Celebriores Controversiae in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti — Tomus Alter (de Scientia Dei et Ideis)

DIGRESSION

Physics: from what principle is the contraction of the created will drawn to such an individuum of action?

SUMMARY.

The improbans opinion, that the same numerically-one effect is pre-had within the virtuality of several causes. Num. 47. Another placitum of the Metaphysicians, which Vázquez and John Capreolus sustain; that no second cause under such a coalition of time, place, and the other circumstances, is indifferent to the production of this individuum before another. Num. 44. The text of Scotus the agent; that the same numerically-one effect is contained within the eminence of several causes. Nu. 48. The sentiment of Scotus concerning the precontaining of the same effect in several causes is founded. Num. 55. The other part of our sentiment concerning the indetermination of the cause under the composition of those circumstances, to this rather than to another individuum, is shown. from N. 58. unto 59. The foundations of those who deny that the same numerically-one effect is pre-had in several causes are infringed; where it is dealt with, that it implies, that the action of this agent flow forth from another, which we demand from the reason of the mode after the mind of Scotus; whence also we infer, that the vital quality advanced by this agent could be effected by another of the same species. Num. 60. Whether the hypostasis of one individuum could be ef-fected by another individuum of the same species? Num.65. Other objects against the true sentiment are struck down. Num. 68. The substantial inaquality of individua of the same species is asserted against the placitum of Peter Hurtado. Nu 70 The response to the arguments which contrive that the second cause under such a confluence of circumstances is not indeterminate to the effecting of this individuum before another; where it is asked whether an intraneal virtue may suffice to the natural cause for reproducing the corrupted? Num.71. The objects against the sentiment of Scotus, concerning the virtue of nature for producing the corrupted, are enervated. Num.74.

39 SINCE what we have done against Suárez, having prefaced that the contraction of the created will to the producing of such an individuum is furnished by the first cause; the necessity of the doctrine urges to digress somewhat, and to disport in the field of physical speculation. Especially since the authors, who assert that the determination of the second cause to such an individuum of influx is drawn from God, also sustain that any efficient principle, within its virtue of acting, concludes the same series of individua which surrounds that other efficient cause of the same specific quiddity: and accordingly at the nod and pleasure of God it comes about that such an individuum is effected by this cause, and not by that. Which assertions, although they are received by authors of the better note, are yet not those which do not demand a special and accurate weighing of judgment.

That this may be more openly untangled, it is to be observed; that the indetermination, on account of which such an agent is contracted by the first cause to the producing of that individuum before another, can issue from a twofold head; either on the part of the effect; or on the part of the cause.

For on the part of the effect an indetermination can stand between, demanding the contraction of the first cause, that such an effect proceed from this cause, and not another; if it be true, that such an effect in its numerical identity is naturally pre-had within the eminence of several causes.

On the part also of the second cause the contraction from the first cause would be desired; if the second cause here and now, under such a confluence of circumstances, were indeterminate to eliciting this individuum rather than another.

The improbans opinion, that the same numerically-one effect is pre-contained within the eminence of several causes.

40 Concerning the first point therefore; there is an improbans opinion, that the same effect in its numerical identity is naturally pre-contained within the eminence of several causes; whether causes of this sort be univocal, or equivocal. Thus St. Thomas, Quodlibet. 5. artic. 8. Capreolus, in 2. sentent. dist. 20. quaest. 1. Marsilius, 1. de Generat. quaest. 8. Soto in 4. dist. 34. q. 1. ar. 3. to whom Cardinal Aureol is suffragan, in 2. sentent. dist. 20. quaest. vnica. artic. 1. §. Dicetur quòd ad hoc. Where he says.

Dicetur, quòd vt effectus sit idem, non oportet semper agens esse idem; quia quodcunque agens applicatum eidem passo potest vnum numero inducere; idò ex alio, et alio parente non est inconueniens idem numero generari.

Sed haec opinio non videtur esse vera; quòd scilicet idẽ homo possit à diuersis parentibus generari.

Et si dicatur; quòd nihil distinguitur per agens. Dico; quòd verum est formaliter; tamen efficaciter, et originaliter facit, quòd illud se ipso (formaliter tamen,) efficeretur; et originaliter, quòd illud se ipso formaliter distinguatur.

And first such an opinion is proved; because to the numerical unity of the effect the numerical unity of the action is necessarily pre-required; since the action is identified really with the term. But the action necessarily demands the numerical unity of the agent, for this reason, that by its essence it flow forth from such an agent; for if it did not proceed immediately, and by its essence, from such an agent in this number, it would be elicited by another, with the mediation of resulting aids, and accordingly of the action there would be given an action, which is absurd: be it therefore, that to the numerical condition of the effect the individuaal unity of the agent necessarily attains, as also the unity of the action conduces.

41 Next it is argued secondly; if any individuum whatever were pre-had within the virtuality of the principle of the same species, and only at the nod and pleasure of God it should come about, that such an individuum be effected by this cause, and not by that; it would follow, that no agent would be of itself the cause of such an effect connected with it in the fourth mode of perseity, but only by accident; if indeed this actual dependence of the effect upon the cause were drawn from the sole external beneplacitum of God, and not from the intrinsic connection of things; which seems alien from all philosophy.

It is argued thirdly; if any individuum whatever produced by this cause could also be effected by another; it would follow that the object, or matter around which [acts] the activity of any individuum whatever, would be the universal series of individua of the same species, which seems false; otherwise it could generate its own generator, if it were not the product.

Which appears absurd to every reason; for this reason, that, as to the real influx a real discretion of the producer and the product is demanded, so also a real independence of the physical cause from its effect is required, which no individuum whatever can import with regard to its own generator, within whose elicitive power it is truly and physically pre-contained: therefore the generator of any individuum whatever is not concluded within the ambit of the potency and activity of its own genitum, and accordingly the genitum does not relate, as to the adequated object of its own activity, to the universal series of individua of its own species.

42 The reason is urged in the vital faculties, which respect motions so intraneously composed with the eliciting principles, that they seem by their own essence to flow forth from such principles; on account of the concept of life by way of second act demanding an intraneal vicinity with the radical principle of the vital motion.

But if the will of Peter were regarded as the adequated object, or matter around which [acts] the elicitive of its own virtue, for the whole collection of volitions which could be produced from a cause of the same species; it would come about, that the volition of Paul could connaturally be effected by the will of Peter. Which seems to militate, not only against the concept of actual life, or by way of second act, which is congruous to a volition; but also against the reason of the voluntary, which demands an intrinsic principle together with cognition.

Next; that philosophy seems to deceive, of the virtue of acting of any individuum whatever enfolding the universal assemblage of individua of the same species; in intentional causality. For the intentional species of Peter, and of Paul, diverge by sole number, and not by species, as also the objects themselves, from which they are intentionally excerned; and yet it cannot be true, that Peter could elicit the representative species of Paul, as is certified more certainly than certain.

Similarly; the intensive grades are of the breadth of the same species, and yet the heat as one cannot effect that heat which adequately answers to heat as four, and which is pre-had effectively within the virtuality of that one; otherwise heat as one would operate beyond the apex of its own intens-ion; and accordingly insofar as it is not in act, which is absurd.

43 Moreover; out of the aforesaid sentiment it would be inferred, that since the hypostasis is an entity really discrete from the nature, which it contracts, and draws to the state of positive perseity, and accordingly issues in the genus of efficient cause from the same nature which it terminates; it would therefore come about, that as the nature of Peter pre-contains within its own virtuality, in the genus of efficient cause, the hypostasis of Peter, so it would also pre-had the suppositality of Paul, and of the other individua of the human species; and that at the sole external statute of God it would come about, that Peter be such a supposit, and not another; all which things seem to be new glosses, contrived against the common way of thinking of the philosophers.

Lastly; the universality, or commonness of the virtue of acting in any individuum whatever, enfolding the universal congeries of individua, is assailed; for this reason, that individua are not substantially equal according to the numerical condition. For as haeccceities, or individuaal reasons, are first diverse, so they constitute individua substantially unequal according to the numerical grade of essence; because as from the specific discretion it is received, that one species cannot be equal to another, so from the omnimodal, and as it were first diverse dissimilitude of individua according to numerical being, the substantial inaquality should be drawn.

But a cause does not act, except insofar as it is in act, or insofar as it imports an actuality of virtue adequately [measuring] the perfection of the effect; therefore the more imperfect individua do not pre-had within their own virtuality more perfect individua; and accordingly it cannot be true, that the sphere of the activity of any individuum whatever encompasses the whole collection of individua of the same species.

Another opinion of Vázquez, and of Dolan the Capuchin; that no second cause under such a confluence of circumstances is indeterminate to the effecting of this individuum before another.

44 Concerning the other point indeed concerning indetermination on the part of the cause; namely that the second cause, as here and now under such a concourse of circumstances, is indeterminate to such an individuum of action; on account of which potentiality it demands the contraction from the first cause. The aforesaid doctrine Vázquez attacks keenly out of the Neoteric writers, 3. part. tom. 1. dispu. 74. cap. 7. numer. margin. 45. vsque ad 53. To Vázquez subscribes Ludovicus Dolan the Capuchin, in Quadripartita disputatione de modo compositionis concursuum Dei, et creaturae. parte 4. huius tractatus, capit. 18. numer. margin. 4. et arguitur.

First: if it were true, that any second cause whatever under such a confluence of place, time, and the other circumstances, were indeterminate to the producing of this individuum rather than another; it would follow, that it would also be intrinsically valid for naturally reproducing that individuum which has been corrupted.

For if a cause could be alleged with such a common and indifferent virtue with respect to the collection of individua; no sufficient reason could be rendered, on account of which, the same portion of matter consenting, man could not be able to resolve upon the resuscitation of the now-dead son; which granted, according to the exigency of natural causes, and without miracle, God could not fail to infuse the soul again into the same numerically-one body: and accordingly the resurrection would be possible by the forces of nature.

