Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae Tomus I: De Christo Legato Divino, De Ecclesia Christi, De Fontibus Theologicis

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

79. In giving revelation, God imposes on human beings the duty of receiving it. Therefore he must furnish his revelation and his envoy, who announces it to others, with marks or signs by which people may become certain that divine revelation is truly being proposed to them. For God demands a rational submission. But it is not rational to believe lightly, that is, without prior certainty about the fact of revelation. The marks by which one recognizes whether a doctrine has been revealed by God or not, or whether an envoy has truly been sent by God to announce such a doctrine, are called criteria of revelation, or motives of credibility, because by them the credibility of revealed doctrine is shown.

There are internal criteria when they are drawn from the character of the doctrine itself; there are external criteria when they are drawn from accompanying facts. There are negative criteria when they show only that nothing prevents such a doctrine from being revealed by God; there are positive criteria when they show that the doctrine has in fact been revealed by God.

An irrational or dishonorable doctrine is not divine; if it is good and weighty, it may have been revealed by God. If it is so excellent and unique that nothing similar has ever been conceived by a human being, there is a strong probability and presumption of divine origin. Nevertheless, internal criteria by themselves do not provide perfect certainty about the fact of revelation, because they do not altogether exclude a human origin for such a doctrine.

If the person who says he has received divine revelation and has been sent to preach it is wicked, deceitful, buffoonish, he is not to be regarded as a divine envoy. If he is a good man and conducts himself worthily, he may be a divine envoy. If he stands out for exceptional holiness, the presumption favors him; indeed, the person who says he has been sent by God may be a miracle of the moral order, such as cannot be understood without a special intervention of God. If this occurs, there is certain proof of a divine mission.

Good religious and moral fruits arising from a doctrine show that so good a tree could have been planted by God; exceptionally distinctive fruits that cannot be explained by natural causes are signs of God's immediate intervention.

The most certain external marks, and the only ones sufficient in themselves, are sensible effects produced by God in confirmation of revelation; these effects are divided into miracles and prophecies. We shall therefore treat them specifically. The First Vatican Council says, session 3, chapter 3: «So that the submission of our faith might be in accord with reason, God willed that external proofs of his revelation, namely divine deeds, and especially miracles and prophecies, be joined to the interior helps of the Holy Spirit; for, since they clearly display God's omnipotence and infinite knowledge, they are the most certain signs of divine revelation and are suited to the understanding of all.» And concerning faith, canon 3: «If anyone says that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and that therefore people ought to be moved to faith solely by each person's interior experience or private inspiration, let him be anathema.» Canon 4: «If anyone says that no miracles can occur, and therefore all accounts of them, including those contained in Sacred Scripture, must be dismissed as fables or myths; or that miracles can never be known with certainty, and that the divine origin of the Christian religion cannot rightly be proved by them, let him be anathema.» (Denz. nn. 1790, 1812, 1813.)

Cf. St. Thomas, Contra gent. l. 3, c. 98 sqq; — De potentia q. 6; J. de Bonniot, Le miracle et ses contrefaçons (also in German: Wunder und Scheinwunder, Mainz 1889); E. Müller, Natur und Wunder, Freiburg 1892; P. de la Barre, L'ordre de la nature et le miracle³, Paris 1900; L. Fonck, Die Wunder des Herrn I², Innsbruck 1907 (where many other books are listed on p. 3 sqq); I. Pohle, Natur und Übernatur, in the work Religion, Christentum und Kirche I, Kempten 1911, 317 sqq.

Proposition VI. Miracles can occur.

80. Position of the question. A miracle is a sensible effect produced by God beyond the powers and laws of nature. It is called a sensible effect because imperceptible effects, such as the production of grace, although they are brought about by God alone, are not usually called miracles; for whatever is not perceived does not arouse wonder, which is what the word miracle signifies. An effect may be sensible either in itself, as in the raising of a dead person, or insofar as it is manifested by certain signs, as when someone shows by words that he knows the hidden thoughts of others.

In producing miracles, God is either the sole cause or the principal cause. For God can use a human being or other creatures as an instrument for producing miracles. But in that case the human being does not act by his own power; rather, divine power is in some way joined to the human being (though transiently, except in Christ, in whom divinity itself is permanently present) and through the human being flows into the effect, as when God acts while a human being, moved by divine impulse, declares that a miracle is to occur.

