De locis theologicis

WHERE CERTAIN KNOTS ARE UNTIED, IN WHICH EVEN LEARNED MEN SOMETIMES BECOME ENTANGLED

With these matters explained, it seemed that nothing remained but to refute the arguments set out at the beginning. But as I prepared to answer those objections, several scruples arose. We should resolve them before going further, lest they impede theologians on the path we opened in the previous chapter. Question 1. First, we must examine this doubt: does a council held through the legates of the Supreme Pontiff have firm and certain authority, or must we await the Roman bishop’s confirmation before the council’s decrees can be considered certain? Cajetan, who without dispute has discussed the authority of the Pope and of a council with the greatest care, and whom we have followed above all others, with some correction, says here many things that seem unrelated to the present undertaking. But he finally affirms what concerns our present point and question: a council conducted by the Pope’s legates can err in faith. For he still remains—the one for whose faith Christ prayed. I mean the one to whom the supreme responsibility for faith is ultimately referred. Therefore, unless the Supreme Pontiffs approve and confirm a council’s definitions, they should not be considered certain and firm. Cardinal Torquemada held the same view in book 3, chapters 6, 8, and 38, where he shows at great length that all the ancient councils of the past sought confirmation of their doctrines from the Supreme Pontiffs. They would not have done so if they had not considered it necessary. That the Pontiff’s confirmation also concerns doctrines of faith is clear from the letter of the Council of Nicaea to Pope Sylvester: “Whatever we have established, we ask that it be confirmed by the assent of your voice.” Sylvester, replying to the same council, says: “I confirm and affix my seal to your teaching against those who oppose the unity of the Trinity.” A little later he says: “I approve that the things which flowed into our common mystery were true,” etc. The fathers of the Council of Chalcedon also say in their letter to Leo: “We have made known to you the whole force of our proceedings, both to prove our sincerity and to secure the firmness and agreement of the things we have done.” Pope Leo, in his letter to the Council of Chalcedon, numbered 59, says: “So that it may not seem doubtful whether I approve what you have decreed unanimously concerning the faith,” etc. Later he says that he sends his approval of the synodal proceedings only in the matter of faith, for which, of course, the council was convened. The same point is clear from the letter of Leo III, in which he confirms the Sixth General Council. Add that before the Pontiff himself confirmed it, the Church never held as firm and valid what the legates presiding over a council had defined. For this reason, Emperor Marcian pressed Leo to approve the Council of Chalcedon’s judgment on faith. Leo also urged Marcian to send the council’s confirmation and approval to all the churches, as is recorded in letter 57 to the same Marcian. Further, a council can err without legates; but the Supreme Pontiff does not transfer to his legates the solidity of his own faith, which he claims for himself alone because he is Christ’s vicar, the pastor of the universal Church, and the rock on which Christ founded his Church. The legates, then, can err together with the council. For Christ prayed not for Peter’s legates but for Peter. Moreover, a provincial council attended by the Supreme Pontiff’s legates can err in faith, whereas one confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff cannot. The legates therefore do not have the same authority in doctrines of faith as the Supreme Pontiff himself.

Accordingly, the council’s decrees will still be weak, even if they have been confirmed by the judgment of the legates. Further, the Second Council of Ephesus erred with Dioscorus, yet it had been lawfully convened under Leo’s authority. A council’s decree is therefore not firm and valid unless confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff. It is no answer to say that the Pope’s legates and a few others opposed it. Not all the fathers have to subscribe to a synodal judgment for it to count as the judgment of a general council, since not all the bishops subscribed to the judgment of the Council of Nicaea either. And if the legates themselves, as all learned men agree, can err, nothing would have prevented them from agreeing with the other erring bishops. A legate of the Pontiff was present when a grave error was committed in the second and third sessions of the Council of Basel; the legate himself subscribed to the error of the others. It is therefore not enough that a council be convened by the Pontiff’s authority and that his legates approve its judgment for it to be considered firm and certain in the Church. On the other hand, some very learned men think that a general council lawfully convened has solid and certain authority even when the Pope is absent and before it is confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff. They can offer two chief reasons for this view. First, a council of this kind, conducted by the legates of the Roman bishop, represents the universal Church because it is a general council of the Church. It therefore cannot err in faith, just as the universal Church cannot. Martin V defined at the end of the Council of Constance that every general council represents the universal Church. Their second reason is that a general council lawfully convened has been convened in the Holy Spirit and therefore has the Spirit present to assist it. Relying on his presence, the fathers may certainly say when they define something, “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us.” This is especially confirmed by the testimony of Julius to the Eastern bishops: “Your decree has no force, because the legate of the Roman Church was not present, and the canons prescribe that councils are not to be held without its authority; no council is valid unless it is supported by that authority.” So far Julius. He therefore plainly thinks that a council has force, is valid, and rests on the authority of the Roman Church if the Roman Church’s legate was present. In explaining this difficult question, we lay down what experience of events establishes: the Supreme Pontiff’s legates do not usually attend a council where a question of faith is to be discussed unless they have first been instructed and informed about the Roman Church’s faith on the matters to be settled there. I say that this is usual, not that it is required. The legates could not conveniently be instructed in advance about the questions to be discussed at the Council of Trent, since they were almost innumerable. But nearly all other councils were convened to treat one or another question of faith, and so the legates attended after first being instructed in the faith of the Apostolic Church. I therefore first lay down that a council can oppose the teaching and instruction of the legates, and conversely that the legates can oppose the council. In that case the council’s decrees will not be supported by apostolic authority but will instead have been rejected. For just as a council convened against the protest of the Church’s true and recognized Pontiff is vain and invalid, so teaching opposed either by the present Pontiff in person or by an absent Pontiff through his legates is uncertain

and weak. The reason is precisely the same: neither has the authority of the Roman bishop, without which neither a council nor its decrees are valid. If anyone thinks that a council, once duly and lawfully convened, still cannot err even when the Pope’s legates oppose it, I ask him to answer the argument by which we proved the second conclusion in chapter 4, citing the example of the Second Council of Ephesus, where nearly all the bishops erred. “It was not a free council,” they say, “but Dioscorus extorted the judgment by his craft, threats, and terrors.” I see that; but if someone is broken by fear, speaking of human nature, he must also be capable of being broken by desire. If heretics can therefore say that a true and lawful synod errs through fear, they will claim that all the other councils served the desires of pontiffs and emperors. Then no synod will have an authority that can be considered certain. We, however, assert something far weightier: a council supported by apostolic authority cannot depart from the true faith because of any human passion. The Church too, though rain falls, rivers come, and winds blow against it, cannot yield or abandon its position in faith. But the rest of a council, however large, can be weakened by passion if the Pontiff and his legates oppose it. This is the point of the words, “You, Peter, strengthen your brothers.” What if a legate abandons the teaching received from the Pontiff and embraces the view of the majority? First, no such example will be produced, except perhaps from the council under the Emperor Michael, where Rodoaldus and Zacharias agreed with Michael and Photius against the instructions and commands of Nicholas, as can be seen in Nicholas’s letter to the patriarchs, metropolitans, and other bishops. Second, if a legate acts against his instructions, he is not considered to act under delegated authority; there is therefore no reason to think that his acts are approved by the authority of his superior. For this reason Pope Agatho says, as is clear from actione 4 sextae synodi: “We gave them authority”—that is, to the legates—“only to the extent that they were instructed, so that they presume to add, subtract, or change nothing, but faithfully relate the tradition of this Apostolic See.” Leo says likewise in epist. 43 ad Pulcheriam Augustam: “I have prepared to send Bishop Lucentius and the priest Basilius, so that they may carry out my instructions according to the rules they have received.” Decrees approved by a legate against the tradition of the Apostolic See therefore do not have the authority of the Roman Church; they are no different from decrees issued by a council without legates. But what if legates attend a synod without instructions from the Apostolic See? Will the synod’s judgment be firm and certain before it is approved by the Supreme Pontiff? Certainly, in matters that do not concern faith but ecclesiastical government, decrees of synods of this kind need not come from the Holy Spirit. They are therefore not valid at all unless they are confirmed by the agreement of the Roman bishop, as can be seen in Leo’s letters 51 to Anatolius, 52 to Marcian, 53 to Pulcheria, and 59 to the Council of Chalcedon. Even in matters of faith, however, their authority is not so certain that someone who calls it into question is a heretic. First, the most distinguished authorities I named earlier, Cajetan and Torquemada, agree—not only without the charge of heresy but also with probability—that no firm doctrine proceeds from synods of this kind until they have been approved by Christ’s vicar. Second, as was said earlier, Peter cannot transfer to his legates the solid authority he has to confirm both his brothers and doctrines. Third, if legates who have received instructions from the Apostolic See can depart from them, those who attend a council without instructions may also depart from the doctrine of the Apostolic See

