Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae Tomus I: De Christo Legato Divino, De Ecclesia Christi, De Fontibus Theologicis

Cf. Guil. Wilmers, De religione revelata, Ratisbonae 1897; G. van Noort, Tractatus de vera religione², Amstelodami 1907; A. de Broglie, Problèmes et conclusions de l’histoire des religions, Paris 1885; — Religion et critique, ib. 1896; Th. Specht, Lehrbuch der Apologetik, Regensburg 1912, 21 sqq. On the virtue of religion: S. Thomas 2, 2, q. 81 sqq; Suarez, De religione; Th. Bouquillon, De virtute religionis; I. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, Freiburg 1881; I. Mausbach, Das Wesen der Religion, in the work: Religion, Christentum und Kirche I, Kempten 1911, 1 sqq; Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones dogm. IX, n. 293 sqq.

Proposition I. God, whose existence is proved in philosophy, is a personal God.

31. Position of the question. There are also not a few among the learned who reject a priori every religion worthy of the name and the possibility of revelation, either because they deny that God exists (atheists, materialists) or, if they concede that there is some being that may be called God, because they deny that this being is personal and say that God is the Universe itself, or a part of the Universe, to which personality belongs only insofar as it has attained self-consciousness in the human being (pantheists). But religion and revelation are a kind of personal intercourse between human beings and God. Therefore, unless God is a person, religion and revelation are incompatible. Conversely, if God is a person, the question of religion and revelation must be properly explained so that every reasonable doubt may be excluded. Indeed, all those who are now¹ theists almost all profess religion and admit that revelation can occur; all who are pantheists can neither practice religion nor admit revelation. So long as each holds to his own principles, no fruitful discussion of this matter can be expected between the theist and the pantheist. Pantheists, too, do speak of religion and revelation, but they attach to these names certain vague meanings of reverence toward the Universe, of inward movements of wonder, and of sublime and “transcendent” feelings. These are pure imaginings and subjective affections, distinguished from the poetic frenzy only by the diversity of their object.

32. God is called a person analogically: that is, the perfection we indicate when speaking of human persons is attributed to God insofar as it is a perfection, with all the imperfections that accompany it in human beings excluded, so that in God it is a pure perfection in an infinite degree. There are two things that constitute the concept of personality: individuality and rationality. A person is first of all a supposit, that is, a complete nature, distinct and separate from every other nature. Yet only a rational supposit is a person; for things lacking reason, such as brute animals, are not designated by the name of persons. These matters are explained in philosophy (e.g. C. Frick, Ontolog.⁴ n. 226 sqq). Therefore, if we call God a person, we affirm that God is distinct from finite things, both individually and taken together, and that he is an infinite substance, infinitely perfect in intellect and will. By saying that God is infinite, we admit that we cannot grasp in our minds the proper manner in which God is personal; by saying that he is distinct from the world and endowed with intellect and will, we affirm that God truly subsists in himself, truly understands, and truly wills. What we affirm is in God; the manner in which we conceive and affirm that perfection is in us alone.

33. Argument 1. Personality is a pure perfection produced by God in the world. But whatever pure perfection there is in the world is also in God as the supreme cause of the world. Therefore, God is personal.

As to the major premise. The existence of persons in the world needs no proof. Personality, however, is a pure perfection because its concept includes no imperfection, and it can exist in every order and degree of rational beings. For a rational substance does not cease to be rational on account of attaining a certain degree of perfection, nor does this substance cease to be individual. But these two things, rationality and individuality, constitute the concept of personality; therefore, personality is a pure perfection. Every personality that we know through experience is indeed a limited perfection, as are also every life, every intellect, and every perfection whatever, because they exist in limited subjects. But just as life, intellect, and many other perfections are pure perfections, since they do not require that they exist only in limited subjects, so personality, too, does not require that it exist in a limited subject.

This perfection, like every other, was created in human beings by God; we do not prove that here, but take it as proved in philosophy. For although other causes, too, contribute to producing human persons, the ultimate cause and cause of all causes is God.