By natural means we know only the visible world, including the human being, and from the visible world we know its author, God. Whether there are created pure spirits is not known with certainty by the philosopher. If such spirits exist (as faith teaches), they can produce effects beyond those to which the powers and laws of the visible world suffice. Hence by their own powers they can perform miracles in a qualified sense, or with respect to us (cf. Mt 24, 24). Nevertheless, divine providence does not permit evil spirits either to disturb the physical order or to lead those who use reason rightly into invincible errors. If, however, we are dealing with good spirits, they are God's ministers for human salvation; if God employs them to confirm some doctrine as revealed, this is no less effective an argument than if God himself performs the miracle. It is therefore superfluous for our purpose to inquire into what angels can do and what only God can do. For although it is theoretically certain that certain things, such as creation and knowledge of future free acts, are possible to God alone, nevertheless in individual miracles it is extremely difficult to determine whether they could absolutely have been performed by an angel.

81. Atheists, monists, pantheists, and all who do not acknowledge a personal God consistently deny, according to their principles, the possibility of miracles; for when the cause is denied, the effect is denied. We can therefore dispute with them about the falsity of the principles on which they rely; but as long as they retain these principles, we cannot dispute with them about miracles. Even if an evident miraculous fact were shown to them, they would answer according to their principles that they could not explain this fact, but that it was not a miracle, since there is no God to perform miracles. In this discussion, then, we assume people who admit a personal, omnipotent, wise, holy, freely acting God.

Although God can perform miracles for various ends, here we consider miracles only as signs of divine revelation. This aspect also prevails in Sacred Scripture, so that miracles are very commonly called signs, σημεῖα (cf. Io 2, 11 18; 3, 2; 20, 30). Miracles considered in this way are not merely events of the physical order, but belong chiefly to the moral and religious order, and are an important part of God's personal intercourse with human beings.

Just as the creation of the temporal world is the effect of an eternal divine decree, so miracles too occur in time because God decreed from eternity that they should occur at that time. Nevertheless, one must not think that created things contain, just as they contain natural powers and laws, certain seeds, as it were, of the supernatural that spontaneously develop into miracles. There is no reason to affirm such a thing; the special divine action required for a miracle is sufficient without such created dispositions; and miracles do not belong to the ordinary course of things but are unusual and extraordinary, arousing human attention. For although God's power and wisdom appear no less in creation and natural divine providence than in miracles, miracles nevertheless indicate a more immediate influx of God than the natural order does.

82. Argument. Miracles can occur if God lacks neither the power nor the reasons to perform them. But he lacks neither. Therefore.

Proof of the minor premise, part I. God does not lack the power to perform miracles. God did not produce the world with its laws and powers by necessity, but by a free decision. These powers, laws, and effects therefore exist in the world not because things could not have been otherwise, but because this was God's pleasure; he could and can make indefinitely many greater things than he has in fact made. Indeed, God cannot so exhaust his omnipotence that he is no longer able to do anything.

Thus, a) God can act above natural powers. For if he was once able to produce effects that require creative power, he can produce such effects again and again—for example, multiply matter, produce external effects by the mere command of his will, and accomplish in an instant what natural powers require a long time to produce.

b) He who gave natural powers and cooperates with them can, in this respect, act against natural powers: he can withhold his cooperation from the production of certain effects, for example, make fire not burn combustible things placed in it, or, when the force of resistance is prevented, make bodies penetrate one another. Something does then occur against the ordinary course of events, but nothing occurs against the law of causality, because all created causes are subject to the uncreated cause.

c) God can act against the disposition of matter and, for example, restore a corpse that is unsuited to being informed by a soul to its former state and unite it with a soul again. In this matter divine power is also required insofar as it belongs to God alone to recall a soul from the state of its term to the state of its way.

d) God can produce intentional effects without the action of a rational creature, such as human speech in the air. He can also act immediately on spirits and, for example, cast out demons.

Only one who denies the existence of an omnipotent and freely acting God can deny all this power to God.

83. Proof of the minor premise, part II. God must not be said to lack reasons for performing miracles. For one must not think that, by establishing the natural order, God renounced the ability to manifest himself personally to rational creatures. Although a priori this personal communication is not proved to be so fitting that the contrary would be unfitting¹, nevertheless, if it pleases God to act with human beings in this way, it is easy to understand how greatly God's power, wisdom, and love toward human beings are commended by it. Therefore, miracles, at least insofar as they belong to the moral order and are signs of divine revelation, must be said to be fitting and worthy of God; for the physical order is subordinate to and serves the moral order. This law is fully observed when the ordinary physical events are in some way broken through by the performance of miracles (cf. what I wrote on this subject in «Theologische Zeitfragen» V, Freiburg 1908, 102 sqq).

