De locis theologicis

ARGUMENTS REFUTED FROM THE PRECEDING CHAPTER

The first argument therefore raises three false charges against D. Thomas, one of which has already been entirely removed. For how do these claims conflict: that the articles of faith are the primary principles of our theology, while Sacred Scripture also contains secondary ones? And since Scripture does not contain everything, but most things, this also agrees and fits very well: divine truth, even unwritten, is the formal ground of faith. For some matters are handed down orally to the Church and are counted among the true and genuine principles of theology. The first charge, then, has no force. The second charge presses more strongly. But if you pay close attention, you will see that we can speak of God in two ways, and then this charge too will be crushed. We must therefore understand that speech about God takes two forms: either because he is the beginning and end of nature, or because he is above nature and is its beginning and end. As long as we understand an excellent and eternal mind, separate from the body and free, detached from all mortal composition, which perceives and moves all things, sustains and governs heaven and earth, and toward which all things strive and exert themselves as far as they can, we understand God naturally and speak about him naturally. But if we consider God himself shown to us by a superior light, by which he appears threefold in one divinity, wondrous in his works above nature, the first efficient cause and ultimate end of all such supernatural works, and thus the one and highest happiness of rational creatures, then our understanding and speech about God are quite different. Since Paulus therefore numbers these two among the things that must be believed—to believe that God exists and that there is

a rewarder of those who seek him—he understands God not as he is seen by the eyes of nature but as the first principle and ultimate end of supernatural things, appearing through a higher illumination. In this sense D. Thomas says (II-II, quaest. 1, art. 7) that all the articles are contained in those first things to be believed, namely, that we believe God exists and exercises providence concerning human salvation. When he says elsewhere that these two are not among the articles of faith but are rather presupposed by faith, he is speaking of God according to the light of nature. For as grace presupposes nature, so supernatural knowledge presupposes natural knowledge, as the same D. Thomas says. It is useless to try to fill with the teaching of faith someone who lacks those two natural anticipations: that God exists and exercises providence over human beings. No nation is so savage, as Cicero says, that it does not know it must have a god, even if it does not know what kind of god is fitting. Anyone who does not first know that God is the governor of human affairs, and therefore their ruler and judge, is very far from our discipline. If God is ruler and judge of human beings, and can be understood in no other way than as endowed with supreme wisdom, justice, and power, it follows that he has rewards prepared for virtue and punishments for vices. For, as Solon most truly said, no commonwealth can be sustained without two things: reward and punishment. This led Plato to assert that, since he saw that the best men, despite their noble deeds, were often given no reward for virtue, no distinguished honor, and no memorial of praise in this life, immortal souls would someday receive the reward and fruit of their duty. For it would be absurd for true and just labor to lack honors, rewards, and glory, if there is piety in heaven, if there is a deity who cares for such things. Thus the Elysian fields, the rock of Sisyphus, the wheel of Ixion, and the thirst of Tantalus are not merely poetic fictions but signify realities. Although all these things were invented by poets, they were invented to signify the truth, so that this most useful and truthful judgment might be impressed on people’s minds: “Rewards are due for right actions, punishments for sins.” I am all the more surprised at Caietanus, who in his commentary on the epistle to the Hebrews has strayed far, or perhaps entirely, from the Apostle’s meaning and from the true teaching of nature. Some have followed him in this error, without carefully attending either to Paulus’s purpose or to the force of reason. But so that the reader can see where this whole error began, I will lay out the matter and quote the very words spoken by the originator and, as it were, architect of this opinion: “Whoever does not believe that God exists will never approach him,” he says. “But if you object that this does not fit those who know evidently by demonstrative science that God exists—for when they see that God exists, it is impossible for them to believe that God exists, since faith is the evidence of things not seen—the solution is that this teaching is given in general and therefore it is said generally that one must believe that he exists. It would be much better to know that he exists rather than believe it, but this is rare or very rare. The other point, that God rewards those who seek him, namely, in the future life, must be held by faith, because no speculative science can reach this, and without faith in this matter no one approaches God.” Thus far Caietanus. At this point I think my whole position must contend with his whole position. First, then, if it pleases you, let us consider what Caietanus said about the principle “God exists.” I knowingly and deliberately pass over the claim that knowing is much better than believing; that would be true if he were speaking about human faith. But faith, which rests on God’s word, is much more certain and superior than the knowledge grounded in the reasoning of our minds. Showing this, however, does not belong to the present place and time; what properly belongs to this discussion is whether

