De locis theologicis

ARGUMENTS OF CHAPTER ONE ARE REFUTED

And as for those arguments set forth at the beginning, some theologians—certainly not bad ones, but not sufficiently sharp—evade them as best they can. For the Roman

Church from the Roman pontiff, and say that he can err in faith while it cannot. In this way they think they can dissolve almost all the arguments, since most of them challenge the faith of the Supreme Pontiff, not that of the Roman Church. Yet these men defend the Roman Church from error, not the Roman bishop. But if we are speaking, as we truly are, of error in a judgment and decree of faith, I find no distinction between the Apostolic See and the person occupying it. First, when we approach the Apostolic See to ask for oracles of faith, we do not question each of the Roman Church’s faithful, nor do we convene the Roman Church itself in a council; we seek the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff and await his decision. Again, it is not the Roman people who teach the universal Church matters pertaining to the faith, but the Roman bishop. The power to judge cases of faith, to bind and loose, and to feed the flock lies not with the Roman people but with the Roman shepherd, the vicar of Iesu Christus. Councils too receive neither confirmation nor strength from the Roman people themselves, but from the people’s bishop. Furthermore, as was proved above, the privilege of firmness was specially given to Peter: “I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail; and you, strengthen your brothers.” And again: “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.” Therefore, if we follow the rule of true theology explained in chapter three, we will first affirm firm and certain teaching in Peter and his successors, and then in the Roman Church, of which Peter and his successors are both head and foundation. I also observe that just as, if all the bishops together taught false errors, the whole Church would necessarily be involved in various errors, so too, if the shepherd of the Roman Church were to decree an error contrary to the faith, the sheep would be scattered while their shepherd erred. Finally, the testimonies we cited mostly prove that the Supreme Pontiff of the Church, Peter’s successor and Christ’s vicar, cannot err when he pronounces on faith. I therefore judge those deserving of greater criticism who thought they would settle the controversy by separating the Apostolic See from its apostolic bishop. Reason does not accept that answer; it scorns and rejects it. Rather, reason takes up the distinction between two kinds of error, one personal, the other judicial. We should not reject the terms peculiar to the schools, even if they are less Latin, but prefer, as Augustinus says, clear speech to polished speech. A personal error is therefore each person’s private error; a judicial error is public. Innocentius IV wrote commentaries on the Decretals. If there is anything mistaken in them, it is plainly the man’s error, not the pontiff’s, although the commentaries were published by a pontiff. But if this same Innocentius were to define in a judgment on a question of faith something that was in fact false, that error would then proceed from the Church’s public judge and would therefore be judicial. Response to the first argument. From this the first argument is easily refuted. No trustworthy history teaches that Ioannes XXII defined anything of this kind after attaining the supreme pontificate; rather, as Benedictus XI says in his extravag., when Ioannes was preparing to define the matter, death overtook him and he could not do so. Nor should he be considered a heretic if he held that error before becoming pontiff, any more than Irenaeus, Chrysostomus, Theophylactus, or Bernardus, whom some claim held that opinion before the Church had explicitly defined the matter. Whether they claim this truly or falsely is not for this discussion or place to determine. ¹

Response to the second argument. The second argument is answered in the same way. Coelestinus defined nothing, for the words of Innocentius III are these: “Although some of our predecessors seem to have thought otherwise.” He says “thought,” not “defined.” But Innocentius himself defines nothing either; he explains his own judgment and opinion, saying: “We do not believe that in this case the one who is left behind can enter into a second marriage.” This is certainly true, although it was not firmly defined by that decretal of Innocentius. For it does not immediately follow that something must be believed as a dogma of faith simply because it is contained in a volume of law. This was explained more fully in the penultimate chapter of the preceding book. Response to the third argument. There is no difficulty in answering the third argument. The word “I judge” is often used to mean the same as “I think” or “I suppose”; this is how Alexander understands it when he says that some of his predecessors judged otherwise. Response to the fourth argument. But the fourth argument is far more difficult, and cannot be resolved so briefly. For Alexander plainly teaches that the custom, also confirmed by civil law, which rescinds less formal wills, is foreign both to divine law, to the institutions of the fathers, and to the general custom of the Church. It is evident that he makes this pronouncement here by pontifical authority, since he forbids anyone, under threat of anathema, to dare rescind such wills. In the next chapter he also instructs judges in this sort of case to require only two or three witnesses, and to follow canonical decrees, not civil laws. Therefore, if the Pontiff of the Church commanded—and commanded under threat of anathema—that no one invalidate wills supported by the testimony of two or three witnesses, he surely defined the question not as any private person but as the Church’s public judge. Yet it is not a commandment of God and the Gospel, though Alexander seems to assert this, that all cases be settled by only two or three witnesses. Otherwise not only Leo IV but also Silvester, in cap. 3 of the Roman Synod, would have issued a law contrary to the Gospel and to God. For they decreed that a bishop could not be condemned without 72 witnesses. From this we understand that the civil law which guards against fraud in the commonwealth by providing that wills are invalid unless signed by seven witnesses is not contrary to evangelical law; nor is the law contrary which, to forestall hostility against bishops, provided that two witnesses alone would not suffice to condemn a bishop. If human life were moderately well ordered and customs shaped by nature rather than greed, the testimony of two people would surely suffice to settle any case in court. But just as an oath is occasioned by evil—not by the one who swears, but by the one who refuses to believe the truth-teller—so requiring more than two witnesses arose from evil, not in the law that requires them but in the person committing fraud. But discussing these matters does not belong to this place or time. What belongs here specifically is whether Alexander erred. In pontifical decrees, two things above all must be distinguished: one is the decree’s intention and conclusion, as it were; the other is the reason and explanation the Pontiff gives for what he has established. In their conclusion the Supreme Pontiffs cannot err if they decide a question of faith from the apostolic tribunal. But if the Pontiffs’ reasons are not necessary—not to mention apt or probable—there is no reason to dwell on them. We do not fight for the reasons given by Pontiffs as if for our altars and hearths. Alexander, then, does not define that this custom is contrary to divine law; rather, as I see is generally approved by legal experts, he orders judges to require only two or three witnesses in pious legacies. ^{2 3}

