Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae Tomus I: De Christo Legato Divino, De Ecclesia Christi, De Fontibus Theologicis

Cf. S. Thomas, S. th. I, q. 1; his commentators, such as Gregorius de Valentia; Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit tract. 5; J. Didiot, Logique surnaturelle subjective, Paris 1894.

1. Theology, as the very name indicates, is concerned with God, though not in such a way that God is its sole object, but in such a way that whatever is treated in theology is either God himself or something else insofar as it is referred to God as first principle and ultimate end. Therefore God is called the subject of theology, because in theology all things are predicated of God either directly or indirectly. In this it agrees with that part of philosophy which is commonly called natural theology or theodicy, from which it differs essentially by reason of its formal object.

2. Since in philosophy God is considered insofar as he is known from principles that are objectively and subjectively natural, the theology of which we are speaking here pertains to the supernatural order. Its objective principle, from which it proceeds, is divine revelation, once made to the prophets and apostles and handed down to the Church; its subjective principle, however, is reason illumined by divine faith. Accordingly, the formal object of theology is truth demonstrable from public divine revelation. The relation to God as subject makes things pertain to theology in the ontological order; the relation to public revelation as formal object makes it possible for things in the logical order to be known theologically. Thus theology is defined as the science of things that are demonstrable about God from revelation.

God, then, is considered in theology in two ways. a) God as God is the subject or, as some put it, the formal object of theology: that which theology treats, or that about which it speaks; b) God, insofar as by revelation he renders truths knowable theologically, is the principle and source of theology. Revelation is called the formal object by means of which theology knows. Theological knowability itself, resting on divine revelation, is sometimes called the formal aspect under which; but this designation is also applied to the supernatural illumination of the intellect that theology presupposes. Accordingly, different writers are accustomed to use these terms in different ways. For the present, therefore, it is simpler to retain only that distinction between the subject and the formal object of theology.

3. Is theology a science in the proper sense of the word? In science two things must be distinguished: knowledge of the principles from which one argues, and the certainty of the demonstrations drawn from those principles. Knowledge of principles, in turn, is derived either from their intrinsic evidence (immediate or mediate) or from authority. But the first principles of theology are not intrinsically evident to human beings; rather, they are made known by divine authority. Therefore, if one says it belongs to the notion of science that it proceed from intrinsically evident principles, one must deny that theology is a science in the strict sense. So Scotus says in the prologue to Book I of the Sententiae, n. 26 ff., and many others agree with him. If, on the other hand, one says that science is that which draws certain conclusions from known and certain principles, then one will regard theology as a science. So St. Thomas says in the first part of the Summa theologiae, q. 1, a. 2, and very many theologians agree with him.

This latter manner of speaking seems preferable, and theology must be called a science. For what constitutes the specific character of science considered subjectively—certainty acquired through reasoning—is found in theology, indeed more perfectly than in the other sciences, because it is founded on firmer principles. Science considered objectively is a body of certain propositions, connected with one another and gathered into a single system. Theology is such a body. The unity of theological science is evident from the unity of its subject and formal object.

Since theological science depends on divine science, it is commonly called a subalternated science (a subordinate science), while divine science is called a subalternating science with respect to theology. Theology is also commonly defined as the science of faith. In this definition, faith is taken either objectively, insofar as it is the complex of revealed truths, or subjectively, because faith is the principle from which theology proceeds, just as natural reason is the subjective principle of philosophy, which is therefore called the science of reason. Supernatural theology and natural theology, then, differ in species.

4. Theology differs from faith a) in its matter: in faith, this is all and only revealed truth, whereas in theology it also includes many other truths inferred by reasoning from revealed truths; b) in its form, because faith embraces its object on account of the authority of God revealing, whereas theology does so on account of scientific demonstration. «I believe in order to understand» (St. Anselm, Cur Deus homo 1, 2); c) in certainty, which in theology is of a lower order than in faith, since theology does not, as faith does, rest solely on divine authority, but also mingles in human considerations and conclusions.

Nevertheless, theology is intimately connected with faith, because the revealed truths from which it proceeds are held by faith alone, and because it uses reason illumined by the light of faith. Hence the habit of theological science, although acquired in itself, may nevertheless be called radically supernatural, since «sacred doctrine is, as it were, a kind of imprint of divine knowledge» (St. Thomas 1, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2).

Hence it is clear how great is the dignity of this science: its principles are from God supernaturally revealing; it treats of God, who is knowable supernaturally; it is directed to God as its supernatural end; and it is a kind of foretaste of the beatific vision. Consequently, theology is also wisdom in a singular way. For «sacred doctrine most properly treats of God insofar as he is the highest cause, because it treats not only of what can be known through creatures, but also of what is known to God alone about himself and communicated to others through revelation. Hence sacred doctrine is called wisdom in the highest degree» (St. Thomas 1, q. 1, a. 6).

5. Theology is divided into theology in the general sense and theology in the special sense. Theology in the special sense is the doctrine of God himself, one and triune. The Greek Fathers often call this theology exclusively, and contrast it with economy, that is, the doctrine of the works of divine providence directed toward the salvation of human beings, especially the Incarnation (e. g. Gregor. Naz. orat. 45, n. 4). Although this way of speaking is no longer in use, it must nevertheless be kept in mind so that the sayings of the Fathers may be understood. Theology in the general sense treats not only of God but also of the relation of creatures to God.

6. By its subject matter, theology is divided into speculative or dogmatic theology, which considers truths only as things to be believed or held, and practical or moral theology, which considers truths insofar as human acts are directed by them and morals are rightly formed.

Dogmatic theology becomes polemical theology when it is treated in such a way that errors opposed to it are refuted and attacks by adversaries are repelled above all. Bellarmine's controversies may serve as an example.

Ascetical theology, which instructs the faithful in Christian virtues, and mystical theology, which is the science of divine things acquired through intimate communion with God, may be assigned to moral theology. Likewise, that more recent discipline called pastoral theology belongs to practical theology. It is not distinguished from the other theological disciplines by definite boundaries, but gathers from them what helps pastors of souls to perform their office rightly and for the spiritual good of souls. Nevertheless, some contend that it is a special science, namely, a scientific exposition of the pastoral office of Christ and the Church.

7. Dogmatic theology is divided into positive theology and scholastic theology. Positive theology gathers revealed truths from Sacred Scripture, the Holy Fathers, and the other sources of revelation, and thus lays firm principles for theological conclusions. Scholastic theology, which is also called speculative in the strict sense, does three things: a) it draws theological conclusions from revealed truths; b) it defends sacred doctrine against adversaries; c) with the aid of the human disciplines (especially philosophy), it illustrates and explains revealed truths, confirms them, shows their connections, and brings them all into one system. It is called scholastic theology because, from the twelfth century onward, this way of teaching theology held the foremost place in the schools of theology. From the sixteenth century onward, however, most of the greatest theologians were accustomed to join positive theology to scholastic theology in such a way that they prefaced speculative expositions with positive arguments drawn from Scripture, the Fathers, and the Councils. This practice still prevails, insofar as the brevity of a course in theology permits; for a more exact study of positive theology, if it is to be pursued securely and fruitfully, presupposes someone well trained in scholastic theology.

Besides the names just explained, other designations are sometimes found. Symbolic theology (that is, comparative theology) compares Catholic dogmas with the tenets of non-Catholic Christian groups (e. g. Moehler, Symbolik). Biblical theology is the name given to the discipline that gathers doctrine from Sacred Scripture alone and arranges the scattered sayings of Scripture under definite headings. If theological sayings are gathered and arranged in this way from the Holy Fathers, the result is patristic theology. The names synodical theology, liturgical theology, and so on are to be explained in the same way.

8. For theology, understood in the objective sense, to be one science, all its parts of doctrine must belong to one common subject. That subject is God. Therefore, it must be shown how everything in theology is referred to God. Since this is a moral organism, not a physical one, the connection among its individual parts is not so invariable that various questions cannot be treated in different places. Nevertheless, everything is subsumed under certain headings, which are these:

1. On God himself, one in nature and three in persons;

2. On God the Creator;

3. On God as the last end;

4. On God the Redeemer;

5. On God the Sanctifier;

6. On God as the Consummator.

It is clear how, in this system, everything is referred to God as its subject. It remains only to explain this arrangement briefly.

9. This system was not devised a priori but drawn from the sources of revelation. For God revealed certain things about himself and certain things about his works. Of what he revealed about himself, some things pertain to the unity of the divine nature, others to the Trinity of persons. Therefore, since theology considers God with respect to himself, while it considers other truths according to their relation to God, theology begins with the treatise on the one and triune God.

The first relation of created things to God consists in their having proceeded from God as the first efficient cause. Hence the treatise on God himself is followed by the treatise On God the Creator, which treats 1. creation in general, 2. the making of the world, 3. the human being, 4. the angels. But since rational creatures were not produced in a purely natural order but raised to the supernatural order, the treatise also treats, 5. God as the one who elevates, or the state of original justice. Since human beings soon lost this state through sin, a treatise on original sin is added.

The other principal relation of creatures is to God as the last end, because God is not only the efficient cause but also the final cause of all things. And since lower things were made proximately for the sake of the human being, while the human being was made immediately for the sake of God, God must be considered especially as the last end of the human being, toward which end the human being tends through human acts; hence the treatise on human acts is closely connected with the treatise on God as the last end.

Yet after committing sin, the human being could no longer attain his last end unless God mercifully rescued him from the state of sin. God did this by sending Jesus Christ the Redeemer, who is the second person of the most holy Trinity. Hence we must treat God the Redeemer. This treatise has two parts: a) the Redeemer himself, which part is called Christology; b) the work of redemption, which part is called soteriology (in Greek soteria, in Latin redemption).

The fruit of redemption is applied to individual human beings through sanctifying grace, by which a human being is joined to God supernaturally, or sanctified. Hence we must treat God the Sanctifier. Certain accompaniments of grace are the virtues infused supernaturally and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Hence there are two treatises, on grace and on the virtues. A treatise is added on what is opposed to the virtues, that is, vices and sins, by which a human being is separated from God.

God, in turn, infuses grace and virtues through certain rites instituted by Christ, which are called sacraments. Therefore, the treatise on the sacraments also belongs to the treatise on God the Sanctifier.

Finally, the course in theology ends with the treatise On God the Consummator, which considers the consummation of individual human beings and the consummation of the whole world. This treatise is also called eschatology (ἔσχατα = last things).

10. St. Thomas divides the Summa theologiae into three parts: the first treats the one and triune God and God the Creator; the second is divided into two parts, one of which treats the last end and virtues and vices in general, law, and grace, while the other treats virtues and vices in particular; in the third part (which he did not finish), he treats God the Redeemer, the sacraments, and God the Consummator.

This division almost coincides with the one we proposed above. But in the Summa St. Thomas has many questions that are now assigned either to philosophy or to moral theology. He joins the treatise on original sin not to the treatise on original justice but to the treatise on sin; therefore, the treatise on original sin is found not in the first part but in the First Part of the Second Part.

The parts of the Summa are subdivided into questions and articles. Hence, for the sake of brevity, the Summa is usually cited without a special title, by indicating the part, question, and article. E. g. I, q. 79, a. 5, or I, 2, q. 3, a. 2; that is, question 79, article 5 of the First Part, or question 3, article 2 of the First Part of the Second Part. Sometimes c. or ad I, 2, 3 is added. The meaning is: in the body of the article, which always begins, “I answer that,” or in the reply to the first, second, or third objection. Other works of St. Thomas are cited by adding a special title.

Cf. Hurter, Nomenclator literarius theologiae catholicae; Grabmann, Geschichte der scholastischen Methode I, Freiburg 1909; II, 1911; Scheeben, Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik I, n. 1027 sqq, where other sources are indicated.

11. On the period of the Holy Fathers. Those theological writers who are outstanding both in antiquity and in holiness are called Fathers of the Church. The period of the Holy Fathers is reckoned up to and including St. John of Damascus and St. Gregory the Great. Some extend it more broadly.

