De locis theologicis

TEACHES WHOSE AUTHORITY GOVERNS JUDGMENT ABOUT THE CANONICAL BOOKS

First conclusion. Let this, then, be our first proposition regarding the present subject: Judgment about Scripture cannot in any way be made suitably by Scripture itself. To say nothing of many other cases that are exactly similar, it certainly cannot be proved from Scripture itself that the books of Ruth, Esther, and Job are canonical. Therefore, if this matter comes into controversy, proof must be sought from somewhere other than Sacred Scripture. Furthermore, to press the same point further, if there is controversy over whether both Testaments, the New and the Old, were published with God as their author, this dispute cannot be settled by the authority of either Testament. For the same reason that one would doubt the whole volume, one would also doubt any part of the volume. A judge outside Sacred Scripture must therefore be appointed for this question.

Moreover, Basilides brings forward certain prophets—I know not which ones—Barchabbas, Barchob, and others of the same sort, who in fact never existed in earlier centuries, as Eusebius attests in Hist. eccl., book 4, ch. 8. Yet the books of prophets of this kind cannot be refuted by Scripture itself. For Basilides could say that, besides the four major prophets and fourteen minor prophets, there were also other prophets in the Old Testament, and he would confirm this by testimonies from that same Testament. Nor are there lacking other examples of this kind. Some heretics rejected the Gospels because the Lord Christ had neither written anything nor commanded that anything be written, as Augustine reports in Retractations II, ch. 16. Others rejected all of Paul's letters, as Eusebius reports in Hist. eccl., book 3, ch. 27; Irenaeus, book 1, ch. 26; and Origen on Psalm 82, as cited by that same Eusebius, book 6, ch. 28. See Irenaeus, chs. 26 and 29. Others denied the whole law of Moses and, indeed, all the writings of the Old Testament, as Augustine often attests, especially in Cont. Faustum, and Eusebius in book 5, final chapter. We, however, have received all these books. We despise the Gospels that heretics produce under the names of Nicodemus and Bartholomew, but venerate the Gospel of Mark. We can give an account of these matters, but they can in no way account for what the whole Church has always maintained and still maintains. Indeed, if the authority of living judges is removed, they have nothing left but to remove the entire text of the Holy Scriptures. Add that Scripture is a dead judge, unable either to hear the arguments of both sides in a dispute or to pronounce a judgment itself. Further, if a form of judgment of this sort had been prescribed in some human republic, so that there were no living judges and every dispute arising about that republic's writings were settled only by written letters, not only would the form of judgment be foolish, but there would also be no end to litigation. For no force can be brought against someone who denies the written instrument if there are no living judges. Thus in Deuteronomy 17 people in disagreement are referred not to the written text but to the examination and judgment of living authorities. And in Malachi 2: “The lips of the priest preserve knowledge; they will seek the law from his mouth,” he says, from his mouth, not from the law itself. In Acts 15 the people of Antioch did not appeal to Scripture to learn whether Paul's words were divine, but to the apostles and elders who were in Jerusalem. Nor did the apostles and elders set up Scripture as judge, but themselves and the Holy Spirit. “It seemed good,” they say, “not to Scripture, but to the Holy Spirit and to us.” For the Holy Spirit does not dwell in the written letter but in the spirit, not in syllables but in hearts. If those who opposed Paul had sought judgment from Scripture in that matter, the question would still be ambiguous today. Second proposition. Judgment about the canonical Scriptures does not pertain to private citizens of the Christian republic. First, such judgments would not be entrusted to private individuals in a human republic unless the legislators were foolish. For each of two parties in a dispute would claim for itself, on equal grounds, the authority to judge, and so there would be no end to disagreements. It will therefore be foolish to wish to follow everyone's private revelations or opinions, and to do so in a matter of faith that is necessary. Each person will define things in favor of his own faction and assert that what he himself believes has been revealed by God. Moreover, no private individual has certain authority in the Church, nor established and solid truth before the other faithful. Any judgment issued by such a private citizen will therefore be weak, and the faith of Scripture will rest on an uncertain and feeble foundation. Moreover, Deuteronomy 17 commands that serious questions be brought not to private individuals but to those who hold public authority in the Church. What? Did the people of Antioch

