that were brought up there privately,… why are we… blamed?” Therefore, this objection is irrelevant.

b) St. Thomas says: In matters of faith the Church does not err; “in other judgments, however, which pertain to particular facts… the judgment of the Church can err because of false witnesses” (Quodlibet 9, a. 16). But it is sufficient to add the examples St. Thomas gives in the same place to see immediately that he is not speaking about dogmatic facts: “as when the matter concerns possessions, crimes, or things of this kind.”

c) Bellarmine, after first explaining his own view concerning the condemnation of Honorius at the Third Council of Constantinople, continues: If anyone is not satisfied with this solution, “let him accept the other solution, which is that of John of Torquemada, On the Church, book 2, ch. 93, who teaches that the Fathers of the Sixth Synod did indeed condemn Honorius, but on the basis of false information, and consequently erred in that judgment. For although a legitimate general council cannot err, as this Sixth Council did not err in defining the dogmas of the faith, nevertheless it can err in a question of fact. Therefore, we can safely say that these Fathers were deceived by false reports and by not understanding Honorius’s letters, and unjustly counted Honorius among the heretics” (On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, ch. 11). It must be admitted that Bellarmine speaks somewhat imprecisely; for he should have said that the council, as approved by the supreme pontiff, condemned Honorius only because he had acted negligently in the face of heresy (above, no. 326, 3). It is nevertheless true that a council can be deceived by false reports, because this is not a dogmatic fact.

Proposition XLIII. The Church is infallible in disciplinary decrees, in approving religious orders, and in canonizing saints.

350. Position of the question. a) Some matters remain to be considered in which the Church does not directly make any doctrinal judgment, but rather prescribes or approves some practice. First among these are ecclesiastical laws concerning the whole Church, by which the faithful are directed to order their lives rightly and worship God as they ought. The supreme pontiff or an ecumenical council can enact, change, and abrogate such laws (cf. above, nos. 204 ff., 270 ff., 290). They are therefore not immutable truths. But because they are closely connected with doctrine and morals, we say that the Church is aided by the assistance of the Holy Spirit so that it never establishes universal laws opposed to right faith or good morals. We do not say that such laws are always the best of all those that could be devised, because the rulers of the Church were not promised the highest degree of prudence, but at least that degree sufficient to preserve faith and morals intact.

b) The approval of religious orders can be referred to disciplinary matters. A religious order is a society of people who, by observing perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience according to a definite rule of life, devote themselves to striving for Christian perfection (cf. Praelect. dogm. VIII, no. 684 ff.). Other vows can be added, but these three are essential. Moreover, people cannot establish a religious society without determining by certain laws the common life, the manner of observing the vows, the other ends they usually set for themselves, and the means to those ends. Approval does not concern the goodness of the vows, since they were approved by Christ the Lord himself (cf. Praelect. dogm. IX, 383, 392), but the goodness of the rule and of the particular institutions. Therefore, the question is: Can the Church, by a final and definitive judgment, approve the institutions of an order that are contrary to faith or good morals, or unsuitable for attaining perfection? The negative answer is certain according to theologians (cf. Bellarmine, On Monastic Life 4; Suarez, On the Religious State 2, 17, 17 ff.).

c) The canonization of saints is the final and definitive judgment of the supreme pontiff, by which a servant of God is declared to have been received into the Church triumphant and is proposed for veneration by all the faithful, so that all the faithful must hold him without doubt to be a saint, worthy of public veneration. Beatification is a preliminary judgment by which veneration is permitted (cf. Benedict XIV, On the Beatification of the Servants of God I, 38 f.). Formerly, the veneration of saints, especially martyrs, was permitted by bishops after the records of martyrdom had been examined. Later, the names and records of martyrs were sent from one Church to another, especially to the Roman Church; and thus, with the consent of the bishops and the Roman Pontiff, the veneration of a saint could be extended throughout the whole Church, and this was called equivalent canonization. A kind of such canonization now takes place when the Roman Pontiff approves “immemorial veneration” without the usual formalities of the process. Since Alexander III, the whole matter of beatification and canonization has been reserved to the supreme pontiff (cf. Benedict XIV, ibid. I, 2 ff.). The inscription of names of saints in the martyrology is not canonization, either formal or equivalent.

351. Proof, part I. The Church is infallible in disciplinary decrees.

a) If the Church were to command all the faithful to do something against faith and good morals, it would practically profess an error, as if God commanded what he actually forbids, or forbade what he actually commands, because people manifest their judgment no less through a constant way of acting than through words. But the Church cannot profess an error by a universal law. Therefore, the Church is infallible in enacting universal laws.

b) When the apostles established a universal law, they say: “It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us” (Acts 15:28). The same conviction prevails in the Church. For example, the Council of Trent anathematizes those who say that the rites prescribed by the Church in the administration of the sacraments and the celebration of Mass can be despised as useless and opposed to good morals (session 7, ch. 13; session 22, ch. 7; Denz. nos. 856, 954). Pius VI says of proposition 78 of the Pistoian Synod: This doctrine, “insofar as by the generality of its wording it includes and subjects to the prescribed examination even the discipline established and approved by the Church, as if the Church, which is governed by the Spirit of God, could establish a discipline that is not only useless and more burdensome than Christian liberty can bear, but also dangerous, harmful, leading to superstition and materialism: [is] false, rash, scandalous, pernicious, offensive to pious ears, injurious to the Church and the Spirit of God by whom it is governed, and at least erroneous” (Denz. no. 1578).

352. Proof, part II. The Church is infallible in approving religious orders.

a) When approving religious orders, supreme pontiffs use formulas forbidding all the faithful, under any pretext, to dare to attack such approvals. But if the approvals could be bad, such a severe and universal prohibition would be established without reason. Therefore, the supreme pontiffs judge that they are infallible in this matter.

