De locis theologicis

Melchor Cano

De locis theologicis

Melchor Cano (1509–1560)

De locis theologicis libri duodecim

First published 1563

Melchor Cano's De locis theologicis, first published in 1563, examines the sources and authority of theological arguments in twelve books. It considers Scripture, tradition, ecclesial authority, reason, and history as grounds for theological inquiry. The present edition includes the Latin text and an English translation. The Latin was prepared from Juan Belda Plans's BAC reading text and checked against The School of Salamanca's CC BY 4.0 transcription and aligned page images of the 1563 edition; both sources are credited.


Preface

Book I

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Book II

Preface to Book II

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Chapter IX

Chapter X

Chapter XI

Chapter XII

Chapter XIII

Chapter XIV

IN WHICH THE ARGUMENTS OF CHAPTER TWELVE ARE REFUTED

Reply to the first. First, when Jerome's authority is brought against us, it will not be difficult to answer. There were two reasons to return to the sources at that time: first, the sources were not so turbid, nor were Scripture's primary springs disturbed; second, there was then great variety and disagreement among Latin copies, and this could not conveniently be removed unless the Latin texts were compared with Greek and Hebrew copies. That these were Jerome's reasons for adopting this view is clear from his preface On the Four Gospels to Damasus and from his letter to Sunia and Fretella. But now, since all Latin copies agree with one another, Greek variants should instead be polished by means of our Latin edition and restored to their former unity. It is wiser to drink clear water from little wells that have been purified than foul liquid from a disturbed spring. Further, with the reader's permission, let us for a moment depart from scholastic disputation: we, who are sons of Abraham according to the promise, dig wells in the alien regions of the Philistines; but the Philistines, envying another's good fortune, try to stop up the wells that have been found. Isaac nevertheless dug them out and cleansed them with great care, until living water was found. There the shepherds of Gerar quarreled with Isaac's shepherds, saying, “The water is ours.” Therefore Isaac named the well “Calumny,” because of what had happened. He went away and dug another well, over which they did not contend, and so he called it “Broad Place.” In just this way the Roman and Latin Church has dug wells of living water, that is, of Sacred Scripture, and found the water of saving wisdom—indeed, it found the springs of life—but in the apparently foreign regions of the Jews and Greeks. They try to smear over and stop up our wells; they even quarrel with us and say: “The water is ours; our spring is the source. Whoever is not Hebrew or Greek must not dig in foreign soil. Christ spoke in our language, as did the prophets, apostles, and Evangelists. You Latins are strangers, and must beg these writings from us; your copies must be restored to their true form by our labor and correction.” Thus Jews, heretics, and curious lovers of novelty try to fill our wells with earth and contend with us; but this is sheer calumny. For how can those who are alien to the body enlighten it? How can those who do not have the mind of Christ interpret the thoughts of Christ? Will those who fight against us provide our weapons? Certainly not. Let us therefore dig another well, which we shall call “Broad Place”: the Church, spread far and wide, about which no controversy arises. For the Church is the pillar and foundation of truth; it is the city of God, gladdened by the rush of a river. For a thousand years this river's water has given drink to its children. We must approve and hold this water, and seek no other sources of truth. Reply to the second. We have considered the first arguments; now let us consider the rest. For as to the appeal to the authority of Augustine and Damasus, after what has been said it has no weight

