De locis theologicis

HERE CONCLUSIONS ARE SET OUT THAT CONTAIN THE AUTHORITY OF THIS LOCUS

Conclusion 1. On these grounds, let the first conclusion be this: A general council that has neither been convened nor confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff can err in faith. This conclusion is clearly proved by the error of the councils of Rimini and Constantinople under the Emperor Leo, which we brought against the authority of this locus in the fifth argument of the first chapter. Gratian also shows the same in 17 dist. cap. Regula and cap. Multis, with the clear testimony of Julius and Pelagius. Damasus defines the same in his letter to Archbishop Stephen, as do the three African councils, which acknowledged this very point in their letter to Damasus. For a council lacking the authority of the Roman bishop is not truly a valid council, as not only the pontiffs but the councils themselves have taught. The Seventh Council taught it in act. 6, tom. I; the Eighth Council in act. I and 7; the Roman Synod under Symmachus in 96 dist. cap. Bene; the synod of ninety bishops under Damasus in histor. trip. libr. 5, cap. 29; and the Lateran Council under Leo X in sess. 11, where the same matter is said to have been defined at the Synod of Alexandria. Socrates, lib. 4 histor. trip. cap. 9, likewise reports that ecclesiastical rule requires councils of this kind not to be held without the judgment of the Roman Pontiff. Julius said this had been established by the Council of Nicaea in his letter to the Eastern bishops, and Marcellus said in his letter to the Antiochenes that the apostles had decreed it. Clearly, councils of this kind have not only always lacked the force to establish the truth of faith in the Church; they have almost been gatherings of iniquity and have had sad, indeed deadly, outcomes. Bucer says that those who claim it is not lawful to convene a council without the consent of the Roman Pontiff are lying. First he confirms this with the testimony of Eusebius and the Historia tripartita. Next, he says, there is the canon of the Council of Nicaea concerning the holding of synods. There are also Apostolic Canons prescribing two synods each year in every province. He claims, however, that whatever is decreed in councils of this kind is firm and valid as truth against falsehood, so that not even the Supreme Pontiff can rescind it. How can anyone answer this man’s shamelessness without indignation? First, how shameless of him to cite Eusebius’s history and the Historia tripartita, which report nothing against us and much in our favor! And what of his next point? He invokes the Council of Nicaea and the Apostolic Canons, which speak of provincial synods, prescribed by the Supreme Pontiffs for the proper organization and administration of the churches. We are not speaking of provincial synods. To say that general councils cannot be convened without the consent of the Supreme Pontiff is no different from saying that the chief councils of a kingdom cannot be convened without the prince’s consent, especially when he opposes them. And what of his claim that whatever is decided in these synods is firm? “As truth,” he says, “against falsehood.” So if something is for the truth, it must be accepted wherever it is established; but who will assure us that whatever provincial synods decree is for the truth? Enough of this for now. These matters will be explained more fully in the fourth conclusion. Conclusion 2. A general council, even when convened by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, can err in faith. ¹

This is plainly demonstrated by the example of the Second Council of Ephesus, where nearly all the bishops subscribed to the heresy of Dioscorus despite the opposition of Leo’s legates. Pope Leo confirms this even more clearly in the letters cited above, in response to the fifth argument; so too does the Eighth Council in act. 7, Nicholas in his letter to the Emperor Michael, and Eugenius IV in the decree on the union of the Jacobites. After condemning the Second Synod of Ephesus, convened under Leo and agreeing, as it did, with the error of Eutyches, Eugenius says: “The holy Roman Church accepts all universal synods lawfully convened, held, and confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff.” He did not say merely “convened,” but “held and confirmed.” The same point is shown by the example of the Council of Basel, whose error we brought against this view in the ninth argument of the first chapter. But we shall discuss this matter more fully in our answer to that argument. Further, no council is or has been valid unless it was supported by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, as Julius, Damasus, Pelagius, and the other fathers cited in support of the first conclusion taught plainly. But even if a council is convened at the command of the Supreme Pontiff, if its doctrines are not confirmed by him—and he or his legates have instead