The Fathers who lived soon after the apostles are called Apostolic Fathers. Among these are counted St. Clement of Rome (pontiff 90–99?), St. Barnabas (whose epistle is held by most not to be genuine), St. Ignatius of Antioch († at the beginning of the second century), Papias (of whose books only a few fragments survive), Hermas (around the middle of the second century), and the anonymous author of Epistula ad Diognetum.

There are certain other writings that bear the names of apostles and, although they do not have apostles as their authors, are nevertheless of great importance for judging the customs of the first centuries: «Doctrina duodecim Apostolorum», «Didascalia Apostolorum» (ed. Funk, 1905), «Constitutiones Apostolorum» (in M 1, where they are attributed to Clement of Rome), «Canones apostolici» (in volume I of the collections of councils, Hardouin, Mansi, etc.), the Eastern «Canones Apostolici», to which the «canones Hippolyti» may be added.

12. Certain Fathers who defended the Christian religion in the second century against the attacks of Jews and pagans are called Apologists. Among them the most distinguished are St. Justin Martyr († around 167), St. Theophilus of Antioch († 182), and Minucius Felix († after 166). Aristides and Athenagoras also wrote apologies.

As soon as Gnosticism and other false doctrines arose, Catholic truth had to be defended against heretics. St. Irenaeus († 202) accomplished this above all; his principal work consists of five books and is usually cited as «Contra haereses». Tertullian published the precious little work «De praescriptionibus haereticorum», but later (c. 202) became a Montanist († c. 240). St. Cyprian († 258) chose him as his teacher and model of writing; Cyprian’s letters in particular are very useful.

13. The adherents of the Alexandrian school began to develop a system of Catholic doctrine. From this school came Clement of Alexandria († c. 217) and Origen († 254), the father of scientific exegesis, who in his work «De principiis», that is, on fundamental doctrines, attempted to give Catholic doctrine the form of a discipline, but without success. Origen’s disciples were St. Gregory Thaumaturgus († c. 270) and St. Dionysius the Great († 264 or 265)¹.

Just as the Alexandrian school loved allegorical interpretations of Sacred Scripture, so the Antiochene school, founded by the martyr Lucian († 311), adhered to a literal interpretation of Scripture. The greatest exegete of this school is Theodoret († c. 458), while its greatest orator is St. John Chrysostom († 407). Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia († c. 428), however, anticipated Nestorianism.

14. From the beginning of the fourth century, errors arose against the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and the Incarnation. Arius, an Alexandrian presbyter († 336), denied the divinity of Christ. This heresy was condemned by the Council of Nicaea, the first of the ecumenical councils (in 325). St. Athanasius († 373) fought the Arians with remarkable courage; among the Westerners, St. Hilary of Poitiers († 366) and St. Ambrose († 397) did so as well. Eusebius Pamphili († c. 340), the father of ecclesiastical history, does not present Catholic doctrine with complete fidelity. After the Council of Nicaea, above all two Cappadocians, Aëtius and Eunomius, propagated Arianism. Three other Cappadocians resisted them: men of the highest distinction and learning, St. Basil the Great († 379), his brother St. Gregory of Nyssa († 395), and St. Gregory Nazianzen († c. 390). In the same fourth century St. Epiphanius († 403) attacked not only Arianism but other heresies as well. St. Optatus of Milevis wrote against the Donatists, African schismatics. St. Cyril of Jerusalem († 386), through his catecheses, and St. Ephrem († after 378), a Syrian deacon, through his orations and poems, shed light on Catholic doctrine.

15. Just as Arius denied Christ’s divinity, so Nestorius denied the personal unity of Christ, saying that in Christ there are two persons, one divine and the other human, joined to one another morally. This heresy was condemned by the Council of Ephesus (in 431). St. Cyril of Alexandria († 444) was Nestorius’s most formidable adversary; several councils approved his Christology.

Another adversary of Nestorius was Eutyches. But he fell into the opposite error, that is, into Monophysitism, by denying that there are two natures in Christ. This error was condemned at the Council of Chalcedon (451). St. Leo the Great, pope († 461), spoke and wrote admirably against the heresy of Eutyches. Monotheletism is related to Monophysitism. The Monothelites did not admit two wills and operations in Christ. St. Sophronius († after 637) and St. Maximus the Confessor († 662) resisted them. Monotheletism was condemned by the Third Council of Constantinople (680).

16. While Christological questions were being debated chiefly in the East, a heresy arose in the West at the beginning of the fifth century, called Pelagianism after its author, Pelagius. He denied original sin and the necessity of grace. St. Jerome († 420), called the “greatest Doctor” in exegetical matters, and above all St. Augustine († 430), who has no equal among the Fathers of the Church for acuity of intellect, defended Catholic doctrine against him. St. Prosper of Aquitaine († c. 463) and St. Fulgentius of Ruspe († 533) follow in Augustine’s footsteps. St. Prosper also fought vigorously against Semipelagianism, which is a kind of mitigated Pelagianism. Among the Semipelagians, who were never heretics, John Cassian († c. 435), otherwise an excellent man, stands out. Vincent of Lérins († 450), who published the most celebrated «Commonitorium pro catholicae fidei antiquitate et universalitate», and Faustus of Riez (at the end of the fifth century) were also touched by Semipelagianism. In the same century St. Gregory the Great († 604) was an illustrious light of the Church; he is usually considered the last of the Latin Fathers. The ecclesiastical orators of that age included St. Peter Chrysologus († 450) and St. Maximus of Turin († after 465). The last of the Greek Fathers is considered to be St. John of Damascus († before 754), who gathered into a kind of theological Summa the works written by the ancient doctors, a work usually cited as «De Fide orthodoxa».

In the fifth century the works of the so-called Dionysius the Areopagite came to light. Since people in the Middle Ages considered Dionysius, the disciple of the apostle Paul, to be the author of these works, they regarded them as worthy of the greatest veneration and often illustrated them with commentaries. Scholastics likewise often expounded the works of Boethius († c. 525), a Roman senator.

17. The age of the Holy Fathers was succeeded by the period of the compilers. Their great merit is that, during the migrations of peoples, they preserved the literary treasures of Christian antiquity for posterity. Those especially worthy of mention are St. Cassiodorus († c. 570), St. Isidore of Seville († 636), and the Venerable Bede († 735). This practice of working “through the ancient masters, which could not be accomplished through newcomers” (Cassiod., De inst. divin. litter. praef.) continued almost to the end of the eleventh century.

18. On the period of the early scholastics. St. Anselm, bishop of Canterbury († 1109), is considered the father of scholastic theology. Not content with knowing what the Holy Fathers had handed down, he undertook to explain it speculatively. “Faith seeking understanding” is his motto. With this aim, he treated the principal dogmas in such a way that they could readily be brought together into a single system. Hugh of St. Victor († 1141) and Richard of St. Victor († 1173), as well as William of Auvergne (of Paris; † 1249), followed the same path. In that age many began to compose «Summas Sententiarum», that is, to arrange in certain headings and interpret speculatively the sayings of Sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers pertaining to the dogmas of the Church. In this genre no one achieved greater success than Peter Lombard († 1164), the «Master of the Sentences», whose «Sententiae» remained the “textbook” in almost all theological schools until the sixteenth century. Alexander of Hales, a Franciscan, the “Irrefutable Doctor” († 1245), published a «Summa theologiae» according to the dialectical method. Together with St. Bonaventure, the “Seraphic Doctor” († 1274), he was the father of the old Franciscan school. In addition to commentaries on Lombard’s Sentences, Bonaventure published the notable «Breviloquium veritatis theologicae» and most beautifully joined mystical theology with scholastic theology. Henry of Ghent († 1293), a man of extraordinary talent, is called the “Solemn Doctor.”

19. When, in the thirteenth century, Aristotelian philosophy began to spread in the West through the Arabs, Blessed Albert the Great, of the Order of Preachers, the “Universal Doctor” († 1280), purified it of Arab corruption and enlisted it as a most useful handmaid of theology. The greatest disciple of this great master was St. Thomas Aquinas, the “Angelic Doctor” († 1274), the greatest of scholastic theologians. Among his works, besides the Summa theologiae and commentaries on the Sententiae, those especially relevant to dogmatic theology are «Compendium theologiae», «De veritate catholicae fidei contra gentiles», and «Quaestiones disputatae», in which many matters of dogma are treated more fully than in the Summa. Giles of Rome, of the Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine, the “Most Well-Founded Doctor” († 1316), follows in St. Thomas’s footsteps.

From the Order of St. Francis came John Duns Scotus (usually cited simply as “Scotus”), a man of keenest intellect, the “Subtle Doctor” († 1308). He called the whole doctrine of Aquinas into question, departed from it in many respects, and began a new Franciscan school, which differs greatly from the older form of Alexander and Bonaventure. Among Scotus’s disciples, Francis of Meyronnes († 1327) should be mentioned, as well as Peter Auriol, the “Eloquent Doctor” († 1322), who vigorously attacked Thomistic doctrine. Against him arose the defender of St. Thomas, John Capreolus, the “Prince of the Thomists” († 1444). Thomas de Vio, commonly called Cajetan († 1534), furnished St. Thomas’s theological Summa with commentaries; Francis Sylvius, commonly called Ferrariensis († 1528), did the same for the Summa contra gentiles. Others continued to expound Lombard’s Sentences, such as Diego Deza, commonly called Hispalensis († 1523). From the Order of Preachers, Durand of St. Pourçain († 1334) was an adversary of St. Thomas. The principal commentators on Scotus are Francis Lychetus († 1516) and Peter Tartaretus († 1494).

20. The school of the Nominalists was founded by William of Ockham, the “Venerable Beginner” († 1349), who often attacked both the doctrine of St. Thomas and that of Scotus, his teacher. Among others, John Gerson († 1419) and Gabriel Biel, the “last scholastic” († 1495), are counted among this school. In the Carmelite Order, John Baconthorpe († 1346) founded a new school, but the Carmelites later adhered to the doctrine of St. Thomas. Thomas Walden († 1430), also from that Order, served Catholic theology well by defending it against the Wycliffites and Hussites. St. Antoninus († 1447) published a Summa theologiae full of learning, following practical rather than speculative principles. Dionysius the Carthusian (Ryckel; † 1471), however, encompassed the entire theology of medieval writers in a very great number of volumes and brought the period of the early scholastics to a fitting close. Thus, in the Middle Ages, the chief achievement was to gather all theology into one body, arrange it systematically, and explain it speculatively. Certain parts of theology were also first fully developed in that age with respect to their subject matter, especially the treatise on the sacraments

21. On the period of more recent theology. Theology entered an altogether new state through the Council of Trent (1543–1563). Already during the council itself, distinguished theologians flourished, such as Ambrosius Catharinus († 1543), Melchior Cano († 1560), whose most celebrated work is «De locis theologicis», Dominic Soto († 1560), and Peter Soto († 1563), all from the Order of Preachers, who, together with others, fought against the heresies then arising.

But theology reached its highest perfection after the council had ended. In the Order of Preachers flourished Dominic Báñez († 1604), author of the Neo-Thomistic school, or of the doctrine of physical predetermination; Bartholomew Medina († 1581); Peter de Ledesma († 1616); Diego Alvarez († 1635); John of St. Thomas († 1644); John Gonet († 1681); Antoine Goudin († 1695); Xantes Mariales († 1660); and others. Among the Carmelites, authors of the «Cursus salmanticensis in Summam S. Thomae» and Philip of the Most Holy Trinity († 1671), among others, joined the Thomists; so too did many from the Order of St. Benedict, such as Alfonso Curiel († 1609) and Augustine Reding († 1692). Most Franciscans champion the doctrine of Scotus, such as Francis de Herrera († c. 1600), Theodore Smising († 1626), Mastrius of Meldola († 1673), Philip Faber († 1630), John Bosco († 1684), and John Poncius († 1660).