They can therefore fight against the doctrine of the Apostolic See, so their confirmation is still weak. What of this: the legate Julian agreed with the teaching of the Council of Basel, which no theologian considers so solid and certain that those who dissent from it should be considered heretics? The contrary arguments prove nothing. The first is refuted as follows. I admit that every general council represents the universal Church, just as all the leading men and representatives of cities represent the whole kingdom when they gather to discuss public affairs. But when you insist that the Church cannot err, this is true in the sense in which the faithful accept it: we understand that the whole Church together, that is, all the faithful, does not err. Yet nothing prevents the greater part of the Church from erring. I therefore do not grant that the whole council together with the legates can err. But the greater part of a council can err, and the legates can subscribe to the error. This is precisely what we are now saying: the judgment of the greater part is not certain, even if the legates follow it. It would be certain if the Supreme Pontiff confirmed it. For, as we taught just above, not all the fathers together need to approve the council’s judgment. To the second argument, take this answer. Certainly a general council presided over by legates is assembled in the Holy Spirit, since it is convened by the authority of Christ’s Vicar, who is also the Church’s lawful head. But the Church too is one body, whose spirit is God, who is always present to assist it. Therefore, what seemed good to the whole Church together also seemed good to the Holy Spirit; but it does not follow that what the greater part of the Church judged is the judgment of the Holy Spirit. Thus, if all the bishops have judged something, it has certainly been judged by God’s Spirit; but it should not immediately be believed that a decision is the Holy Spirit’s judgment merely because most of a council’s fathers agreed on it, unless it is confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff. For it belongs to him to settle the disputes and disagreements of the fathers. Julius’s testimony is now very easy to explain. He leaves unstated what was obvious: that the council had lacked the presence of the Supreme Pontiff; he says, however, that even the legates of the Roman Church were absent. From these two points, one unstated and the other expressed, he concludes that the authority of the Roman Church was entirely absent from the council. It was therefore invalid and vain. Otherwise, if anyone presses us with that testimony in a crude way, he is easily refuted. The inference that a council’s judgment was weak because it lacked legates does not hold: therefore, if it had legates, its judgment was firm. Enough has now been said about the first question. Question 2. The next question is whether the fathers of a council are truly judges or rather counselors. There are some authors, and not the worst, who would have the authority of councils lie not in judging and settling a case of faith but in seeking and investigating the truth. They refer the whole force of judgment to one head of the Church, Christ’s Vicar, who brings more or fewer people into counsel when a case of faith must be decided, depending on whether the case is more serious or easier. The first argument for this is that in the sex libris Decretalium and the Clementinae, judgment is ascribed not to the fathers but to the Supreme Pontiff, with the sacred council approving. Thus Clement V, presiding at the Council of Vienne, says: “Turning the attention of our apostolic consideration—which alone has the right to declare these matters—to so distinguished a testimony and the common judgment of the holy fathers, with the sacred council approving, we declare,” etc. Judgment therefore belongs to the Apostolic See alone; the fathers offer not a judgment but counsel.

Further, when the Pontiff of the Roman Church calls priests together to judge a case of faith, he says, “with the counsel of our brothers,” etc. They therefore advise; they do not judge. Moreover, Deut. 17 says: “If it is difficult and ambiguous … you shall go,” it says, “to the priests of the tribe of Levi, and to the judge who is there at that time,” etc. It continues: “But whoever acts arrogantly, refusing to obey the command of the priest who serves the Lord your God at that time, that man shall die by decree of the judge.” See: authority is assigned not to all but to the high priest, and the decree is said to belong not to the judges but to the judge. The other priests, then, are counselors, not judges. The contrary view is supported by the fact that at the first Council of Jerusalem not only Peter but also the other apostles and elders are said to be judges. “Therefore I judge,” says James, “that those who turn from the Gentiles … should not be troubled.” Later, in the same chapter, Paul calls the council’s commands the commands of the apostles; and in ch. 16 he says that these doctrines were decreed by the apostles and elders. The answer to this question is very easy and straightforward: the bishops of a council are not merely counselors in a case of faith but also judges. Otherwise, not only bishops but also learned theologians and prudent churchmen would be called in to deliver a synodal judgment. This is unheard of and contrary to the form prescribed in Acts 15, where only the apostles together with the elders judged the question of faith. Since, then, by the Church’s constant practice only pastors sit in a council, it follows that they are judges, not merely advisers. If they were called in only to give advice, bishops who were inexperienced and untrained in theology would have no place at all in a council when a theological question arose. Further, not only the Roman bishop but also the other bishops hold the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and therefore have the power to bind and loose in a case of faith. “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us,” they say, “to impose no further burden on you than these necessary things,” etc. All the bishops impose the burden and command, and all together are authors of the synodal judgment. But counselors who are not also judges do not usually subscribe to a judgment and sentence. Yet in a synodal sentence we find the subscriptions not only of the Pontiff but also of the other bishops. They are therefore undoubtedly judges. But a scruple now arises that troubles some people: if all the bishops are judges, the Supreme Pontiff will surely be bound to follow the opinion of the majority when passing judgment and approve their teaching. For in every rightly and properly constituted tribunal, the presiding judge must confirm the judgment of the majority and disregard that of the few. To resolve this question, Cardinal Torquemada, following the jurists, says many things in lib. 3 Summae Ecclesiae, chs. 64 and 65, not all of which I approve. I do not intend to follow each point and refute every opinion. As Cicero says, the mark of a keen debater is to consider not what each person says but what each ought to say. We cannot and must not deny the assumption, then, that the fathers of a council are not merely counselors but also judges. For the fathers of the Council of Nicaea ask Sylvester to confirm whatever they have established. Leo says that he approves what the Council of Chalcedon decreed concerning the faith. The council itself says to Leo: “Honor our judgment with your decrees.” And the Sixth Synod says in actione 18: “We anathematize Theodorus, Sergius, Cyrus,” etc. A little later it says: “With all these matters established by this holy council and confirmed by the subscription of our strength,”