The common formula is: “Therefore, let no one at all be permitted to violate this page of our approval or rashly oppose it; but if anyone presumes to attempt this, let him know that he will incur the indignation of almighty God and of his blessed apostles Peter and Paul.” Sometimes the penalty of excommunication is also added, as, for example, in the bull of Gregory XIII, “Ascendente Domino,” by which the institute of the Society of Jesus is confirmed: “We command in virtue of holy obedience and under the penalties of excommunication incurred by the act itself, without any further declaration, as well as incapacity for any secular office or benefice and for any regular office of whatever order, that no one, whatever his state, rank, or preeminence, may dare directly or indirectly to attack or contradict the institute of the said Society, its constitutions, or even the present document, or any of its provisions or any other matter concerning the above, under whatever pretext of disputation or even of inquiry into the truth.” But it cannot be admitted that the supreme pontiff could use his supreme authority in this or a similar way to defend matters contrary to faith or good morals.

b) Reason also suggests the same. For when the pontiff approves an order, he proposes this way of life to the whole Church as a safe path not only to virtue but also to attaining perfection. But the Holy Spirit cannot permit an evil or useless matter to be authoritatively proposed by the supreme pontiff to the whole Church as a means to virtue and perfection. Therefore, the pontiff is infallible in approving orders.

353. Proof, part III. The Church is infallible in canonizing saints.

a) Pontiffs act as infallible teachers when they prescribe something for the whole Church to hold. But they do this in canonization. Therefore, the supreme pontiff acts as an infallible teacher in canonization. The formula the supreme pontiff uses in canonization is: “By the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, and our own… we decree and define that blessed N. is a saint, and we enroll him in the catalogue of saints, establishing that his memory is to be recalled by the universal Church every year on the day of his birth… with pious devotion” (Benedict XIV, On the Beatification of the Servants of God I, 36, 21).

b) Supreme pontiffs have sometimes expressly manifested their view on this matter. Thus Sixtus V, in an address given before the canonization of St. Didacus, as reported by Benedict XIV (ibid. I, 43, 2), said that “the Roman Pontiff… for whom the Lord Christ prayed that his faith might not fail, and who is the true head of the Church, which is the pillar and foundation of truth and is governed and directed by the Holy Spirit, cannot err or be deceived in the canonization of saints. He affirmed that this must be believed not only piously but necessarily and with the most certain faith.” Benedict XIV himself (ibid. I, 45, 28) holds as follows: “We shall call him, if not a heretic, at least rash, bringing scandal upon the whole Church, injurious to the saints, favoring heretics who deny the Church’s authority in the canonization of saints, savoring of heresy as paving the way for unbelievers to ridicule the faithful, an assertor of an erroneous proposition, and liable to the gravest penalties, if he dared to assert that the pontiff had erred in this or that canonization and that this or that saint canonized by him was not to be venerated with the worship of dulia.”

c) The argument from reason is drawn from the fact that religious worship would be stained if a man condemned [to hell] were solemnly proposed by the supreme pontiff to the whole Church as one to be venerated and as a model for rightly ordering one’s life. But the Church has been given infallibility to such an extent¹ that it is a teacher worthy of faith in religious and moral matters. Therefore, it is infallible in canonizing saints.

The theologians’ judgments concerning the certainty of this doctrine are quite diverse, because according to some it is “pious,” while according to others it is of faith (cf. Benedict XIV, ibid. I, 45). More commonly, they judge it to be theologically certain, and this judgment should be followed.

354. Objection I. The Church orders all priests to recite certain accounts in the readings of the Breviary’s second nocturn that lack historical truth. But this is contrary to good morals. Therefore, the Church is not infallible in disciplinary decrees.

I answer. I distinguish the major: the Church orders these accounts to be recited as if they were to be held true with absolute assent, I deny the major; as certain pious and human traditions not to be lightly despised, I grant the major. I distinguish the minor: it is contrary to good morals to affirm as absolutely certain what is not certain, I grant the minor; it is contrary to good morals to treat ancient traditions with reverence, I deny the minor. And I deny the conclusion. The Church has often changed readings after questions were better discussed, and is ready to hear arguments if sound ones are brought against the readings; but it does not act precipitously in response to every outcry and rash assertion, and waits until learned people have reached a unanimous and well-founded judgment.

355. Objection II. The Church has sometimes approved religious orders and later suppressed them. Therefore, it first judged them good and later judged them bad, and consequently did not judge infallibly.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: the Church ever considered the same institute in itself, which it had previously approved as good, and later condemned as bad, I deny the antecedent; the Church at some time judged that an institute which was good in itself would be better suppressed because of changed circumstances, I grant the antecedent. The reason for suppressing an institute previously approved may be either that there are no longer enough people who wish to embrace it, or that many of its members have departed from the holiness of the institute, or that because of changed circumstances it is no longer opportune, for example because its original purpose no longer exists, as happened with military orders. It is evident, however, that the Church does not correct its earlier judgment by now suppressing, because of changed circumstances, an institute it approved under other conditions.

356. Objection III. Before canonization, the supreme pontiff offers prayers asking God to avert all error in that act. But if, by virtue of Christ’s promises, the pontiff were infallible in this act, the prayers would be superfluous. Therefore, by praying, the pontiff declares that he is not infallible.

I answer. I grant the major and deny the minor. For by these prayers the supreme pontiff declares that he, as a private individual, is not infallible, but that all infallibility derives from the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Thus, too, the invocation of the Holy Spirit is customarily offered before definitions in ecumenical councils. But by acting in this way councils certainly do not indicate that they can err in their definitions. Just as suitable natural and supernatural means must be employed before definitions, and yet infallibility rests solely on the assistance of the Holy Spirit, so before canonization the life and miracles of the servant of God whose cause is being examined are investigated, witnesses are heard, prayers are offered, and other things are done, while the ultimate basis of infallibility is the assistance of the Holy Spirit (cf. Benedict XIV, On the Beatification of the Servants of God I, 44, 21). Although the pontiffs do not pray in order to receive infallibility, since it has been absolutely promised to them, they nevertheless pray that they may commit nothing contrary to God’s will in the whole procedure; for they do not have the gift of impeccability in the accompanying circumstances.