45 Nor is the force of the argument eluded, if it be alleged that God does not determine the second cause to eliciting that effect which has already pre-existed: for this reason, that the marvelous and manifold multiplication of individua would more refer to the unlimitedness of the divine power than the repeated effecting of the same ones.

Against; because if the created cause were intrinsically valid for reproducing an effect already corrupted; it seems undeniable that God either once was not ready to this effective potency for eliciting such an effect; otherwise such a virtue would be vain, and accordingly also impossible, and the force would be inferred to it from the first cause, if a concourse expedited for operating were not furnished to it, so that it might burst forth into act even but a single time from the beginning of the world.

46 Secondly Vázquez argues, sub numer. 49. because if it could philosophically be alleged that the created cause here and now were not determined to the production of this effect, and not of another within the same species; it would follow, that it would also be valid as indifferent to infinite effects of another sort, since no assignable reason exists why rather to ten effects than to a hundred, and thus it would be pronounced indeterminate to infinity? Which seems to militate against the limitation, and native condition, of the created agent.

Wherefore Vázquez opines more advisably, and more aptly for the philosophical matter; to profess candidly that no reason is found why the created caual here and now is potent to this numerically-one effect, and not to another within the same species? Referring it to the unknown arcana of nature, rather than merely by divination blurting out that the created cause is utterly indeterminate in this subject place and time to several numerically-one effects within the same species, and that the contraction of such potentiality is to be demanded from the first cause.

47 Lastly Vázquez argues nume. 51. specially in free causes. Because, if the will were entirely indeterminate to such an individuum of action before another, in such a way that a contraction of this sort would have to be drawn from the external beneplacitum of God; a necessity would be inferred to our will from God, for this reason, that it ought to be whole for the created will, salva the right of liberty, not only to be able to love and not to love, but also to be able to pursue the object by this act of impulse, and not by another.

For as the action of our will puts on meritorious causality, not only according to the common and specific predicates of such a form, but also according to the numerical grade of its essence, so it ought to be free according to the numerical being of such an impulse; and accordingly also to be subject to the nod of the will with respect to the individuaal reason of such a volition: so that with full right the will could be borne into the object by this act of volition before another within the same species of the pursuing of the appetitive.

The sentiment of Scotus, concerning the precontaining of the same effect within the virtuality of several causes, is elucidated, and propped.

48 BUT notwithstanding these things; the opposite sentiment is to be sustained, which Scotus clearly constituted in 2. sent. dist. 20. quaestion. 2. sub numer. margin. 2. Where he says.

Dico, quòd soli nunc electi fuissent in statu innocentiae nati.

Ratio huius est; quia omnis ordinatè volens, post volitionem finis, immediatè vult illud, quod est immediatius, vel proximius fini; Deus est volens ordinatè: ergo primò vult seipsum, vel bonitatem suam tanquam finem. Secundò vult bonum creaturae rationalis vltimatum, quod est communicatio creaturae, siue communicatio beatifica suae bonitatis, creaturae tali; et postea vult gratiam, quae ordinatur ad beatitudinem huius, vel ad fruitionem eius: posteriùs vult istum beatum, vel beatificabilem, esse nasciturum à tali parente, quod esse supponit argentiae.

49 Cùm ergo (vt dictum est,) priùs sint beatitudini determinati, quàm quòd nascantur à talibus parentibus; per quoscunque parentes nascantur, ex quo habent rationem posterioris, huiusmodi parentes non poterunt variare determinatos beatificandos à voluntate diuina, quin ijdem in numero nascantur.

50 Dices; quòd identitas numeralis in effectu, non solùm requirit identitatem numeralem materiae, sed etiam efficientis; sicut tangit primum argumentum.

Dico; quòd non oportet. Ignis enim, (A) quantitatis, et virtutis tantae si ex tali materia ignem talem generaret; ignis (B) eiusdem virtutis, et qualitatis, pro eodem instanti, si in istam materiam ageret, eumdem ignem in numero produceret, non obstante quòd generans sit aliud, et aliud numero: quia generatum non sequitur praecisè vnitatem, vel pluralitatem, ex generante.

51 Concerning which text, and especially concerning the letter which we transcribe under num. 50., it is to be noted; that God, with respect to the destination of the predestinated to a determinate grade of glory, and with respect to the supposits to be beatified, had that absolute efficacious purpose aiding, that such a will by no means awaited the conditional foreknowledge of the fall of Adam; for this reason, that if God by conditional science had foreknown Adam not about to fall, still the same numerically-one decree would not have been infused to God, as is treated more broadly in the general controversia concerning Predestination. But since in the state of innocence reprobrate men would not have subsisted; be it, that those predestinated, who de facto are procreated by reprobrate parents, would have to be generated by other predestinated parents, salva the numerical unity of the predestinated: and accordingly it follows, that to the unity of the effect the unity of the generator is not necessary.

Moreover, that in the state of innocence no reprobrates would subsist, from whom the elect would be generated, Scotus produces out of Gregory in the aforesaid q. 2. sub num. marg. 1. where he says.

Oppositum patet per Gregorium. 4. Moralium. Si parentem primum nulla peccati rubigo corrupisset, nequaquam ex se filios gehennae generaret; sed ilii, qui nunc per redemptorem saluandi sunt, soli ab illo electi nascerentur.

Although Suárez rejects this doctrine as uncertain in sua Metaph. tom. 1. disp. 26. section. 5. num. margin. 11.; yet with Scotus we adhere more securely to Gregory, rejecting the generation of the elect from reprobrate parents in that hypothesis that the first parent had not sinned; for in those things which cannot be asserted without divine revelation, the sentiment of the holy Fathers of the Church is to be embraced most of all, who are believed to have handed it down suffused with celestial light.

52 Nor does the replica of Suárez infringe the pronounce-ment of Scotus, opining; that although the predestination of all the elect forestalled the absolute foreknowledge of the fall of the first parent, yet not the conditional, which alone furnishes that God decreed the generation of the elect from reprobrate parents, for this reason, that by conditional science he foresaw the fall of Adam before the predestination of the elect.

For these things do not stand in the way; for this reason, that with Scotus the absolute destination of the elect to glory is so independent from the foreknowledge, whether absolute, or conditional, of the fall of Adam, that grant that God by conditional foreknowledge had foreseen Adam not about to fall, whom de facto he foreknew about to fall, the same numerically-one would have been infused to God with respect to the elect; in which hypothesis, the same numerically-one elect, who de facto are generated by the reprobrate, would have had to be produced by others not reprobrate. This concerning the theological axiom, of which concisely in the controversia of predestination.

53 Concerning indeed the physical reason, why it does not stand in the way of the numerical unity of the effect, that it could be effected by several agents? which Scotus insinuates in the letter which we proposed under n. 50. in those words.

Ignis (A) quantitatis, et virtutis tantae, si ex tali materia ignem talē generaret; ignis (B) eiusdem virtutis, si in istam materiã ageret, eumdẽ ignẽ in numero produceret.

The aforesaid doctrine of Scotus Suárez thus interprets at the place cited sub n. 12.; that Scotus intends in that place nothing else, than that from the equality of virtue, which the agents of the same species have available, to hunt out the numerical identity of the same series of effects.

Which proof Suárez expels as weak; for this reason, that from the equality of virtue only an aquality is drawn out between the effects of either cause, yet not numerical identity; in such a way that the same individuum would be valid to make the effects which [the other could effect] around that matter applied to itself, that the other efficient of the same species could elicit.

Which opposition of Suárez rightly indicates, that Scotus did not produce the inclusion of the same number of the effect in a duplicated principle from the precise aquality of virtue, which alone seems to convince aquality, yet not numerical identity of effects; for such a aquality could stand between faculties of acting utterly diverse, and not converging into the same predicate of operative virtue, if that virtue only made available acting within its own species as the other of dissimilar potency within another species respecting a diverse series of products, (for we have more than once taught that the aquality of virtue between forms, and potencies dissite in species, is possible,) but from the identity of virtue, which is congruous to the agents of the same operative virtue, insofar as they converge, and are gathered together into the same faculty of effecting.

Which is clear from those words of the proposed text. Ignis (B) eiusdem virtutis eumdem ignem in numero produceret; for he did not say, of unlike virtue, as Suárez objects, but of the same. More explicitly another text of Scotus concerning the virtual precontaining of the same effect in several causes; not on account of parity, but on account of identity of virtue, see below sub n. 71. which is of the matter for blunting the blow of Suárez.

54 Indeed the reason for Scotus can be thus instructed; it does not stand against the numerical unity of any effect whatsoever that it be pre-had within the eminence of several causes on account of their natural sympathy in acting; as is plain concerning the mental word, which is pre-contained within the virtuality of the intellect, and of the intelligible species; and concerning the accessible idol, or the image of the sensation of vision, which is pre-had within the eminence of the visual faculty, and of the intentional species. Therefore it stands no more against the numerical unity of any effect whatsoever, that it be pre-contained within the eminence of several causes; if those converge into the same predicate of operative virtue, whether formal, or eminential.

Which I would say on account of the equivocal cause, which therefore pre-contains the same numerically-one effect, which the univocal cause pre-had within its own eminence; for example, the Sun the same numerically-one heat, which the hot thing produces; because, although the Sun, and the hot thing, do not converge into the same formal predicate of heat, they nevertheless converge into the same, at least eminential, reason of the operative faculty.

Therefore therefore this matter is to be untangled; that the universal, and equivocal cause, which indeed within the ambit of its own elicitive potency encompasses the whole collection of the individua of the inferior species; be able to elicit any individuum whatever of such a species. But the univocal cause would not pre-had the universal assemblage of individua of such a species; for this reason, that such a cause is one out of the individua of this species, and the same individuum cannot truly, and causally, pre-contain itself. Wherefore any individuum whatever does not intend a distinct series and line of producenda, which another individuum cannot elicit, as the opposite opinion fawns; but the same numerically-one class of products.

Because with Scotus all its asseclae, ancient and Neoteric, prop up that sentiment; especially Bassolius, in 2. sentent. distinct. 20. quaestione vnica. §. Ad primum istorum dici potest. Where he says.