22. Shortly before the Council of Trent (in 1540), the Society of Jesus was founded, and soon many great theologians emerged from it². To leave aside other branches of theology, the following stand out in dogmatic theology: Francis Toletus († 1596), who may be called the father of theological science in the Society of Jesus; then Luis de Molina († 1600), after whose name the proponents of “middle knowledge” are called Molinists; Gregory of Valencia († 1603); Francis Suárez, the “Eximious Doctor” († 1617); Gabriel Vázquez († 1604); Leonard Lessius († 1623); Adam Tanner († 1632); Ruiz de Montoya († 1632); John Martínez de Ripalda († 1648); John de Lugo († 1660); and many others. Robert Bellarmine († 1621) cultivated polemical theology above all, and Dionysius Petavius († 1652) positive theology.

Other distinguished theologians of that age are Thomas Stapleton († 1598), a controversialist; André Duval († 1637) and Nicolas Ysambert († 1642), doctors of the Sorbonne; and Louis Thomassin († 1695), an Oratorian.

23. After the middle of the seventeenth century begins the “period of the epigones,” which is reckoned up to the end of the eighteenth century. In this age, too, not insignificant dogmatic works were published. Thus, from the Thomistic school came Charles René Billuart († 1757), Louis Gotti († 1742), and Bernard de Rubeis († 1775); from the Scotist school, Claude Frassen († 1711) and Thomas ex Charmes († 1765); from the Society of Jesus, Theophilus Raynaud († 1663), Jacques Platel († 1681), Dominic Viva († after 1710), Paul Antoine († 1743), and, after many others, a crown worthy of them all, the «Theologia wirceburgensis», whose authors were Udalricus Munier († 1759), Henricus Kilber († 1783), Thomas Holzklau († 1783), and Ignatius Neubauer († 1795). From the Augustinian school, Laurence Berti († 1766) published a great work. Among the doctors of the Sorbonne, Honoré Tournély († 1729) stands out.

24. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, scholastic theology lay almost buried, while vulgar rationalism reigned nearly everywhere, with which certain Catholic theologians too had been infected. The best known among them are Georg Hermes († 1831) and Anton Günther († 1863), whose systems the Church rejected because they did not subordinate reason to faith but wanted to dominate faith. The Traditionalists fought against rationalism unsuccessfully, for they unduly diminished the power of human reason to know religious and moral truths. Such were Louis Bautain († 1867) and Augustin Bonnetty († 1879). The Church rejected their errors as well, as it did the error of the Ontologists, who taught that human beings have an innate, though confused, immediate knowledge of God. Vincenzo Gioberti († 1852) and Antonio Rosmini-Serbati († 1855) belong to this group.

Yet there were men endowed with learning and talent who strove to restore theology to its former dignity. These included Bruno Libermann († 1844), Heinrich Denzinger († 1833), and above all Johann Perrone († 1876) and Joseph Kleutgen († 1883). Through the works of these and other theologians, scholastic theology recovered new strength and has been bearing new and excellent fruit day by day, especially after the Supreme Pontiffs Pius IX and Leo XIII celebrated it with the highest praise and commended it to all Catholic theologians for study and cultivation.

25. Most recently a false doctrine has arisen which had long prevailed among Protestants, but gradually infected the minds of certain Catholics too by its contagion. This disease is called “Modernism.” It consists in a certain extreme subjectivism, according to whose tenets religion, revelation, and faith are grounded not so much in the objective truth handed on by Christ to the Church as in the inner experience of individual people, through which a person has a kind of mystical intercourse with God, who cannot be known intellectually. This inner and subjective relation to God alone is an essential element of the whole of religious life. Everything else—the Church, dogmas, and sacraments—is a set of secondary aids that can be useful for stirring religious feelings, provided they continually adapt themselves to subjective developments and needs. Hence in religion nothing is stable; everything flows.

This system, since it overturns the Christian religion and is hostile to the Church instituted by Christ, has rightly been condemned. Yet this poison still spreads. Therefore a Catholic theologian needs great vigilance and diligent care, lest he allow this plague to penetrate sacred doctrine through any fissure. “Guard the deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words and the contradictions of knowledge falsely so called, which some professing have erred in the faith” (1 Tim 6, 20). But you should “know how you ought to conduct yourself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and foundation of truth” (ib. 3, 15). Faithfully, soberly, devoutly, and in Catholic fashion! Cf. Caes. Carbone, De modernistarum doctrinis, Romae 1909; Ful. Bessmer, Philosophie und Theologie des Modernismus, Freiburg 1912; A. Gisler, Der Modernismus², Einsiedeln 1912; I. M. Piccinelli, De catholico dogmate universim, Neapoli 1811.

26. Since dogmatic theology assumes revealed truths as its principles, it must necessarily be demonstrated before it whether God has revealed anything; for revealed principles are not self-evident, as natural principles are, from which philosophy proceeds.

First and foremost, the revelation at issue is that whose author is Jesus Christ. There have indeed been, or are said to have been, other divine revelations as well. But the Christian revelation alone was of such universality and efficacy that it changed the entire face of the world and is still of incomparable importance for the whole human race. Once this revelation has been established, it will not be difficult to judge what should be thought of the others.

27. Accordingly, another discipline is placed before dogmatic theology, commonly called apologetics, because it defends and secures the principles on which dogmatic theology is built. It is also called fundamental theology (or general theology), because its object is revelation, which is the foundation of theology. Nevertheless, apologetics itself is not properly theology, since it lacks what is most essential to supernatural theology: namely, reasoning from revealed truths. Apologetics, however, must show by historical and philosophical arguments that revelation has taken place, and its aim is to prepare the way for theology properly so called; only when it has proved that certain things really have been revealed will it be able to use them in further argument. Thus the subject of this science is the credibility of the supernatural order revealed by God; its formal object is the historical and philosophical knowability of this credibility; its material object is whatever about revelation must be presupposed before theology. Hence apologetics may be defined as: an account of those things concerning the supernatural, or revealed, order that must be known in order to pursue theology. For this reason, this discipline is rightly called a propaedeutic to sacred theology.

28. Apologetics, then, in itself concerns only supernatural revelation, especially that which was given through Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, many people customarily preface it with certain general considerations about religion and about revelation and its criteria. This abstract consideration belongs rather to philosophy than to theology, and is rightly treated in philosophy¹; yet, since this is not done everywhere and the subject is usually assigned to the course in theology, after some preliminary inquiry we shall consider these general and abstract questions very briefly.

Accordingly, the division of the treatise will be as follows: after the question of religion and revelation in general, we must first inquire whether Christ declared and proved himself to be a divine envoy. Thus the first part is On Jesus Christ, the Divine Envoy. Next, we must see how Christ wished the doctrine revealed by him to reach us, and we shall find that for this purpose he instituted a visible society, to which he entrusted the task of preserving, handing on, and explaining his doctrine. Hence the second part is On the Church of Christ. Third, we ask what the sources are from which the doctrine of the Church is to be drawn. Thus the third part is On the Theological Sources.

29. In our times, among certain Catholics, especially in France, the opinion has gained ground that the apologetics of immanence should be preferred to traditional apologetics. For, they say, since very many people, infected by Kantianism and positivism, no longer admit the possibility of demonstrating transcendent things—that is, things that are not purely experimental—those who strive by objective historical and philosophical arguments to prove the truth of the Christian religion labor in vain. Therefore, one should instead proceed from the subject and show that there is in man a certain moral and religious need, which only the Christian religion can satisfy perfectly. They criticize the “traditional” method of apologetics as “extrinsicism,” because it wishes to impose the duties of religion on people from outside; as “historicism,” because it wishes to prove by historical arguments what is above all history; and as “intellectualism,” because it supposes that it can accomplish everything by intellectual reasoning. To this obsolete method, then, they oppose the method of “vital immanence,” “religious psychology,” and “moral dynamism,” because, they say, this method teaches that through attentive consideration of himself, religious experience, and moral striving, man can arrive at supernatural religion.

30. What should be thought of the apologetic system of immanence? If those apologists intend only to offer a method for disposing the minds of people, deceived by false philosophical opinions, to embrace Catholic truth more readily, they put forward various things that are useful for this purpose. But if they wish to abolish the old apologetics and substitute their new system in place of the one abolished, they are seriously mistaken.

For a) there is nothing in man's natural powers and actions that can avail to know or embrace the supernatural order, since it belongs to the essence of a supernatural being to surpass every natural power and need. Hence Pius X, in the encyclical “Pascendi dominici gregis,” complains that there is no lack of Catholics who “use the doctrine of immanence for apologetics, and do so so incautiously that they seem to admit in human nature not merely a capacity and suitability for the supernatural order—which Catholic apologists have indeed demonstrated by applying appropriate qualifications—but a genuine and proper need.” The Pontiff says that such a method and such doctrines are “not suited to building up but to destroying, not to making Catholics but to leading Catholics themselves into heresy” (Denz. n. 2103). It is indeed true that all people are now in an order that is supernatural, and that no one who has the use of reason is deprived of the promptings of the Holy Spirit. But this is known to be so only from supernatural revelation, and it cannot be proposed to unbelievers as a fact better known than the Christian religion itself, in order to demonstrate that religion, which is less well known in itself.

b) In particular, the method of immanence, taken exclusively, conflicts with the very essence of Christian faith. For it belongs to faith to believe revealed dogmas on the authority of God revealing. But this is incompatible with faith so long as there is no sufficient certainty about the fact of divine revelation and the authority of God revealing. And because the revelation in question is not made immediately to every person, but was once made to certain chosen people and handed on through them to later generations, if those objective facts on which supernatural faith rests are unknown or called into doubt, the whole Christian religion and with it all dogmatic theology must necessarily collapse. Therefore, this objective, historical, intellectual foundation cannot be compensated for by any psychological or subjective considerations. They may employ these considerations to remove certain obstacles and to prepare minds to accept objective arguments more readily; but let them remember that exaggerated subjectivism is the worst enemy of the Catholic religion, since, before it is the subjective religion of individuals, it is essentially an objective religion that all people are bound by divine command to embrace.

By the “traditional” path, then, we shall prove the fact of Christian revelation. If unbelievers reject our arguments a priori, this does not trouble us, because the force of the arguments is no less for that reason. Nor is it our task here to convert Kantians, but to secure the foundations of theology. How individual people should be led to embrace the faith cannot be set out by any general method, since judgment must be made according to each person's internal and external circumstances².

Cf. Guil. Wilmers, De religione revelata, Ratisbonae 1897; G. van Noort, Tractatus de vera religione², Amstelodami 1907; A. de Broglie, Problèmes et conclusions de l’histoire des religions, Paris 1885; — Religion et critique, ib. 1896; Th. Specht, Lehrbuch der Apologetik, Regensburg 1912, 21 sqq. On the virtue of religion: S. Thomas 2, 2, q. 81 sqq; Suarez, De religione; Th. Bouquillon, De virtute religionis; I. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, Freiburg 1881; I. Mausbach, Das Wesen der Religion, in the work: Religion, Christentum und Kirche I, Kempten 1911, 1 sqq; Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones dogm. IX, n. 293 sqq.

Proposition I. God, whose existence is proved in philosophy, is a personal God.

31. Position of the question. There are also not a few among the learned who reject a priori every religion worthy of the name and the possibility of revelation, either because they deny that God exists (atheists, materialists) or, if they concede that there is some being that may be called God, because they deny that this being is personal and say that God is the Universe itself, or a part of the Universe, to which personality belongs only insofar as it has attained self-consciousness in the human being (pantheists). But religion and revelation are a kind of personal intercourse between human beings and God. Therefore, unless God is a person, religion and revelation are incompatible. Conversely, if God is a person, the question of religion and revelation must be properly explained so that every reasonable doubt may be excluded. Indeed, all those who are now¹ theists almost all profess religion and admit that revelation can occur; all who are pantheists can neither practice religion nor admit revelation. So long as each holds to his own principles, no fruitful discussion of this matter can be expected between the theist and the pantheist. Pantheists, too, do speak of religion and revelation, but they attach to these names certain vague meanings of reverence toward the Universe, of inward movements of wonder, and of sublime and “transcendent” feelings. These are pure imaginings and subjective affections, distinguished from the poetic frenzy only by the diversity of their object.

