De locis theologicis
Melchor Cano (1509–1560)
De locis theologicis libri duodecim
First published 1563
Melchor Cano's De locis theologicis, first published in 1563, examines the sources and authority of theological arguments in twelve books. It considers Scripture, tradition, ecclesial authority, reason, and history as grounds for theological inquiry. The present edition includes the Latin text and an English translation. The Latin was prepared from Juan Belda Plans's BAC reading text and checked against The School of Salamanca's CC BY 4.0 transcription and aligned page images of the 1563 edition; both sources are credited.
Preface
Book I
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Book II
Preface to Book II
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Chapter X
Chapter XI
Chapter XII
Chapter XIII
Chapter XIV
Chapter XV
Chapter XVI
Chapter XVII
Chapter XVIII
Book III
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Book IV
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Book V
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Book VI
Chapter I
WHERE THE ARGUMENTS ARE SET OUT BY WHICH THE AUTHORITY OF THIS TOPIC IS ATTACKED
We have come to a topic that theologians, especially more recent ones, commonly treat at length and in great detail, because the authority and weight of the Apostolic See—and indeed all its power and capacity—has always been attacked by heretics, and is now assailed much more fiercely by Lutherans, whose quarrel with the Roman Church is stubborn and whose hatred is lasting. I will not pursue the countless questions about the power of the Roman Pontiff; let us consider only the authority of dogmas. I do not want to proceed confusedly, explaining in this discussion only what is being asked. We shall therefore first set out the arguments of those who attack this topic; then, together with the Catholic Church, we shall uphold its force and authority; after that we shall dissolve the adversaries’ arguments. If the discussion runs long, it may still seem short when compared with the great benefit. Those who strive to weaken this topic make what they regard as the following arguments. First argument. First, Ioannes XXII publicly taught that the souls of the just do not see God until Judgment Day, and forbade anyone to receive a degree in theology at Paris unless he had first sworn to this opinion. The Supreme Pontiff, and therefore the Apostolic See, can thus err in faith.
Second argument. Second, Coelestinus III defined that when one spouse falls into heresy, the marriage is dissolved, as is clear in De divortiis, cap. Quanto. Hostiensis asserts that Coelestinus’s decretal letter was once included in the Corpus iuris. Coelestinus therefore erred in faith, for that definition is contrary to the Gospel. Third argument. Third, Alexander III, de sponsa duorum, cap. Licet, says that some of his predecessors had judged that if, after a marriage had been contracted by words in the present tense but not consummated, a second marriage is consummated, the first is dissolved and the second is valid. This is plainly an error in faith and morals. Fourth argument. Fourth, Alexander III, cap. Cum esses, De testament., defines that it is foreign both to the Church’s general custom and to divine law and the statutes of the holy Fathers for wills to be wholly rescinded unless they have been confirmed by the signatures of five or seven witnesses. Yet we know that ecclesiastical men today approve the civil law that invalidates wills of this kind when they are made without the usual formalities. Alexander therefore errs in faith, since he declares a law contrary to divine law that is in fact not contrary to it. Fifth argument. Fifth, Innocentius I, in his letter to Rufus and Eusebius, cap. 1, says: “We acknowledge that men who have taken widows as wives have attained the highest priesthood. No one is unaware that this is contrary to the precepts of the law, since Moyses proclaims: ‘A priest shall take a virgin as wife.’ No defense can be opposed to this precept, supported by divine authority, except your custom, which arose from ignorance.” And Innocentius III, cap. Per venerabilem, Qui filii sint legitimi, after citing a law of Deuteronomy, says: “Since Deuteronomy is interpreted as a second law, the force of the word confirms that what is decreed there must be observed in the New Testament.” But that we must observe the decrees of the Old Law is contrary not only to sacred Scripture but also to the Council of Florence. Sixth argument. Sixth, Nicolaus III, in the Extravagans Exiit qui seminat, de verborum significatione, decrees that Christ the Lord taught by word and example the renunciation of ownership of all things, both individually and in common. Ioannes XXII teaches in the Extravagans Cum inter nonnullos that this is erroneous. Seventh argument. Seventh, Nicolaus, ad consulta Bulgarorum, cited in De consecratione, distinct. 4, cap. A quodam Iudaeo, defines that if someone is baptized in the name of Christ, he must not be baptized again. Pope Pelagius decides the opposite in his letter to bishop Gaudentius, cited in the same distinction, cap. Multi and cap. Si re vera, both passages taken from the same letter. Pope Zacharias agrees with Pelagius in cap. In Synodo, in the same distinction. Either Nicolaus or Pelagius, then, issued a false decree on a question of faith. Eighth argument. Eighth, Divus Gregorius in a certain letter to Augustinus, archbishop of Canterbury, and Gregorius III in a letter to bishop Bonifacius, declared on the authority of the Apostolic and Roman Church that if a woman is struck by some infirmity and cannot render the marital debt to her husband, the husband may take another wife, provided that he does not withhold support from his first wife. But, as Gratianus said in 31, quaest. 7, it is contrary to evangelical and apostolic teaching for a man to leave a wife who cannot render the marital debt because of infirmity and pass to a second marriage.
Ninth argument. Ninth, Gelasius defines against Eutyches and Nestorius that in the Sacrament of the altar, even after consecration, the substance of bread and wine remains. This is foreign to the Catholic faith. Tenth argument. Tenth, the Roman Pontiffs have often falsely interpreted sacred Scripture. To pass over the passages Caietanus cites in opusculo 27 quaestionum, q. ult., Gelasius Papa, with a council of seventy bishops, cited under the name of Pelagius in 21 dist., cap. Quamvis, and Anacletus in 22 dist., cap. Sacrosancta, prove that the Roman Church is preeminent over the others by the Savior’s Gospel words: “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.” Many other Pontiffs are also known to have held the same view. It seems ridiculous, however, to want to bend the Gospel testimony to that meaning. In the same way, most Supreme Pontiffs, to prove that the greater causes of the Church must be referred to the Roman See, cite the words from Lucas: “I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail.” They say how inept this is is clear from the fact that the Lord spoke there only to Peter, not to his successors. For he adds: “And you, once converted, strengthen your brothers.” If these words refer to his successors, namely the Roman Pontiffs, then they must first have been turned away so that, once converted, they might strengthen their brothers. Since Roman bishops falsely interpret sacred Scripture, they can err and lead others into error in a dogma of faith. True dogmas are drawn from the right understanding of sacred Scripture, false ones from a distorted understanding. Eleventh argument. Eleventh, if the Apostolic See could not err in faith, this would above all follow from the privilege of Peter, Luc. 22: “I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail.” But Peter’s faith failed, according to what Ambrosius says: “Peter became more faithful after he wept that he had lost his faith.” The other successors could therefore err in faith much more. Anastasius certainly erred, 19 dist., cap. Anastasius. Honorius also erred, as is defined in the sixth Council of Constantinople, actione 13 et 18. Twelfth argument. Finally, Hieronymus, in his letter to Evagrius, when the custom of the Roman Church was put to him as an objection, said: “If authority is sought, the world is greater than the city. Wherever a bishop may be, whether at Rome, Constantinople, or Alexandria, his merit and priesthood are the same. The power of riches and the humility of poverty do not make a bishop higher or lower. All are successors of the Apostles. Why, then, do you bring me the custom of a single city? Why do you claim as laws of the Church a small number, from which arrogance arose?” Thus far Hieronymus. And Ambrosius, lib. 3, De Sacram., cap. 1, when the Roman custom was set against him, says: “In all things I desire to follow the Roman Church; yet we too are human beings with judgment. Therefore what is observed more rightly elsewhere, we also rightly preserve. We follow the Apostle Petrus himself; what does the Roman Church say to this? The Apostle Petrus himself, who was a priest of the Roman Church, is the author of this assertion for us.” If Hieronymus and Ambrosius readily reject the institutions of the Roman Church, there is certainly no reason why we should follow a rule of conduct prescribed by the Apostolic See. This is especially so because the Trullan Synod, canon 55, asserts that the Roman Church fasts on Saturdays in Lent contrary to
the ecclesiastical custom handed down, and corrects this custom of the Roman Church, which had grown up contrary to apostolic canon 65. These are chiefly the arguments by which some contend that this topic is weak. They believe that the Apostolic See can err even when it judges a question of faith. Among the Parisians, Gerson and Almain are regarded as the principal authorities for this opinion. Adrianus follows it in 4 Sentent., De confir., last question. Thomas Wal. seems to follow it in lib. 2, Doctrin. fid. anti., c. 19, although in lib. De sacramentalibus, doctrina 10, he thinks quite differently. Gratianus, 19 distin.: Hoc autem intelligendum est, also seems to assent to the same opinion. Cardinal Turrecremata does not appear to be far from it, lib. 4, par. 2, c. 16, although in lib. 2, c. 109. 110, he both held and demonstrated the contrary opinion. Erasmus gladly embraces this view in his commentary on Hieronymus’s letter to Damasus about the meaning of hypostasis. Indeed, in De ratione verae theologiae he says that those who teach that the Roman Pontiff cannot err whenever he pronounces on morals or faith open a window to the destruction of true piety. Luther subscribes to this, as do the Wicleffistae and, consequently, all heretics.
Chapter II
WHERE THE REASON IS GIVEN WHY THE APOSTOLIC SEE HOLDS THE FIFTH PLACE
I will refute the opinion of these men in the theological schools and, as I hope, by the force of my arguments, if they are weighed with open minds and free of the contention and hatred that usually blind all judgment. To make the great error of this opinion clearer, let us imagine one Luther alone, against whom our pen is sharpened. The multitude of those who err does not create support for error. Let him, then, be the first and only man who dares to assert that the Supreme Pontiff and the Roman Church can err against the Gospel when deciding controversies of faith. Unless I prove this erroneous with arguments more certain than those by which Catholics prove either purgatory or the divine authority of papal indulgences, my authority, slight as it may be, will be at risk with my readers. I shall show this better if, to establish this topic firmly, I lay its foundations deeper. Before that, however, I must briefly explain why we have placed this topic fifth. Some may think the order more fitting if this topic came before the preceding one, which contains the authority of councils. Although they may be mistaken in their conjecture, I understand the consequence they have in mind: if the authority of the Apostolic See is removed, all councils not only waver but fall; yet the Apostolic See has its authority in itself even without councils. The authority of the Apostolic Church would therefore come before the authority of councils. But nature requires that each thing keep its proper place, just as each element has its own proper place: earth occupies the lowest, water floods above it, the ether lies higher, and the highest regions are given to fire. We answer briefly that, given the limits of human understanding, we often disregard nature’s order. Human beings, however,
are so constituted, as Aristoteles has often observed, that they proceed from what is better known to what is less known. Since the authority of councils is more acceptable and familiar to most people, it is no wonder that we have put the natural order aside. Besides, councils represent the Church, and it would not have been orderly to separate Catholic councils from the Catholic Church. We therefore rightly joined the Church’s councils to it. Enough of this. Let us now pursue the matter we set out to treat.