opposed them—the synod is certainly not supported by apostolic authority. It will therefore not be valid and firm, and consequently will not be sufficient to establish our faith. This conclusion will be explained more fully in the next chapter. Conclusion 3. A general council confirmed by the authority of the Roman Pontiff establishes the Catholic doctrines as certain articles of faith. We must hold this conclusion so firmly established that we regard its opposite as heretical. First, otherwise all the heresies condemned by the authority of general councils would return, and the Nicene Creed too would become uncertain if the authority of a general council were set aside. Further, if a council of this kind could err in faith, no certain way would remain to ascertain Catholic doctrine in disputes about faith. Whoever rejects the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff and all the other pastors of the Church will find no living judge whose tribunal he cannot leave. The Lutherans want Scripture to be the judge in a council, although it neither senses nor understands nor can itself pronounce judgment. Luther himself cries out that the words “This is my body” must be taken literally, while Zwingli says they are figurative. Who will decide between them? Scripture itself? Or rather the supreme judge of the Church, together with a council of priests, as is written in Deuteron. 17? If someone in human courts rejected the living judges established in the commonwealth and fled to mute, lifeless writings, he would be rejected by everyone. We have spoken much about this and shall often do so again. Let us return to the point. If we reject the faith of councils, we shall also lose a good part of Scripture. For if someone, with Luther, removes the Epistle of James from the canonical writings, this question certainly cannot be settled by Scripture. Living judges must therefore be established. If, after rejecting the judgment of the pastors, you appeal to another tribunal, you do nothing but evade the judges of Christ and the Church and substitute human judges for divine ones. Whoever you choose apart from the pastors of the Church will have only human and uncertain authority. Further, the faithful people must either stand by the council’s definition or may oppose it. If they must, then when a council errs the people will share its error. If they may oppose it, where is the saying, “He who hears you hears me”? Where again is, “The scribes and Pharisees sit upon Moses’ seat; whatever they tell you, observe and do”? ^{2 3}

They object that if we must do whatever the authorities tell us, why did Christ elsewhere warn us against the leaven of the Pharisees? Matthew explains that this means the doctrine of the Pharisees. Why, again, did Christ teach us by his own example to despise their traditions? They can therefore mix something of their own doctrine into the purity of the Gospel, in which case they are not only not to be heard but also must be refuted. Christ guarded against this, lest the people be led by the evil examples of teachers to despise true doctrine. Christ therefore commands us to do what the Pharisees say when they sit on Moses’ seat—that is, when they expound, teach, and set forth God’s law. If they teach their own doctrines, however, we not only may but must disregard them, as Augustine plainly interpreted in in Ioannem. The pastors gain nothing, then, from that saying of the Gospel. Indeed, since they can speak on their own authority, we may even despise them. Hence Jerome, commenting on those words in Matthaei, 17 cap., “Not everyone who says to me,” etc., says: “Just as above he said that those who wear the garment of a good life are not to be received because of the wickedness of their doctrines, so now, conversely, he asserts that we are not to place our faith even in those who, though strong in the integrity of faith, live shamefully and destroy the integrity of their teaching by their evil works.” But these men deceitfully and maliciously apply to true pastors of the Church what Augustine says about hirelings. They do not understand that the Church has always had true pastors among its hirelings, whose voices the sheep must hear, especially if all speak with one voice. For then the voice of the pastors is also the voice of the Church, and therefore of Christ. Otherwise, what does this mean: “I beg you all to say the same thing, and let there be no schisms among you”? “Is Christ divided?” Far from it. “God is not the author of dissension but of peace.” In truth, to put this argument briefly: if the sheep follow the same doctrine of all the pastors, there will be no fault in the sheep. Let us suppose that they do so; if all the pastors err, then all the sheep will err too. We proved in the previous book that this cannot happen. Jerome immediately explains what he means: both things are necessary in God’s servants if we are to trust them—their deeds must be confirmed by