32. God is called a person analogically: that is, the perfection we indicate when speaking of human persons is attributed to God insofar as it is a perfection, with all the imperfections that accompany it in human beings excluded, so that in God it is a pure perfection in an infinite degree. There are two things that constitute the concept of personality: individuality and rationality. A person is first of all a supposit, that is, a complete nature, distinct and separate from every other nature. Yet only a rational supposit is a person; for things lacking reason, such as brute animals, are not designated by the name of persons. These matters are explained in philosophy (e.g. C. Frick, Ontolog.⁴ n. 226 sqq). Therefore, if we call God a person, we affirm that God is distinct from finite things, both individually and taken together, and that he is an infinite substance, infinitely perfect in intellect and will. By saying that God is infinite, we admit that we cannot grasp in our minds the proper manner in which God is personal; by saying that he is distinct from the world and endowed with intellect and will, we affirm that God truly subsists in himself, truly understands, and truly wills. What we affirm is in God; the manner in which we conceive and affirm that perfection is in us alone.

33. Argument 1. Personality is a pure perfection produced by God in the world. But whatever pure perfection there is in the world is also in God as the supreme cause of the world. Therefore, God is personal.

As to the major premise. The existence of persons in the world needs no proof. Personality, however, is a pure perfection because its concept includes no imperfection, and it can exist in every order and degree of rational beings. For a rational substance does not cease to be rational on account of attaining a certain degree of perfection, nor does this substance cease to be individual. But these two things, rationality and individuality, constitute the concept of personality; therefore, personality is a pure perfection. Every personality that we know through experience is indeed a limited perfection, as are also every life, every intellect, and every perfection whatever, because they exist in limited subjects. But just as life, intellect, and many other perfections are pure perfections, since they do not require that they exist only in limited subjects, so personality, too, does not require that it exist in a limited subject.

This perfection, like every other, was created in human beings by God; we do not prove that here, but take it as proved in philosophy. For although other causes, too, contribute to producing human persons, the ultimate cause and cause of all causes is God.

The minor premise is evident. For if there were in an effect a perfection that was not in its cause, that perfection would be without a cause, and the principle of causality would be overturned. There are indeed in effects mixed perfections that essentially have an imperfection attached to them, such as every material perfection, which cannot exist in a purely spiritual being, since it conflicts with the latter’s perfection. God, then, is the ultimate cause of these mixed perfections and, in that sense, contains them in himself as well; but he contains them not formally, with their accompanying imperfections, but eminently and virtually, insofar as the perfection of the divine being not only equals but infinitely surpasses the perfections of those created beings, and insofar as by the mere act of his will he can produce them from nothing. For infinite power cannot produce only what is contradictory, that is, what by its very concept is nonbeing.

34. Argument 2. God is of infinite perfection. But a being of infinite perfection is personal. Therefore, God is personal.

Proof of the major premise. A finite perfection is limited either because it is limited by its essence, as a human being is, or because it is received in a limited subject, as human cognition is, or because its efficient cause cannot or does not will to produce a greater perfection. This division is complete, because the cause of a limited perfection must necessarily be either formal, material, or efficient; otherwise it would have no cause, which is impossible. But God is limited neither by his essence, nor by a receiving subject, nor by an efficient cause. The latter two possibilities are excluded because God has no efficient cause, since he is from himself, and is not limited by reason of a receiving subject, because a being from itself is an unreceived act. Nor is God limited by his essence, since in a being that exists from itself, existence is not received in a subject but is its very essence. But existence, or actuality, is not restricted to any particular perfection. Therefore, God is not limited in perfection by his essence; rather, his perfection extends as far as the concept of existence or actuality.

The minor premise is evident. For an infinite being lacks no pure perfection. But personality is a pure perfection. Therefore, the infinite is personal.

35. Argument 3. For a being to be personal, two things are required: real distinction from every other being and rationality. But God is distinct from the world and is rational. Therefore, God is personal.

Proof of the minor premise. God is distinct from the world because the world, as a mutable and potential being, requires an immutable being and pure act as its ultimate cause; but pure and immutable act is really and essentially distinct from every mutable and potential being. Therefore, God, pure act, is distinct from the world and all its parts. God is also rational, because he is the cause of rational creatures, and because teleology, that is, consideration of the order prevailing in the world, requires a wise ordainer. Therefore, both elements of personality, individuality and rationality, are found in God.

Since these arguments are treated more fully in philosophy (e.g. Hontheim, Theodicaea n. 248 sqq 418 sqq 522 sqq 714 sqq), it is enough to recall these few points. Philosophy also shows that God is free in his external operations (with a freedom of power, not of potentiality), since an infinite being has no need of creatures but is fully satisfied, according to intellect and will, by his own infinite truth and goodness.

36. Objection I. God cannot be both infinite and personal if infinitude and personality conflict with each other. But infinitude and personality do conflict with each other: for the infinite is a being that contains in itself every notion of being, so that nothing of being can exist beyond it; whereas a personal being is one that subsists in itself, distinct from every other being. Therefore, God cannot be both infinite and personal.

I answer. I concede the major premise. I deny the minor premise, and distinguish the reason added: the infinite is a being that contains every notion of being in itself either formally or eminently and virtually, I concede the assertion; that it contains every notion of being formally in itself, I deny the assertion. An infinite being can contain formally in itself only perfection; what is imperfect, or insofar as it is imperfect, is excluded from an infinite being, because imperfection, as negation or privation, is nonbeing. Mixed perfections are in an infinite being insofar as they receive from it every notion of being, so that nothing can exist that does not have its ultimate foundation and first cause in the infinite being. Thus there is no more perfection in God and the world together than in God alone; there are only more beings. Nor do created beings, because they subsist in themselves, become independent of God; rather, all their perfection continually proceeds from divine causality. God subsists as a being from himself; other things subsist as beings from God. Hence, I deny the inference.

37. Objection II. Whoever is a person distinguishes himself as this “I” from other “I”s. But God does not distinguish himself as one “I” among many other “I”s. Therefore, God is not personal.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: whoever is a person necessarily requires that there be other rational supposits from which he distinguishes himself, I deny the major premise; whoever is a person necessarily distinguishes himself as one “I” among other “I”s, if there are other “I”s, I further distinguish: if there are other “I”s of the same order, which can be counted together, I concede the major premise; if there are other “I”s of an order so different that they cannot be counted together, I deny the major premise. I distinguish the minor premise: God does not require that there be other rational supposits, I concede the minor premise; if there are other rational supposits, God does not distinguish himself as one of them, I distinguish under a distinction: God does not know that he is not those others, I deny the minor premise; God does not count himself together with them as a supposit of the same order, I concede the minor premise. God is not first, Adam second, and other human beings third, fourth, and so on; for things that agree only analogically cannot be counted together in this way. We do not count a human being, an ox, a tree, and a stone together. Much less, then, is God counted together with other things, with which he does not agree even in the notion of being univocally.

38. Objection III. We acquire the notion of person from consciousness of ourselves. But this notion involves limitation. Therefore, it cannot be applied to God.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: consciousness is one of the sources from which we draw the concept of person, I concede the major premise; we are so bound by the testimony of consciousness that we cannot develop a concept of person that could also be applied to beings other than human beings, I deny the major premise. I distinguish the minor premise: the notion of a human person involves limitation, I concede the minor premise; the notion of a rational being subsisting in itself involves limitation, I deny the minor premise. I distinguish the inference: the notion of a human person cannot be applied to God, I concede the inference; the notion of a rational being subsisting in itself cannot be applied to God, I deny the inference.

39. Objection IV. Philosophy arrives at only one divine person. But according to revelation God is triune, or three persons. Therefore, the philosophical doctrine of God’s personality is false.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: philosophy teaches that God is one rational nature subsisting in itself, I concede the major premise; philosophy teaches that we know the proper manner of divine personality, I deny the major premise. I distinguish the minor premise: according to revelation God is not one rational nature subsisting in itself, I deny the minor premise; according to revelation there are certain internal processions in the divine nature, about which philosophy neither knows nor teaches anything, I concede the minor premise. On the distinction given, I deny the inference, because revelation does not deny what philosophy teaches, but adds something. The philosophical concept of divine personality, then, is indeed imperfect, but it is not false.

Proposition II. Every human being must acknowledge God’s supreme excellence and show him reverence, that is, must profess religion.

40. Position of the question. If God were an impersonal being, whether the Universe or a part of the Universe, people could know this state of affairs and perhaps be struck with a kind of amazement by comparing themselves with the variety, vastness, and depth of the Universe. But in that case God would be only an object of speculation and sterile wonder, and no personal intercourse with him would be possible. Yet matters are not so: by his wisdom and love God produced the whole world from nothing, especially human beings, and continually preserves them, governs them, and leads them to their end. Should a human being, then, not also turn to God with intellect and will and pursue him by his actions, but instead somehow turn his back on God, who is always watching over and loving him? Surely this is contrary to sound reason and good morals. Whoever admits that God’s knowledge and love are continuously directed toward every human being, individually and collectively, must confess that it is the human being’s duty to raise his mind to God as the highest truth and to embrace God with his will as the highest good. To acknowledge God’s infinite excellence and make that acknowledgment known is to worship God, or to profess religion. For religion is the virtue by which we offer worship to God on account of his infinite excellence. Worship adds nothing to God’s perfection and beatitude, nor does human impiety take anything away from them. But it is of the greatest concern to human beings themselves to act rightly toward God; and because God wills human spiritual good and observance of the moral order, he therefore requires that human beings worship him.

41. Religion in itself is a virtue of the will, but it presupposes in the intellect knowledge of divine excellence, because we cannot revere what we do not know. Hence religion considered subjectively includes both right knowledge of God and of our relation to God, and a disposition of the will to act according to this knowledge. Consequently, religion considered objectively consists in the sum of truths and duties by which the moral relation of the human being to God is constituted. Therefore, on the basis of those objective truths on which religion rests, one can distinguish true religion and false religion. Considering the matter in a purely philosophical way (that is, abstracting from supernatural revelation), the religion that proceeds from a correct concept of God is to be called true; that which is the product of an erroneous opinion about God is false. The divine perfections at issue here are not, however, those considered according to purely metaphysical considerations, but the divine perfections insofar as they are relevant to the moral order. Provided that someone admits a supreme lord and ruler of the world, wise, holy, and powerful, and worships him as such, that person has true religion, even if he does not proceed to the concept of creation from nothing, or attributes some very subtle body to God, or does not know what God’s metaphysical essence is. But if someone conceives God after the likeness of a human being, subject to passions, cruel, wrathful, desirous of flattery, and in need of us and our affairs, or thinks other things about God that are morally unworthy, and worships God according to these concepts, that person has a false and superstitious religion.

42. A distinction is made between natural religion and supernatural religion. For although in the present order of things true religion is one and supernatural, because God has prescribed by supernatural revelation how he is to be worshipped, nevertheless God would have to be worshipped even if he had revealed nothing supernaturally; and because this religion would proceed from the natural light of reason alone, it is called natural religion. Hence even those people who have never heard anything about revelation must worship God.

43. The etymology of the word religion is obscure. See in St. Thomas (2, 2, q. 81, a. 1) what St. Isidore (Etymol. l. X, n. 234) collected from Cicero (De nat. deor. l. II, c. 28, n. 72) and St. Augustine (De civ. l. X, c. 3; De vera relig. c. 11 113; Retract. l. I, c. 13, n. 9); to these may be added Gellius (Noct. attic. l. IV, c. 9), Lactantius (Div. instit. l. IV, c. 28), and St. Jerome (In Amos 9, 6). Most probably, religion is derived from religendo, that is, frequently calling to mind, the opposite of which is to neglect. So think Cicero and Gellius, as well as scholars of our own time. A religious person, then, is one who is mindful of God and of his duties toward God, just as an impious person is one who neglects these duties. Less probably, the word religion is derived from religando, insofar as religion is a bond binding us to God. So thinks Lactantius. Or it may come from re-eligendo, insofar as we choose again the God we lost through sin. So thinks St. Augustine. Although they differ somewhat over the etymology of the word, they agree about the nature and acts of religion. What these acts are will become clear from the arguments.

