Celebriores Controversiae in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti — Tomus Alter (de Scientia Dei et Ideis)

ARTICLE III

Whether ideas are a medium on the side of the object for the foreknowledge of futures? Where also, whether ideas pertain to the knowledge of vision? And whether the knowledge of vision is practical?

SUMMARY.

The opinion which holds that future contingents are apprehended in ideas. Num. 1. The true opinion of Scotus is elucidated and established: that the idea is not a medium on the side of the object for the foreknowledge of futures. Num. 5. Two assertions on behalf of the true opinion. Number 12. Satisfaction to the objections against the foreknowledge of futures in ideas. Num. 18. The last argument in opposition is weighed: whether the knowledge of vision is the cause of its object? from Num. 22. through 31.

The present article also bears upon the refutation of those opinions which render a less exact account of the objective infallible determination of futures; yet it is to be traversed with a more restricted pen, because it does not greatly advance the business.

1 St. Bonaventure, in 1. distinct. 39. art. 2. quaest. 3., seems to intimate that future contingents are foreknown by God in His own ideas; which opinion Scotus thus elucidates in 1. dist. n. 39. q. vnica, §. circa istas quaestiones, sub numer. marginal. 7., where he subjoins:

Certitude is posited of the divine science with respect to all things, as to all the conditions of existence, on account of the ideas which are posited in the divine intellect; and this on account of their perfection in representing, because they represent those things of which they are, not only according to themselves whole, but also according to every ratio and habitude of the extremities.

And so in the divine intellect they are the sufficient ratio, not only of apprehending simply those ideata, but also of apprehending every union of them, and every mode of those ideata pertaining to their existence.

Bonaventure was followed by Cajetan, 1. part. quaestion. 14. artic. 13., who cites for that opinion St. Thomas, while he asserts in the body of the article: Wherefore all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only for the reason that He has the ratios of things present with Himself (as some say), but because His intuition is borne from eternity above all things, as they are in their presentiality. Where St. Thomas seems to prove both ratios of foreknowing futures: that which is sought from the ideal rationes, and that because the divine gaze regards the real presence of futures coexisting with eternity from eternity.

2 The aforesaid opinion, moreover, is commended by the proofs which Bassolius constructs for it in 1. dist. 38. q. vnica. §. quantùm ad secundum articulum., where he has it thus:

The foundation and term is the sufficient ratio of knowing the habitude, or relation, as is plain; because upon these alone they depend. But the cognition and the terms are the foundation and term of the complexion, which is a certain respect, whether it be of the thing or of reason; therefore.

Then: the divine essence most perfectly contains every being, and any mode of being you please, and consequently represents them; but contingency is nothing but a mode of being, or a certain habitude to a determinate time.

Moreover, the same is the ratio of knowing the necessary and the contingent, as the straight is the index of itself and of the crooked; just as also it is the same ratio to know the possible and the impossible, light and darkness. But the necessary things are known through the ideas; therefore also the contingent.

That position is confirmed: because the essence and the actual esse of the existence of a creature are entirely the same; therefore, when the essence is represented determinately by the idea, it seems that the actual esse of existence, and by a like ratio the going-to-be and the having-been, are represented.

From which proofs of Bassolius the following argumentation is produced. The ideas, for example, of Socrates and of running, carry that sufficiency by which they can express the complexion of these terms; since that complexion seems to be nothing else than a certain habitude of reason, which can be known when the coextremes have been apprehended.

But, given a complexion which consists of terms that approach a contingent composition, a medium of the infallible science of God is assigned before the determination of the divine will; since every enunciation, as such, by the force of its own intrinsic commensuration to the object, whether future or not future (any subsequent decree of the divine will being set aside), is strongly asserted to have a determinate truth or falsity.

Strength also from the illimitation of the ideal forms. Then: just as before the free decrees the ideas of necessary complexions express such objects, because on account of the pre-eminence and illimitation of those ideal rationes not only animal and rational are represented separately, but also the complex coalescing out of animality and rationality; so, by a parity of ratio, the ideas of Socrates and running, since they are illimitate, will be able to express not only the terms, as it were, incompossible or incomposite among themselves, but as bearing the nexus of a contingent complexion, namely that Socrates will run.