ARTICLE IV.

ON THE HOLY FATHERS AND THEOLOGIANS.

Cf. Canus, On Theological Places; Theology of Würzburg (Kilber) I, Paris ed. 1852, 397 ff.; Franzelin, On Divine Tradition, sect. II; introductions to patrologies, such as Fessler–Jungmann, Institutes of Patrology, Innsbruck 1890; O. Bardenhewer, History of Ancient Church Literature I, Freiburg 1902; — Patrology³, Freiburg 1910 (also in French, Paris 1905).

Proposition XLIV. The unanimous consent of the Fathers in matters of faith and morals is a certain theological argument.

357. Position of the question. a) Up to now we have considered the exercise itself of the infallible teaching office: the Church teaching throughout the world, ecumenical councils, and the supreme pontiff. This teaching office, by the very fact that it is infallible, directly and irrefragably shows what must be held and what rejected. Hence, for example, one definition of one council suffices to settle a controversy about the matter defined.

But besides this primary source there are also secondary theological sources, from which theological knowledge cannot be drawn with the same simplicity and certainty, but which help us only indirectly to acquire theological certainty. These are the holy Fathers and theologians, who, as such, are not infallible, but are guides for discovering the doctrine of the infallible teaching office. Studying them is useful and necessary for two reasons. 1. Not everything pertaining to faith has been solemnly defined by the Church; therefore, the field of theology is broader than the definitions of councils and pontiffs. 2. It is not sufficient for a theologian to know what has been defined by councils and pontiffs; he must also show to opponents that the defined doctrines have always been handed down by the Church. This requires examining the sources from which the councils themselves and the pontiffs drew their doctrine. At the same time, this investigation helps us to understand the meaning of definitions better and to resolve any difficulties that may arise. For these reasons, we must explain what authority the Fathers and theologians have and how their works should be used.

b) Fathers are called ecclesiastical writers who 1. flourished in the first centuries, and 2. were distinguished by orthodox doctrine and 3. holiness. Their orthodoxy and holiness are established by a solemn judgment or by the Church’s simple consent; hence one may add, 4. they were approved by the Church. One or another material error does not prevent orthodoxy, provided that the writer in question had a Catholic mind and correctly proposed Catholic doctrine in most matters. As regards antiquity, St. Gregory the Great († 604) in the Latin Church and St. John of Damascus († about the middle of the eighth century) in the Greek Church are usually regarded as the last Fathers.

c) Certain writers of the first centuries are indeed of great importance in theology, either because of their antiquity or their learning, but are not counted among the Fathers, either because of errors in doctrine or because they lacked holiness, such as Tertullian, Origen, and Eusebius of Caesarea. Therefore, they do not enjoy doctrinal authority as Fathers, but are invoked as witnesses when the antiquity of some doctrine or practice is at issue. They are called “ecclesiastical writers.”

d) The title Doctor of the Church is distinguished from that of Father; it has been granted by ecclesiastical authority to certain men outstanding in holiness and theological doctrine. Ancient writers do indeed use “doctor” in a broader sense for all the Fathers, but this way of speaking must be distinguished from the special title of Doctor, which is granted only to certain people. To be a Doctor of the Church, antiquity is not required, but excellence in theological doctrine is. The greatest Latin Doctors are considered to be St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and St. Gregory the Great; the Greek Doctors are St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and St. John Chrysostom.

358. Argument 1. From the testimony of the Church.

a) Ancient ecumenical councils already insisted on abiding by the doctrine of the holy Fathers. St. Athanasius says of the Council of Nicaea: “The bishops did not devise words for themselves, but wrote testimonies drawn from the holy Fathers” (Letter to the Africans, no. 6). At the First Council of Constantinople, the Macedonians were asked “whether they wished to abide by the judgment of the Fathers who flourished before the heresies under discussion arose” (Socrates, Ecclesiastical History, under the year 381). In its first session, the Council of Ephesus decreed: “It has pleased God that nothing else be decreed for posterity to believe except what the sacred antiquity, in agreement with the holy Fathers, has held” (Mansi IV, 1183). The Second Council of Constantinople: “We confess that we hold and preach the faith… which the holy Fathers also confessed and explained” (Denz. no. 212). Many other councils say the same (cf. Denz. nos. 269, 271–273, 302–304, 320, 336, 786 f., 1788). But the Church could not so insist on the necessity of following the unanimous consent of the holy Fathers unless this consent provided a certain argument.

b) By the same reasoning, later Fathers judge earlier ones. St. Augustine, appealing to the holy Fathers against Julian of Eclanum, says: “These are bishops, learned, serious, holy, zealous defenders of the truth against empty prattling… If an episcopal synod were assembled from the whole world, it would be remarkable if so many men of this kind could easily sit there. For these men did not all live at one time, but God himself, as he pleases and judges expedient, distributes his faithful and much more excellent servants, a few at a time, across different ages and distances of time and place… the Catholic faith which they drank in as milk and consumed as food, whose milk and food they administered to young and old, and which they defended most openly and courageously against its enemies… The holy Church grew through such planters, waterers, builders, shepherds, and nourishers after the apostles… As they faithfully administered the Lord’s food to this divine household, they shone with great glory in the Lord” (Against Julian 2, 10, 37). St. Cyril of Alexandria says: “For all those whose minds are sound have this goal set before them: to follow the opinions of those [the Fathers], since they too, after filling their minds with apostolic and evangelical tradition, treated their teaching and the doctrine of the faith rightly and without stain or error, and were lights in the world, holding forth the word of life” (Apology for the Twelve Chapters, Anathema 8). Similar things are read in other Fathers.

c) When in our own time certain theologians began to make little of the doctrine of the holy Fathers under the pretext of more cultivated scholarship, ecclesiastical authority vigorously resisted their efforts. Thus Pius IX wrote to the bishop of Breslau on 30 March 1857 concerning Günther: “He has not sufficiently understood how much deference is due to the venerable authority of the most holy Fathers, and with what care one must avoid abandoning their safe footsteps out of love for profane novelty, thereby spreading most grave errors.” Pius X, against the errors of the Modernists, ordered all bishops and priests to swear: “I will most firmly hold the faith of the Fathers and will hold it to the last breath of my life” (Denz. no. 2147). But this obligation ought not be imposed if the faith of the Fathers could be false.

