De locis theologicis

WHERE THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO PERSUADE US THAT GOD CAN SOMETIMES DECEIVE ARE REPORTED

First controversy. To begin with that controversy—which, although very easy, is nevertheless the head of the others—let the first opinion of the younger theologians be brought forward. It is well known to most, though not to all, but only to a few, who assert that God has at times deceived human beings through the ministry of a human being or an angel. They do not dare to call into question whether the Spirit of truth himself directly deceives anyone, lest they incur the charge of impiety. But they think they can persuade us that God can deceive through another. First argument. First, Abraham lied to the servants when he said, “Wait here; I and the boy will return to you after we have worshiped.” Yet that was a prophecy of divine revelation, as Ambrose teaches in De Abraham, book I, ch. 8, in these words: “He prophesied what he did not know: he alone intended to return after sacrificing his son, but the Lord spoke through his mouth. He spoke evasively to the servants, lest, once they knew the matter, someone should interfere or interrupt with a groan or with weeping.” Therefore God deceives human beings through the ministry of a human being. Second argument. They also bring forward another argument for the same point: Jacob deceived his father Isaac with a lie deliberately contrived, saying, “I am your firstborn, Esau; I have done as you commanded me. Rise and eat some of my game.” A little later, when Isaac asked, “Are you my son Esau?” Jacob replied, “I am.” Jacob therefore lied, as his father recognized when he said, “Your brother came deceitfully,” and so on. Yet Jacob did and said all these things in accordance with divine revelation, as Innocent teaches. Therefore God can deceive through another. Third argument. Further, Isaiah said to Hezekiah, “Tomorrow you will die and not live.” Isaiah himself undoubtedly affirmed his own words, and he recognized that the revelation was divine only by prophetic light:

for prophetic light sometimes becomes the cause of a prophet's being deceived. Hezekiah did not die at that time, but recovered. Fourth argument. Moreover, when the Lord once asked, “Who will deceive Ahab?” a spirit came forth and said, “I will deceive him.” The Lord asked him, “How?” Then he said, “I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.” The Lord said, “You shall deceive him and prevail; go and do so.” Micah then adds, “Now therefore, behold, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these your prophets, and the Lord has spoken evil against you.” Thus God deceives by means of a demon as his servant. Augustine admits this in book 83 of the Questions. For just as a judge considers it unworthy and wicked to strike a condemned man with his own hand, yet has the executioner do so at his command, so a demon deceives, at God's command, someone whom God would not deceive directly. I wish to make an argument for this point by the same comparison and almost the same words that Augustine uses. Fifth argument. The Jews, too, deceived the Egyptians at the Lord's command. For the children of Israel did as the Lord had commanded Moses and asked the Egyptians for vessels of silver and gold. The Lord gave his people favor in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they lent the things to them; and they despoiled the Egyptians. Therefore, with God as author, one person deceives another. Nor is it surprising if God commands a worthy enemy to be deceived, since this pertains to justice and truth: that each receive what is due, as Augustine himself argues in the passage just cited. Sixth argument. These testimonies are not equally forceful; the more difficult ones, since they are almost all of one kind, will be recalled together. The first is this: “He changes the heart of princes, deceives them, and makes them wander like drunkards.” The second is this: “If a man has set uncleanness in his heart and comes to the prophet to inquire of me through him, I, the Lord, will answer him; and when the prophet errs and speaks a word, I, the Lord, have deceived that prophet.” The third is this: “Why have you made us err, Lord, from your ways?” The fourth is the Apostle's statement: “Since they did not approve of having God in their knowledge, God delivered them over to a reprobate mind.” The fifth is another statement of the same Apostle: “Because they did not receive the love of the truth, God will therefore send them an operation of error.” Augustine thinks these testimonies clearly teach that God acts in human hearts to incline their wills toward evil, and even their minds toward falsehood. Seventh argument. Nor is the following reasoning unrelated to these points. Since error is a punishment, there is no reason why God, whom the prophets say is the author of every punishment, could not himself bring about error, especially in someone whose prior sins have made him deserve to be led into error by a just judge. “Life and death,” it says, “poverty and honor are from God; wisdom and discipline are with God; error and darkness were created with sinners.” Eighth argument. This is confirmed above all by the fact that God is the cause of every motion: in him we move and exist. Error, then, which is the motion of a person who errs, can be brought about in a person by God; therefore God will be able to deceive. Ninth argument. Another argument for the same point is that a lie is not evil by its nature. God can therefore command someone to lie. The first point is shown by the fact that Joseph even confirmed a lie with an oath: “By Pharaoh's life, you are spies.” We should not believe that a just man would utter a lie secured by an oath unless he had a divine revelation that excused him from mortal sin. Next, the same point is also proved by Micah's words:

“Would that I were a man without the spirit, and would rather speak a lie.” What the prophet desires at God's prompting is therefore not intrinsically evil. Add to this that Aristotle, in Ethics IV, divides lying into boasting and irony, which, according to St. Thomas, II–II, q. 110, a. 2, is a proper division of lying. But the use of the latter, which in Latin may be called dissimulation and in Greek είρωνία, is frequent in Sacred Scripture, as in the passage, “Behold, Adam has become like one of us,” and elsewhere, “You are already filled; you are already rich; you reign without us,” and in 3 Kings 22, “Go up,” Micah says, “and prosper,” and so on. If, then, irony is a lie, and God sometimes speaks ironically through the sacred authors, there seems to be no reason to deny that God can lie through others. The new theologians, little versed in Sacred Scripture, could use these testimonies and arguments to persuade us of their opinion. I deliberately pass over the arguments they themselves use, lest those who read this book incur ill will toward those scholastic authors and prefer the ignorance of the common and unlearned people to the Academies when they hear what our writers sometimes argue. But enough of this. Let us now explain the question itself and, since it will be easy, defend divine truth against adversaries of this kind. Who could fail to understand how impious and wicked it is to believe that God is a deceiver?