This is the decree’s conclusion and purpose; there is no doubt that the Pontiff could have prescribed this by a certain right of his own. But if, to confirm his prescription, he makes use of the law of Deuteronomy, calling it divine, refers to the statutes of the canons, or adduces the custom of the Church, there is no need to dissect those reasons to the quick. It is like councils that define that there are two persons in the Godhead, the Father and the Son, and cite in support the passage from Genesis, “The Lord rained down from the Lord”: they do not immediately err in a judgment of faith, although the Trinity is proved somewhat inaptly from that passage. There is also a Synod which pronounced on Mary’s perpetual virginity. To support this, the fathers cite the closed gate in Ezechiel. Let whoever wishes mock this, but he will mock in vain. For the fathers do not always offer necessary reasons in a question of faith, but sometimes offer plausible ones. And if Pontiffs too sometimes err in giving such reasons, they should not even be blamed for it, much less should the authority of this passage be weakened on that account. Moreover, if my judgment has any force, Alexander erred neither in his conclusion nor in his reasons. He was making laws for those subject to him in both jurisdictions, namely the citizens of Hostiensis and the judges of Vellenensis. Alexander therefore did not wish to disapprove the civil law used by emperors in regions subject to their rule; he wished even lay judges in the Church’s patrimony to judge wills according to the statutes of the canons, not the emperors’ laws. He does not think it fair that the sacred canons should be as strict in adjudicating temporal matters as civil laws are, and he considers it more honorable that in cities and towns under the Church’s right and dominion, the custom of the canons rather than civil law should be observed. It follows that, if the reasoning of this decretal is taken strictly, Alexander’s law should be observed not only in lands subject to the Roman Church but in any others under the dominion of bishops and churches—not only for bequests left to the Church for pious purposes, but also for any other legacies. Alexander’s law is therefore honorable, holy, and legitimate. Nor did he err in his reasons. Although they are not necessary, they are not entirely inept. He says that a custom requiring more than three or two witnesses is first foreign to divine law—that is, the Old Testament—which generally required only two or three witnesses; it is also foreign to the institutions of the fathers, that is, to canonical custom and law, where two witnesses suffice, especially in temporal matters; finally, it is foreign to the general custom of the Church, which is content with two or three witnesses in such cases. “Foreign” does not mean contrary, but new and unfamiliar, and therefore not very suitable for approval in the Church’s court. If secular princes do not wish to follow this sincerity of intention and sound judgment about witnesses, or this custom of the Old Law and canon law, but instead require more witnesses for the wills of their subjects in order to eliminate fraud, they may freely exercise their own judgment. Alexander’s letter does not prevent this; it binds only those subject to the Church in both jurisdictions. Enough and more than enough has now been said about the fourth argument. Response to the fifth argument. The fifth argument is easily dissolved by what was said in refuting the fourth. Pontiffs sometimes offer reasons that persuade rather than compel. Because the Synagogue once received certain laws from God, useful and suitable not only for governing but almost necessary for shaping the customs and religion of each people, the Church took them up for its own use under Christ. Accordingly, the Supreme Pontiffs and legal experts call certain old laws approved and restored anew by the Church “divine”—not because they are now God’s commandments, since that old law has been abolished, but because they were once God’s commandments and are still to be observed by us, not by force of the old law, as was falsely charged against the learned Pontiffs, but by a new institution of the Church. This new institution, or rather restoration, of the Church is nevertheless plausibly supported by the old divine law.