359. Argument 2. From the relation of the Fathers to the infallible teaching office.

The holy Fathers have this relation to the ecclesiastical teaching office: if they had unanimously erred in matters of faith and morals, the ecclesiastical teaching office itself would have erred concerning faith and morals. But the ecclesiastical teaching office cannot err in this way. Therefore, neither can the holy Fathers.

Proof of the major premise. The relation of the holy Fathers to the ecclesiastical teaching office is chiefly twofold. For: a) In their own times, the holy Fathers constituted the ecclesiastical teaching office, or at least were its principal part. Hence they were authentic teachers. b) Later, the ecclesiastical teaching office draws from the writings of the holy Fathers the doctrine it proposes to the faithful, as we have seen. In this respect the holy Fathers are witnesses to tradition.

Most of the holy Fathers were bishops (which was the original reason they were called “Fathers”), who in the exercise of their office proposed and explained revealed doctrine. God “appointed a few stewards, surpassing many in excellence, across different ages,” as we heard St. Augustine say. They were like “ever-shining lamps, illuminating our steps,” as the Fourth Council of Constantinople says (Denz. no. 336). The other bishops followed them as their guides. Thus, if these guides had unanimously taught error, with the other bishops not only silent but consenting, the whole Church would already have been deceived by error. Among the holy Fathers who left us major works, few were laymen (e.g. St. Justin Martyr), deacons (e.g. St. Ephrem), or priests² (e.g. St. Jerome). They are therefore to be considered rather as witnesses.

Besides, under either aspect, the consensus of the holy Fathers is a certain argument. What some say—that the holy Fathers are witnesses only of irresistible authority, not teachers—is true only when the individual Fathers are considered as private teachers, not when they are considered as representatives of the authentic teaching office³. Therefore, when their consensus is established, we need not inquire whether they spoke as witnesses or as teachers (cf. Franzelin, De trad. thesis XV, I, 2° a).

The holy Fathers, as teachers, are already naturally worthy of the highest esteem, because they were learned men, well versed in theology, most of them talented, outstanding in virtue, ardent in their love of truth, diligently devoted to investigating revealed truth, and not rarely enduring serious hardships for it with great courage, even suffering death. Thus, if such men, separated by place and time, agree in one judgment, this consensus is a singular indication of truth. Nevertheless, the principal reason for their authority is divine providence, which not only made them participants in the teaching power of the Church but also endowed them with such singular capacity, love, and zeal for investigating, propagating, and defending the truth. Leontius of Byzantium expresses the Church’s common sense on this matter as follows: “After the apostles and prophets, God placed teachers [the Fathers] in the Church, according to the incomprehensible providence of the Holy Spirit, for the work of ministry and the building up of the Body of Christ” (Against Nestorians and Eutychians I, 35). Cf. the lessons for the second nocturn in the Roman Breviary for the common of doctors.

360. Objection I. The holy Fathers lived at a time when the philosophical disciplines had not yet reached the degree of perfection they have now attained. But sound knowledge of theological matters depends greatly on the natural sciences. Therefore, the holy Fathers are worthy of authority only to the degree of perfection attained by the natural sciences in their time.

I answer. I concede the major. I distinguish the minor: Philosophy, or natural science generally, is a source from which knowledge of theological matters is drawn, I deny the minor; it is an aid used by the Church or theologians to propose revealed matters in definite and fixed terms and to arrange them into a scientific system, I grant the minor. And I distinguish the consequence: The holy Fathers are worthy of authority only to the level of the science of that age in purely philosophical matters, I grant the consequence; in theological matters, I subdistinguish the consequence: as regards terminology, which perhaps was not yet definite and fixed in that age, and as regards the scientific system, if they have one, I grant the consequence; as regards theological matters themselves, I deny the consequence.

“For the doctrine of faith, revealed by God, was not proposed to human minds as a philosophical invention to be perfected, but was handed on to the Bride of Christ as a divine deposit, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared.” Natural science gives faith help in two ways, “when right reason demonstrates [a] the foundations of faith and, illuminated by its light, [b] cultivates knowledge of divine things.” Similarly, reason receives a twofold benefit from faith, when “faith [a] frees and protects reason from errors and [b] furnishes it with manifold knowledge.” So teaches Vatican I on faith, session 3, chapter 4 (Denz. nos. 1799 f.).

361. Objection II. The doctrine of the Fathers is full of disagreements and contradictions. But such a doctrine can never provide a certain argument. Therefore, the thesis is false.

I answer. I distinguish the major: The Fathers sometimes disagree in theological matters (for only those are at issue), I grant the major; they do not agree on many of the most important questions, I deny the major. I distinguish the minor: The doctrine of the Fathers does not provide a certain argument when they disagree, I grant the minor; when they agree, I deny the minor. And I deny the consequence. Indeed, the Fathers’ disagreement on some matters strengthens their authority when they agree. For it is a sign that they did not blindly follow others, but proposed and defended their own views so long as the opposing views did not seem sufficiently established.

Nevertheless, we must not allow that the Fathers in one age agreed about some doctrine and that, in a later age, the Fathers agreed on the opposite doctrine. If this had happened, the Church would have erred in one age. But the Fathers could disagree among themselves in one age, and later, after the matter had been better considered, consensus could follow.

It may be objected that the Fathers of the first three centuries unanimously taught chiliasm, that is, that Christ would have a glorious thousand-year reign on this earth before the universal resurrection; whereas the later Fathers unanimously rejected this opinion.