A diuersis in numero potest idem in numero in eadem numero materia generari, sicut à diuersis calefacientibus potest idem calor numero in eodem subiecto generari; sic etiam idem homo potest generari à diuersis hominibus, etc.

Suárez follows Scotus, in sua Metaphysic. disput. 26. section. 5. especially from num. 14.

Which sentiment William of Rubione, Auditor of Scotus, firms up, and almost too slightly weighs, in 1. sentent. dist. 38. quaest. 1. conclusion. 3. et in 2. distinct. 34. quaest. 2. §. Sed hic sunt duo dubia. Whose words, on account of the subtlety of the doctrine, and for showing out of the testimonies of the ancient asseclae of Scotus how open a professor of physical predetermination Scotus was, I transcribe below in the following article; where the predetermination of God to the material of sin is urged.

Thus also, besides Suárez, the Jesuit authors so think: Peter Hurtado, as is plain from num. 73. And Valentinus de Herice, see the following article concerning the predetermination to the material of sin, sub num. 63. The same sentiment Gregory of Rimini props up, see the following article num. 77. where he almost… elucidates the matter with some spirit.

And besides the reason which we formed in the preceding number for the defense of Scotus, thus we can act ad hominem against the Thomists, out of a very common and received sentiment of the Thomists opining; that the same effect of the absolute power of God can be elicited from several total causes principally operating; since moreover the principal cause, insofar as it dissides from the efficient instrument, ought to operate by its own proper virtue; be it, that several causes by their own proper virtue conclude the same numerically-one effect within their own eminence.

For in such a hypothesis God alone would furnish that of miracle in that supernatural action with respect to the mode, so that he would supply the concomitancy of the influx; in such a way that he would predetermine both causes, and apply them for eliciting the same numerically-one effect simultaneously, and conjointly, which nevertheless severally, and divisively, the laws of nature regarded, they could effect.

Further; nor is that confirmation of our view a weak one, which is drawn from the connatural conservation of the same numerically-one effect by a wholly distinct cause. As is plain in light, which depends on being made and conserved in being by its own efficient principle, yet in such a way that, if another luminous body of the same virtue be substituted in place of the efficient, it conserves connaturally the light produced by the other efficient.

For it neither is to be asserted, that the light producted from the first luminous thing perishes instantaneously at that one's absence, and another numerically distinct one sprouts forth from the following luminous thing; since that is a voluntary commentum against the common way of sensing and speaking of all.

But the light could not be conserved connaturally by the second luminous thing, if it were not pre-contained within its virtuality; therefore it does not stand against the numerical unity of such a form, that it be pre-had within the eminence of several total agents.

Because since the conserving cause is a true efficient principle, so much so that if the illuminative action bursting forth from the second luminous thing would not presuppose the producted light, it would effect it; from this, so that also the same effect could be elicited divisively from several causes.

The other part of the sentiment of Scotus is firmed, concerning the potentiality and indetermination of the second cause to the effecting of such an individuum, whenever any composition of time and place is assumed.

56 TO which things being presupposed concerning indetermination on the part of the effect, that it be effected by this generator rather than by that; on account of which indifferency the contraction of the aforesaid indetermination is demanded from the first cause predefining, that this numerically-one effect be elicited by this efficient rather than by another; from the hypothesis that within the virtuality of either it is concluded.

Now it can be luculently made plain, and let it be referred, the indetermination on the part of the cause; on account of which the created efficient under that composition of time, place, and the other circumstances, is asserted utterly indifferent to this numerically-one act rather than another of the same species; in such a way that such universality, or commonness of operating necessarily expects the predefinition of the first cause constituting such an individuum of action before another within the same species.

So the cited authors, especially Suárez at the place cited; to whom subscribes Peter Hurtado in sua physica. disputat. 10. de causa prima. sectione quarta. praecipuè sub. §. 61. and out of the ancient Theologians Gregory of Rimini handed it down, in primo. distinction. 17. quaestion. quarta. articul. secundo. ad 7. et distinctione 35. quaestion. prima. articul. 1. Where because he opined all the grades of intension homogeneous, and not individuaally heterogeneous, so also he pronounced, the hot thing to be an agent utterly indeterminate to the production of heat as one rather than to the effecting of heat as eight; in such a way that the contraction of such an efficient cause to such an individuum of intension rather than another is drawn from the sole preordination of God.

Which placitum of the Riminate, although as to the homogeneity of the grades of intension, be not proved to us, who esteem them individuaally unequal, dissimilar, or heterogeneous; yet it is suffragan to our sentiment, insofar as he asserts, that the created efficient cause composed to such a confluence of circumstances is of itself indeterminate to the effecting of this individuum before another. The indetermination also of the created will to such an individuum before another, Gregory props up, in secundo. distinctione 35. quaestion. prima. articul. tertio. in secunda probatione conclusionis, whose words I transcribe below, in the following article sub numer. margin. 77. the same sentiment William of Rubione most strongly defends, see the following article concerning the Predetermination of God to the material of sin, from nu. 49. unto 52.

But the express testimony of Scotus for the indetermination of the thing, as it corresponds to such or such an extension of time; see in this art. under num. 75. where especially those words of Scotus are to be observed: Sicut est in Sole respectu radij; cùm non dependeat identitas radij in secundo instanti ad se ipsum in primo instanti, vel ab existentia ejus in tempore intermedio. Add the place cited; where also Scotus consequently maintains, that the same thing, the connatural state due to it being preserved, could after corruption be reproduced again; for the reason that it happens to an entity to be composed with this, or with that, circuit of time.

57 The truth of this pronounce-ment is produced out of what has been said; because the dependence of the thing upon the generator is more connatural, and intraneal, than upon place, time, and the other extrinsic circumstances; but the effect is indifferent from the intrinsic, and, the connatural state of its own production being kept, so as to be able to be effected by this, or that generator; therefore it is more indeterminate to be produced in this place, and time, than in another. And, accordingly, the created cause under any composition whatever of extrinsic circumstances is utterly indeterminate, so as to effect such an individuum rather than another within the same species; and hence it demands the contraction of such an indifferency from the first cause. I hold this reason most efficacious, granted the truth of the preceding assertion; that that effect is pre-contained within the virtuality of several causes.

Next; if a free cause were affixed to the producing of this individuum of act rather than of another; I ask, by what principle is such a will contracted, so that it elicit this individuum of act rather than another of the same species? For is this contraction drawn either from the intrinsic individuaal condition of such a cause, or from the extrinsic conditions, namely place, and time? If it be taken from the intrinsic individuaation of such a cause, that it be forced to the effecting of this individuum; on that reason, that that will is affixed to the effecting of this numerically-one act, and not of another, because the will is such an individuum; that is asserted gratis, since the same numerically-one agent can effect several acts numerically distinct.

Nor does the objection stand; that although there is nothing repugnant to the individuaation of the will to elicit, in diverse times, and places, several acts numerically distinct; nevertheless it is repugnant that in this place, and time, it not be forced to such a numerically-one act.

Because that is to flee vainly to circumstances utterly extrinsic; for that is the very thing we ask about: why, when time, and place so extrinsically adjoin the immanent, and spiritual motion of the will, do they so affix the will to such an individuum of action, that it is no longer whole with it to attempt another impulse within the same species?

Ludovicus Dolan the Capuchin answers otherwise at the place cited, parte 4. cap. 18. §. Responderi posset secundo. sub num. marg. 5. That such a contraction to a determinate individuum of action, given that coalition of place, time, and circumstances, is not demanded from the concursual action of God, (for the aforesaid author denies the immediate concourse of God to the actions of free arbitrium,) but that free arbitrium is contracted to such individua of action by habits sent in by God for that office, if such a contraction is to be demanded from an extrinsic principle, and not from the intrinsic virtue of each principle. And it is quite credible (he says) that as God sends into our wills habits inclining them to a certain species of act, so he can send in others determining them to some singular, and individuated act.

But this doctrine halts, and falls short in many things; wherefore it is shaken out, and cast down, first. Because although God, salva liberty, sends in habits inclining to the various species of acts, yet he cannot, salva liberty, send in habits determining free arbitrium to such a species of operations. Which we show luculently out of Scotus in this dist. ar 2. n marg. 11. where we elucidated that testimony of Scotus. Quòd esset contra naturā voluntatis determinari ab habitu, siuè à natura inferiori.

Whence we also manifestly produce against Dolan: that it implies a habit determining to such individua of actions; because since a physical action does not prescind in its tending toward the term, nor can it contract to individuum grades without determining to the higher predicates identified with the numeric grades: so that, if it stand in the way of liberty that it be determined by a habit to the species of the act, so also that it be determined to its individuation.

Moreover, I thus either shove at the assertion of Dolan; because either the habit, contracted to the individuum of action, submits its operative force to the will, or not? If it subject its force to the arbitership of the will, and leave it free, so as to be able to operate otherwise; the volition still remains potential, and indeterminate to another individuum of action. Of which indetermination, namely, again, by what is it contracted? by the same habit; or by another numerically distinct? If by a distinct habit, so that each habit inclines only to a single act in num. alone; it would follow, that in the same instant of operation there would be given infinitely many habits sent in by God, so that the will could freely, and at its arbitership, determine itself to any act whatever, which it virtually pre-had, as also the virtue of the will stands ready for the innumerable acts of the same species to be elicited through the whole aeternity.

But if you say, that the same habit is potent to determining the will to several acts numerically distinct; then the same difficulty returns concerning the habit, and its potentiality to several acts diverse in sole number, which urges in the will potential, and indeterminate here and now, to several individua of actions. Because if this habit sent in by God stands ready here and now for several acts in a discretely different number, (for if it were potent only to one, the unimpaired potency of the will would not be preserved salva toward either, and it would be necessitated,) I ask, by what principle is the habit contracted, so that here and now it produce this act rather in num. than another? Not from another intrinsic principle; therefore extrinsic, namely from the first cause.

Nor of greater moment is another refugium of Dolan, for which he cites Arriaga; that although free arbitrium hangs upon the permission of the first cause, so that it should be whole with it, or permitted, to elicit this individuum of action before another; yet not so as to need for that a positive determination of God.

