De locis theologicis

To refute the first argument, nothing needs to be added to what has already been said. For, I think, we have shown that the Church’s and sacred Scripture’s testimony is not lacking for upholding scholastic theology. We have already brought forward the testimonies we have, and perhaps more and weightier ones will be brought forward later by others. The second argument has likewise been refuted. We have said—and although we have said it often, it must still be said again—that factions in the school, as if sworn together, a desire to contradict, and similar evils arise from the faults of people, not the school. Otherwise, many decrees among the scholastics are certain and firm, all the more so because no faction has ever called them into question. The third argument, however, is very difficult and requires considerable inquiry. If the difficulty of this argument demands a longer discussion, the Reader should not be troubled: the length of the speech will be balanced by the greatness of its benefit. First, I would have all theologians warned to set aside not only their inclinations but also the prejudices of their opinions, and to judge matters of faith prudently and seriously. For if something has become customary in the school, even in good times, it must not immediately be regarded as a dogma of faith. Some people, however, pass judgment on the most serious matters with a certain rashness and without judgment, carried by the opinions with which they were imbued from the beginning, as if by a sudden wind. Their judgment would be quite different if they had made it carefully and steadily. They first err by failing to distinguish the school’s opinions from its certain and established decrees. They also err by confusing two kinds of things: one kind consists of matters that concern religion, the other of matters that do not touch it at all.

If, as was established in the preceding book, we are not to follow and hold the consensus of the ancient saints in every question of law but only in the rule of faith, and if not every common opinion of theirs, even on a serious matter, binds the faithful, but only a firm and settled judgment, what should we say about the more recent theologians of the school, whom those ancients far surpassed in merit of life, use of Scripture, and weight of authority? I need not say what many devout men want me to mention about these matters; although the case calls for it, it does not demand it, so I shall pass it over. Since I have often given examples of both errors, and will add various ones in book 12, I shall now be content with one, which will be enough to warn those who are accustomed to be rash in theological censures. The Master of the Sentences said that the sacrament of baptism was instituted by Christ before his death and was administered by Christ himself and by the Apostles. D. Thomas and the other scholastic theologians agreed with him. The Master was evidently following Divus Augustinus, whose opinions the school gladly embraces. But if someone happened to think that baptism of the new law, a true and proper sacrament, was not instituted by Christ until after he had suffered on the cross, we should not immediately harass him with a grave theological censure. First we should consider whether the theologians on this point define something in their own judgment as a certain and settled matter, or instead offer a probable opinion on something not yet sufficiently investigated. We should then examine whether it pertains to the Catholic faith that Christ instituted this sacrament before his Passion or not. The Master of the Sentences states nothing with certainty, but chooses the more probable opinion: “It is more conveniently said,” and so on. Augustinus too says: “Christ baptized, not by himself but through his disciples.” We understand that they had already been baptized, either with the baptism of Ioannes, as some think, or, what is more credible, with the baptism of Christ. Here Augustinus does not state with certainty that the Apostles had been baptized with Christ’s baptism before administering the baptism mentioned in Ioannes, chapters 3 and 4. Indeed, he teaches everywhere that we do not know when the Apostles were baptized. It is not at all plausible that if the Apostles were already ministers of the true sacrament of baptism, they had not first received that same sacrament. It follows that both opinions are held with neither a weak nor a firm and settled decree. Moreover, scholastics disagree even about the form of that baptism. The Master and Adrianus think the Apostles baptized then in the name of the Trinity, something I cannot persuade myself to believe. Others teach that they baptized in the name of Iesus Christus, which is more plausible. Such disagreement about the form of baptism is foreign to the certainty of dogma. The theologians therefore did not intend to establish anything certain about this matter. The words of Divus Thomas do not indicate anything else, if read attentively. “It seems,” he says, “that baptism was instituted before the Passion of Christ,” and so on. Divus Thomas generally uses this word when the matter is not clear and settled. I therefore think that when D. Thomas said “it seems,” he meant exactly that: it only seems so, not that it must be so. What would an otherwise prudent and serious man have defined about a matter he understood did not pertain to faith? For it cannot be established with certainty from sacred writings or the institutions of the Apostles that the baptism in use among the Apostles immediately after their conversion remitted sins and conferred grace.