84. Objection I. God is not an inept craftsman. But he would be an inept craftsman if he had to remedy defects in his work by his immediate intervention. Therefore, God does not act in this way.

I answer. I deny the assumption of the minor premise. God does not perform miracles to repair defects in the physical world but for the ends of the moral and religious order. A craftsman is not inept if he makes a work that no one can handle with absolute mastery except himself, and thereby shows that he is a craftsman superior to others. This is how God acts in creating the world and performing miracles. In creating the world, he made a work that he alone can make; by performing a miracle, he shows himself to be the supreme lord and master of this work.

85. Objection II. He is not a good legislator who first establishes laws and then violates them. But God would act in this way by performing miracles. Therefore, God must not be thought able to perform miracles.

I answer. I grant the major premise; I deny the minor premise. God established no law by which he himself is prevented from immediately producing a sensible effect. The so-called natural laws are constant modes of acting followed by physical causes in their actions. We infer these laws by inductive reasoning based on a sufficient number of observations and experiments. These laws therefore state what effects causes produce if they act according to their own mode; they do not establish what another cause besides them can do, or how they themselves can be modified, impeded, employed, or directed in their actions by other causes. Therefore, no law of God is violated in miracles; for by implanting certain powers, inclinations, and modes of acting in things, God did not impose on himself a law never to do anything immediately by himself, or never to use created causes as instruments for producing certain praeternatural effects. Those who bring forward the unbreakable chain of physical laws against the possibility of miracles speak as though physical laws absolutely and unconditionally demand the same effects always and everywhere. But this is manifestly false. Various negative conditions (such as the removal of impeding causes) and positive conditions (such as divine cooperation) are required for certain effects to proceed from causes. Therefore, if conditions are changed through divine intervention, physical laws do not demand that the same effects nevertheless be produced. Physical law does not determine whether certain conditions are present or absent.

86. Objection III. All natural and scientific certainty would perish if miracles could occur, because we would never be certain that a miracle was not taking place. Therefore, miracles cannot occur.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. To object in this way is to speak against the facts. For those who admit miracles are no less certain of the ordinary course of things than those who deny miracles. We are certain that a miracle is not occurring where no special indication of a miracle appears. By miracles God wishes to make human beings attentive to a matter of the moral order. Hence miracles do not occur surreptitiously, with no human being noticing, nor so frequently that they cease to be unusual events and to arouse wonder.

The physical, chemical, and biological sciences proceed rightly if they formulate their theses and hypotheses without taking miracles into account, because it is their task to define the natural course of things, not the special effect of God, by which ordinary powers and laws are not changed. In this sense it is rightly said that a miracle is not an object of natural science. One must only take care not to draw this false conclusion: “A miracle does not exist within the province of science (physics); therefore it does not exist at all.” For the science of phenomena alone does not exhaust the adequate object of human knowledge; rather, by the principle of causality a step is made to a “transcendent” cause: there is an effect that cannot be explained by causes in the world; therefore, a cause beyond the world is required.

Proposition VII. Miracles can be known with certainty as miracles.

87. Position of the question. If God performs a miracle to show that some doctrine has been revealed by him, he will also bring it about that the human beings whom he wishes in this way to instruct understand that a miracle truly has occurred. Otherwise the whole thing would be futile. Nor can anyone who admits a personal God reasonably deny that God is powerful and wise enough, if he wills, to make human beings certain that a miracle has occurred. It will help only to add a few points to explain the concepts more fully and to reject certain quibbles.

We do not say that all human beings can judge with certainty about every miracle ever performed, but that nothing prevents those whom God performs a miracle to instruct from arriving at a certain judgment.

In a miracle one distinguishes the historical truth of the fact itself, for example, that a blind man receives his sight at the word of a wonderworker; the philosophical truth, that is, the supernatural or praeternatural character of such a fact; and its relative truth with respect to proving revelation. We shall speak later about this third property.

In this thesis we consider the knowability of the historical fact and the knowability of the supernatural character of such a fact.

88. Argument. A miracle can be known with certainty if both its historical truth and its philosophical truth can be known with certainty. But both can be known with certainty. Therefore.