For that does not stand in the way; because then only a permission is demanded, which bears itself in the manner of a removing, prohibiting [obstacle]; when an intraneal virtue stands ready for the act, and for the mode of contracting, and unfolding itself toward the exercise of the act. But no created cause, especially one operating through cognition, acquires an intrinsic principle such that it determine itself, or unfold its proper virtue to eliciting this individuum of action before another; because a free cause determines itself through cognition, and no cognitive agent understands itself to cognize this act with that num., and not another of the same species, or to appetize by this appetite in this num., and not another of the same species. As Gregory of Rimini argues sharply, in 2. sen. dist. 35. q. 1. art. 3. Cùm nullus talium actuum sit pro tunc magis possibilis quàm alius; voluntas ipsa creata indifferenter se ad quemlibet illorū habeat, nullumque distinctè cognoscat antequam ipse actus sit; ac per hoc non possit velle distinctè aliquem illorū determinatè producere. Et tandē post pauca cõcludit: sed talis causa libera distinctè illos cognoscens nõ potest esse alia quàm Deus.

58 Moreover, I urge the reason from those things which we premised in controu. 8. de aeternitate Dei, ar. 2. de duratione creata. à n. mar. 30. vsque ad 33. where we disclosed, that the thing is not composed immediately, and by its own essence, to this determined duration of the first mobile; but through the successive medial form of presentiality, or of coexistence, running out to the flux of the motion of the first mobile; which successive presentiality constitutes the praedicamentum Quando.

Wherefore, a thing, of itself, and from the connatural state of its own production, is so indeterminate, that it lies under the nature of this Quando, as also of another; that is, under this temporal presentiality with which it coexists at this time, rather than another; from which it is manifestly drawn out, that to the numerically-one unity of the action it does not belong to flow forth from the agent at this time rather than in another; but that the cause composed to such place and time is indifferent to several actions within the same species. To those things which we sketched at the place cited, which untangle that matter quite neatly.

59 Out of the things prefaced there emerges an efficacious confutation of Suárez, and of his asseclae, who expel the predetermination by the divine will. Because after God has excited our will by a congruous vocation, he does not foreknow, that it will consent, loosely, and according to the specific reason only of the pursuit of the impulse, as such; but he understands infallibly the created will to be about to consent by such an appetite with that num.; since the science of God does not attain the object according to the common and specific predicates, or in potential, and abstract being; but in the contracted, and the numericized: otherwise there could be attributed to God a science that would inspect man before this man, and so of the rest.

But any will whatever, excited by a congruous vocation, is not conceived the determined principle of this numen of impulse before another within the same species, unless the volition of God accede, contracting the created will, potential of itself, to such an individuum of impulse; therefore the divine volition, on account of the aforesaid causality of determining, cannot fail to be praefinitive, or predeterminative, of the whole created action.

Which reason Vázquez judged so nervous at the place cited sub nu. 53. that he opines it cannot be consistently sustained, before the principles of the controversies, by the school of the Jesuits; that the liberty of the created will stand with its determination to such an individuaal action, which is drawn from the first cause.

And rightfully did Vázquez censure that Suárez and the other authors fall away from the consistency of the doctrine; while they assert that the potentiality of the second cause to such an individuum of action is contracted by God, yet expel the predetermination. Because since with the aforesaid authors this contraction is not made on the part of the contingent effect alone, but on the part of the principle; it is consistent that the predetermination be censured absolutely, and simply. Since every motion of the first cause, which does not stop at the sole contraction of the effect to a determined futurition, but also passes through to contracting the principle, is a true, and rigorous premotion; not only on the part of the effect, but also on the part of the cause, so that from it, thus contracted to act, the influx also proceeds contracted.

The foundations are shaken [by us] of those who, when it is dealt with that the effect is pre-contained in several causes, assail it; where it is shown, that it implies, that the action of this agent flow forth from another, which we demand from the reason of the mode after the mind of Scotus; whence also we infer, that the vital operation produced by this agent could be effected by another of the same species.

60 FROM what has been said the foundations of the adversaries can be dislodged.

To the first argument of the first opinion improbans, that the same effect in its num. is naturally pre-had within the eminence of several causes. It is answered; that the action is not at all identified with the term, in the sentiment of Scotus, who opines that the action is in the agent, and not in the patient; which premise granted, it could also be alleged that, as the unity of the agent is not pernecessarily required for the numerically-one unity of the effect, so neither the unity of the action; and accordingly that although this act with its num. is so effected by this generator, yet it could have been generated connaturally by another; so also that it is so produced through this act of generating as medial, that it also could have been generated connaturally through another act.

It could be answered secondly; that the implication is not apparent in this, that as the numerically-one unity of the effect does not stand in the way of its being produced by several agents; so neither does it stand against the unity of the action, that it could flow forth from several agents taken severally.

But when the opposition acts, that therefore the unity of the action essentially demands the unity of the agent, for this reason, that by its essence it hang from the agent, and sprout from him,

It could be said: that such a pronouncement involves an amphibology; for if by the action's depending upon the agent through its own essence he intends the same as depending immediately, and not by any other mediating causality, or influx; in this sense it is true, that the action sprouts from its own principle through its own essence, and is not made by another medium; for otherwise of the action there would be given an action. But if he intends that it be of the quidditative reason of such an action to flow forth from this agent, and not from another; that could be denied, since as yet no assigned reason appears which demonstrates it; however else Suárez may feel at the place cited under n. 10.

Yet the prior solution is preferable, since it rests on the more common doctrine and expressly follows Scotus's mind, as will be clear from what follows in the next number. Further, even if we grant—but do not concede—that an action flowing from this numerically individuated agent could have been elicited by another, if we consider only the action's relation to its agent as an efficient cause, the contrary holds insofar as the action depends on the agent as its material cause, namely, as the subject in which it is received. In that sense, therefore, we must admit the proposition that an action depends essentially on its agent: its composition with its substratum—which is the efficient agent itself—is predicated of the essence of the action as a modal form. For Scotus holds that action inheres in its agent, so that not even by God's absolute power can an action be preserved without the agent from which it was elicited; the action depends on that agent both as efficient cause and as material cause, by virtue of the abstract notion of a mode.

Whence, granted that, with only the dependence of the action upon the agent in the genus of efficient cause regarded, there would be nothing repugnant to the action's being elicited by another agent, (which we hold false; since the action by its own essence flows forth from this agent;) there nevertheless stands against it the intrinsic dependence in the genus of material cause; according to those things which we assert below in the following number.

61 Moreover, that the agent is the substratum of its own action, or that the action is subjected in the agent, is certain-mostly with Scotus; as is plain from 4. fen. distin. 13. quaest. 1. §. dicetur ergo. fub n. marg. 10. et §. istorum trium fub n. marg. 11. vbi habet.

And this is confirmed out of the Philofophim, 5. Metaph. who defined active potency (effe principium transmutandi a-liua, inquantum aliud, ficut autem potentia actiua est principium transmutandi, ita actio, quae eft actus potentiae actiuae, erit transmutatio alterius, id est passi, inquantum alterum est.) And further below. fub num. marg. 14. §. si obijcias. he subiicit. Ex hoc patet folutio ad quamdam obiectionem prius factam ex illa litera; concedens enim Aristoteles ibi, actionē eße in passo, et non in agente, quia tunc agens moueretur; loquitur de actione fecundùm hanc quintam fignificationem; non autem fecundùm quòd actio est genus distinctum contra passionem. Illo enim modo accipiendo actionem. Actione formaliter aliquid est agens; ficut relatione eft relatum; et fic necesse eft illud, (quo) eff intrinfecum illi, quod dicitur effe tale per ipfum, ficut fimilitudinem eße in fimili.

Wherefore in controu. 9. de Vifione Dei. dist. 3. fubdist. 1. ar. 1. de Vitalitate vifionis fub n. marg. 25. 26. et 32. we showed, that the action is not, by formal reason, intrinsic, on account of which the patient might hang from the agent: but that the formal effect of the action consists in this, that it contract the potency of the agent, so that it pass from the being of a potential principle into the being of an actual principle.

Which Scotus also asserts perspicuously, loco citato ex 4. fen. dist. 13. q. 1. fub nu. mar. 16. §. isti duo respectus. where he teaches. Praemifit enim Aristoteles ibi in principio illius capituli de actione, quòd oportet ineffe actū vtriq; fcilicet, motiuo, et mobili; mobile enim est in ipfo passo, motus autē in operari; ergo illū actū modēatis, quē ponit operari, vult inefe motiēti. Vt fcilicet cōtrahat mouēs in potentia, et reddat illud fiue cōftituat in ratione principij actualis, et mouentis in actu.

Since moreover the action is the intrinsic form of the agent, and not an entitative form, but modal, of which the composition toward such a substratum is not made really distinct from the same form, (as, in entitative forms, the actual composition toward substrata is really severed from the forms, which are not modes, but entities,) thence it accedes, that it implies that the same form of action could also, divisively, hang from several agents. Of which see those things which we dispatched above in cōtro. 2. de vnitate Dei in Append. metaph. de distinctione entis, ar. 3. de dift. modali praecipuè n. mar. 20. et 23. where, de expressa Scoti mente, we taught that the composition of the relation toward the foundation is not really distinct from the relation.

And that the same judgment must be made concerning all the other accidental forms, which Scotus calls all modal forms, with quantity and quality excepted, is proved out of Scotus, in Quodlib. 3. §. habemus ergo primum membrum. sub n. mar. 3. editionis Cauelli. vbi habet ita.

Secundo modo accipit Boëtius, distinguendo rem contra modum rei; ficut loquitur lib. de Trini. (patet, inquit, qua fit diffẽrẽtia predicationũ, quia aliae quidem quafi rem mõnstrãt, aliae quafi circãftãt:ã rei; quia ifta praedicatur fic, quòd fecundùm rem aliquam monstrant, illae verò vt non esse, fed potiùs extrinfecùs aliquid apponunt.)