The minor premise is evident. For if there were in an effect a perfection that was not in its cause, that perfection would be without a cause, and the principle of causality would be overturned. There are indeed in effects mixed perfections that essentially have an imperfection attached to them, such as every material perfection, which cannot exist in a purely spiritual being, since it conflicts with the latter’s perfection. God, then, is the ultimate cause of these mixed perfections and, in that sense, contains them in himself as well; but he contains them not formally, with their accompanying imperfections, but eminently and virtually, insofar as the perfection of the divine being not only equals but infinitely surpasses the perfections of those created beings, and insofar as by the mere act of his will he can produce them from nothing. For infinite power cannot produce only what is contradictory, that is, what by its very concept is nonbeing.

34. Argument 2. God is of infinite perfection. But a being of infinite perfection is personal. Therefore, God is personal.

Proof of the major premise. A finite perfection is limited either because it is limited by its essence, as a human being is, or because it is received in a limited subject, as human cognition is, or because its efficient cause cannot or does not will to produce a greater perfection. This division is complete, because the cause of a limited perfection must necessarily be either formal, material, or efficient; otherwise it would have no cause, which is impossible. But God is limited neither by his essence, nor by a receiving subject, nor by an efficient cause. The latter two possibilities are excluded because God has no efficient cause, since he is from himself, and is not limited by reason of a receiving subject, because a being from itself is an unreceived act. Nor is God limited by his essence, since in a being that exists from itself, existence is not received in a subject but is its very essence. But existence, or actuality, is not restricted to any particular perfection. Therefore, God is not limited in perfection by his essence; rather, his perfection extends as far as the concept of existence or actuality.

The minor premise is evident. For an infinite being lacks no pure perfection. But personality is a pure perfection. Therefore, the infinite is personal.

35. Argument 3. For a being to be personal, two things are required: real distinction from every other being and rationality. But God is distinct from the world and is rational. Therefore, God is personal.

Proof of the minor premise. God is distinct from the world because the world, as a mutable and potential being, requires an immutable being and pure act as its ultimate cause; but pure and immutable act is really and essentially distinct from every mutable and potential being. Therefore, God, pure act, is distinct from the world and all its parts. God is also rational, because he is the cause of rational creatures, and because teleology, that is, consideration of the order prevailing in the world, requires a wise ordainer. Therefore, both elements of personality, individuality and rationality, are found in God.

Since these arguments are treated more fully in philosophy (e.g. Hontheim, Theodicaea n. 248 sqq 418 sqq 522 sqq 714 sqq), it is enough to recall these few points. Philosophy also shows that God is free in his external operations (with a freedom of power, not of potentiality), since an infinite being has no need of creatures but is fully satisfied, according to intellect and will, by his own infinite truth and goodness.

36. Objection I. God cannot be both infinite and personal if infinitude and personality conflict with each other. But infinitude and personality do conflict with each other: for the infinite is a being that contains in itself every notion of being, so that nothing of being can exist beyond it; whereas a personal being is one that subsists in itself, distinct from every other being. Therefore, God cannot be both infinite and personal.

I answer. I concede the major premise. I deny the minor premise, and distinguish the reason added: the infinite is a being that contains every notion of being in itself either formally or eminently and virtually, I concede the assertion; that it contains every notion of being formally in itself, I deny the assertion. An infinite being can contain formally in itself only perfection; what is imperfect, or insofar as it is imperfect, is excluded from an infinite being, because imperfection, as negation or privation, is nonbeing. Mixed perfections are in an infinite being insofar as they receive from it every notion of being, so that nothing can exist that does not have its ultimate foundation and first cause in the infinite being. Thus there is no more perfection in God and the world together than in God alone; there are only more beings. Nor do created beings, because they subsist in themselves, become independent of God; rather, all their perfection continually proceeds from divine causality. God subsists as a being from himself; other things subsist as beings from God. Hence, I deny the inference.

37. Objection II. Whoever is a person distinguishes himself as this “I” from other “I”s. But God does not distinguish himself as one “I” among many other “I”s. Therefore, God is not personal.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: whoever is a person necessarily requires that there be other rational supposits from which he distinguishes himself, I deny the major premise; whoever is a person necessarily distinguishes himself as one “I” among other “I”s, if there are other “I”s, I further distinguish: if there are other “I”s of the same order, which can be counted together, I concede the major premise; if there are other “I”s of an order so different that they cannot be counted together, I deny the major premise. I distinguish the minor premise: God does not require that there be other rational supposits, I concede the minor premise; if there are other rational supposits, God does not distinguish himself as one of them, I distinguish under a distinction: God does not know that he is not those others, I deny the minor premise; God does not count himself together with them as a supposit of the same order, I concede the minor premise. God is not first, Adam second, and other human beings third, fourth, and so on; for things that agree only analogically cannot be counted together in this way. We do not count a human being, an ox, a tree, and a stone together. Much less, then, is God counted together with other things, with which he does not agree even in the notion of being univocally.