Response to the sixth argument. Turrecremata answers in lib. 2, c. 112, that there is no disagreement between those Pontiffs. Rather, Ioannes explains Nicolaus. For after the words already cited, Nicolaus added: “Let no one think that Christ’s having purses at times is an obstacle; Christ assumed the condition of the weak in having purses.” This is what Ioannes XXII defined: namely, that it is heretical to deny that Christ and the apostles held something in common, as the contrary is clear from Luc. 22, Ioan. 4 and 17, and Actor. 4. Response to the seventh argument. First, we say in reply to the seventh argument that neither Pontiff defined this controversy there. Pontiffs often answer private questions from this or that bishop by explaining their own opinion about the matters submitted, not by delivering a judgment that they intend the faithful to be obliged to believe. Certainly, to say nothing of Pelagius, Nicolaus decreed nothing in that passage that bears on this question. The question submitted to him was not whether baptism conferred in the name of Christ was valid, but whether a person baptized by a pagan or a Jew had received the true Sacrament of baptism. In passing, while answering the question submitted, he added without being asked about it that baptism is conferred in the name of Christ. In this matter he could undoubtedly have been mistaken. Indeed, he was so mistaken that we showed this with strong arguments in lib. 4 Sentent. Then perhaps these two Pontiffs do not disagree. Nicolaus is understood to have taught that in a similar necessity, such as existed in the time of the apostles, baptism in the name of Christ would still be valid now, other things being equal. Pelagius, however, defines that it is not valid apart from such a necessity. It would be as if balsam, a book, or a chalice to be touched were now lacking, and the Sacraments of confirmation and orders were conferred by the laying on of hands alone, as was done from the beginning in the apostolic age. But where there were no similar necessity, neither ordination nor confirmation would perhaps be valid without the appropriate matter of those Sacraments. We have said this about baptism in the name of Christ by following the common opinion. For, as I understand it, baptism was nowhere administered in this form: “I baptize you in the name of Christ.” Saint Ambrosius and many others seem to have understood this as well. But if the apostles used some such form, it was: “I baptize you in the name of Iesu Christus,” Act. 2. 38 and 19. Second, it is not necessary that the apostles conferred the Sacrament of baptism in either of those forms. Nor, if Scripture says that something was done in Christ’s name, are we immediately compelled to suppose that it was done and administered in those exact words. There are many examples in Sacred Scripture. This one is readily at hand: “Through you we shall gore our enemies with the horn, and in your name we shall trample those who rise against us.” Likewise: “After they had been scourged, they ordered them not to speak at all in the name of Iesu.” Act. 5. Paulus is also said to have acted boldly in the name of Iesu. Act. 9. Among the Hebrews, something is done in someone’s name when it is carried out by that person’s authority and power. Thus, whoever acts in the king’s place and as his minister is said to act in the king’s name. We therefore rightly interpret those who sanctified people in water and the Spirit as Christ’s ministers to have bestowed the grace of baptism in Christ’s name. It is therefore not necessary to think that the apostles changed the form of baptism prescribed by Christ.

For even today we truly perform baptism in Christ’s name—that is, in his place, by his power and authority. And if the apostles baptized using the prescribed formula with the name of Iesu Christus, they should not be thought to have omitted the names of the Father and the Holy Spirit, but to have baptized in the name of the Father, of his Son Iesu Christus, and of the Holy Spirit. It belongs to another place to demonstrate this. That is enough about the seventh argument. Response to the eighth argument. Much could be said in explaining the eighth argument, but we will condense it into a few points. Gratianus, at 32 qu. 7, says with far more boldness than eloquence that this opinion of Gregorius is contrary to evangelical and apostolic teaching. I strongly disagree. For even if we set aside the authority of the Roman pontiffs, we still cannot disregard the definition of both Gregorii, I and III, since both were not only most learned but also most holy. They did not err, as Gratianus falsely thought; rather, they spoke of a woman who, because of an infirmity existing before marriage, was unfit for marital intercourse—that is, to use the language of the schools, she was unable to discharge the marital debt. You have a similar example concerning the impotent, c. Consultationi. Gregorius himself explains his judgment in this way in his epist. ad Ravennatem archiepisc., cited by Gratianus at 33 q. 1, cap. Requisisti. Other answers to this argument are also available, but this one is clearer and more straightforward. The Gloss also follows it at 20 d., c. De libellis, under the word iunioris. Response to the ninth argument. In the ninth argument the Lutherans, especially Oecolampadius, Bucerus, and Calvinus, taunt us, but childishly. For I have shown with strong arguments that the book is not by Gelasius, the Roman pontiff. First, the author of the little work says that the dispute about the truth of the two natures in Christ is recent. But it was not recent in Gelasius’s time; it had long since been settled by Leo and the Concilium Chalcedon., where the opinions of Eutyches and Nestorius were rejected. Again, the whole book makes no mention of Leo or the Concilium Chalcedon. The author would surely have done so, especially if he were Gelasius. In his epist. ad Faustum he gladly invokes the authority of this council, and he would have been even more willing to do so here, where he could refute his opponents with the testimony of so great a Synod. Certainly, since he cited Damasus against Arius, he would have cited Leo against Eutyches all the more if he had written after Leo’s time. And Gelasius lived many years after Leo. Moreover, why did this author refer to Damasus only by the title “bishop of Rome,” without any other honorific? That is quite foreign to the custom of later Pontiffs when they cite the testimony of earlier ones. Further, to prove the truth of both natures in Christ, the author of this work counts Eusebius Pamphili among the teachers of the Catholic Church and uses his testimony. Yet Hieronymus says in his epist. ad Pammachium et Oceanum, which begins Schedulae, that Eusebius was a most open defender of Arian impiety. Indeed, Eusebius was condemned as an Arian, along with his writings, in act. 5 and 6 of the seventh general Synod. In asserting both natures of Christ, this author cites only Ambrosius among the Latin fathers. If he were Gelasius, he would use the testimonies of Hilarius, Hieronymus, and Augustinus, and would not have cited certain Greek writers who were, and always had been, dead to Latin readers. Gelasius did write about both natures of Christ against Eutyches and Nestorius; we do not deny it. But he is said to have written five books, not this little work, which circulates under a false title. Gennadius too wrote against Eutyches; why should we attribute this work to Gelasius rather than Gennadius? There was also a Gelasius, bishop of Caesarea