Chapter III
IT CONTAINS THREE PROPOSITIONS BY WHICH IT IS SHOWN THAT PETER’S FIRMNESS IN FAITH ALSO PASSES TO HIS SUCCESSORS
Although I am not unaware that some dislike the scholastic form of disputation, I ought not to adopt any other way of disputing than one that I have found approved by men of the highest distinction and have always considered most suitable for refuting every error. Certainly, what Augustinus argued against the Church’s adversaries was devised with greater subtlety and expressed with greater refinement than everyone can readily understand; yet it is judged all the more suitable for defeating heresies because it cuts down to the living issue with such precision. Since I am going to demonstrate that the Apostolic See, which is also the Roman See, cannot err in faith, following the practice of the schools I will lay down three propositions on which the hinge of this question turns. First proposition: the Apostle Petrus was appointed by Christ as pastor of the universal Church. This is plainly proved by the testimony in Ioannes: “Feed my sheep.” For Christ did not distinguish these sheep from those, thereby showing that any sheep that did not recognize Petrus as its shepherd belonged outside his fold, as Innocentius argues most clearly in De mai. et ob. cap. Solitae and Bernardus in lib. De consid. Ad Eugen., cap. 6. There can be no doubt that this care specially belonged to Petrus, whom the Lord questioned before entrusting him with the sheep, and did so not once or twice but a third time: “Simon, son of Iona, do you love me more than these?” Here he stated not only Simon’s own name but also his father’s name, so that no ambiguity could evade Peter’s authority or perversely turn it toward someone else. The same point is again made clear by another testimony in Matthaeus: “Blessed are you,” the Lord says, “Simon Bar Iona, for flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven. And I say to you that you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and whatever you bind on earth…” First observe that, although all the disciples had been asked, while the others remained silent, Peter alone answered. Then notice that Christ preserved Peter’s old name, saying, “Blessed are you, Simon,” and added his father’s name so that the words could not refer to the Cananaeus. He also gave him a new name, one not shared with the other Apostles but his own. “And I say to you,” he says—not to Ioannes, not to Iacobus, but to you: “you are,” not merely called but truly are, Peter, that is, a rock. Hence in Ioannes, cap. 1, he was called Cephas by the Lord, that is, a great stone or cliff fit to bear a great building. “And upon this rock,” he says, “I will build my Church”—that is, upon you, Peter—as Hilarius explains in his commentary on Matthaeus; Ambrosius, sermone 47 de fide Petri; Cyprianus, in his letter to Quintus; Hieronymus, lib. 1, Contra Iovinian., and on Matthaeus, and in a certain letter to Marcella, and on Isaiae, ch. 2 and 16 (although in a sermon on Pentecost he explained it differently); Chrysostomus, homil. 55 in Matth.; Cyrillus, lib. 2 in Ioann., cap. 12; Origenes, hom. 1 in Matth. and hom. 5 super Exodum; and Theophylactus
Luke 22; Gregory in one letter to the Emperor Maurice and another to Eulogius, Bishop of Alexandria, lib. 6, epist. 37; Leo, concione 2, de apostolis Petro et Paulo. In his letter to Flavian, Peter, he says, “drew the solidity both of his virtue and of his name from the principal rock”; and he explains this more clearly in epist. 67 ad episcop. Viennens. and 19 dist., cap. Ita Dominus. Tertullian, lib. De praescr. haer.; Epiphanius in lib. Ancoratus; and Dionysius in his letter to Timothy also say that Peter was called by Paul the foundation of the Churches. The Council of Chalcedon too calls Peter the rock and foundation of the Catholic Church, and consequently acknowledges that the Catholic Church was built upon Peter. I know that Augustine hesitated to grant this in his final homily on John and De verb. Domini, homil. 4. Yet in lib. 1 Retract., cap. 21 he does not reject this common view of the saints. Nor could it rightly be rejected, since it is approved not only by the Supreme Pontiffs but also by councils, as will be clear from what we say later. But there is no need to illuminate a matter already so clear by bringing in outside lights. Why, then, does the Lord say to Simon son of Jonah, “You are Πέτρος,” that is, a rock, unless we are to understand that when he immediately adds, “and upon this rock I will build my Church,” Peter himself is the very rock upon which the Church was to be built? Since, by metaphor, the foundation of a house is the same as the head, preserving the analogy of the body, it is plainly inferred that Peter is both the head and the foundation of the Church. Why should we fear to call Peter the head when we cannot deny that he is the ruler of Christ’s sheep? The rulers of peoples are called heads, Amos 6; and because Saul was king, he is called the head of the people, 1 Regum 15. But Bucer asks for the testimonies of the fathers and denies that Peter was ever called the head of the Church by anyone. His denial is utterly shameless, since Evaristus, Alexander I, Pius I, Callistus I, Gregory, Athanasius, Chrysostom, the fathers of the Council of Chalcedon, and the Seventh Synod of Constantinople have plainly called Peter and his successors the head of the Church. We shall set down their testimonies shortly. Let us therefore acknowledge that Christ established Peter as head, foundation, ruler, and shepherd of the universal Church. For all these things are so closely joined that if you remove one, you must remove the rest. But Clement, 6 Dispo. lib., says: “Peter, James, and John, although they had been preferred by Christ to almost everyone, did not claim the glory of primacy for themselves, but appointed James, who was called the Just, bishop of the apostles.” Peter was therefore not, for Clement, the shepherd of the universal Church. Heretics hunt up testimonies of this kind here and there to cast darkness over the light. Dionysius, 3 c. De div. nomin., says that Peter was the highest honor and pillar of the theologians. Eusebius, lib. 2 Eccles. hist., cap. 14, writes that Peter was the most approved and greatest of all the apostles and the foremost prince in the magnificence of faith. Epiphanius, haeresi 51, asserts that Christ chose Peter to be the leader of his disciples. Leo, in his letter to the bishops of Vienne, says that the Lord wished the mystery of the evangelical office to pertain to the duty of all the apostles in such a way that he placed it principally in blessed Peter, the chief of all the apostles. Heretics do not believe these many suitable witnesses—for it would take too long to list the others—but want us to believe one Clement, who says that James was appointed bishop of the apostles. James is acknowledged as bishop of Jerusalem; he is not acknowledged as bishop of the apostles. Yet while the apostles were in Jerusalem, for the sake of edification they certainly showed great deference to James, to provide an example for later bishops to conduct themselves as subordinates in another Church. It is fortunate that Clement does not claim that the Lord established this but that the apostles did so out of modesty. In this first proposition, however, we assert that the Lord established Peter as shepherd of the Catholic Church.
Since Cajetan has shown this with many powerful arguments in libel. De auctoritate Papae et Concilii, and even more fully in another work, De Eccles. Romanae primatu, it is enough for us to have demonstrated it briefly. Second proposition: Peter could not err when he taught the Church or strengthened the sheep in faith. This is shown first by Luke 22: “Simon, Simon, behold, Satan has asked for you, to sift you like wheat; but I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail; and you, once converted, strengthen your brothers.” Notice that when the Lord said, “Satan has asked for you,” he did not say, “I have prayed for you all,” but “for you”; nor did he say, “and when you all are converted,” but “you, once converted, strengthen your brothers.” Since Christ’s prayer, as Paul attests, was always heard, Christ certainly obtained what he prayed for: that Peter’s faith would not fail, so that he might strengthen his brothers in faith. This is also shown by Matthew 16: “Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” Explaining these words, Origen says in hom. 1 in Matth.: “It is clear, even if it is not expressly stated, that the gates of hell will not prevail either against Peter or against the Church. For if they prevailed against the rock on which the Church was founded, they would also prevail against the Church.” Peter, then, stood firm in faith, lest the building founded upon him collapse. Further, if Peter was given the keys of not one heaven but the heavens, as Origen noted in homil. 6 in Matth., and the keys open the heavens, it follows that they remove every obstacle to heaven. Ignorance of the faith blocks entry into heaven on the side of the understanding, just as an evil affection blocks it on the side of the will. Peter was therefore given power no less to remove ignorance than to remove sins. Whatever he loosed and whatever he bound, whether it concerned the understanding or the affections, would accordingly be loosed and bound in heaven. Peter could therefore rightfully resolve difficult questions of faith and bind the faithful by his judgment to hold what he decreed. But the faithful cannot be bound by a false judgment on faith. If “there is divination on the lips of a king, and his mouth shall not err in judgment,” as Proverbs 16 says, why should we think that Peter, appointed by God as prince of the kingdom of heaven, could have erred in a most serious judgment of faith? And if Caiaphas, an impious man in the synagogue, prophesied because he was high priest that year, should we not all the more believe that Peter, made by Christ the Supreme Pontiff of the Church, was moved by the divine Spirit to settle the truth? Finally, if Peter was appointed by God as pastor of all the faithful, he was therefore made the Church’s supreme teacher and master. If he did not give Christ’s sheep the pastures of wholesome doctrine but could feed them with false and ruinous errors, Christ would surely not have provided for the Church. Yet he did provide for it, unless Peter himself deceived us when he said: “Brothers, you know that in the early days God chose among us that the Gentiles should hear the word of the Gospel from my mouth and believe.” Christ therefore chose Peter in particular among the others so that the Gentiles would not only hear him speak in disputes of faith but also believe him. For after Peter gave his judgment, the whole assembly fell silent and agreed with Peter’s decision, as Luke reports in Actor. 15. Third proposition: When Peter dies, divine law requires someone to succeed him in the same authority and power. Since Christ’s sheep were to exist until the end of the age, it would surely be foolish to think that Christ appointed a temporary shepherd for a flock that would endure forever. The Lord, then, in establishing the pastoral office of the Church and conferring it on the first shepherd, is understood to have conferred it in the ordinary course on each successor, as Cajetan proved in De prim. Eccles. Rom., cap. 12.
has demonstrated with great learning. Further, the kingdom of Christ was to be eternal; therefore the rule of the Church was not temporary, as was also proved in the preceding book. Otherwise, if Peter’s power was not transmitted to his successors, we would not acknowledge that the power of the other apostles was transmitted to succeeding bishops either. The Church would now have no power belonging to either bishops or priests. This is plainly an error in faith. Bernard also uses, in confirmation of this, the testimony from Exod. in ad Eugen. lib. 2, cap. 6: “Be a mediator for the people in matters pertaining to God, to show the people the ceremonies, the rite of worship, and the way in which they must walk. Choose from all the people capable men to judge the people at all times. Whatever matter is greater, let them refer to you; let them judge only the smaller matters. If you do this, you will fulfill the command of the Lord.” When Jethro had said this, Moses did all he had suggested. Since Jethro’s advice was plainly excellent and most necessary for the synagogue—that there be one supreme judge to whom the more important cases and questions were referred—it is in no way plausible that Christ the Lord lacked advice of this kind, which the Church likewise needed. The Lord did not therefore confer this power on Peter alone; it also passed to his successors, unless God cared more for the synagogue than for the Church. This point is especially confirmed by another testimony from the Old Law, which Innocent III used in cap. Per venerabilem, qui Filii sunt legitimi. “If,” it says, “you see that a judgment among you is difficult and ambiguous, and you see that the words of the judges within your gates differ, rise and go up to the place that the Lord your God will choose; you shall go to the priests of the tribe of Levi and to the judge who is there at that time, and ask them for the true judgment. You shall do whatever those who preside in the place the Lord has chosen tell you and teach you according to his law; you shall follow their judgment and not turn to the right or left. Whoever acts arrogantly, refusing to obey the command of the priest who serves the Lord your God at that time, shall die by decree of the judge, so that no one may grow proud thereafter.” First, we must observe in these words that not every case is to be referred to the metropolitan judge and supreme priest, but only more difficult cases, beyond the power of lesser judges to resolve. Next, we must observe that this supreme tribunal, from whose judgment there was absolutely no appeal under the rule of the Law, did indeed have a senate of Levites and priests, but only one was the chief judge and supreme priest, who alone is indicated as having authority to pass judgment: “Whoever acts arrogantly,” it says, “refusing to obey the command of the priest who serves at that time”—or “who presides in the ministry,” as the Seventy translated. Again: “He shall die by decree of the judge.” It does not say, “of the priests and judges,” but “of the priest and judge.” Nor should we pass over that the Lord does not command a council to be assembled from the whole synagogue; he commands that a council of priests and Levites be convened, who would always be present in the capital as a senate for the supreme priest. Since these questions and controversies could arise repeatedly, the tribunal needed to be ready and easy to access. It would not be so if a frequent council had to be gathered from the whole synagogue to settle every dispute. We must also not neglect that the lawgiver absolutely prescribes that after the judgment of the presiding priest all must yield their opinions. “You shall do,” he says, “... and follow their judgment, and you shall not turn to the right or left.” The lawgiver rightly prescribed this,
because earlier, to make those deliberating secure, he had promised that the judgment of the senate to which the inquiry was referred would be true. “They will judge for you with true judgment,” he says. But Bucer says these things will be true if the judges have pronounced according to the Law. For Moses says, “You shall do whatever they teach you according to his Law.” First, as these men often do to us, I would like to call them back to the Hebrew truth. The Seventy translated it this way: “You shall act according to the word they announce to you from the place that the Lord your God will choose. Be very careful to do everything they have decreed for you: you shall act according to the Law and according to the judgment they tell you.” Sanctes Pagninus rendered it this way: “You shall act according to the utterance of the word they announce to you, and you shall be careful to do whatever they teach you. You shall act according to the rule of the Law that they teach you, and according to the judgment they tell you.” Moses does not command them to believe the priests if they have judged according to the Law; rather, he commands that what the priests teach be held as the Law. Otherwise, if people returning to the senate to settle a dispute about the Law and religion could seize upon this objection, no such question would ever be settled. There would always remain the point of doubt whether the priests were speaking according to the Law, and no judge would have been appointed to resolve that doubt. But I think I have discussed these matters sufficiently and carefully elsewhere. Here we are concerned only to show that God established a single supreme tribunal of the High Priest even after the time of Moses, for as long as the synagogue would exist, and that all private citizens and even lesser judges would depend on its judgment. What, then? Did Moses provide for the synagogue, while Christ failed to provide for the Church? Or do we want there to be no judge in Israel in these days, but for everyone to do and think whatever seems good to him? “We want the liberty of the Gospel,” they say. Is it liberty for a city to have no ruler? Is it liberty for a ship to be abandoned to the waves and wind without a helmsman? Liberty would then mean, as someone says, having no teacher in a school, no head in a human body, no mind in a person, but having everything confused and mixed up at the whim of one’s desires. Even beasts would not wish for that, since they need shepherds to lead them to pasture and defend them there from the harm of wild animals. Returning, then, to our point: when Peter died, one household was not left without a father, one city without a ruler, or one flock without a shepherd. Someone succeeds him in the authority to govern and feed the sheep. If you object that a suitable argument cannot be drawn from a type and figure, remember that what was sketched in that ancient people according to the pattern and order of the Church must be referred to the pattern and order of the Church. We are not arguing from a type or figure, but from the lesser to the greater, and with evident reason. For it is unbelievable that, by God’s authority, the synagogue had a judge and senate to settle disputes of faith, law, and religion, while the Church has none—especially since the Church has much greater need of one. Since it has arisen from nations, languages, minds, and customs so diverse, it must have more and greater disputes about faith and religion. Unless the prince of this commonwealth can settle them, the form and condition of the Church is surely most shameful, and its lot far worse than that of the synagogue. But setting aside the comparison of Church and synagogue, the authority appropriate to a ruler in any society is certainly prescribed by its end. The authority is not equal for every ruler: one kind suits a head of a household, another a prefect, and another a king. Each of these must have as much authority as the end of the society he governs requires, so that the head of a household
must have the authority that right reason and doctrine prescribe as necessary for the end of a domestic household, since otherwise it is entirely impossible to live in one house and under one roof where people have different natures and different duties. The Supreme Pontiff established by Christ therefore has as much authority in the Church as is necessary to keep the citizens of the Christian commonwealth in faith, religion, and duty. Disputes about faith and religion must arise among us. If Christ gave no judge to settle them, to whom every such question would finally be referred, they would continue without end in perpetual disagreement, and the Church would contain as many discordant opinions on faith and religion as it has heads, all different from one another. If the unity, charity, and fellowship of the Church must be preserved, then Christ certainly left one ruler who, like Peter, can settle the quarrels of those who disagree and resolve their questions. We see that this belongs to the ruler of every other society: if disputes arise among its members, especially disputes that properly concern the end of that society, he can settle them with the counsel of prudent and senior people he calls to his side. This third proposition was finally defined at the Council of Constance. In its 8th session, it condemned this error of Wycliffe: “The Pope is not the nearest and immediate vicar of Christ.” In its 15th session it condemned as the seventh error the following: “Peter was not and is not the head of the holy Catholic Church.” And as the thirteenth error: “The Pope is not the manifest and true successor of Peter.” And as the twenty-seventh error: “There is not even a spark of evidence that there must be one head governing the Church in spiritual matters, who always lives and remains with the Church militant.” In the bull of Martin V, who presided over the same council, the question is also asked: “Does he believe that the Pope lawfully elected at that time is the successor of blessed Peter, holding supreme power in the Church of God?” This was certainly no novelty; rather, the Church has always acknowledged one Supreme Pontiff and pastor of the whole Church succeeding Peter. If all the other power granted to Peter, whether for remitting sins or for any other duties necessary to the Christian commonwealth, belongs not to Peter alone but to his successors, then surely these words—“Upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it”; “I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven”; “Feed my sheep”; and finally, “I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail”—must be referred to the Supreme Pontiffs who succeed Peter in the Church. The privilege of not erring in faith was granted to Peter for the benefit of the Church. For after Christ said, “I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail,” he immediately added, “And you, strengthen your brothers.” Let this suffice in general. We shall now explain more clearly, in particular, the matters relevant to this controversy.