assume judgment for themselves in that controversy, when it was uncertain whether Paul's words were God's or not? Certainly not; they sent to the apostles and elders who were in Jerusalem, Acts 15. Add that, since some very learned men denied that the Epistle to the Hebrews was canonical and other authors of no little distinction excluded the Apocalypse of John, the controversy among those most learned men could not be settled by the opinion of each private individual. See Origen, homil. 7 In Ezech.; Gregory Nazianzen in the Apology; Jerome on Ezekiel, ch. 13, and on Jeremiah, ch. 23, so that you may understand how little weight should be given in such matters to the prejudgments of private individuals. But more on this later. Let us now pursue the remaining matters. Third proposition. It is for the Church to determine which book is canonical, and its authority is a certain rule for receiving books into the number of sacred books or rejecting them from that number. Irenaeus held this position in Adversus haereses, book 3, chs. 2, 3, and 4; Augustine in Contra Faustum, book 13, ch. 4, and book 28, chs. 2 and 4; in book 2 of De doctrina christiana, ch. 8; and finally in Contra epistolam Manichaei, ch. 5, where he states the well-known saying: “I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Church moved me.” The First Council of Toledo also defines the same point in these words: “If anyone says or believes that there are other canonical Scriptures besides those received by the Catholic Church, let him be anathema.” The authority of the Catholic Church therefore provides a certain argument for receiving or rejecting sacred books, as is proved by many powerful reasons. First, if this matter comes into controversy, since judgment is to be pronounced neither from Scripture itself nor from anyone's private opinion, it must be sought from some other source. There is no more convenient and consistent source from which to seek such a judgment and decision than the Church, which is the pillar and support of truth. This question must therefore be referred to the Church's tribunal, and its decree will be the touchstone for determining which book is canonical. Further, as St. Augustine argues in Contra Faustum Manichaeum, we determine which authors are genuine in the books of the pagans more by no other means than by the common agreement and testimony of those who lived before us. How do we know Plato's, Aristotle's, and Cicero's books if not from the continuous testimony of those who preceded us in time? If in all other cases this is the safest and most certain way to know the author of a given book, why should it not be equally certain and established for a Catholic to understand that this book is Matthew's and that one is not Thomas's, that this letter was written by Paul and that one was not written by Paul? Sacred books must therefore be accepted on the testimony of the Church. This seems to be what John the Evangelist signified when he said, “This is the disciple who testifies to these things, and we know that his testimony is true.” John therefore bears witness to the Gospel, and the Church confirms it, saying, “And we know,” and so on. Otherwise, why that sudden and unexpected change in number? The Apostle Paul also clearly teaches this in his Epistle to the Galatians, ch. 2. For after he had received the Gospel through a revelation of Jesus Christ and had stayed with Peter and James for fifteen days, he went up again to Jerusalem by revelation and conferred with the apostles and the faithful about the Gospel he preached among the Gentiles, privately with those who seemed to be something, lest perhaps he run or had run in vain. If the Church's approval were not

necessary, Paul certainly would not have been concerned to go up and confer about the Gospel, lest perhaps he had run in vain, and so on. And as Augustine says in Contra Faustum, if the Apostle Paul had not found the apostles in the flesh with whom he could confer about the Gospel, the Church would not have believed him at all. Jerome too, in his Epist. ad Augustinum, commenting on these words of the Apostle, says: “From this he shows that he did not have security to preach the Gospel unless his opinion had been strengthened by Peter and those who were with him.” This letter is also in the second volume of Augustine's works, no. 2. Tertullian too, in book 4 of Adversus Marcionem, says: “For this reason Paul went up to Jerusalem to consult the apostles, lest perhaps he had run in vain. For the uniqueness of a document, without the support of its predecessors, would not be sufficient for faith. Finally, when he had conferred and agreed with the authors about the rule of faith, they joined right hands.” Therefore, if Luke himself, the enlightener, sought the authority of his predecessors for his faith and preaching, how much more should I demand it for Luke's Gospel, for it was necessary for the Gospel of his teacher? So far Tertullian. The same point is found in Acts 15. For when there was doubt at Antioch whether Paul and Barnabas truly believed and taught that the legal observances had ceased, the faithful decided that Paul and Barnabas and some others should go up to the apostles and presbyters in Jerusalem. Therefore, not everyone knows by himself whether a teaching is from God or not, nor does the teaching itself immediately show everyone that it is divine; rather, it needs the approval of the Church. The Lutherans finally confessed this at the Diet of Augsburg, namely, that the Church has authority to discern the words of God from the words of human beings. In his book De captivit. Babylonica, where he discusses the Sacrament of Order, Luther also admits that the Church has the power to discern God's word from human words, but nevertheless denies that it is the judge of God's word. As Augustine says, the soul is so captured by truth itself that through it the soul can judge all things most certainly, but cannot judge truth. Rather, it must say with infallible certainty, “This is the truth,” being judged by truth rather than judging it. So too in the Church, he says, there is a sense, enlightened by the Spirit, for judging and approving doctrines—a sense it cannot demonstrate, but nevertheless holds with utmost certainty. For just as among philosophers no one judges common conceptions but all are judged by them, so among us no one judges the sense of the Spirit, which judges everyone and is judged by no one. But in this passage we do not wish to quarrel about words. We merely define what even the Lutherans now reluctantly concede: that from the authority of the Church a certain argument can be drawn either for admitting sacred books or for rejecting those that are not sacred. A considerable question nevertheless arises: by the name “Church” here do we mean the Church that existed in the time of the apostles, the gathering of the faithful who live now, or rather the whole body of Christians, propagated from the baptism of Christ through the apostles and their other successors down to our own times? Durandus in Sentences III, dist. 24, q. 1, and Gerson in De vita spirituali animae, lect. 2, corollary 7, refer this authority to approve sacred books or even reject non-sacred ones to the Church of the faithful who lived with the apostles. John Driedo, however, in book 1 of De Ecclesiasticis Scripturis et dogmatib., ch. 1, and Thomas Waldensis in book 2 of The Antiquity of the Catholic Faith, chs. 19 and 20, think that this authority should be referred to the line of all the Fathers and faithful who succeeded the apostles. This certainly seems also to have been the opinion of Irenaeus, book 3, ch. 3, and book 4, ch. 63.