“we decree that no one undertake anything further concerning the faith,” etc. Are these the words of a counselor, or rather of a judge? In the other matters too the fathers speak as judges, not counselors. I easily remove the scruple now raised. I deny that, when the matter concerns faith, the judgment of the majority must be followed. Here we do not measure a decision by the number of votes, as we do in human elections or trials. We know that it often happens that the majority defeats the better side; we know that what pleases the many is not always best; we know that in matters of doctrine the judgment of the wise must be preferred. The wise are very few, while the number of fools is infinite. Four hundred prophets lied to Ahab, but the truth came from the mouth of Micaiah alone, a man who was despised. Divine judgments must therefore not be governed by human calculations. Sometimes the Lord saves more quickly through a few than through many. For the greater part of the Second Council of Ephesus adopted the view of Dioscorus, yet the legates did not subscribe to the judgment of the majority. The Supreme Pontiff, then, is not bound to embrace the opinion of the greater part. Indeed, whether a few or many have turned toward error, it is the duty of the Apostolic prelate to bring them back to the true faith, in keeping with what Christ said to Peter: “I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail; and you, strengthen your brothers”—not just one or another, but whether few or many. Thus Damasus, writing to the bishops in Illyricum, freely disregarded the number of the Council of Rimini and set Vincent and a few others against that great multitude, since they had spoken against the council’s judgment. And when Anatolius appealed to the agreement of 630 fathers in support of the Council of Chalcedon’s decree on the primacy of the Church of Constantinople, Leo said: “As though what the multitude wished unlawfully could not be refuted. Councils do not flatter themselves on account of the size of their gathering, nor should a larger number of priests dare to compare or prefer themselves to those 318, since the Synod of Nicaea was consecrated with so great a privilege from God that, whether ecclesiastical judgments are held by fewer or more, whatever differs from its decree is entirely without authority.” So far Leo. The opinion of the majority therefore does not prevail among us as it does in human assemblies. If we once reduce a case of faith to human conjecture and prudence, we must fear that we shall turn the Church’s business from divine to human. Indeed, it is certain that those who rely on the probable judgment of the many undermine the firmness of our faith. The Second General Council consisted of 150 fathers, while the Fourth had 630; nevertheless, the Church received both with equal reverence. These matters are judged not by number but by weight. The weight of councils is supplied by the dignity and authority of the Supreme Pontiff. If he is present, a hundred fathers are enough; if he is absent, none are enough, however many there may be. Nor will the Supreme Pontiff oppose the fathers of a council if the majority truly hold the truth. It belongs, and has always belonged, to Christ’s particular providence to prevent the Church from being split into factions. Nor has the Roman bishop ever spoken against fathers of a council who held the truth, if an example is wanted. We need add nothing about the second question: the arguments on the contrary side are easily resolved from what we have said.

Question 3. There is another question, which is not easy to explain. If a council supported by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff is guided by the Holy Spirit in judging cases of faith, then its definitions will belong to Sacred Scripture. For what is called Sacred Scripture is written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. A very learned man, so advanced in theology that he could be compared with eminent theologians, did not hesitate to grant this conclusion of the argument in my presence. Gratian too seems to have accepted this view, supported by the testimony of St. Augustine in 19 dist. cap. In canonicis, where he says that the decretal letters of the Supreme Pontiffs are canonical Scriptures. By the same reasoning, then, the decrees of councils would be counted among the canonical Scriptures. Innocent seems to embrace the same view in de celebr. Missae, cap. Cum Marthae. For he says that Sacred Scripture asserts that the person who prays for a martyr wrongs that martyr. This testimony must surely belong to some Pontiff or council. Reason also agrees with these testimonies. The Catholic faith believes nothing except what has been revealed by God; if we are bound to hold the decrees of councils as certain according to faith, then they have surely been revealed by God and consequently are canonical Scripture. But, reader, even without my instruction you will understand how thoughtless this opinion is. If the Athanasian Creed or the Nicene Creed is counted among sacred writings, why is it not entered into the book of Sacred Scripture or numbered among the canonical books? It is absurd to count among the sacred and canonical books the books that contain papal decretal letters or the judgments of synods. For there are two differences between sacred authors on the one hand and the Supreme Pontiff and the fathers of a council on the other. First, sacred authors write Catholic doctrines from an immediate revelation or inspiration of God. They do not need an external stimulus to write, nor do they reason from other Scriptures, investigate, or draw conclusions through human reasoning. But a council and a Pontiff proceed by human powers, follow reason, and distinguish truth from falsehood by argument. We must not think that the Supreme Pontiff has the power possessed by the apostles, prophets, and evangelists, by which he could immediately recognize which side of a question of faith was true or false whenever any such question was put before him. He must first take counsel and weigh the arguments on both sides; only then does God’s help follow, which is necessary to keep the Supreme Pontiff in the true faith. In councils too, the fathers cannot pronounce judgment at once, as though by authority alone and without discussion. Rather, after the matter has first been treated in meetings and disputations, and prayers have first been poured out to God, the question is finally settled by the council without error, through the combined help and favor of God and the diligence and effort of human beings. When the apostles and elders had gathered in the synod at Jerusalem, it was not immediately revealed what they should decide in the case of faith. Rather, as Luke says, there was first a great inquiry. At the Council of Nicaea too, as Rufinus reports, the meeting was held each day; the fathers did not decide so great a matter easily or rashly. Arius was frequently summoned before the council, and his claims were examined in sustained discussion; what should be held or decided against them was considered with the greatest care. Thus, after a long and thorough discussion, Arius was condemned by the firmest judgment of all. From this ^{1 2}