For the words Augustinus cites, “He who has bathed needs only to wash his feet, but is entirely clean,” should not be understood about cleansing through baptism, but about what follows: “You are already clean because of the word that I have spoken to you.” What some cite—“I did not know him; but he who sent me to baptize in water told me, ‘The one on whom you see the Spirit descending and remaining is he who baptizes in the Holy Spirit’”—does not compel this conclusion either; even those who misuse that testimony readily admit as much. It is established that the Apostles baptized in Ioannes 3 and 4, and, as is well known, not with the baptism of Ioannes; therefore, they baptized with Christ’s baptism. This is the Master’s argument. But the argument is too weak and uncertain to establish anything firm and certain. For “the baptism of Ioannes” can be understood in two ways: as baptism administered at the institution and by the authority of Ioannes, or as baptism with water, such as Ioannes’s baptism was, namely a kind of meditation and preparation for the sacrament of the new law. “The baptism of Christ” can likewise mean either baptism administered at Christ’s command and by his authority, or baptism instituted by Christ to wash away sins. It can therefore be said, without absurdity, that the baptism of the Apostles mentioned in Ioannes 3 and 4 was not that of Ioannes the Baptist in the first sense, but only in the second. It was Christ’s baptism because the Apostles baptized by his command and authority. If someone concludes from this that it was already the true sacrament of the new law, he will by the same reasoning argue that the anointing used by the Apostles before the Passion was from the beginning the true and proper sacrament of extreme unction. Some theologians have asserted this, but it is not settled. Among serious and genuine theologians, it is a dogma of faith that extreme unction is a sacrament; they consider it irrelevant whether it was instituted before or after Christ’s Passion. They think the same about the sacraments of confirmation and penance. I do not see why we should think differently about baptism or suppose that it is a question of faith whether this sacrament was instituted before Christ’s Passion. It is easy to say that it was instituted, and theologians generally speak that way; but who has shown this to be true with suitable arguments? Moreover, Theophylactus in his commentary on Ioannes 3 and Chrysostomus, homilia in Ioannem 28, explicitly deny that the baptism we are discussing was a sacrament that remitted sins and conferred grace. Hieronymus, in his dialogue against the Luciferians, after distinguishing two baptisms, perfect and imperfect, teaches clearly enough that before the Cross and Resurrection there was no perfect baptism; Ioannes’s baptism was therefore imperfect. Leo, in his letter to the bishops of Sicily, also seems entirely to support those who maintained that the sacrament of baptism was issued and established not when Christ was baptized by Ioannes but after the Resurrection. I have said these things, candid Reader, not to disapprove of the school’s common opinions. For we use that theology most in which matters that do not differ greatly from the common opinion are stated. What, then, is my point? First, we want an opinion to be distinguished and recognized as distinct from a dogma. Second, theologians must be warned to pronounce on these matters not from a passing and temporary inclination of the mind, but with a mature judgment, especially when it cannot readily be determined whether they pertain to faith. ¹