It is urged against the foreknowledge of futures in ideas. But that connexion which is expressed by the word erit, for example, Socrates will be running, by the force of its own enunciation imports a determinate true or false, just as also a determinate commensuration to the object from which, as from a measure, the truth of the enunciation is drawn; therefore from the ideas, before the arrival of the subsequent decree, is drawn that objective determination, which can be assigned as a medium ex parte obiecti of the infallible science of God.

It is conceded, because the idea is adequated to the cognition 3 Moreover, the idea, as object, is adequated to the divine essence, inasmuch as it is the ratio cognoscendi; but the divine essence, expressed by the mode of a species, is the ratio of apprehending any futures whatever: therefore the idea is the ratio cognoscendi futures on the side of the object.

Whether the ratio that the objective esse of a creature in the science of vision imports an omnimodal determination ex parte obiecti. Next it is argued from the opinion of many Thomist authors maintaining that the science of vision is not merely speculative but practical, because it imbibe causalitatem with respect to its object, or is its proper cause: Because the objective esse which the creature draws from the science of vision imports an omnimodal contraction and determination, which can be the ratio on the side of the object, or a medium ex parte obiecti, for terminating the wholly infallible science; as we have clearly shown, and will show below in this article under the margin number 12. But creatures, inasmuch as they have that objective esse in the science of vision, pertain to the ideal rationes; therefore the ideal rationes supply a sufficient medium ex parte obiecti for the infallible foreknowledge of futures:

That, moreover, the science of vision and its object pertain to the ideal rationes is thus opened up and shown:

It is shown that vision is practical Because the science of vision is the practical ratio of its object, inasmuch as God so conducts Himself by the force of that tendency of the science of vision toward the object, that the Deity is not absolved, as the term of that science, from the connexion of causality with respect to future creatures. For just as the science of vision regards creatures not in themselves, nor from the intentional motion of creatures, but from the motion of the Deity; so the science of vision inspects creatures only as in God, and as conjoined with the power of God according to the connexion of causality. Therefore such a science cannot be compared to the secondary object (which are the future creatures) under a merely speculative, and not practical, connotation.

It is urged against it The consequence is shown from the analogy of the vision of corporeal gaze, which for that reason is not a practical ratio of its object, but a merely speculative intuition of it; because it intuits the object without any comparison of causality and dependence upon another; for corporeal vision, apprehending Peter, does not look into his connexion with a cause; it intuits Peter, indeed, from his intentional motion, and not from the motion of the cause.

Therefore, on the contrary, the vision of future creatures in God, and not in themselves, is not absolved from the connexion of causality which stands between future creatures and God; and accordingly it is not compared merely speculatively to creatures, but as the principle and practical ratio of creatures.

It is objected, that the objective esse of a creature in the science of vision pertains to the ideal rationes Then thus: but the objective esse of an effect, inasmuch as it pertains to the practical science of the artificer, conduces to the ideal rationes; therefore, if such an objective esse as creatures have in the science of vision pertains to the practical science, it will come to pass that it also pertains to the ideal rationes. Yet the objective esse pertaining to the science of vision is a sufficient medium of the infallible science; therefore futures are foreknown by God in the ideas or ideal rationes infallibly.

The pronouncement of the more recent Thomists, that the science of vision is of the making of its object 4 Wherefore the whole foundation of the opinion asserting that the science of vision is practical, or imbibes the comparison of a cause with respect to the object of the science of vision; is such in John of Saint Thomas, a recent professor among the theologians of Complutum, 1. par. quaestion. 14. disp. 18. ar. 3. §. From this, therefore, an efficacious argument is drawn.

Because God is compared to the object of the science of vision not only inasmuch as He imports a virtue for the production of a future being, but inasmuch as this virtue is in the last readiness and application to act. Yet the virtue of God last applied imbibe the imperium of the practical intellect, which, after the manner of an operative art, moves to execution; since it is not enough that that science precede which is the efficacious purpose of the divine will, and which is called of simple intelligence, regarding the possibility of a being with omnimodal potentiality and indifference to futurecence or non-futurecence.