it is clear that the Holy Spirit assists the fathers not when they are asleep and drowsy, but when they diligently seek the truth of the matter under discussion by human means and reasoning. The second difference is that, as we explained at greater length in the first place, the Spirit of God is present to sacred writers in every matter. Even in the smallest matters? Yes. But the Spirit of truth is not present to the fathers of a synod in everything, only in matters necessary for salvation. What is said in the synod of Athanasius—that soul and body together make one human being—need not be true, even though the Council of Nicaea agreed with Athanasius. For whether those parts together constitute a human being is a question of philosophy, not of faith; it is therefore a question for philosophers, not for the faithful. A provincial synod under Stephen VII mistakenly decreed that all the ordinations performed by Bonosus were invalid; this was rejected at the Roman synod under John IX. That was a judgment about historical events, not a decree of religion and faith. Such are the matters dealt with in Clement. Pastoralis, de sent. et re iudic. They do not concern faith and religion. Therefore, even if Clement had erred, as Bucer contends, the authority of the council would not thereby have been weakened. Although that Clementine belongs to Clement, it does not belong to the council. The case is the same for Pontiffs and councils. Sixtus IV taught that St. Catherine of Siena did not bear the stigmata, but someone was not lacking who judged otherwise. Neither Pontiff’s judgment concerns the Church of Christ; we can approve or disapprove of either without endangering the faith. But let fools go, who quarrel over trifles. We offer these examples so that the reader may understand that sacred authors are to be treated differently from the fathers of councils: the former speak the truth in every matter, whereas the latter can err in small matters. What Christ promised his Church—that the Spirit would teach it all truth—is to be referred to the truth of faith. Augustine teaches this explicitly both in his commentariis super Ioannem and in the actis contra Foelicem, book 2. Christ did not pray that Peter would not lack knowledge and truth in philosophy or in historical matters, but that he would not lack faith. Perhaps someone will say: “Are not the decrees of the Council of Jerusalem therefore Sacred Scripture? For there was a great inquiry, yet it has been said that it is not fitting for the authors of Sacred Scripture to investigate and reason as human beings do.” Someone may also say: “If the Supreme Pontiff and councils can err when they fail to be diligent, but we do not know whether the Supreme Pontiff and the council fathers took the care and pains needed for the inquiry to proceed by a proper method, then we will not know whether they erred. Thus whatever they define will be uncertain.” The first scruple is more easily removed. Pilate’s words belong to the Canon not because Pilate spoke them but because the Evangelist wrote them. In the same way, the definition of the Council of Jerusalem is Sacred Scripture because Luke joined it to the other parts of his history. Conversely, Peter’s words reported by Clement are not part of the Canon, because Clement was not a sacred writer. This is a sound reason why the Apostolic Canons, said to have been written by Clement, are not included among the canonical books—even though Damascenus, lib. 4, cap. 18, seems to include them in his catalogue of sacred books, and Epiphanius calls the Apostolic Constitutions divine Scripture in the final heresy he refutes. He is undoubtedly speaking of constitutions that are not written in the sacred books. It is one thing when truth itself is refined in a disputation and another when speech is adapted casually and in passing to some common opinion. ³

Therefore, like wise men, we use ecclesiastical language here and call only those books sacred and canonical that were written at the Spirit’s prompting. The other scruple took such deep root in Sylvester’s mind that he could scarcely drive it out. He would have done better to conceal it than to spur others with the scruple that troubled him. Some also say openly that whenever the Roman Pontiff has erred in a definition of faith, this could have happened because he did not exercise as much diligence as he ought before delivering his judgment: either he did not examine the matter fully or did not consult the people he should have. If you object that the Apostolic See cannot err in faith, they admit this but say that the name “Apostolic See” signifies not only the Supreme Pontiff but also the Pontiff acting in matters that pertain to his office—that is, proceeding not on his own but with the counsel of good and learned men. On this view, the judgments of the Apostolic See are not those issued secretly, maliciously, and without due consideration by the Roman bishop alone, or even with a few supporters, but those he issues after the matter has first been fully examined on the counsel of many wise men. The same reasons apply, as I said just above, when speaking about councils. We must not think that only the Supreme Pontiff errs when he is asleep and speaks the truth when awake, while the fathers always walk rightly whether asleep or awake, seeing in the dark with their eyes shut, as the saying goes. Believe me, it is common to all judges of the Church that if they issue decrees rashly and without judgment, as if driven by a sudden gust of wind, they produce nothing that can be considered solid, weighty, or certain. Only what is issued with judgment, deliberation, and constancy ought to be held in the Church as weighty and certain. Therefore, those who call into question the diligence of Pontiffs or councils when settling a case of faith must undermine all judgments of Pontiffs and councils. We shall uproot that later scruple from the mind in another way. God orders all things gently, and at the same time provides both the end and the means needed to attain the end. If he promised someone eternal life, he would at once also grant him the grace of good works by which he would attain that life. As it is said in Romans, chapter 8: “Those whom he glorified, he also justified and called.” In the same way, when he promised the Church firmness in faith, he cannot fail to grant it prayers and the other helps by which that firmness is preserved. Nor can we doubt that what happens in natural things also happens in supernatural things: whoever gives the end also gives what leads to the end. Since this is a maxim of philosophers and is also often repeated by theologians, I beg those more fluent in Latin to allow me sometimes to speak in our own words along with them. Although we usually discuss matters more elegantly than they do, we sometimes wish to express in the same words the opinions we have received from the scholastics, lest we seem to have departed from the school by entirely changing our manner of speaking. Thus, when the Pontiff and council pronounce on faith, each does what lies within its power, and the case is settled if anyone among us thinks otherwise. For if Christ had said to Peter, “I have prayed for you, that your charity may not fail,” we would certainly understand that he had obtained for him the diligence, care, vigilance, prayers, and other suitable helps necessary to preserve charity. So when he said, “I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail,” we undoubtedly understand that he obtained this from his Father: that all the things

should be present to Peter for a sound judgment on a question of faith, whether they were to be expected from God or from human beings. If God promised an abundant harvest in the coming year, what could be more foolish than to doubt whether people would sow seed in the earth? If they sow, they will surely reap; if they do not sow, they will not reap. From God’s promise we infer not only favorable changes in the weather, by which all that the earth produces grows more abundantly, but also the farmers’ care, labor, and diligence. For the promised abundance of crops will not come unless people plow, sow, and work. From these points it is easy to understand that, when Christ promised the apostles and their successors the Spirit of truth for judgments of faith, nothing necessary for settling disputes of faith would be lacking to them. If we once allow heretics the freedom to question whether the Church’s judges showed the diligence and care needed for the question to be settled by a proper method, who could be so blind as not to see that all judgments of Pontiffs and councils would immediately be undermined? Further, even if that matter were called into question and could not be supported by certain arguments, theologians have nevertheless established and defined that councils, whatever their condition, cannot err in faith if they have been confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff. In my judgment, however, it is absurd to reach any end except by suitable means. I will therefore never admit that either a Pontiff or a council omitted any diligence necessary for deciding questions of faith. Any other private individual can fail to make the diligent effort needed to investigate the truth; even if he has made the effort and conducted himself with integrity in the matter, he may still err, although his error is without fault. But even a blameless error is far removed from the Church of God, as we established in the previous book. This is very strong evidence that neither the Pontiff nor councils have omitted anything necessary in deliberation. Suppose, then, that something necessary was omitted. I ask whether the faithful must obey those who judged a question of faith until their negligence becomes known to the Church. “They must obey,” they say. Then while the judges err, the Church too will err. “The Church will err at that time without fault of its own,” you say. I agree. But, as was said, we must not admit even this kind of error in the Church of God. Moreover, if we once doubt the diligence of the judges, a new examination and judgment will always be demanded to assess whether due diligence was exercised. Let us therefore grant that the judges appointed by God in the Church cannot lack any of the things necessary for a right and true judgment. With these matters explained, it is easy to return to the head of this third question and see that neither the decrees of Pontiffs nor those of councils are parts of Sacred Scripture, contrary to what was objected in the first argument. Let us now address what was said in the second argument, where Gratian did not understand Augustine’s meaning. Perhaps some corrupt manuscript gave rise to his error. Augustine’s true reading is this: “In the canonical Scriptures, let him follow as much as possible the authority of the Catholic churches. Among these churches, of course, are those that merited being apostolic sees or receiving letters from the apostles.” The meaning is this: in judging canonical books, we must first see what the Catholic churches think. Among the Catholic churches, however, the testimony of those that either were apostolic sees, such as Jerusalem, or received a letter from the apostles, such as Corinth and Galatia, must be preferred.