For whether you oppose Augustine or Damasus to us, both speak about their own time. As for Innocent, Distinction 20, chapter “De quibus,” which some also wish to use against us, I truly do not understand what he means unless the passage is corrupted. I think we should read not “Greek” but “canonical.” I may discuss this more fully in another book. Reply to the third. What Erasmus thought he could press most forcefully is, in fact, a very weak point. Jerome initially believed that many things in the old edition of the New Testament and in the translation of the Seventy were errors; but on later reflection with greater care, or after being warned by friends or even enemies, he learned they did not need correction, as Franciscus Titelmann declared in his Apology. Certainly Jerome notes in his Hebrew Questions that the Seventy translators rendered “friend” as “shepherd” against the Hebrew truth. Yet he later followed the Seventy himself. I am not unaware of Augustine of Eugubio's opinion, but it is clearly fabricated. What could be more foolish than to say that an error by the Seventy translators crept into Jerome's edition through the fault of copyists? What could be less plausible than that the Seventy, most distinguished men, were mistaken in a matter so obvious, one that even ordinary people could easily understand? Franciscus Titelmann clearly shows in a single letter to the Romans how undeservedly the old edition is criticized everywhere by Valla, Faber, and Erasmus. From this we can understand how much trust should be placed in those critics. The first point, by which our old edition is accused of falsehood, is an argument of Osiander's in his Harmony of the Gospels. Nicolaus of Lyra had already marked the old translator with the same charge at Judges 10, as had Burgensis at Numbers 36. But Jerome followed the Seventy. They are supported by Damasus, book 4, chapter 15; Eusebius, book 1 of Eccles. hist., chapter 6; Epiphanius, Heresy 78; Ambrose, book 3 of his Comment. in Lucam; Nicephorus, book 1, chapter 11; and Bede, book 1 on Luke, chapter 10. I would rather imitate their negligence than the obscure diligence of these men. Therefore, since the law takes account of its purpose, it must be understood as referring to those women who inherit their father's property because there are no male heirs. This was the reason St. Thomas, in 1.2, q. 105, a. 2, reply 2, and in book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 30, q. 2, a. 1 and q. 3, reply 4, allowed the daughters of Aaron to marry freely, since the reason for this law did not apply to them. Leviticus 21 also commands the high priest to marry a virgin from his own people, not from his own family or tribe. Judges 10 states that Thola and Abimelech were related, although one was from the tribe of Issachar and the other from Manasseh. A Levite man from the territory of Ephraim took a wife from the tribe of Judah (Judges 19). Josephus says the same in book 5 of the Annals, chapter 6. Our edition, then, is not false, though its wording must be interpreted soundly. What, someone may ask, has the genealogy traced down to Joseph to do with the Lord? It has a great deal to do with it. When the Evangelist wrote, it was well known among the Jews that Joseph belonged to the same tribe; hence both are counted in Bethlehem as descended from the same lineage. All the historical accounts agree that the Blessed Virgin had no brothers. She therefore married a man of her own tribe. What was known to the Jewish people at that time did not need to be written by the Evangelist; he showed that Joseph descended from David. In doing so, he observed the custom of Scripture, which does not trace women's lines in genealogies, and truly taught what could have been disputed. Since it was widely known among the people of that time that Mary belonged to the same family, the Evangelist did not think it necessary to mention it.

Osiander's second argument is also in his Harmony of the Gospels. He claims: “The Hebrews have no neuter gender in the inflection of words, and consequently they use masculine or feminine forms for neuter ones. Thus, where we say, ‘It is not good for a human being to be alone,’ an unskilled translator would render, ‘It is not good for Adam to be alone.’ In the same way, instead of Jerome's translation, ‘You are small,’ it should plainly and correctly be translated, ‘It is too little for you to be among the chiliarchs, or princes of Judah.’ The reason for this principle is aptly given: ‘For from you,’ and so forth. This reason is utterly inept if it is applied to the preceding statement according to Jerome's version. That the second clause is the reason for the first is shown by the nature of the language, judged by common sense, and attested by the Holy Spirit through the Evangelist's mouth.” So much for Osiander's words. But the insolent impudence of this heretic is astonishing. The Chaldean paraphrase, all the more recent Jews, the Septuagint translators, and Jerome agree; yet he alone thinks himself wise. Since the Hebrew text has no conjunction, the whole sentence can indeed be understood so that the second clause gives the reason for the first. The chief priests and scribes took this view, and Matthew faithfully reported their words. But it can also be understood so that the latter part is taken in an adversative sense; Jerome took it that way, as is clear from his commentaries on Micah. If you examine the matter more carefully, it makes little difference which way the sentence is understood. Osiander is therefore ridiculous for raising such a storm over a trivial matter. What is easily answered is the point added third: the copies of the Septuagint had a question mark, and so they translated, “Will he be angry every day?” Although Augustine read it without a question, he nevertheless expressed our sense, saying: “Long-suffering, and not bringing anger every day.” Thus the Septuagint translators seem to have expressed the meaning of that verse very well, if the preceding words are to be joined to what follows. As for Calvin's objection in chapter 5 of the Institutes, it is cold and feeble. First, Solomon is speaking, as some think, about the love and hatred of predestination and reprobation, and they consider this supported by what follows: “But all things are kept uncertain for the future.” Second, he speaks according to the common condition and adapts his speech to common usage: since a person does not know whether he deserves death, he rightly says, “No one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love.” Third, as he often does elsewhere in that book, Solomon adopts the position and voice of someone making an argument, not of someone defining a doctrine. From the beginning of that chapter, then, he argues that many evils follow from the fact that everything happens equally to the just and the wicked in this world. One absurdity he proposes is that there are different servants in the Lord's house, some good and others wicked, and yet the Lord does not declare whom he loves and whom he hates; rather, he seems to treat the wicked as kindly as the just and to be no less severe with good servants than with evil ones. For all the good and evil things of this life are common to both. Our edition, therefore, contains nothing false, whether we embrace the first, second, or third sense. As for what some suspect—that at Matthew 24 the translator wrongly rendered “lightning” instead of “brightness,” because it is not lightning but brightness that goes out from the east and extends to the west—that argument is utterly ridiculous. First, if there is an error in this passage, it seems more likely that it belongs to copyists, not the translator. The words “lightning” and “brightness” are so similar that it is easy