For if we wished to add to the example just given the arguments and scriptural testimonies by which the opposing side might attack the school’s common opinion, the question might become so ambiguous on both sides that it would be difficult to judge which agrees more with faith and religion. But, as I said, I am not now disputing whether the school’s common opinion is true or false. Although this may not be entirely outside my purpose, I am concerned to show that scholastic opinions must be distinguished from decrees, and questions of faith from those matters that shift this way and that and can be disputed on either side without loss of piety. We must hold decrees firmly and defend them carefully; opinions are different. They should be held not with the Academic but with Christian restraint. Fight for the faith, even at risk of life; if you wish, fight for matters that are not of faith, but let the fight be bloodless. Anyone who observes these rules may argue nobly, seriously, and with spirit; may judge steadfastly; and may do so truly and usefully for both the learned and the unlearned. “Why,” you will ask, “have these matters been repeated at such length, not only far from the topic but with such long detours?” To explain what was stated briefly in the conclusions of the preceding chapter: we have sworn allegiance not to the school’s opinions but to its certain and settled judgments on faith and morals. This topic must defend those judgments; the opinions belong to another place and time. With these points explained, the third argument can, I think, readily be refuted. I deny that the school has by a certain and settled decree established that marriage contracted without a minister of the Church is truly and properly a sacrament. I deny that the matter pertains to faith and religion. I deny that all the school’s theologians have asserted it. Once I establish these three points, the argument will have been refuted in every respect. I will therefore show first that this common opinion is not a firm dogma or judgment of the school. How can this be understood? Because the theologians discuss this matter in such a way that they do not seem to want to settle anything. Read the Master, D. Thomas, Scotus, Bonaventura, Richardus, Paludanus, Durandus, and the other scholastic theologians; if you do not immediately find their minds hanging and wavering, then judge me foolish or rash. When they ask whether marriage confers grace—the point that most needed to be settled there—they do not define it, but instead report the views held by people. They are likewise so inconsistent and varied, so uncertain and ambiguous, in determining the matter and form of this sacrament, that anyone would be foolish to try to establish anything certain, settled, and verified amid such diversity and disagreement. If theologians speak ambiguously and inconsistently, and define nothing, about the form and matter of the sacrament, one of the most serious matters in the treatment of the sacraments, why should we admit that they prescribed something certain on a question that is less important and less necessary to the constitution of this sacrament? The Council of Florence certainly prescribed nothing about the matter, form, or minister of the sacrament of marriage. It would undoubtedly have done so, as it did for all the other sacraments of the Church, if it had seen that the theologians had established anything about these matters in the school. Further, theologians neither explicitly and properly raised the question whether marriage without an ecclesiastical minister is a sacrament of the new law, nor investigated it by the method and reasoning they usually use, nor concluded it with any arguments. Anyone who wants to say they pronounced with certainty on theological matters without careful inquiry, diligent treatment, or suitable arguments should take care not to insult them and at the same time undermine the credibility of the most serious matters. ²

Add that in the writings of councils and decretal letters of Supreme Pontiffs, not every simple affirmation or denial is a certain and established judgment. Certain distinctive marks let us recognize the definite decisions of councils and Pontiffs, as was explained more fully in book 5; we must use these marks, even more carefully, to distinguish the school’s decrees. Otherwise, if every simple assertion of scholastics were a certain dogma of faith, their authority would be greater than that of Pontiffs and councils. Since no one can prove this, everyone must accept at least that theologians defined absolutely nothing on this question. They neither called the contrary opinion heretical or erroneous nor said that what they asserted must be firmly embraced by Catholics; in short, they gave none of the signs that usually indicate certain and settled judgments. Thus what first had to be established has been: on the matter we are discussing, theologians decreed nothing with certainty or constancy; through uncertain and inconsistent opinion, the others followed the probable view of one man. Their common agreement may therefore have arisen by chance. The opposite could also have happened: if the first had asserted that not every marriage of the faithful is a sacrament, but only one solemnly and sacredly constituted, the second, third, and the rest might have followed the same opinion because it too was probable. It follows that I must show that whatever theologians happen to think, it does not pertain to faith whether a marriage of this sort is or is not a sacrament of the Church. One argument, I think, settles this easily and clearly. Three things establish that something pertains to faith: it is written in the sacred books, handed down in apostolic institutions, or clearly inferred from certain premises and consequences of either kind. None of these can establish that a marriage contracted without a minister and sacred rites is a sacrament of the new law. Even if all the Thomists and Scotists stood against me, and younger theologians joined the ancients in fighting me, I would still prevail. Not everything, as some think, depends on theologians’ authority. There is a truth so evident that nothing can weaken it. Let those who would speak against me test their strength; when sacred Scripture, apostolic traditions, and the school’s syllogisms have failed them in this case, they will understand with me, unless unlearned and dull, that this question does not pertain to faith. Someone may argue that the marriage of the faithful is a sacrament of the new law, and there is no greater reason for one marriage than another; therefore every marriage of the faithful is a sacrament. Would such a person be called a theologian, or even worthy of the name? Reasoning in this way would make him neither theologian nor philosopher nor even dialectician. Do serious theologians reason so? Do they decide matters of faith on these arguments? I know baptism is a sacrament, but without sacred form or minister it is baptism, not a sacrament. I acknowledge the sacrament of unction, but without sacred form and a minister of the Church there may be an anointing, not a sacrament. I embrace the sacrament of penance, but without sacred form and minister I find penance, not a sacrament. ^{3 4}