Augustine was therefore not speaking about the decretal letters of Pontiffs, as Gratian wrongly supposed. Some other very diligent men before us noticed this as well. The third argument can be answered as follows. Papal laws are sometimes called sacred to distinguish them from the laws of princes. It was in this sense that Innocent called them Sacred Scripture. Perhaps the canon law is called sacred, while civil law is human, as the jurists Hostien., Andreas, Siculus, Cardinal, Barba, and others noted in de iurament. calum., cap. I, as did the Gloss on cap. Ex diligenti, de Simonia. Indeed, Innocent IV in cap. Cum de diversis, de privil. In 6 plainly calls canon law divine and civil law human. Justinian also calls canon law sacred and divine in Authen. ut clerici apud proprios episcopos, cap. Si vero. Perhaps some half-learned person who did not understand this replaced the final word “canonical” with “Greek” in 20 dist. cap. De quibus, where the correct reading was “turn to the divine canonical writings.” Nothing could have been further from Innocent’s purpose in that chapter than to direct judges to Greek copies of the Bible when judging ecclesiastical cases. Why not Hebrew copies as well? Nor is it true that Innocent omitted canonical writings when deciding cases in the Church. Indeed, after divine Scripture he placed them in second place, even before the writings of the saints. This was Gratian’s particular purpose in that distinction. It is therefore no wonder if the canons are sometimes called sacred and divine Scripture. But we speak of Sacred Scripture in a different sense. The testimony cited by Innocent is in fact Augustine’s, concerning the Apostle’s words: “It is an injury to pray for a martyr, whose prayers we ought to commend ourselves to.” The final argument is refuted very easily. Two kinds of conclusions can be defined in a council. One kind belongs properly to the theological discipline, because the conclusions are drawn either from two principles accepted by faith or from one principle accepted by faith and another known by the light of nature. The second kind consists of conclusions that the Holy Spirit himself revealed to the apostles, evangelists, or prophets, but which a synod declares because their meaning was not equally clear. Conclusions of the first kind concern faith secondarily and, so to speak, mediately. Therefore, as we shall explain at length in its proper place, whoever denies them is a heretic because by consequence he denies the principle from which they are derived. Conclusions of the second kind, however, concern faith properly and in themselves; we must not expect new ones from Pontiffs or councils. We assert again and again that the Church has now, and will have in the future, no other Scriptures than those of the peoples and leaders who were in it. They are not, I say, to come in the future; they already existed. For everything that the Father entrusted to his only-begotten Son to reveal to the Church was first revealed by the Son himself to the apostles, and then he commanded them to make it known. “I have called you friends,” he says, “because I have made known to you everything I heard from my Father.” Ioannis 15. Again: “He will teach you all things and bring to your remembrance everything I have said to you.” Ioann. 14. And again: “When the Spirit of truth comes, he will teach you all truth.” Ioann. 16. These were the ministers of the New Testament who contemplated the Lord’s glory with unveiled face, as Secunda ad Corinthios tertio says. They were ministers of the word, as Luke testifies in the first chapter of his Gospel. They were also told: “Teach all nations to observe everything that I have commanded you,” Matthaei ultimo.

The apostles therefore received the whole truth of faith either from Christ while he lived on earth or later from the Holy Spirit, and according to the prescribed rule they handed it on to the Church either in writing or by word of mouth. This is why Irenaeus, Jerome, and Augustine, when arguing against heretics, always try to see whether their new doctrines agree with ancient tradition and faith. If heretics produce new Scriptures or pretend to be apostles or prophets, they are immediately rejected because of their novelty. We therefore recognize no sacred authors after the apostles and those approved by the apostles. But whether it is the Supreme Pontiff or councils, they first judge the true meaning and interpretation of Scripture, as at the Council of Trent, sess. tertia. It would surely be absurd for the Church to have authority to distinguish God’s words from human words but not to distinguish God’s meaning from human meaning. Let us grant this to councils above all. Next, councils investigate the true and legitimate traditions of Christ and the apostles by method and reason. They also determine through a clear sequence and connection which conclusions agree with these traditions and which conflict with them. In settling such matters, they consult not only Sacred Scripture but also the practices of the apostles, earlier councils, the decrees of Supreme Pontiffs, the writings of the ancient saints, the doctrines of scholastic theologians, and sound philosophical reasoning. In short, they bring the matter under discussion to bear on those loci with which this book of ours is concerned. For they cannot draw arguments from other sources to resolve questions of faith or theology. To seek new revelations and sacred Scriptures is characteristic of the Jews, who still await new prophets. Question 4. Another very difficult question arises from what we have said: If not everything in councils is certain—for the Holy Spirit is not present at each council—by what method and means shall we discover which decrees of councils are certain in faith? First, in Clement. unic. De summa Trinitate, et fide catholica, the opinion that grace and virtues are infused in baptism is chosen as more probable. By the same reasoning, then, we could say of other decrees of councils that probable opinions are chosen, not established facts. Further, in cap. Firmiter, de summa Trinitate et fide catholica, the fathers of the Lateran Council say: “We firmly believe and simply confess that there is one sole and true God, creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and bodily, who at the beginning of time created both creatures from nothing: the spiritual and the bodily, that is, the angelic and the earthly.” But it is not contrary to faith that angels were created before the bodily world. Gregory Nazianzen asserts this in his first oration on the Nativity of the Lord; so do Basil (exam. congressione prima), Damascenus (2 lib. cap. 3), Ambrose (exam. lib. 1, cap. 5), Jerome (in commentariis super primum caput epistolae ad Titum), and Cassian (Collatione 8. cap. 7). Hence neither Augustine (lib. De Civit. Dei, 11, cap. 32) nor St. Thomas (I p. q. 61, art. 3) thought this opinion contrary to faith. Thomas had seen that Lateran Council and had even written a commentary on that very chapter. Therefore neither the definitions nor confessions of faith of councils are certain; even when the fathers say they firmly profess and believe something, they define nothing that the faithful are bound to follow. First, we must answer this question by saying that it is not enough for the judgments of councils and Pontiffs to be believed firm merely because the whole Church publicly celebrates them in the divine office. For the histories that recount the deeds of martyrs and confessors, although they are read by the Supreme