Vult ergo distinguere rem cõtra circũftantiam, et fic fecundùm eum folâ tria genera, fubftantia, qualitas, et quantitas, rem monstrant; alia verò rei circumftantias.

Hoc ergo nomẽ (res) in fecũdo membro acceptum dicit aliquod ens abfolutũ diftinctũ cõtra circumftãtiã fiue modũ, qui dicit habitudinem unius ad alterum.

Where Scotus, out of Boëthius, by the name of mode, comprehends all the accidents, with quantity only, and quality excepted; wherefore as, with him, in the same Quodl. 3. §. repõdeo, ftandum in ipfa relatione, fub n. 15. he asserted, that the composition of the relation toward the foundation is not really distinct from the relation; whence it comes about, that this relation cannot cohere to another substratum, nor even divinely; the same must be pronounced concerning action, passion, and all the other accidental forms, which Scotus calls modal forms; with quantity and quality excepted, which are entitative forms.

That the mode is thus used Hugo Cauel elucidates in Schol. 1. Quodlib. 3. vbi disquirit Scotus; an relatio fit res, vel ratio? where Cavelius thus has. Resumit tripliciter. Primò, cõmuniffimè pro omni conceptibili reali et rationis. Secũdò, communiter pro ente extra animam, vt opponitur modo rei. Tertiò, pro ente per- fe. Et quaeftio eft an relatio fit ref primo modo extra animam? Quia certum eft non effe rem fecundo modo, vel tertio, quia nec fubftãtia, nec aliud. Intellige quantitatem et qualitatem iuxta trãfcriptum teftimonium Scoti.

62 To the second argument, from num. 41. which also imbibes an amphibology; insofar as a principle sole and unique (which excludes the fellowship of another principle, within whose potency the same effect is contained, so that it be able to be effected by any cause whatever, divisively) seems to run together with the principle per se of such an effect.

For of a cause per se it is not required that the effect so hang from her, that she cannot connaturally be effected by another, divisively; but that it be so elicited by this cause, that from another its being is not actually received, although it could have asked it of her, within whose virtuality it is connaturally pre-had, had the premotion or predetermination of God acceded.

But when the opposition subsumes; that that is a dependence per accidens of the effect upon the cause; which is taken from the sole libitum, and the extrinsic statute of God.

That granted, we deny that the dependence of this effect upon this principle rather than upon another is drawn from the sole nod of God; but from the intrinsic, and natural precontaining of such an effect in such a cause; while from the external beneplacitum of God it is only expected, that, the aptitudinal connection premised in the fourth mode of perseity, and the natural precontaining of the same effect in several causes standing, he actually, and in second act, premote this one rather than that one to such an effect; since moreover such a premotion presupposes, by way of first act, the natural faculty of acting of such a cause and its connection with this effect, therefore it must not be said to be demanded from the sole extrinsic nod of God, but from the nature of things.

To the third argument; that, although de facto no individuum produces its own generator, for the reason that it has already pre-existed, placed outside the causes; and corrupt individua cannot again be produced, from the hypothesis of their past extraction outside the causes; and corrupt individua, the law of divine predetermination supposed, as will more plainly stand below from the solution of the first argument of Vázquez. Nevertheless, with the force, and native faculty of acting of any individuum whatever regarded, as that individuum could have been produced not by this generator from which de facto it issued, but by another; so also that same individuum could have availed, by which de facto it issued, (in that hypothesis, though, it would not have issued,) to generate.

63 As for the objection from vital faculties, which seem to produce through the intrinsic union and dependence of their operation on their principle—so that an impulse produced by this will could not be produced by another impulsive faculty—the same point presses in the case of intellection and other vital operations.

Suárez answers at the place cited, sub numer. 17. that it must be thought otherwise of the faculties that alter external matter, and of the potencies operating immanently; for this reason, that immanently-operating agents, of which sort are all the vital faculties, since they operate from themselves, and in themselves, are not only the elicitive principles of acts, but also the substrata, and material principles of them. Hence it comes about that, according to the numerically-one discretion of the efficient principle, there must also be alleged a distinction of the substratum, or material cause, of such accidents; and moreover, since the accidental forms, which imbibe a special connection with such a substratum, are pluralized in number according to the plurality of the subjects: thence it accedes, that as one and the same intellection cannot connaturally act upon several intellective potencies, so neither can it be elicited, divisively, by several intellective faculties.

But against this is; that as there would be nothing repugnant to the act of an immanent faculty from an aptitudinal dependence upon several potencies in the genus of efficient cause taken divisively; so neither does an aptitudinal dependence upon several potencies in the genus of material cause, even taken divisively, seem to be repugnant. Because although the actual dependence, and composition of a vital act upon several substrata necessarily imports a partition, and plurality of the form affording several subjects: yet an aptitudinal dependence upon several subjects does not convince a partition of the form, since it is actually composed with that potency alone from which it is elicited, although it be able to inhere aptitudinally in other potencies, upon which it could also hang in the genus of efficient cause; for the reason that it is actually composed with that substratum alone from which it flows forth in the genus of efficient cause.

Wherefore, as the heat, which is actually composed with one subject only, is not pluralized in number by the reason that it could be aptitudinally composed with several other substrata; for neither is the informative force of the heat exhausted around that substratum alone which it actually acts upon; since it is not a modal form identified with the composition toward this substratum, (otherwise neither could it be conjoined to another subject even by the absolute power of God, since God cannot supply the informative force;) so neither from this, that a volition, which is elicited by the will of Peter, could act upon the will of Paul; (as also proceed from the will of Paul in the genus of efficient cause;) is it pluralized in number on account of an aptitudinal dependence in the genus of material cause upon the will of Paul; although it cannot actually hang from several substrates, conjointly, but only in aptitude, and divisively.

Which mode of speaking has great probability: granted that vital quality does not savour of the nature of a mode by its essence affixed to a substratum; but rather that this, it seems, must necessarily be sustained after the mind of Scotus, with whom there is not a more essential comparison of the operation, or vital quality, to its intrinsic principle in the genus of material cause; than is that intimate comparison of the same quality to the same principle in the genus of efficient cause. Wherefore as there does not stand in the way of the vicinity, and intimacy of the comparison of vital quality in the genus of efficient cause to the intraneal, and conjoined principle, that the intellection flow forth from the intellect of Peter, or from the intellect of Paul, since it would be elicited from whatever agent as from a conjoined principle; so neither does the intellection more demand that it be composed in the genus of material cause with this intellect than with another: since the comparison of the intellection to the intellect in the genus of material cause is not more intimate than in the genus of efficient cause.

Of which take thus the philosophizing Scotus in Quodl. 13. §. de quarto principali dici potest. n. mar. 32. where he says. » Illa qualitas, qua vel est operatio, vel includitur in operatione, no habet relatione ad subiectũ magis essetiãle quã alia qualitates, alias qualitates » non esse essentialiter relatas ad subiectum, nec ista ponetur essentialiter relata ad subiectum.

64 But it can also be said otherwise for Suárez; that vital acts, which flow forth from potencies operating from themselves, and in themselves, or premoulding such a substratum of their influx, and not another, cannot be elicited by other agents numerically distinct. Because, although the same form in num. can be produced connaturally, divisively, by several agents, for the reason that such a dependence is altogether extrinsic; yet it is otherwise with the dependence in the genus of educutive material cause, which is intrinsic, if the form by its connatural exigency demands to be educed from such a substratum. Which distinction Scotus seems to have insinuated in the place transcribed by us, sub num. 50. Ignis (A) si ex tali materia ignem talem generaret; ignis (B) eiusdem virtutis, et qualitatis pro eodem instanti, si in istam materiam ageret, eumdem ignem in numero produceret. Where although he does not demand the unity of the agent for the numerically-one unity of fire; yet he demands the unity of the matter, which belongs to the quiddity of such a composite. Therefore, if the vital form by its connatural exigency demanded to be pre-had in such a conjoined principle, and to be drawn out from its educutive virtuality; it could not be connaturally educed from another substratum.

Which Scotus also seems to insinuate in 4 sentent. dist. 43. quaest. 3. whose text we transcribe in full below sub num. marg. 71. for he says. Quando cunque materia tota eadem approximatur agenti eidem sine impedimentis, potest idem reduci; (understand of non-being to being.) Nec tantùm eidem agenti numero, sed eidem secundùm speciem; quia identitas secundùm speciem in agente aequiualet identitati numerali.

Where also there incidentally occurs the thing to be noted, that which we showed against Suárez sub num. 53. that Scotus did not seek the containment of the same effect in several causes from an equality of virtue, but from a specific identity; as is plain from those words. Identitas secundùm speciem aequiualet identitati numerali. But that for the numerically-one unity of the effect, although the unity of the agent be not required, the unity of the material cause is exigible, is plain from those words. Quādocunque materia tota approximatur agenti; potest idem reduci.

Since moreover the intellect of Paul cannot subject to itself the intellect of Peter as the matter, and substratum of its intentional causalitatem, but can by necessity act only within itself; hence it comes about that it is not potent as to eliciting those forms of vital acts, which are connaturally pre-had in the genus of educutive material cause within the mind of Peter.

But it is answered; that for the intellect of Peter to elicit the intellection which is produced by the intellect of Paul, it is not required that it subject to itself the intellect of Paul; as neither has the intellection elicited by the intellect of Paul a greater connection with the intellect of Paul insofar as it is compared to such an intellect in the genus of material cause, than as it is referred to it in the genus of efficient cause. Whence as vital quality does not by its essence hang from this intellect in the genus of efficient cause; so neither in the genus of material cause; concerning which we at large above in controu. 9. de Visione Dei, dist. 3. subdi. 1. art. 1. de Vitalitate visionis beatificae praecipuè, à nu. 40 vsq; ad 45. Wherefore the answer of Suárez cannot be sustained in the way of Scotus; nor do the testimonies of Scotus requiring the identity of matter for the numerically-one unity of the same individuum favour Suárez. Because there Scotus proceeds concerning an individuum composite from matter and form; for example, concerning fire; not however concerning a simple form, and irresoluble according to physical being; and one which by its essence is not composed to a substratum.