Thus, although marriage is a sacrament, we are not obliged to revere every marriage, but only one that has sacred form and is consecrated by a true minister of the Church. Otherwise, if every marriage of the faithful must necessarily be a sacrament according to theologians, who will defend Scotus, who denies that marriages contracted by nods alone are sacraments? The Master, Divus Thomas, and the Council of Florence teach that every sacrament consists of words, without which no sacrament is effected. If gestures could replace a sacrament’s words of form, a mute priest could absolve from sins and a mute bishop initiate someone into sacred orders. Moreover, marriage is sometimes contracted through no gestures other than sexual intercourse: after betrothal, bride and groom unite with marital affection, and jurists and theologians all admit that a true marriage is thereby formed. But it is absurd to call sexual union itself properly a sacrament of the new law. The Holy Spirit and sacramental grace are not given through intercourse. 32. quaest. 2. cap. connubia. The Church therefore does not teach that every marriage of the faithful is a sacrament. Unless someone is so foolish as to condemn Caietanus, who, most probably and in my judgment most truly, denied that a marriage contracted by letters and agents between absent parties is a sacrament. Those who cry that Caietanus erred do not understand what they say or assert. If they persist in refuting opinions with foolish, disruptive shouts instead of suitable, necessary arguments, and condemn what has been said probably and truly, we shall sit quietly and laugh at their folly. Let them grant that one sacrament is received on behalf of another when someone contracts for another; let them grant that Christ’s sacraments are administered to absent people, conferring grace and remitting sins for them. Since these claims are absurd, we prefer not to grant that contracts made between absent parties are true marriages but not true sacraments. These points show not only that it is no dogma of faith that every marriage of the faithful is a sacrament, but also that the contrary opinion is more probable. If Scotus and Caietanus were permitted, as they were, to exclude from the Church’s sacraments marriages contracted by signs rather than words, or through agents, what religious obligation binds us to say that a marriage contracted civilly and profanely in the manner of Jews, Saracens, and pagans, without sacred ceremonies or a Church minister, is properly a sacrament? Especially since the contrary opinion is more probable, easier for defending the Catholic faith, and stronger for repelling Lutheran attacks. Since my discourse has brought me here, let us try to persuade the reader by the same arguments that persuaded me that such a marriage is not properly a sacrament—that is, neither a sign of sanctification nor a cause of it in those who worthily receive it. I hope this labor will not be in vain, since arguments, testimonies, and the whole nature of the sacraments agree with me. First, I have persuaded myself that sacraments properly so called are sacred rites of religion. Sacred rites belong to religion, by which we worship God; a sacrament is therefore an act of religion. In the sacraments too we profess that we ⁵

seek salvation from God our Savior. This outward profession of inward faith belongs to the virtue by which we worship God; sins in abusing sacraments oppose religion. Augustinus defines not every sign of a sacred thing as a sacrament, but a sacred sign. Sacraments are thus sacred acts of divine worship. Marriage contracted civilly and profanely by the mere words of a man and woman, although it signifies a sacred thing, is not a sacred act of religion and is therefore not properly a sacrament. Otherwise, the bronze serpent and manna would be sacraments, as would everything instituted to signify sacred things. Since this is absurd, let us agree that marriages without a sacred minister and religious ceremony are not sacraments of Christianity. Further, after listing the seven sacraments of the new law, the Council of Florence says all are completed by three things: things as matter, words as form, and the person of the minister who confers the sacrament. If any is lacking, the sacrament is not completed. But the marriage in question has no sacramental minister, so no sacrament is effected. We should not listen to those who say the man and woman are each other’s ministers; I could refute them plainly were I not hastening to weightier matters. The faithful do not consider themselves sacrilegious if they lack grace when contracting this profane marriage. Their minds therefore recognize it is not a sacrament of the Church. If it were, marrying in mortal sin would be sacrilege; an excommunicate contracting it would be doubly sacrilegious, unworthily intruding on sacraments from which the Church had deprived him. This plainly conflicts with the faithful’s common understanding. Augustinus also teaches in his letter to Bonifacius that the bodily things constituting sacraments must bear the image and likeness of the sanctification of which they are signs and causes. Baptism’s outward washing figures the spiritual cleansing it effects; the Eucharist’s visible food and drink foreshadow invisible refreshment. Likewise, the other sacraments present inward sanctification by outward action. But civil, profane marriage bears no image of sanctification and is not presented to sanctify under an outward appearance of holiness; it is therefore not properly a sacrament. The Council of Florence further teaches, as all theologians decree, that every sacrament consists of words as its form. A sacrament is completed by its form, as human form makes a human being and whiteness makes something white; every sacrament must exist by its sacred form. But civil, profane marriage has no sacred words, and thus not even the semblance of a sacrament. Nor can the words of those marrying—“I take you as my own,” and so on—be its form. First, the recipient’s words