38. Objection III. We acquire the notion of person from consciousness of ourselves. But this notion involves limitation. Therefore, it cannot be applied to God.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: consciousness is one of the sources from which we draw the concept of person, I concede the major premise; we are so bound by the testimony of consciousness that we cannot develop a concept of person that could also be applied to beings other than human beings, I deny the major premise. I distinguish the minor premise: the notion of a human person involves limitation, I concede the minor premise; the notion of a rational being subsisting in itself involves limitation, I deny the minor premise. I distinguish the inference: the notion of a human person cannot be applied to God, I concede the inference; the notion of a rational being subsisting in itself cannot be applied to God, I deny the inference.

39. Objection IV. Philosophy arrives at only one divine person. But according to revelation God is triune, or three persons. Therefore, the philosophical doctrine of God’s personality is false.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: philosophy teaches that God is one rational nature subsisting in itself, I concede the major premise; philosophy teaches that we know the proper manner of divine personality, I deny the major premise. I distinguish the minor premise: according to revelation God is not one rational nature subsisting in itself, I deny the minor premise; according to revelation there are certain internal processions in the divine nature, about which philosophy neither knows nor teaches anything, I concede the minor premise. On the distinction given, I deny the inference, because revelation does not deny what philosophy teaches, but adds something. The philosophical concept of divine personality, then, is indeed imperfect, but it is not false.

Proposition II. Every human being must acknowledge God’s supreme excellence and show him reverence, that is, must profess religion.

40. Position of the question. If God were an impersonal being, whether the Universe or a part of the Universe, people could know this state of affairs and perhaps be struck with a kind of amazement by comparing themselves with the variety, vastness, and depth of the Universe. But in that case God would be only an object of speculation and sterile wonder, and no personal intercourse with him would be possible. Yet matters are not so: by his wisdom and love God produced the whole world from nothing, especially human beings, and continually preserves them, governs them, and leads them to their end. Should a human being, then, not also turn to God with intellect and will and pursue him by his actions, but instead somehow turn his back on God, who is always watching over and loving him? Surely this is contrary to sound reason and good morals. Whoever admits that God’s knowledge and love are continuously directed toward every human being, individually and collectively, must confess that it is the human being’s duty to raise his mind to God as the highest truth and to embrace God with his will as the highest good. To acknowledge God’s infinite excellence and make that acknowledgment known is to worship God, or to profess religion. For religion is the virtue by which we offer worship to God on account of his infinite excellence. Worship adds nothing to God’s perfection and beatitude, nor does human impiety take anything away from them. But it is of the greatest concern to human beings themselves to act rightly toward God; and because God wills human spiritual good and observance of the moral order, he therefore requires that human beings worship him.

41. Religion in itself is a virtue of the will, but it presupposes in the intellect knowledge of divine excellence, because we cannot revere what we do not know. Hence religion considered subjectively includes both right knowledge of God and of our relation to God, and a disposition of the will to act according to this knowledge. Consequently, religion considered objectively consists in the sum of truths and duties by which the moral relation of the human being to God is constituted. Therefore, on the basis of those objective truths on which religion rests, one can distinguish true religion and false religion. Considering the matter in a purely philosophical way (that is, abstracting from supernatural revelation), the religion that proceeds from a correct concept of God is to be called true; that which is the product of an erroneous opinion about God is false. The divine perfections at issue here are not, however, those considered according to purely metaphysical considerations, but the divine perfections insofar as they are relevant to the moral order. Provided that someone admits a supreme lord and ruler of the world, wise, holy, and powerful, and worships him as such, that person has true religion, even if he does not proceed to the concept of creation from nothing, or attributes some very subtle body to God, or does not know what God’s metaphysical essence is. But if someone conceives God after the likeness of a human being, subject to passions, cruel, wrathful, desirous of flattery, and in need of us and our affairs, or thinks other things about God that are morally unworthy, and worships God according to these concepts, that person has a false and superstitious religion.