in Palestine, whom Hieronymus says wrote certain things at that time but kept them hidden. I would attribute the little work to him, were it not that Hieronymus says his style was pure and polished, which I do not recognize in this book—unless a good and elegant author happened to have a bad and inelegant translator. Those who attribute this work to Gelasius, the Roman pontiff, are mistaken because of the words: “Since your love unanimously holds, steadfastly proclaims, and wisely defends the Apostolic See.” The reader will see, even without my demonstrating it, that “the apostolic faith” should be read here. Nor is it new for books of this sort to appear under the names of Roman pontiffs. In act. 5 of Synodus 7 the Iconoclasts produced two little books as works by Vigilius, the Roman pontiff, but falsely. And even if the work were by Gelasius, it would still prove nothing. When Roman pontiffs publish books on any subject, they express their opinion like other learned men; they do not pronounce on faith as judges of the Church. I think the ninth argument has now been refuted sufficiently clearly. Response to the tenth argument. In refuting the tenth, we should not repeat here what Caietanus said in that little work on 27 questions, lest we do work already done, which an old proverb forbids. What now requires attention is the force of the inference: if Christ built the Church upon Peter, why does it immediately follow that the Roman See is set above the others by divine right? From this the further conclusion will also be clear: if Peter’s faith did not fail, in keeping with Christ’s prayer, the Church’s greater causes must be referred to the Roman bishop. I see that these matters cannot be explained plainly and clearly except by a learned and discerning person. I do not claim to have attained the ability to handle so great and difficult a subject; I openly acknowledge that I have attempted it. For it is clear that I undertook in this work to explain not matters accessible and familiar to everyone, but those which even the most learned would scarcely understand without care. If the effort succeeds, it deserves praise; if it does not, it certainly does not deserve blame. But enough of this. Let us now explain the matter itself. First, we must recall what we have often said elsewhere: what Christ said in the Gospel to Peter was said not to him as a private person, but as the one placed over the Church; it therefore pertains also to his successors, without violence to the text or distortion of its letter. In the same way, what the Lord entrusted to the apostles, and which equally applies to all the faithful, was entrusted in its literal sense to all Christians to come, in accordance with Christ’s own explanation in Marci 13: “What I say to you, I say to all: Watch.” Watching indeed applies equally to everyone. Therefore, even if Christ had not explained it so explicitly, we too would necessarily explain it in that way. Likewise, what the Lord said to the apostles concerning their role as priests of the Church applies not to all the faithful but to the other priests who would come after them. An example is Luc. 22: “Do this in remembrance of me.” For when the Lord had taken and broken the bread, raised his eyes to heaven, and given thanks to God, and had also taken and lifted the cup, he undoubtedly offered the Eucharistic sacrifice, that is, the sacrifice of thanksgiving, according to the Jewish rite; unless he was foolish and ungrateful, able to give the Father supreme thanks for the supreme gifts he had received from him but failing to do so. Therefore, when Christ commanded his apostles to do what they saw him doing, he plainly commanded them to offer the Eucharistic and thanksgiving offering. Cyprianus, in his letter to Caecilius, and Irenaeus, lib. 4, cap.