Proof of the minor premise, part I. The historical truth of a miraculous fact can be known with certainty. For, given the proper conditions, sensible events can be known with certainty. But a miracle is a sensible event that differs in itself from other events only in being a fact that occurs rarely and outside the ordinary course of things. Its being rare and unusual does not alter its perceptibility, but rather increases attention to it. Thus, just as certain unusual events in history are for this very reason more conspicuous and certain than commonly occurring events (for example, the first crossing of the English Channel by an aircraft, the deed of Herostratus, or other singular events of past times), so also the sudden cure of someone suffering from a serious and perhaps incurable disease, and similar events, draw everyone's eyes to themselves and are usually investigated more carefully. Therefore, insofar as miracles are considered only as certain sensible facts, they can be perceived by those present under the same conditions and can come to the knowledge of posterity through historical testimony, just like any other sensible facts. There are accounts both of miracles and of natural events that lack sufficient testimony. According to the rules of criticism, these must be rejected or considered doubtful. But to say a priori that every fact reported as miraculous must for that very reason be regarded as not having occurred is a frivolous and contemptible assertion. It is reasonable to adhere to sound criticism, but it is foolish to speak against facts and testimony on the basis of a priori principles that are by no means evident. Such a principle is the one held by many unbelievers: “A miracle cannot occur; therefore, it did not occur; the witnesses were deceived or deceivers.” In fact, when unbelievers reject accounts of miraculous events, they are often entirely lacking in sound criticism, and they abuse the name of science so that it truly becomes a mockery of science.

89. Proof of the minor premise, part II. The philosophical truth, or praeternatural character, of a miracle can be known with certainty. For it can be known with certainty that certain events cannot be produced by natural powers, either in substance or at least in the manner in which they occur. But an effect that cannot be produced by natural powers requires a praeternatural cause. Therefore, in this sense miracles can be known as praeternatural events. In substance, those events are supernatural that never occur through the powers of nature, such as the raising of a dead person, the penetration of bodies, and the suspension of the law of gravity. In their manner, those events are praeternatural that do occur through natural powers but slowly and given certain conditions, not suddenly and independently of conditions, such as an instantaneous cure of a disease or the multiplication of bread, and similar things. It does not matter that we often cannot know with certainty whether a particular miracle belongs to the first or the second class. Whenever creation intervenes formally or equivalently, the effect is praeternatural in substance (cf. above, n. 82).

To judge the character of a miraculous fact, we do not need to be able to define accurately a priori what natural powers absolutely can and cannot do. The same is true of many natural things about which we nevertheless judge with complete confidence. Thus, we do not know what all human beings, present and future, can do, yet we know that no human being can fly like a bird, because the entire composition of the human organism prevents it. Similarly, we know that a human being cannot raise a dead person, perform any external effect by an act of will alone, or cure every kind of disease by saying, “I want you to be well.” Therefore, just as people are certain about what occurs according to natural powers and laws even though, theoretically, they do not know all these powers and laws perfectly, so they can also be certain that a given event, either in itself or at least in such circumstances, cannot occur through natural laws. Physical certainty and the knowability of miracles in this respect belong on the same footing.

90. It can also be known that miraculous facts are not portents performed by the devil. For God, whose providence governs all things wisely, cannot permit human beings to be led invincibly into error by the devil. Therefore, if he permits the devil to perform portents, he will also provide that their diabolical character can be known. If the work itself, its circumstances, and its end are all good, it is not a diabolical fact, because the devil always intends something evil. Everything dishonorable, irreligious, cruel, manifestly false, or ludicrous is a sign of an evil spirit, just as things that are entirely pure, holy, and beautiful flow from a good source. This moral examination, when conducted from principles known from elsewhere and not dependent on the truth of the miracle, is not a vicious circle, because one does not conclude: “Because it is a miracle, it is good; and because it is good, it is a miracle”; rather: “Because the work is good, it is not diabolical; and because it is a work that cannot be done by material or human powers, it is from an agent beyond the world.” Therefore, the work was done either by God or by a good angel (cf. Dt 13, 1 sqq; 18, 15 sqq; Lc 11, 15 sqq; Suarez, De myst. vitae Christi disp. 31, sect. 2, n. 8). Moreover, the devil can never raise the dead or generally do those things that presuppose supreme dominion over things and creative power.