Therefore the science of vision is that to which practical causality is inscribed with respect to the object already contracted by the decree to futurecence; since, from the phrase of Sacred Scripture, the whole energy of operation, quasi ultimate and exercised, is attributed to the word, and to the science of God; as is clear from that Psalm 103: Omnia in sapientia fecisti; and from Proverbs 3: Dominus sapientis fundauit terram; and also from that: Ipse dixit et facta sunt.

From which it follows, that since the ideal rationes pertain to the practical science, or the art of the artificer, if the science of vision were an art, and the practical ratio of God toward the future object, it would follow that the objective esse which creatures have in the science of vision, pertaining to the ideal rationes, would be a sufficient medium ex parte obiecti for the foreknowledge of futures.

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The true opinion of Scotus is elucidated and established: that the idea is not a medium ex parte obiecti for the foreknowledge of futures.

The present dissertation Scotus settles at the place cited ex distinction. 39. quaestion. vnica, §. Contra istas quaestiones, n. 7. Where he subjoins:

On the contrary; the rationes cognoscendi the terms of any complexion do not sufficiently cause the cognition of that complexion, unless it be apt by nature to be known from the terms; but a contingent complexion is not apt by nature to be known from the terms, because then it would not only be necessary, but also first and immediate: therefore the rationes cognoscendi the terms, however perfectly they represent them, are not sufficient causes of knowing that contingent complexion.

Moreover, the ideas merely naturally represent that which they represent, and under the natural ratio under which they represent anything. Which is proved from this: because the ideas are in the divine intellect before every act of the divine will, so that they are in no way there through an act of the divine will; but whatever naturally precedes the act of the will is merely natural.

I take, therefore, two ideas of extremities, which are represented in them, say, of a man and of white. I ask: do these of themselves represent the composition of those extremities, or the division, or both? If only the composition, then He knows it naturally, and so necessarily, and consequently in no way knows the division: the same holds if they only represent the division. If both; then God knows nothing through these; for to know contradictories to be true is nothing at all to know.

Moreover, in the same way are the ideas of possibles that are not futures, as of futures; because that difference of possibles that are not futures from futures exists only through an act of the divine will; therefore the idea of a future possible represents its going-to-be no more than the idea of a possible that is not future.

Moreover, the idea of the future will no more represent it to be possible for deity to be now in this, than in that.

For the explanation of whose letter, and especially about those words, numer. 5. Ideae merè naturaliter repraesentant illud, quod repraesentant, et sub naturaliExplanation of the words of Scotus about ideas. It must first be premised what is to be treated of under the program in controversia 12. on ideas; namely, that the ratio of idea befits the divine essence, as it is the object of its own cognition, and as it performs the function of origin and of the expressed species of creatures; wherefore the primary ratio of idea consists in the objective concept, after the manner of the formal in God: as for the rest, from the mind of Scotus we gather that, although we ascribe to it a secondary ratio, that it be an object, which is left over from the divine cognition when it intends creatures.

For the rest, just as the Theologians hand down the divine science with respect to creatures as twofold, one of simple intelligence and the other of vision; so also chapter 12 teaches the object of creatures to be considered in a twofold way: one, that which is coequated to the science of simple intelligence; but the other, that which accedes to the science of vision.

This premised, it remains briefly to refer: to what divine cognition, regarding creatures, does the primary ideal ratio befit; then, to what objective esse of creatures does the secondary ideal esse cohere?

Scotus plainly asserts that neither the science of vision, nor the objective esse of creatures which is made by such a science, can claim the ratio of idea; and that it proceeds thence. Because an idea is made in the divine intellect before every act of the divine will.

But since the science of vision, and that denominative or objective esse of creatures which is formed by the aforesaid science, presuppose the free decree of the divine will, as is confessed among all Theologians: it follows from this that neither can the divine essence, as it is the thing knowable by the vision of creatures, be affected by a formal idea of creatures; nor can such an objective esse of creatures, which follows upon such a science, even be asserted to be an idea less principally and secondarily.