Chapter IV
IN WHICH IT IS SHOWN THAT THE ROMAN BISHOP IS THE ONE WHO SUCCEEDS PETER BY DIVINE RIGHT BOTH IN FIRMNESS OF FAITH AND IN SETTLING RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES
It follows that we must show that the Roman See is the place where Peter’s firmness and authority have been established by God. Since not only heretics but also some Catholics have shamelessly and imprudently denied this, we must strengthen the point with the greatest care. It is not easy to overthrow an opinion that has been so carefully—and though less truly, still carefully—founded and built up, if it can even be called an opinion, since it is refuted by arguments so certain. Although Cajetan said much about this subject both here and elsewhere, especially in libello De Romanae Ecclesiae primatu, we must discuss the same things again. Perhaps we shall explain them somewhat briefly, since there is little room here for an abundant style. Yet whatever is said clearly about matters of great importance and difficulty is said excellently and admirably. As we set out to explain a difficult passage, we shall first do so by witnesses whose testimony leaves no room for doubt. I do not want to burden the reader with as many testimonies as possible, but shall cite only the strongest and clearest. I shall begin with the Supreme Pontiffs themselves, whose judgments on this matter are clear and certain. I shall cite them directly, so as not to keep interrupting with “he says” and “he adds.” Anacletus, in Epist. 1 de oppressione episcoporum, says: “More difficult questions and greater cases are to be referred to the Apostolic See, because the apostles established this by the command of the Savior: greater and more difficult questions are always to be brought to the Apostolic See, upon which Christ built the whole Church, when he said to the blessed prince of the apostles, ‘You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.’” In epist. 3 de patriarchis et primatibus, he explains what he understood by the Apostolic See in these words: “This most holy Roman and Apostolic Church obtained its primacy not from the apostles but from the Lord himself, our Savior, and acquired preeminence of power over all the Churches and the whole flock of the Christian people, just as he said to blessed Peter the apostle: ‘You are Peter,’ etc.” Evaristus says: “Doubts are to be referred to the Apostolic See as to a head.” Evaristus said this to the bishops of the African region when they consulted him on a question of faith. He also said that in this they were following the rule of the fathers. From the Church’s beginning, then, the Roman Pontiff was recognized as a teacher of faith, which was Peter’s particular office. Alexander I says in a letter to all the orthodox: “The arrangements for the most important cases and all the affairs of the Churches were entrusted by the Lord himself to the summit of this holy and Apostolic See, as to a head.” He proves this by the same testimony from Matthew: “You are Peter,” etc. Sixtus I, in a letter to the Churches of Gaul, and Eleutherius, in a letter to those same Churches, affirm that the holy apostles established that the judgments of bishops be referred to the Apostolic See, namely, because the greater cases of the Church, etc. Pius I says in a letter to all the Churches: “The Lord commanded that this holy Apostolic See be the head of all the Churches, saying to the prince of the apostles, Peter: ‘You are Peter,’ etc.” Victor, in a letter to Theophilus, defines that the cases of all bishops belonged to the Roman bishop from the time of the apostles; he proves this by the testimony, “Whatever you bind,” etc. He also cites the institution of the apostles, in which the Roman See is called
the universal Apostolic Church. Sixtus II also reports this same apostolic canon in the name of the Church. Zephyrinus says in a letter to the bishops of Sicily: “The greater cases of the Church are to be settled by the Apostolic See, and by no other, as the apostles established, in accordance with the words, ‘Whatever you bind,’ etc.” Marcellus confirms the same in a letter to the bishops of the province of Antioch, citing, “You are Peter,” etc. He also asserts that, by divine command and the tradition of the apostles, the greater affairs of the Church are to be referred to the Roman Church as to a head. Eusebius, writing to the bishops of Campania and Tuscany, first affirmed that the Roman Church had been endowed with Peter’s privilege, then added: “The first condition of salvation is to keep the rules of the true faith and in no way depart from the constitutions of the fathers. Nor may we neglect the sentence of our Lord, who says, ‘You are Peter,’ etc. These things are proved by their effects: in the Apostolic See the Catholic religion has always been preserved without stain.” Melchiades says in a letter to the bishops of Spain: “The Lord entrusted the privilege of judging bishops, in his place alone, to blessed Peter, the keeper of the keys. He grants that prerogative to Peter’s See to be inherited for future ages. It was established from the time of the apostles that this privilege be preserved; it remains unharmed to this day, lest the members ever disagree with their head and schisms arise.” Marcus says to Athanasius: “The holy Roman Church, which has always remained immaculate, with the Lord’s providence and the help of blessed Peter the apostle, will remain firm and immovable in the future, without any assault by heretics. This is the living tradition of the apostles. This is the holy Apostolic Mother Church of all the Churches of Christ, which by the grace of almighty God is proved never to have strayed from the path of apostolic tradition, but remains undefiled to the end, in accordance with the Lord’s promise: ‘I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail.’” Lucius proves the same point by this testimony in reply to questions from the bishops of Gaul and Spain, as does Felix in a letter to Benignus. Julius says in a letter to the Eastern bishops: “According to the Gospel and apostolic institutions, the right to convene councils and the greater cases must be referred to the Apostolic See. The holy apostles and their successors established this; the Synod of Nicaea defined it.” To confirm this, the Pontiff cites the same testimony of Christ repeated by the others: “You are Peter,” etc., as well as the reason that the members must not disagree with their head. Julius says the same in a letter to the bishops gathered at Antioch: “The Lord himself properly addressed the holy Roman and Apostolic Church when he said, ‘You are Peter,’ etc. For it has authority granted by a singular privilege, consecrated by the Lord’s own words and exalted from above. Just as blessed Peter was first among all the apostles, so this Church, consecrated in his name by the Lord’s institution, is first and head of the others, so that the greater cases of the Church may be referred to it as to the mother and summit of all.” He adds that the Synod of Nicaea defined that neither councils may be held nor bishops condemned in any way without the judgment of the Roman Pontiff, to whom the Lord himself entrusted the greater affairs of the Churches by a special privilege. To confirm this, he cites chapter 18 of the Council of Nicaea: “In more serious cases, all bishops may freely appeal to the Apostolic See and flee to it as to a mother; ancient apostolic authority reserved all the greater ecclesiastical cases to its decision.”
He also cites chapter 19 of the same Council of Nicaea in these words: “Although the case of an accused Pontiff may be examined by the bishops of his province, it must not be decided without consulting the Roman Pontiff, since the Lord himself said to blessed Peter the apostle, ‘Whatever you bind on earth,’ etc.” See: the Council of Nicaea plainly asserts that the power the Lord gave to blessed Peter was transmitted to the Roman Pontiff. It is no objection that these chapters are not found in our copies now. First, Julius himself testifies under solemn oath that they are held in the archive of the Roman See; Julius was the first of that name to give this testimony, a man of upright and uncorrupted faith. Second, he wrote his letter against people, most of whom had themselves attended the Council of Nicaea; it is in no way plausible that he would have cited canons against people who could easily prove that the Pontiff had fabricated them. Third, Athanasius and the Pontiffs of Egypt, Thebaid, and Libya also attest to it in their letter to Felix; they too were present at that council. “We know,” they say, “that at the great Synod of Nicaea all unanimously confirmed that no councils may be held and no bishops condemned without the judgment of the Roman Pontiff.” In the same letter they report that heretics burned and took from us these chapters and many other necessary ones. At the Sixth Council of Carthage, Faustinus, Philippus, and Asellus, legates of the Apostolic See, also cited the same canon in the name of the Council of Nicaea, from the letters of Zosimus, Roman Pontiff. Athanasius also testifies in a letter to Pope Marcus that the Council of Nicaea had seventy chapters; Marcus himself plainly confirms this in his reply. Pope Felix complains in a letter to the bishops of Egypt that heretics deleted the chapters we are now discussing. Pelagius too, 17 distin., cap. Multis, says that the holy Synod decreed what we are trying to prove, meaning the Council of Nicaea. Innocent I expressed the same in ad Victricium seu Victorinum, cap. 3, as did Leo in a letter to the younger Theodosius. There can therefore be no doubt that our position was defined by the Council of Nicaea, as Pope Julius asserted. Damasus says to the bishops of the three African councils: “It is not lawful to define the most important cases without the authority of the Roman See, and to hold a synod without its authority is not Catholic. No councils are recorded as valid unless supported by apostolic authority. For the Apostolic See is the firm and immovable support of all bishops and the summit of the Churches, fixed by God; upon it Christ built the universal Church, saying, ‘You are Peter,’ etc.” See the same testimony in his letter to Prosper and the other orthodox bishops of Numidia. Innocent I says in letters to the two Councils of Carthage and Milevis: “You rightly consult the secrets of the Apostolic See, following the form of the ancient rule, which you know has always been observed throughout the world, especially whenever the question concerns faith.” To be brief—for it would be tedious to cite everyone’s words—Leo confirms the same in epist. 54 ad Anastasium and epist. 67 ad episcopos Viennensis provinciae; Gelasius, in his letter to Emperor Anastasius and in the decrees issued with seventy bishops, and in his letter to the bishops of Dardania; Vigilius in his decrees, final chapter; Pelagius II to the bishops gathered in Constantinople; St. Gregory in his letter to Augustine, bishop of the English; and many other Pontiffs. Their testimonies can be found in 12 dist., 17, 19, 20, 21, 22; 80 dist., cap. Urbes; 96 dist., cap. Bene; 24 quest. 1 in many chapters; 25 quaest. 1; De electione, cap. Significasti; De Privileg., cap. Antiqua; De Baptis., cap. Maiores; De elect. in 6, cap. Fundamenta; and in Extravag. Unam
sacred. The Lateran Council under Leo X made this decretal known and approved it. Since all the bishops who succeed Peter in the See of the Roman Church have unanimously asserted that the firmness of faith conferred on Peter belongs to the Roman Pontiffs as his lawful successors, anyone who denies this also denies the authority of the Church, if Irenaeus’s canon is true. This was a sound reason why Churches that had fallen away from the Roman See were received back into ecclesiastical unity by the Supreme Pontiffs only under a confession of this kind: “The first condition of salvation is to keep the rule of the true faith and in no way depart from the constitutions of the fathers. Since we cannot neglect the sentence of our Lord Jesus Christ, who says, ‘You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church,’ and since these things are proved by their effects, because in the Apostolic See the Catholic religion has always been preserved without stain, we anathematize all who raise their necks against the holy Roman and Apostolic Church. In all things we follow the Apostolic See, in which there is the complete and true firmness of the Christian religion, and we profess that those separated from communion with the Catholic Church—that is, those who do not agree with the Apostolic See—are not to have their names recited among the sacred mysteries, namely, those who strive to annul the privileges of the holy Roman and Apostolic Church.” Boniface II prescribed this rule of confession in a letter to Eulalius, Bishop of Carthage. John, Bishop of Constantinople, made it when the Church of Constantinople was reunited with the Roman Church, from which it had fallen away under Acacius. Pope Hormisdas sent the same rule to the bishops of Spain, so that if people coming out of schism sought ecclesiastical communion from them, they would be admitted according to that form of profession. Finally, Pope Adrian gave it to the Eighth General Synod. Unless we are very obstinate, we should now be sufficiently persuaded that Peter’s authority and firmness reside in the Roman See.
