De locis theologicis

Melchor Cano

De locis theologicis

Melchor Cano (1509–1560)

De locis theologicis libri duodecim

First published 1563

Melchor Cano's De locis theologicis, first published in 1563, examines the sources and authority of theological arguments in twelve books. It considers Scripture, tradition, ecclesial authority, reason, and history as grounds for theological inquiry. The present edition includes the Latin text and an English translation. The Latin was prepared from Juan Belda Plans's BAC reading text and checked against The School of Salamanca's CC BY 4.0 transcription and aligned page images of the 1563 edition; both sources are credited.


Preface

Book I

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Book II

Preface to Book II

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

SHOWS THAT GOD CAN NEVER DECEIVE, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ANOTHER

Since this question must be explained, and I wish to be brief, we must first set down that there are two descriptions of divine power. We understand a certain general power which, since it is constrained by no law, not even a natural one, is called by theologians absolute power; and another power subject to it, which concerns the order of things that has been prescribed, and is therefore called ordinary power. The former is usually defined as extending over those things whose existence involves no incompatibility and no contradiction, as they put it. The ordinary power, subject to that prior one as to a genus, is defined as extending over those things that can exist while the divine law and decrees remain intact. We must also lay down that to lie is nothing other than to assert what is false with the intention of deceiving. Augustine and Gelasius defined it in this way. A lie, then, is compounded of two things: that something false is said, and that it is said with the intention that the hearers be deceived. We must also briefly explain who is properly said to deceive, so that what we wish to teach may be understood more easily. Someone who tells the truth is not properly to be considered deceitful, even if the hearer, through a mistaken understanding of the truth, falls into the greatest errors. Things created by God are improperly called deceitful; they are also called snares, but snares for the feet of the foolish. Who, then, properly deceives another? The one who, by asserting what is false, causes another to be deceived. Otherwise, if we define someone as deceitful on account of another's error and ignorance, the truth itself will also be most deceitful to us. First conclusion. With these points established, let this be the first conclusion: It is heretical to assert that God can lie by his ordinary power. For God is truthful, but every human being is a liar. And again: “If we do not believe, he remains faithful; he cannot deny himself.” And elsewhere.

Finally: “God is not like a human being, that he should lie.” This conclusion is so certain to everyone that it might seem superfluous to have confirmed it even with clear testimonies. So, having stated it briefly, let us proceed to the rest. Second conclusion. The second conclusion is this: Whoever thinks that God can, by his ordinary power, either lie or deceive through a minister errs most gravely in the faith. It will belong to the authority of the Church to brand him with the mark of heresy. This conclusion is first inferred from the fact that commanding evil and doing evil are the same: everyone is the cause of what happens at his command. But according to the Catholic faith God cannot be the author of sin; therefore he cannot be the author of lying either, which is a sin by ordinary power. An angel or human being therefore does not deceive anyone with God as author. Further, when the Lord speaks to us through ministers, whether angels or human beings, he testifies that he himself is speaking, as is clear in many passages of Sacred Scripture. If God's ministers were therefore to lie, God too would have to lie. Who does not see how absurd that is? Moreover, those who hold this opinion could not be sure whether God had deceived us through the apostles and prophets. Since in Sacred Scripture God himself has spoken directly only rarely, but most often through angels and human beings, if we can be deceived by God through these ministers, the firmness of Sacred Scripture will surely collapse. This argument has such weight for me that I do not doubt the Catholic Church would condemn this error as heresy if it were brought before it for consideration, since it either completely overturns the foundations of our faith or certainly prevents them from standing firm. Furthermore, we would not be bound to believe the sacred authors if we once adopted the opinion that God can deceive through others. No promise of God would be firm unless God himself had fulfilled it directly. This openly conflicts with the Apostle. For when he came upon the promise made to Abraham—undoubtedly through the ministry of an angel—the writer says that God, wishing to show the heirs of the promise the unchangeableness of his purpose, interposed an oath, “so that through two unchangeable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we might have the strongest consolation, we who have fled for refuge to grasp the hope set before us, which we have as a sure and steadfast anchor of the soul.” But this would not be sure and steadfast if we believed this opinion. It follows, then, that God cannot deceive in any way. Do not tell me that the sacred writers were just and holy: “The holy men of God spoke as they were inspired by the Holy Spirit,” and again, “As he spoke through the mouth of his holy ones,” and so on; and that through men of this kind God neither wished nor was able to deceive, but that he can do so through the ministry of wicked men. First, if even an ungodly person speaks while inspired by the Spirit of God, those words are attributed to God and therefore have God's authority. Next, if an ungodly person lies by God's plan or command, then a pious person will certainly be able to lie by the same plan or command. God therefore cannot deceive through another, as the second conclusion stated. Third conclusion. God cannot lie even by his absolute power, either directly or through another. As Augustine says, although God is omnipotent, he cannot die, be deceived, or lie. And again, he says the same: “When we have said so much about the omnipotence of God, if they wish to find something that the Omnipotent cannot do, they have it: I say that he cannot lie.” The Lord also seems clearly to confirm this for me when he says, “Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will not pass away.” Let all heaven and all nature collapse, then; divine truth must nevertheless stand.