substitute one thing for another. For that reason, blame is no more fairly laid on the translator than it would have been to assign it to the copyists. Besides, there could have been no fault of the translator here at all, since all the Greek manuscripts, both old and new, agree and read only άστραπή, a word that means not radiance but lightning. But the passage cannot refer even to radiance, even if the Greek word meant both. The sun rises gradually, and its coming is anticipated for a long time before it appears. Its radiance, then, does not arrive unexpectedly. The Lord, however, undoubtedly means that his coming will be sudden and unforeseen. This is most aptly expressed by the comparison with lightning, which flashes and is gone before one expects it. Although lightning does not extend from east to west, if you examine the comparison according to philosophical reasoning, it is enough to adapt what appears to our eyes in order to express Christ's coming as sudden and unforeseen, yet visible to everyone's eyes. Otherwise, St. Thomas might be accused of ignorance of optics, since, when explaining how divine things shine forth in human things, he gives the example of a mirror in which, as he says, an image is seen—although this is not really so, it nevertheless seems so to us. Moses too might be accused of ignorance of astronomy for positing two great lights when there are others much larger. Yet those two appear greatest to our senses; and it is not foreign to the authority of the authors of Sacred Scripture to accommodate themselves to an unlearned people and speak as the common people do. I would add more examples of this sort, were enough not already said about the subject. Elihu certainly spoke according to this principle when he said, “From the south comes the tempest, and from the Bear the cold,” Iob 37. In the same way the Prophet says, “He founded the earth upon the waters,” as if the waters were below, though they are in fact above, as we shall show in Book Thirteen. By a similar rule, the three angels who appeared to the Patriarch are said to have eaten, not because they really ate, but because they seemed to eat. Justin, however, took this figuratively, just as fire is said to devour and consume because it destroys. The passage occurs in the Dialogo cum Triphone. Those matters do not require a lengthy discussion. For this reason, interpreters thought that the very same things signified in Hebrew did not always need to be translated into Greek and Latin, but that it was sometimes enough to use things near and very similar. In translating even Sacred Scripture they followed what Cicero said about the law of translation: “Words are not to be counted but weighed,” and sense is to be rendered for sense, so that, insofar as possible and permitted, the reader's understanding may be helped, sometimes with little concern for the words themselves. They considered this especially permissible when Hebrew authors used a comparison involving some animal, tree, shrub, plant, or other thing unknown to the Greeks and Latins. Thus in Isaiae 1, where the Latin edition reads, “When you have become like an oak with falling leaves,” the Hebrew has Ela, a word that, if we trust the Seventy and Jerome himself in his commentaries, denotes a terebinth more than an oak. But since the terebinth is a foreign and unfamiliar tree, celebrated among the Latins by name alone, an oak, a tree familiar to every language and people, was appropriately put in its place. Likewise, in Psalmo 101, the Hebrew has Lika for “pelican,” and kokom for “night owl.” Some rendered the former as jackdaw, others as pelican or cormorant; the latter as either owl, cuckoo, or night owl. The Seventy interpreters, however, translated the Hebrew term