Chapter V
HERE THE SAME CONCLUSION IS SHOWN BY CLEAR TESTIMONIES OF THE ANCIENT SAINTS
We should not listen to those who criticize and mock us for citing here testimonies from people whose judgment, they say, our opponents may rightly and justly reject as though it were given in their own cause. This was not the particular cause of the Roman Pontiffs but a matter common to the Church and all nations. Some of these witnesses were Latins, others Greeks; some Spaniards, some Africans, some Gauls and Germans. For almost all of these people, the cause of the Roman Church was not only not their own but foreign to them. Among them too were many men so distinguished and upright in doctrine, life, and conduct that their good faith neither ought nor can be suspected. Moreover, some of them were disciples of the apostles, or at least lived close to their time; only impious and brazen men would dare to cast suspicion of fiction upon that age.
But so that no room for evasion remains, I also wish to use testimonies from the ancient saints who were not Roman Pontiffs. For they certainly had no reason to be ignorant of this matter or to fabricate it. Irenaeus says in lib. 3 Advers. haeres., cap. 5: “Since it would take a very long time to list the successions of all the Churches, we point to the greatest, most ancient, and universally known Church founded at Rome by the two most glorious apostles Peter and Paul. By showing the tradition it has received from the apostles and the faith it has announced to people, which has come down to us, we confound all those who gather doctrines beyond what is fitting. For on account of its more powerful primacy every Church must agree with this Church—that is, the faithful everywhere—with which the apostolic tradition has always been preserved.” So far Irenaeus. Persuaded by this, Augustine says in Contra epistolam Manichaei, cap. 4: “Many things most rightly hold me in the bosom of the Church. The succession of priests holds me, from the very See of the Apostle Peter, to whom the Lord entrusted his sheep to be fed, down to the present bishop.” Augustine also acknowledges this apostolic chair and primacy in the Roman Church in epist. 162 ad Glorium et Eleusium, epist. 106 ad Paulinum, in Ioan. tract. 56, lib. 2 Contra Pelag. et Coelest., and lib. 2 Contra Donatist., cap. 1. Cyprian holds the same view most plainly in lib. 1 Epist., in his letter to Cornelius; in lib. 4, in his letter to Pupianus; and in the treatise De simpl. praelat. Ambrose too is a clear witness to this in lib. De excessu fratris sui Satyri, cap. 7 and serm. 47 de fide Petri. Cyril, cited by St. Thomas in libello Contra errores Graecorum, gives far clearer testimony to this truth than the other authors. Do not wonder that these passages can no longer be found in the books of the Thesaurus from which St. Thomas cites them. Heretics mutilated that book and erased everything in it that concerned the authority of the Roman Pontiff. Catholic scholars today have also discovered and exposed that heretics did the same in Theophylact’s commentaries on John. Not all the books of the Thesaurus have been translated into Latin, since the Sixth Synod cites book 32, which has not been rendered for us. St. Thomas also gives great weight to the same opinion, not merely asserting it but confirming it with the argument that the Apostle Paul came to Peter’s teaching, thereby setting an example for the future: in a similar case, people should have recourse to Peter’s successors, the Roman Pontiffs. Jerome too is a most reliable witness in his letter to Damasus on the word hypostasis. Gratian quoted his words in 24 quaestione prima, cap. Quoniam vetusto. I deliberately pass over the passage cited in quaest. cap. Haec est fides, from Jerome’s explanation of the Creed to Damasus, since Erasmus denies that letter is Jerome’s. Fortunately, the letter to Damasus on the word hypostasis is unquestionably Jerome’s. Add that in lib. 1 Apolog. adversus Ruffinum he holds the same, that someone who holds the Roman faith is Catholic. Bernard also supports our view in epist. 131 ad Mediolanenses, 166 ad Innocentium, 189 ad the same, 237 ad Eugenium, and 242 ad Romanos. I would cite others, but these are more than enough to establish the point. What unanimous, harmonious, and continuous judgment of so many great fathers would not compel anyone to accept what is said,
especially since their views are confirmed by the testimonies of holy synods as well, as will be shown in the next chapter.
Chapter VI
HERE THE CLEAREST TESTIMONIES OF COUNCILS ARE REPORTED, PROVING THE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE ROMAN CHURCH
In the two preceding chapters we did not include the words of all the Supreme Pontiffs or of the ancient saints, lest the discussion grow longer and more tiresome. We merely indicated the passages; when the reader sees them, he will clearly understand that we have cited nothing obscure, inept, or irrelevant. Now we shall report not only the judgments but also the words of synods on this matter, so that our opponents may be overwhelmed even more heavily by the cloud of these witnesses. First is the testimony of the Council of Nicaea, which it is not worth repeating here because it was cited in chapter 4. Second is that of the Council of Chalcedon, which St. Thomas reported in his work Contra errores Graecorum in these words: “According to Scripture and the definition of the canons, we venerate the most holy bishop of ancient Rome as first and greatest of the bishops.” And below: “If a bishop is declared infamous, he has the freedom to appeal to the most blessed bishop of ancient Rome, because we have Peter as the rock of refuge, and to him alone, by free power in God’s place, belongs the right to discern according to the keys given him by the Lord; everything defined by him is to be held as coming from the vicar of the apostolic throne.” Indeed, in act. 1 of this synod, Leo is said to govern the apostolic throne, and the Roman See is called the head of all the Churches. In act. 2, when Leo’s letter had been read, the fathers cried: “Anathema to whoever does not believe this! Peter has spoken through Leo.” In act. 3, they call the Roman bishop “our lord,” acclaim him as apostolic and universal, embrace his teaching as that of blessed Peter, and desire all the council’s doctrines to be confirmed by the authority of the Apostolic See. When Leo condemned Dioscorus, the Synod said: “The most holy archbishop of great Rome, together with thrice-blessed Peter, who is the rock and foundation of the Catholic Church and the foundation of the true faith, stripped him of his episcopal dignity.” In their synodal letter to Leo, the fathers also rejoice that the Lord gave so great a prelate to the Apostolic See, from which the source and origin of our religion flows. Such are the testimonies of the Council of Chalcedon. Those reported by St. Thomas, however, are not found in copies from our time. Gregory complains that they were erased by heretics in lib. 5 Epist., epistola 14 ad Narsem comitem. A third testimony appears in the Fifth General Synod held at Constantinople. In the judgment pronounced against Anthimus by Menas, Archbishop of Constantinople, to which all the council fathers subscribed, Menas himself added these words: “We follow the Apostolic See and obey it, as your charity knows; we count as our communicants those who are in communion with it, and we condemn those whom it condemns.” The Fifth General Synod, then, by subscribing to Menas’s judgment, embraces the decrees of the Apostolic See as certain. For otherwise it would not regard as Catholics all who are in communion with the Roman and Apostolic faith, nor condemn all those whom the Apostolic See had condemned.
Another very weighty testimony is found in the Fourth Session of the Sixth General Synod. There the profession of faith that Agatho, Roman bishop, sent to the council is recorded. Agatho repeats it in his synodal address—as it is called there—to which countless bishops subscribed. Lest anyone slander us, this address was approved by all the council fathers in act. 8, 13, and 17. The words of the synodal profession are as follows: “With the support of the blessed apostles, this Apostolic Church of his has never deviated from the way of truth in any part of error. All the Catholic Church of Christ and the universal synods have always faithfully embraced and followed its authority, since it is the authority of the prince of all the apostles. All the venerable fathers have embraced its apostolic teaching; through it the most approved lights of Christ have shone, and the holy orthodox doctors have revered and followed it, while heretics have attacked it with false accusations and hateful disparagement. By the grace of God, this Apostolic Church of Christ is proved never to have strayed from the path of apostolic tradition or to have yielded, corrupted by heretical novelties. As it received the faith at the beginning of Christianity from its authors, the princes of the apostles, so it remains undefiled to the end, according to the divine promise of the Lord and Savior himself: ‘Peter, Peter, behold Satan has asked for you,’ etc.; ‘I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail. And you, strengthen your brothers.’ It is known that my predecessors, the apostolic Pontiffs, have always done this with confidence.” So far Agatho, Roman bishop. In act. 18 the Synod itself plainly professes that Agatho, Roman bishop, is the successor in the see of the prince of the apostles. In act. 2 of the Seventh General Synod, the synodal letter of Adrian I was also read, in which he defines that the Roman Church is the head of all the Churches. The general council received and approved the letter, as is clear in that same act. 2. In the Eighth General Synod, too, there is a libellus of Adrian II, accepted and confirmed by the Synod itself, containing the profession of faith that we set out at the end of chapter 4. The fathers of this Eighth Synod agree with the teaching of the Roman Pontiff in these words: “Following in all things the Apostolic See, we hope to deserve to remain in the one communion proclaimed by the Apostolic See, in which the true and complete firmness of the Christian religion resides. Therefore, the names of those who do not agree with the Apostolic See are not to be recited among the sacred mysteries.” So far the fathers. In the same Synod, the letter of Ignatius, Patriarch of Constantinople, to Adrian was also approved, where this same point is taught plainly. The libellus of the Roman Church was approved too, as was the Synod of Nicholas, both of which teach the same doctrine. In its final session, canon 21, the Synod also calls the Roman See the see of Peter, prince of the apostles. The Roman Synod under Symmachus likewise agrees that the prelate of the Roman See rightly holds the primacy of the priesthood throughout the world by the merit of blessed Peter the apostle, and is accustomed to give firmness to synodal decrees. Further, another universal Synod presided over by Nicholas says: “If anyone despises doctrines or decrees promulgated by the prelate of the Apostolic See concerning the Catholic faith or ecclesiastical discipline, let him be anathema.” Lucius III adopted almost the same judgment in cap. Ad abolendam, De haereticis. Leo IX also asserts in his synodal letter to Peter, Patriarch of Antioch, that the holy Roman and Apostolic Church is the head of all the Churches,
to which the greater cases are to be referred. It says: “All councils and the Holy of Holies, the King of kings, confirm them.” Further, the Lateran Council under Innocent III says: “We do not wish to detract from Abbot Joachim, since he ordered all his writings to be submitted to the judgment of the Apostolic See for approval or correction, firmly confessing that he holds the faith held by the Roman Church, which by the Lord’s appointment is the mother and teacher of all the faithful.” The Council of Lyon under Gregory taught the same. By the Lord’s institution, then, the Roman Church is the teacher of the faithful, and therefore the Roman bishop succeeds Peter in the Church’s teaching office. The Council of Lyon under Innocent IV teaches the same. The Council of Trent, sess. 7, states the same in these words: “If anyone says that the Roman Church, which is the mother and teacher of all the Churches, does not have the true doctrine concerning the Sacrament of Baptism, let him be anathema.” The Council of Lyon under Gregory says that the Roman Pontiff is the Vicar of Jesus Christ, successor of Peter, and ruler of the universal Church. The Council of Vienne under Clement asserts that the declaration of questions of faith belongs to the Apostolic See alone. Moreover, the fathers of the Council of Florence say: “We define that the holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff hold primacy over the whole world; that the Roman Pontiff himself is successor of blessed Peter, prince of the apostles, and the true Vicar of Christ; that he is head of the whole Church and father and teacher of all Christians; and that our Lord Jesus Christ gave him full power in blessed Peter to feed and govern the universal Church, as is contained in the acts of the ecumenical councils.” So far the Council of Florence. We have cited enough testimonies from councils. What we have set out must now be strengthened by theological arguments, especially that the Roman Pontiff cannot err when he judges matters of faith.