their words and their words by their deeds. Further, Martin V, in the Council of Constance, included among the questions by which those suspected in faith were to be examined whether they believed that every general council represents the universal Church. If a general council therefore has the authority of the universal Church, whoever removes that council’s authority dissolves the authority of the whole Church by the same act. Augustine’s statement in libro primo de Baptismo contra Donatistas, ch. 18, is therefore excellent: the judgment of a full council is the agreement of the whole Church. Moreover, Paul saw no more fitting way to investigate the truth in a question that had arisen than to refer the dispute to the Council of Jerusalem. We must therefore follow the course that Paul considered most suitable for settling a question of faith, and imitate the moderation described by Luke in Acts 15, both among Jews and among Gentiles. The Gentiles could have protested against the Council of Jerusalem for taking away the liberty Christ had given them and imposing on the disciples’ shoulders certain ceremonies as necessary, although they seemed less necessary because faith in Christ was sufficient for salvation. Yet even the Jews did not resist, though they could have opposed the council’s decision with Scripture, which says, “The man whose flesh is uncircumcised,” etc. They therefore paid such honor to the council and offered an example to be followed in future ages, so that synods confirmed by the authority of Peter and his successors

might be held as establishing certain faith. “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us,” they said. The council’s judgment, then, is the very judgment of the Holy Spirit. Another reason is that the Catholic Church has always accepted the decrees of general councils and has certainly considered those whom they called heretics to be heretics. If we wish to hold the faith of the Church, we must therefore hold the faith of councils. This was also confirmed by strong arguments in the previous book. Conclusion 4. A provincial council not confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff can err in faith. An example is the Council of Milan, lib. 10. hist. ecclesiast. cap. 20; the Council of Antioch of ninety bishops, lib. 4 histor. trip. cap. 9; the Council of Seleucia, lib. 1. trip. cap. 34; and the Council of Carthage, which we mentioned while arguing. This conclusion is confirmed not only by examples but also by Symmachus, who says: “Councils of priests prescribed by ecclesiastical laws for the provinces have lost their validity because they do not have the Pope’s presence.” It must therefore be admitted that provincial councils have sometimes issued laws that are too harsh and scarcely reasonable, such as perhaps that of Aachen, cited in 36 quaest. 2. cap. Placuit. The Council of Elvira also issued its decree against images not only unwisely but impiously. If a general council lacking the authority of the Roman bishop can err in faith, then a provincial synod can sometimes err, and all the more so. Conclusion 5. A provincial council confirmed by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff cannot err in faith. The condemnation of many heretics would be uncertain if this conclusion were not certain. For most heretics were condemned not by general but by provincial councils: Priscillian by the First Council of Toledo; Helvidius by the Council of Telensis; Pelagius by the Councils of Milevis and Carthage. Gregory also reports that Pelagius was condemned by the Council of Ephesus, de haeret. cap. Fraternitatis. But this judgment does not now appear in the Council of Ephesus. Further, it is neither expedient nor tolerable to convene a separate general synod for each heretic to be condemned. Since God has provided what is necessary for his Church, provincial councils must surely suffice for refuting local heresies, provided they are strengthened by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover, the Church has always rejected all those condemned as heretics by such councils; therefore they cannot err in faith. If they could, at least one example would be produced, but there is none. Oecolampadius cites the Roman Synod under Gelasius, where, he says, it was defined that the substance of bread remains in the sacrament of the Eucharist. We shall show in the next chapter that this is fabricated, for this judgment belongs to no synod, not even to Gelasius. Further, Pope Symmachus says that provincial councils decreed by the Church’s laws each year have lost their validity because they lack the Pope’s presence. It follows that they are valid if they have his presence. In the Seventh Council, act. 3, after Theodorus had accepted the general councils, he immediately adds: “We do not reject local synods; rather, we love,

