De locis theologicis

To return to what we said about the agreement of ecclesiastical authors: Clemens Alexandrinus, lib. 1 Strom., agrees with us and offers many reasons why philosophy is necessary for a theologian. One is to teach philosophers; for we are taught by a similar

example. Just as the Apostle became a Hebrew to the Hebrews, and indeed all things to all people, so that he might win them all, a teacher of theology must become a philosopher to philosophers, so as to win them over more suitably and easily. One must offer each person what is fitting and familiar to him, so that he may come to the faith of truth by way of what is proper to him. He takes up this reason again in lib. 5 Strom. He offers a second reason: to refute sophists. For how can we refute the deceptive quibbles of philosophers unless we pursue the art of arguing and refuting? Third, a teacher’s varied and manifold learning delights, inspires admiration, and so wins over his listeners. What is supported in many different ways by many kinds of argument takes firmer hold in the minds of students. The Apostle also says he teaches in all wisdom, to present every person perfect in Christ. “In all wisdom,” he says, that is, divine and human, so that he might affect and perfect in Christ people of every kind. The Queen also stood at Christ’s right hand, clothed in variety. Further, just as fire is produced by striking iron and flint, so truth is drawn out through the debates and discussions of the most learned people. For this reason Cicero says he approved the Peripatetics’ custom of arguing both sides of every question. Discussions among people untrained in human disciplines are usually most inept. If philosophy were useless to a wise person, why would God have given it to Salomon? God gave him true knowledge of the things that exist, so that he might know the structure of the world, the powers of the elements, the divisions of time, the courses of the stars, the natures of animals, the force of winds, and the differences among plants. If the Lord teaches knowledge of these things, and God truly teaches what is useful, as Isaias says, then this knowledge cannot be harmful to a theologian but must instead be suitable. And if, as Salomon says, it is true knowledge, what will Luther say, since he declares all speculative disciplines to be empty errors and deceptions? Clemens goes on to argue that an athlete who has not first trained for the contest is rightly despised. Thus, whoever is not equipped with manifold learning to contend against the many kinds of adversaries of the faith is not worthy to be counted among accomplished theologians. Moreover, he says, a theologian must distinguish ambiguous words found in Scripture, lest he both deceive and be deceived through ambiguity. He cannot do this without the help of grammar. But if grammar is admitted, why not dialectic? Why not philosophy? Do grammarians want to claim theology for themselves alone and exclude everyone else—dialecticians, natural philosophers, astronomers, geometers—from sharing in it? Since this is plainly absurd, we must admit that human disciplines are very useful to a theologian. “Even if they are not,” says Clemens, “it is still necessary to learn them, so that they may properly be condemned.” For how can we pass judgment on things we have not examined and do not know? Thus far we have followed Clemens Alexandrinus, not as interpreters but, as we usually do with others, exercising our own judgment and discretion, drawing from his sources as far as and in the manner that seems appropriate. As Eusebius reports in lib. 6 Ecclesiast. hist., cap. 15, Origines replied to those who disparaged the study of philosophy that he had pursued it diligently, but not without the example of very distinguished men—Panthaenus, Heracla, and others like them—who, although they were apostolic teachers, nevertheless used to read the books of philosophers and practice the study of philosophy. Eusebius also reports that Origines had the custom

of giving to any gifted young Christians he saw the same things philosophers usually teach their pupils as elementary studies. He used to say that the faithful gained no small benefit in understanding Scripture if they trained in the liberal arts and philosophical literature. For the Greeks had anticipated some parts of our philosophy, and truth should not abandon its own parts merely because falsehood had seized them first. See also Eusebius, lib. 4, cap. 7, and Sozomenus, lib. 3 Hist. suae, cap. 15. Theodoretus, too, lib. 8 Hist. tripart., cap. 8, reports that Didymus learned grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the syllogisms of Aristoteles, because these would be weapons of truth against falsehood. For enemies are forcefully defeated when we use their own weapons against them. So Socrates, lib. 3, cap. 16, and Damasus, lib. 4, cap. 18. Do not immediately be misled by the mistaken opinion that this is permitted against enemies but must be avoided in other discussions; for, as Hieronymus says to Magnus, nearly all the books of the teachers of the Church are full of this kind of learning. When Theodoretus says in the same place that truth—that is, the truth of faith—is not taught by these disciplines, he means that the Gospel is not propped up by them as if with beams, nor does proof of Catholic truth depend on them. Otherwise, most distinguished men would not have used natural arguments to support even the particular matters of our faith and religion. We have examples in Eusebius, lib. 3 Hist. eccles., cap. 25 and lib. 9, cap. 8; also Melito, cited by the same author, lib. 4, cap. 26; Iustinus, also according to Eusebius, lib. 4, cap. 8; Tertullianus in Apolog., which Eusebius also reports in lib. 2, cap. 24; and finally the martyr Lucianus, a man of great learning, according to the same Eusebius, lib. 9, cap. 6. I do not cite Damascenus, lib. 4, cap. 4; Epiphanius, Haeresi 76; Augustinus, lib. 1 De mo. Eccles. and all of the first book Adversus Cresconium, who condemns dialectic in Augustinus as a grammarian, or De util. cre., cap. 97, and Contra epist. Funda., cap. 4, and 18 De civit., cap. 41; nor Beda, 37 dist., cap. Turbatur; nor Hieronymus, same distinction, cap. Si quis artem and cap. Qui de mensa; nor the Synodus of Pope Eugenius, cap. De quibusdam; nor Clemens, cap. Relatum. I do not cite these and many others because in the following books I will pursue this argument more carefully. This much is clear: the most distinguished men used human arguments not only to support what agrees with natural reason but also what surpasses the light of nature, and used them to defend the Christian religion against the attacks of pagans. ^{1 2}