Chapter VII
HE PROVES BY THEOLOGICAL REASONS THAT THE ROMAN PONTIFF CANNOT ERR IN SETTLING DISPUTES OF FAITH
Since the time of the apostles, the Church has always recognized that the Roman pontiff succeeds Peter in faith and authority. Because the agreement of the whole world had firmly established this, even the Arians could not deny it, as Sozomenus reports in lib. 4 Histor. trip., cap. 15 and 16. Moreover, it is so certain and evident that bishops of the Churches appealed to the Roman See in their most serious cases, that the faithful always sought oracles of faith from its mouth, that all Catholics awaited its judgment in disputes about religion, and finally that all sacred councils sought its power and authority, that I would be foolish to try to prove it. From these facts, since they cannot be denied, the argument we seek is constructed and established: what we seek—
an argument which, among many great ones, one could hardly call less evident or certain. For if no interpreter of Christ’s laws is sounder than the Church’s perpetual practice, and if in questions of faith and religion and in other most serious controversies the Church has always turned, not to the bishops of Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople, Ephesus, Milan, Paris, Cologne, Toledo, or Braga, but to the bishop of Rome, who can doubt that this is the one whom we regard both as Peter’s successor and as teacher of apostolic doctrine and judge of questions of faith? For if Christ left some such person after Peter to establish the Church and keep it in the truth, surely it is either this bishop or no one, since there is no question that the bishops of other churches were not appointed by God as universal teachers and shepherds of the Church in Peter’s place. Therefore, as the Church’s practice interprets it, the Roman bishop is the one to whom the Lord said in Peter, “Upon this rock I will build my Church”; “I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven”; “Whatever you loose,” and so forth; again, “Feed my sheep”; and, “I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail; and you, strengthen your brothers.” Moreover, do we not learn from experience itself that Christ’s prophecies concerning Peter and his successors are fulfilled more manifestly in the Roman Church? For it is clear that this Church has remained steadfast and immovable in Peter’s faith and authority, even while the whole world shook it with every kind of assault. We have seen the other apostolic churches either occupied by unbelievers, with no trace of the faith remaining, or at times afflicted by heretics; yet neither pagans nor heretics have prevailed against this one Roman See. Indeed, a fierce struggle was waged, not only by the Greeks but by many other bishops throughout the world, to undermine this privilege of the Roman Church. They had on their side the arms of emperors and the greater number of churches, yet they could never abolish the Roman pontiff’s authority or transfer it to another bishop. On the contrary, those who defected from the Roman See were always regarded in the Church as schismatics, while those who rejected this See’s judgments on matters of faith were regarded as heretics. All this plainly shows that by divine, not human, decree the Roman Church has been set above the others, has rightly claimed for itself Peter’s privileges, and is that rock on which Christ built the universal Church, against which the gates of hell cannot prevail. If this were not so, how could the Roman Church have resisted so many and such powerful princes, so many dissenting heretics, and so many churches plotting defection? If theologians had asserted this privilege of the Roman bishop on the basis of a fictitious and empty opinion, that judgment would not have remained so steadfast, been strengthened by time, and grown old along with the centuries and generations of humanity. We see, after all, that invented and empty opinions fade with time, especially when learned men oppose them. Time erases the inventions of opinion, but confirms the judgments of faith. Add that the integrity of apostolic traditions could not have been preserved down to our day, when heretical bishops have so often occupied other churches, unless the one Apostolic See had stood firm and undefiled amid so many upheavals throughout the world. Moreover, since councils, both provincial and general, have sometimes erred without the authority of the Roman pontiff, but never when confirmed by his authority, it should be sufficiently clear that the firmness of councils, and therefore of the whole Church, derives from the Roman pontiff. Since we have said much about this in the preceding chapter, from there
the reader will gather what bears on explaining this argument. And if the Roman bishop could err when defining a question of faith, the condemnation of many heresies would immediately become uncertain for us, since most have been condemned not by the judgment and decree of a general council but by that of the Roman Church. Further, if there is disagreement among the fathers of a council about the interpretation of Sacred Scripture, whether any book is canonical, or some other question of this kind, a judge must be appointed to settle the dispute; yet if he could err, his judgment would be uncertain. No one in the Church has been recognized as judge among dissenting council fathers except the Roman bishop. Moreover, the Church’s custom plainly declares this. An appeal in cases of faith has never been admitted from the Roman See; those whom it has judged heretics, the Church has always judged heretics as well. Certainly, if the judgment of the Roman See were fallible while that of a council were true and certain, a person who denied an appeal from the pontiff to a council would oppose nature, reason, and true theology. By this single argument Gelasius shows that the Apostolic See judges the whole Church, while it itself is subject to no one’s judgment. The Church knows no such appeals, especially in matters of the dogma of faith; only heretics make use of them. If a general council had to be assembled to condemn each individual heretic, since this is often not merely difficult but impossible, heretics would surely be free to live with impunity in the meantime, until a synod could be convened by the whole Church. Since this is plainly foreign to Christ’s providence, let us instead acknowledge that the authority of the Roman See is sufficient to refute heresies. Thus the judgment of this tribunal on faith will be held entirely certain. Moreover, do we believe only in the Catholic Church, and not also in the Apostolic Church? Yet the Roman Church is called Apostolic by the agreement of the fathers and the faithful, while all the others lost this title many years ago. But you ask: would it be heretical to assert that the Roman Church too can degenerate like the others, and that the Apostolic See can also fall away from Christ’s faith? We answer this question briefly. We do not wish here to anticipate the Church’s judgment; but if the matter were referred to a general council, that error would be branded with the mark of heresy. I do not see why I should not dare to say what I myself think about this, since I seem to see it all the more clearly because I consider it closely and carefully, and do so without passion or agitation. If I err in defending the privileges of the Roman See granted to it by Christ and in believing that those who contradict them should be condemned as heretics, I err not only safely but willingly; nor do I wish to be torn away by force of reason from an error that is useful to me and even delights me. For I was moved to believe this not only by reason and argument but also by the distinction and authority of the greatest theologians. Hieronymus says that the one who does not follow the faith of the chair of Peter and of the Roman See is profane and perjured. Cyprian says that the one who does not maintain the unity of the universal Church—that is, one light from which many rays shine, one root from which many branches grow, one source from which many streams flow, one rock on which the Church is built, one Pontiff who holds all the others together by his power and authority—is an outsider, profane, and an enemy. If you remove a ray from it, it is extinguished; if you break a branch, it perishes; if you cut off a stream, it dries up. This is how he explains it. But whoever rejects the faith and judgment of the Apostolic See in a controversy of faith can maintain neither unity nor light, root, or source. Cyprian also says, “Whoever abandons the chair of Peter, on which the Church is founded,”
“should not trust that he is in the Church.” Ambrosius regards being Catholic and agreeing with the Roman Church as entirely the same thing. Gregorius holds that the authority of the Roman See in matters of religion and faith must be embraced so that whoever refuses it is torn away from the firmness of that rock on which Christ founded the universal Church. Leo declares that the one who dares to depart from Peter’s firmness is excluded from the divine Mystery, and calls it an impious presumption to try to violate the strength of this rock, built by God. Nicolaus concludes that whoever tries to take away the privilege of the Roman Church, handed down by Christ himself, the supreme head of all the churches, undoubtedly falls into heresy. “For he violates the faith,” he says, “who acts against her, who is the mother of faith.” Please do not dismiss this judgment of Nicolaus, reader; it was confirmed in the first and seventh sessions of the eighth Synod. There Photios and Michael were also condemned, because they tried to shake this privilege of the Roman See. If one falls into heresy by denying that the Roman bishop succeeded Peter and that the Roman Church is therefore set above the others, what should we think of the one who denies that the privileges given to Peter by Christ for the Church’s benefit—privileges granted to Peter as pontiff, teacher, and shepherd—also belong to his successors? But feeding the sheep with sound doctrine, confirming the brothers in faith, having all nations hear the word of the Gospel and believe through his mouth, and building the Church upon him so that the gates of hell would not prevail against it, belonged to Peter not as a private person but as governor of the Christian commonwealth. Therefore Catholics neither should nor can doubt that the judgments of the Roman See on faith and religion are certain. Further, anyone who denied that the Roman bishop now possesses the same power of binding and loosing that Christ is believed to have conferred on Peter would rightly and deservedly be regarded as a heretic; therefore the one who denies to Peter’s successors the power to strengthen the brothers in faith must be judged a heretic. Moreover, let us suppose there is some disputed matter of religion among the faithful. We then ask: if the Roman and Apostolic See, in order to settle disputes and disagreements among churches, pronounces from Peter’s chair and tribunal, should we follow its judgment or not? If we follow it, and the Roman See errs, the whole Church will be caught in its error. If we do not follow it, where is “Whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven”? Where, again, is “God chose among us that the nations should hear the word of the Gospel and believe through my mouth”? Therefore, what Peter’s successor binds, at least in disputed matters, will be bound; and what he teaches in a question of faith must not only be heard by the nations but believed. I do not cite here what Leo says in support of this matter, 20 distinct., cap. De libellis, or what Damasus and Adrian say in 25, quaest. 1, cap. Violatores and cap. Generali. I will cite instead what happened at the Council of Complutum, confirmed by Sixtus IV: Petrus Oxoniensis was condemned under the charge of heresy for asserting that the Church of the city of Rome could err. Sixtus himself condemned the same error under the same charge of heresy in the Extravagans issued against Petrus Oxoniensis. Since we discussed this at length in the Relectio De poenitentia, the reader should be referred there. He was therefore compelled to recant in this form: “I agree with the holy mother, the Roman Church, and the Apostolic See, and with mouth and heart I confess that I hold the faith which Lord Sixtus, pope, holds by apostolic and evangelical authority. And I declare that all who have come against this faith deserve eternal damnation.” Thus far from the Conc. Compl.
At the end of the Council of Constance, Martin V says: “With the sacred council approving, we order archbishops, bishops, etc., to judge as a heretic anyone who thinks or teaches differently from the teaching and practice of the holy Roman Church concerning the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of the Lord, baptism, confession of sins, the imposition of penance for sins, the other Sacraments of the Church, or articles of faith.” The Council of Constance therefore judged as heretics those who opposed the faith and teaching of the Roman Church. Finally, I shall add this. Since a firm and certain argument can be drawn from the traditions of the apostles to refute heresy, and since, if you compare the testimonies and arguments set out here with the rules we laid down in book 3, it is clear that the Roman bishops succeeded Peter in the pontificate over the whole Church and in the teaching of faith by apostolic tradition, why should we not dare to condemn the contrary assertion as heretical? But, as I said, I do not wish to anticipate the Church’s judgment. I do not seem to be doing so, since the Church’s own language has already confirmed our whole position concerning the authority of the Roman See. I say this with some hesitation because of certain learned and devout men who have contradicted us. Yet I confidently assert that those who either deny that the Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter in authority over faith and doctrine, or assert that the supreme pastor of the Church, whoever he may be, can err in a judgment of faith, bring pestilence and ruin to the Church. Heretics do both; those who oppose them in both matters are considered Catholics in the Church. I therefore do not understand why certain faithful people prefer the opinions of heretics to those of Catholics. I see what the heretics pursue: liberty to live and teach, and impunity in all these matters. They want a body without a head, so that neither the foot nor the mind does its duty. They want sheep without one shepherd, so that, though they are wolves themselves, they may still appear to be shepherds. They want disputes without a judge, so that disagreement has no end; once the arbiter is removed, they can fight learned men and have the crowd decide who wins. Finally, they want everything thrown into confusion, because, as the Spanish proverb says, the fisherman profits from troubled waters. Let us instead follow the common judgment of Catholics, for we can follow it safely because it is common to Catholics. Moreover, they hold what is confirmed by the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, decided by the decrees of Pontiffs, sung in harmony by the choir of ancient saints, affirmed by the fathers of councils, proved by apostolic tradition, and observed by the Church’s constant practice. Therefore, if the things I have said are clearer and brighter than the sun itself, if they are all drawn from the sources of the Church and Scripture, and if this whole discourse confirms its authority by certain theological arguments and unimpaired, uncorrupted witnesses, let us finally agree that theologians may draw firm arguments from the authority of the Apostolic See to prove doctrines of faith and theology. So much, then, about the firmness of the fifth locus. Now let us refute the arguments of our adversaries.