32. explained it thus. Since making a sacrifice is the proper duty of sacrificers and priests, what the Lord entrusted to the apostles in that passage pertains specifically to the future priests of the Church, not to the common people, including women, as heretics have believed. Moreover, what we read that Christ entrusted to those apostles because they were to be future shepherds of the Church, we should understand as literally entrusted to the bishops and shepherds who succeed them. An example is Matthaei 18: “Whatever you bind,” and so forth. And likewise Ioan. 20: “As the Father sent me, I also send you: receive the Holy Spirit,” and so forth. If we follow this rule in explaining Sacred Scripture, we will surely avoid the confused and obscure tangle that heretics suffer in understanding Scripture. Why say this? So that we may distinguish suitably and wisely what was said to Peter in the Gospel: if something applies to him as a private person, we should think it applies to each of the faithful (for example, “If your brother sins against you, correct him between you and him alone,” etc.); but if something applies to him as prince of the apostles and shepherd of the Church, we should without controversy understand that it must be referred to those who succeed him in the Church’s pontificate, and that this is the genuine literal sense. For what a civil legislator prescribes to his delegates is referred not only to the person to whom he speaks face to face but also to others who succeed him in the same office. Next, we must also carefully observe that the succession of the Roman pontiff to Peter is not revealed directly in Sacred Scripture, but is established from another source: namely, from what the most reliable histories report, that the apostle Peter finally established his chair at Rome and died there as its bishop. Velenus, Sebastianus Francus, and certain other heretics deny this; they even say Peter never visited Rome. Yet they maliciously deny what all the serious historians have reported. We should not think they believe inwardly what they deny in words, unless they are thought to be children, and foolish children at that. For what could be said more foolish or childish than to deny that events once took place in the commonwealth when every serious man before us affirms that they did? If you ask for the authorities on this matter, the first is Dionysius in his epistola ad Timoth. The second is Dionysius, bishop of Corinth, in Eusebius, lib. 2. Ecclesiast. hist., cap. 25. The third witness is Clemens in epistola prima. The fourth is Anacletus in epistola De ordinatione episcoporum. The fifth is Marcellus, 24 quaest., 1. cap. Rogamus. The sixth is Leo, in concione prima de festo Petri et Pauli. The seventh is Gelasius with a council of 70 bishops. The eighth is Innocentius III in cap. Per venerabilem: Qui filii sint legitimi. The ninth is Nicolaus III, cap. Fundamenta, De elect. in 6. The tenth is Leo IX in epistola synodica ad Petrum Antiochenum patriarcham. The eleventh is Constantinus in an edict before the Nicaean Synod, 96 dist., cap. Constantinus. The twelfth is Epiphanius, Haeresi 27, which is that of Carpocrates. The thirteenth is Irenaeus, lib. 3 Contra Valent. cap. 3. The fourteenth is Tertullianus, lib. 4 Adversus Marcionem and lib. De praescript. haeret. The fifteenth is Ambrosius, in oratione contra Auxentium de Basil. trad. The sixteenth is Hieronymus, in lib. De viris illustr. in Petro. The seventeenth is Egesippus, 3 lib. De exci. Hierosol., cap. 2. The eighteenth is Augustinus, lib. 1 Contra Iulianum Pelag. The last is Eusebius, lib. 2, Ecclesiast. histor. cap. 14 and 15, and also book three, chapters 2 and 25. In these places he also cites Origenes, Caius, and Papias. Whoever does not believe so many reliable and unimpaired witnesses shows himself to be either foolish or certainly a heretic—without even mentioning the public voice of the city of Rome and the places in the city that still bear witness to Peter’s life and death. ⁴

With these points established, a difficult and very obscure question is easily explained—a question that, as I said, has so entangled the most learned men that they could not extricate themselves. That the shepherd whom Christ appointed in the Church after Peter has Peter’s ordinary power and the other privileges granted to Peter for the Church’s sake is found in the Gospel, in accordance with what was noticed and demonstrated for us in the first proof. But that the person whom Christ appointed after Peter’s death was a Roman bishop is inferred from what happened. For if Peter had always remained at Antioch, as he began, the bishop of Antioch would undoubtedly have succeeded him lawfully in the pontificate. Finally, this too must be considered, for it is a great matter and worthy of careful reflection: Catholic doctrine includes not only what was explicitly revealed to the apostles but also what is derived by a clear syllogism and inference from one revealed proposition and another certain proposition known by natural reason. It may not be expressly stated in Sacred Scripture that Christ the Lord has two wills and two intellects, with the actions of each, both created and uncreated, or that Christ can laugh by his own nature, as other human beings can. But Scripture has handed down that the Son of God is human, and natural reason establishes that every human has a created will and intellect and created operations of each power, and that every human can laugh as well as weep. Whoever denies any one of these will be judged a heretic, because by denying the consequence—that is, that the Son of God has a created intellect and act of understanding—he thereby denies the antecedent from which it was inferred, namely, that the Son of God is human. Here is another example. It is not stated in Sacred Scripture or in the traditions of the apostles that the Concilium Nicaenum, Chalcedonense, or Ephesinum did not err in the faith; what is stated is only that councils lawfully assembled in the Holy Spirit cannot err. That the Concilium Nicaenum, Chalcedonense, and Ephesinum were lawfully convened is not believed on the basis of divine revelation, but it is believed on the basis of human testimony and the tradition of trustworthy history, through which we know that these Synods gathered from the whole world at the summons and with the confirmation of the true shepherds of the Church. Thus, although the certainty and truth of what such councils defined seem to depend on two principles, as it were—one revealed by God, namely, that councils lawfully assembled possess the most certain truth, and the other believed with only natural certainty through what reliable and unimpaired writers have recorded—still, whoever denied the decisions and decrees of those Synods would be a heretic, just as if he denied the Gospel. Here is another most evident example. It is not recorded in Sacred Scripture that the priests of our own age were duly consecrated by true bishops; rather, it is an event that depends on the words and intention of those consecrating them. Therefore, whether the true Sacrament of the Eucharist now exists in the Church necessarily depends on this principle, which we hold with human certainty: that these priests were duly ordained. The Church would regard as a heretic anyone who denied this. Yet the revealed universal proposition is only that all true priests, if they have the right intention of consecrating, effect the true Sacrament of the Eucharist. That those now living are such priests is proved not only by the Gospel but also by sound and constant reasoning from nature together with the Gospel. In precisely the same way, anyone who denied that the Roman pontiff has the same power that Peter received from Christ must be considered an adversary of the faith, although what follows immediately from the Gospel is only that Peter’s successors have the same power as