if we understand Paulus’s statement generally and as applying to what usually happens, then we evade his whole argument. The Apostle was trying in that chapter to show that all the ancients who were approved by God were approved by the testimony of faith. After including Enoch with the others in his list, he showed that Enoch was approved by faith only because, before his translation, he had received testimony that he pleased God. Having established this proposition from Sacred Scripture, he immediately added the minor premise: “Without faith it is impossible to please God. For whoever approaches God must believe,” and so forth. The Apostle’s argument for this minor premise is vain and weak if we grant that someone approaching God need not always believe that he exists, but only sometimes—and rarely—need know it. For we could refute the Apostle’s argument by answering that it is possible, and better, for someone to know that God exists; in that case, he would not need to believe that God exists. It would follow that pleasing God without faith is not impossible, and that Enoch was one of those who did not believe but knew that God exists. Therefore, just as when the Apostle says that without faith it is impossible to please God, he should be understood not to speak generally or for the most part, but always and about each person who lives in this world, so too, when he gives the reason for this and says, “For whoever approaches God must believe that he exists,” he should be understood in the same way to make no exception at all, but to speak of everyone and every time, if his argument is to have any force in producing belief. As for the next principle, Caietanus should be defended insofar as he said that no speculative science can clearly demonstrate that God rewards those who seek him, if he means supernatural reward. But Caietanus seems to assert generally that no science shows that any reward awaits just and wise men after death; this I must reject. Chrysostomus (hom. 4 de provi.) teaches that those who doubt the immortality of the soul might as well doubt whether it is daytime at noon. For, he says, if they deny that souls are immortal, they deny that punishments for the wicked and rewards for the just follow this life. Thus they deny God’s providence and therefore divinity, which cannot be understood without providence. For if those who rightly worship God depart after suffering injustice, while the impious enjoy unjust happiness, there is no justice in God, if he can reward his own with honors and gifts. If you take away God’s power, justice, or sight, the name of God is empty. For it follows by every kind of reasoning that if God rewards none of those who seek him, he does not exist at all, unless we regard God as blind, weak, or unjust: blind because he does not see his own; weak because he cannot grant rewards; unjust because he is unwilling. Therefore, whoever denies one of these must deny both, and if he does not have a rewarder of those who seek him, he cannot have God either. I scarcely understand what Caietanus means when he says that no speculative science can attain the truth that God rewards those who seek him, and concludes that we must hold it by faith. What if no speculative science can attain it? Is it not enough if a productive science can? I am convinced that just as speculative natural science declares that God, the first efficient cause, exists, so productive natural science also shows that God is the ultimate end of all things. It shows not only this but also that the laws of nature have some author and judge—unless perhaps this one law alone has been abandoned, which has no