Chapter VIII
ARGUMENTS OF CHAPTER ONE ARE REFUTED
And as for those arguments set forth at the beginning, some theologians—certainly not bad ones, but not sufficiently sharp—evade them as best they can. For the Roman
Church from the Roman pontiff, and say that he can err in faith while it cannot. In this way they think they can dissolve almost all the arguments, since most of them challenge the faith of the Supreme Pontiff, not that of the Roman Church. Yet these men defend the Roman Church from error, not the Roman bishop. But if we are speaking, as we truly are, of error in a judgment and decree of faith, I find no distinction between the Apostolic See and the person occupying it. First, when we approach the Apostolic See to ask for oracles of faith, we do not question each of the Roman Church’s faithful, nor do we convene the Roman Church itself in a council; we seek the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff and await his decision. Again, it is not the Roman people who teach the universal Church matters pertaining to the faith, but the Roman bishop. The power to judge cases of faith, to bind and loose, and to feed the flock lies not with the Roman people but with the Roman shepherd, the vicar of Iesu Christus. Councils too receive neither confirmation nor strength from the Roman people themselves, but from the people’s bishop. Furthermore, as was proved above, the privilege of firmness was specially given to Peter: “I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail; and you, strengthen your brothers.” And again: “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.” Therefore, if we follow the rule of true theology explained in chapter three, we will first affirm firm and certain teaching in Peter and his successors, and then in the Roman Church, of which Peter and his successors are both head and foundation. I also observe that just as, if all the bishops together taught false errors, the whole Church would necessarily be involved in various errors, so too, if the shepherd of the Roman Church were to decree an error contrary to the faith, the sheep would be scattered while their shepherd erred. Finally, the testimonies we cited mostly prove that the Supreme Pontiff of the Church, Peter’s successor and Christ’s vicar, cannot err when he pronounces on faith. I therefore judge those deserving of greater criticism who thought they would settle the controversy by separating the Apostolic See from its apostolic bishop. Reason does not accept that answer; it scorns and rejects it. Rather, reason takes up the distinction between two kinds of error, one personal, the other judicial. We should not reject the terms peculiar to the schools, even if they are less Latin, but prefer, as Augustinus says, clear speech to polished speech. A personal error is therefore each person’s private error; a judicial error is public. Innocentius IV wrote commentaries on the Decretals. If there is anything mistaken in them, it is plainly the man’s error, not the pontiff’s, although the commentaries were published by a pontiff. But if this same Innocentius were to define in a judgment on a question of faith something that was in fact false, that error would then proceed from the Church’s public judge and would therefore be judicial. Response to the first argument. From this the first argument is easily refuted. No trustworthy history teaches that Ioannes XXII defined anything of this kind after attaining the supreme pontificate; rather, as Benedictus XI says in his extravag., when Ioannes was preparing to define the matter, death overtook him and he could not do so. Nor should he be considered a heretic if he held that error before becoming pontiff, any more than Irenaeus, Chrysostomus, Theophylactus, or Bernardus, whom some claim held that opinion before the Church had explicitly defined the matter. Whether they claim this truly or falsely is not for this discussion or place to determine. 1
Response to the second argument. The second argument is answered in the same way. Coelestinus defined nothing, for the words of Innocentius III are these: “Although some of our predecessors seem to have thought otherwise.” He says “thought,” not “defined.” But Innocentius himself defines nothing either; he explains his own judgment and opinion, saying: “We do not believe that in this case the one who is left behind can enter into a second marriage.” This is certainly true, although it was not firmly defined by that decretal of Innocentius. For it does not immediately follow that something must be believed as a dogma of faith simply because it is contained in a volume of law. This was explained more fully in the penultimate chapter of the preceding book. Response to the third argument. There is no difficulty in answering the third argument. The word “I judge” is often used to mean the same as “I think” or “I suppose”; this is how Alexander understands it when he says that some of his predecessors judged otherwise. Response to the fourth argument. But the fourth argument is far more difficult, and cannot be resolved so briefly. For Alexander plainly teaches that the custom, also confirmed by civil law, which rescinds less formal wills, is foreign both to divine law, to the institutions of the fathers, and to the general custom of the Church. It is evident that he makes this pronouncement here by pontifical authority, since he forbids anyone, under threat of anathema, to dare rescind such wills. In the next chapter he also instructs judges in this sort of case to require only two or three witnesses, and to follow canonical decrees, not civil laws. Therefore, if the Pontiff of the Church commanded—and commanded under threat of anathema—that no one invalidate wills supported by the testimony of two or three witnesses, he surely defined the question not as any private person but as the Church’s public judge. Yet it is not a commandment of God and the Gospel, though Alexander seems to assert this, that all cases be settled by only two or three witnesses. Otherwise not only Leo IV but also Silvester, in cap. 3 of the Roman Synod, would have issued a law contrary to the Gospel and to God. For they decreed that a bishop could not be condemned without 72 witnesses. From this we understand that the civil law which guards against fraud in the commonwealth by providing that wills are invalid unless signed by seven witnesses is not contrary to evangelical law; nor is the law contrary which, to forestall hostility against bishops, provided that two witnesses alone would not suffice to condemn a bishop. If human life were moderately well ordered and customs shaped by nature rather than greed, the testimony of two people would surely suffice to settle any case in court. But just as an oath is occasioned by evil—not by the one who swears, but by the one who refuses to believe the truth-teller—so requiring more than two witnesses arose from evil, not in the law that requires them but in the person committing fraud. But discussing these matters does not belong to this place or time. What belongs here specifically is whether Alexander erred. In pontifical decrees, two things above all must be distinguished: one is the decree’s intention and conclusion, as it were; the other is the reason and explanation the Pontiff gives for what he has established. In their conclusion the Supreme Pontiffs cannot err if they decide a question of faith from the apostolic tribunal. But if the Pontiffs’ reasons are not necessary—not to mention apt or probable—there is no reason to dwell on them. We do not fight for the reasons given by Pontiffs as if for our altars and hearths. Alexander, then, does not define that this custom is contrary to divine law; rather, as I see is generally approved by legal experts, he orders judges to require only two or three witnesses in pious legacies. 2 3
This is the decree’s conclusion and purpose; there is no doubt that the Pontiff could have prescribed this by a certain right of his own. But if, to confirm his prescription, he makes use of the law of Deuteronomy, calling it divine, refers to the statutes of the canons, or adduces the custom of the Church, there is no need to dissect those reasons to the quick. It is like councils that define that there are two persons in the Godhead, the Father and the Son, and cite in support the passage from Genesis, “The Lord rained down from the Lord”: they do not immediately err in a judgment of faith, although the Trinity is proved somewhat inaptly from that passage. There is also a Synod which pronounced on Mary’s perpetual virginity. To support this, the fathers cite the closed gate in Ezechiel. Let whoever wishes mock this, but he will mock in vain. For the fathers do not always offer necessary reasons in a question of faith, but sometimes offer plausible ones. And if Pontiffs too sometimes err in giving such reasons, they should not even be blamed for it, much less should the authority of this passage be weakened on that account. Moreover, if my judgment has any force, Alexander erred neither in his conclusion nor in his reasons. He was making laws for those subject to him in both jurisdictions, namely the citizens of Hostiensis and the judges of Vellenensis. Alexander therefore did not wish to disapprove the civil law used by emperors in regions subject to their rule; he wished even lay judges in the Church’s patrimony to judge wills according to the statutes of the canons, not the emperors’ laws. He does not think it fair that the sacred canons should be as strict in adjudicating temporal matters as civil laws are, and he considers it more honorable that in cities and towns under the Church’s right and dominion, the custom of the canons rather than civil law should be observed. It follows that, if the reasoning of this decretal is taken strictly, Alexander’s law should be observed not only in lands subject to the Roman Church but in any others under the dominion of bishops and churches—not only for bequests left to the Church for pious purposes, but also for any other legacies. Alexander’s law is therefore honorable, holy, and legitimate. Nor did he err in his reasons. Although they are not necessary, they are not entirely inept. He says that a custom requiring more than three or two witnesses is first foreign to divine law—that is, the Old Testament—which generally required only two or three witnesses; it is also foreign to the institutions of the fathers, that is, to canonical custom and law, where two witnesses suffice, especially in temporal matters; finally, it is foreign to the general custom of the Church, which is content with two or three witnesses in such cases. “Foreign” does not mean contrary, but new and unfamiliar, and therefore not very suitable for approval in the Church’s court. If secular princes do not wish to follow this sincerity of intention and sound judgment about witnesses, or this custom of the Old Law and canon law, but instead require more witnesses for the wills of their subjects in order to eliminate fraud, they may freely exercise their own judgment. Alexander’s letter does not prevent this; it binds only those subject to the Church in both jurisdictions. Enough and more than enough has now been said about the fourth argument. Response to the fifth argument. The fifth argument is easily dissolved by what was said in refuting the fourth. Pontiffs sometimes offer reasons that persuade rather than compel. Because the Synagogue once received certain laws from God, useful and suitable not only for governing but almost necessary for shaping the customs and religion of each people, the Church took them up for its own use under Christ. Accordingly, the Supreme Pontiffs and legal experts call certain old laws approved and restored anew by the Church “divine”—not because they are now God’s commandments, since that old law has been abolished, but because they were once God’s commandments and are still to be observed by us, not by force of the old law, as was falsely charged against the learned Pontiffs, but by a new institution of the Church. This new institution, or rather restoration, of the Church is nevertheless plausibly supported by the old divine law.
Response to the sixth argument. Turrecremata answers in lib. 2, c. 112, that there is no disagreement between those Pontiffs. Rather, Ioannes explains Nicolaus. For after the words already cited, Nicolaus added: “Let no one think that Christ’s having purses at times is an obstacle; Christ assumed the condition of the weak in having purses.” This is what Ioannes XXII defined: namely, that it is heretical to deny that Christ and the apostles held something in common, as the contrary is clear from Luc. 22, Ioan. 4 and 17, and Actor. 4. Response to the seventh argument. First, we say in reply to the seventh argument that neither Pontiff defined this controversy there. Pontiffs often answer private questions from this or that bishop by explaining their own opinion about the matters submitted, not by delivering a judgment that they intend the faithful to be obliged to believe. Certainly, to say nothing of Pelagius, Nicolaus decreed nothing in that passage that bears on this question. The question submitted to him was not whether baptism conferred in the name of Christ was valid, but whether a person baptized by a pagan or a Jew had received the true Sacrament of baptism. In passing, while answering the question submitted, he added without being asked about it that baptism is conferred in the name of Christ. In this matter he could undoubtedly have been mistaken. Indeed, he was so mistaken that we showed this with strong arguments in lib. 4 Sentent. Then perhaps these two Pontiffs do not disagree. Nicolaus is understood to have taught that in a similar necessity, such as existed in the time of the apostles, baptism in the name of Christ would still be valid now, other things being equal. Pelagius, however, defines that it is not valid apart from such a necessity. It would be as if balsam, a book, or a chalice to be touched were now lacking, and the Sacraments of confirmation and orders were conferred by the laying on of hands alone, as was done from the beginning in the apostolic age. But where there were no similar necessity, neither ordination nor confirmation would perhaps be valid without the appropriate matter of those Sacraments. We have said this about baptism in the name of Christ by following the common opinion. For, as I understand it, baptism was nowhere administered in this form: “I baptize you in the name of Christ.” Saint Ambrosius and many others seem to have understood this as well. But if the apostles used some such form, it was: “I baptize you in the name of Iesu Christus,” Act. 2. 38 and 19. Second, it is not necessary that the apostles conferred the Sacrament of baptism in either of those forms. Nor, if Scripture says that something was done in Christ’s name, are we immediately compelled to suppose that it was done and administered in those exact words. There are many examples in Sacred Scripture. This one is readily at hand: “Through you we shall gore our enemies with the horn, and in your name we shall trample those who rise against us.” Likewise: “After they had been scourged, they ordered them not to speak at all in the name of Iesu.” Act. 5. Paulus is also said to have acted boldly in the name of Iesu. Act. 9. Among the Hebrews, something is done in someone’s name when it is carried out by that person’s authority and power. Thus, whoever acts in the king’s place and as his minister is said to act in the king’s name. We therefore rightly interpret those who sanctified people in water and the Spirit as Christ’s ministers to have bestowed the grace of baptism in Christ’s name. It is therefore not necessary to think that the apostles changed the form of baptism prescribed by Christ.