To the instantia of the intentional species; we confess, that on account of their dissimilitude, or heterogeneity in representing, (although the representative species of objects distinct in sole number diverge only numeraliter, and not essentially) Peter cannot produce the intentional species of Paul.

Which same we assert concerning the grades of intension, in which with authors of better note we also receive heterogeneity; on account of which heat as one is not in act toward the grade of intension which is called as-eight, and exceeds the actuality of heat as one.

To the oppositio-n that the hy-postasis of Pe-ter can be pro-duced by Pau-lo

65 Concerning the opposition indeed of num. 43. contending, that if any efficient cause whatever virtually pre-contained the whole series of effects of its own species; it would follow, that the nature of Peter would pre-had the whole collection of human hypostases, which are distinguished in sole number; and accordingly also, that it could naturally cause the suppositality of Paul.

This objection we premised in part dissolved, in controuersia 1. in Appendice Metaphysica de subsistentia creata. à num. margin. 34. vsque ad 36. yet it can still be answered: by conceding that it is not inconveniens that the nature of Paul pre-had within its own eminence the suppositality of Peter; and accordingly that the contraction of the nature of Peter to eliciting this hypostasis before others would have to be drawn from the first cause.

Nor out of the aforesaid assertion is it to be inferred; that from the sole extrinsic statute of God it is sought that Peter be such a supposit, and not another of the same species. Because, as is plain from what was said to the 3. argument. sub nu. 61. as from this, that this effect, which is pre-contained within the eminence of several causes of the same species, is elicited by this rather than another cause by the volition, and predetermination of God, it does not follow that such an effection is drawn from the sole extrinsic nod of God, but from the intrinsic connection of things, and the eminence of the causes; which premised, so far as it touches the first cause, granted that this effect is pre-contained within the virtuality of several causes, that it be effected by this, and not by that; so concerning the virtue of the substantial nature to eliciting the hypostasis, and the indetermination of the hypostasis, so that it flow forth from this, or the other nature of the same species, it will have to be judged.

66 Yet the aforesaid answer seems to be assailed by those things which Scotus teaches in the place cited, sub num. 64. concerning the principles immanently operating, and premoulding for themselves a determinate substratum of their causalitatem; so that they cannot alter external matter, nor operate outside themselves. Of which sort that force seems to be; which we yield to any nature whatever, that it contract itself, and draw itself from the state of negative perseity to positive perseity; for neither does that elicitive force of the hypostasis suit the nature, so that it flow into an extrinsic patient, but that it perfect itself intraneously.

It is confirmed concerning the subsistence of prime matter. Which can be shown in prime matter, to which we ascribe such an effective potency toward the production of its own hypostasis, and toward the production of its own ubication; while nevertheless we profess that, by the common sense of the philosophers, matter lacks an effective force for altering an external patient.

Wherefore since the substantial nature, as the efficient principle of suppositality, is operative from itself and in itself; hence it comes about that the numerically-one discretion of the efficient principle imbibes the discretion of the material cause: Moreover, since a distinct material cause necessarily infers a distinction in the effect; thence it accedes, that the hypostasis of Paul, which demands to be drawn out from the eminence of the nature of Paul in the genus of material cause, cannot be educed from the nature of Peter in the genus of material cause; and accordingly neither be elicited in the genus of efficient cause by that same nature of Peter: since the productive force of the hypostasis is identified with the substratum of the eduction of the same hypostasis.

And as far as Scotus is concerned; it seems to be asserted that neither is the nature naturally inclined into an alien hypostasis, even though it be of the same species as its own; nor does it virtually pre-have it; as an adequate, and connatural, principle. For if the nature of Peter were a connatural principle virtually pre-having the hypostasis of Paul; it would naturally tend into that one. Of which hear thus the philosophizing Scotus: in Quodlibeto 19. a. 3. §. Tertio etiam negatio non sufficit, sub n. mag. 19. editionis Hugonis Cauelli.

For it itself (he speaks of the humanity of Christ the Lord assumed by the Word.) Since it is of the same reason with my nature, it has the aptitude for subsisting in itself; and it has not the aptitude for depending upon an external person.

Nor is it inconueniens that possibility be without aptitude; because for supernatural forms, although there be some potency in an insusceptible [subject], yet it is not properly an aptitude; since that is proper only for the forms that naturally perfect.

Where, absolutely, and without any distinction between hypostases of the same, or of diverse species, Scotus pronounced; that there is not given in nature a natural inclination toward union with the hypostasis of another supposit. But if the nature of Peter naturally pre-had within its own eminence the hypostasis of Paul, it would be naturally inclined toward that one; as appears perspicuous.

But this present dissertation must be lulled to sleep according to those things which we handed down after the mind of Scotus concerning the nature of the mode identified with its actual composition toward the substratum; so that incidentally the mode could be composed with another substratum even by the absolute power of God; from which there bursts forth the plain decision of this question.

For if the suppositality be the mode of the nature identified really with the actual composition toward this nature; there will be implied a contradiction, that the suppositality of Peter flow forth in the genus of efficient cause from the nature of Paul; as also that it hang in the genus of material cause from the nature of Paul; since the suppositality of Peter is its own composition exercised toward the nature of Peter; whence it comes about that the dependence of this suppositality upon this nature in the genus of material cause also imbibes the affixion of this suppositality, as of a modal form, to this nature in the genus of efficient cause.

But if subsistence be not a modal form, but entitative, not identified with the actual composition toward this substratum; which we judge the more probable in the way of Scotus, who asserts it more probable that a created supposit can by the absolute power of God assume an extraneous nature. Which could not be sustained, if the hypostasis were identified with the real composition toward the substratum; since the hypostasis is not identified, nor can it be identified really with the actual composition toward an extraneous nature: as neither can a relation be composed divinely to another foundation, or substratum, insofar as the actual composition, (or actual accidentalitas, as Scotus speaks,) by which it coheres to this substratum, is identified with the relation.

Therefore, granted that the hypostasis is not a mode but an entity; it must be said, consequently, after the principles of Scotus, that the suppositality, which flows forth connaturally from the nature of Peter, could have been elicited connaturally from the nature of Paul.

Nor does that opposition stand in the way; that the nature with respect to the sprouting forth of its own hypostasis is a principle immanently, or within itself operating. Because if the nature of Peter would effect the hypostasis in whichever mode it is elicited by the nature of Paul, it would also operate from itself, and in itself, the same hypostasis in num. By a similar reason, by which under num. 64. we taught; that for Peter to elicit from himself, and in himself, that intellection which is effected by the intellect of Paul, it is not required that he alter the intellect of Paul, or that he subject to himself the intellect of Paul; since Peter around his own intellect can elicit the same form of vital quality which Paul effects in his own intellect, for the reason that the intellection is an entitative form, and not a modal one, which is identified really with such an accidentalitas exercised, or actual composition toward the substratum.

67 Nor yet do those words of Scotus give any trouble. Natura habet aptitudinem ad subsistendum in se; et non habet aptitudinem ad dependendum ad personam extrinsecam.

For Scotus wills only this, that the nature of Peter is not naturally inclined into the suppositality of Paul as the compositive of the nature of Paul, and as flowing forth from another nature than that of Paul; yet he did not deny that the nature of Peter be inclined into the hypostasis of Paul, as flowing forth from the nature of Peter, and as the compositive of the nature of Peter; since such suppositality, from its intrinsic reason, is potential, and indifferent, so that it depend upon any nature whatsoever of the same species in the genus of efficient and material cause. Nor in that hypothesis would the nature of Peter be said to depend in the genus of formal cause upon an extraneous person; because the hypostasis of Paul, as flowing forth from the nature of Peter, and as the compositive of the nature of Peter, would not be an extrinsic, or extraneous, personality.

By an unlike reason, as although the intellect of Peter is not naturally inclined to eliciting that intellection which is effected by Paul, insofar as it hangs from Paul, and is composed to Paul as to an intrinsic principle; yet it tends toward that intellection, which from its intrinsic reason is potential, and indifferent, so that it flow forth from the intellect of Peter, or of Paul, as from an intrinsic principle. In which sense those things are to be taken which we handed down above, dealing with subsistence, in controuersia 1. de Essentia, et simplicitate naturae diuinae. art. 3. in Appendice Metaphy. de subsistentia creata. Membro 2. à numer. 34. vsque ad 36. inclusivè.

The other objects against our sentiment are struck down; and the substantial inaquality of individua is defended against the placitum of Peter Hurtado.

To the last argument it is answered, that since the action, or causalitatem, regards the formal principle of operating in the agent, and also the formal reason of terminating the influx in the term, if in the formal reason of terminating the influx, and in the formal principle of acting, or in the principle (Q. 9.) there be given an aquality, neatly enough there will be assigned a first act dispatched to eliciting the effect.

Yet since the formal principle of operating, or the principle (Q. 10.) does not cohere to the nature as contracted, in such a way that the operative potency flow forth from the composition of the nature with its own singularity, but rather suits the nature insofar as it antecedes its singularity, (for the nature of fire, insofar as it is formally supposed to singularity, imports that it be ignifactiue, as also the human nature that it be risible;) so also the formal terminus of the operation of nature is not the nature insofar as it is determined through singularity, or the composition of the nature with singularity.

Otherwise no univocal action would be assigned in the individua of the same species, since the formal terminus would not answer to a like producing principle; and because in singularity no similitude is found, since individua, insofar as they are such, are first diverse. Wherefore only this seems to be demanded, that the individuated agent import an aquality with the product according to the specific reason; however not according to the individuated condition.

Which, however, are not to be taken so that nature in abstract and specific being is operative, without the concretion of singularity; for otherwise it would come about that it could act even without existence, since existence is not closer to essence than singularity, and conversely. But, that the power of acting follows the specific predicate, as a passion of its essence; so that the power of acting coheres to the individual nature, speaking specifically, not however reduplicatively, as it is individual; but as it refers to the specific constitution, from which such power of acting flows, or to which it responds as a passion.

