De locis theologicis

We therefore regard it as a grave error to close our ears to the arguments of nature whenever theologians put them forward. For if a theologian sometimes philosophizes about human matters—and surely he does, unless we suppose his humanity has been rooted out—what reason, I ask, is there to banish natural arguments from theology, lest theology, being divine, seem to have needed human supports? Let us say it does not need them; it is contained within its own, as it were, divine lines. But do we want the theologian, who knows only divine matters, to err, stumble, be blind, and go astray in human matters? What difference, with reason

of the mind removed, would there be—not merely between a rustic and a theologian, but between a theologian and a beast, a stone, a stump, or anything of that sort? What sort of mind—or rather, human reason—would a person have if he had neither philosophy nor dialectic nor any discipline of human reason at all? Teachers of Christian doctrine should be understood to be clothed, as it were, in two persons. One is common to them, because we all share in reason, from which every natural argument is drawn and by which the method of discovering a natural argument is sought. The other is attributed specifically to theologians, from which arguments proper to the theological discipline are expected. If the theologian wishes, let him lay aside the person of a human being when he treats divine matters; but when he treats human matters, what folly, I ask, would it be to strip the human being away from a human? Indeed, in any discussion, whether about human or divine matters, it would be most foolish to lay aside either person. What could be more foolish than to cast away the foot when the head performs its office, or to remove the head when the foot performs its own? The foot does not hinder the head, nor the head the foot. Indeed, as the Apostle warns, the head cannot say to the feet, “You are not necessary to me.” Since neither understanding human matters impedes knowledge of divine matters nor knowledge of divine matters impedes understanding of human matters, we should not abandon either in the proper exercise of the other, unless we wish to be foolish. Moreover, someone who establishes theology in such a way that it has no connection with natural reason, and measures all the doctrines of this excellent discipline solely by belief in Scripture, if he persists in that opinion and is not sometimes overcome by the goodness of nature, can cultivate and defend neither theology nor faith nor humanity. Not humanity, for we must often say that humanity is rooted out without reason: those who take rational disciplines away from a theologian deprive him of his own reason. If you remove from reason the truth found in the disciplines and in human understanding, it will surely collapse—or rather, cease to exist. Nor can faith defend itself alone, without learning and reason. Once philosophy and every rational method of disputation have been removed, a holy rusticity remains with faith; as Hieronymus writes to Paulinus, it benefits life through merit as much as it harms through simplicity if it does not resist its adversaries. Faith will therefore waver unless the believer is prepared, as Petrus says, to give a reason; this cannot be done by faith alone, without reason. Finally, theology cannot exist apart from natural reason. Since a human being is rational, reasoning is innate in him, whether he thinks through something by himself or with another, and whether he wishes to know human or divine matters. Therefore, when people discuss things, they neither should nor can reject natural reason unless they cease to be human. Reason embraces all things; wherever you turn, it is present and cannot be excluded from any discussion. Therefore, those who want natural reason removed from theology also exclude every discussion from theology, even though without discussion one cannot distinguish or grasp what is true in any matter. So, I think it is established that reason, the source of every discussion given by nature, is necessary among theologians. Moreover, grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, and nature does not reject grace but receives it. Sacred theology, therefore, will not reject the reason of human nature. As we said elsewhere, many things are also contained in the principles of theology which cannot be understood and explained without the intervention of natural reason and inference. It would be foolish to remain fixed on the principles themselves and turn the eye away from their consequences and contradictions. If you remove reason from theology, theology itself loses both its substance and its name.

For, if you wish to interpret the word, theology is nothing other than speech and reasoning about God. If you ask about the thing itself, it is, as the ancient theologians define it, knowledge of divine matters. But, as Aristoteles demonstrated, knowledge is acquired only through syllogism. If we add what may rightly be added—that there is scarcely anything not mentioned in Sacred Scripture, not an angel, soul, air, fire, water, heaven, or earth—then surely we must concede that, if the theologian wishes to explain these matters elegantly and learnedly, he must possess philosophy, that is, understanding of such things. Whoever removes philosophy from theology thus removes its greatest adornment, the philosophy by which even divine Scripture, let alone human reason, is cultivated. In my opinion, all theological instruction needs the help of human reason, but especially instruction that discusses matters of nature, which are discussed very often. I will set aside the fact that sacred teaching prescribes morals in keeping with the moderation of nature and refutes vices opposed to reason. Whether you define these things in the schools or persuade the people in a sermon to do what is right and avoid what is wrong, it would be madness to scorn the aid of nature, reason, and philosophy. It is nevertheless clear that Sacred Scripture contains many things that cannot be explained without the support of philosophy, arithmetic, geometry, geography, and astronomy. The Sacred Books are full of examples, especially when Solomon, David, Job, and the other prophets often cite what might be called wonders of nature, explained by human disciplines, to commend divine power or wisdom. Since we will pursue this matter fully and carefully in the thirteenth book, I do not wish to explain it at present. For now it is enough to have shown that human arguments are not only useful but necessary for the human theologian. A human being who removes all reason and establishes everything as a theologian solely on authority cannot possibly exist. The harmful criticism of something so necessary is therefore all the more blameworthy. There is one philosophy concerning human matters, whose usefulness the ecclesiastical writers all affirm with one voice, although the Lutherans despise it and call it a kind of deceit and display. Those who say this either do not think they are saying anything contrary to the reason of nature, or they think they are waging war against the gods like giants—that is, resisting nature. If they do not think they teach anything that conflicts with reason, what can you discuss with them, when they fail to understand that depriving the human theologian of natural reason is contrary to reason? But if they do think it conflicts with reason, they are shamefully mistaken to believe they can persuade a rational human being of an error contrary to reason. Let them go, then; since they do not wish to reason or philosophize with human beings, let them introduce themselves and their theology to someone of the race of beasts—for some people are beasts in fact, not merely in name.