Moreover, the Apostle's testimony cited above proves the same point. “God is truthful,” he says, “but every human being is a liar.” In this passage Paul does not mean that all human beings actually lie, but that they are of a nature such that they can lie. For he speaks of nature, not of habit. One can find men who at times, either following right reason as their guide or aided and admonished by the grace and law of the Gospel, shrink from lying and embrace the truth. But since human nature is so weak that it can sometimes abandon the truth it holds, Scripture therefore said that every human being is a liar. From this we understand that God is called truthful in the sense that lying is incompatible with the divine nature. This conclusion follows not only from a probable argument but also from a necessary theological argument. For the opposition between evil and good is the same as that between falsehood and truth; but it is contrary to the highest goodness to do evil; therefore it is also contrary to the highest truth to speak falsely. Hence these words: “The Lord is faithful in all his words and holy in all his works,” and, “God is faithful, and there is no iniquity in him.” God is therefore as far removed from falsehood as from iniquity; and just as he can do no iniquity either directly or through another, so he can deceive no one. If someone were deceived with God as author, a lie would then flow from the fountain of truth. Yet we have learned, not only from the Evangelist's testimony but also with nature as our guide, that no lie comes from the truth. Indeed, to return to the point from which the discussion began, both doing evil and speaking falsely are contrary to a stable and immovable nature. For after Scripture had said, “God is not like a human being, that he should lie,” it immediately added, “nor like a son of man, that he should change.” Lying, after all, is a mark of a changeable nature. Add to this that if God can deceive human beings through another, he will also be able to do the same directly. God can inflict other evils, which are punishments distinct from guilt, both through ministers and directly without ministers. And, to bring this to a conclusion, if God could lie, we too could rightly fear that he had lied at some time. But, you will say, there is no reason for fear, since it is established by ordinary power that God cannot lie. A fine point indeed; but since this can be established only by revelation, how can we know whether God abused his absolute power in that very revelation? For, as Augustine says, how can one believe a person who thinks that one must sometimes lie? Perhaps he is lying even then, when he commands us to believe him. Unless this is so, the certainty of Sacred Scripture is lost. Besides, among philosophers it is as evident that God does not lie as it is that he is both supremely good and supremely wise, and hence cannot deceive or be deceived; nor does it matter whether he does this himself or through his ministers. For truth is not utterly pure if falsehood or deception is in any way mixed with it; nor is that considered supreme than which we can conceive something greater. The one who could not deceive either directly or through another would be more truthful than one who could deceive through another. With divine truth thus firmly established and strengthened by the certainty of arguments and testimonies, nothing remains but to refute our adversaries' arguments.

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Chapter IX

Chapter X

Chapter XI

Chapter XII

Chapter XIII

Chapter XIV

Chapter XV

Chapter XVI

Chapter XVII

Chapter XVIII

Book III

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Book IV

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Book V

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Book VI

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Book VII

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Book VIII

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Book IX

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Chapter IX

Book X

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Chapter IX

Book XI

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Book XII

Preface to Book XII

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Chapter IX

Chapter X

Chapter XI

Chapter XII

Chapter XIII

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