De locis theologicis

The unanimous agreement of all philosophers establishes certain belief in a philosophical doctrine. For what holds in other arts—that approved authors have such authority among those who pursue that art that it is ordinarily rash to depart from them—must hold in philosophy, and much more so, lest students wander in varied error about knowledge of natural things and never have anyone to follow. “It is well,” Aristotle says in libro secundo de caelo, “for each person to be persuaded that the opinions of the ancients, especially those of our predecessors, are true.” If in every discipline and art a learner must believe, as Aristotle himself prudently warned and Theodoret showed and made clear with many examples, then in learning philosophy we must certainly trust its teachers, especially when they agree in the same opinion. How arrogant and rash it would be—not to disagree with Plato, Aristotle, Hippocrates, Galen, Theophrastus, Themistius, Alexander, Dioscorides, and the other philosophers of this choir, all singing the same tune, whose writings were composed with great care and study and tested by posterity not only through examination but also approved by its agreement—but to speak against the learned men of one’s own time and prefer individual opinions to common ones. This, as the saying goes, is to wage war on the gods—that is, to oppose nature; for most people are usually led where nature itself draws them. From this it is clear that, in theological studies, it is not foreign to the task of investigating matters that raise doubts about nature to consult learned people, and, if the question concerns morals, those experienced in practice, and to ask what they think about each kind of question. If painters, sculptors, and even true poets want their work examined by the common people too, so that they may correct anything many people criticize, how much more should a prudent theologian revise and correct many opinions about natural things in light not of the common crowd but of the judgment of wise philosophers, even when those opinions seem true to him? Indeed, in matters of morals, not only the most learned philosophers but also the very best men have authority, even without giving a reason. For what Aristotle taught so learnedly, as he taught almost everything, is that just as a healthy palate judges flavors correctly, but a disordered one does not, so a good and just man distinguishes the good from the bad and the right from ¹

the wrong. By contrast, every disturbance of the mind’s passions removes and corrupts the judgment of truth. So true is the saying: as each person is, so is the judgment he gives. Aristotle himself plainly testifies that we ought to heed the opinions not only of those with experience but also of the elders and the prudent, just as we heed demonstrations. For, he says, having experience as their eye, they see the principles of action themselves and, guided by them as if by nature, judge rightly. Therefore Innocent rightly and piously wished us to follow the examples of the saints in moral judgments. Plato too says most gravely in Timaeo: “It cannot be that faith is not given to the children of the gods, even if they speak without probable and necessary demonstrations.” And Ecclesiasticus says: “Settle the counsel of a good heart within you. For the soul of a holy man sometimes declares what is true better than seven watchmen sitting aloft to observe.” This has always been my reason, most holy and excellent Father, for expecting your weighty judgment in such matters no less than that of any other most learned philosopher and theologian. For I understood that all the virtues I had observed in you, even without any dialectical syllogism, would lead you to follow what was right and avoid its contrary. Yet this discourse of mine is not about you but about the whole class of good men. I would have it understood especially of judgments of prudence, not of doctrines of knowledge. For judgments of prudence change when customs change, but decrees of knowledge do not. I strongly disagree with those who, when deciding cases of conscience, as they call them, consult certain spiritual men, I know not whom, leaving aside the most learned philosophers and theologians—men who speak visions from their own hearts, not from the mouth of the Lord. Much practice in virtue is also needed, as Origen says on cap. 4 Ioannis, so that we may judge good and evil, truth and falsehood. But few have, as the Apostle says, their senses trained to discern good and evil. Enough of this. Let us now return to where we digressed. It is therefore established that we must hold in high regard the judgment of philosophers—those who excelled in great learning and outstanding intellect—if we do not wish to be considered rash. Indeed, if anything is probable, nothing is more so than that the chief of nature has provided some men for humankind as teachers of natural science. Who would be so foolish as to establish any academy without teachers? Certainly, since God, who is known in Judea, established there a kind of gymnasium of divine knowledge, he also provided rabbis there. And since he wished there to be academies of evangelical doctrine among Christians, he gave apostles, prophets, Evangelists, and doctors to profess that doctrine in the Christian commonwealth. Therefore, since he gave all nations the laws and disciplines of nature, it is not plausible that he instituted no teachers of such laws and disciplines. If it is fitting to argue from another comparison, Clement of Alexandria says that philosophy was given by God to the Greeks like a testament of their own. Just as he did not leave the testament of the Jews or of Christians without an interpreter, neither did he leave that of the Greeks without one. It was therefore also part of divine providence that not all philosophers should err together in knowledge of God, the rule of morals and life, or even the understanding of natural things,

which is necessary for those first two matters. This is why, according to Paul, the Greeks were without excuse. They could, however, be excused if their teachers had not been sufficiently instructed in the truth of goodness by the best author, guide, and teacher of nature. Sacred Scripture also bears witness to this. For it is written of God in Psalmo: “He teaches man knowledge.” And again, in libro Iob: “He teaches us more than the beasts of the earth and makes us wiser than the birds of heaven.” Just as nature has given certain animals, as leaders and guides of the others, certain instincts by which they are led to guide their own flock rightly and usefully and are drawn away from what is crooked and harmful, so we must believe that notions have been implanted in the minds of those human beings who are natural leaders of the others, by which they are led to those matters that concern the instruction of unlearned and untutored peoples. For the condition of beasts is not better than ours. Boethius, a man of great intellect and outstanding learning, rates the common conceptions of the wise (as he calls them) no less highly than if they were common to all people. In the sixth and seventh places, we ourselves have also shown by the same reasoning that the common judgments of ecclesiastical doctors must be accepted as if they were the common and concordant opinions of all the faithful. Therefore, there is no doubt that what all philosophers agree upon is true and established. For how could men, ambitious for honor and glory, nearly blind with eagerness to criticize, and separated by many centuries and immense distances, come to one opinion unless they were driven toward this agreement by some impulse of nature? From this we may again understand what was said shortly before: philosophers received from some mortal teacher whatever they wrote, by common agreement, for all peoples and nations. Thus the common opinions of philosophers are most true, and we may not dissent from them if they all hold one and the same view. But when an opponent had objected to Jerome, in his book Contra Pelagianos, that philosophers commonly held that whoever has one virtue has them all, Jerome replied that this was indeed the philosophers’ opinion but not the Apostles’, and that he cared not what Aristotle taught but what Paul taught. I shall pass over here, lest I be lengthy, Jerome’s customary manner in that dialogue and his way of evading arguments. For the argument is easily answered: Jerome also agreed that this opinion was true and proved it by the authority of the philosophers. Thus, in cap. 16 Esdrae, he says: “The opinion of the philosophers and the Apostle James is that the virtues cling together, so that whoever lacks one lacks them all.” And in cap. 56 of the same prophet: “The virtues follow one another, so that whoever has one has them all, and whoever lacks one lacks them all.” In that dialogue, then, Jerome does not wish to be pressed in a dogma of faith by the authority of the philosophers, although he himself uses that authority elsewhere.