91. Objection I. It is physically certain that miracles do not occur; that people are not deceived in perceiving a miracle, judging it, or accurately transmitting it to others is at most morally certain. But physical certainty is greater than moral certainty. Therefore, it is always more certain that a miracle did not occur than that it did occur.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: it is physically certain that miracles do not occur through physical powers, I concede the major premise; through God, I distinguish under a distinction: where there are no indications of a miracle, I concede the major premise; where there are sufficient reasons for affirming a miracle, I deny the major premise. I grant the minor premise. I distinguish the inference: it is more certain that miracles do not occur through physical powers than that they do, I concede the inference; it is more certain that miracles do not occur through God, I distinguish under a distinction: where there are no indications of a miracle, I concede the inference; where there are sufficient reasons for affirming a miracle, I deny the inference.

This whole argument rests on a false assumption, as if physical certainty about physical powers and laws and moral certainty about divine intervention were conflicting testimonies about the same thing; this is manifestly false. Physical certainty testifies nothing about God's intervention, and moral certainty testifies nothing about the natural order; rather, they are testimonies of different orders and about different things, which are not commensurable with one another.

Almost the same should be said about the objection: “The experience of countless thousands of people establishes that the dead do not rise; the experience of a few testifies that a dead person rose.” The objection has no force. For these are testimonies about different things, that is, about the natural course of things and about a special divine action.

92. Objection II. Those who testify to a miracle say that they saw an event through powers and according to laws of nature, and at the same time say that something occurred in that event beyond the powers and laws of nature. Therefore, they contradict themselves.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: they say that the subjective act of cognition occurred naturally and that the objective fact was supernatural, I concede the antecedent; they affirm that the same thing is both natural and praeternatural, I deny the antecedent. And I deny the inference.

Similar objections can easily be multiplied. They are not serious difficulties, but rather show the straits of unbelievers when faced with supernatural events, which are the root of the Christian religion and manifest their existence and life through their fruits. Take supernatural facts out of religion, and religion will weaken and die. That is why these facts are attacked so vehemently; and when nothing else remains, they proclaim that all who admit miracles renounce science, since the rejection of miracles has long ago and forever been adjudicated in the court of science. But nothing is accomplished by worn-out phrases (cf. Praelect. dogm. I, n. 75 190).

93. Objection III. Most witnesses to miracles are unlearned people, prone to superstition and lacking critical skill, who lived in an age when many things now common and known to all would have been considered prodigious (steam and electric machines, telegraphy, telephony, and many others), as would also many cures of diseases now effected through suggestion or hypnotism. Therefore, it must be thought that people of former times, through their ignorance or even through the fraud of clever tricksters, were led to regard as miracles things that were entirely natural events.

I answer. I deny the assumption of the argument. Provided that the fact itself and its circumstances are sufficiently established, we ourselves, using our own intellect and the help of developed science, can judge the character of the fact; we need not entrust ourselves to the credulity of people of old. People could see the sensible fact itself. If an unusual fact initially seems prodigious when it is not, the matter will gradually be disclosed, as happened when steam-driven carriages or telegrams were first introduced. Furthermore, the question is not only what can now be effected by certain means, but how an event produced without such means is to be explained. For example, Christ did not use electrical instruments or the various techniques hypnotists employ to heal, but cured the most diverse diseases by his mere command. Let men who boast so much of scientific progress do something similar, if they can. Certain events that are praeternatural in substance can never occur through natural powers, such as the raising of a dead person. Moreover, not all learned men of our times have been or are unbelievers; many of them have admitted miracles and carefully investigated recent events. The supposition that wonderworkers may have possessed knowledge of hidden powers, or that several coincidences came together, is far too gratuitous to be serious.

Many miracles have been falsely asserted, just as many scientific doctrines have been falsely established. But just as science is not to be rejected because false theses have sometimes been established, so miracles are not to be simply denied because some accounts of miracles are fables.

Proposition VIII. Miracles performed in confirmation of revelation are certain signs of revelation.

94. Position of the question. Every miracle, simply by being performed, is a manifestation of a personal, supramundane God whose power surpasses all created powers. Therefore, if even one miracle has ever truly occurred, it is an effective argument for the existence of God and for various divine perfections. Hence it is no wonder that atheists and pantheists stubbornly deny every miracle, because once a miracle is admitted they must admit the moral and religious consequences they do not want (cf. Praelect. dogm. I, n. 128).