But the answer is that there never was a consensus of the Fathers about chiliasm. For apart from St. Justin and St. Irenaeus, those who were the chief defenders of this doctrine were not Fathers of the Church, such as Papias, Tertullian, Nepos, Commodianus, Lactantius, and others, who do not possess dogmatic authority. Justin and Irenaeus, however, acknowledge that good Christians also reject the doctrine of chiliasm. “I have told you that many Christians of pure and pious judgment do not acknowledge this,” says Justin (Dialogue with Trypho 80). Therefore, there can be no question of dogmatic consensus.

Scholium. On the use of the holy Fathers in theology.

362. For an argument to be firmly established from the authority of the Fathers, certain conditions are required, which must be briefly explained.

1. It is self-evident that the works from which arguments are drawn must be genuine and their readings critically certain, because no certain argument can be made from spurious or uncertain works. Nevertheless, the force of a dogmatic proof is generally neither destroyed nor diminished by a work of one holy Father being mistakenly attributed to another Father, as in the Middle Ages certain works of St. Fulgentius were commonly attributed to St. Augustine. Moreover, there are certain works by unknown authors that already existed in the time of the holy Fathers and were highly esteemed by them, such as De vocatione omnium gentium. One may certainly argue from such works.

2. Once the certainty of the texts is presupposed, the first question to be resolved above all is what sense the author intended by his words. Very often the holy Fathers state in explicit and wholly unambiguous terms that something must be believed or, on the contrary, rejected as heretical. Whenever the sense is clear and definite, nothing further need be investigated on this point. Often, however, it is not enough to inspect statements detached from their context; rather, we must weigh the context and the manner of reasoning and speaking that the holy Father customarily uses, and sometimes even the manner of speech proper to the whole age. If we neglect these things, we may perhaps know what sense the cited words could have, but by no means what sense they actually have in that passage. For each writer has not only a distinctive character of his own, but also conforms more or less to the spirit of his age. Thus, the technical terms of later times do not have the same definite meaning among the early Fathers, as is the case, for example, with the words “sacrament,” “substance,” and “hypostasis.” Moreover, when the holy Fathers attack a heretical doctrine, they not rarely emphasize the arguments opposed to the error so strongly that they seem to neglect and almost deny the other side of the truth. Thus, for example, St. Augustine speaks in one way against the Manichaeans, who denied freedom, and in another way against the Pelagians, who exaggerated human freedom; we should not therefore think that, in fighting the Pelagians, he recalled what he had established against the Manichaeans. We must therefore compare with one another what a holy Father wrote about one and the same subject at different times and on different occasions. Besides, it is clear that all these investigations cannot be presented every time an argument is made from the holy Fathers; rather, it is a necessary presupposition that the Fathers’ words truly have, according to their own mind, the sense attributed to them.

3. The Fathers must be interpreted as witnesses to Catholic Tradition. Sometimes it is laid down as a principle that the holy Fathers are to be interpreted in the same way as secular authors. This is true as regards the merely grammatical interpretation of words, for the sound principles of the art of hermeneutics must be applied to all writings, even sacred ones. But the principle is false when it concerns real interpretation, that is, finding the true theological sense of the words. For, as the holy Fathers very often protest, above all they wish to preserve the doctrine revealed and handed down by the apostles (cf. above, no. 329). Therefore, so long as it is not certain that a Father has departed from right doctrine on some point, we must presume that he intended his words to propose the handed-down doctrine, even if, taken grammatically, the words could just as easily or even more easily admit another sense. This method of explanation should be followed especially if one or another Father seems to speak against a doctrine commonly accepted in that age, since it is improbable that men so distinguished, as the Church judges the holy Fathers to be, either ignored or attacked the common doctrine of their age. The holy Fathers themselves already interpreted their predecessors in this way: for example, St. Athanasius interpreted St. Dionysius of Alexandria, who called God the Father the ποιητήν of his Son (St. Athanasius, De sent. Dionys. no. 21); St. Basil interpreted St. Gregory Thaumaturgus (St. Basil, Letter 210, formerly 64, no. 5); and St. Augustine interpreted St. Hilary (St. Augustine, De Trin. 6, 10, 11). St. Ambrose says: “If the wording is offensive, inquire into the force of the profession … Even a wavering expression is overshadowed and protected from error by an unwavering mind” (Letter 48, no. 4); that is, the holy Father’s own orthodox mind requires us to explain his ambiguous words in an orthodox way. The contrary method of acting is condemned in the oath prescribed by Pius X: “I reject the opinion of those who hold … that the writings of individual Fathers are to be interpreted solely by the principles of science, with every sacred authority set aside, and with that freedom of judgment with which any secular documents are commonly investigated.” For the holy Fathers, as Fathers, are not merely individual human beings, but members of Catholic Tradition considered actively, extending without interruption from the apostles to our own time.

4. For the authority of the Fathers to be irrefragable, their consensus is required, because their disagreement removes the authority of one by the other on the matter about which they disagree. The consensus of the Fathers of one age suffices, provided there are enough witnesses truly to represent the Church of that age, since the Church could not teach error in any age. If, however, many Fathers have borne witness to one and the same matter, it is not necessary to hear every one of them before a certain judgment can be made; if those who are most eminent and were guides to the others agree without doubt, the agreement of the rest cannot prudently be doubted. An example is the Council of Ephesus, which judged the case of Nestorius settled after citing the statements of twelve Fathers. On this matter Vincent of Lérins says: “Although a much greater number of the ancients could have been cited, it was not necessary, because … no one doubted that those men truly thought no differently from all their other colleagues” (Commonitorium, ch. 30). Besides, we must not forget that silence is not disagreement; therefore, an argument from silence rarely proves anything, and only under special conditions.