may be the matter but not the form of a sacrament. Form proceeds from the agent to the recipient through instrumental causes. The forms of sacraments therefore come from God through sacred ministers to their recipients. This is evident by induction from every unquestioned sacrament. Further, although a sacrament’s matter may be a material thing previously used by people, its form must be supernatural, its force and meaning arising from a higher cause, not nature. A sacrament is supernatural, so its form must be received through faith, not nature. But “I take you as my own” is entirely natural and used by all peoples, including those who contract without faith. A sacrament’s form also signifies the spiritual effect it causes: sacraments, as the school’s proverb says, effect what they signify, and this meaning shines especially in the form. Those words signify no spiritual effect. Moreover, sacramental forms are prescribed by divine institution and cannot be altered at human discretion, as D. Thomas demonstrates in the third part. No words for contracting marriage have been defined; countless varied and dissimilar verbal forms can make such a contract. The words used by bride and groom are therefore not a Christian sacrament’s form. Further, if words are a sacrament’s form, replacing them with gesture, writing, or any sign makes the action empty. Yet those contracting can replace words with gestures or writing and form a marriage just as well as with a thousand words. This is no small argument that the parties’ words are the sacrament’s matter. The recipient may administer its matter but not its form; when words serve as matter in one sacrament and form in another, gestures and other signs can replace words serving as matter, but not those serving as form. This is clear in penance. The contracting parties’ words, for which other signs may be substituted, might be sacramental matter, but cannot be its form. The name “sacrament” is also usually applied to the matter, not the form, as D. Thomas teaches in 4. Sen., d.1, q.1, art. 1; q.5, art. 1 and dist. 3, q.1, ar.1; q.1, ad 2. Baptism, that is, washing, is a sacrament, not “I baptize you”; likewise unction, confirmation, and penance. But the contracting parties’ words are called the sacrament, as the same author testifies in additionum q.44 art. I ad I. We say marriage is a sacrament, but marriage is the contract formed by both parties’ words. Their words are therefore the matter, not the form. Who does not see that the younger theologians invented false claims to defend this civil human contract as a sacrament of Christ and the Church? Most are foolish to unbelievers and not solid to the faithful. One says the parties are the matter; another, their consent; another, the gestures and nods used by the man and woman in addition to words,

another claims the first speaker’s words are the matter and the second speaker’s the form. If only they said these things seriously, truly, and probably, so heretics would not rightly laugh at them! Why philosophize thinly, even ridiculously, about a grave matter? Why so much variation and inconsistency on what is necessary to faith and religion? Hieronymus says what varies can never be true; again, “That which varies is not true,” even slanderers attest. We ask about a sacrament’s matter and form—that is, things sacred by religion—while they answer about the matter and form of a profane natural contract. Pagans disputing that contract would speak no differently. Thus Luther wittily mocked theologians for making the sacrament of our religion complete from things entirely found in pagan marriages. That the matter and form of a civil natural contract, always used under every law by faithful and unbelievers alike, are precisely those constituting our religion’s perfect sacraments: scarcely anyone, not even Luther, could be persuaded of this unless so prejudiced that opinion prevailed without reason. When preparing to answer Luther’s many arguments against this sacrament, I do not undertake to defend a marriage of this sort—with no sacred appearance and not even conceivable as univocally a sacrament alongside the others—as a sacrament. Whether our opinion is true or false, if Lutherans debate this sort of marriage, they should understand that they have entered school disputes; a Catholic need not answer their arguments. But if they argue that marriage administered with sacred ceremonies, matter and form, and a sacred minister—as in the Roman Church from the Apostles onward—is not a sacrament, a Catholic should answer confidently and defend it boldly. He can give reasons consistent with the Church’s firm, perpetual teaching, commend our faith gently to the faithful, and defend it against unbelievers’ slanders. I would gladly undertake this debate with the Lutherans if this book’s purpose allowed. I have digressed beyond what the argument required. Yet it is no digression to insist that what can be argued probably on either side should be referred not to Catholic faith but to school opinions. This could have been said in fewer words, but words do not always match the matter exactly. I added many arguments that marriage without a Church minister is no sacrament, to show that the question does not pertain to faith, as I promised. Attend, Reader, as I settle the last point: not all scholastic theologians agreed with this opinion, as the argument