42. A distinction is made between natural religion and supernatural religion. For although in the present order of things true religion is one and supernatural, because God has prescribed by supernatural revelation how he is to be worshipped, nevertheless God would have to be worshipped even if he had revealed nothing supernaturally; and because this religion would proceed from the natural light of reason alone, it is called natural religion. Hence even those people who have never heard anything about revelation must worship God.

43. The etymology of the word religion is obscure. See in St. Thomas (2, 2, q. 81, a. 1) what St. Isidore (Etymol. l. X, n. 234) collected from Cicero (De nat. deor. l. II, c. 28, n. 72) and St. Augustine (De civ. l. X, c. 3; De vera relig. c. 11 113; Retract. l. I, c. 13, n. 9); to these may be added Gellius (Noct. attic. l. IV, c. 9), Lactantius (Div. instit. l. IV, c. 28), and St. Jerome (In Amos 9, 6). Most probably, religion is derived from religendo, that is, frequently calling to mind, the opposite of which is to neglect. So think Cicero and Gellius, as well as scholars of our own time. A religious person, then, is one who is mindful of God and of his duties toward God, just as an impious person is one who neglects these duties. Less probably, the word religion is derived from religando, insofar as religion is a bond binding us to God. So thinks Lactantius. Or it may come from re-eligendo, insofar as we choose again the God we lost through sin. So thinks St. Augustine. Although they differ somewhat over the etymology of the word, they agree about the nature and acts of religion. What these acts are will become clear from the arguments.

44. Argument 1. From the human being’s complete dependence on God. A human being depends on God because he was created by God and is preserved in existence by him; because without God’s concurrence he can do absolutely nothing; and because God is the ultimate end by which the human being is to be made blessed. Moreover, the human being receives from God all the good things he uses, not only bodily but also spiritual goods, since God is the source of all truth and goodness. But human nature is such that a human being ought to acknowledge the truth and will the good. Therefore, he ought to acknowledge God as the supreme lord, beginning, and end of all things, and profess this acknowledgment, or submit himself to God.

This act of acknowledging God’s supreme excellence and submitting to God is adoration, which in technical terms is called worship of latria, and is the act most proper to religion. Adoration in itself is an interior act, either elicited or commanded by the will. For the will can not only elicit an act of submission to divine excellence itself, but can also direct acts of other virtues to this end, so that God may be honored by them; for example, it can elicit acts of humility, temperance, and obedience from this motive. A human being can and ought to perform not only interior acts but also external acts of religious worship, because he owes everything to God not only in soul but also in body, since he depends on God at every moment; and because interior acts that in no way manifest themselves outwardly soon grow weak, whereas they are strengthened and stirred up by sensible signs. For a human being is not a pure spirit but a composite of soul and body, and this whole composite ought to cooperate in worshipping God. Indeed, human beings ought not to worship God only privately by interior and exterior signs; public worship must also be offered, because a human being is a social being, and society as such also depends on God. The reason for external worship, then, derives from human nature; for although God immediately sees the human mind, a human being, insofar as he is a sensible and social being, ought not to be without acts of external worship. External acts, however, have no moral or religious worth except insofar as they proceed from and are shaped by an interior disposition.

Thus, although religion is a particular virtue, it nevertheless governs the whole of human and moral life, consecrating it to God and, as it were, turning it into a continual worship of God. A person is perfectly religious when he lives never for himself but in all things for God.

45. Argument 2. From the gratitude owed to God. God, compelled by no necessity but out of pure benevolent love, has conferred and continues to confer many things on human beings. But right order requires that we show due gratitude to a benefactor. Therefore, we ought to give the highest thanks to God, our supreme benefactor, and by giving thanks worship him.

The major premise is clear, because God, infinitely perfect and blessed, has no need of creatures, but freely produces them to bestow good things on them. He did indeed create all things for his glory. But what is this glory formally, if not the knowledge of the highest truth and love of the highest good existing in a rational creature? Therefore, if God willed to produce rational creatures, he must also have willed that they know and love him. God’s benevolence, then, does not consist in this: that, once creation has been assumed, he appoints possession of himself as the ultimate end for rational creatures; rather, it consists in his freely willing to produce creatures so noble that possession of God is due to them, and, moreover, in his willing, as revelation teaches, to raise these creatures to the supernatural order.