For even today we truly perform baptism in Christ’s name—that is, in his place, by his power and authority. And if the apostles baptized using the prescribed formula with the name of Iesu Christus, they should not be thought to have omitted the names of the Father and the Holy Spirit, but to have baptized in the name of the Father, of his Son Iesu Christus, and of the Holy Spirit. It belongs to another place to demonstrate this. That is enough about the seventh argument. Response to the eighth argument. Much could be said in explaining the eighth argument, but we will condense it into a few points. Gratianus, at 32 qu. 7, says with far more boldness than eloquence that this opinion of Gregorius is contrary to evangelical and apostolic teaching. I strongly disagree. For even if we set aside the authority of the Roman pontiffs, we still cannot disregard the definition of both Gregorii, I and III, since both were not only most learned but also most holy. They did not err, as Gratianus falsely thought; rather, they spoke of a woman who, because of an infirmity existing before marriage, was unfit for marital intercourse—that is, to use the language of the schools, she was unable to discharge the marital debt. You have a similar example concerning the impotent, c. Consultationi. Gregorius himself explains his judgment in this way in his epist. ad Ravennatem archiepisc., cited by Gratianus at 33 q. 1, cap. Requisisti. Other answers to this argument are also available, but this one is clearer and more straightforward. The Gloss also follows it at 20 d., c. De libellis, under the word iunioris. Response to the ninth argument. In the ninth argument the Lutherans, especially Oecolampadius, Bucerus, and Calvinus, taunt us, but childishly. For I have shown with strong arguments that the book is not by Gelasius, the Roman pontiff. First, the author of the little work says that the dispute about the truth of the two natures in Christ is recent. But it was not recent in Gelasius’s time; it had long since been settled by Leo and the Concilium Chalcedon., where the opinions of Eutyches and Nestorius were rejected. Again, the whole book makes no mention of Leo or the Concilium Chalcedon. The author would surely have done so, especially if he were Gelasius. In his epist. ad Faustum he gladly invokes the authority of this council, and he would have been even more willing to do so here, where he could refute his opponents with the testimony of so great a Synod. Certainly, since he cited Damasus against Arius, he would have cited Leo against Eutyches all the more if he had written after Leo’s time. And Gelasius lived many years after Leo. Moreover, why did this author refer to Damasus only by the title “bishop of Rome,” without any other honorific? That is quite foreign to the custom of later Pontiffs when they cite the testimony of earlier ones. Further, to prove the truth of both natures in Christ, the author of this work counts Eusebius Pamphili among the teachers of the Catholic Church and uses his testimony. Yet Hieronymus says in his epist. ad Pammachium et Oceanum, which begins Schedulae, that Eusebius was a most open defender of Arian impiety. Indeed, Eusebius was condemned as an Arian, along with his writings, in act. 5 and 6 of the seventh general Synod. In asserting both natures of Christ, this author cites only Ambrosius among the Latin fathers. If he were Gelasius, he would use the testimonies of Hilarius, Hieronymus, and Augustinus, and would not have cited certain Greek writers who were, and always had been, dead to Latin readers. Gelasius did write about both natures of Christ against Eutyches and Nestorius; we do not deny it. But he is said to have written five books, not this little work, which circulates under a false title. Gennadius too wrote against Eutyches; why should we attribute this work to Gelasius rather than Gennadius? There was also a Gelasius, bishop of Caesarea
in Palestine, whom Hieronymus says wrote certain things at that time but kept them hidden. I would attribute the little work to him, were it not that Hieronymus says his style was pure and polished, which I do not recognize in this book—unless a good and elegant author happened to have a bad and inelegant translator. Those who attribute this work to Gelasius, the Roman pontiff, are mistaken because of the words: “Since your love unanimously holds, steadfastly proclaims, and wisely defends the Apostolic See.” The reader will see, even without my demonstrating it, that “the apostolic faith” should be read here. Nor is it new for books of this sort to appear under the names of Roman pontiffs. In act. 5 of Synodus 7 the Iconoclasts produced two little books as works by Vigilius, the Roman pontiff, but falsely. And even if the work were by Gelasius, it would still prove nothing. When Roman pontiffs publish books on any subject, they express their opinion like other learned men; they do not pronounce on faith as judges of the Church. I think the ninth argument has now been refuted sufficiently clearly. Response to the tenth argument. In refuting the tenth, we should not repeat here what Caietanus said in that little work on 27 questions, lest we do work already done, which an old proverb forbids. What now requires attention is the force of the inference: if Christ built the Church upon Peter, why does it immediately follow that the Roman See is set above the others by divine right? From this the further conclusion will also be clear: if Peter’s faith did not fail, in keeping with Christ’s prayer, the Church’s greater causes must be referred to the Roman bishop. I see that these matters cannot be explained plainly and clearly except by a learned and discerning person. I do not claim to have attained the ability to handle so great and difficult a subject; I openly acknowledge that I have attempted it. For it is clear that I undertook in this work to explain not matters accessible and familiar to everyone, but those which even the most learned would scarcely understand without care. If the effort succeeds, it deserves praise; if it does not, it certainly does not deserve blame. But enough of this. Let us now explain the matter itself. First, we must recall what we have often said elsewhere: what Christ said in the Gospel to Peter was said not to him as a private person, but as the one placed over the Church; it therefore pertains also to his successors, without violence to the text or distortion of its letter. In the same way, what the Lord entrusted to the apostles, and which equally applies to all the faithful, was entrusted in its literal sense to all Christians to come, in accordance with Christ’s own explanation in Marci 13: “What I say to you, I say to all: Watch.” Watching indeed applies equally to everyone. Therefore, even if Christ had not explained it so explicitly, we too would necessarily explain it in that way. Likewise, what the Lord said to the apostles concerning their role as priests of the Church applies not to all the faithful but to the other priests who would come after them. An example is Luc. 22: “Do this in remembrance of me.” For when the Lord had taken and broken the bread, raised his eyes to heaven, and given thanks to God, and had also taken and lifted the cup, he undoubtedly offered the Eucharistic sacrifice, that is, the sacrifice of thanksgiving, according to the Jewish rite; unless he was foolish and ungrateful, able to give the Father supreme thanks for the supreme gifts he had received from him but failing to do so. Therefore, when Christ commanded his apostles to do what they saw him doing, he plainly commanded them to offer the Eucharistic and thanksgiving offering. Cyprianus, in his letter to Caecilius, and Irenaeus, lib. 4, cap.
- explained it thus. Since making a sacrifice is the proper duty of sacrificers and priests, what the Lord entrusted to the apostles in that passage pertains specifically to the future priests of the Church, not to the common people, including women, as heretics have believed. Moreover, what we read that Christ entrusted to those apostles because they were to be future shepherds of the Church, we should understand as literally entrusted to the bishops and shepherds who succeed them. An example is Matthaei 18: “Whatever you bind,” and so forth. And likewise Ioan. 20: “As the Father sent me, I also send you: receive the Holy Spirit,” and so forth. If we follow this rule in explaining Sacred Scripture, we will surely avoid the confused and obscure tangle that heretics suffer in understanding Scripture. Why say this? So that we may distinguish suitably and wisely what was said to Peter in the Gospel: if something applies to him as a private person, we should think it applies to each of the faithful (for example, “If your brother sins against you, correct him between you and him alone,” etc.); but if something applies to him as prince of the apostles and shepherd of the Church, we should without controversy understand that it must be referred to those who succeed him in the Church’s pontificate, and that this is the genuine literal sense. For what a civil legislator prescribes to his delegates is referred not only to the person to whom he speaks face to face but also to others who succeed him in the same office. Next, we must also carefully observe that the succession of the Roman pontiff to Peter is not revealed directly in Sacred Scripture, but is established from another source: namely, from what the most reliable histories report, that the apostle Peter finally established his chair at Rome and died there as its bishop. Velenus, Sebastianus Francus, and certain other heretics deny this; they even say Peter never visited Rome. Yet they maliciously deny what all the serious historians have reported. We should not think they believe inwardly what they deny in words, unless they are thought to be children, and foolish children at that. For what could be said more foolish or childish than to deny that events once took place in the commonwealth when every serious man before us affirms that they did? If you ask for the authorities on this matter, the first is Dionysius in his epistola ad Timoth. The second is Dionysius, bishop of Corinth, in Eusebius, lib. 2. Ecclesiast. hist., cap. 25. The third witness is Clemens in epistola prima. The fourth is Anacletus in epistola De ordinatione episcoporum. The fifth is Marcellus, 24 quaest., 1. cap. Rogamus. The sixth is Leo, in concione prima de festo Petri et Pauli. The seventh is Gelasius with a council of 70 bishops. The eighth is Innocentius III in cap. Per venerabilem: Qui filii sint legitimi. The ninth is Nicolaus III, cap. Fundamenta, De elect. in 6. The tenth is Leo IX in epistola synodica ad Petrum Antiochenum patriarcham. The eleventh is Constantinus in an edict before the Nicaean Synod, 96 dist., cap. Constantinus. The twelfth is Epiphanius, Haeresi 27, which is that of Carpocrates. The thirteenth is Irenaeus, lib. 3 Contra Valent. cap. 3. The fourteenth is Tertullianus, lib. 4 Adversus Marcionem and lib. De praescript. haeret. The fifteenth is Ambrosius, in oratione contra Auxentium de Basil. trad. The sixteenth is Hieronymus, in lib. De viris illustr. in Petro. The seventeenth is Egesippus, 3 lib. De exci. Hierosol., cap. 2. The eighteenth is Augustinus, lib. 1 Contra Iulianum Pelag. The last is Eusebius, lib. 2, Ecclesiast. histor. cap. 14 and 15, and also book three, chapters 2 and 25. In these places he also cites Origenes, Caius, and Papias. Whoever does not believe so many reliable and unimpaired witnesses shows himself to be either foolish or certainly a heretic—without even mentioning the public voice of the city of Rome and the places in the city that still bear witness to Peter’s life and death. 4
With these points established, a difficult and very obscure question is easily explained—a question that, as I said, has so entangled the most learned men that they could not extricate themselves. That the shepherd whom Christ appointed in the Church after Peter has Peter’s ordinary power and the other privileges granted to Peter for the Church’s sake is found in the Gospel, in accordance with what was noticed and demonstrated for us in the first proof. But that the person whom Christ appointed after Peter’s death was a Roman bishop is inferred from what happened. For if Peter had always remained at Antioch, as he began, the bishop of Antioch would undoubtedly have succeeded him lawfully in the pontificate. Finally, this too must be considered, for it is a great matter and worthy of careful reflection: Catholic doctrine includes not only what was explicitly revealed to the apostles but also what is derived by a clear syllogism and inference from one revealed proposition and another certain proposition known by natural reason. It may not be expressly stated in Sacred Scripture that Christ the Lord has two wills and two intellects, with the actions of each, both created and uncreated, or that Christ can laugh by his own nature, as other human beings can. But Scripture has handed down that the Son of God is human, and natural reason establishes that every human has a created will and intellect and created operations of each power, and that every human can laugh as well as weep. Whoever denies any one of these will be judged a heretic, because by denying the consequence—that is, that the Son of God has a created intellect and act of understanding—he thereby denies the antecedent from which it was inferred, namely, that the Son of God is human. Here is another example. It is not stated in Sacred Scripture or in the traditions of the apostles that the Concilium Nicaenum, Chalcedonense, or Ephesinum did not err in the faith; what is stated is only that councils lawfully assembled in the Holy Spirit cannot err. That the Concilium Nicaenum, Chalcedonense, and Ephesinum were lawfully convened is not believed on the basis of divine revelation, but it is believed on the basis of human testimony and the tradition of trustworthy history, through which we know that these Synods gathered from the whole world at the summons and with the confirmation of the true shepherds of the Church. Thus, although the certainty and truth of what such councils defined seem to depend on two principles, as it were—one revealed by God, namely, that councils lawfully assembled possess the most certain truth, and the other believed with only natural certainty through what reliable and unimpaired writers have recorded—still, whoever denied the decisions and decrees of those Synods would be a heretic, just as if he denied the Gospel. Here is another most evident example. It is not recorded in Sacred Scripture that the priests of our own age were duly consecrated by true bishops; rather, it is an event that depends on the words and intention of those consecrating them. Therefore, whether the true Sacrament of the Eucharist now exists in the Church necessarily depends on this principle, which we hold with human certainty: that these priests were duly ordained. The Church would regard as a heretic anyone who denied this. Yet the revealed universal proposition is only that all true priests, if they have the right intention of consecrating, effect the true Sacrament of the Eucharist. That those now living are such priests is proved not only by the Gospel but also by sound and constant reasoning from nature together with the Gospel. In precisely the same way, anyone who denied that the Roman pontiff has the same power that Peter received from Christ must be considered an adversary of the faith, although what follows immediately from the Gospel is only that Peter’s successors have the same power as
the primacy to Peter. For if you add to this evangelical conclusion that the Roman bishop is Peter’s successor—a point we have received from histories and the tradition of men of the greatest authority—it plainly follows that the Roman bishop is superior to the other bishops and has in the Church the same power and authority that Peter had. The Supreme Pontiffs therefore aptly and prudently applied those evangelical testimonies to the Roman bishop and the Apostolic See. If this view of ours should find less favor with learned men, though I do not know why it should, we still have another way to explain the matter, from which it will be clear that the Roman pontiff succeeded Peter, by divine institution, in the pontificate over the whole Church, and therefore that the testimonies proving Peter’s primacy and faith also apply to the Roman bishops. For we have already said that our faith is contained not only in writing but also in tradition. Thus, although it is not written in the Sacred Books that the Roman bishops succeed Peter, it was nevertheless handed down by the apostles to the Church, as it were, from hand to hand. That this was a living apostolic tradition is plainly established by the lines of reasoning that we either set out or indicated in Book III. We need not explain each of them separately, lest we weary the reader with a long discourse. Certainly, this is an evident proof: even before Phocas and Constantine, not only before the Council of Nicaea but before any emperor after Nero, before any Council of the Church, and before any Supreme Pontiff after Peter, the Roman bishop was always acknowledged by ecclesiastical men as Peter’s successor. That this was apostolic tradition is stated plainly by Anacletus, Peter’s disciple, in his first epistle, De oppressione episcoporum; by Sixtus I, Ad Gallicanas Ecclesias; Eleutherius, Ad easdem; Victor, in his epistle to Theophilus; Sixtus II, in his epistle to Bishop Gratus; Zephyrinus, in his epistle to the bishops of Sicily; Marcellus, to the bishops of the province of Antioch; Miltiades, to the bishops of Spain; Mark, in his epistle to Athanasius; and Julius, to the Eastern bishops. It is not plausible that the Lord Christ would have failed to reveal to his apostles a matter so necessary for preserving the unity of the Church. For if that place where the Lord had chosen that the Jews should seek divine oracles was revealed to Moses, how much more should we believe that Christ showed Peter which place he had appointed as the seat and primacy of his kingdom? And if, as Eusebius reports in lib. 3 Eccles. hist., cap. 5, and Epiphanius in lib. 3 Contr. haer., cap. ult., the apostles were warned by the Lord’s voice to transfer the Church of Jerusalem to the city of Pella, we should believe all the more that Peter was warned by the Lord’s oracles to move from Antioch to Rome and transfer his chair there. If this is so—and it truly is, since nothing else can be believed except most absurdly—let the faithful now understand the origin of the Lutherans’ declaration in which, among the other articles proposed at Worms, they also demanded the abrogation of the power of the Roman Pontiff, which he claims over the other bishops. Let them understand, too, the purpose of those who assert that the monarchy of the Roman bishop arose only after the time of St. Jerome. Those who write that Phocas instituted the Roman Church as head of all the churches may perhaps have written piously—for I judge no one’s intention—but they wrote imprudently. Let them also understand why St. Thomas, in lib. quarto Adversus gentes, cap. 76, declares presumptuous the error of those who try to withdraw from Peter’s obedience and subjection by refusing to recognize his successor, the Roman pontiff, as pastor of the universal Church; let them finally understand why Leo X condemned Luther’s twenty-fifth article in these words: “The Roman pontiff, Peter’s successor, is the vicar of Christ over all the churches of the whole world, instituted by Christ himself in blessed Peter.” Therefore, since the tenth argument presented the greatest difficulty in its explanation, we could not answer it in fewer words.