claims. Indeed, serious authorities agree with us. Guillermus Parisiensis, libro de sacra. tracta. de Matrimonio c. 9. q. 1, denies that marriage is properly a sacrament or has sacramental power unless consecrated by priestly ministry. I omit the Master and Durandus, who generally hold that marriage does not confer grace; they would not have erred here unless the common opinion were strongly against them. The Fathers of the Council of Cologne also deny that clandestine marriage is properly a sacrament. They assert that one word contracts marriage and another effects its sacrament; mutual-consent words do not suffice. Another word is needed which, as in other sacraments, joins the element and makes the sacrament; it must be of faith, not nature. Their view is difficult not to approve. I do not approve that they fail to seek the sacrament’s form where Catholics always have: the Church’s rites and words are found most safely and certainly in the Roman Church’s perpetual custom. This is not the place to discuss it; perhaps later we shall explain this sacrament’s proper matter and form. Now to our subject. Petrus Paludanus, 4. sent. dist. 5. q. 2, also adopts our view, though imprudently. He does not believe that a man and woman who contract civilly, even as sinners without penance, commit sacrilege. This would be improbable if such marriage were a true Church sacrament; everyone agrees that receiving Christ’s sacraments after mortal sin without penance is sacrilege. D. Thomas, though generally following common opinions in his writings, was finally compelled by truth and reason to support ours. In 4 dist. 1, q. 1, art. 3, after teaching words are necessary in every sacrament, he raises a fifth objection: “Penance and marriage are sacraments, but neither has words as part of its integrity.” He answers that marriage as a duty and penance as a virtue have no verbal form; but as sacraments consisting in the Church ministers’ dispensation, each has words. So D. Thomas. In 4. lib. adversus gent., c. 78, he likewise teaches marriage is a sacrament only when dispensed through Church ministers: “What is dispensed to the people through Church ministers is called a sacrament. Marriage, insofar as it is the union of man and woman intending to generate and educate children for God’s worship, is therefore a Church sacrament. Hence Church ministers give a blessing to those marrying.” The Fathers’ testimony likewise shows marriage was held properly a sacrament only when priestly ministry intervened: Calixtus’s letter to all bishops of Gaul; Cyricius to Cumerius, bishop of Tarraco, cap. 4; Nicolaus, 31. q. 2. c. Lotharius; and Hormisda, Evaristus, and Isidorus, as Gratianus reports, 30. q. 5. So the Council of Carthage, 4. c. 13, cited in 30. q. 5. c. sponsus; the Council of Lyon, cited in 35. q. 3. c. Nulli; and the Lateran Council, de

symo. c. cum in ecclesiae corpore; the Council of Constance under Martinus V at its conclusion; Clemens, de privile. Religiosi; and Ambrosius, lib. 1. epi. epist. 1, to Vigilius. I neither quote nor examine their testimonies, since that debate belongs elsewhere. Evaristus not only refuses to acknowledge as a Church sacrament a clandestine marriage without a priest, but calls it an adulterous union. Almost all jurists also agree with us. When they deny that marriage confers grace, they mean a civil contract, which they call a sacrament in the broader sense. When priestly administration is added, jurists clearly teach that grace is conferred through the consecrating priest’s act. Therefore no payment may be accepted, because it is an ecclesiastical sacrament. Here jurists speak more probably, I think, than theologians, though some learned, serious theologians have also rejected the others’ common opinion. If anyone still opposes us, he must not immediately condemn our claims but refute them by a suitable argument. I do not claim never to approve anything false, but I do not assert what I discuss arrogantly or make my judgment the rule; I support it with saints’ testimony or probable, consistent reasoning. I may rightly ask learned men to judge me only after examining the case. If they prove my view false by argument, I shall gladly accept it. But no one can readily defeat me by assertion alone. Enough about the school’s authority. ⁶