As to the minor premise: gratitude in general is a virtue distinct from the virtue of religion, and consists in readiness to acknowledge benefits received while praising the benefactor. But if we give thanks to God as God, we acknowledge him not as a private benefactor but as the supreme principle and lord of all things. This is an act of adoration or religion, distinguished from other acts of religion only in that it does not regard the whole of divine excellence but specifically God’s infinite beneficence. By an act of gratitude we do not love this beneficence as a divine good—for that would be an act of charity—but we consider it as the source of so many benefits flowing to us. God, however, is not our benefactor as other benefactors are, but is so omnipotently, omnipresently, with pure liberality, and without ceasing. At every moment, therefore, we are the recipients of innumerable divine benefits, without which we could neither exist nor act, and whose ultimate end will be God himself, making us blessed through possession of him. Therefore, gratitude shown to God as God is an act of latria (cf. St. Thomas 2, 2, q. 106, a. 1).

46. Argument 3. From the necessity of petitionary prayer. A human being ought to procure for himself those divine helps without which he cannot live rightly and attain salvation. But prayer is necessary in order to obtain these helps. Therefore, a human being ought to pray to God and also worship God for this reason.

As to the major premise: In the present order, the human being is subject to many bodily and spiritual miseries, from which he often cannot free himself either by himself or through other human beings. Setting aside purely bodily miseries, one cannot deny the great moral weakness involved in observing the natural law and living rightly without speaking against the facts. We do not ask here how this misery arose; the fact suffices for us, and no prudent person can call it into question. On the other hand, it is clear that God, who is omnipotent and free in acting externally, can help a human being if he wills; that he wills to help a human being live rightly and attain salvation follows from divine wisdom, goodness, and holiness. For God cannot assign the human being an end and a path to that end so difficult that the task must be called morally impossible. Therefore, since God did not at once grant, along with human nature itself, a corresponding ease, he undoubtedly willed that the human being obtain the necessary divine helps through his own cooperation.

As to the minor premise: That prayer is the means of obtaining divine help is already suggested by the fact that no people have yet been found who, in their needs, do not turn to God, or to those they regarded as gods. Ethnography and the history of religions bear witness to this (cf. O. Peschel, Völkerkunde; W. Schneider, Die Naturvölker; Fr. Ratzel, Völkerkunde; Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte). Formerly some objected, but they have been silenced by the consensus of experts. They therefore resort to another escape, saying that with the progress of the human race recourse to the divine power, and indeed all religion, will be abolished. This is a prophecy whose fulfillment must be awaited before it can be considered true. It will never be fulfilled, however, because natural reason will always perceive the truths on which religion rests, and because the magnificent promises of evolutionists cannot remedy the many forms of human need. Vices can obscure the dictate of natural reason, and the religious instinct implanted in human nature can be weakened. But if the human race as a whole is considered, truth will ultimately always prevail, and the laws implanted by the author of nature will assert their force. Religion will not perish, nor will prayer fall silent until the last human beings die. But God would not have created in rational nature this inclination to ask God for help unless he willed to hear petitions.

Why, then, does God want people who ask him to turn to him, when he already knows beforehand what they need? He wills this for their sake, because it is most useful for people to raise their minds to God and enjoy divine companionship. People who pray well and constantly grow day by day better and nobler through converse with God; for whoever keeps frequent company with someone is imbued with that person’s spirit, especially if he is a person of eminent character, and all the more if he is God himself.

God did indeed decree all things immutably from eternity; nevertheless, in this eternal decree he took account of the prayers that he foresaw would likewise be made from eternity, and according as he willed to hear the prayers, he ordered the course of things to be such as it would not have been had the foreseen prayers not been made.

In view of these points, it appears wholly improbable that God wills to grant all necessary and fitting helps to people who do not pray. He gives many things without prayer, namely all those things that a rational creature requires in order not to be futile, such as the whole natural order with its end and means to that end, together with preservation, general concurrence, and governance. Therefore, the things that flow from nature and its powers according to constant laws are not objects of petition. But within this natural order there is an immense range of divine gifts that are by no means determined by natural requirement. The distribution of goods of fortune, health or sickness, greater or lesser dangers to salvation, good or bad thoughts and feelings that arise, the company of this or that person, these and many other things that can greatly promote or hinder spiritual salvation are not so determined by the very nature of things that God could not arrange them one way or another. Thus, since God has not removed every misery from human beings by nature itself, nor supplied all the helps morally necessary, it must be thought that he wills a human being to do something on his part to obtain divine help. What else can he do but ask God for help? For human inability to keep the law and attain the end is a just title for turning to divine help; while the power, holiness, and goodness of God, who wills the human being to be saved, are a kind of tacit promise from God to provide help. Therefore, all the elements required are present for us to affirm not only the possibility but also the obligation of praying.