have been approved by the Supreme Pontiff or a council, they are decrees of faith, just as even the little works of ecclesiastical teachers approved by the synod of Pope Gelasius, 15 dist., cap. Sancta Romana, are not. We also grant this, and willingly: it is not immediately to be believed as a dogma of faith merely because something is contained in the volume of Canon Law. For, as we will show more clearly in libro huic proximo, some things are found in decretal epistles that are not decrees of the Catholic faith. I was just demonstrating this explicitly from the one Clementina, De summa Trinitate. We should not think this happened only in this Clementina; rather, we are warned that something similar may happen in other places too. This is especially so when judges use words of opinion, or when their answers concern not the whole universal Church but particular Churches and bishops. For they are to be understood as pronouncing on faith only when the judgment concerns all the faithful of Christ and binds everyone. The certainty of faith was established and granted by God’s judges not for particular Churches, each of which can err, but for the universal Church, which cannot err. Thus, when the teaching of Supreme Pontiffs and councils is proposed to the whole Church and proposed with an obligation to believe it, then the judgment concerns a matter of faith. But we must examine more carefully both the nature of the matters judged and the propriety and force of the words. Ecclesiastical teaching, which we are also bound to embrace, does not have one uniform degree, and not all decrees of judgments are to be held in the same place. Since we will discuss this at length in libro duodecimo, it is not worth our while to speak of it now. We say that not everything contained in the volumes of law or councils is a judgment of Christian teaching; nor, in turn, are all judgments of teaching censures of faith. Many things concern the sound discipline of the Church but are not decrees of faith. “Is there, then,” someone may say, “some mark by which judgments of councils on faith can be recognized?” Certainly. The first and most evident is when those who assert the contrary are judged heretics. You have examples of this in cap. Damnamus, De summa Trinitate, and cap. unico, De summa Trinitate, in 6; and in Clement. unic. De summa Trinitate, cap. 2. A second mark is when a synod prescribes its decrees in this form: “If anyone holds this or that, let him be anathema.” There are many such decrees in concilio Toletano primo and in synodo Tridentino. A third is when a sentence of excommunication is imposed by the law itself on those who speak against them. An example is De haereticis, cap. Cum Christus, and cap. Ad abolendam. In concilio tamen Tridentino, sess. habita 11 Octobris, anni 1551, it was defined concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist that sacramental confession must precede the Eucharist if the conscience is burdened by mortal sin. Immediately afterward the synod says: “If anyone presumes to teach, preach, or stubbornly assert the contrary, or even publicly defend it in disputation, let him thereby be excommunicated.” But this provision was made because of the danger; for the contrary opinion was harmful. Therefore, that excommunication chiefly concerns public teaching. For the opinion of Cajetan was not condemned as heretical, and we are witnesses, having been present at the council, while the very context shows it. For canon 11, the last one, reads as follows: “If anyone says that faith alone is sufficient preparation for receiving the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist, let him be anathema.” Immediately, in a changed form of speech, these words are added: “And lest so great a sacrament …” Here you see ⁴

that no anathema is pronounced against Cajetan’s opinion, but that it is rejected because it was not only false but also harmful; and, because of the danger, public preaching and disputation in particular are forbidden. A fourth mark is when something is said, expressly and properly, to be firmly believed by the faithful or accepted as a dogma of the Catholic faith, or when something is said in similar terms to be contrary to the Gospel or the teaching of the apostles. I say “said,” not on the basis of opinion, but by a certain and firm decree. For the opinion of Durandus is indeed reproved in cap. Gaudeamus, De divortiis. But the one who said, “This seems truly absurd and hostile to the Christian faith,” did not wish to condemn him as a heretic. For the word “seems” weakens the certainty of the judgment. Moreover, those things introduced in the decrees of councils or pontiffs to explain something, answer an objection, or merely by the way and in passing, apart from the principal purpose—the matter chiefly at issue—do not pertain to faith; that is, they are not judgments of the Catholic faith. Let us give an example of something stated about one matter that can be applied to many. What is said in cap. Firmiter, De summa Trinitate, that angels are incorporeal is not a decree of faith, since after that decretal some philosophers and theologians falsely asserted the contrary without the mark of heresy. But the synod added “corporeal and incorporeal” to explain what the Catholic faith holds, namely, that God is the creator of all visible and invisible things. It is clear that these words were added to explain, not define. And just as the council took as true and highly probable that, since angels are invisible, they are also incorporeal, so perhaps it also accepted the claim that angels and the world were created at the same time. For this was not the occasion to condemn the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen and those who follow him. I am not, however, the one who wishes to defend that opinion at present. For I do not doubt that at this time it is defended rashly and inconsiderately—to say nothing further. But my point, which I think worth doing for theologians, is that not everything asserted absolutely and simply in councils is a decree of faith. If necessary, I could readily produce many examples of this, but I do not want to be long in explaining each one. That is enough about the fourth question. Question 5. The final question troubles the mind: can councils err in morals? If someone says that they can, he has first of all this argument: the Lord prayed only for Peter, that his faith might not fail; therefore the Church can err in other matters that do not concern faith but morals. Second, Catholics believe with certain faith nothing that has not been revealed by God to the Church; therefore whatever a synod defines, if it concerns morals rather than faith, need not be believed with certain faith. Further, we can deny the Church’s faith in the canonization of saints, as our people call it, without danger to the faith. It is established, however, that this matter concerns morals; therefore the Church can err in a judgment of morals. This is confirmed by the testimony of Thomas and Antoninus, who do not say that the Church cannot err in this kind of matter with certainty and firmness, but that it is to be believed piously. The reason confirms that it can err absolutely: in these kinds of judgments the Church relies on the testimonies of people who can both deceive and be deceived. Finally, if a council, when judging a dogma of theology, relied not on certain and established arguments but on probable ones, it certainly would not make the faith

of that dogma indubitable. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff will have an ambiguous faith, since, when he enrolls any person among the saints, he relies on uncertain means and arguments. Finally, the approval of religious orders, in which various kinds of people are said to serve Christ under different institutions and rules, undoubtedly concerns morals. But it is not in doubt that some orders have been approved not only uselessly but even harmfully. For in so many orders and institutions religion has suffered such great harm that, among the other remedies for evils, devout men rightly and deservedly expected even this from a general synod: that, once a few select orders had been retained, all the rest should be abolished. Therefore, sometimes the Church’s judges make a false and imprudent judgment about morals, since at times the Church approves what it ought not to have approved. Some authors proceed by these arguments to weaken ecclesiastical authority only in judgments of morals, for they agree with us that it is firm in decrees of faith. But since some judgments of the Church about morals are undoubtedly certain, we must examine more deeply which ones they are. Every question about theological matters is of two kinds. One concerns contemplation and knowledge of things. The other concerns precepts of morals, by which the conduct of life in every respect can be regulated. There is also another division of a theological question. One kind concerns matters whose knowledge and explanation are necessary for salvation; another concerns matters whose ignorance can occur without loss of piety and salvation. For theology does not always deal with necessities; sometimes it also deals with things that seem useful, although they are not so necessary. Many things have been argued both in the preceding books and in this one against those who thought wrongly about the Church’s authority in judgments of faith; and some will also be argued in the next book. By the Church’s authority I now mean that which belongs also to general councils and the Supreme Pontiff. For this is altogether one thing, so that the judgments of the Church, councils, and the Apostolic See do not differ much, because they are connected and joined together, as we see in the human body and its head. Thus whatever was distinctive of ecclesiastical authority in decrees of faith has either been said or will be said in its proper place. What pertains to judgment about morals, which we have been discussing for some time, must now be said. First conclusion. Let the first conclusion, then, be this: the Church cannot err in the teaching of morals whose observance is necessary for salvation. Let an example be given that makes the point more broadly. Whether the faithful laity ought to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist under both species, or whether the species of bread alone suffices, is a question about matters without which salvation is impossible. Therefore, on this and other controversies of the same kind, the Church’s decree is certain. Thus, if the Church defines by a firm judgment something that must necessarily be done or avoided, it cannot err in this, just as it cannot err in faith. For God does not fail in necessities, as has often been said already; therefore, in the teaching of morals that are necessary for salvation, the Church’s judges and teachers, given by God, cannot err. This is confirmed especially by the Lord’s words to Peter: “Feed my sheep.” And Paul says that God gave pastors and teachers “for the completion of the saints, so that we may not be carried about by every wind of doctrine.” But if they could err in such morals, they would not feed