8 Which we can make plain, moreover, by this manifest proof. Because the science imposing the decree is not extrinsic and terminal, but potent speculative objectio of the end, inasmuch as the adevolution is turned to futurecence; besides, the rest is called the science of vision on account of the analogy to corporeal vision, by which the object is not intuited practically, which it inspects merely speculatively.

Yet in the mind of an artificer not the ratio of idea, but that apprehension which presupposes the artefact constructed according to the prescriptions of the art, but the cognition directing the intellect of the artificer, and as it were specifying, and contracting it to the effecting of such a species of artificial being; nor is it derived into the mind of God that that science will perform an ideal function, which presupposes a being efficaciously adorned objectively for futurecence.

From which it follows, that only the science of simple intelligence, and that objective esse which creatures acquire by the force of the aforesaid science, can pertain to the ideal rationes: about which the inquiry presses, whether it can supply a medium ex parte obiecti of the infallible judgment about future contingents?

9 The matter Scotus settled in a few words, with, however, wonderful subtlety, in those words: nu 5. But the ideas of themselves represent the composition of those extremities, or the division, or both, so that these oppositions are naturally known, they are, and will be then necessarily; and consequently no way does He know the division, etc.

Because the idea, for example, of Socrates and of running, inasmuch as they import an objective something sought from the science of simple intelligence; either refer the composition Socrates and running, so that it be infallibly true that Socrates will run; or express the division, so that Socrates infallibly will not run, before the decree of the divine will. And consequently it would come to pass that a creature would be destined to a determinate futurecence, or a determinate non-futurecence, from itself, before any purpose of the divine will; since the science of simple intelligence, to which alone any ideal ratio belongs, antecedes all free decrees of the divine will.

Which, how false it is, and against the essential ratio of participated being, we shall pursue thoroughly in the following Article, where we shall show it to be contradictory that a determinate truth of the future, absolute or conditional, be not preceded by the free purpose of God, whether absolute, or conditional, by which the thing be determined to composition, or division, as Scotus says, whether to going-to-be, or not going-to-be; unless we wished to place the thing from itself, apart from the light of a class of possibles, into the series of futures, without the preceding decree of the divine will objectively mutating the thing toward futurecence.

10 Whence it comes to pass that, with Scotus, through the science of simple intelligence, and through the ideal rationes which pertain to that sort of science, contingent complexa can be conceived only as neither [inclined] toward truth and falsity; yet not as determinate to either part of the contradiction.

For if the science of God, as it antecedes every free decree, should apprehend determinately either part of the contradiction, the necessity of the created cause would be inferred simpliciter. Since that apprehension of God is infallible, and consequently [there] has been obtained an inimpedible object, and the supposition of a form not free by essence, nor touching the influx by the will according to the mode of its intrinsic indifference (for that reason by which Scotus asserts the extrinsic predetermination of the divine will to touch the impulse according to the mode of the intrinsic liberty and indifference of the created cause) but by a merely natural and necessary ratio, and consequently inferring the necessity of the created cause: since the science anteceding the decree is not a free predicate in God, but essentially necessary, from which the liberty, and mode of indifference of the influx of the second cause cannot be drawn, as it were, from an extrinsic principle.

11 There follows, secondly; that that pronouncement is false on which rests that school of theirs which rejects the physical extrinsic predetermination of the divine will; namely, that every complexion, by the force of its own intrinsic enunciation, which is expressed by the enunciative word about the future, befalls a determinate truth or falsity.

Since the science of simple intelligence, with Scotus, regards the complexions of futures, not as importing a determinate composition toward going-to-be, or a determinate division of the extremities toward not going-to-be; but as neither [inclined] toward truth and falsity, which they draw from the subsequent decree, while it objectively mutates the possible being determinately to going-to-be, or not going-to-be; although nevertheless before the decree the enunciation be apprehended with all the expressive force of the object imported by the copula of the verb enunciating about the future: of which more precisely in the following article, where from Scotus, and from Aureolus, we perhaps attack the determinate truth of future contingents in themselves.

