De locis theologicis
Melchor Cano (1509–1560)
De locis theologicis libri duodecim
First published 1563
Melchor Cano's De locis theologicis, first published in 1563, examines the sources and authority of theological arguments in twelve books. It considers Scripture, tradition, ecclesial authority, reason, and history as grounds for theological inquiry. The present edition includes the Latin text and an English translation. The Latin was prepared from Juan Belda Plans's BAC reading text and checked against The School of Salamanca's CC BY 4.0 transcription and aligned page images of the 1563 edition; both sources are credited.
Preface
Book I
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Book II
Preface to Book II
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Chapter X
Chapter XI
Chapter XII
Chapter XIII
Chapter XIV
Chapter XV
Chapter XVI
Chapter XVII
Chapter XVIII
Book III
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Book IV
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Book V
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Book VI
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Book VII
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Book VIII
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Book IX
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Since it is easy for heretics to scorn the practice and authority of the ancient fathers, I will next show that the apostles themselves introduced natural arguments into theology through their teaching and examples. By these they led outsiders to the faith, strengthened their brothers, invited the teachable, and refuted opponents. First, outsiders are led to the faith by reason and are, as it were, prepared.
For God uses the promptings of nature to bring faith into the minds of mortals, as we explained more fully at the beginning. For this reason he produced eyewitnesses of his resurrection and joined miracles to his teaching, so that the apostles might persuade their hearers of the faith not only by their words but also by the work itself, as Epiphanius teaches in lib. 2, Haeres. 51, and Ambrosius in Comment. epist. ad Rom., cap. 1: “The power of the teaching is its witness, so that what is preached, though incredible to the world, might be made credible by deeds.” And Beda, lib. 3 in Luc., cap. 7: “After granting them power to perform signs, he sent them to preach the kingdom of God, so that the power shown might give credibility to their words.” Thus signs and miracles pave a path to faith through the senses and reason. So Sergius Paulus, a prudent man, believed in amazement when he saw what had happened, at the teaching of the Lord. So the Centurio, seeing what had happened, glorified God, saying: “Truly this was the Son of God.” Peter and Paulus too, to draw their hearers more gently to faith in the resurrection, use natural reasoning to show that the passage of Scripture, “You will not allow your holy one to see corruption,” cannot be understood of David and must therefore be understood of Christ. In another place Peter himself sets forth Christ’s resurrection to his hearers, first through the most certain testimony of eyewitnesses and then through the clear evidence of a miracle performed: “We are witnesses of this,” he says. And immediately, “In his name, God has made this man whole, whom you have seen and know, and has granted this perfect healing in the sight of you all.” There Peter tries to prove Christ’s resurrection by calling the senses themselves most clear witnesses of the truth. Nor was it in vain: many of his hearers believed. The brothers are then confirmed by natural reason. The Gospel does not say “with signs preceding” but “with signs following,” nor “with the word introducing” but “confirming,” Marci, final chapter. Thus Hieronymus notes in cap. 8 Matth. that after the Lord’s sermon on the mount he performed a remarkable miracle so that the preceding sermon might be confirmed for his hearers. Moreover, when Peter wanted to persuade the faithful of the conclusion about the legal observances, which was disputed at the Council, he said: “God, who knows hearts, bore witness by giving them the Holy Spirit,” and so forth. Immediately the whole assembly fell silent, and they listened to Barnabas and Paulus recounting all the signs God had done among the gentiles. Thus external events and the testimony of the senses are cited even in a dispute of faith to be resolved among Catholics. The apostles would never have issued at that Council the law about abstaining from blood, things strangled, food sacrificed to idols, and fornication if they had not followed natural reason. No testimonies were available that seemed suitable to prove that law. Therefore a theologian may use human reasoning not only with outsiders, whose sole guide is nature, but also with those within the Church. This is especially true, as we have said, when he wishes to persuade others or ourselves about things knowable by the light of nature. Barnabas and Paulus took this path, as we read in Act. 14. When the priest and people wanted to sacrifice to Barnabas and Paulus, contrary to natural reason, they also opposed them by natural reasoning: “Men, why are you doing these things? We too are mortal, human like you, and we announce to you that you should turn from these vanities to the living God, who made heaven and earth and the sea and all that is in them. He did not leave himself without witness, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons,” and so forth. Since natural things bear witness to God, as the Apostle asserts here, it is not absurd but entirely fitting that a theologian, even when discussing divine things, should use such testimonies from natural things.
For in Act. 17 Paulus likewise proves that God needs nothing, since he is Lord of heaven and earth and himself gives everyone life, breath, and everything. He also proves that God is not far from any one of us, because “in him we live and move and are.” The Prophet in Psal. 138 shows that God knows us and our inmost parts, for he formed us and laid his hand upon us. You find the same natural argument in Psal. 93. From these matters, briefly discussed, we can understand what we said earlier: if unbelievers are teachable, reason attracts and invites them to the faith; if they are already faithful, it strengthens them. Both groups can be persuaded about matters of nature. If, however, they are unteachable and resistant, natural reason is also effective in overcoming them. The rulers and elders saw Peter’s steadfastness and learned that Peter and Ioannes were unlettered and untrained, and they were amazed; seeing the man who had been healed standing with them, they could say nothing in opposition. The blind man in Ioannes also confounds the Jews who opposed Christ with an argument from nature, saying: “This is truly astonishing: you do not know where he is from, and he has opened my eyes.” In Matth. 12 the Lord refutes those who slandered him for healing a sick man on the Sabbath with natural reasoning and an example. In Matth. 22 he refutes the Sadducaei by setting down two principles. One was the testimony of Exodus: “I am the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Iacob.” Once this was established and approved by the agreement of his opponents, Christ drew on another principle from natural reason, namely, that God is not of the dead but of the living. By this syllogism he concluded that the souls of Abraham, Isaac, and Iacob live; the Sadducaei rejected this and consequently denied the resurrection of the dead. Natural arguments are therefore very powerful against adversaries of the faith. They are not Saul’s weapons, which burden Christ’s champion more than they help him, as some argue foolishly by allegory. If we must use allegories, they are instead Goliath’s sword: once you wrest it from their hands, you slay them with their own sword. But they say: “If I believe what has been handed down, why do I need laborious disputation? If I do not believe, no human argument will persuade me.” They want to obscure an otherwise most evident matter with a clever dilemma. “I do not believe, so I am persuaded; I believe, so I am confirmed; I resist, so I am confounded”—with reason not as mistress but as servant, and with the syllogism not presiding but serving. Why say more? Do we not see that the letters of the other apostles, and especially those of Paulus, both overthrow their adversaries and instruct the faithful not only through the testimonies of Scripture but also through natural reasoning? Since this is beyond doubt, let it stand that this manner of discussion came from Christ the Lord, was taken up by the apostles, confirmed by holy authors, and is used by theologians not only usefully but necessarily.