which Jerome consistently translates as “cormorant,” now as “pelican,” now as “bird,” and at another time even as “lion.” They did not do this because the words were multiple or ambiguous, but because, since the names of animals and especially plants were completely unknown among the Hebrews, they thought it made no difference to substitute one of these similar things for another, provided the meaning remained exactly the same. For what is sought there is the likeness in which all those things agree, not some other particular and distinctive nature. Similarly, if someone were to translate the Latin proverb “A dog in the manger” into Spanish as “el perro del hortelano” (“the gardener's dog”), he would be translating it very well, since the same meaning would be conveyed to the reader under different words and images. For that reason, Cajetan's scruple was excessive when he refused to change the Hebrew word Ela in the Latin text of Isaiae 1, as if there were some danger if we read “oak,” “terebinth,” or any other similar tree. The error of those who assumed that the bird is the same because Jerome renders it as “cormorant” there and the Septuagint generally renders it as “pelican” is refuted by this same point. The author of the commentaries on the Psalms circulated under Jerome's name was also responsible for this error. That they should be attributed to St. Jerome is plainly shown to be evidence of ignorance by this one passage alone. For the author says here that the Latin word for pelican is “cormorant.” What ignorance could be greater than to think that the word cormorant is Latin? But enough of this. We now assert again and again that, in translating comparisons of this kind, it makes absolutely no difference whether the same things are translated as the same things or as similar and related things, provided the meaning is not different but the same. Indeed, when both the Hebrew thing itself and its name are missing in Latin, if the translator names for us an otherwise unknown thing by means of a related and neighboring one, he has done nothing at all absurd. Rather, he has attempted what is allowed to all translators, either by authority or by proximity: either to assign a Latin name to signify it or at least to render it by a similar or related thing. Since, then, in Ionae c. 4 some translated it as “gourd” and others as “ivy,” they acted within their rights; and, not being bound by scruples about words, they should not have allowed the Greeks and Latins to understand absolutely nothing in that passage. Porphyry also objected to the prophecy of Daniel that it was fabricated and not found among the Hebrews, but was an invention of the Greek language, because the story of Susanna contains the expressions άπο τού πρίνου, πρίσαι, και άπό τοΰ σχίνου, σχίσαι. This etymology suits Greek more than Hebrew. Since what Eusebius, Apollinaris, and Jerome answered was rejected by the Church, we answer far more truly that the Greek translator could do this, and was indeed right to do so, although the Latin translator shrank from it. For it was not necessary to render the same trees in that passage as Hebrew had, since, if the same trees were rendered, not only could the etymology not be preserved, but neither could the playfulness of the prophecy nor the point of the saying. He therefore translated different but similar or related trees, in which both the sharpness and the purpose of the prophetic judgment were preserved. Besides, those trees were named by the prophet in the Chaldean language; there is no need for us to worry if neither those trees nor similar ones are found in Hebrew. I believe, then, that we have answered abundantly the arguments usually brought against the truth of our edition. Although I deliberately passed over some points that seemed easier