Two assertions on behalf of the true opinion against the foreknowledge of futures in the ideal rationes.

12 With these premised, it must first be said that the objective esse which accedes to creatures from the science of vision is a sufficient medium ex parte obiecti of the infallible science of futures; yet not the first, nor regarding the ideal rationes.

This assertion is clear by mere explication; it embraces three parts. First, that such an objective esse as is made by the science of vision supplies a sufficient medium ex parte obiecti for the science of futures. Second, that such a medium is not first in the order of causality, but necessarily pre-requires another medium of such science. Third, that this kind of medium of the cognition of futures, inasmuch as it is sought from the science of vision, in no way pertains to the ideal ratio; whence it comes to pass that, because of the apprehension of futures in such an objective esse as is drawn from the science of vision, God cannot be said to foreknow futures in ideas.

The first part stands: because the science of vision presupposes the absolute and efficacious decree, and consequently the inimpedible energy concerning future contingents; and even the objective mutation which accedes to the possible being from the decree; whereby it is extracted from the mere heap of possibles into the series of futures.

But such objective mutation, with a habitude to a determinate and unimpedible existence, is a most sufficient medium on the side of the object for that infallible judgment which God adds concerning the determinate futurecence or non-futurecence of a being: therefore the objective being of creatures, which is made through the science of vision premising an objective mutation to futurecence sought from the decree, exhibits a sufficient medium for the knowledge of futures.

The second part of our assertion: namely, that the medium of the knowledge of futures which is taken from the science of vision cannot be the first medium, according to the series and habitude of causality, is evident.

Because such objective being, which follows upon the science of vision, presupposes the objective mutation which the decree supplies, extracting the possible from the mere condition of possibility to the existence of futures; but that objective mutation, which is sought from the decree as a medium on the side of the object, especially for apprehending infallibly the determinate futurecence of a being, since such a mutation is owing to an absolute and infallible purpose, in no way awaits the knowledge of the cooperation of a created cause. Therefore the objective being, which accedes to the science of vision, cannot be set up as the first medium on the side of the object of the knowledge of futures.

The third part also of our assertion stands from those things premised under n. 8, where we showed that neither the science of vision, nor that objective being of creatures which is left by such a science, can pertain to the ideal rationes.

For that it premises the future being infallibly according to the rule of the supreme artificer, and determinately to being for such a difference of time; and the exemplary cause, in that whole amplitude in which it embraces the created and the uncreated, does not presuppose a work already then constructed according to the prescriptions of the art, but directs, and as it were contracts, the mind of the artificer to eliciting such a species of artefacts.

13 Secondly it must be said: that future contingents are foreknown by God in ideas not at all determinately.

Thus Scotus, together with Basil and all his own, to whom Severus adheres, Opuscul. 2. de Scientia futurorum contingentium, lib. 1. cap. 4, especially num. 15; Albertinus, de praedest. 2. Theologic. tom., according to the reasoning from the four principles of the philosophical questions; Machado, 1. p. disp. 32. sect. 4.

The proof of which assertion I bring forward chiefly from that text, 6. In the same way are the ideas of possibles that are not future as of futures: because that difference of possibles that are not future and of futures is nothing through an act of the divine will.

From which I argue thus: every ideal ratio pertains to the knowledge of simple intelligence, which does not premise that efficacious constitution of the thing in objective being which is drawn from the decree. But the knowledge of simple intelligence intends possibles that are not future in the same way as futures: as we shall show below, since by the force of the aforesaid knowledge it follows altogether necessarily that things be contracted to futurecence.

For otherwise the thing, as the object of such a knowledge, would necessarily be uncreated: and a creative force would be inferred of the will, if its consent be predefined not by a form essentially free, such as is the decree of the divine will, but by a predicate altogether necessary, such as is the divine knowledge, as the free purpose of God will set forth before itself. Therefore the object of the knowledge of simple intelligence (to which alone every ideal ratio pertains) does not import a determination on the side of the object, which can be the medium of the infallible knowledge of futures.