the primacy to Peter. For if you add to this evangelical conclusion that the Roman bishop is Peter’s successor—a point we have received from histories and the tradition of men of the greatest authority—it plainly follows that the Roman bishop is superior to the other bishops and has in the Church the same power and authority that Peter had. The Supreme Pontiffs therefore aptly and prudently applied those evangelical testimonies to the Roman bishop and the Apostolic See. If this view of ours should find less favor with learned men, though I do not know why it should, we still have another way to explain the matter, from which it will be clear that the Roman pontiff succeeded Peter, by divine institution, in the pontificate over the whole Church, and therefore that the testimonies proving Peter’s primacy and faith also apply to the Roman bishops. For we have already said that our faith is contained not only in writing but also in tradition. Thus, although it is not written in the Sacred Books that the Roman bishops succeed Peter, it was nevertheless handed down by the apostles to the Church, as it were, from hand to hand. That this was a living apostolic tradition is plainly established by the lines of reasoning that we either set out or indicated in Book III. We need not explain each of them separately, lest we weary the reader with a long discourse. Certainly, this is an evident proof: even before Phocas and Constantine, not only before the Council of Nicaea but before any emperor after Nero, before any Council of the Church, and before any Supreme Pontiff after Peter, the Roman bishop was always acknowledged by ecclesiastical men as Peter’s successor. That this was apostolic tradition is stated plainly by Anacletus, Peter’s disciple, in his first epistle, De oppressione episcoporum; by Sixtus I, Ad Gallicanas Ecclesias; Eleutherius, Ad easdem; Victor, in his epistle to Theophilus; Sixtus II, in his epistle to Bishop Gratus; Zephyrinus, in his epistle to the bishops of Sicily; Marcellus, to the bishops of the province of Antioch; Miltiades, to the bishops of Spain; Mark, in his epistle to Athanasius; and Julius, to the Eastern bishops. It is not plausible that the Lord Christ would have failed to reveal to his apostles a matter so necessary for preserving the unity of the Church. For if that place where the Lord had chosen that the Jews should seek divine oracles was revealed to Moses, how much more should we believe that Christ showed Peter which place he had appointed as the seat and primacy of his kingdom? And if, as Eusebius reports in lib. 3 Eccles. hist., cap. 5, and Epiphanius in lib. 3 Contr. haer., cap. ult., the apostles were warned by the Lord’s voice to transfer the Church of Jerusalem to the city of Pella, we should believe all the more that Peter was warned by the Lord’s oracles to move from Antioch to Rome and transfer his chair there. If this is so—and it truly is, since nothing else can be believed except most absurdly—let the faithful now understand the origin of the Lutherans’ declaration in which, among the other articles proposed at Worms, they also demanded the abrogation of the power of the Roman Pontiff, which he claims over the other bishops. Let them understand, too, the purpose of those who assert that the monarchy of the Roman bishop arose only after the time of St. Jerome. Those who write that Phocas instituted the Roman Church as head of all the churches may perhaps have written piously—for I judge no one’s intention—but they wrote imprudently. Let them also understand why St. Thomas, in lib. quarto Adversus gentes, cap. 76, declares presumptuous the error of those who try to withdraw from Peter’s obedience and subjection by refusing to recognize his successor, the Roman pontiff, as pastor of the universal Church; let them finally understand why Leo X condemned Luther’s twenty-fifth article in these words: “The Roman pontiff, Peter’s successor, is the vicar of Christ over all the churches of the whole world, instituted by Christ himself in blessed Peter.” Therefore, since the tenth argument presented the greatest difficulty in its explanation, we could not answer it in fewer words.

not recognizing his successor, the Roman pontiff, as pastor of the universal Church; and let them finally understand how Leo X condemned Luther’s twenty-fifth article in these words: “The Roman pontiff, Peter’s successor, is the vicar of Christ over all the churches of the whole world, instituted by Christ himself in blessed Peter.” Since the tenth argument presented the greatest difficulty in its explanation, we could not answer it more briefly. Reply to the eleventh. I answer the eleventh as follows. We certainly must not admit that even Peter’s personal faith failed. For to assert falsely that Peter’s judgment in matters of public faith failed is manifest heresy. But since none of the apostles could err in the doctrine of faith, it was Peter’s special privilege that even his personal faith could not fail. The claim made by some that the Lord Christ reproached the eleven reclining at table for their unbelief, and so forth, does not touch the apostle Peter at all. For when Luke had written in chapter 24 that the women reported to the eleven apostles what they had heard from the Lord, and that they did not believe the women but judged their words to be nonsense, he immediately added: “But Peter ran to the tomb.” He would not have run unless he had believed. The adversative conjunction used by the Evangelist sufficiently shows that the women’s words did not seem like nonsense to Peter. Christ’s prayer for Peter plainly demonstrates that Peter’s faith did not fail. But our opponents explain that the Lord prayed that Peter’s faith would not fail finally. So they speak, but no disciple’s faith failed in this way. Christ’s prayer, then, would not have been a special privilege for Peter, contrary not only to Chrysostom, Theophylact, Ambrose, and Bede, but also to the context. When Ambrose says that Peter lost faith, he uses “faith” to mean loyalty, which Peter did not keep toward his friend Christ. It is also common for “faith” to be used for the confession of faith. But it is ridiculous to suppose that, because Christ is said to have reproached the apostolic college, he reproached each of them individually—as if the prophets did not often rebuke a people among whom many were in no way subject to the reproach. We discussed this matter more fully in Book IV. What is added concerning Anastasius and Honorius raises no small question. For if Christ’s prayer is to be referred not only to Peter but also to later Roman bishops, then by the same reasoning by which Peter’s faith could fail neither publicly nor privately, no successor’s faith could fail either, whether in public judgments or in private conversations and assent. But if, when that prayer is referred to Peter’s successors, it is to be understood only of public faith—that is, in deciding questions of faith—then we seem to have defended Peter’s faith, even his personal faith, by that testimony rashly and inconsistently. Albert Pighius of Kampen could meet this passage only by freeing all Roman pontiffs from the charge of error. He therefore contends that none ever fell into heresy. To exonerate Anastasius, he most abusively attacked Gratian and most shamefully reviled the jurists. To defend Honorius, he tried with many conjectures to persuade us that forgers had corrupted the records of the Sixth General Council. He then leaned toward the view that the Greeks had, as usual, corrupted Honorius’s letter to Sergius, and that the Council had been deceived in its judgment. Indeed, he slandered the entire acts of the Sixth and Seventh Councils and, as far as he could, undermined the authority and credibility of both. ⁵