Next, that what Suárez had asserted does not seem to hold true, in Metaphy. disp. 26. sect. 5. num. 25. that, given the opinion of the substantial inequality of individuals, an individual could not produce, just as it could not precontain within its eminence, the whole collection of individuals, but only those individuals which would be equal or inferior to the generator according to individual perfection; but not those that are more excellent according to numerical actuality.

For against this is the fact that from the aforesaid assertion of Suárez it seems to be inferred that a generated individual ought never to exceed the individual perfection of its generator; which indeed cannot hold in the parents of the Blessed Virgin, and it also fails in other generators, who are found to be of less worth in genius and in the use and functions of the other vital faculties than those begotten: whence it is detected a posteriori that the begotten sometimes surpass the individual perfection of their parents.

Another argument ad hominem against Suárez. Next, that if the quality of perfection is not admitted in predicates which differ specifically; much less will it have to be asserted in individuals, inasmuch as they refer an individual reason primarily and per se diverse. Wherefore it will come about that an individual neither can produce individuals equal according to numerical actuality, but only inferiors, against the pronouncement of Suárez; for Suárez admits that an individual is capable of the generation of equal individuals.

Objection against our assertion. 69 But you will insist; that although the singularity of the effect is not the formal term of the productive action, yet it is truly and really attained by it; but it implies that the more imperfect cause elicit (just as it does not precontain within its eminence) the more perfect effect: therefore an individual is not able to be the efficient cause of an effect nobler according to numerical perfection.

Unbinding of the objection. It is answered; that since such inequality does not pertain to the principle, Quo, nor to the formal term of the action, and consequently is not regarded in the agent as the agent is formally, it will not hinder such an individual from being produced by another less perfect according to numerical condition; especially with divine premotion intervening, which can complete the second cause for that preeminence, or material excess of the action and term.

To others, the objection that the individual would produce an instrumental cause with respect to the inferior. Nor is it inferred from this, that the more imperfect individual attains the more perfect effect as an instrumental principle; because it produces the more excellent product not by its own power alone, but with the aid of divine predetermination.

The objection is blunted. Because there there intervenes disparity in the principle Quo of generating, and in the formal term of the action; but the ratio of a principal and instrumental agent is not regarded at the material term, but the formal one.

A fitting response on behalf of our opinion. Next; that just as it does not contradict the ratio of a principal cause, that it operate as moved; because it needs divine premotion contracting its indetermination to such an individual before another; so much so, that with such predetermination ceasing, it is not in act, so as to elicit such an individual; so neither will it be contrary to the concept of the same principal agent, that the executing faculty of God, or its executive power toward the outside, while it contracts the indetermination of the principle to such an individual of action, also supply that material [element] of inequality.

Another way of speaking, from the dilution of the last argument. But, he to whom these please less, will be able to answer; that since substantial individuals claim substantial heterogeneity for themselves; what wonder that they are not in act for the production of others, which surpass their substantial actuality; for which reason also degrees heterogeneous according to intension, and unlike, do not afford for producing a form of more perfect intension.

It can be said, that an individual is capable of generating equals and inferiors, yet not superiors. Wherefore it will be able to be said; that individuals will be able to produce only those which are inferior according to numerical actuality; and those which are equal; not indeed those which are superior.

Nor do those instances about individuations primarily diverse greatly make for the case; for equality can be asserted between individuals primarily diverse; just as we showed that parity of perfection can intervene between specific differences, in controversia 9. de Visione Dei. distinct. 3 subdistin 1.art. 2. num. 15. Where we transcribed from Basil such a pronouncement. Non apparet impossibilitas, cur non possent esse aequales duae differentiae indiuiduales sub eadem specie licet sint alterius rationis, sicut etiã dicetur de differentijs specificis.

To the instances about the generation of the B. Virgin from parents not equaling the individual perfection of the Virgin. That objection indeed about the individual preeminence of the Virgin also seems to be diluted; because by the special providence of God she was generated from parents not equaling the individual nobility of the most pure fetus.

The judgment of the Author about this twofold way of thinking. But because in good philosophy one must not have recourse to miracles (as far as it can be done,) therefore I judge the first way of speaking more probable, which asserts that every substantial individual precontains within its eminence all the other individuals of the same species; because equality is available in the principle Quo of generating, and in the formal term of generation, to which individuation does not pertain; otherwise, as we showed, no generation would be an univocal action. Next; that this way of speaking is more conformable to the mind of Scotus: who, speaking absolutely, used no distinction in more or less perfect individuals, but taught universally; that the elect begotten by reprobate parents would be generated by other elect during the state of innocence: and that identity according to species in the agent is equivalent to numerical identity.

70 Moreover, because Peter Hurtado, disp. 2. de Anima. sect. 7. subsect. 5. §. 94. assails the substantial inequality of individuals with no slight contention; it will be to the point to cast down his objections.

Thus therefore he argues; because the degrees of specific constitution in individuals refer quidditative equality; but these before the intellect do not differ from hecceities, or individual reasons, as it is established in the common school of the Thomists; it implies therefore that hecceities sustain substantial inequality, since equality and inequality are opposed privatively, as the position of a form and its non-being.

For inequality expresses nothing else than the negation of the quantity of virtue equaling the actuality or perfection of the other; but it implies the position of the form and its non-being coexisting in the same entity: therefore, given the disparity of the specific predicate, inequality in the individual degree of being will not be able to fail to be repugnant.

Nor would one go expediently against an opposition of this kind, who would adduce that only virtual distinction, or that which is called of reasoned reason (such as intervenes between the specific and numerical degree of being) could afford for inferring habitudes of equality and inequality of this kind, with respect to diverse formalitates.

Because whatever agrees to one formalitas reduplicatively; that agrees to the other formalitas materialiter, and identically: Just as the ratio of life, which formally coheres to supernatural appetite through a habitude to the living and intrinsic principle; also agrees materially to the supernaturality of such an act, and through identity with the predicate of vitality.

But the negation of the quantity of virtue, which inequality formally imbibes, can neither materially, nor through identity, agree to the position of the virtual quantity which equality refers, or conversely; otherwise forms, and the non-being of that, could agree in an identical conjunction; therefore if two individuals infer a habitude of equality by reason of the specific predicate, it implies that they import inequality on account of the numerical degree of being.

But the aforesaid doctrine collapses with no trouble; for besides that it supposes something false in the opinion of Scotus, namely that specific and individual degrees are distinguished by reason alone, when they differ by a metaphysical discretion from the nature of the thing: still, with only the virtual distinction of the specific predicate and individual reason admitted, the aforesaid opposition of Hurtado is demolished.

For he presupposes a falsehood, namely, that the respect of inequality is posited in the negative; when equality and inequality are real habitudes demanding positive substrata. Therefore the foundation of the relation of inequality is not the negation of the quantity of virtue, but the position of such a degree of being, which precisely because, as quidditative of its constitution or reason, it has acquired such a quantity of virtue, (no other negation being awaited,) infers the habitude of disparity to another virtual quantity, which surpasses the quantity of that one. Whence, although such a lesser quantity of virtue is necessarily accompanied by the negation of the quantity surpassing it, nevertheless the aforesaid negation is not the foundation of the relation of inequality; otherwise inequality would not be a real habitude, but of reason, against the common opinion; according to which no negation is the substratum illative of a real positive form, such as relation.

Then again; that just as, according to the common placitum of the Thomists, which Hurtado defends, the mere virtual discretion which intervenes between the generic and the specific grade of being obtains, so that the grade of animality infer the relation of identity, of equality, or of essential conveniency, between man and horse, and the grade of rationality the habitude of essential disconveniency and inequality; why, then, should not the mere virtual discretion between specific and individual reasons contribute to inferring a real and positive habitude of equality between individua, as they import quidditative predicates; and to the emanation of a real and positive habitude of inequality, as they express individual reasons?

Satisfaction to the foundations of Vázquez about the determination of the second cause to this individual, with such a coition of circumstances premised, where the physical power of nature is asserted for producing a corrupt [thing].

71 TO the Arguments of the second way of speaking about indetermination on the side of the cause; inasmuch as the second cause here and now, and under any composition of time, place, and the other circumstances, is asserted indeterminate for the effection of this individual before another; and consequently needing the effectual contraction and premotion of the first cause: it is answered.

To the first foundation of Vázquez contending, that if the cause here and now were indeterminate to this individual before another; it would follow that it would also be intrinsically capable of producing an individual which is corrupted; and consequently that resurrection would be possible by the forces of nature.

I answer with Scotus, in 4. sent. dist. 43. q. 3. where he inquires. Whether nature can be the active cause of resurrection? where §. de secundo articulo principali sub n. marg. 19. he says.

» The first conclusion is proved; because if the third opinion in the preceding article is true, whenever the whole same matter is approximated to the same agent without impediments, it can reduce the same [thing].

Nor only to the same agent in number, but to the same according to species; because identity according to species in the agent is equivalent to numerical identity.

Proof; if in this instant, this fire from that log generates this fire; and if in the same instant, that other fire were approximated to the same log, it would generate the same fire. But it is possible that the whole matter, from which this body was formed otherwise in natural generation, be again under the form of seed and of the menses in another womb; as is proved by the saying of Gregory, Moralium. 4. and is posited libr. 2. dist. 20. quaestione. 2. therefore then in another womb the same mixed body would be formed.

72 The second conclusion is more certain to me; because that one depends on certain [things], if the third opinion said is true.

I prove that second one; because the whole active nature is bound to a certain order of forms in transmutation, so that the whole of nature could not immediately after vinegar induce wine: but God alone in acting is not limited to that order, and that order is most necessary with respect to a natural agent, when one proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect; because that cannot be produced by more or fewer ways.

Now this mixed [body] is perfect among those corruptibles, and therefore a great order of forms preceding it is determined to it according to the natural order, as perhaps of seed, blood, and flesh, etc.

Now such forms do not precede that formation of the body in the mode in which it will then be repaired; because it will suddenly be repaired from ashes, or dust, or other things in which it had previously been dissolved; therefore the whole of created nature will not be able to repair that body in the same mode in which it will then be repaired.