legislator, or if someone has prescribed these laws to the world, he cares nothing about whether they are observed. If we speak, then, of God and divine reward insofar as they are shown by the light of nature, we recognize both in this light: that God exists and that he rewards those who seek him. But to please God, it is not enough to know that he is the principle and author of nature; we must be drawn toward God because he is a supernatural end, rising above and surpassing the powers of nature. Therefore the Apostle said most rightly in general that anyone approaching God, the supernatural end, must believe that he exists, and so forth. For knowing what natural reason teaches is not enough for this supernatural approach. “We have access to God through faith” (Rom. 5). That Paulus spoke of approaching a supernatural end and also of supernatural reward is plainly demonstrated by the following (Heb. 11): “He was waiting for the city with foundations, whose architect and builder is God.” And later: “Now they desire a better homeland, that is, a heavenly one; therefore God is not ashamed to be called their God, for he has prepared a city for them.” Again: “He looked to the reward,” and “as seeing the invisible one, he endured.” Finally: “They did not accept redemption, so that they might find a better resurrection,” and “all these were approved by the testimony of faith but did not receive what was promised, since God had provided something better for us, so that they would not be made perfect without us.” The accusation brought against D. Thomas in the second place has now been adequately refuted, in my opinion. There is no need to clear him of the third error, since we have already explained that theological faith, which we now discuss, does not assent to anything whatsoever God has said but only to those things that pertain both to the common religion of the faithful and that the Church’s common ministers proclaim. We have indeed solved the first knot; the second will be resolved as follows. Matters of faith are of two kinds. Some are simply and universally matters of faith, such as those that surpass natural reason. Others are called matters of faith not in themselves but, as it were, incidentally: things divinely revealed for those who lack their demonstration and evidence, such as that God exists and is one, eternal, wise, and just. Although we see all these things in the light of nature, God providentially revealed them to an unlearned people, as D. Thomas explained (secunda secundae, quaestione I, artic. 5 et q. 2, artic. 4). We can also speak of God in two ways, as we used when resolving the first argument: either as the principle and end of nature or as the principle and end above nature. In the first sense, the natural light shows that God exists, is one, immortal, wise, and so forth; in the second, faith alone holds these same things. Thus D. Thomas (secunda secundae, quaestione I, articulo 8), when he objected in the first argument that God’s unity need not be counted among the articles of faith because it can be known by demonstration, replied that by faith we hold many things about God which philosophers could not investigate by natural reason, such as his providence and omnipotence and that he alone should be worshipped. All these things are included under the article of God’s unity. Thus far D. Thomas. He speaks of providence and omnipotence also concerning supernatural things. He also says (q. 2, arti. 2, ad 3): “To believe in God does not befit unbelievers in the sense in which it is taken as an act of faith,” and so forth.

These claims may perhaps not escape the charge of slander unless we return to the rule of this distinction. Once these matters have been explained, D. Thomas plainly teaches that nothing that is properly and in itself a matter of faith can be made clear by natural argument. Indeed (I p. q.32, art. 1), he rebukes as enemies of faith and harmful to our religion those who try to demonstrate the things of faith by arguments from nature. If the holy Doctors bring forward arguments to prove the decrees of faith, those arguments are appropriate, not evident; probable, not necessary; persuasive, not compelling; they lead the mind, they do not prove the point. For natural light makes clear and illuminates what agrees and harmonizes with nature. Since faith, as we have often said, properly concerns things that surpass human nature and understanding, such things cannot be shown by the light of nature or established by natural reasoning. If faith is the substance of things hoped for, as the Apostle says in the epistle to the Hebrews, and hope that is seen is not hope, as he teaches in the epistle to the Romans, it necessarily follows that what faith believes—and hope hopes—cannot be seen by the eye, heard by the ear, or enter the human heart, and therefore cannot be demonstrated by human arguments. Unless human things support and sustain divine ones, or Paulus deceives and is deceived when he asserts that faith is the evidence of things not seen and that our wisdom is hidden in a mystery unknown to any ruler of this age. Philosophers can therefore show the principles of our discipline probabilistically, but cannot demonstrate them necessarily. No one need fear losing the merit of faith by using arguments to explain and adorn the truth of faith. However much he tries, he will not use arguments that provide the evidence of the senses, but arguments by which those who do not believe may be brought more gently to faith, and those who do believe may be kept in the faith more willingly. Faith does not fight against nature but agrees with it; human and divine reason do not disagree but cohere. Both are true, and truth does not oppose truth; both come from God, and God is not opposed to himself. People therefore overturn the foundations of nature when they separate it from faith. Rather, faith should guide natural reason, so that these two words do not seem to refer to things at odds. Since human and divine things are similar and related, the one who offers to God the service due from a human and makes nature serve grace properly fulfills the office of a theologian. D. Thomas often proves this very point, and we will discuss it at length elsewhere, in books 8, 9, 10, and 11, and especially in book 14. For now, however, we must refute the arguments that seemed to show that theology proves the decrees of faith. The first argument has been answered sufficiently. The second is refuted as follows: it is not an article of faith that the world came into existence from God, but that God created heaven and earth at the beginning of time. This is an article of faith that cannot be demonstrated by any reasoning, as D. Thomas discusses (I p. q. 46, ar. 2). As for the testimony of Petrus raised in the third place, it only shows that the Christian religion and discipline is not entirely like the Pythagorean school, whose pupils clung stubbornly to their teacher’s authority without any prior preparation by reason and without being given any explanation. That is the custom of the unlearned, and of Saracens, pagans, and heretics: they embrace blindly and rashly the dogmas of their sect without judgment, and accept without examination precisely the things that most require investigation. Believe me, they are not educated but constrained; they are not taught by reason and method but driven to madness, as if by spells and incantations.