14. Which Scotus accurately unravelled, quodlib. 1. 4. §. completo autem toto isto processu, marg. §. 1. of the Cavell edition. As he has.

But the divine essence does not move to the distinct knowledge of a creature of whatsoever complexion: because if it moved, determinately to knowing the other part in future contingents, since a thing naturally moving moves necessarily, it would follow that the divine intellect would necessarily understand this part of the contradiction as the true one: and so either it could err, or the opposite could not come about, and then that which is posited to be contingent would not be contingent but necessary.

And after a few things he subjoins. I answer: it moves naturally, and, speaking per se, necessarily, to the knowledge of whatever can be naturally and necessarily known, whether it be simple or complex: and to every necessary cognition: but such is not any complexum about the existence of a contingent creature, because it is not apt by nature to be determined to truth.

15 And if you ask: why does it not necessarily move to such a cognition of the complexum to be had, as could be had of it? I answer: either it would move to know under distinction that this is going to be, or not going to be; and this cognition is not determinately about either part. Or if it moved determinately to knowing either part; that would necessarily be determinate.

16 Behold Scotus expressly defending that the divine essence, before the arrival of the free decree, cannot move the divine intellect to the apprehension of the determinate truth of any contingent complexum; because that [complexum], by the force of its intrinsic enunciation and of its own commensuration to the future object, is not apt by nature to be the substrate of a determinate truth or falsity, the decree being set aside.

For Scotus argues that if a determinate truth could befit a contingent complexum through its habitude to the science of God before the free purpose of the divine will, then either the divine apprehension could be deceived; or the created will would be necessitated, while it is contracted by a necessary form, from which, as from an extrinsic principle, the mode of the contingency of the cooperation of free choice cannot be sought. For the confirmation of this proof of Scotus, see the following article from num. 32. through 34. inclusive.

17 But Cajetan comes forward at the place cited, ex 1. part. quaestion. 14. art. 13. versiculo. Ad secundum Scoti; against the proof of our second assertion. To wit, that the Ideas represent something merely naturally, namely the quiddities of things; and something not merely naturally, but naturally upon the supposition of free will; namely the existences of things, and contingent complexions. Because the quiddities of things are expressed by the Ideas before the act of the will; but the contingent complexions, after the antecedent decree of the divine will.

But the onset of Cajetan is routed; because no ideal reason presupposes the decree that changes the thing objectively unto futurity; otherwise the idea would have to be, not a practical construction of the entity exemplified, but a merely speculative inspection of that futurity-in-unimpedibility which has been constituted by the decree; and accordingly the exemplary cause would not attain the construction of the exemplified entity: it would contemplate it merely speculatively, as already constructed.

Nay, Cajetan seems here to fall short of the doctrine of St. Thomas; because (as we showed below at margin. num. 23) St. Thomas assimilates the practical science of God about things to the practical cognition of the artisan about his artificial work; but the art, or practical cognition, of the artisan does not look upon the fabricated work as factum, but as factibile. For the cognition of an artificial entity not as factible but as factum, and already present in its own proper existence (as is the intuitive cognition flowing from the species cut away by the already-constructed thing), does not avail as a practical reason that would direct the artisan's intellect to construct the artificial entity, in the state anteceding the existence of that entity.

Therefore by parity of reason that knowledge, which directs the power of God, or his faculty that executes it, that it may contract being into a state entirely determinate, cannot be the knowledge of vision, which presupposes the objective mutation bursting forth from the decree; but the knowledge of simple intelligence, which proposes the object not changed but changeable; which we also showed below out of St. Thomas at num. 23, already cited. Of this Valentius de Herice also teaches well, 1. part. tractatu 1. de Scientia Dei; disput. 10. capit. 2. sub nu. marg. 9.

Satisfaction to the objections for the foreknowledge of future things in the Ideas, as in a medium holding itself on the side of the object.