Where Scotus establishes two things. First; that, the numerical unity of matter being given, even though a plurality of agents of the same species intervene, the same effect in number can be generated; which he hands down expressly in those words: Identitas secundùm speciem in agente aequivalet identitati numerali. Where he repeats, and confirms, that doctrine about the pre-containment of the same effect in number in several causes of the same species, which he had handed down from the mind of Gregory the Great, in 2 sentent. distin. 20. quaestion. 2., and which we transcribed, under numer. 48.

The other; that from the aforesaid it does not follow that the general resurrection of men at the end of the world can be asserted to be from the forces of nature. Because although nature should have the forces for reproducing the same effect in number; yet not for a reproduction so miraculous, by which human nature will suddenly be repaired from ashes, or dust, without the coition of male and female, and childbirth.

Guilielmus Rubionus expounds Scotus, in 2. sentent. dist. 34. quaest. 2. § Sunt hic duo dubia. Where with wondrous erudition he elucidates the arcane doctrine of Scotus about this matter, so as to exhibit himself not only a true follower of Scotus, but a hearer of him: thus therefore it stands at the place cited.

This can be the reason assigned why the same corrupted thing cannot be repaired naturally: namely because no second cause can act, except toward the effect to which it is determined by the first cause; but the first cause does not determine the second, nor did it assign to it the necessity for any corrupted effect to be repaired the same in number.

For since this corrupted fire is no more nothing, nor impossible, after it is corrupted, than it was before it was produced by another fire; consequently, that it could then be produced naturally, and not now, this does not seem able to be from anything else than from the first cause unwilling to assign to the second the necessity for the same effect in number, except once.

Peter Hurtado also follows Scotus in sua physica. disp. 10. de causis prima. sect. 4. § 78.

75 But when you press on behalf of Vázquez; because the second cause would be intrinsically capable of reproducing the effect; God, from the office of the first cause, could not fail to have been at hand to this power for expediting it to such a reproduction; otherwise the power of the second cause would be inferred.

It is answered; that just as by all authors, none excepted, natural passive power is asserted in matter for forms after their separation; when nevertheless the composition of such forms to matter is asserted impossible by the forces of nature. So neither is natural active power for producing a corrupt [thing] repugnant, although this power is never reduced to act; because the first cause, from whose office and function it comes that the second cause be premoved and contracted to such an individual of action, never predetermines to the reproduction of the same individual, but to eliciting diverse ones: because the new multiplication of individuals displays more the inexhaustible diffusion of divine goodness than a repeated, or iterated reproduction of them. So Hurtado at the place cited, following Guilielmus Rubionum, of whom in the following article sub numer. marg n. 51. et 52. although Hurtado does not cite Rubionus.

That indeed remains to be weighed, which seems toHover relying upon the placit of Vázquez and Dolan; namely that the unities of place and time determine the principle, and contract it to the numerical unity of this action before another.

For those words of Scotus transcribed, sub num. 71, seem to intimate this. Si in isto instanti, hic ignis ex illo ligno generat gnem hunc, et si in eodem instanti, hic alius ignis esset approximatus eidem ligno, generaret eumdem ignem. Where Scotus appears to demand, once and again, the unity of the instant for the numerical unity of the fire to be produced.

But the mind of Scotus could not be, that the unity of the instant is demanded for the numerical unity of the effect; since with Scotus the numerical unity of the agent is not required for the numerical unity of the effect, and it is more certain than certain, and most evident, that the numerical unity of the agent is more demanded, and conduces more to the effecting of this individuum, than circumstances altogether extrinsic of place and time. Nevertheless Scotus granted this to the adversaries, so that, the identity of the extrinsic circumstance of time being supposed, and, as it were, expedited by it, he might the more press the adversaries who demand the numerical unity of the agent for the numerical unity of the effect.

Which openly appears from the context of the same quaest. 3. §. Quantum ad istum articulum respondeo. sub num. margin. 12. where he also thus shows, that there is in nature a power to produce a corrupted effect, inasmuch as it happens to the effect, (the numerical condition of it being saved,) to be produced in the present, or the past, extension of time; the example being proposed of a ray breaking forth from a luminous body, and preserved for one hour without any physical addition, or intensive accretion. For just as the ray, as produced by the conserving action in the last instant of that hour, does not depend, as regards the numerical identity of such a ray, upon the coexistence of such a ray, and its presential composition with the successive extension of the extrinsic time of the first movable measuring through the course of a whole hour; (since it would be the very same ray, physically unchanged, although it had been produced only in the last instant of the hour, and had not been successively composed to the extrinsic duration for one hour,) so neither does it conduce to the numerical unity of the ray that it be composed, or correspond, to this or that extrinsic measure of time through coexistence. Whence also it is brought about that after corruption it can again be naturally reproduced; since it is no more distant from nothing after corruption than before production; and from its intrinsic reason it claims no more to coexist with that extrinsic instant than with another; take the words of Scotus, which we transcribe entire in numer. 75 of the present article.

Since that identity of the ray in the second instant does not depend upon itself in the first instant, or upon its existence in the intermediate time; because without that existence the same in number could have been produced, etc.

The objections against the opinion of Scotus concerning the power of nature to produce a corrupted thing are enervated.

74 But against the natural power of reproducing the product, you will object from Scotus, objecting against his own opinion in the above-cited distinction 43. quaestion. 3. §. Praeterea rationes quatuor ponuntur. sub numer. 8. where he says:

Moreover, the same could not return, unless the same power were for it; but this is false, because either the same power always remaining; or newly reduced. Not in the first way; because the power is corrupted at the arrival of the form; and consequently after the first reduction to act the same power does not remain. Nor in the second way; because as one privation succeeds another privation than that which preceded it; so the form is resolved into another power, if it be resolved into any.

It is also proved at the same time that it is in neither way: because there is no power toward the past; this form is past.

Where the mind of Scotus goes to this, that just as that privation of the form is distinct in number which follows the power after the corruption of the form, from that privation of the form which affected the power before the production of the form; (where with Scotus, that the power to the form does not remain when the form arrives is nothing else than that the lack of the form be taken away from the subject;) so also the form itself must be distinct in number; since the unity of the privation is taken from the unity of the form, of which it is the non-being; therefore after the corruption of the form there is not given in the agent a power to the same form in number.

Then again; that toward the past no power is given; therefore there is not left in nature an effective force for eliciting the same form in number, which is now past.

Which objections are torn down by the doctrine of Scotus without any trouble. For the first assumes that which was to be shown by him; namely, that the privation of the form of fire after its corruption is distinct in number from that privation which preexisted in the power before the generation of such a form.

Because since the unity of the privation is sought from the unity of the form; of which it is the non-being; just as we assert with Scotus the same form in number to be within the eminence of the same power before the production of the form, and after the corruption of the form; so also we cannot deny the numerical unity of that privation: whence, as it were, the same nothing of the form revives, the form being corrupted, which preexisted before the production of the form.

The second objection also obtains nothing; because, as Scotus most excellently demonstrates, when we assert that there is in the power a force for eliciting the corrupted form, we do not then intend that such a faculty of the power be available to the form as past, but as future; thus, then, Scotus has it at the place cited, n. 18.

Although it be argued against both members that there is no power toward the past; it is true, as it is past. Whence it is not properly a power, that what was, were not; but the power is toward that which was past, inasmuch as it can nevertheless be future.

75 For since a thing (as we opened above under n. 58 and 73) is not composed through its essence to such a duration of time, but is altogether of itself potential, and indeterminate, so as to coexist with such a succession of time; to such a degree that it needs a form of successive coexistence, or of presentiality, really and modally distinct, by which it be contracted so as to be conjoined to such a measure of time, and not to another: hence it comes about that the same form altogether in number can, on account of the diverse composition to a distinct course of time, sustain the denominations of past and of future being.

Which Scotus neatly untangles in the same dist. 43. q. 3. §. Quantum ad istum articulum respondeo, under margin number 12, where he adds:

It does not appear why nature cannot reduce something the same in number; for if, where there is a continuous action of a natural agent with respect to the product, as is the case in the sun with respect to the ray, it be posited to produce the ray in the first instant, and to conserve it in the time had, in the last instant (say B) the same ray will be there; since that identity of the ray in the second instant does not depend upon itself in the first instant, or upon its existence in the intermediate time: because without that existence the same in number could have been produced in the same instant. It follows therefore; that, that intermediate being destroyed, the same could be in either extreme.

Where Scotus therefore contends that there is in the sun a natural power for the reproduction of the same ray in the same subject; for the reason that, just as the numerical identity of the solar ray being saved, it can coexist with diverse courses of time, through diverse intrinsic forms of coexistence, and of presentiality to time, which pertain to the predicament Quando; so also it would not contradict it, according to the existence of a natural state, to answer, or be composed, to a distinct extension of time after its corruption, from that with which it coexisted in its first efflux from the sun. Yet, although these things be so, the same effect in number is never reproduced; for the reason that God is never at hand to premove the second cause to the reproduction of the same individuum; which we showed from William Rubio, transcribed under margin number 72.

76 To the second argument of Vázquez; we grant frankly, that every created cause pre-has within its eminence collectively the whole company of individua of the same species; yet not that it collectively effect the whole class of individua, but that from that indeterminate collection it elicit the one, or the other, divisively, at the nod of the divine predetermination contracting the potentiality of that individuum with respect to the whole collection of individua. Nor indeed is it repugnant to the limitation of a finite principle that it pre-have within its virtuality an innumerable multitude of individua; but that this power of acting can be reduced to act to infinite effects collectively; not so to infinite divisively, or to so many, or so many, out of infinite ones, at the placitum of the divine predetermination.

77 To the last argument of Vázquez; it is answered, that it in no way touches the opinion of Scotus, which, liberty being saved, maintains not only the premotion of God to this individuum of action in preference to another, but also to this species in preference to another; nay, it draws from the necessity of the divine premotion to such an individuum of action the necessity also of that same premotion to such a species of act; which we also did above in the present art., from nu. 27 to 29.