At times ecclesiastical authority has approved the doctrine of a particular holy Father in a special way, as St. Augustine’s doctrine (Denz. no. 128 ff.), though in such a way that “we do not dare to despise the deeper and more difficult parts of the questions that arise … yet we are not obliged to affirm them” (Denz. no. 142; cf. no. 1320). Indeed, the doctrine of certain Fathers has been approved in a very special way, such as the anathemas of St. Cyril of Alexandria against Nestorius (Denz. no. 113 ff.). Since the Church’s approval is the principal reason for granting the holy Fathers authority in the logical order, that is, with respect to theological demonstration, the greater a Father’s authority, the more specifically his doctrine has been approved.

5. Since individual Fathers are not infallible, they could err on one question or another, and some of them did in fact err, especially in matters that in that age did not yet pertain to the Church’s explicit profession, such as questions about the spirituality of angels, the rebaptism of heretics, and others. If these Fathers’ disagreement with the Church’s later explicit doctrine is manifest, the fact must be conceded, the reasons for the error explained, and the authority of the holy Fathers safeguarded in this way, not by artificial and improbable explanations (cf. St. Augustine, De bapt. contra donat. 1, 1; 2, 4; 2, 14; 5, 26; 6, 3).

6. The fact that individual Fathers could err does not mean that each one’s authority is null, since there are many degrees of authority between infallible authority and no authority at all. Thus, even individual Fathers, because they have been approved by the Church, have greater authority in theological matters than others who have not been approved in this way. A statement of a Father is therefore a true argument, but in itself only a probable argument: it does not establish the matter absolutely, yet it is not to be rejected lightly. On this matter we must follow the rule established by St. Thomas: Sacred doctrine “uses the authorities of canonical Scripture properly and necessarily in arguing; it uses the authorities of other doctors of the Church as though arguing from what is proper to them, but only probabilistically” (I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2). He appeals to the words of St. Augustine: “I read the others [besides the inspired writers] in such a way that, however greatly they excel in holiness and doctrine, I do not consider something true merely because they themselves thought it so; rather, they persuaded me either through those canonical authors or by a probable argument that does not depart from the truth” (Letter 82, no. 3). He says this of individual Fathers; but he argues from their consensus “so that it may be shown that [the same dogma] has been preserved with such constancy in the faith of the Church from the beginning until the present” (On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins 3, 7, 14).

7. Finally, it is asked how we are to judge whether the holy Fathers wish to propose a doctrine as the Tradition of the Church, or only as their own more or less probable opinion. Often this is immediately clear from their words. It suffices to read, for example, what the holy Fathers wrote against the Arians and the Pelagians, or the catecheses they gave to catechumens. Often, however, the holy Fathers simply propose a doctrine without adding whether it must necessarily be accepted. In that case, we cannot discern from the words alone whether it is a dogma or a matter necessarily connected with dogma; we must conclude from their other statements whether they want this doctrine to be considered the only true and Catholic one. If this cannot be inferred with certainty, the argument is not certain in itself. But if later Fathers and theologians consistently and exclusively propose the same doctrine as something that must necessarily be embraced, this is a sign that the doctrine of the earlier Fathers was considered the only Catholic one; and therefore the statements of the earlier Fathers must also be explained in this way. From this point of view, scholastic theology greatly helps us interpret the Fathers correctly, because it is patristic theology arranged as a system and adapted for easier understanding. What the Fathers say in passing or rhetorically exaggerate in their speeches, and in general whatever they say in a way that makes it clear they do not intend there to propose doctrine exactly and precisely, should be accepted for use only with caution and the necessary qualifications.

Prop. XLV. Even the unanimous consensus of theologians in matters of faith and morals is a certain theological argument.

363. Position of the question. We are speaking of those theologians who flourished from the twelfth century onward in Catholic schools under the supervision and care of the Church (cf. above, no. 18 ff.). Thus we are speaking especially of those called “scholastics,” to distinguish them from other modern writers who, abandoning principles that had prevailed for many centuries in all Catholic schools, applied the tenets of new philosophies to theology.

Most theologians were not bishops, and therefore did not belong to the teaching Church. In this respect, as also with regard to antiquity, they differ from the holy Fathers. Nevertheless, as witnesses to Tradition they show us the mind of the Church in their own times. They also cultivated the system of theology scientifically and therefore give definite answers to many questions; consulting them is more convenient than consulting the holy Fathers. Their authority derives principally from the Church’s approval, and the more specifically they have been approved, the greater it is. Some of them are doctors of the Church, such as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. Although dogmatic theologians are to be consulted especially in dogmatic questions, canonists, exegetes, and others who have written about dogmatic matters when occasion arose are not wholly excluded.

This theological source must also be carefully observed in our own time, because some who wish to be theologians seem to ignore it entirely. For when an argument from the consensus of theologians is presented to them, they reply: “That is what theologians once thought; I, however, think the opposite,” as if someone who establishes new theories against the common consensus were not thereby convicted of error. Especially the modernists, as Pius X says in the encyclical “Pascendi,” “everywhere ridicule and despise scholastic philosophy and theology. Whether they do so from ignorance, fear, or rather from both causes, it is certain that the desire for novelties is always joined with hatred of the scholastic method; and no clearer sign can be given that someone is beginning to favor the doctrines of modernism than when he begins to abhor the scholastic method.”

364. Argument 1. From the Church’s approval.

The Church has often celebrated scholastic theology with the highest praise and recommended that all follow it. But this could not have happened if the scholastics, by unanimous consensus, had handed down doctrines contrary to the faith. Therefore, their consensus is an argument for doctrine in agreement with the faith.

Proof of the major. In the bull by which he declared St. Bonaventure a doctor of the Church, Sixtus V says: “The snares of heretics and diabolical machinations, by which they attack most vehemently in this sorrowful age sacred theology, called scholastic, admonish us most urgently to retain, illustrate, and propagate with every effort this same theology, than which nothing is more fruitful for the Church of God … The more they strive to attack and overthrow this most strongly fortified citadel of scholastic theology, the more it is our duty to defend this unconquered bulwark of faith and preserve and protect the inheritance of our fathers, honoring to the best of our ability its fiercest defenders of truth with the honors they deserve.” Leo XIII repeats and confirms the praises Sixtus V gave to scholastic theology in the encyclical “Aeterni Patris” (Acta Sanctae Sedis 1879, 107 f.).