For everything we are taught in the Gospel, although it moves our minds most strongly to take hold of supernatural things, is nevertheless framed by Christ himself in gentler reasoning from nature, so that he would not seem to have disciples devoid of reason. For although the wisdom of God reaches powerfully from end to end, it also orders all things gently; it instructs and educates people in a human way, that is, rational beings through reasons. God also wants his disciples to be composed to teach others in the same way as they themselves were taught by him. (Esai. 50): “He gave them an instructed tongue, so that they might know how to sustain the weary with a word; he also opened their ear so that they might hear like a teacher.” Just as we hear Christ’s disciples as teachers, not as enchanters chanting spells, so we have a tongue that is not carried here and there by a flow of words, but is trained and educated, knowing how to give the reasons and grounds of its teaching. Eusebius writes (Lib. 9, c. 6) that when Lucianus of Antioch was asked by the governor why, although he was a rational and prudent man, he followed a sect whose reasons he could not give, he answered in these words: “We Christians are not constrained, as you think, by an error of some human persuasion, nor are we deceived, like others, by our parents’ tradition without examination. God is our authority concerning God. For that lofty majesty could not enter the senses of the human mind unless it were conveyed by the power of his Spirit or made known through the explanations of his Word and Wisdom. I admit that we too once erred and thought that the idols we had fashioned were gods and authors of heaven and earth. But their fragile substance argued against them: we had consecrated them ourselves, and they had only as much reverence as the skill of their makers had put into their appearance. But that omnipotent God, not fashioned by our hands but whose handiwork we ought to be, took pity on human error and sent his Wisdom, clothed in flesh, into this world to teach us that the God who made heaven and earth should be sought not in things made by hands but in invisible things. He established for us the laws and precepts of life and discipline: to practice moderation, rejoice in poverty, cultivate gentleness, study, endure, embrace purity of heart, and preserve patience. He also foretold that all these things you now do against us would come. For he who was immortal himself submitted to death so that he might provide us an example of patience. He did not deceive us by his death; after three days he rose for us to conquer death by rising. What I say did not happen in some obscure place and needs no witnesses: almost the greater part of the world now bears witness to this truth. Or if anything in it seems suspect, even the unlearned common people attest to it, who know nothing of fabrication. If this still is not believed, I will also call upon the testimony of the place where the events happened. The place itself at Hierusalem and the rock of Golgotha, split under the weight of the cross, bear witness; as does the cave which, after the gates of hell were broken open, gave back the body alive again. If earthly things seem unworthy to you, accept also a faithful witness from heaven. I present the sun itself as your witness: when it saw these things done on earth by the impious, it hid its light in the sky at midday. Search your annals: you will find that in the time of Pilate, when Christ suffered, the sun fled and the day was interrupted by darkness. If you do not trust the earth, heaven, or the blood of the martyrs, how will you believe my words and arguments?” He had almost begun to persuade his hearers with these words when he was ordered to be seized and taken to prison, where he was killed without public commotion. Petrus therefore commands the teachers of the faithful to give reasons of this sort, which, when they precede faith, do not drag unbelievers but lead them; when they follow faith, they do not burden the faithful but add strength.

For Augustinus says in this sense that the understanding of natural things produces, nourishes, and strengthens faith. It also defends the truth of faith, since once natural things are carefully perceived and known it is immediately understood, first, that faith in no way fights against nature but wonderfully agrees with it, and second, that all the arguments that attack the truth of faith are deceptive and empty. But we have spent far too long resolving the second knot. Fortunately, the third and final knot needs no solution. What should we add that would be worth reading after the judgment of D. Thomas has been explained so clearly, carefully, and fully above? Enough, then, about the principles of theology.