Adversus haereses; Tertullian’s book 4, Adversus Marcionem; Augustine’s book 33, Contra Faustum Manichaeum; and book 2, chapter 6, Contra Iulianum Pelagianum; and book 2, De doctrina Christi., chapter 8; and Letter 63. Others, however, also attribute this authority to the Church of the present time, which is, of course, the same as the ancient Church and has the same Spirit of truth assisting it. I, for my part, think first that it belonged to the apostles to establish which books were sacred, not to reject sacred books. For we have no canonical books of either the Old or the New Testament other than those which the apostles approved and handed on to the Church. I further think that this apostolic tradition is best made known in no other way than through the Fathers and teachers of the Church who succeeded the apostles, just as there is no surer and more direct way to learn the other traditions of Christ and the apostles—a point we shall demonstrate in its place. Neither of these points needs to be confirmed with elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to point them out. What must be demonstrated, however, is that the Church of the faithful now living cannot write a canonical book, but can determine whether or not a book under discussion is canonical. For the resolution of doubts that now arise concerning the faith belongs to the present Church. There must indeed be a living judge in the Church who can settle controversies of faith, since God has not failed to provide what is necessary for his Church. Whether a book is canonical, however, touches the faith most directly. The judgment of this matter, then, will belong to the Church of the present time. For if the Church that now exists cannot condemn errors opposed to sound doctrine, then, once the judges have been removed, the heretics of this age can live with impunity and even reign. Again, in Jerome’s time a Catholic was permitted to doubt whether the Apocalypse of John was sacred and canonical. Now, however, as we shall show in its place, it is not permitted to call this into question. Therefore, after Jerome’s time the Church had authority to settle that question. Consequently, since some people in our time call into question whether the books of Baruch and Maccabees, as well as the others now under discussion, are canonical, the judgment of the present Church will certainly be able to resolve this uncertainty. Moreover, the Church that now exists cannot err in the faith. Therefore, if it believes some book to be canonical, theologians will draw from its testimony a suitable and firm argument. For the present Church can rightfully teach those who have embraced the faith whatever pertains to the faith, and can itself hand on to its successors the sacred books it received through the tradition of the ancients. Those successors must hold the faith most immediately from the present Church, just as we have believed those immediately before us, and they those before them, in a certain series and order all the way to the apostles, whom the faithful then living believed most immediately. For just as in the sciences we see two kinds of principles, one remote and the other proximate—the latter last, the former first—and conclusions are referred to first principles only through the last, so the faith of those who come later cannot be referred to people who did not precede them in time except through us, until one reaches the apostles and from there Christ, in whom the Catholic faith rests as on its first foundation. And just as both kinds of principles in the sciences are firm and each establishes conclusions with certainty, although one is mediate and the other immediate, so the Church that now exists provides a certain argument for Christian doctrine, even though its own faith must ultimately be referred to the teaching of Christ and the apostles. In this matter Thomas Waldensis seems to me to be mistaken. For, as we indicated a little earlier, it is one thing to ask what the present Church can define and how far its authority extends in deciding controversies;