than those for whose refutation I ought to expend either oil or labor. One such point is what Faber Stapulensis says: that the Church, through the translator's error, has impiously read “angels” for God. He thinks this reading impious: “You made him a little lower than the angels.” It would not be difficult to show how unlearnedly, imprudently, rashly, and foolishly he has erred in this matter, were Erasmus not already to have won the same case with great force of argument. Certainly, either Clement or Luke was the translator of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as very weighty authorities have reported. It would be sacrilege to accuse either of them of impiety. I do not know whether it could be done without impiety to accuse the Church as well, since it approved the epistle in which this impious error is said to occur. But enough of this. Let us pursue the remaining matters. Now, since ecclesiastical usage approved the history of Susanna after those times and read it to the people under the name of the prophet Daniel, and since the Council of Trent confirmed it by its own decree, that history must certainly now be received by the faithful. Africanus did object to Origen that the history of Susanna seemed fabricated and foreign to prophetic Scripture, as Eusebius testifies in book 6, ch. 23. But, as that same Eusebius says, Origen replied very plainly that we should not listen to the inventions and frauds of the Jews, but should hold as true in the divine Scriptures only what the Seventy had translated, since this alone was confirmed by apostolic authority. So says Eusebius. Jerome reports the same in his Catalog., speaking of this Julius Africanus; and Jerome himself, in lib. 1 Apol. adversus Rufin., clears up what he had said in his prefaces, as follows: “As for what I report about what the Hebrews are accustomed to say against the history of Susanna, the hymn of the three boys, and the fable of Bel and the Dragon, which are not found in the Hebrew volume: whoever accuses me of stupidity proves himself a slanderer. For I explained not what I myself thought, but what they say against us.” So far Jerome. Response to the fifth. As for the other argument, since we do not wish to be lengthy in explaining every point, a brief answer is given: that passage from the priori ad Corinthios epistola is read in Greek in two ways and, as the Vulgate edition has it, as follows: “We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed.” Didymus and Jerome in the epistola ad Minerium et Alexandrum attest to this. Neither reading has been rejected by the men of the Church. Rather, they have always warned that the reading is uncertain and variable, and have embraced neither one as certain and established. We are therefore not compelled to accept either reading, since the doctors of the Church have asserted neither side to be established and Catholic. The same would apply to any other passage in the Latin edition if exactly the same thing had happened there. But where Catholic doctors have held to one and the same reading without variation, and have not kept their judgment about the assertion wavering between two possibilities, we may not call the Latin edition into question. Even here, however, the opinion of Erasmus, Faber, and Cajetan cannot be approved: in a matter where it made no difference which way it was said, they preferred the reading that the consideration of novelty would make more plausible. This is a twofold pagan habit, shared by those who prefer to pursue curiosities rather than solid things. We prefer to follow Origen, Didymus, Athanasius, Augustine, Cyprian, Tertullian, and the common agreement of the Latins. For Acacius, bishop of Caesarea, also says in Jerome that our reading is found in many Greek manuscripts, but the other in fewer. Nevertheless, I am not unaware of what Chrysostom and Theophylact wrote in their commentaries, and what Jerome too wrote in a certain epistola ad Marcellam. But, as I said earlier, I am troubled by this,

in matters that are disputed on both sides—things that are new delight theologians more than old things, even when the latter have been confirmed by the practice of our forebears. Enough, then, about the fifth argument. As for what follows, take this as the answer. Those are gravely mistaken who think that they can understand or interpret Sacred Scripture without a special gift of the Holy Spirit. The more this gift is needed to understand and interpret Sacred Scripture, the more rarely and with greater difficulty it is received. Human diligence supplies learning, command of words, and knowledge of many languages. But if the special spirit given by God's gratuitous mercy—not so much for the benefit of the person who receives it as for the benefit of the Church—is lacking in an interpreter of the sacred books, everything will be barren and cold, however carefully it has been worked out, and however long it has been thought through and devised beforehand. Indeed, most things translated through human understanding and judgment will be false in interpretation. For Clement of Alexandria, in lib. 1 Stromat., believes that the interpretation of Scripture is prophecy and inspiration from God; and the Apostle in the priori ad Corinthios epistola counts it among the other gifts of the Holy Spirit. He calls it not philosophy but prophecy, evidently because the same spirit is needed to explain Sacred Scripture as was needed to compose it: a divine and prophetic spirit. Peter confirms this in his posteriori sua epistola, saying: “We have the prophetic word made more sure, to which you do well to attend, as to a lamp shining in a dark place; understand this first, that no prophecy of Scripture is a matter of one's own interpretation. For prophecy was never brought by human will, but holy men of God spoke as they were inspired by the Holy Spirit.” As the most distinguished men before us have understood it, this means: “You do well to attend to the prophets, but first understand that divine prophecies are not understood by human and private interpretation. For holy men of God spoke by the Holy Spirit, and the natural person does not perceive the things that are of the Spirit of God.” “For who has known the mind of the Lord?” Isaiah also signified the same when he said: “The Lord gave me a learned tongue, that I might know how to sustain the one who is weary with a word. He awakens me morning by morning; he awakens my ear to hear as a teacher.” And in Luke: “The Lord opened the disciples' understanding, that they might understand the Scriptures.” Hilary proves by this testimony in his commentary on Psalm. 115 that understanding the Scriptures is a gift of God. If understanding the Scriptures is a gift of God, and no one can interpret the Scriptures unless he understands them, it follows that no one can translate Sacred Scripture into another language without a special grace from God. Otherwise, if St. Jerome thought that command of words, secular eloquence, knowledge of three languages, and a manifold knowledge of things were sufficient—and he knew he was abundantly equipped with all these—why does he, in his epistola ad Desiderium, beg the help of other people's prayers so that he may translate the books into Latin with the same spirit in which they were written? Why also, when about to interpret the Holy Scriptures in his epistola ad Paulinum, does he say, “Open my eyes, and I shall consider the wonders of your law”? For the law is spiritual, and revelation is needed for it to be understood. Again he says, “How many today think they know the Scriptures, yet hold a sealed book and cannot open it unless the one who holds the key of David unlocks it.” And on Galat. 1, “There are some who trouble you and wish to change the Gospel of Christ,” he says: “Everyone who interprets the Gospel with a different spirit from that in which it was written troubles believers and changes the Gospel of Christ, turning what is before them behind their backs and bringing what is behind their backs before them. If someone follows only the letter,”