Whenever opponents attacked scholastic theology, the Church rejected these attacks. Thus Pius VI condemned proposition 76 of the Synod of Pistoia: “The attack by which the synod assails scholastic theology … is false, rash, and injurious to the holiest men and doctors who cultivated scholastic theology to the great benefit of the Catholic religion; it favors the hostile insults of heretics against it” (Denz. no. 1576). Pius IX speaks of an opinion that had prevailed “against the ancient school and against the doctrine of those greatest doctors whom the universal Church venerates for their admirable wisdom and holiness of life. By this false opinion, the Church’s own authority is put in danger, since for so many successive centuries the Church not only permitted theological science to be cultivated according to the method of those doctors and principles sanctioned by the common consent of all Catholic schools, but very often also extolled their theological doctrine with the highest praise and strongly commended it as the strongest bulwark of faith and a formidable weapon against its enemies” (Denz. no. 1680). Thus, if the question concerns “that submission which is to be made by an act of divine faith, it is not to be limited to those things defined by the express decrees of ecumenical councils or of the Roman Pontiffs and this See, but is also to be extended to those things … held by Catholic theologians by universal and constant consensus to pertain to the faith.” If the question concerns an assent inferior to faith, one must submit “to those points of doctrine which by the common and constant consensus of Catholics are held as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions contrary to these points of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, nevertheless deserve another theological censure” (Denz. no. 1683 f.). These points suffice to show how and in what sense ecclesiastical authority has approved scholastic theologians and their doctrine (cf. Denz. nos. 1620, 1652, 1657). Pius X reaffirmed in the encyclical “Pascendi” what had earlier been established on this matter.

What was said about the Fathers also applies to theologians: the more specifically a theologian’s doctrine has been approved, the greater that theologian’s authority. Now, in general, no one has been praised and commended more often and magnificently by the Supreme Pontiffs than St. Thomas Aquinas. Leo XIII says of him: “Among the scholastic doctors, Thomas Aquinas stands out far above all as their prince and master; as Cajetan observes, because he greatly venerated the ancient doctors, he somehow acquired the intellect of them all” (encyclical “Aeterni Patris”; Acta Sanctae Sedis 1879, 108). By these and other praises St. Thomas was not declared infallible, but he is proposed as a doctor whom we safely follow and whose doctrine we should not abandon unless a solid reason requires it, which happens very rarely in dogmatic questions. There is scarcely need to emphasize specifically that other great theologians are not to be neglected. In general, the same things said above (no. 362) about the holy Fathers apply to the use of theologians in theology.

365. Argument 2. From the connection of theologians with the teaching Church.

The scholastic theologians are connected with the teaching Church in such a way that, if they unanimously taught errors in matters of faith and morals, the Church itself would have fallen into error. But this is impossible. Therefore, scholastic theologians cannot unanimously teach errors in matters of faith and morals.

On the major. From the twelfth century to the eighteenth, theological schools were under the provident governance of ecclesiastical authority, not merely by right but also in fact. Ecclesiastical authority appointed teachers, supervised doctrine, and corrected or even deposed those who erred. Many examples of this are found in history (cf. e.g. Denz. nos. 368 ff., 412 ff., 419 ff., 495 ff.). Therefore, if the scholastics had unanimously proposed false doctrine without the Church’s protest, the leaders of the Church would have gravely failed in their office; indeed, by praising and recommending scholastic theology, they would have positively fostered error (cf. Denz. nos. 480, 483).

Moreover, priests, bishops, and Supreme Pontiffs emerged from those ecclesiastical schools, all imbued with scholastic principles. It was therefore impossible for error to be taught in all the schools while the leaders of the Church remained free from error. Indeed, it is clear that the leaders of the Church proposed to the faithful no doctrine other than what was commonly taught by theologians. Therefore, if all the theologians had erred, the whole Church would have erred. Since the Church could not err in any age, doctrine commonly received in the Middle Ages cannot now be weakened because some theologians are beginning to contradict it; rather, what was once unanimously taught as to be believed by faith is of faith; what was taught as theologically certain is still theologically certain; and what was taught as a commonly received opinion without theological qualification cannot be rejected rashly, except for solid reasons. If the scholastics disagree among themselves, the greater party is not necessarily to be followed; rather, the reasons by which they prove their assertions must be weighed. If the question is not resolved by the arguments, it is reasonable to follow those of greater authority, especially St. Thomas. If only one theologian, or two theologians of lesser renown or marked for their singular views, strives against the common current, this is to be regarded as nothing (cf. Canus, De locis theol. 8, 4; Wirceburg. I, 234 ff.).

366. Objection I. The scholastic theologians make theology insipid and deter people rather than attract them by their barbarous terminology, abstract manner of speaking, dry and awkward syllogistic form, endless divisions and distinctions, and other serious defects. Therefore, scholastic theology should be abandoned and replaced with another theology more suited to the conditions of our times.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: All these defects, insofar as they are supposed to be real, caused the doctrine itself to be corrupted, I deny the antecedent; they left the doctrine itself untouched, which is the only matter our thesis concerns, I grant the antecedent.

If someone dislikes in the scholastics the things objected to, let him correct the defects if he can, and retain their sound doctrine. Nevertheless, in theological treatises dryness is preferable to verbosity, the use of distinctions to confusion, and a clear and simple form to an affected and alien ornamentation. Besides, there is such great variety among the scholastics themselves in their manner of writing that no reasonable person can speak of a scholastic style as something common to them all; if someone looks, he will find examples of almost every style in their writings. These things do not pertain to the essence of scholastic theology but are accidental.

367. Objection II. The scholastics lacked a historical sense and tried to define everything a priori; hence, they were inept at correctly resolving questions that require careful historical investigations. Therefore, their doctrine must be abandoned in many respects.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: The scholastics generally neglected purely historical questions, I grant the antecedent; they did not possess the knowledge of Catholic Tradition required to preserve sound theological doctrine, I deny the antecedent.

