De locis theologicis

Having explained these matters, it remains to teach whether this source is strong or weak in theology. I see no need to linger here, since natural arguments are known to be some certain and others uncertain. The certain ones are what dialecticians call demonstrations: they draw a conclusion with certainty and clarity from evident and well-established principles. Uncertain arguments, though probable, are drawn this way or that by conjecture and have no compelling force. Here is a strong argument: “God is not far from any one of us, for in him we live and move and are.” Act. 17. And this one: “He who planted the ear, will he not hear? Or he who formed the eye, will he not see?” Psalm. 93. And also this: “Eat and drink what they have, for the worker is worthy of his wages.” Lucae 10 and 1 Corinth. 9. A probable argument is the one Petrus uses in Act. 2: “For these men are not drunk, since it is only the third hour of the day.” It is thus clear that natural arguments used in theology are sometimes weak and sometimes strong. Those who want every question to be infinite and no truth to remain fixed and constant are impious toward nature itself and toward God. For the Apostle wisely said that the reasons arising from nature are manifest, and then traced them back to God as their author. “What is known of God,” he says, “has been made manifest.” By angels? By prophets? By apostles? Certainly not: “The invisible things of God are understood and seen from the creation of the world through the things that have been made.” Natural reasons are therefore sometimes evident and certain. “All people are vain, in whom there is no knowledge of God, and who, from the works they observe, have failed to recognize their maker. From the greatness and beauty of creatures, their creator can be seen by understanding.” Some natural arguments are therefore evident, and so strong. Speculative disciplines, then, which are formed and established from such arguments, are not errors and empty deceits. Luther asserted this not only foolishly but impiously. For all human knowledge and wisdom come from God, as is shown not only by the testimony of the Apostle just cited but also by other testimonies reported by Clemens Alexandrinus. One is: “All wisdom comes from the Lord God.” Another is: “I have called Beseleel by name and filled him with wisdom and understanding, to devise whatever can be fashioned,” and so forth. The craft of making things, then, and every human discipline must be referred to God as the source and first principle of all wisdom. From this and many other passages we must understand that those who call philosophy an error and empty deceit should be condemned not only for folly but also for impiety. God is truth, and no error comes from him. It is therefore easy to understand that, since the arguments of philosophy are drawn and taken from divine truth, those who reject them oppose the truth of God, on which they depend. What rests on such a foundation cannot be weak or frail. Therefore, vain people will try in vain to overthrow the arguments of philosophy and nature. Both lights—that of nature, by which we are said to see natural things, and that of faith, by which we see supernatural things—come from God. “That was the true light which enlightens every person,” and “The light of your countenance, Lord, is marked upon us,” refer also to the natural illumination of the mind. We would be no less deceived by God, erring in the light of nature, than if we erred through the light of faith. To reject the guidance, investigation, and arguments of natural light is not only foolish, as Augustinus teaches in 4 De Trin., but also impious, as

we have abundantly shown in this passage. We could already conclude this source here, were it not first necessary to answer the arguments heretics have raised. Let us therefore consider the first, then the rest in order.