But a miracle also has, or at least can have, another power of proof. For if someone says that he is an envoy sent by God to announce divine revelation to human beings, and performs a miracle to prove this assertion, he appeals to God as a witness to his truthfulness. In this case, then, beyond the signification inherent in the thing itself, the miracle receives a new signification or truth in relation to the fact of revelation, in whose confirmation it is performed. This too seems clear from the concept of the matter. Nevertheless, for greater clarity let us explain it somewhat further and hear the objections of our adversaries.

95. Argument. God cannot testify as true to what is false. But when God performs a miracle after being asked to do so as a sign of revelation, he testifies that revelation has truly occurred. Therefore, under these conditions a miracle is certain proof of revelation.

Proof of the minor premise. God alone can perform a miracle, either by himself or through an instrumental cause. Therefore, a wonderworker who asks for a miracle to prove the fact of revelation invokes God as a witness to the truth of his assertion. Hence, if the miracle occurs, God grants this request and testifies that revelation has truly occurred.

If God did not wish to testify to the wonderworker's truthfulness, the performance of the miracle would coincide with the invocation of divine testimony only by chance. But to admit this is in itself irrational, because an explanation that resorts to chance explains nothing; and it also conflicts with God's wisdom and holiness, since in those circumstances God cannot act in such a way that people necessarily judge him to be testifying to the truth of what the wonderworker says, although in fact it is false. If someone is asked to manifest by an external sign that he assents to another person's words, and gives this sign, everyone takes it as testimony of assent. Therefore, if God were to give a sign under the same condition, even though revelation had not truly occurred, he would be a false witness, which is impossible.

Nor is it permissible to resort to certain hidden ends for which God might nevertheless have performed the miracle. For all certainty would perish if things that by their nature are signs of truth could be made by God for hidden ends in such a way that they confirmed falsehood. Much less can it be understood how God could mark the life of a human being who falsely claims to be a divine envoy with a continuous series of miracles, as happened in the life of Christ.

Finally, God can declare explicitly, by a miraculously produced voice, that this person is a divine envoy. But however God confirms a person's testimony, he can never confirm a falsehood as true by a miracle.

A human being, bound to the senses and unable to see the fact of revelation itself immediately, is moved to admit revelation by nothing more than seeing a sensible sign given by God in testimony to revelation. Therefore, by confirming revelation with a miracle, God accommodates himself to human nature and leads a human being to faith in the way most fitting to him.

96. Objection 1. A miracle is a contingent fact; the things proposed for belief are necessary truths. But contingent things cannot be an argument for necessary truths. Therefore, a miracle cannot be an argument for revelation.

I answer. I deny the minor premise and its assumption. The minor premise is false, because a contingent fact can very well lead us to knowledge of a necessary truth, just as from the contingent world we know its necessary cause, God. Certainly, contingent facts are not the ontological foundation of eternal truths, but they can be a logical means of knowing eternal truths, because our cognition, too, is a contingent fact. If this cannot be done, why do our adversaries write books, which are certainly contingent, to teach necessary propositions? Every proof of a necessary truth given to human beings is a contingent fact.

The false assumption of the minor premise is that miracles are performed to prove that the objects of faith are true. They are not performed for this, but to show that God truly revealed what the envoy preaches. The motive for believing revealed things, however, is not the miracle but the authority of God revealing.

Cf. St. Thomas, Quaest. disp. de verit. q. 12; Suarez, De fide disp. 8, sect. 3 sqq; H. Denzinger, Vier Bücher von der religiösen Erkenntnis II 402 sqq; I. B. Becker, Die Weissagungen als Kriterien der Offenbarung, Mainz 1890.

Proposition IX. Prophecies, too, can be suitable criteria of revelation.

98. Position of the question. Prophecy and prediction are sometimes taken in the same sense. But prophecy in a broader sense signifies any message brought by a human being in God's name (cf. Cornely, Introductio in libros V. T. II, n. 242 sqq). A prediction is a certain foretelling of a future event that cannot be foreknown from natural principles. Its object is chiefly the free acts of God or of creatures. Cardiognosia, by which someone knows the secrets of hearts, open to God alone, may be referred to this category.