44. Argument 1. From the human being’s complete dependence on God. A human being depends on God because he was created by God and is preserved in existence by him; because without God’s concurrence he can do absolutely nothing; and because God is the ultimate end by which the human being is to be made blessed. Moreover, the human being receives from God all the good things he uses, not only bodily but also spiritual goods, since God is the source of all truth and goodness. But human nature is such that a human being ought to acknowledge the truth and will the good. Therefore, he ought to acknowledge God as the supreme lord, beginning, and end of all things, and profess this acknowledgment, or submit himself to God.

This act of acknowledging God’s supreme excellence and submitting to God is adoration, which in technical terms is called worship of latria, and is the act most proper to religion. Adoration in itself is an interior act, either elicited or commanded by the will. For the will can not only elicit an act of submission to divine excellence itself, but can also direct acts of other virtues to this end, so that God may be honored by them; for example, it can elicit acts of humility, temperance, and obedience from this motive. A human being can and ought to perform not only interior acts but also external acts of religious worship, because he owes everything to God not only in soul but also in body, since he depends on God at every moment; and because interior acts that in no way manifest themselves outwardly soon grow weak, whereas they are strengthened and stirred up by sensible signs. For a human being is not a pure spirit but a composite of soul and body, and this whole composite ought to cooperate in worshipping God. Indeed, human beings ought not to worship God only privately by interior and exterior signs; public worship must also be offered, because a human being is a social being, and society as such also depends on God. The reason for external worship, then, derives from human nature; for although God immediately sees the human mind, a human being, insofar as he is a sensible and social being, ought not to be without acts of external worship. External acts, however, have no moral or religious worth except insofar as they proceed from and are shaped by an interior disposition.

Thus, although religion is a particular virtue, it nevertheless governs the whole of human and moral life, consecrating it to God and, as it were, turning it into a continual worship of God. A person is perfectly religious when he lives never for himself but in all things for God.

45. Argument 2. From the gratitude owed to God. God, compelled by no necessity but out of pure benevolent love, has conferred and continues to confer many things on human beings. But right order requires that we show due gratitude to a benefactor. Therefore, we ought to give the highest thanks to God, our supreme benefactor, and by giving thanks worship him.

The major premise is clear, because God, infinitely perfect and blessed, has no need of creatures, but freely produces them to bestow good things on them. He did indeed create all things for his glory. But what is this glory formally, if not the knowledge of the highest truth and love of the highest good existing in a rational creature? Therefore, if God willed to produce rational creatures, he must also have willed that they know and love him. God’s benevolence, then, does not consist in this: that, once creation has been assumed, he appoints possession of himself as the ultimate end for rational creatures; rather, it consists in his freely willing to produce creatures so noble that possession of God is due to them, and, moreover, in his willing, as revelation teaches, to raise these creatures to the supernatural order.

As to the minor premise: gratitude in general is a virtue distinct from the virtue of religion, and consists in readiness to acknowledge benefits received while praising the benefactor. But if we give thanks to God as God, we acknowledge him not as a private benefactor but as the supreme principle and lord of all things. This is an act of adoration or religion, distinguished from other acts of religion only in that it does not regard the whole of divine excellence but specifically God’s infinite beneficence. By an act of gratitude we do not love this beneficence as a divine good—for that would be an act of charity—but we consider it as the source of so many benefits flowing to us. God, however, is not our benefactor as other benefactors are, but is so omnipotently, omnipresently, with pure liberality, and without ceasing. At every moment, therefore, we are the recipients of innumerable divine benefits, without which we could neither exist nor act, and whose ultimate end will be God himself, making us blessed through possession of him. Therefore, gratitude shown to God as God is an act of latria (cf. St. Thomas 2, 2, q. 106, a. 1).

46. Argument 3. From the necessity of petitionary prayer. A human being ought to procure for himself those divine helps without which he cannot live rightly and attain salvation. But prayer is necessary in order to obtain these helps. Therefore, a human being ought to pray to God and also worship God for this reason.

As to the major premise: In the present order, the human being is subject to many bodily and spiritual miseries, from which he often cannot free himself either by himself or through other human beings. Setting aside purely bodily miseries, one cannot deny the great moral weakness involved in observing the natural law and living rightly without speaking against the facts. We do not ask here how this misery arose; the fact suffices for us, and no prudent person can call it into question. On the other hand, it is clear that God, who is omnipotent and free in acting externally, can help a human being if he wills; that he wills to help a human being live rightly and attain salvation follows from divine wisdom, goodness, and holiness. For God cannot assign the human being an end and a path to that end so difficult that the task must be called morally impossible. Therefore, since God did not at once grant, along with human nature itself, a corresponding ease, he undoubtedly willed that the human being obtain the necessary divine helps through his own cooperation.

As to the minor premise: That prayer is the means of obtaining divine help is already suggested by the fact that no people have yet been found who, in their needs, do not turn to God, or to those they regarded as gods. Ethnography and the history of religions bear witness to this (cf. O. Peschel, Völkerkunde; W. Schneider, Die Naturvölker; Fr. Ratzel, Völkerkunde; Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte). Formerly some objected, but they have been silenced by the consensus of experts. They therefore resort to another escape, saying that with the progress of the human race recourse to the divine power, and indeed all religion, will be abolished. This is a prophecy whose fulfillment must be awaited before it can be considered true. It will never be fulfilled, however, because natural reason will always perceive the truths on which religion rests, and because the magnificent promises of evolutionists cannot remedy the many forms of human need. Vices can obscure the dictate of natural reason, and the religious instinct implanted in human nature can be weakened. But if the human race as a whole is considered, truth will ultimately always prevail, and the laws implanted by the author of nature will assert their force. Religion will not perish, nor will prayer fall silent until the last human beings die. But God would not have created in rational nature this inclination to ask God for help unless he willed to hear petitions.

Why, then, does God want people who ask him to turn to him, when he already knows beforehand what they need? He wills this for their sake, because it is most useful for people to raise their minds to God and enjoy divine companionship. People who pray well and constantly grow day by day better and nobler through converse with God; for whoever keeps frequent company with someone is imbued with that person’s spirit, especially if he is a person of eminent character, and all the more if he is God himself.

God did indeed decree all things immutably from eternity; nevertheless, in this eternal decree he took account of the prayers that he foresaw would likewise be made from eternity, and according as he willed to hear the prayers, he ordered the course of things to be such as it would not have been had the foreseen prayers not been made.

In view of these points, it appears wholly improbable that God wills to grant all necessary and fitting helps to people who do not pray. He gives many things without prayer, namely all those things that a rational creature requires in order not to be futile, such as the whole natural order with its end and means to that end, together with preservation, general concurrence, and governance. Therefore, the things that flow from nature and its powers according to constant laws are not objects of petition. But within this natural order there is an immense range of divine gifts that are by no means determined by natural requirement. The distribution of goods of fortune, health or sickness, greater or lesser dangers to salvation, good or bad thoughts and feelings that arise, the company of this or that person, these and many other things that can greatly promote or hinder spiritual salvation are not so determined by the very nature of things that God could not arrange them one way or another. Thus, since God has not removed every misery from human beings by nature itself, nor supplied all the helps morally necessary, it must be thought that he wills a human being to do something on his part to obtain divine help. What else can he do but ask God for help? For human inability to keep the law and attain the end is a just title for turning to divine help; while the power, holiness, and goodness of God, who wills the human being to be saved, are a kind of tacit promise from God to provide help. Therefore, all the elements required are present for us to affirm not only the possibility but also the obligation of praying.

It is enough to have briefly explained these three duties of religion—that is, adoration, gratitude toward God, and petitionary prayer; for there is no need here to list all the specific duties of religion, since they will be discussed in the course of dogmatic or moral theology itself.

47. Objection I. It is a mark of a noble spirit not to care much about human honors. But God is the noblest spirit. Therefore, he sets little store by human honors.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: it is a mark of a noble spirit not to pursue empty glory, I concede the major premise; it is a mark of a noble spirit to refuse those honors required by right moral order, I deny the major premise. And, granting the minor premise, I distinguish the inference: God will not value human honors more highly than they deserve in themselves, I concede the inference; God will not care about the honors due to him that right moral order requires, I deny the inference.

48. Objection II. Every honor that human beings can offer to God is almost nothing in comparison with the honor owed to God. But when a debtor to a very rich creditor can pay only a tiny amount, for example a single coin, the creditor does not reasonably demand that this tiny amount be given to him. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, God should not be thought to will that he be given even the small measure of honor that human beings can offer.

I answer. I deny the assumption of the argument and the parity in the example given. For God requires honor not for his own advantage but for right order and the benefit of human beings, as has been explained. Nor is there parity between a real debt and a personal debt of honor. For a human being is undoubtedly excused from paying real debts as long as he has no means to pay. But anyone who has the use of reason can and ought to acknowledge divine excellence; and in this matter no equality is required between the honor and the one honored, as there is between what is received and what is repaid in real debts. God’s perfect glory is God himself, through knowledge and love of himself. This, however, does not prevent rational creatures from having to ascend to God with their intellect and will. Although God differs infinitely from creatures in the order of being, there is nevertheless in the intellect and will of a rational creature a proportionate relation to knowing, honoring, and loving God. Thus, in worshipping God, we truly worship him as God, place him outside the series of creatures, and acknowledge and magnify his infinite excellence. This honor, then, is infinite in its terminus, and can be given to no creature.

49. Objection III. Since religion consists essentially in interior acts, external worship is at least indifferent; and in this sense one religion is as good as another, provided that a person acknowledges and reveres God’s supreme excellence. Therefore, one religion is not to be preferred to another except insofar as one suits these people better and another suits those people better.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: if God by positive revelation or legitimate human authority has prescribed a certain form of religious worship, God can be worshipped in any other way while that worship is neglected, I deny the antecedent; for worshipping God contrary to his immediate or mediate law is not to honor him but to wrong him. So long as no worship has been prescribed by divine authority or legitimate human authority, it is permissible to worship God in any manner and with any rites one chooses, I subdivide: it is permissible to worship God with sound and reasonable rites, I concede the antecedent; with superstitious rites, that is, rites that conflict with right reason, I deny the antecedent. Just as it is not permissible to ascribe indecent and unworthy attributes to God, so it is not permissible to worship God with rites that signify such attributes. Good and true religion, even if purely natural, must proceed from correct concepts of God, as was said.

Scholium. On the origin of religion.

50. We can inquire into the origin of religion in three ways: historically, metaphysically, and psychologically.

Historically, one can ask when and for what reasons religion was introduced into the human race. Although this approach is not in itself impossible, it is closed to us, because the beginning of the human race is prehistoric and can be known only by divine revelation, which teaches that religion arose not by purely natural means but with God’s supernatural cooperation. History, however, no matter how far back it reaches by its own powers, never reaches a time when religion did not yet exist among human beings or was first introduced. Therefore, the history of religions describes only the development of various religions that had existed long before historical times. As for the rest, it can only conjecture by reasoning, with greater or lesser probability. In this way, among other things, the following conclusion has been reached: the more ancient religions are, the less polytheistic they are, and even in polytheistic religions certain traces of an earlier monotheism remain. Thus the Indo-Europeans, before their separation, worshipped Dyu, which is the root of the word for God and its derivatives. The God of the Semites was El. The Chinese revered Shang Ti (“Supreme Lord”). Something similar holds for other peoples, as I have explained more fully and substantiated with the testimony of scholars in three booklets entitled «Der Gottesbegriff in den heidnischen Religionen des Altertums» and «Der Gottesbegriff in den heidnischen Religionen der Neuzeit» (cf. J. Souben, Nouvelle théologie dogmatique I², Paris 1902). Polytheism and other forms of false religion arose from monotheism through the moral and intellectual corruption of human beings.

In individual people today, religion historically arises through the education they receive from other people already imbued with religion. For individuals do not each discover everything on their own from the beginning; rather, living in human society, they are enriched by its intellectual and moral treasures, or, conversely, infected by evils that already prevail. Philosophy, that is, polished and reflective knowledge, is not the origin of religion but an accidental supplement to it, which is absent in most cases without altering the essence of the matter.

