De locis theologicis

Although an argument drawn from civil law may not be certain or established, it is nevertheless most probable, especially one that a theologian draws from laws approved by the practice of the Christian commonwealth. We must believe that such laws were given to the Romans not without divine direction; indeed, John VIII declares that they were promulgated divinely through the mouths of princes. Augustine says that God distributed human laws to humankind through emperors and rulers of the world. Demosthenes thinks laws are an invention and gift of the gods. Cicero says that the law of a prince, suited to commanding and forbidding, is the right reason of Jupiter himself. And Solomon says: “Divination is on the lips of the king; in judgment his mouth does not err.” It therefore belonged to God’s providence that the makers of Roman laws should be inspired by a certain divine power to prescribe rules for governing the commonwealth that were just and lawful. Therefore, if a theologian draws an argument from them, he will not depart from the purpose of his profession; even if he does not argue with certainty, he will argue probably. I cannot approve Ludovicus Vives in his attempt to break and diminish the authority of all Roman law. He sometimes indulges himself excessively in pursuing corrupt disciplines and tries not only to refute new errors that have crept or intruded into them, but also to overthrow accepted opinions of the ancients, always with great flourish of words but sometimes with little force of argument. In his books De corruptis disciplinis he said many true and excellent things, but at times he pronounced confidently as if he had descended from a divine council. Learned men would approve him much more if he had restored collapsed disciplines with the same diligence and eloquence with which he described the causes of their corruption. But he faltered in teaching the disciplines after having flourished in criticizing errors. This is no wonder. It is easy enough to criticize the mistakes of others, even probably; but to bring disciplines, which for many years certain unlearned and barbarous men have bent aside, back to the straight line—that is indeed the task and the labor. This was exactly what he should have attempted if he wished to accomplish anything worthy of great praise.

It is one thing to criticize civil laws, especially those approved by long practice in a well-ordered commonwealth, and another to criticize the errors of interpreters. As far as jurists are concerned, however, Ludovicus agreed with us. He says: “The ancient interpreters of civil law were once held in the highest honor, deservedly and for good reasons, because philosophers interpreted civil law as it had been gravely and prudently formulated by distinguished philosophers. But after this discipline began to be in the hands of men who had acquired no philosophy or serious training before approaching and adorning themselves with it, all its splendor was destroyed. Its teachers are now held in esteem only by the common people, who are all full of lawsuits. Just as the Egyptian priests were greatly honored because they had devoted much labor to mathematics, while the whole of Egypt needed geometry, since the yearly floods of the Nile confused the boundaries of the fields, so, since lawsuits have flooded and overrun the borders of the Christian world and mixed and confused them, those who are said to be skilled in settling quarrels must necessarily be held in the highest honor. Whether they settle them or not is for them to see; this much we certainly see: there are fewer lawsuits where there are fewer scholars of this kind.” I too do not wish to claim the novices for theology’s use. Not every shrewd and cautious pettifogger, guardian of formulas, hunter of syllables, patron of injustice as much as justice, is a jurist. I teach only that civil laws, especially those long observed by the custom and practice of the Christian people, are useful to a theologian in argument. Enough about these matters. Now let us speak of the authority of history. The arguments we offered to diminish the authority of civil law are easier than those that require our discourse to linger in refutation.