De locis theologicis

IN WHICH ARGUMENTS 15, 16, 17, AND 18 ARE REFUTED

Although, from what we said in the preceding chapter, the refutation is apparent of those arguments placed fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth, they must nevertheless be refuted one by one in order, so that we may accommodate even the lesser theologians in the schools. In the fifteenth argument, the authority of Philo is first called into question. It was certainly great, but the breuiarium illud temporum Philonis was not his, nor was the other little book de antiquitatibus, which is known to be of the same quality. The Romans’ leading men, and also men of the Church, have celebrated Josephus’s credibility as a historian. Hegesippus, a good authority above all, a man of proven reliability and a serious historian in every respect, praises Josephus greatly in what pertains to his authority as a historian; for as to religion, he makes him a companion in the Jews’ faithlessness. Jerome does not hesitate to give Josephus a place among the Church’s writers and even to count his records of events among ecclesiastical histories. Eusebius of Caesarea, Sozomen, and Nicephorus, to omit others, commend Josephus’s history in remarkable ways. Indeed, Josephus himself commended his history with weighty and probable arguments, which lend it no less credibility than if Jerome or some other author had advanced the same arguments. Yet he interprets the serpent’s punishment altogether crudely; he calls the power of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil false and fictitious; he writes that Herodias was the wife not of Philip but of Herod, who was also the brother of Herod the tetrarch; he says that the Temple was completed in the second year of Darius’s reign; and he refers the elders’ lamentations, when they recalled the former Temple’s magnificence, not to the laying of the new foundations but to its completion, and finally says other things contrary in part to Sacred Scripture and in part to other true and approved histories. I plainly say so; I do not deny it. But these were errors of an ignorant man, not lies of a deceiver. Nor is it fair to spread a stain over the whole body of a narrative because of a few spots. Josephus was therefore an outstanding historian, as Hegesippus affirms, attentive to the investigation of events and to sober expression. As for those who criticize him in dating events, I could not easily say whether they do so rightly or wrongly. For my part, I readily and willingly attribute such errors to unlearned and careless copyists. The five books on chronology by Julius Africanus have not come into our hands. For this reason we cannot always judge for ourselves the credibility of his history. But there is the ruling of Gelasius, which was raised in the argument, and theologians who are to judge matters of this kind ought to follow it. “The little works of Tertullian or Africanus are apocryphal.” It is not entirely clear in this passage whether Gelasius meant to condemn Julius Africanus. First, none of the ancients held a bad opinion of Julius Africanus. Eusebius and Jerome, moreover, honor his testimonies about events. Nor was Julius censured for his doctrine of the faith. For in believing the history of Susanna to be fictitious, he followed the error of very learned men. Yet it does not at all seem plausible to me that Gelasius condemned all the little works of Julius because of one sin, for which there is even a probable excuse.

For if it was a sin, Julius shared it with the teachers of the Church. For you will scarcely find anyone who has not erred in some matter. Next, why does Gelasius formulate the judgment in that way, as though it made no difference whether this or that man were condemned: “The little works of Tertullian or Africanus are apocryphal”? If those two authors differed both in name and in fact, Gelasius, following his usual practice, would have condemned the works of each individually. But since he marks Tertullian or Africanus with a single pronouncement, we should not suppose that he meant different authors, but the same man. Such conjectures make me suspect that the passage is corrupt, as are many others in this chapter, and that the particle “or” was added through the copyists’ error. It should therefore be read: “The little works of Tertullian Africanus are apocryphal.” Unless perhaps some called Tertullian by the surname Africanus, and therefore Gelasius delivered his judgment in that form so that we would understand him to have been condemned whether called by his proper name or by a surname. Eusebius and Sozomen remain, whose authority was finally pressed in the fifteenth argument. But what I thought and judged about these authors you have in the preceding chapter. In the fifteenth argument no difficulty was raised that was not resolved. In the sixteenth, the decree of Innocent is first brought forward. But if he approves the records of the Church, he does not thereby immediately disapprove pagan histories. I admit that these are of little use for the ecclesiastical court and ordinary lawsuits, although they can sometimes be useful for this purpose as well; since it is beside our present subject, it is not worthwhile to say in which places and questions. But, as we said at length in the second chapter of this book, secular history is altogether useful in the interpretation of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, if a question arises concerning the divine writings, neither councils nor other ecclesiastical judges ought or are able to neglect such histories. Nor are the histories of the nations suited only to these uses of Scripture. They are also necessary to theologians in other ways, as we explained earlier and will explain in the books that follow. Moreover, Andreas teaches nothing else at the Council of Florence than that knowledge of the wars of Greeks or Romans does not pertain to a synod. He could have said the wars of the Trojans or even the Florentines. For some knowledge of Greek and Roman wars is most useful for explaining the prophecies of the prophets. But these matters are very easy; let us pursue the rest. They too, after what we discussed earlier, present no difficulty. Indeed, I think not one word need be added in response to the seventeenth argument, since, unless I am mistaken, it was accurately and carefully resolved in chapter 6. I shall therefore resolve the eighteenth and final argument as briefly as I can, and thus at last bring this topic to an end. Theologians use two kinds of arguments: one is certain, the other probable. Both are to be discussed more fully in the next book. Now I shall state the matter briefly. It is not necessary that a theologian always take certain principles. From uncertain ones, provided they are probable, he sometimes constructs arguments that are suitable not for proving but for persuading. The theologian who would insist that in every syllogism he must match necessary matters only with necessary matters would be foolish. For some matters are so involved and obscure that it belongs to theological prudence not to try to demonstrate them, but to persuade; not to illuminate them fully, but to explain them as best one can.

If, then, someone uses the probability of human testimony in this kind of argument, he may of course sometimes be mistaken, but he cannot be criticized without injustice. Further, as we said above, human testimony conveys certain things so certainly that to call them into doubt is a most certain sign of folly. If a theologian claims these things for his use, he will construct nothing deceptive, nothing weak or inept, but something true, firm, and consistent with both human and divine reason. It seems sufficiently explained how an argument is drawn from the parts of history that have been set out. We said in the first book that all theological arguments flow from ten sources. In the ten following books it was shown what kinds of arguments can be drawn from each of the individual loci. Perhaps what has been said was longer than the subject required, but certainly shorter than I had thought I could make such weighty matters. I confess that my discussion was lengthy in explaining the authority of human history. But there was no locus of theology where the subject of discussion was broader, or where I had to work with greater care, diligence, and effort. Even if I did less than the importance of the matter demanded, I did not labor in vain. For I was able to admonish others to write more carefully, either to add better things, remove superfluities, or compress more tightly matters stated diffusely and at length; in short, if they know something better than these things, to impart it generously.

ON THE USE OF THE THEOLOGICAL LOCI IN SCHOLASTIC DISPUTATION