De locis theologicis
Melchor Cano (1509–1560)
De locis theologicis libri duodecim
First published 1563
Melchor Cano's De locis theologicis, first published in 1563, examines the sources and authority of theological arguments in twelve books. It considers Scripture, tradition, ecclesial authority, reason, and history as grounds for theological inquiry. The present edition includes the Latin text and an English translation. The Latin was prepared from Juan Belda Plans's BAC reading text and checked against The School of Salamanca's CC BY 4.0 transcription and aligned page images of the 1563 edition; both sources are credited.
Preface
Book I
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Book II
Preface to Book II
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Chapter X
Chapter XI
Chapter XII
Chapter XIII
Chapter XIV
Chapter XV
Chapter XVI
Chapter XVII
Chapter XVIII
Book III
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Book IV
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Book V
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Book VI
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Book VII
Chapter I
Chapter II
We must fight vigorously in its defense, and first establish that the authority of the saints can be discussed in three ways: first, concerning the personal opinion of one or another saint, such as Augustine’s view of the work of the six days seems to have been; second, concerning the common agreement of several saints, from which one or another saint nevertheless departed; and finally, concerning the unanimous and concordant judgment of all, since the arguments mentioned all these. We must also consider that the testimonies of the saints may be referred either to confirming philosophical doctrines or to establishing assertions of faith or theology. Some of the holy writers were learned not only in Sacred Scripture and the other subjects pertaining to Christian discipline, but also in what the philosophers taught about nature and morals. Finally, and with the greatest care, we must note that even among ecclesiastical authors there are two kinds of disputes. One concerns matters that truly pertain to faith and Catholic doctrine; the other concerns matters that may be unknown without harm to piety, not only to the unlearned but even to the learned, since they are neither dogmas of faith nor derived from them. These two kinds of matters are not easy to distinguish. Some matters that in themselves pertained to faith, having been revealed to the apostles, prophets, and Evangelists, may be called into question before they have been defined by the Church. But this happens through ignorance, which excuses those who raise questions about matters otherwise divinely handed down. Thus some Greeks could, without fault, deny before the Church’s definition that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle, even though the Gospel and the Apostles taught it. We include such matters in the first category, since here we measure the dogmas of the Catholic faith not by the accidental ignorance of imprudent men but by divine revelation. We were saying, then, that it is difficult to discern which matters fall naturally under the first category and which under the second. In general, however, it can readily be defined in a single statement that the first category contains all that the apostles handed down to the Church either in writing or by word, and whatever is proved to follow from these by necessary consequence. as is true in the second category
are those matters that we received neither from Christ nor from the apostles, and that are not certainly inferred from what we hold on the authority of Christ and the apostles. We can scarcely prescribe all such matters individually with precise definitions, although we can indicate some by particular examples. For instance, Scholastics debate whether the grace by which we are justified is a quality impressed upon the soul, giving it being and life, from which other qualities follow—that is, infused theological and moral virtues through which the soul performs divine and supernatural actions. Likewise, many dispute with considerable disagreement whether the sacraments, said to be the cause of grace and virtues, produce such effects through some power and an inherent, divinely infused quality. I put questions of this kind in the second category, and do not think the testimonies of Sacred Scripture are to be understood as referring to these qualities. Nor do I think the Catholic controversy with the Pelagians about grace for believing, hoping, loving, fulfilling the law, and persevering concerns chiefly qualities, but rather God’s gratuitous and special help. Again, if someone wishes to inquire curiously whether the Evangelist John has already departed this life or remains alive with Elijah and Enoch; or, if he has died, whether his flesh has seen corruption or he has recently been raised, arguments can be offered on both sides, and either position can be proved or disproved without harm to the faith. For although it is established that all people must die once, exempting one or another from that general law by a privilege does not so contradict Sacred Scripture that it cannot be questioned. These three principles agree by their own reason, so there is no need to pursue them further: learned men do not ordinarily argue about matters that are evident and undisputed, since, as Cicero says, evidence is weakened by argument. With these points approved by everyone’s agreement, the first conclusion follows.