De locis theologicis

The second error belongs to those who define everything solely by the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, or sometimes also by those of the ancient writers, and shun arguments from nature as if they were hostile and opposed to theology. They support this error with many testimonies.

First argument. The first witness cited is Gregorius Nazianzenus, Orat. 1 in Iulianum, where he says our discipline is Pythagorean. Among the Pythagoreans, however, authority alone could carry such prior weight that it prevailed without reason. The second witness is Hieronymus in cap. 10 Matth., where he does not want teachers of the Gospel to rely on the support of human reasoning, because, as he says, it is like a reed staff: if you lean on it even a little, it breaks and pierces the hand of the one leaning on it. In cap. 31 Ieremiae he says that to argue about God’s words according to human understanding is sacrilege. The third is Augustinus, lib. 1 De actis cum Felice Manichaeo, cap. 10. When Felix the Manichaean boasted that he had taught his disciples the beginning, middle, and end, and how or why the world was made, the courses of the sun and moon, and other such physical matters, Augustinus replied that the Paraclete Spirit does not teach these truths. He wishes to make Christians, not mathematicians. It is enough for people to know about these things for human purposes what they learned in school before converting to the religion of Christ. “For human purposes,” he says; therefore, human reasoning and learning will be of no use to a Catholic for theology. Gratianus also cites two testimonies at 37 dist., one from Ambrosius and the other from the fourth Concilium Carthaginense, which seem to urge that human disciplines be kept out of theology as harmful or at least useless. The Concilium Carthaginense quartum forbids bishops to read the books of pagans. Ambrosius says astrology and other disciplines of this sort have no value for salvation but lead people into error. Epiphanius, too, arguing against Aetius at Haeresi 76, says that God does not reveal the Father and the Son through the Holy Spirit to those who reason about him by syllogisms. Those who bring human reasoning into theology, then, cannot share in divine revelation. Second argument. They abuse not only the testimonies of the fathers but also those of Sacred Scripture in support of their error. First they cite Ecclesiast. 1: “I resolved in my heart to seek and investigate wisely all that is done under the sun. God has given the children of men this most miserable occupation, to be occupied in it. I saw all that is done under the sun, and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit.” If the study of human letters is a most miserable occupation, if it is vanity and vexation of spirit, theologians surely should not pursue it. Third argument. Next, they argue from Proverb. 5: “Do not attend to the deceit of a woman, for the lips of a harlot drip with honey,” and so forth. Later it says: “Why are you seduced, my son, by a stranger?” and so forth. They interpret this as human wisdom, which the Apostle testifies is deceitful in Coloss. 2, in these words: “See that no one deceive you through philosophy and empty deceit.” Fourth argument. They add the passage from 1 ad Corinth. 1: “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and reject the prudence of the prudent. Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the investigator of this age? Has God not made the wisdom of this world foolish?” They also add another passage from the same Apostle, 1 Corinth. 8: “Knowledge puffs up”; and another from 1 ad Timotheum 6: “If anyone does not assent to sound words and to the teaching that accords with piety, he is proud, knowing nothing, but sick with questions.” Here they want the Apostle to mean that human disciplines are diseases and only the teaching of Christ is sound: that this teaching accords with piety, that is, conforms and agrees with religion, while the others do not. Fifth argument. Moreover, the apostles did not have philosophy; therefore it is not necessary for a theologian. For if the Holy Spirit taught the apostles all truth, as the Lord promised in Ioannis 16, and did not teach them these disciplines, it follows that they are not useful to a Christian teacher and do not even concern truth. ¹

Moreover, philosophy is either necessary for a theologian when he instructs the imperfect in the Church or when he addresses the perfect. The Apostle gives milk to the imperfect and thinks he knows nothing among them except Christ, and him crucified. But to the perfect he speaks wisdom—not the wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age, that is, of philosophers. Therefore, a theologian does not need philosophy, whether he speaks divine words to children or to those advanced. Sixth argument. They also argue that if philosophy were useful and necessary for a theologian, this would be chiefly because philosophers who oppose Christ could be refuted in no better way. But this is plainly most foolish: first, because the Cross of Christ would be emptied, as the Apostle says, if he triumphed over philosophers and sophists by human wisdom; and again, because, as the same Apostle teaches in 2 ad Corinth. 10, the weapons of Christian warfare are not carnal but powerful through God for destroying strongholds, overthrowing arguments and every height raised against the knowledge of God, and taking every thought captive in obedience to Christ. Therefore, a theologian, a soldier of Christ, does not need the support of human disciplines to overcome the adversaries of the faith. This is easily demonstrated by the example of the Concilium Nicaenum, where the sincere faith of a simple man proved more powerful in overcoming the philosopher than all the subtleties of dialecticians and philosophers together. Certainly Hieronymus, in his letter to Pammachius against the errors of Ioannes, says that arguments drawn from reason and flowing from a pagan source should be laid down by a Christian as pagan weapons. Finally, they also argue that Christ’s teaching is perfect and therefore does not need the support of philosophy.