This opinion of Albert is indeed new in the Church, but it can also be supported by the consideration that it is implausible that the Lord entrusted the supreme charge of faith to a man who could be a heretic. For, as Aristotle teaches, what is straight is the rule of what is bent. Therefore, if the faith of the Roman pontiff cannot direct him, it seems much less able to make others upright in faith. Moreover, the weak in faith cannot strengthen their brothers in faith. If, then, the Roman bishop is to strengthen his brothers, according to Christ’s promise, he himself must be firm. Although Pighius says in many places, as he does here, that the authority of the Supreme Pontiff is sufficiently probable, what matters is not what he says but what it is consistent for him to say, given his commitment to defend and maintain the truth. He says many things about this matter in many places, but, as the saying goes, he is swimming in shallow water. Let Pighius defend Liberius, whom Jerome in Chronicis says subscribed to heretical depravity, overcome by the weariness of exile. Let him excuse Marcellinus, who is reported to have offered sacrifice to idols, broken by fear. Let him vindicate Victor, whom the Paulianists falsely claimed as their own, as Eusebius writes in lib. 5 Eccl. hist., cap. 2. Let him free Anastasius, whom Gratian accused of heresy without certain and probable evidence. But how will he defend Honorius from error? Phellus reports him to have been a heretic in his poem De septem Synodis; so does Tharasius in his letter to the high priests of Antioch, Alexandria, and the Holy City, as recorded in 7 Synodo, actione 3; Theodorus with his Synod of Jerusalem in its confession of faith, found in that same third action; Epiphanius, replying to heretics before the same Council in action 6, tome 2; and finally the whole Seventh Synod in its last action and in its epistle to all priests and clerics. Adrian, the Roman pontiff, also says in action 5 of the Eighth General Council: “We do not read that anyone judged the Roman pontiff. Although the Easterners pronounced an anathema against Honorius after his death, it must nevertheless be understood that he had been accused of heresy, and only on that account is it lawful for inferiors to resist the movements of their superiors.” Thus far Adrian. There he also adds that the sentence passed on Honorius was issued with the consent of the Roman pontiff. This is established in the Sixth General Council, action 4, where Agatho anathematizes Honorius himself in his epistle to the Council. Bede likewise says in De natura rerum, cap. 67, that in the Sixth Synod Macarius, with his followers and predecessors Cyrus, Sergius, Honorius, and Pyrrhus, was anathematized. The Liber Pontificalis also reports that Leo II accepted the Sixth Synod, at which Cyrus, Sergius, and Honorius were condemned. At the end of the Sixth Synod appears Leo’s epistle to Constantine, in which, after receiving and confirming the Council, he says: “We anathematize Cyrus and Sergius, as well as Honorius, who did not enlighten this Apostolic Church with the doctrine of apostolic tradition, but tried by profane treachery to overturn the immaculate faith.” Moreover, we must regard as most important the chapter Si Papa, 40 distin., which the man of Kampen considers worthless. For the one case in which the sheep may judge their shepherd—namely, when he has become a heretic—is found, to pass over other passages, in the Fifth Roman Synod of 218 bishops, in these words: “It has been synodally decreed and confirmed by many of our predecessors that the sheep presume neither to rebuke their shepherd unless he has strayed from the faith.” Anacletus teaches the same in epist. 3 De patriarchis et primatibus, saying: “If the pastor of the Church has strayed from the faith, he must be corrected by the faithful; but for wicked conduct he is to be tolerated rather than constrained, because the rulers of the Church are to be judged by the Lord.” Eusebius teaches the same in his letter to the bishops of Egypt, and it is cited in 2 quaest., 7 cap. Oves. Pope John teaches the same in his epistle to Zacharias. The same is taught in the Eighth Synod.

