De locis theologicis

Even after establishing this, it is not yet clear how interpreters and teachers of law can help theologians in their discussions, or what arguments their authority supplies for theological disputation. Since no one has touched on this even briefly, I shall explain it as best I can, perhaps without polish but clearly enough to be understood. Pontifical-law volumes address various subjects. First, they profess and explain Catholic faith, as in titu. de sum. trini. Next, they define conduct and Christian religion insofar as evangelical law or natural reason permits, as in titu. de usura, de iureiurando, de divortiis, de symonia. They also discuss ecclesiastical conduct, religious ceremonies, and Church ministers’ offices insofar as these are arranged by positive laws. We willingly use school terminology and do not fear grammarians’ censures. Otherwise, as Aristoteles says, weighty matters are sometimes disfigured by verbal polish and excessive attention to ornament. This is why I use the school’s familiar speech, lest scholastic theologians rightly laugh at me as they do at those who speak the purest Latin. Yet I know serious judgments in rough words especially offend refined ears, so I generally use a clean style, neither irritating nor over-elaborate, just enough to avoid rustic carelessness. To the point: I have called human laws about ecclesiastical rites and conduct “positive.” Many occur in titu. de celebra. Missa., de cleri. peregrini. coniugatis, etc.; c. de aetate et qualit. ordin.; de obser. ieiun.; lib. I Decre., de officiis iudicum; and lib. 2, de ordine iudiciario. Finally, pontifical laws prescribe penalties for violators of evangelical, natural, or ecclesiastical laws, as in titu. de esco., de rapto, de apost., de haereti. First conclusion. On this basis: in matters of faith, a theologian does not need jurists’ authority. Rather, a jurist must borrow from a theologian the exposition of titles that decide matters of faith. The reason is plain. If Pontiffs or councils in legal volumes define anything concerning faith, they must, as we explained elsewhere, have gathered it not from their own understanding but from Scripture and the traditions of Christ and the Apostles. The principles from which they decide questions of faith properly belong to theology, whose task is to know what God revealed and what follows from those principles or ^{1 2 3}

From this disagreement it is plainly established that in such matters the interpretation of the sacred canons must be sought from theologians, not jurists. The fathers, to whom knowledge of the faith has been entrusted, readily acknowledge this. For no one is condemned on a charge of heresy before theologians have defined that the matter under judgment is heresy. Since this is so, I do not see why our own people now allow theologians the last part, if not no part at all, in examining questions of faith, while jurists receive the first part or even all of it. The chief task in this examination is to determine what heresy is, what makes someone a heretic, what the faith holds, what conflicts with the faith, and how far the defendant’s claim opposes sound and Catholic teaching. The commonwealth has appointed judges to determine the defendants’ penalties, which is the later task; but for the earlier and more serious task in a matter of faith, the commonwealth has no theologians appointed as senators, whose judgment of guilt jurists might follow when they judge penalties. May Christ, whose cause this is, grant that Christian princes, who are usually eager to support this work by which faith and religion are upheld, complete what they have begun and add the most esteemed theologians—indeed, the most esteemed—to the highest tribunal, so that this divine matter may be governed to perfection. If this is done for the Church, nothing will be lacking in the most holy and especially necessary office of the Inquisition. But enough about the first conclusion. Let us now proceed to the rest. Second conclusion. Even in matters of morals, insofar as either evangelical law or philosophical reason prescribes on such matters, the authority of jurists can contribute little or certainly nothing to the theologian. On the contrary, jurists must borrow from theologians a sound and correct understanding of these matters. Just as a musician takes the rationale of his conclusions from the arithmetician, because those conclusions derive from the principles of arithmetic, so too the theologian will recognize as received from proper principles, and will understand and interpret more correctly, any moral teachings that canon law derives either from the Gospel or from philosophy. From this it is easy to infer that certain jurists are in great error and ignorance of the truth when they assert that, in matters of usury, simony, and others of this kind involving mortal sin, one should consult jurists rather than theologians. Ancharranus held this error in the disputation beginning Antiquis et modernis temporibus; Ioannes de Anania in cap. In civitate, De usuris; Alexander in consilio primo; Alvarus Pelagius, li. 2 art. 20; and Hostiensis in cap. penul., De aeta. et quali. ordi. Yet they are not difficult to refute. Since knowledge of Sacred Scripture properly belongs to the theologian, whatever about morals is contained in Sacred Scripture or can be derived from it by a certain connection, wherever a theologian finds it, he will claim as his own, while the jurist will borrow it as another’s. Again, since theologians also possess the principles of philosophy—for they discuss at length virtues and vices, the end of human life, and the actions by which that end is reached, and build the structure of morals on foundations laid in these matters—whatever law prescribes about morals on principles established by natural reason, the theologian will surely claim by his own right and will hand it on, explained and clarified, to jurists. Third conclusion. In the third class of matters, where the customs of the Church and the institutions of religion are determined only by pontifical laws, and also in the final class, where legal penalties are prescribed, the common agreement and harmonious ^{4 5}

judgment of all jurists should inspire great confidence in the theologian whenever a question about such matters arises. For example, if it is in doubt whether a particular person is irregular, excommunicated, under interdict, or suspended; likewise, whether a delegate can subdelegate, whether a bishop can dispense in this or that matter, to use the language of the schools, whether a shepherd of the Church was duly elected, or whether an ecclesiastical judge lawfully decided a case in court. In these and hundreds of other matters of this kind, a theologian would be most arrogant if he judged what he does not know, and even more arrogant if, after consulting jurists, he opposed the authority of them all. For, as we have often said elsewhere, no one has more certain and better expertise in any matter than those skilled in that very matter. Therefore, one must trust the most learned in their own art. It would surely be rash not to trust those learned in pontifical law about matters proper to that discipline. Further, in interpreting canons of this sort, the Church’s judges and officials embrace the unanimous judgment of all jurists. For if anyone were guided by his own opinion, rather than the common judgment of all jurists, in ecclesiastical proceedings or courts, the Church would surely discipline him by its own judgment. Thus, by approving the practice of judges, the Church seems also to approve the understanding of those whom the judges follow in administering the Church. Nor is it an unreasonable inference that Christ the Lord is in some way present to experts in this law as they interpret ecclesiastical laws. Since the sacred canons were issued for the Church’s benefit at the prompting of the Holy Spirit, as Pope Damasus defines, it is fitting that the Church, which needs those canons in order to be governed in religion and ecclesiastical morals, has received from God sound interpreters of the laws and institutions by which it is administered. For it would have been of little use to have dead laws written on parchment if the Christian commonwealth had no living interpreters to grasp their correct meaning. Since God does not fail in what is necessary, he has poured out the spirit of truth not only on theologians but also on experts in pontifical law. Therefore, from the unanimous judgment of all, a theologian may draw a most probable argument for deciding questions that arise in the two classes of matters placed second. Many questions will arise in both classes, and theologians must know their resolution, especially those who hear the confessions of laypeople and clergy, or teach theology in universities. Since they bear the great responsibility of answering questions about many matters that depend on law, they will sometimes err dangerously and shamefully if they neglect the answers and rulings of jurists. Questions brought to experts in their respective arts are answered with little or certainly no danger. I think I have said enough about the seventh source. Now let us refute the arguments of our opponents.

ON THE EIGHTH SOURCE, WHICH CONTAINS ARGUMENTS FROM NATURAL REASON