51. The origin of religion is considered metaphysically when its material, formal, and final causes, and its conditions, are set out. We have briefly done this by saying that religion is an act or habit of the will by which a human being is rightly ordered with respect to God’s supreme excellence, rendering him the worship due to him and directing all moral life to God as first principle, supreme lord, and ultimate end. This worship, however, presupposes an intellectual and correct concept of God concerning the moral order that intervenes between human beings and God. Although we do not claim that human beings arrive at religion by philosophical reasoning, we do say that religion has an intellectual foundation, and that there cannot be religion worthy of the name that does not proceed from true knowledge of God. Many non-Catholics deny this very point, and among Catholics those called Modernists have joined them. They decree that all intellectualism must be banished from explaining the origin of religion, since the source of religious life is a certain instinct arising from a need for the supraphenomenal order, by which a human being is moved toward a transcendent being that the human intellect cannot grasp, but that the affections of the heart demand and that is apprehended by a certain special intuition (e.g. Loisy in Revue du Clergé franç. XXI [1900] 250 sqq). The intellect can neither produce nor overthrow this faith. Therefore, the origin of religion must be explained psychologically according to the system of immanence. This false opinion is the ultimate root of Modernism.

52. The origin of religion is considered psychologically when those vital acts that by their own nature lead to religion are shown in the human soul. This consideration differs from the metaphysical one in that it does not distinguish and define the concepts at issue and explain their relations to one another, but rather examines the concrete life of the human being and seeks the root of religion in it. For since religious life consists in immanent acts, the root of these acts must also be immanent. A human being perceives that he is a dependent being and unequal to attaining that noble moral state to which, unless he is already too corrupt, he recognizes by the guidance of nature itself that he is destined. Given, then, sufficient knowledge of God, it is innate in a human being to turn to divine help, so that God may supply what he lacks, as we explained above (n. 46). Therefore, religion truly arises psychologically from dependence and moral need (cf. what I wrote in Stimmen aus Maria-Laach LXVIII [1905] 381 sqq). Call this theory one of immanence, if you like, but do not confuse it with the false immanentism of the Modernists. For they say that people in their needs do not turn to a God already known, but are instead driven by their moral needs to posit God’s real existence, which is unknowable to the intellect. They confess that, according to the judgment of the mind, they do not know whether God exists or not, but trust that he exists because they need him. Certainly, arguments can also be drawn to prove God’s existence from the natural moral law, from the testimony of conscience, and from the innate desire for beatitude. But this would be an intellectual method, which the Modernists disdain in religious matters. Their “faith,” by which they perceive God, is not intellectual, is directed by no reasoning, but is an irrational appetite for God, which they sometimes adorn with the name of intuition, although in reality they intuit nothing. Hence their whole theory is contrary to reason, has no arguments in its favor, is a bare and empty way of philosophizing, is not at all supported by the testimony of conscience, and contradicts the common conviction of learned and unlearned people, who think that even in religious matters one ought to use the light of reason, not blind instinct. Finally, this theory removes the distinction between true religion and false religions, introduces religious indifferentism, and overthrows all religion, because it is an extreme subjectivism in which nothing is stable, but everything varies and flows from subject to subject and from day to day. The origin of religion worthy of the name, which is the first among the ideal powers of the moral order, therefore cannot be explained in this way.

Cf. M. I. Scheeben, Handbuch der kathol. Dogmatik I, n. 5 sqq; H. Denzinger, Vier Bücher von der religiösen Erkenntnis (book II, which reviews various opinions proposed on this matter); Fr. I. Mach, Die Notwendigkeit der Offenbarung, Mainz 1883; I. Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit V, n. 536 sqq; J. Didiot, Logique surnaturelle objective, Paris 1892.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

53. God gave the human being a rational nature so that, by considering the visible world and himself, he might rise to know God as the maker, governor, and end of the world, and pursue him by acts of the will. This manifestation of God through created objective and subjective light proportionate to rational nature is sometimes called natural and broad-sense revelation of God. For, by the force of the word, revelation is a manifestation of hidden things; and since God is hidden from us in himself but is manifested to us a posteriori through creatures, it is permissible to speak of natural revelation of God. It is called revelation in a broad and improper sense in comparison with that strictly so-called revelation which theologians mean when they speak of revelation without qualification.

54. Divine revelation in the strict sense is God's speech by which God communicates to human beings some of the things he knows, so that they may believe them on account of the authority of God who speaks. This revelation differs in many ways from the natural manifestation of God. For 1. in revelation in the broad sense, God is treated as a thing about which a human being reasons; in revelation in the strict sense, God as a person speaks to persons. 2. To revelation in the broad sense corresponds, on the human side, science, by which from created things as effects one knows God and his attributes as cause; to revelation properly so called corresponds, on the human side, faith, by which a human being affirms that what God has said is true on account of the authority of God revealing. 3. The objects of revelation properly so called can be truths that natural revelation is not sufficient to teach. 4. Revelation properly so called is something that takes place beyond the natural course of things through God's immediate intervention. 5. Revelation in the improper sense cannot of itself lead a human being except to a natural ultimate end; revelation properly so called can lead, and does lead, a human being to an end that surpasses every natural requirement and power.

These distinctions must be observed so that from the very beginning the concept of the subject under discussion may be sufficiently clear. It will therefore be useful to add a few brief explanations, for the supernatural order, faith, and the other matters at issue here will have to be treated more fully in the proper dogmatic treatises.

55. Revelation is God's speech to human beings in the proper sense. How one human being speaks to another is well known. Most commonly this is done by spoken words, often by writing, and sometimes by gestures or other signs. The one essential point is that one person intentionally manifests some judgments of his own to another person. Therefore, it is not speech properly so called if a parrot utters certain articulate sounds. Nor is it speech if someone discloses his thoughts or feelings through involuntary signs. Speech properly so called is testimony by which someone testifies to what he himself judges, so that another may accept the things testified to. At least implicitly, the speaker appeals to his knowledge and truthfulness, and wants his words to be believed. If, in addition, the speaker has a right to demand that another hear what he says, there is full authority of a witness; knowledge and truthfulness alone do not yet suffice for this, because I have no moral duty to hear whatever any person wants to tell me, but may refuse to listen: “What is that to me? I do not want to hear you.” Often, however, it is not permissible to answer in this way; rather, we must hear and accept what another says. That God has authority to speak to us and demand faith from us follows from the concept of the supreme lord and first truth. But how does God speak to human beings?

56. God's immediate speech to human beings can take place in various ways: through voices or other external signs that human beings use when conversing with one another. But, in addition, God can produce in a human being's imagination or intellect, without external signs, species that cannot be produced in one human being by another except through external signs (cf. St. Thomas 2, 2, q. 173, a. 2 and Contra gent. 3, 154). Nevertheless, the production of species alone, whether through external signs or without them, does not suffice for there to be divine speech, just as it would not suffice among human beings if someone heard only voices but did not know who uttered them or whether that person meant to speak to him. An intellectual judgment must therefore be added, by which a human being understands that God is speaking to him and what God is saying; and because God revealing wills his word to be believed without doubt, and usually also to be announced to others as something to be believed in God's name, he himself must infuse into the human being an intellectual light by which the one who receives revelation certainly understands that these and those things are being revealed to him by God.

57. In receiving and believing revelation, a human being is not purely passive, any more than when he learns something from another human being. To perceive truth and assent to it is a vital act, even when the one teaching is God, who indeed strengthens the natural faculties but does not overpower them or cause the vital act not to be elicited by the human being. Therefore, even in divine revelation, the acts by which a human being perceives and affirms revealed truth are and remain vital acts; but these acts are only the means and manner of attaining revelation, not God's word itself. Only what is revealed and believed is the divine word. So that the imperfect manner of knowing proper to a human being may not impede the right apprehension of revealed truth, God helps the human being with interior light and strengthening. This divine help does not raise a human being to an immediate intuition of the revealed things, but ensures that divine things are represented by analogical concepts, which are indeed imperfect but not positively false. For it is not the manner of knowing that is proposed for belief, but what is made manifest through revelation.

58. This revelation, then, is called immediate, not as though it did not take place through the human being's subjective acts, but in comparison with natural revelation, in which the objects proposed for immediate knowledge are not divine words but created objects, from which a human being reasons upward to God.

Revelation is distinguished in another way as mediated or immediate with respect to the subjects to whom it is made. For God can reveal something to one human being and at the same time send him as a messenger to announce the divine words to others. If this happens, God must mark his messenger or surround him with signs by which it is certain that he is God's messenger and truly speaks in God's name. Such signs are especially miracles and prophecies. Under these conditions, then, revelation is immediate with respect to its subject only for the messenger himself, while the others receive divine revelation only mediately, whether from the messenger himself or from others who heard it from him. Nevertheless, we rightly say that the matter so handed on was revealed immediately by God and is properly God's word, because God's word remains God's word even if it is repeated by others and transmitted to others—especially if this transmission takes place by God's command and under the assistance of God, who sees to it that his word is not corrupted in this way.

59. On the human side, faith corresponds to divine revelation, not science in the strict sense. For science is knowledge of things from intrinsic principles, whether a thing is perceived immediately, a conclusion is drawn from cause to effect, or a cause is known from its effect. Faith, however, is assent to a thing on account of the authority of the witness affirming it. If that authority is certain, it does indeed give certainty that the thing is as it is affirmed to be; nevertheless, both the authority and the certainty prepared by authority are something external to the thing testified to. Hence, through faith there is no insight into the believed thing, but only assent to it; and the sole formal motive of this assent is the authority of the witness. This holds for human faith and also for divine faith. Human authority is fallible in itself; therefore human faith, too, is fallible. Divine authority is absolutely infallible; therefore the faith that corresponds to the authority of God revealing is infallible, and its assent is the firmest possible adherence. For it is not permissible to answer God revealing, “Perhaps it is as you say”; rather, one must answer, “Because you, the first truth, say so, it is so, and it cannot be otherwise.” Despite this, since in faith the intellect is not determined to one thing by the evidence of the thing itself, doubt is psychologically possible, and doubt is excluded only by the free command of the will, out of reverence for God. These matters will be explained more fully later in the treatise on faith; for now, however, they must be kept in mind, lest anyone think that we wish or are able to extort the assent of faith from people by apologetic arguments. Perhaps matters would proceed in this way if the question were one of acquiring science by perfectly evident arguments, as, for example, in mathematics. But apologetic arguments are primarily arguments of the moral order, which differ greatly from metaphysical proofs; moreover, even if we suppose them to be entirely evident, what they undertake to prove is the credibility and obligation to believe revealed things, that is, they show that we can believe them reasonably and have a duty to believe them. But the fact that I can and ought to believe something does not yet impose a physical necessity to believe; rather, the act of faith depends on the free will. And if I freely will to believe and do believe, by this act of faith I do not have insight into the thing believed, but simply assent that the thing testified to is true.

60. From what has been said it follows that revelation takes place beyond the natural order of things. Experience shows that, according to what commonly occurs, we do not perceive God's words properly so called; and from the concept of the matter it is clear that God's immediate speech does not take place through natural powers and laws. God can send angelic spirits as his messengers, but this itself is something beyond the natural order. God can also employ natural powers to produce certain external signs; but these do not occur by natural law and are not sufficient unless God brings about something from which it is certain that God is speaking. As long as only natural things occur, there is nothing that would lead us to suspect divine speech properly so called. Therefore, revelation is something praeternatural.

The revelation that is the foundation of the Christian faith is supernatural revelation, both with respect to its principal objects and with respect to its end: that is, God revealed truths that the human intellect is not able to discover by itself, and he revealed these truths in order to lead human beings to an ultimate end that surpasses every natural power and requirement. He did indeed reveal some things that can also be known naturally; this revelation may be called supernatural according to its mode. These, moreover, are secondary revealed things; but with respect to its principal objects and end, Christian revelation is supernatural according to its substance.

Therefore, as regards the fact itself, divine revelation belongs to the supernatural order; and just as an order of pure nature has never existed, so no revelation of a purely natural order has taken place. Nevertheless, one may ask whether, in a natural order, revelation supernatural according to its mode ought to or could have occurred. It is difficult to give a certain answer to this question. On the one hand, it would also have been useful for human beings in a natural order to be instructed by God about religious and moral matters; on the other hand, if God had instituted a natural order with a corresponding divine providence, that order would have had all the means physically and morally sufficient for the human being to attain his end. Therefore, it is not sufficiently clear how it would befit divine wisdom to intervene immediately and beyond the nature of things in an order in which the human being would have been fully equipped to attain his natural end. Absolute power would not have been lacking to God, but the question is whether he would have had ordained power. It is therefore better to abstract from this question and consider human beings and revelation as they actually are now.