“We embrace and accept them. We honor with the greatest reverence their canonical constitutions, corrections, and legislation, divinely inspired as they are.” The Seventh Synod itself approves this letter of Theodorus and the Eastern bishops. The Eighth Synod likewise says in its final session, Canone 1: “We profess that we preserve and keep the rules handed down to the holy Church both by the holy apostles and by universal councils of the orthodox, as well as by local councils. We also decree that all who bear the name Christian are canonically subject to the condemnations and approvals issued by them.” So far the Eighth Synod. Its words are to be understood as applying especially to councils confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff. For, as will be shown in the next passage, the Supreme Pontiff cannot err in a judgment of faith. The decrees of provincial councils concerning faith are therefore firm and certain if confirmed by the Roman Pontiff. This was explained in Actorum 15 cap. The gathering reported there was not a general but a provincial council. Yet the faith placed in it, with Peter presiding, was no less than if it had been a general synod. This refutes Erasmus’s slander. In annot. super epistolam ad Rom. cap. 5 he said that he was not so bound by the Synod of Milevis and other similar provincial councils. He added: “Otherwise, if someone insists that whatever was decreed in them must be observed, I shall produce from them certain doctrines that the Church now condemns as heretical.” So far Erasmus. But, as we said, the Council of Milevis was confirmed, and for that reason a Christian is bound by it. The councils from which heretical doctrines may be produced were not confirmed. We add another conclusion. Conclusion 6. Although provincial councils lack the authority of the Roman bishop, a probable argument may be drawn from them to support doctrines of faith. A very strong argument for this is that, among countless councils of this kind, scarcely five or six are found to have departed from the proper way and method of defining. If such councils generally hold the right faith and only rarely define matters, an argument drawn from councils of this kind is without doubt highly probable. Unless they have been specifically rejected, they are commended by the Church’s common silence or even its tacit consent, if they have come to the Church’s general notice. It is not at all plausible that the Church would have long concealed a heresy spread throughout the world by a provincial council. For an error that is not opposed is approved, 83 dist. cap. Error. Do not object to the Council of Elvira: in the matter in which it erred, Catholics have always rejected it. This is the chief reason why the ancient Councils of Toledo, Arles, Seville, and similar councils seem to have been approved by the Church, if not explicitly, then tacitly. The Councils of Ancyra, Neo-Caesarea, Gangra, Sardica, Africa, and Carthage were confirmed by Leo IV, 20 dist. cap. De libellis. The Synod of Trullo also approved certain provincial councils, but we shall discuss later at length how much this approval of Trullo is worth. For now, we assert only that councils not approved by the Supreme Pontiff do not supply a certain argument, but a probable one, to strengthen a doctrine of faith. This is inferred from Innocent, 20 dist. cap. De quibus.

Conclusion 7. Provincial councils, if confirmed by the Roman Pontiff in their decrees of faith, provide a certain argument for the truth. For if the Synod of Toledo errs in faith while the successor of Peter presides and confirms it, there seems to be no reason why the Roman Synod could not err. Further, a provincial council confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff has certain authority; therefore an episcopal synod does too. But I cannot recall any other episcopal synod on a judgment of faith confirmed by the Roman bishop, apart from that of Complutum under Alfonso Carrillo, Archbishop of Toledo, where a certain master of Osma was condemned for holding false opinions about the keys of the Church and the Sacrament of Penance. Final conclusion. An episcopal synod by itself can establish probable belief in a case of heresy, but not certain belief. We must first resolve the former point, for the latter is clear enough. The former is shown by cap. Ad abolendam, de haereticis, where Lucius III binds with the perpetual ban of anathema those whom either the Roman Church or individual bishops in their dioceses, with the counsel of their clergy or, if necessary, of neighboring bishops, have judged to be heretics. The judgments of synods of this kind are therefore no light presumption: Lucius valued them so highly that he decreed that those whom these synods judged heretics were to be treated as excommunicated. I am not unaware that some learned men interpret this decretal of Lucius as referring to people caught in manifest heresy. Otherwise, they deny that an episcopal, and even a provincial, council has the right to judge heresy. They prove this by saying that faith is a matter common to all, and therefore the power to judge faith and the heresy opposed to it belongs not to particular churches but to the universal Church. They also support their view from cap. Maiores, de baptism. and cap. Quoties, 24 quaest. 