It is enough to have briefly explained these three duties of religion—that is, adoration, gratitude toward God, and petitionary prayer; for there is no need here to list all the specific duties of religion, since they will be discussed in the course of dogmatic or moral theology itself.

47. Objection I. It is a mark of a noble spirit not to care much about human honors. But God is the noblest spirit. Therefore, he sets little store by human honors.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: it is a mark of a noble spirit not to pursue empty glory, I concede the major premise; it is a mark of a noble spirit to refuse those honors required by right moral order, I deny the major premise. And, granting the minor premise, I distinguish the inference: God will not value human honors more highly than they deserve in themselves, I concede the inference; God will not care about the honors due to him that right moral order requires, I deny the inference.

48. Objection II. Every honor that human beings can offer to God is almost nothing in comparison with the honor owed to God. But when a debtor to a very rich creditor can pay only a tiny amount, for example a single coin, the creditor does not reasonably demand that this tiny amount be given to him. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, God should not be thought to will that he be given even the small measure of honor that human beings can offer.

I answer. I deny the assumption of the argument and the parity in the example given. For God requires honor not for his own advantage but for right order and the benefit of human beings, as has been explained. Nor is there parity between a real debt and a personal debt of honor. For a human being is undoubtedly excused from paying real debts as long as he has no means to pay. But anyone who has the use of reason can and ought to acknowledge divine excellence; and in this matter no equality is required between the honor and the one honored, as there is between what is received and what is repaid in real debts. God’s perfect glory is God himself, through knowledge and love of himself. This, however, does not prevent rational creatures from having to ascend to God with their intellect and will. Although God differs infinitely from creatures in the order of being, there is nevertheless in the intellect and will of a rational creature a proportionate relation to knowing, honoring, and loving God. Thus, in worshipping God, we truly worship him as God, place him outside the series of creatures, and acknowledge and magnify his infinite excellence. This honor, then, is infinite in its terminus, and can be given to no creature.

49. Objection III. Since religion consists essentially in interior acts, external worship is at least indifferent; and in this sense one religion is as good as another, provided that a person acknowledges and reveres God’s supreme excellence. Therefore, one religion is not to be preferred to another except insofar as one suits these people better and another suits those people better.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: if God by positive revelation or legitimate human authority has prescribed a certain form of religious worship, God can be worshipped in any other way while that worship is neglected, I deny the antecedent; for worshipping God contrary to his immediate or mediate law is not to honor him but to wrong him. So long as no worship has been prescribed by divine authority or legitimate human authority, it is permissible to worship God in any manner and with any rites one chooses, I subdivide: it is permissible to worship God with sound and reasonable rites, I concede the antecedent; with superstitious rites, that is, rites that conflict with right reason, I deny the antecedent. Just as it is not permissible to ascribe indecent and unworthy attributes to God, so it is not permissible to worship God with rites that signify such attributes. Good and true religion, even if purely natural, must proceed from correct concepts of God, as was said.

Scholium. On the origin of religion.

50. We can inquire into the origin of religion in three ways: historically, metaphysically, and psychologically.

Historically, one can ask when and for what reasons religion was introduced into the human race. Although this approach is not in itself impossible, it is closed to us, because the beginning of the human race is prehistoric and can be known only by divine revelation, which teaches that religion arose not by purely natural means but with God’s supernatural cooperation. History, however, no matter how far back it reaches by its own powers, never reaches a time when religion did not yet exist among human beings or was first introduced. Therefore, the history of religions describes only the development of various religions that had existed long before historical times. As for the rest, it can only conjecture by reasoning, with greater or lesser probability. In this way, among other things, the following conclusion has been reached: the more ancient religions are, the less polytheistic they are, and even in polytheistic religions certain traces of an earlier monotheism remain. Thus the Indo-Europeans, before their separation, worshipped Dyu, which is the root of the word for God and its derivatives. The God of the Semites was El. The Chinese revered Shang Ti (“Supreme Lord”). Something similar holds for other peoples, as I have explained more fully and substantiated with the testimony of scholars in three booklets entitled «Der Gottesbegriff in den heidnischen Religionen des Altertums» and «Der Gottesbegriff in den heidnischen Religionen der Neuzeit» (cf. J. Souben, Nouvelle théologie dogmatique I², Paris 1902). Polytheism and other forms of false religion arose from monotheism through the moral and intellectual corruption of human beings.