Christ’s sheep in a healthful way. For moral teaching is no less required for the saving nourishment of Christ’s sheep than the discipline of faith. The Church’s pastors, then, cannot err in these matters. Add that the Lord promised through Ioannes that the Spirit would teach the Church all truth, namely, what is necessary for attaining eternal life. But both kinds of truth are necessary, that which concerns contemplation and that which concerns action; therefore, in defining both, the Spirit teaches the Church. Further, in his first epistle ad Timotheum, cap. 3, the Apostle says: “I write these things to you so that you may know how you ought to conduct yourself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and foundation of truth.” It is clear that what Paul wrote there concerns in large part the truth of morals. The Church, therefore, is the foundation not only of the truth that is seen in contemplation but also of the truth that directs action. It tells us, namely, how we ought to conduct ourselves in the house of God. Moreover, if the Church’s pastors, especially when gathered in a council, interpreted the laws and precepts of life perversely—saying, for instance, that what is necessary for salvation is unnecessary, or defining as necessary what is by no means necessary—then, since Christ said, “The scribes and Pharisees sit upon the chair of Moses; whatever they tell you, do,” and again, “He who hears you hears me,” the Church, in following its erring pastors according to what was prescribed to it, would have Christ himself as the chief author of this error. Further, if the evangelical law was not imperfect and incomplete, as indeed it was not, it fully prescribed the morals that are necessary for salvation. For a lawgiver is imperfect unless he prescribes those things without which the end of the commonwealth cannot be maintained. But the Spirit of truth suggests to the apostles and their successors whatever Christ told us; therefore, they cannot err in the precepts of life that are necessary. Again, in Matthaei 16, the Lord says to Peter: “I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” The kingdom of heaven is shut by ignorance of both kinds, in faith and in morals; therefore, by Christ’s authority the Church can open both questions and loosen both knots, whether they concern faith or morals. For we must believe this too: “Whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven.” But you will say that this is understood of a key that does not err. I agree. But it is one thing to discuss the private judgments of pastors, which we may sometimes disregard; it is another to discuss the public judgments of the Church, which we embrace just as we do the Church’s decrees. Indeed, when a pontiff, whoever he may be, privately does something and loosens or binds, he can err through ignorance or even malice and abuse the power of the keys. But when the judgments are public and common to the whole Church, and concern matters necessary for salvation, the common judges of the whole Church, such as the fathers of a council, cannot err, lest through such an error all the Christian people be left ignorant of the truth necessary for ordering their lives. Further, Concilium Constantiense, sess. 13, condemns as heretics those who say that the Church errs in its custom of administering the Eucharist to the people under only one species. And Martinus quintus, in the letters by which he approved the council, defines that those who condemn this institution of the Church are to be restrained as heretics or as favoring heresy. Therefore, the Church does not err in judgments of this kind about morals, and consequently neither do councils confirmed by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff.

Second conclusion. A further consequence of this conclusion seems to be that, when the Church gives laws to the whole people on a serious matter that is especially conducive to forming Christian conduct, it cannot command anything contrary either to the Gospel or to natural reason. I therefore do not approve all the Church’s laws here, nor commend every penalty, censure, excommunication, suspension, irregularity, or interdict. I know that some such laws are wanting, if nothing else, in prudence and measure. What I say, then, is that the commands, decrees, and sanctions of the Supreme Pontiffs and councils will be approved by us all if they are necessary for forming the conduct of the faithful. For if, as we asserted just now from the Council of Constance, the Church’s custom cannot oppose the Gospel, neither can the Church’s law oppose it. Further, the Church cannot define as a vice what is honorable, or say that what is shameful is honorable; therefore neither can it approve by a law of its own anything hostile to the Gospel or to reason. For if the Church, either by an express judgment or by a law enacted, approved shameful things or condemned honorable ones, this error would bring pestilence and ruin not only to the faithful but would also in a certain way oppose the faith, which approves every virtue and condemns all vices. These sayings also apply: “Whatever they tell you, do,” and “He who hears you hears me.” By them we are commanded to obey the Church’s laws. Thus, if she errs, Christ is the author of our error. Anyone who sees this would act not merely ignorantly but impiously by claiming that the Church errs in teaching morals, especially if the conduct and precepts of life are necessary for salvation. The same reasoning that establishes this about the Church establishes it about a council, in which the authority of the universal Church resides. Accordingly, just as a council cannot propose falsehoods for the people to believe, so it cannot propose evils for them to do. I mean a proposal made by a firm and certain decree, obliging all to believe and act under eternal punishment. But I would not dare to decide whether it is heretical to assert that some custom of the Church is bad or one of her laws unjust. For although the Council of Constance, sess. 13, decreed that those were to be condemned as heretics who asserted that the Church erred in the custom of communicating the people under one species alone, it made this decree at a time when it was without a head. Caietanus, in opusculo de auctoritate Pap. et constit. and in apolog. cap. 20 et 21, and Turrecremata likewise, 3 lib. cap. 32, contend that a council without a head has no certain authority in issuing decrees of faith. Though they try to persuade us with many arguments, this one carries the greatest weight with me: just as God does not fail in what is necessary, so he does not abound in what is superfluous. Since the Church needs authority to depose a heretical Pontiff, elect one, or decide who is Catholic in cases where it may lawfully convene a council without a head, there is no reason to grant an imperfect council greater power. The remaining matters can be settled by a full council, either once a Catholic Pontiff who was lacking has been elected, or once it has been determined with certainty who the true Pontiff is when there was doubt among several. Add that, as said above, the council’s dogmas are not firm unless confirmed by the Roman Pontiff. When, therefore, a council is without a head, it does not have certainty in its dogmas. Moreover, Martinus quintus, in the letters by which he approves the council, does not approve that article without qualification, but only defines that those who taught that the Church errs in this custom