1, where such cases are said to be referred to the Apostolic See alone, since they have been reserved to it by a special privilege from the Lord. After the words quoted, Lucius himself seems to confirm this when he says: “We nevertheless decree by this ordinance that whoever is found manifestly in heresy …” The Pope is therefore speaking of a case in which the heresy is manifest. Yet the opinion of those who think that by this decretal of Lucius all those whom either the Roman Church, a provincial synod, or even an episcopal synod judges to be heretics are plainly and simply bound by the ban of anathema has always seemed far more probable to me, even if the heresy is not manifest to everyone. First, the text does not say “those whom they have declared heretics,” but “judged.” If that declaration concerned something manifest, it would not be a true judgment in a case of faith. Why, then, did Lucius refer the matter to a bishop with the counsel of the clergy rather than to theologians, so that those whom learned theologians declared heretics might be struck with anathema? Second, if Lucius did not use the word “judged” properly, but improperly to mean “explain something manifest,” then since exactly the same word is applied to both the Roman Church and the bishop with his clergy, it would follow that we should understand Lucius to excommunicate people declared—not judged—to be heretics by the Roman Church as well. But it is clear that the word is understood properly and simply of the Roman Church; when it refers to a bishop’s synod, it must not therefore be twisted into another sense. Add that there were many reasons why the case of a person accused of heresy could be referred to synods of this kind. First, it might be done by a special commission from the Apostolic See, as the Council of Toledo I heard the case of Priscillian, and the Synod of Complutum under Alfonso Carrillo, Archbishop of Toledo, heard the case

of a certain master of Osma. Next, it might be done without a special commission from the Pope, as inquisitors do now, in a case where the heresy was manifest but it was not clear that the accused was a heretic—either because it had not been proved or made known that he asserted a heretical proposition, or because, even if he had asserted it, his pertinacity had not yet been established, without which no one is a heretic. Finally, it might concern a heresy not so manifest that everyone knew of it, but still such that there was no need to refer it either to a general council or to the Apostolic Church, since learned theologians agreed that it was heresy. In all these cases, synods once had the right, and those now entrusted with knowledge of faith still have the right, to pronounce and judge a case of faith. Their judgments are not so certain, however, that they cannot be false—not only in a doubtful matter disputed among learned men, a case in which local synods have no right to pronounce on heresy, but even in a matter that seems manifest to all the province’s theologians, a case in which they pronounce on a case of faith without the crime of usurping judgment. In these three cases, then, although such judgments are not certain and firm in the Church, they are nevertheless highly probable and ought to be held in the greatest regard by the faithful. It would not be a small harm to the Church if people did not meanwhile avoid those whom not only the Roman Church but also a provincial or episcopal synod had judged heretics, as they would avoid excommunicated people. Let us consider the first objection. “The matter of faith,” they say, “is common to all; therefore private judges are not permitted to pass judgment on it.” But the crime of treason against majesty and betrayal of the commonwealth also concerns all citizens, and private judges nevertheless commonly decide such cases. The chapters they cite are to be understood as applying when a matter is disputed among bishops and theologians themselves, as Pelagius explained, 17 dist. cap. Multis. The same sense is stated more clearly in Deuter. 17, 8: “If,” it says, “you see that a judgment among you is difficult and ambiguous, and you see conflicting words in a judgment within your gates, rise and go up to the place that the Lord will choose,” etc. What Lucius adds does not work against us. He did not say, “whoever is caught in manifest heresy,” but “whoever is manifestly caught in heresy.” As is clear from the context, he wants no one delivered to the secular arm unless it has been established that he is a heretic. Punishments of this sort require proofs as clear as broad daylight before they can be carried out. Enough has now been said about the authority of councils.