Proposition III. God's immediate revelation is not incompatible with reason.

61. Position of the question. Immediate revelation is understood as that which is distinguished from natural and mediated revelation, as explained above (n. 53 sqq). We do not claim to know a priori whether God has reasons for speaking immediately to human beings; we only state negatively that there are no reasons for saying that such speech is incompatible with reason. For once its noncontradiction is established, its possibility is positively proved by the very fact of revelation. Here, then, we are rather removing the obstacles that are erected a priori against the fact of revelation. Moreover, that God knows many things human beings do not know, and has the power to manifest certain things to them, seems so evident—unless there is some other obstacle—that there is no need to dwell on it. The whole question is whether revelation can be reconciled with God's wisdom and human nature.

Modernists call “revelation” something that is not true revelation but fiction, because they imagine that a human being experiences within himself certain movements that the religious sense receives as a divine manifestation; this “revelation” proposes no truths to be believed, but only moves a person's feelings. If this whole thing occurred, it would remain within the sphere of subjective experiences. We, however, are speaking of revelation by which God teaches human beings truths to be believed, whether theoretical or practical, that is, pertaining to moral life; therefore, we are speaking of objective revelation.

62. Argument. If immediate revelation were incompatible with reason, it would be so either on God's side or on the human side. But it is incompatible with neither. Therefore, immediate revelation must be said not to be incompatible with reason.

Proof of the minor premise, part I. Immediate revelation is not incompatible on God's side. For God is infinite truth itself and the first source of all truth. Every ontological, logical, and ethical truth that exists in the world has God as its ultimate principle. Therefore, God can communicate truth to creatures. But the infinite divine truth is not exhausted by the limited truth actually granted to creatures, nor is divine power bound to one way of teaching human beings by means of created objects, that is, by revelation in the broad sense. Rather, just as according to his most wise and free plan he has granted human beings this degree and manner of knowing divine things, so God has many other degrees and manners in his power. This faculty of knowing and this actual knowledge are not in human beings because the nature of things makes it impossible for them to be otherwise, but because God freely chose it to be so.

If objective and subjective truth were a necessary development of a necessary world, as pantheists maintain, no other degree or manner of revelation of truth could exist except the one that actually exists naturally; indeed, no permanent truth would exist, but everything would constantly change according to unchanging laws. This is the ultimate reason why many people infected with pantheism deny that revelation can occur, and they do so in complete consistency with their own principles. But once an infinite, personal, freely acting God is admitted, there is no reason to doubt that God can impart to human beings, from the infinite treasury of his knowledge, cognitions beyond those they can acquire by their own powers, and in another way than that followed by natural laws. Therefore, if he wills, God can announce truths to human beings in such a way that they understand that it is God who is speaking to them; that is, he can give immediate revelation.

63. Does divine wisdom have reasons for giving human beings immediate revelation? This can neither be affirmed nor denied a priori, because we do not look into the divine mind; we know only the order of created things, which does not require praeternatural revelation, but neither excludes instruction communicated by God that surpasses nature. Divine providence is indeed necessary so that creatures, and especially human beings, can act and attain their end. Therefore, a certain immediate action of God in the world is also necessary: preservation and concurrence. But insofar as this action is required for things to exist and not be futile, the whole divine governance belongs to the natural order. Now, the human being, who has natural faculties and corresponding divine concurrence, lacks nothing for attaining his proper end. And if perhaps a lesser degree of divine help is not sufficient, even within the natural order God can give more and greater interior and exterior helps, so that human beings lack absolutely nothing in pursuing their end. Therefore, from natural principles alone one cannot derive a reason why God should reveal something praeternaturally. Whether God has higher designs for human beings that exceed the natural order, we do not know. In this matter, therefore, human reason has a purely negative role, and is very much in error if it attempts to exclude a priori the possibility of immediate revelation.

64. Proof of the minor premise, part II. Immediate revelation is not incompatible on the human side. For the human being was created by God, depends on him in his acts, and is subject to him as supreme lord. From God as creator he received the faculty of understanding; from God as preserver and cooperator he also received every actual cognition. Therefore, although actual cognition is elicited by the human being himself as a vital act, God also produces it insofar as it is a being. Now, if God cooperates with human cognition, he can also cooperate in a way that surpasses every natural power and requirement, so that by virtue of this cooperation the human being knows what he cannot know naturally, or knows in a more perfect way what he can know naturally.

This supernatural cognition can take place in different ways. If it is such that through it a human being knows created things from intrinsic principles, this is infused science, called infused because, beyond natural cooperation, the species of the things to be known are infused. If immediate knowledge of God is given, this is the beatific vision. If knowledge from intrinsic principles is not given, but only God's testimony about something is proposed, to which the human being assents with supernatural cooperation, this is faith. Thus, with the interior grace of faith, we believe the doctrine proposed by Christ. This doctrine reaches us through witnesses sent by Christ and specially safeguarded by assistance against errors in handing on and preserving revealed doctrine. A human being owes faith to God speaking and to the witnesses sent by him.

Therefore, revelation is not incompatible either with the vitality of human cognition, because vitality does not exclude divine cooperation, or with human autonomy, because a human being is not so autonomous that he can refuse faith to God speaking. It is not the human being but God who is the supreme norm of truth. A human being is not omniscient, but is subject to errors, ignorance, and doubts. Hence he must be instructed by other human beings. But divine teaching authority is better than human teaching authority, because God is infallible and teaches not only from without but also enlightens from within. To deny the possibility of immediate revelation is the same as making God a mute idol, unable to meet the intellectual and moral needs of his creatures, and separated from all personal intercourse with human beings. Such a God does not exist in reality, but is a figment of philosophers who have strayed far from the truth.

65. Objection I. God is immutable. But immediate revelation presupposes a change in God. Therefore, immediate revelation is impossible.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: God is immutable in himself, or entitatively, I concede the major premise; God is immutable in his external works, or terminatively, I distinguish under a distinction: the decree by which God established from eternity what would happen in time is immutable, I concede the major premise; there are no successions in the divine works themselves, I deny the major premise. I distinguish the minor premise: immediate revelation presupposes an entitative change in God, I deny the minor premise; it presupposes a terminative change in the divine action, I distinguish under a distinction: it presupposes a new decree of God, I deny the minor premise; it presupposes a temporal effect of an eternal decree, I concede the minor premise. And I deny the inference.

66. Objection II. God's works are perfect. But praeternatural revelation shows an imperfection in the divine works. Therefore, praeternatural revelation is impossible.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: God's works are perfect relatively, insofar as they have everything due to them in their degree and order, I concede the major premise; they are perfect absolutely, so that nothing can be added to their perfection, I deny the major premise. I distinguish the minor premise: praeternatural revelation shows an imperfection in the divine works, as though they did not have everything naturally due to them, I deny the minor premise; it shows imperfection insofar as God can add something to them beyond their due perfection, I concede the minor premise. And I deny the inference.

67. Objection III. It is unworthy to imagine God as a teacher instructing his pupils. But through immediate revelation God is shown to act in this way. Therefore, immediate revelation is unworthy of God.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: it is unworthy to imagine God as a teacher who knows little and instructs ineptly, I concede the major premise; it is unworthy to show God condescending to human beings, accommodating himself to their nature, and instructing them through suitable external teaching and interior light, I deny the major premise. I distinguish the minor premise: revelation shows God as an imperfect teacher, I deny the minor premise; it shows him as a divine teacher instructing human beings in a manner suited to them, I concede the minor premise. And I deny the inference.

Nothing unworthy of God is apparent in the teaching authority of Jesus Christ, even though Christ is God; rather, everything is full of wisdom, dignity, and beauty. Divine revelation, too, as it is presented historically, is most wise and gentle insofar as God did not announce all the things to be revealed to human beings at once from the beginning, but educated the human race gradually, as a teacher would, and led it through the various stages of the patriarchal law and the Mosaic law up to the fullness of Christian revelation; then he instituted a teaching office, under whose care and watch the understanding of the revelation made through Christ would be explained more and more each day until the end of the world. So far is the revelation recounted in the books of Sacred Scripture from being unworthy of God that it deserves the greatest admiration. On the contrary, many objections devised by rationalists against the possibility of revelation are trifles unworthy of philosophers. (Cf. Praelect. dogm. I, n. 150 sqq; IX, n. 195 sqq in the third edition.)

Scholium. On divine revelation announced through envoys sent by God.

68. Since the human being is a social being, a priori one should expect that if God wishes to reveal anything concerning human society, he will not speak immediately to each individual but rather to specially chosen men through whom he instructs others. All who admit revelation properly so called agree that God really acted in this way. In this manner of acting, not only is nothing contrary to reason apparent, but the nature of human beings and of human society is also perfectly taken into account.

They object, however, that by this way of proceeding it cannot be avoided that human elements become mingled with the divine words and that the usefulness of revelation is greatly diminished or even corrupted. The answer is: whether human beings receive revelation immediately or mediately, they undoubtedly know what is said in a human, not a divine, manner; for what is known is in the knower according to the manner of the knower. Nevertheless, this does not affect the objective truth of the things revealed. If, for example, God reveals that the dead will rise, the future resurrection of the dead remains true, even if a human being knows much less perfectly than God how this will happen. A human being ought to believe the objective truth, not the subjective manner in which he knows it. And insofar as human imperfection could put the objective truth itself in danger, God will help by a special assistance so that what must be believed remains intact. Therefore, if God wills to send envoys to carry a divine message to others, he will take care not only that the envoys themselves are not deceived, but also that he equips them with conditions such that they do not lead other rational people into error. Faith is to be given to these envoys insofar as they can prove by sufficient arguments that their doctrine has been revealed by God; and faith extends only to those things they have been sent to announce. In other matters they remain subject to error like other human beings.

Nor do divine envoys, through divine revelation and mission, become dead instruments, like phonetic tubes through which God speaks; rather, they are enlightened so as rightly to understand and announce the revealed things. In this matter God does nothing violent or contrary to rational nature, but uses instruments in a way proportionate to their nature.

Rationalists indeed pervert all these things either through ignorance or through malice, in order to mock supernatural revelation. It is enough to have noted them, since their distortions do not need refutation.

Proposition IV. The revelation of mysteries is not incompatible with reason.

69. Position of the question. In its broadest sense, a mystery is a hidden thing that we are unable to know. Four degrees of hidden things can be distinguished. a) There are some things that we do not know, although in themselves they are knowable by us, but they are not accessible to our cognitive faculty, such as things at the bottom of the sea or deep within the earth. b) Other things manifest themselves to us not immediately but through their effects. Thus we know that they exist, but do not see their inner nature. To these belong, for example, the soul and every vital principle, and especially God. c) Sometimes we know that a thing is possible but not that it exists, because its existence must be determined by the exercise of freedom; such things include the future free acts of creatures or God's decrees. d) Finally, some things are so remote from our knowledge that even after revelation we do not positively see their intrinsic possibility; such are the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

These last are mysteries in the strict sense, whose existence we cannot discover from natural principles, nor can we positively understand their possibility from intrinsic reasons in this life, not even when they have been revealed to us by God. Mysteries in the strict sense are above reason, but not contrary to human reason, because no principle of reason is overturned by them; indeed, a well-trained intellect can resolve all the objections raised against them.

If the word mystery is taken broadly, it is clear that there are many mysteries, since there are more things that human beings do not know than things they do know. The divine intellect is infinite and has an object of infinite perfection. Hence it is certain that God knows many things we do not, and in this respect the existence of mysteries and the possibility of their revelation are self-evident. Nevertheless, it is not evident a priori that there are mysteries in the strict sense, because we do not know whether there are truths that God cannot reveal to us in such a way that we positively understand their intrinsic possibility through analogical concepts. We speak chiefly about these mysteries in the thesis, and say that there are no sufficient reasons to deny a priori that God can reveal such mysteries.