not recognizing his successor, the Roman pontiff, as pastor of the universal Church; and let them finally understand how Leo X condemned Luther’s twenty-fifth article in these words: “The Roman pontiff, Peter’s successor, is the vicar of Christ over all the churches of the whole world, instituted by Christ himself in blessed Peter.” Since the tenth argument presented the greatest difficulty in its explanation, we could not answer it more briefly. Reply to the eleventh. I answer the eleventh as follows. We certainly must not admit that even Peter’s personal faith failed. For to assert falsely that Peter’s judgment in matters of public faith failed is manifest heresy. But since none of the apostles could err in the doctrine of faith, it was Peter’s special privilege that even his personal faith could not fail. The claim made by some that the Lord Christ reproached the eleven reclining at table for their unbelief, and so forth, does not touch the apostle Peter at all. For when Luke had written in chapter 24 that the women reported to the eleven apostles what they had heard from the Lord, and that they did not believe the women but judged their words to be nonsense, he immediately added: “But Peter ran to the tomb.” He would not have run unless he had believed. The adversative conjunction used by the Evangelist sufficiently shows that the women’s words did not seem like nonsense to Peter. Christ’s prayer for Peter plainly demonstrates that Peter’s faith did not fail. But our opponents explain that the Lord prayed that Peter’s faith would not fail finally. So they speak, but no disciple’s faith failed in this way. Christ’s prayer, then, would not have been a special privilege for Peter, contrary not only to Chrysostom, Theophylact, Ambrose, and Bede, but also to the context. When Ambrose says that Peter lost faith, he uses “faith” to mean loyalty, which Peter did not keep toward his friend Christ. It is also common for “faith” to be used for the confession of faith. But it is ridiculous to suppose that, because Christ is said to have reproached the apostolic college, he reproached each of them individually—as if the prophets did not often rebuke a people among whom many were in no way subject to the reproach. We discussed this matter more fully in Book IV. What is added concerning Anastasius and Honorius raises no small question. For if Christ’s prayer is to be referred not only to Peter but also to later Roman bishops, then by the same reasoning by which Peter’s faith could fail neither publicly nor privately, no successor’s faith could fail either, whether in public judgments or in private conversations and assent. But if, when that prayer is referred to Peter’s successors, it is to be understood only of public faith—that is, in deciding questions of faith—then we seem to have defended Peter’s faith, even his personal faith, by that testimony rashly and inconsistently. Albert Pighius of Kampen could meet this passage only by freeing all Roman pontiffs from the charge of error. He therefore contends that none ever fell into heresy. To exonerate Anastasius, he most abusively attacked Gratian and most shamefully reviled the jurists. To defend Honorius, he tried with many conjectures to persuade us that forgers had corrupted the records of the Sixth General Council. He then leaned toward the view that the Greeks had, as usual, corrupted Honorius’s letter to Sergius, and that the Council had been deceived in its judgment. Indeed, he slandered the entire acts of the Sixth and Seventh Councils and, as far as he could, undermined the authority and credibility of both. 5
This opinion of Albert is indeed new in the Church, but it can also be supported by the consideration that it is implausible that the Lord entrusted the supreme charge of faith to a man who could be a heretic. For, as Aristotle teaches, what is straight is the rule of what is bent. Therefore, if the faith of the Roman pontiff cannot direct him, it seems much less able to make others upright in faith. Moreover, the weak in faith cannot strengthen their brothers in faith. If, then, the Roman bishop is to strengthen his brothers, according to Christ’s promise, he himself must be firm. Although Pighius says in many places, as he does here, that the authority of the Supreme Pontiff is sufficiently probable, what matters is not what he says but what it is consistent for him to say, given his commitment to defend and maintain the truth. He says many things about this matter in many places, but, as the saying goes, he is swimming in shallow water. Let Pighius defend Liberius, whom Jerome in Chronicis says subscribed to heretical depravity, overcome by the weariness of exile. Let him excuse Marcellinus, who is reported to have offered sacrifice to idols, broken by fear. Let him vindicate Victor, whom the Paulianists falsely claimed as their own, as Eusebius writes in lib. 5 Eccl. hist., cap. 2. Let him free Anastasius, whom Gratian accused of heresy without certain and probable evidence. But how will he defend Honorius from error? Phellus reports him to have been a heretic in his poem De septem Synodis; so does Tharasius in his letter to the high priests of Antioch, Alexandria, and the Holy City, as recorded in 7 Synodo, actione 3; Theodorus with his Synod of Jerusalem in its confession of faith, found in that same third action; Epiphanius, replying to heretics before the same Council in action 6, tome 2; and finally the whole Seventh Synod in its last action and in its epistle to all priests and clerics. Adrian, the Roman pontiff, also says in action 5 of the Eighth General Council: “We do not read that anyone judged the Roman pontiff. Although the Easterners pronounced an anathema against Honorius after his death, it must nevertheless be understood that he had been accused of heresy, and only on that account is it lawful for inferiors to resist the movements of their superiors.” Thus far Adrian. There he also adds that the sentence passed on Honorius was issued with the consent of the Roman pontiff. This is established in the Sixth General Council, action 4, where Agatho anathematizes Honorius himself in his epistle to the Council. Bede likewise says in De natura rerum, cap. 67, that in the Sixth Synod Macarius, with his followers and predecessors Cyrus, Sergius, Honorius, and Pyrrhus, was anathematized. The Liber Pontificalis also reports that Leo II accepted the Sixth Synod, at which Cyrus, Sergius, and Honorius were condemned. At the end of the Sixth Synod appears Leo’s epistle to Constantine, in which, after receiving and confirming the Council, he says: “We anathematize Cyrus and Sergius, as well as Honorius, who did not enlighten this Apostolic Church with the doctrine of apostolic tradition, but tried by profane treachery to overturn the immaculate faith.” Moreover, we must regard as most important the chapter Si Papa, 40 distin., which the man of Kampen considers worthless. For the one case in which the sheep may judge their shepherd—namely, when he has become a heretic—is found, to pass over other passages, in the Fifth Roman Synod of 218 bishops, in these words: “It has been synodally decreed and confirmed by many of our predecessors that the sheep presume neither to rebuke their shepherd unless he has strayed from the faith.” Anacletus teaches the same in epist. 3 De patriarchis et primatibus, saying: “If the pastor of the Church has strayed from the faith, he must be corrected by the faithful; but for wicked conduct he is to be tolerated rather than constrained, because the rulers of the Church are to be judged by the Lord.” Eusebius teaches the same in his letter to the bishops of Egypt, and it is cited in 2 quaest., 7 cap. Oves. Pope John teaches the same in his epistle to Zacharias. The same is taught in the Eighth Synod.
This is the tradition we were just recounting. Burchard also reports it in lib. 1, cap. 13, 138, 139, attributing the same view to Callistus, Clement, and Gaius. We must therefore not deny that the Supreme Pontiff can be a heretic, and one or another example of this may perhaps be offered; but not even one example can be produced of his having defined anything against the faith in a judgment on faith. Let this, then, be the answer to the objection proposed. One thing in Peter concerns his private excellence as a man; another concerns the common good of the Church. His denial of Christ belonged to the man; his strengthening of his brothers belonged to the Church. The former was personal, the latter common. Likewise, Peter’s faith being always preserved inwardly was a privilege of the man; but his presenting a solid faith to strengthen others and not failing in a judgment on faith was a public privilege of the Church. The Roman bishop therefore did not inherit Peter’s personal privileges or faults, which were joined to Peter’s public authority only incidentally; he succeeded to those things that concerned the common and necessary needs of the Church. For the privileges granted by Christ to the apostles are referred differently to the apostles themselves and to their successors. The apostles had personal privileges of greater grace than their successors. For example, from the words “Whatever you bind on earth,” and “As the Father sent me, so I send you,” we understand that the apostles received universal, extraordinary power over the whole world. Thus they are called equal to Peter in 21 dist., cap. In novo, and 24 quaest., 1 cap. Loquitur. But later bishops did not succeed the apostles in their extraordinary universal power, but in the ordinary power that each apostle held in his own church, as Simeon succeeded James in the Church of Jerusalem, and so forth. Here is another example. From the words “I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete, to remain with you forever, the Spirit of truth,” theologians rightly conclude that the apostles were confirmed in grace after the coming of the Holy Spirit. Yet this Spirit did not pass to succeeding bishops in such a way that he would remain in them forever by confirming them in grace, as he was granted to the apostles by a personal privilege. Only what was necessary for the common good of the Church passed to later pastors. In precisely the same way, the privilege of unfailing faith, which was also personal to Peter, was transmitted to the Roman bishops, not insofar as it was Peter’s particular privilege but insofar as it was common to the Church. The other objections raised in support of Albert’s view are therefore also answered. The Roman pontiff’s inward faith is not necessary for the Church, nor can his hidden and private error of mind harm Christ’s Church. Hence God need not always assist the Roman pontiffs by preserving their inward faith. But that, when they decide what the faithful must believe and direct Christ’s Church in faith, they do not fail but are upheld by the divine hand—this is necessary for the Church, and therefore will not be denied even to Roman bishops who are weak or privately err in other matters, lest through an error of public authority they cause the Church to remain ignorant of the common truth. The eleventh argument has thus, I think, been refuted sufficiently. Reply to the final argument. In refuting the last argument, readers need not be reminded that defending Rome’s bad customs, if the city has any, is not the business of this discussion. We are not so ignorant and foolish as the Lutherans slanderously claim. We too have learned eyes, though they are modest. 6 7
It is written that when their father’s nakedness was exposed, his good sons turned away as they came and covered it. We are said to turn away from what we reject. What did the sons do by covering their father’s nakedness with a cloak laid across their backs as they turned away, except, as Gregory says, show that good subjects should be displeased by the faults of their superiors while nevertheless concealing them from others? “They carry the covering turned away,” he says, “because while judging the deed they honor the office, and do not wish to see what they cover.” Thus good disciples rightly condemn their teachers’ lives silently within themselves and still honor them, even when displeased with them. “The scribes and Pharisees,” Christ says, “have sat on Moses’ seat; do whatever they tell you, but do not act according to their works.” But enough of this. Rather, the reader should be reminded to observe that some Roman customs are shared at Rome with the whole Church; these, Rome is believed to have received from the tradition of the apostles Peter and Paul. Augustine discusses many of them in epistola ad Ianuarium, numero 118, and Innocent I treats them more fully in epistola ad Decentium. Other customs are those that the Roman Church either established privately on its own or received from the apostle Peter but did not promulgate throughout the whole world. Augustine speaks clearly of these in epistola 86 ad Casulanum, et in epistola 118. 119. ad Ianuarium. We must therefore observe without exception the former customs, which the Roman Church not only keeps but also teaches the universal Church to keep, as Julius teaches in 2 dist., cap. Nolite; Innocent in the same distinction, cap. Quis nesciat; Callistus in 12 dist., cap. Non decet; and Gregory in the same distinction, cap. Praeceptis. Private churches, however, need not follow the later customs of the Roman Church, as St. Augustine teaches in the cited passages, as do Nicholas in 12 dist., cap. Scit, and Gregory in the same distinction, cap. Novit. The same is taught in 31 dist., cap. Quoniam and cap. Aliter. For a difference in the custom of the Holy Church does no harm in a matter of one faith, as stated in De con., dist. 4, cap. De trina. Ambrose and Jerome must be understood to speak of customs of this sort in the passages that were brought against us. The point cited from the Council of Trullo is easily answered: as was explained more fully in the previous book, this Council has no authority in the Church, especially in those matters where it set itself against the Roman Church in Greek contention. No efforts of Councils to enact or abrogate laws have any force unless confirmed by the decree and judgment of the Supreme Pontiff. It is clear that the custom of fasting on Saturday belongs to the latter class, as Ambrose also says in 12 distinct., cap. Illa. Therefore the Roman Church is blamed in vain by the Council of Trullo on this matter. Let Book VI end in this way. Perhaps we have made it longer than necessary, although nothing is long when there is nothing that can be removed.
ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE SAINTS