A prediction is a miracle of the intellectual order. A miracle more clearly manifests divine omnipotence; a prediction manifests omniscience. In a prediction, as in a miracle, three things must be distinguished: the historical fact of the prediction and its fulfillment; judgment about the prediction's supernatural character; and its power to prove the truth of revelation. There is, however, this difference: a miracle, as soon as it is performed, is an object whose character can be investigated and whose power of proof can be discerned; a prediction, in itself, can be known as a true supernatural fact and as certain proof of revelation only once it has been fulfilled.

Just as a miracle, insofar as it is a sensible effect, is usually a natural thing, so in a prediction both the foretelling and the fulfillment can also be natural things. But just as in a miracle the manner in which the event proceeds from its cause is supernatural, so in a prediction the manner in which the prophet receives knowledge of future things is supernatural. Moreover, since supernatural knowledge of future things is revelation, what was said above (n. 54 sqq) about revelation applies here.

99. Argument. For a prediction to be a suitable criterion of revelation, it must be possible, it must be possible to know it as a supernatural fact, and it must have the power to prove revelation. But all three conditions are met. Therefore.

Proof of the minor premise, part I. A prediction is possible. For God, being an infinite intellect, knows all things, including future free acts, and can reveal to a human being some of what he himself knows about future contingents, as is evident from what we established above (n. 62 sqq) concerning the possibility of revelation.

100. Proof of the minor premise, part II. A prediction can be known as a supernatural fact. It needs no proof that one can hear a human being foretelling future events and afterward see whether what was foretold actually happens or not. We assume that the events in question are sensible and can be known by human beings. Knowledge of both the prediction and its fulfillment can also be transmitted to posterity by witnesses, so that certain knowledge of the matter may be obtained under the same conditions in which other historical facts can be known.

A prediction is known to be a supernatural fact if knowledge of the future event could have been acquired only through God's praeternatural intervention. Under the proper conditions, a judgment about this can be made with certainty.

For when the future free acts of creatures are in question, their prediction is either fortuitous, conjectural, or certain. The fulfillment of a purely fortuitous prediction is more surely excluded the more numerous and determinate the things predicted are. Someone who asserts without any foundation that something will happen may sometimes happen to say what later actually occurs, if the matter concerns some simple event that occurs often—for example, if someone were to say, “A year from today, on this very date, it will rain.” But even in such matters he will often be mistaken. The more numerous and minute the circumstances specified, however, the less likely it is that the event will correspond to a rash prediction; for things that happen by chance happen rarely. Therefore, if future free acts are rashly predicted with many specified circumstances, it is wholly improbable that the event will correspond to the prediction. Least of all can effects that depend on God's free will be predicted in this way (cf. Ottiger, Theol. fundam. I, n. 233 sqq).

The same holds for a conjectural prediction. A human being can sometimes infer from previous observations, with a certain moral certainty, how other human beings will act, but only when the matter is a bare and simple fact and not very remote in time. But no one can ascertain through psychological conjectures with certainty what this or that person will do after a long time, on a certain day, in a certain place, and under certain circumstances.

Accordingly, a prediction is a certain sign of divine revelation when complex events, remote in time, are foretold with certainty, together with circumstances that here and now are not determined in their causes, but depend in every way on the free will of God or human beings (cf. St. Thomas 2, 2, q. 171, a. 6 ad 2 and q. 172, a. 1).

Angels, whether good or evil, naturally know many things that human beings do not, and so they can foretell certain things that are prophecies with respect to us, as was said above (n. 80) about miracles. Perhaps this is how various events recounted about the oracles of the pagans are to be explained (cf. Act 16, 16 sqq), although many of them must be attributed to fraud, as even the ancients themselves observed, for example, Cicero (De divinat. 2, 56). Moreover, angels do not naturally know future free acts with certainty, least of all God's decrees about future things (cf. Is 41, 23 sqq; 46, 9 sq). Good angels can be employed in prophecies, as in miracles, as instruments of God. If this happens, God himself acts as the principal cause. But evil angels, too, are subject to divine providence, which does not allow rational human beings to be led invincibly into error; the malice of demons will appear either in the thing predicted, in the circumstances of the prediction, or in its end. For the devil does nothing that is simply good.

101. Proof of the minor premise, part III. A prediction can be known as a certain criterion of revelation. For God can predict that a human being will appear at a certain time and place, distinguished from all other human beings by these and those signs, and that this person will be his envoy and a truthful witness to divine revelation. This was done concerning Christ, as we shall see later, and the ancient Fathers often and effectively used this argument to convert the pagans. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a more evident argument for demonstrating that a human being predicted in this way is God's envoy.