Rationalists sometimes explain the origin of the doctrine of mysteries in this way: since the first Christians were not highly cultivated in intellect, and understood various points of Christ's doctrine too crudely, they could not reconcile Christ's words with the opinions of philosophers. Therefore they said that there are mysteries inaccessible to the human intellect but revealed by God. Once this way of escaping difficulties had been discovered, however, they began in a sense to luxuriate in inventing one mystery after another and to boast of them as a special prerogative of the Christian religion. “Our task,” rationalists say, “is to cleanse minds of this childish conception and explain everything rationally.”

How false this assertion is is evident from the fact that Christ and the apostles already taught that there are mysteries (cf. Mc 4, 11; Mt 11, 27; 24, 36; Lc 10, 21; Rom 16, 25; 1 Cor 2, 7; Col 2, 2 3); that among the first Christians there were men of the greatest talent and learning, such as Paul, Justin, Irenaeus, and Tertullian; that great doctors of later times would long ago have corrected this defect, if it had occurred; and that the explanations of the mysteries given by rationalists are not explanations but distortions of Christ's doctrine. Even if we consider the matter in a purely philosophical way, it is wholly improbable that all Christians, in unanimous agreement, misunderstood the doctrine handed down to them, while the rationalists' mutually conflicting accounts are true.

With these points assumed, we prove only that there is no incompatibility in the revelation of mysteries. We shall see later that mysteries have in fact been revealed.

70. Argument. The revelation of mysteries is not incompatible with reason if it is not incompatible with God knowing mysteries, nor with mysteries being announced to human beings. But neither is incompatible with reason. Therefore, the revelation of mysteries is not incompatible with reason.

Proof of the minor premise, part I. God is infinite pure act, whom we do not attain by our cognition through proper concepts in themselves. But we do not so clearly see a being that surpasses our intellect by so great a distance that we can know a priori that there is nothing in it that simply transcends our natural faculty of understanding. Indeed, since there is such a great difference in intellectual faculties even among human beings themselves that one person may be wholly unable to grasp what another understands, it must all the more be supposed that there are things in the infinite intellect that no human intellect can grasp. This does not mean that it is denied that God can elevate the human intellect so that it understands those mysteries; but this very thing, if it occurs, is a great mystery. We deny only that, by the manner of understanding we use in this life, we can penetrate all the hidden things of the divine intellect.

On the other hand, whatever is true agrees at least analogically with the adequate object of our intellect. Therefore, one ought not say a priori that there is some truth that God cannot manifest to us even by analogical concepts. In some way we know what a person is, what a nature is, what God is, and what a human being is. Therefore, we can also form some kind of concept of a divine person and human nature. But if someone asks, “Can a divine person assume a human nature?” we must answer: if the divine person were precisely of the same character as a human person, the thing would be impossible; but what an infinite person can do according to his own proper manner, we do not know. Hence, if God reveals that a human nature has been assumed by a divine person, we understand in some way what this means; nevertheless, we do not see the possibility of the thing from intrinsic principles, but divine testimony gives us external evidence that it is so. In this way, then, God can reveal mysteries in the strict sense to us, if such mysteries exist. Therefore, the revelation of mysteries through analogical concepts and through the external evidence of divine testimony should not be said to be incompatible with reason.

Proof of the minor premise, part II. The revelation of mysteries would be incompatible on the human side if it brought no knowledge at all, or no useful knowledge, to a human being. But neither is to be said. Even after revelation, knowledge of mysteries remains very imperfect. Yet imperfect knowledge is neither no knowledge nor always useless. For through faith in mysteries, better than through any natural knowledge, we understand the majesty of God, our lowliness in comparison with it, God's benevolence and love, our ultimate end, and many other things of the greatest importance for religious and moral life. Through faith in these things our intellect is joined to the first truth, and the principle of a new supernatural life is implanted in us, whose ultimate term is the beatific vision. Although these things are not known to us a priori, they show nevertheless that nothing on the human side stands in the way of the revelation of mysteries.

71. Objection I. Evidence is the principle of certain knowledge. But mysteries are not evident to us. Therefore, we cannot be certain about them.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: the principle of certain knowledge is either the internal evidence of a truth manifesting itself or the external evidence of testimony, I concede the major premise; it is solely internal evidence, I deny the major premise. For through faith we know more things than through internal evidence. I distinguish the minor premise: mysteries are not evident to us by the evidence of science, I concede the minor premise; they are not evident to us by the evidence of credibility, I deny the minor premise. And I deny the inference.

72. Objection II. Whoever does not see whether a predicate belongs to a subject or not knows nothing. But in the case of mysteries we do not see whether the predicate belongs to the subject or not. Therefore, we know nothing about them.

I answer. I distinguish the major premise: whoever sees neither from the inner nature of the thing nor from testimony that the predicate belongs to the subject knows nothing, I concede the major premise; whoever at least knows from testimony that it belongs knows nothing, I deny the minor premise.

Some say that mysteries are empty formulas, by which our intellect is no more instructed than if we heard: x + y = z. But this is not true. For if we hear that we have been called to the immediate vision of God, we know that this concerns the most perfect knowledge of the highest truth, by which we shall be perfectly blessed. This is not an empty formula but a most weighty and useful truth. The same holds for the mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and all the others.

73. Objection III. It is wrong to renounce the use of reason. But whoever believes mysteries renounces the use of reason. Therefore, he acts wrongly.

I answer. I grant the major premise; I deny the minor premise. For whoever believes mysteries is first certain, through the use of reason, that God has revealed them, and understands that it is reasonable to believe God revealing. Therefore, he does not act wrongly but rightly.

Indeed, the greatest doctors, such as St. Augustine and St. Thomas, did not renounce the use of reason by believing mysteries; rather, faith in mysteries became for them a source of many and very lofty kinds of knowledge about divine matters, both theoretical and practical. All the saints are offspring of faith, while faith is chiefly and principally concerned with mysteries. But a tree that has borne such fruits should not be called a bad or useless tree.

Proposition V. Revelation is morally necessary for the human race with respect to religious and moral truths of the natural order, but is absolutely necessary on the hypothesis of a supernatural order.

74. Position of the question. The natural order is understood as that order in which the human race, by natural powers alone and under corresponding divine providence, ought to pursue an ultimate end proportionate to human nature. In that order, too, God is the human being's external ultimate end, to be possessed by the most perfect cognition, though only analogical; to that order, too, belongs the providence of God governing human beings and directing them to their ultimate end, but this providence and governance remains within the limits of natural requirement.

The supernatural order, which we know from revelation alone, is that order in which the human being is destined to see God immediately as his ultimate end, and to pursue that end through proportionate acts, aided by special divine help. The supernatural order does not destroy the natural order but perfects it. Natural faculties remain with their acts; natural knowledge of divine and moral things remains; natural ethics remains; and the human being who attains the ultimate end will also know God most perfectly through analogical cognition. Therefore, although an order of pure nature no longer exists, it is nevertheless right to ask how revelation relates both to the natural order and to the supernatural order.

Moral necessity derives from the greatest difficulty of acquiring the knowledge required for living a good religious and moral life. Absolute necessity for supernatural revelation exists when natural powers are wholly inadequate for properly pursuing the end established by God.

We assert that this moral necessity applies to the human race as it is now; therefore, we mean neither each individual human being apart from many others placed in the best conditions, nor the whole race as it might have been in another order of providence, but human beings taken generally, as they really are now. Nor do we say that human beings in general cannot know some religious truth, for example, the existence of God, sufficiently easily; rather, we speak of the whole complex of those truths without which a religious and moral life worthy of a human being is impossible. God could indeed have provided for human need in another way than through revelation; but since no other remedy is offered, nothing remains but revelation.

75. Proof of the first part. Revelation is morally necessary with respect to truths accessible to reason. For a) history teaches that all peoples deprived of revelation lacked correct knowledge of God and the moral law. But what never occurs is morally impossible. Therefore, revelation is necessary for the human race to acquire correct concepts of religious and moral matters. The nations imagined abominable gods, worshipped them with abominable rites, and moral depravity was universal. This is a very well-known fact. Doellinger collected many testimonies (Heidentum und Judentum, Regensburg 1857, especially books 7 and 8), as did other writers; for the rest, it is enough to read the first chapter of St. Paul's letter to the Romans.

b) Natural philosophy could not remedy this evil. Even the works of the best philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, are filled with the worst errors; the greatest discord often prevails among philosophers, even on fundamental questions concerning God, the human soul, and the end of the human being; and if they taught anything good, their lives usually contradicted it. Moreover, philosophers despised the common people, and the common people thought nothing of philosophers. Do not philosophers of our time who reject revelation also very often fall into skepticism, agnosticism, and pantheism, and corrupt the whole moral teaching? The many evils produced by unbelieving philosophy are evident; what it has contributed to the advancement of religious and moral life is not apparent.

c) Nor can most people acquire for themselves by their own investigations the knowledge necessary for the religious and moral order, because of a lack of talent and diligence, lack of leisure, the danger of falling into grave error, and the urgency of religious and moral duties that cannot be postponed until all incidental questions have been resolved by scientific methods. Therefore, for all human beings to arrive surely, quickly, and without error at knowledge suitable to the religious and moral order, divine revelation is required as the sole remedy for the very great difficulties that obstruct this knowledge.

Even revelation does not compel a human being to admit the truth, but is offered to his freedom. Hence, if human beings resist it with ill will, their condition does not improve but worsens. But those who are well disposed can learn from revelation all the truths necessary to be known, especially when they are aided by divine grace. In fact, the desperate condition of human beings was healed through Christian revelation alone. We therefore rightly conclude that this revelation was morally necessary.

76. Proof of the second part. Revelation is absolutely necessary on the hypothesis of a supernatural order, because if a human being must pursue a supernatural end that he cannot know naturally, this end and the means necessary to attain it must be revealed. In the supernatural order, then, divine faith is the root of the whole religious and moral life, and all human acts must in some way proceed from this root so as to be proportionate to meriting the beatific vision of God. The nature of supernatural being and order is to be explained more fully in the treatises on God as elevating and on grace.

Although it is so necessary, revelation is a true grace, that is, an unowed gift. It is indeed owed to a human being that God provide him with the means necessary to attain a natural end. But an end and means so excellent as to surpass every natural power and requirement are not owed. Moreover, once God has promised supernatural gifts, he must also give them. But the promise itself is entirely gratuitous; God owes the fulfillment of his promise neither to natural merits nor to natural requirement, but to his own faithfulness and goodness.

From what has been said, the teaching of the First Vatican Council, session 3, chapter 2, is understood: «It must indeed be attributed to divine revelation that those things in divine matters which are not in themselves inaccessible to human reason can, in the present condition of the human race, also be known by everyone readily, with firm certainty, and without any admixture of error. Revelation is not, however, to be called absolutely necessary for this reason, but because God in his infinite goodness has ordained the human being to a supernatural end, namely, to share in divine goods that wholly surpass the understanding of the human mind» (Denz. 1786).

77. Objection I. God's works are not defective. But God's works would be defective if revelation were necessary for human beings. Therefore, revelation is not necessary.

I answer. I deny the minor premise. For religious and moral errors did not flow from God's institution, but from the abuse of human freedom. It would be a just punishment if God left human beings, polluted by so many sins, to their misery; and if he rescues them from this misery through his revelation and grace, this is a work of mercy. The institution of a strictly supernatural order, however, does not indicate a defect in nature but only its capacity for perfection.

78. Objection II. Even among Christians many false opinions about religious matters are current, there are many opposing doctrines, and there are many sins. Therefore, revelation is not even a sufficient remedy for religious and moral evils.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent: many errors and evils have not been removed by revelation with regard to things that are not essential in relation to the ultimate end, I concede the antecedent; with regard to essentials, I distinguish under a distinction: insofar as human beings can resist revelation with ill will, I concede the antecedent; insofar as revelation does not make it possible for those who will to pursue and attain the ultimate end with sufficient certainty and ease, I deny the antecedent. And I distinguish the inference in the same way.