18 From the above swept together the foundations of the opposing arguments collapse. To the first opposition, which on the side of the opposing opinion instructs Basolius, an assertor of our own opinion:

It is answered; that the ideas of Sortes and of cursus, although they confer upon the knowledge of that complexum, Sortes curret, under a neutral state with respect to truth and falsity, yet not under a contracted state to one part of contradiction; because no object of the knowledge of simple intelligence, to which the ideal reasons look, bears an infallible objective determination before the decree; as will stand forth more fully from the following articles.

19 To the second opposition we say; that the essence of God, as it is subserved beneath the free purpose of his will predetermining the complexum of the future to one part of contradiction, imports every determination on the side of the object that can be sought to determinate foreknowledge of future things; but otherwise, in that it antecedes the free constitution of his volition; of which we treat below by disposition.

To the third opposition of the same Bassolius it is answered; that it is precisely by the ideas that those complexa are apprehehended which consist of necessary terms; because such terms coalesce together into such a complexum of necessity, and intrinsically, so that it is contradictory for them not to be composed with each other. Which is otherwise in the case of the terms contingently con-liberable, whose complexion awaits the good-pleasure of the divine will, that it may be contracted to being-future or not-being-future.

Wherefore it is urged as an objection; that by the same ideal reasoning both the necessary and the contingent are apprehended; just as also the right and the oblique, the possible and the impossible.

It is answered; that such opposition labors in the equivocation of the word (contingens). We say therefore, that by the ideas that is apprehehended as contingent in the signified act, insofar as it is opposed to the necessary entity; for the very same ideal reason that expresses it to be a necessary complexum, whose extremes converge of necessity into one nexus, also makes it known to be a contingent complexum, whose terms do not coalesce intrinsically and of necessity into one composition. Such a contingent, in the signified act, insofar as it imports the quidditative concept of the contingent entity, just as the necessary is — for (as is asserted) the quiddity of any entity whatever is necessary insofar as it refers a quidditative grade of entity in such an order of entities — so also the contingent, as such, insofar as it stands opposed to the necessary entity as such, is apprehehended by the knowledge of simple intelligence, through which all the quiddities of things are comprehended.

Yet the one part of contradiction is not foreknown determinately by the knowledge of simple intelligence in the contingent complexum, on account of the defect of determinate truth, which is sought from the subsequent decree. Which we call the not-apprehending of the contingent in the act exercised, or insofar as contingency is exercised in such a determinate object.

1 To the last confirmation of Bassolius we say; that just as by the knowledge of simple intelligence, which attains the entity as it is absolved from existence, the actual existence of the object is not apprehehended; so neither by the ideal reasons, which pertain to the knowledge of simple intelligence anteceding the decree.

But when it is objected; that essence and existence are in no manner to be severed; therefore the idea, which renders avail to the expression of the thing's quiddity, will also avail to the representation of existence for any difference of future time.

It is answered; that the essence, in the status negatiuo, or state of non-repugnance to exist (under which it terminates the knowledge of simple intelligence), does noticeably diverge in a negative way from that other positive reason of the objective mutation, with respect to the positive actuality which the possible entity acquires from the decree; by the force of which objective mutation it is congruous for the possible entity to be determinately future, which it did not cohere with before the decree; because the objective mutation adds the decree of God contracting the possible being into a determinate fore, or not fore.

20 To the remaining oppositions, at num. 2, the response to the first is; that it is false to suppose that every proposition concerning a future contingent, by the force of its intrinsic enunciation and its commensuration to its object, acquires determinate truth or falsity, with the predetermining decree set aside; as we touch at num. 11, and it will be more fully treated in the next article.

To the confirmation: that the ideas of Socrates and of running represent a complexion neutral to truth and falsity, yet not determinately true or false; because from the object there cannot be drawn a determinate conformity, or

or the dissimilarity of the enunciation, if there precisely lie hidden the objective mutation which is required by the predetermining decree.

We say that the idea is adequated to the Deity as the Deity is the knowledge of simple intelligence; but not as it is the science of vision: since ideas in no way pertain to the science of vision.

But because futures are not foreknown by God through the knowledge of simple intelligence, but through the science of vision; hence it comes about that futures cannot be apprehended by God in the ideas as in a medium on the side of the object.