it is another to investigate by what way and reasoning it can arrive at a correct and firm definition of these matters. We frankly admit that new revelations are not now to be expected, whether from the Supreme Pontiff, a Council, or even the whole Church; rather, the records of the ancients and the writings of the saints must be examined. Apostolic traditions must again be consulted, as must Sacred Scripture, and the question of faith must be decided by means of what has been gathered in this way. For the apostles and elders assembled in the Council of Jerusalem, after making a thorough inquiry both into past events and into the Scriptures of the prophets, delivered a judgment on the matter proposed and called into question. Thomas Waldensis is mistaken in another matter too, unless I am mistaken: he asserts that the testimony of faithful laypeople also pertains here, but says there is no need to consult them because, as he puts it, they did not know how to commit their faith to the memories of their successors in appropriate and unambiguous words. Matters pertaining to the faith, however, are of two kinds. One kind comprises what all the faithful explicitly believe, such as that the Son of God assumed human nature. The other comprises what only the leaders are bound to believe explicitly, while the people believe it implicitly in the faith of their leaders, such as that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. One might perhaps rightly seek testimony from an unlearned people about matters of faith belonging to the first kind, since belief in these matters pertains equally to leaders and ordinary people. But if a question arises about matters belonging to the second kind, it would be most foolish to consult an ignorant crowd, a senile old man, a talkative old woman, or an unlearned shoemaker—especially if such questions are to be referred not to the present Church but to the Church of earlier times. Thomas Waldensis himself asserted that this ought to be done. Since, then, explicit belief about the number of canonical books belongs not to the common people but to the leaders, whose concern it is to know which books are sacred, we must admit that in the question now before us testimony should not be sought from the populace but from the teachers of the Church. It is right, and therefore also certain, that the unlearned people should believe these teachers and that judgment on such matters belongs to them. It follows that if all the saints and teachers of the Church have asserted that some book is canonical, this must be held as certain, just as if the whole Church had asserted it. This will be explained more fully elsewhere. Enough, then, has been said about the third proposition. Fourth proposition: It belongs especially to a universal Council to define which book is canonical. I would readily tolerate heretics’ refusal to accept this proposition. I am, however, deeply saddened that some of the faithful deny it; Thomas Waldensis seems to be among them, in book 2 of his Doctrinalis fidei antiqu., chapter 19. Yet the proposition is plainly proved, because it belongs above all to the pastors of the Church to set before the faithful what has been divinely revealed: first, because the whole Church cannot set forth and teach such revelations; second, because even if it could, it would not be fitting for the whole Church to assume the office of teaching; third, because tending the sheep in knowledge and doctrine is the proper duty of pastors, as Jeremiah 3 says; and fourth, because at times even Catholics disagree over whether this or that book is canonical. To settle such a dispute, then, there must be judges in the Church whose decision the faithful ought to follow. As judges in the doctrine of faith, we rightly recognize none more suitable than bishops and teachers, to whom the instruction of the faithful has been entrusted; if you remove them, you immediately remove the judgments of the universal Church;

for the whole Church itself—that is, all the faithful—neither ought nor can assemble to judge the question under consideration. Moreover, a Council is a sure rule in matters of faith, as we shall show later. Since, then, this question of sacred and canonical books concerns the faith, it can be amply settled by the testimony of a Council. The Antiochenes are known to have understood this. They did not refer the question about legal matters to the people of the faithful, but to the synod of the apostles and elders. After the Council’s decision no room for doubt remained: Acts 15. Fifth proposition: It belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to define which books are canonical. First, because the greater cases of the Church must be referred to the Supreme Pontiff, as Innocent proves in De baptismo, chapter “Maiores”; we too shall demonstrate the same. But this matter of canonical books is a very great case, so it must be referred to the Supreme Pontiff. Second, because disagreement can arise among the Fathers assembled in a Council. If there were no judge in the Church to settle this dispute and contention, then God would certainly not have provided for the Church in matters necessary to it. Moreover, the Supreme Pontiff cannot err whenever he makes a pronouncement on the faith, as must also be shown later in its place. Therefore, with the Pontiff’s testimony as a certain judge, we shall be able to prove which book is canonical and which is not. Finally, this is shown by an argument of Pope Nicholas. For what the Apostolic See has truly approved is held as accepted today, while what it has rejected is still considered altogether ineffectual. Thus the Church approves the short works of the teachers that it has approved, and rejects those it has rejected. We are therefore compelled, by the constant experience of events as well, to regard the testimony of the Supreme Pontiffs on these matters as firm and certain. For the Gospel that Paul preached among the Gentiles, as we showed earlier from Tertullian, Jerome, and Augustine, would not have been received by the Church unless it had been confirmed by Peter’s authority. And, as the same Jerome writes in De viris illustrihus, book 6 of the Hypotyposeis (ύποτυπώσεων) of Clement, when Peter heard the Gospel of Mark, he approved it and by his authority published it for the Church to read. Eusebius confirms the same in book 2 of Ecclesiasticae historiae, chapter 15, citing not only Clement but Papias as well. It is clear, moreover, that Peter’s successor possesses this same authority in those matters necessary to the Church. Therefore, this judgment concerning canonical books belongs to the Supreme Pontiff. For if a similar question arose under the Old Law, its definition would belong to the high priest, as we read in Deut. 17. Up to this point, with all possible brevity, we have said what was sufficient here so that the devout reader might understand which authorities one ought to trust in establishing the canonical books. If any of these points need stronger force and arguments to be proved generally to everyone, they will be confirmed later in their proper places. Now, however, I think we must refute, as briefly as we can, the arguments of the enemies of true religion.