De locis theologicis
Melchor Cano (1509–1560)
De locis theologicis libri duodecim
First published 1563
Melchor Cano's De locis theologicis, first published in 1563, examines the sources and authority of theological arguments in twelve books. It considers Scripture, tradition, ecclesial authority, reason, and history as grounds for theological inquiry. The present edition includes the Latin text and an English translation. The Latin was prepared from Juan Belda Plans's BAC reading text and checked against The School of Salamanca's CC BY 4.0 transcription and aligned page images of the 1563 edition; both sources are credited.
Preface
Book I
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Book II
Preface to Book II
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Chapter X
Chapter XI
Chapter XII
Chapter XIII
Chapter XIV
Chapter XV
Chapter XVI
Chapter XVII
Chapter XVIII
Book III
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Book IV
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Book V
Chapter I
ARGUMENTS USED BY HERETICS TO UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THIS LOCUS
After the authority of the Church comes the authority of councils, which heretics attack with many arguments. Argument 1. First, the Church is the pillar and foundation of truth. But only cardinals and bishops come to a synod, and they are fewer in number and no weightier in authority—that is, neither more virtuous nor wiser. Therefore, a synod is not the rule of belief for the Church; rather, the Church is the rule for a synod. Argument 2. Next, the pontiffs and Pharisees assembled a council whose decision was impious, as is read in Ioann. 11 cap. Therefore, the judgment of a priestly synod is not always to be approved. For just as the chief priests and the whole council sought false testimony against Jesus, as in Matth. 26, and all the chief priests and elders of the people took counsel against Jesus, Matth. 27, so our bishops and pontiffs can also pass a judgment contrary to Jesus Christ. Argument 3. Further, if the bishops hold the truth and cannot be deceived, this must result from some divine covenant. But this covenant is nowhere evident. And, even if it were evident, it must be interpreted differently from the covenant that the Lord once made with Levi and his descendants. “My covenant,” he says, “was with Levi: the law of truth was in his mouth, and no iniquity was found on his lips; he walked with me in peace and equity, and turned many away from iniquity. For the lips of the priest will guard knowledge, and they will seek the law from his mouth, because he is the angel of the Lord of hosts. But you have departed from the way and caused many to stumble in the law; you have made void the covenant with Levi, says the Lord of hosts.” 1
Again: “I beg you, Lord, who keep the covenant with those who keep your commandments.” On these words Jerome says: “What the Lord promises will not happen immediately; he fulfills his promises to those who keep his commandments.” From this it is clear that the covenant to preserve the truth, once made with the priestly tribe, was annulled by the sins of its descendants. It follows that in the same way, if Christ promised truth to the apostles and all the pontiffs who succeed them, they will preserve that truth only so long as they have not acted through their own sins in such a way that they deserve to be deprived of it. Otherwise, as Jerome says on this passage of Malachias, it is indeed the priests’ duty to answer when questioned about the Law, but if they claim diligence in other matters while showing negligence in the Holy Scriptures, they boast in vain of a dignity whose work they do not perform. Jerome also writes that priests falsely boast of the saying, “The law will not perish from the priest, nor counsel from the wise, nor speech from the prophet,” since Scripture says, “Wisdom will not enter into a perverse soul.” And through Ezechiel the Lord says: “They will seek a vision from the prophet, the law will perish from the priest, and counsel from the elders.” On these words Jerome himself says: “These things were sought not only at that time, when the Babylonian army came against Jerusalem, from prophets, priests, and elders, but they are sought daily in the Churches. If they have lost vision, law, and counsel, they boast in vain of being prophets, priests, and elders.” Add the testimony of Hieremias: “The priests did not say, ‘Where is the Lord?’ Those who hold my law did not know me; the shepherds transgressed against me, and the prophets prophesied by Baal.” Jerome says in his commentaries that these words should be used against the teachers of our order. Add this too: “All its watchmen are blind; they all lack knowledge. They are mute dogs, unable to bark, seeing vain things, sleeping and loving dreams … The shepherds themselves did not understand; they all turned aside to their own way.” From these things it is readily understood that we must not trust the judgments of pastors and priests, especially if the Lord is angry with them. If only they are summoned to a council, then, a council can certainly err. Argument 4. Further, the authority of councils is usually proved chiefly by this testimony: “If two of you agree on earth about anything they ask, it will be done for them by my Father who is in heaven. For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them.” But this testimony would prove that the judgments of provincial synods are equally certain—a conclusion foreign to the true faith, as is clear from other examples and especially from concilio Carthaginense sub Cypriano, in which eighty bishops, not merely two or three, erred against orthodox doctrine about the one baptism. The truth of synods, therefore, rests on a weak—or rather, no—foundation. Moreover, Christ promised in that testimony to assist only those councils that convene in his name. First, then, let them prove that they assemble in Christ’s name, for wicked bishops may conspire against Christ. Next, let them add nothing to or take nothing away from the word of God, since this law was prescribed to them. Argument 5. In addition, concilium Arimenense, with six hundred bishops, erred with Arius; concilium Ephesinum secundum, though very numerous, erred with Dioscorus; and concilium Constantinopolitanum, with three hundred pontiffs, erred with Emperor Leo. Therefore, even general councils of any kind provide theologians with no firm argument. 2 3
Argument 6. Further, the Synod held at Trullo committed not one but many errors, as can be seen in canons 2, 3, 13, 55, and 67. Councils, then, can err in faith and morals. Argument 7. Moreover, Albert Pighius, a learned and devout man, shows by many arguments that the acts circulated under the names of the Sixth and Seventh Councils contain various errors. Therefore, the faith of councils, even general ones, is not so certain that it cannot be called into question. Argument 8. Furthermore, the Council of Constance defines that a council is above the Pope; but the Council of Florence under Eugenius IV and the Lateran Council under Leo X settled the contrary doctrine. The authority of councils is therefore weak. Argument 9. Again, the Council of Basel defines that a person is a heretic if he denies that a council is above the Pope, or asserts that the Pope can transfer a council to another place or prorogue it to another time. Yet after that period no one was so insane as to consider the authors of the contrary opinion heretics. The judgments of councils are therefore too uncertain to establish certain faith. Argument 10. Further, Augustine, lib. 2 de baptismo contra Donatistas, ch. 3, says: “Often full councils are corrected by later ones.” This certainly would not happen if they always attained the truth. Isidore too, 50 dist. cap. Domino, says: “Whenever a discordant judgment is found in the acts of councils, the judgment of that council is to be preferred whose authority is older and greater.” The decrees of councils, then, are not all certain; sometimes they vary and even conflict with one another. Argument 11. Further, when a council is said to be unable to err, this means either that it is mutilated, without its head, or that it is complete, with the authority of its head also present. If mutilated, it has sometimes erred, as Catholics themselves freely admit. If complete, it is pointless to convene it to settle a question of faith, since the Roman Pontiff can rightly pronounce on faith without a general council, as we shall show in the next chapter. Either, then, the doctrines of councils are uncertain, or councils are convened to no purpose. Gregory Nazianzen plainly attests this in his letter to Procopius, numbered 102, in these words: “I avoid every gathering of bishops, because until now I have seen no synod whose end was attended by any benefit, or from which troubles were not more aggravated than healed.” Argument 12. Finally, Oecolampadius argues from the Roman Council under Nicholas, where, as he says, Berengarius was compelled to swear to wholly false words, which neither Roffensis, libro tertio contra Oecolampadium, ch. 12, nor Cajetan in his libello de Coena Domini could free from error. Heretics are accustomed to fight against the authority of this locus with these and other arguments. Luther, however, as is his custom, settles the matter not by any argument but by mere assertion, saying: “Councils have often erred, especially the Council of Constance, which erred most impiously of all.” And in a sermon to the people he says that the first council, attended by the apostles and their disciples, erred because they thought the law and works necessary for salvation. But we must always confirm and defend this locus, and not be moved by any false reasoning away from the true judgment of the Church.