were either heretics or to be condemned as people who favor heresy. What Martinus, presiding over the council, did not dare condemn in the name of heresy, I do not dare, nor ought I, to accuse under a harsher censure. If such restraint was shown regarding a custom necessary for salvation, as that one seems to have been in the controversy at the Council of Constance, how much more restrained should we be in condemning other errors that oppose no Church custom necessary for salvation? Lutherans reject the custom of carrying the Sacrament of the Eucharist through public streets in a solemn procession. If you look to the origin and starting point of their error, it will seem heretical to you. For they mock this custom of carrying the Sacrament because they deny Christ’s true presence in the Sacrament. But if you consider the error in itself, it has the flavor of heresy; it is rash and impudent (for this error deserves censure on many counts), yet it is not heresy, since even if the Church were mistaken in this custom, her authority in more serious matters would not thereby be endangered. This was why the Council of Trent cautiously framed Canon 6 on the Sacrament of the Eucharist in these words: “If anyone says that Christ in the holy Sacrament of the Eucharist is not to be adored with the worship of latria, even outwardly, and therefore is neither to be venerated with a special festive celebration nor solemnly carried in processions according to the Church’s praiseworthy custom, let him be anathema.” The synod does not simply strike with anathema those who criticize that rite of the Church, but those who do so for this reason: they do not admit Christ’s bodily presence in the Eucharist and consequently do not admit his adoration and worship at all. Perhaps this same reason moved Martinus quintus to condemn those who criticized the Church’s custom of giving the Eucharist to the people under one species, not as heretics but as people who favor heresy. Since in former times the people received the Sacrament of the Eucharist under both species, and this was confirmed by apostolic authority and practice, it was not heretical to question whether that true custom of the Church ought to be preferred to the new one. But because the Wicleffistae asserted that the Church erred on the ground that they considered it necessary for the people’s salvation to receive both species of the Sacrament, twisting the Lord’s words, “Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood…” in that direction, Martinus quintus very wisely said that criticizing the Church’s new custom did not constitute heresy, but favored heresy. There is also this weighty argument for not branding errors of this sort as heresy: as we shall say later, it is not heretical to believe that the Church can err in enrolling people among the saints. Yet the Church sometimes commands that saints whom it honors in this way be worshiped with a special feast day and cult. It is therefore not heresy to assert that the Church errs in a law and custom concerning the worship of one saint or another. We must understand, however, that some customs of the Church were handed down to it by Christ and the Apostles; anyone who said that the Church errs in these would make Christ and the Apostles the authors of its error. For this reason he is judged a heretic, as were the Iconomachi, who asserted that the Church erred in the veneration and worship of images. Other customs, however, were introduced after the Apostles; even if the Church erred in these, the faith would not thereby be endangered. One can therefore hold without risk of heresy that the Church can err in some law and custom. So much for the second conclusion. Let there be a third conclusion. Third conclusion. In matters of conduct that are not common to the whole Church but concern private persons or churches, the Church can err through ignorance—not only, I say, in judging events that have occurred, but also in private precepts and laws themselves.

For when someone who has secretly taken one wife publicly marries another, the Church commands him to leave the first and take the second. In this matter it is undoubtedly mistaken and commands a man to do what is contrary to reason and the Gospel. Innocentius tertius gave the true and adequate reason for this conclusion in cap. A nobis, de sentent. excom., in these words: “The judgment of God always rests on truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived; the judgment of the Church, however, sometimes follows an opinion that often deceives and is deceived. Hence it sometimes happens that one who is bound before God is released before the Church, and one who is free before God is bound by an ecclesiastical sentence.” Thus far Innocentius. These matters seem clear and should be judged briefly and without dispute. We do not set them out in order to raise questions but to explain them. At this point, therefore, it is not so much the conclusion as its reason that must be considered. From this it is clear—and this deserves the closest attention—that the Church’s decrees cannot be certain and firm unless they rest on certain and firm principles and foundations. Accordingly, if even one of the things on which the Church’s judgment depends is uncertain, the Church’s decree cannot be certain, whether the question is speculative or practical, as our writers customarily say. For, as the proverb of the dialecticians has it, a conclusion follows the weaker part; if any one of its principles is unsound, it must also be weakened on that side. From this it is easy to understand that the Church’s judgments which proceed from uncertain human testimony are too weak to establish a certain and verified belief. Such is the judgment by which it decides that someone should be inscribed in the catalogue of saints. Yet it is not permitted to call such decrees into question with impunity. Indeed, it is rash and irreligious to withhold credence from the Church in consecrating saints. As Innocentius teaches in cap. Cum Marthae, de celeb. Miss., “He does an injury to a martyr who prays for a martyr”; therefore he does an injury, and much more so, who rejects someone inscribed in the catalogue of martyrs and numbered among the saints. Since he will do this rashly and thoughtlessly, he will rightly be punished by the Church. Moreover, if even one decree of this kind is called into question, we could question without blame the holiness of Hieronymus, Ambrosius, Augustinus, and the rest, and even assert that they were condemned with the demons. In this way you could tear them down with curses and harass them with insults, all of which faithful ears recoil from. If the Church errs in placing just men in the catalogue of saints, it would surely not be very absurd for those who do so to reject the worship of all saints whom the Church consecrated after Clemens. What could be said that is more foolish or impudent? It also matters greatly to the Church’s common conduct to know whom you ought to worship religiously. Therefore, if the Church erred about them, it would also be seriously mistaken in matters of conduct. And if the Church were to enact a law of abstinence contrary either to reason or to the Gospel, it would certainly err shamefully; so it would also err shamefully in its teaching on conduct if it enacted a law about worshiping a saint whom, if he is not a saint, it is contrary to both reason and the Gospel to worship. To prevent such a great error in the Church, we must believe that God provides in a special way that the Church, whatever human testimony it follows, does not err in the canonization of saints. Ample evidence of this very special providence is that belief based on human witnesses, once accepted in such judgments, has never been undermined—something that often happens in civil cases.

Even if these points individually perhaps do not move us, all of them connected and joined together must surely do so, so that we regard those who detract from the Church’s credibility in these matters as not indeed heretics, but rash, imprudent, and irreligious. Once these matters have been set out, the first, second, and third arguments are easily refuted. The questions that can be disputed concerning the last one will be explained at another time and for another purpose, if we have the opportunity. For now, it can be said briefly that those who rashly and indiscriminately defend every judgment of the Supreme Pontiff on any matter weaken the authority of the Apostolic See rather than support it; they overthrow it rather than strengthen it. To pass over what was explained a little earlier in this chapter, what, then, will a man accomplish in arguing against heretics if they see that he takes up the defense of pontifical authority not by judgment but by inclination, and does not act so that the force of his reasoning may bring truth and light to bear, but instead turns himself toward another’s opinion and will? Peter does not need our falsehood or our flattery. Whether to approve or refute religious orders depends not only on knowledge but also on prudence, and therefore does not belong among the matters in which the Supreme Pontiff cannot err. Even at the Lateran Council it was already observed that the excessive number of religious orders, which we now see, greatly harms the Church of Christ. The Council of Lyon also acknowledges that the importunate eagerness of petitioners extorted confirmation of certain orders contrary to the synod’s decree. It therefore decreed that some orders, even though approved by the Apostolic See, should be abolished as harmful or useless to the Church, and that no one thereafter should be admitted to profess them. Celestinus quintus confirmed the state and way of life of the fratricelli by his privilege; but Ioannes 22 explicitly declared that this privilege of confirmation was invalid, because Bonifacius, for certain rational reasons, had entirely deprived of force what Celestinus had granted. Paulus tertius is likewise said to have approved by his letters the order founded in Italy by frater Baptista Cremensis; but recently that order was rejected by a public edict of the Venetians, and the teaching of Baptista, to which the members of that order adhered, was condemned at Rome. The argument of those who infer from privileges of this kind—readily granted, or rather extorted, in these times—that new religious orders should be welcomed as if they had fallen from heaven is therefore weak, including orders that have no rule among those approved and profess none of their own. Privileges of this kind are not certain judgments of the Apostolic See that bind all the faithful. It is enough if they have the authority of decretal letters. Some of these, as is known, were later rejected with better judgment, since they arose not from a firm decree but from the opinions of Pontiffs. Before the time of divus Thomas, new orders were admitted so restrictively and with such difficulty that this grave and august judgment could be taken as probable evidence of prudent counsel. In our own age, however, so many religious orders have been confirmed by Pontiffs that anyone who tries to defend them all as useful or necessary to the Church may rightly and on the strongest grounds be charged with imprudence, not to say folly. But now the book on the authority of councils must be brought to a close, after first refuting the effort of those who have tried to attack and assail the firmest stronghold of this question.