In another way, a fulfilled prediction can be an argument for revelation when a prophet says: “So that you may know that I truly announce divine revelation to you, behold, I foretell to you in God's name this or that, which no one can now foresee except God alone, so that when it has happened you may know that I have spoken the truth.” For in this way God is invoked as a witness, just as in other miracles; and if what was predicted is then fulfilled, he testifies that the person spoke in God's name. God can no more permit someone to abuse knowledge received from him to deceive people than he can permit someone to abuse a miracle for deceiving them. The more evidently an envoy appears to be endowed with the gift of prophecy, the more forceful this argument is (cf. what I wrote in «Theologische Zeitfragen» V, 110 sqq).

102. Objection I. The prediction of future things is impossible precisely because free acts would thereby occur necessarily. Therefore, it must not be admitted.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: they would occur necessarily by consequent necessity, I concede the antecedent; by antecedent necessity, I deny the antecedent. Consequent necessity, however, does not hinder freedom. Just as an act, when it is done freely, cannot at the same time not exist, so an act that is going to happen cannot at the same time not be going to happen. This necessity is called consequent because it follows the present or future existence of the act; in this way even free acts are necessary. Antecedent necessity, on the other hand, exists when an act is already determined antecedently to its existence in its causes, as happens in all nonfree agents, which always produce the same effects under the same conditions. We will discuss this further later in the treatise on God's foreknowledge.

103. Objection II. Predictions are usually so indeterminate that we cannot judge with certainty whether they have been fulfilled. Therefore, they are useless.

I answer. This is a question of fact, which we shall examine later. For now, however, it is useful to note a certain trick of rationalists. When a prediction seems less determinate, they say, “It proves nothing.” When it is very determinate, they say, “This could not have been known so precisely before the event; therefore, it is a prediction made after the event.” They speak in this way for no other reason than that they hate predictions a priori just as much as miracles.

104. Objection III. The pagans, too, had oracles and other predictions, yet their religion was not divine. Therefore, predictions do not prove the divine origin of religion.

I answer. There is a great difference between the oracles of the pagans and true predictions, because those oracles were often ambiguous, as in this one: «Croesus, by crossing the Halys, will destroy a great kingdom» (that is, either he will overthrow the kingdom of his enemies or his own); they were often false. Cicero writes: «You [Apollo] have filled an entire volume with your oracles, partly false, as I think, partly true by chance, as often happens in every kind of speech, partly equivocal and obscure, so that an interpreter needs another interpreter and the oracle itself must be referred to other oracles, partly ambiguous and of a kind that must be brought before the dialecticians» (De divinat. 2, 56). True predictions, however, as we have said, must be certain and determinate.

There is another difference between true prophets and the pagan seers. The Pythia and other seers, raging in madness, uttered things they themselves did not understand. A true prophet is enlightened by God so as rightly to perceive what has been revealed and to be able to teach others. St. Paul already indicates this difference (1 Cor 12, 2; 14, 32 sq). The many shameful things that occurred in the oracles of the pagans sufficiently show that if some higher power was present there, it was a diabolical power, as many Fathers teach; this is supported by the fact that the oracles fell silent at the presence of Christ's servants (cf. Praelect. dogm. III, n. 414). For the rest, it is difficult to judge which things there were human frauds and which were operations of demons (cf. Fr. Leitner, Die prophetische Inspiration, Freiburg 1896, 29 sq).

It is not incompatible with reason that God gave revelation to the pagans, not to confirm idolatry but to lead them to the truth. Not a few Fathers judge that the Sibylline books truly contain divine prophecies about the future Messiah. But those books, in the form in which they now exist, are partly Jewish and partly Christian in origin. Hence we learn scarcely anything from them about the prophecies of the pagans (cf. C. Alexandre, Oracula Sibyllina, Parisiis 1856).

Somnambulism, magnetism, spiritism, and similar phenomena are not to be compared with prophecies, because the doctrine of the prophets is sound and promotes the moral and religious order¹, and is directed to ends worthy of God; those phenomena, by contrast, are morbid, harmful to soul and body, and often joined with evil moral effects. Magnetism and the more obscure phenomena of psychic life are usually treated in philosophy (cf. T. Pesch, Institutiones psychologicae II, Friburgi 1897, n. 695 sqq) and in moral theology (cf. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis I¹¹, n. 499 sqq). Therefore, it seems that nothing further need be added here.