Apostolic doctrine is preserved in the Church not immediately and principally through the study of history, but through the daily teaching office and the extraordinary definitions of councils and pontiffs. This is the proximate rule and norm of faith and theology. The historical study of sacred doctrine is indeed most useful, but it is only an aid and a secondary source. The scholastics did not neglect even this secondary source, especially the works of the holy Fathers, as their books bear witness, although they considered everything more theologically than historically. In our own time the historical sense has indeed developed much more, but the theological sense is often lacking. Hence, not rarely, more and graver theological errors are found in a single work on the history of dogmas than in all the volumes of the greatest scholastics taken together. Thus, a lesser defect has been exchanged for a greater one. Let us therefore avoid defects and retain the practice according to the wise counsel given by Pius X in the encyclical “Pascendi”: “A greater regard must certainly be had than before for positive theology; yet this must be done in such a way that scholastic theology suffers no detriment, and those are to be reproved as acting on behalf of the modernists who exalt positive theology in such a way as to seem to despise scholastic theology.”

368. Objection III. The scholastics in fact unanimously taught theological errors. Therefore, the thesis is false.

I answer. I deny the antecedent, insofar as the question concerns theological doctrines which they unanimously proposed as to be believed or held by all.

The errors proposed in the works of the scholastics can be divided into three classes:

a) In the purely natural sciences, they were imbued with false opinions common in that age, such as the theory of the four elements and similar matters. It should nevertheless be noted that they were aware that many of these opinions were only hypotheses or merely probable theories. For example, St. Thomas says of astronomers who followed the Ptolemaic system with respect to the motion of the heavenly bodies: “Their suppositions, which they have devised, need not be true. For although, once such suppositions are made, the appearances are saved, it does not follow that these suppositions must be said to be true, since perhaps the appearances concerning the stars are preserved in some other way not yet understood by human beings” (De caelo II, lecture 17; he says the same in Summa I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2).

b) In theological questions, older scholastics could accept as probable or more probable a doctrine that later theologians rejected. An example is the fairly unanimous teaching of the ancient scholastics that the episcopate is not a sacramental order distinct from the priesthood. For they did not hand down this opinion as something that had to be embraced necessarily. Thus, one of the oldest scholastics, William of Auvergne (Alvernus), defended this opinion, but at the end says: “If someone wishes to say that the episcopate is an order distinct from the lesser priesthood, we do not oppose him” (De sacram. ordinis 13).

c) Some, or even many, could teach dogmatic errors in matters not yet defined by the Church, but not all unanimously. Thus, many fiercely attacked the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, but others defended it no less vigorously.

Scholium 1. On the consensus of the Christian people in matters of faith and morals.

369. The Lord Jesus gave infallibility to the ecclesiastical teaching office for the benefit of all the faithful, so that all may come together in the unity of faith (Jn 17:20 f.; Eph 4:11 ff.). Thus, just as the testimony of teachers is preserved infallibly through the Holy Spirit, so also is the faith of believers. For this reason, even the holy Fathers argue against heretics from the consensus of the faithful. Thus St. Basil reproves Eunomius “for thinking that one ought not to remain in the simple and unadorned faith of the many, but should once again drag the truth down to what seems right to him through certain artificial and deceptive arguments” (Against Eunomius 3, 1). St. Augustine, against Julian, says: “We do not oppose you, as you slander us, with ‘the mere murmur of the people,’ although the people themselves murmur against you for this very reason: this is not a question whose knowledge could even escape the common people. Rich and poor, high and low, learned and unlearned, men and women know what is remitted to each age in baptism … As if it were a small assertion of this truth that in this most firm and ancient foundation of faith the multitude spread throughout the whole world does not disagree with itself” (Against Julian 1, 7, 31). These words indicate in what matters the consensus of the people may be invoked: not in subtle questions beyond the people’s grasp, but in matters accessible to everyone, because they pertain either to doctrine or to daily practice. Therefore, if a clear consensus of the people is apparent in these matters, it is a certain argument that the ecclesiastical teaching office proposes this matter to all to be believed or held. The people’s mind is manifested in various ways—in books, pictures, monuments, and inscriptions. Above all, pictures and inscriptions made by Christians in the first centuries can be useful for dogmatic argument. But since these matters require many investigations before they provide a firm basis for argument, they are treated in a special discipline called sacred archaeology (cf. P. Syxtus, Notiones archaeologiae christianae, Rome 1908 ff.). The same applies to ecclesiastical history (cf. Franzelin, De tradit. thesis XII).

Scholium 2. On the use of human reason in theology.

370. St. Thomas says: “Sacred doctrine also uses human reason, not indeed to prove the faith, but to make clear certain other things handed down in this doctrine. Since grace does not remove nature but perfects it, natural reason must serve the faith, just as the natural inclination of the will follows charity” (I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2). Reason is understood either subjectively or objectively. By subjective reason, that is, our intellect, we understand what is to be believed and why it is to be believed, elicit an act of faith, and appropriate the doctrines of faith to ourselves by meditating on them. The theologian uses objective reason, that is, naturally known principles, in four ways: 1. to establish the preambles of faith and motives of credibility, which must be known before theology; 2. to form theological conclusions from a revealed major premise and a philosophically known minor premise; 3. to show that dogmas agree with philosophical truths or at least do not contradict them, and also to illustrate mysteries in some way by certain analogies; 4. to defend revealed truths against the objections of opponents.

Hence it is understood why the authority of philosophers is also invoked in theology within certain limits. In sacred doctrine, philosophy always remains a servant; it never becomes the mistress. It is admitted to serve only insofar as it is true in its principles, sound in its doctrines, cautious in its choice of opinions, and sober in its use (cf. Conc. vat. session 3, chapter 4; Denz. no. 1795 ff., and also nos. 1669 ff.; Wirceburg. I, no. 242).