In individual people today, religion historically arises through the education they receive from other people already imbued with religion. For individuals do not each discover everything on their own from the beginning; rather, living in human society, they are enriched by its intellectual and moral treasures, or, conversely, infected by evils that already prevail. Philosophy, that is, polished and reflective knowledge, is not the origin of religion but an accidental supplement to it, which is absent in most cases without altering the essence of the matter.

51. The origin of religion is considered metaphysically when its material, formal, and final causes, and its conditions, are set out. We have briefly done this by saying that religion is an act or habit of the will by which a human being is rightly ordered with respect to God’s supreme excellence, rendering him the worship due to him and directing all moral life to God as first principle, supreme lord, and ultimate end. This worship, however, presupposes an intellectual and correct concept of God concerning the moral order that intervenes between human beings and God. Although we do not claim that human beings arrive at religion by philosophical reasoning, we do say that religion has an intellectual foundation, and that there cannot be religion worthy of the name that does not proceed from true knowledge of God. Many non-Catholics deny this very point, and among Catholics those called Modernists have joined them. They decree that all intellectualism must be banished from explaining the origin of religion, since the source of religious life is a certain instinct arising from a need for the supraphenomenal order, by which a human being is moved toward a transcendent being that the human intellect cannot grasp, but that the affections of the heart demand and that is apprehended by a certain special intuition (e.g. Loisy in Revue du Clergé franç. XXI [1900] 250 sqq). The intellect can neither produce nor overthrow this faith. Therefore, the origin of religion must be explained psychologically according to the system of immanence. This false opinion is the ultimate root of Modernism.

52. The origin of religion is considered psychologically when those vital acts that by their own nature lead to religion are shown in the human soul. This consideration differs from the metaphysical one in that it does not distinguish and define the concepts at issue and explain their relations to one another, but rather examines the concrete life of the human being and seeks the root of religion in it. For since religious life consists in immanent acts, the root of these acts must also be immanent. A human being perceives that he is a dependent being and unequal to attaining that noble moral state to which, unless he is already too corrupt, he recognizes by the guidance of nature itself that he is destined. Given, then, sufficient knowledge of God, it is innate in a human being to turn to divine help, so that God may supply what he lacks, as we explained above (n. 46). Therefore, religion truly arises psychologically from dependence and moral need (cf. what I wrote in Stimmen aus Maria-Laach LXVIII [1905] 381 sqq). Call this theory one of immanence, if you like, but do not confuse it with the false immanentism of the Modernists. For they say that people in their needs do not turn to a God already known, but are instead driven by their moral needs to posit God’s real existence, which is unknowable to the intellect. They confess that, according to the judgment of the mind, they do not know whether God exists or not, but trust that he exists because they need him. Certainly, arguments can also be drawn to prove God’s existence from the natural moral law, from the testimony of conscience, and from the innate desire for beatitude. But this would be an intellectual method, which the Modernists disdain in religious matters. Their “faith,” by which they perceive God, is not intellectual, is directed by no reasoning, but is an irrational appetite for God, which they sometimes adorn with the name of intuition, although in reality they intuit nothing. Hence their whole theory is contrary to reason, has no arguments in its favor, is a bare and empty way of philosophizing, is not at all supported by the testimony of conscience, and contradicts the common conviction of learned and unlearned people, who think that even in religious matters one ought to use the light of reason, not blind instinct. Finally, this theory removes the distinction between true religion and false religions, introduces religious indifferentism, and overthrows all religion, because it is an extreme subjectivism in which nothing is stable, but everything varies and flows from subject to subject and from day to day. The origin of religion worthy of the name, which is the first among the ideal powers of the moral order, therefore cannot be explained in this way.