This is the tradition we were just recounting. Burchard also reports it in lib. 1, cap. 13, 138, 139, attributing the same view to Callistus, Clement, and Gaius. We must therefore not deny that the Supreme Pontiff can be a heretic, and one or another example of this may perhaps be offered; but not even one example can be produced of his having defined anything against the faith in a judgment on faith. Let this, then, be the answer to the objection proposed. One thing in Peter concerns his private excellence as a man; another concerns the common good of the Church. His denial of Christ belonged to the man; his strengthening of his brothers belonged to the Church. The former was personal, the latter common. Likewise, Peter’s faith being always preserved inwardly was a privilege of the man; but his presenting a solid faith to strengthen others and not failing in a judgment on faith was a public privilege of the Church. The Roman bishop therefore did not inherit Peter’s personal privileges or faults, which were joined to Peter’s public authority only incidentally; he succeeded to those things that concerned the common and necessary needs of the Church. For the privileges granted by Christ to the apostles are referred differently to the apostles themselves and to their successors. The apostles had personal privileges of greater grace than their successors. For example, from the words “Whatever you bind on earth,” and “As the Father sent me, so I send you,” we understand that the apostles received universal, extraordinary power over the whole world. Thus they are called equal to Peter in 21 dist., cap. In novo, and 24 quaest., 1 cap. Loquitur. But later bishops did not succeed the apostles in their extraordinary universal power, but in the ordinary power that each apostle held in his own church, as Simeon succeeded James in the Church of Jerusalem, and so forth. Here is another example. From the words “I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete, to remain with you forever, the Spirit of truth,” theologians rightly conclude that the apostles were confirmed in grace after the coming of the Holy Spirit. Yet this Spirit did not pass to succeeding bishops in such a way that he would remain in them forever by confirming them in grace, as he was granted to the apostles by a personal privilege. Only what was necessary for the common good of the Church passed to later pastors. In precisely the same way, the privilege of unfailing faith, which was also personal to Peter, was transmitted to the Roman bishops, not insofar as it was Peter’s particular privilege but insofar as it was common to the Church. The other objections raised in support of Albert’s view are therefore also answered. The Roman pontiff’s inward faith is not necessary for the Church, nor can his hidden and private error of mind harm Christ’s Church. Hence God need not always assist the Roman pontiffs by preserving their inward faith. But that, when they decide what the faithful must believe and direct Christ’s Church in faith, they do not fail but are upheld by the divine hand—this is necessary for the Church, and therefore will not be denied even to Roman bishops who are weak or privately err in other matters, lest through an error of public authority they cause the Church to remain ignorant of the common truth. The eleventh argument has thus, I think, been refuted sufficiently. Reply to the final argument. In refuting the last argument, readers need not be reminded that defending Rome’s bad customs, if the city has any, is not the business of this discussion. We are not so ignorant and foolish as the Lutherans slanderously claim. We too have learned eyes, though they are modest. ^{6 7}

It is written that when their father’s nakedness was exposed, his good sons turned away as they came and covered it. We are said to turn away from what we reject. What did the sons do by covering their father’s nakedness with a cloak laid across their backs as they turned away, except, as Gregory says, show that good subjects should be displeased by the faults of their superiors while nevertheless concealing them from others? “They carry the covering turned away,” he says, “because while judging the deed they honor the office, and do not wish to see what they cover.” Thus good disciples rightly condemn their teachers’ lives silently within themselves and still honor them, even when displeased with them. “The scribes and Pharisees,” Christ says, “have sat on Moses’ seat; do whatever they tell you, but do not act according to their works.” But enough of this. Rather, the reader should be reminded to observe that some Roman customs are shared at Rome with the whole Church; these, Rome is believed to have received from the tradition of the apostles Peter and Paul. Augustine discusses many of them in epistola ad Ianuarium, numero 118, and Innocent I treats them more fully in epistola ad Decentium. Other customs are those that the Roman Church either established privately on its own or received from the apostle Peter but did not promulgate throughout the whole world. Augustine speaks clearly of these in epistola 86 ad Casulanum, et in epistola 118. 119. ad Ianuarium. We must therefore observe without exception the former customs, which the Roman Church not only keeps but also teaches the universal Church to keep, as Julius teaches in 2 dist., cap. Nolite; Innocent in the same distinction, cap. Quis nesciat; Callistus in 12 dist., cap. Non decet; and Gregory in the same distinction, cap. Praeceptis. Private churches, however, need not follow the later customs of the Roman Church, as St. Augustine teaches in the cited passages, as do Nicholas in 12 dist., cap. Scit, and Gregory in the same distinction, cap. Novit. The same is taught in 31 dist., cap. Quoniam and cap. Aliter. For a difference in the custom of the Holy Church does no harm in a matter of one faith, as stated in De con., dist. 4, cap. De trina. Ambrose and Jerome must be understood to speak of customs of this sort in the passages that were brought against us. The point cited from the Council of Trullo is easily answered: as was explained more fully in the previous book, this Council has no authority in the Church, especially in those matters where it set itself against the Roman Church in Greek contention. No efforts of Councils to enact or abrogate laws have any force unless confirmed by the decree and judgment of the Supreme Pontiff. It is clear that the custom of fasting on Saturday belongs to the latter class, as Ambrose also says in 12 distinct., cap. Illa. Therefore the Roman Church is blamed in vain by the Council of Trullo on this matter. Let Book VI end in this way. Perhaps we have made it longer than necessary, although nothing is long when there is nothing that can be removed.

ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE SAINTS