he puts what comes later before him; if someone yields to Jewish interpretations, he puts behind his back what by its nature is set before him.” Later in the same chapter, on the words “I make known to you the Gospel, because it is not according to man,” and so on, he says: “Marcion and Basilides and the other plagues of heretics do not have the Gospel of God, because they do not have the Holy Spirit, without whom the Gospel that is taught becomes human. Let us not think that the Gospel lies in the words of Scripture but in its meaning, not on the surface but in the marrow, not in the leaves of words but in the root of reason.” So far Jerome. If he speaks truly, he certainly compels us to believe either that the ancient translator translated Sacred Scripture by a special gift of the Holy Spirit or that for many centuries the Latin Church did not have the Gospel of God but the gospel of a human being. When you object that the translator was not a prophet, he was indeed not a prophet, but, as Titelmann rightly insists, he had a certain spirit very near and akin to the prophetic spirit, such as we have shown to be necessary for interpreting Sacred Scripture—indeed, such as was necessary for the Latin Church to possess an edition of the sacred books that it could safely follow in faith and morals. We now answer the final argument easily. If we were to neglect comparing the Latin with the Greek and Hebrew, we could in some way defend ourselves by the example of St. Ambrose, who, although he knew Greek and published commentaries on Sacred Scripture, often did not deign to consult Greek, even where a difference of reading was known to exist. One can see this in his commentaries on chapter 12 of the epistola ad Romanos. If, moreover, we were more troubled than helped by the variety of interpreters, we could be excused by the example of Sophronius, who admitted this about himself to Jerome: “We do not wish to condemn either the translations of new interpreters, knowledge of languages, or the comparison of Latin texts with Greek and Hebrew manuscripts; rather, we greatly commend them.” For if Augustine says in De doctrina christ. lib. 2, cap. 11, that translations by common and not very learned interpreters help understanding more than they hinder it, I neither can nor ought rightly to criticize various editions by very learned men. And to ward off the resentment of those who might slander us as wretched barbarians, strangers to good letters, or envious critics of others' labors, I frankly admit that knowledge of languages offers many further advantages for understanding Sacred Scripture. Far from attacking the study of languages,

Chapter XV

Chapter XVI

Chapter XVII

Chapter XVIII

Book III

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Book IV

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Book V

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Book VI

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Book VII

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Book VIII

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Book IX

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Chapter IX

Book X

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Chapter IX

Book XI

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Book XII

Preface to Book XII

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Chapter IX

Chapter X

Chapter XI

Chapter XII

Chapter XIII

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