21 To the instance concerning the practical causality of the science of vision; on account of which ideas ought to pertain to the science of vision.

We say that it is not gathered that the science of vision is a practical ratio in respect of the object, from the fact that it represents the future being not in itself, nor from its intentional motion, but from the motion of the Deity; because it would follow that the beatific vision of creatures in God also, for a like reason and from the intentional motion of the Deity, would not be a merely speculative intuition of creatures, but the cause of the futurecence of the object; for that it represents the connexion of the future object with the decree.

Nor is that analogy between the science of vision and the intuition of a body, blunt though it be, of any moment; because although the corporeal eye could represent a secondary object from the intentional motion of the primary object; that aspect would not on that account turn out to be not merely speculative, in that it would express the connexion of causality between the primary and the secondary object, if the vision did not produce that connexion; but it would intuit it most simply.

Hence; because the science of vision does not produce an objective mutation of the future being, nor the contraction of a possible being to a determinate de facto existence from the decree of its futurecence, nor its connexion with the decree, if it so evidently premise it, as in the science of vision, which is called the said science of simple intelligence, but of all ideal rationes — according to the opinion of Scotus.

Indeed from those transcribed words, under n. 5, as though to establish that they represent that which is represented... And those following words: The ideas are in the divine intellect before every act of the divine will.

For the discussion of the last opposition it is weighed; whether the science of vision be the cause of the object.

22 For the dissolving of the last reason to the contrary, there falls in a disquisition concerning the comparison of the science of vision to its object, whether it be merely speculative or practical? From the decision of which question it will appear whether the ideal rationes conduce to the science of vision? which pertain to the practical knowledge of the divine artificer.

From the doctrine of Scotus it appears more than sufficiently that every ideal function precedes the free decree of God, and conduces to the knowledge of simple intelligence; which, as with Scotus it directs the decree objectively immutating creatures as possible, and contracting them to the state of its ratio, so the knowledge of simple intelligence alone is the practical, artefactive ratio of the object; but the science of vision is a certain mere intuition, and speculation, of that objective mutation which has been produced by the decree.

In which we have St. Thomas consenting, whatever the more recent Thomists may gainsay; which the words from 1. p. q. 14. ar. 8. sufficiently lay open, where he teaches.

I answer, it must be said; that the knowledge of God is the cause of things, for thus the knowledge of God bears itself to all created things, as the knowledge of an artificer bears itself to the artefacts; but the knowledge of an artificer is the cause of the artefacts in that the artificer operates through his intellect, whence it appears that the form of the intellect is the principle of operation, as heat is the principle of heating.

23 And that he speaks here of the knowledge of simple intelligence is evident from the very context; together with that sentence: But even if the form of intelligence bears itself to opposites — or the same power of the will to opposites — it does not produce a determinate effect, unless it be determined to one by appetite. And after a few words: Whence the science of God, according as it is the cause of things, is accustomed to be named the science of approbation.

In which place St. Thomas expressly teaches that that science is the cause of things which exists indifferent to opposites, and which is contracted to one by the efficacious appetition of God. But since the knowledge of vision does not look upon its object as indifferent to either of two, but contracted to one by the force of an antecedent decree; it comes to pass that the knowledge of vision, with St. Thomas, nowise appertains to the art of God, or his practical reason, about created objects.

It is then inferred: that the knowledge of simple intelligence is that which is valued by St. Thomas as the knowledge of approval. Because with St. Thomas, as is plain from the transcribed context, the knowledge of approval is held to be that which is the cause of things, and which represents the creature comporting itself potentialiter towards opposites; but this knowledge, comporting itself potentialiter on the part of an object indifferent to either of two, cannot be the knowledge of vision, as is manifest and evident. Therefore the knowledge of simple intelligence, as approving whatever the divine will shall have chosen, and as consenting to the decree contracting the object to one part of contradiction, ought to be called by the name of knowledge of approval, according to the context and mind of St. Thomas.

24 Moreover, the more recent Thomists, holding that the knowledge of vision is the practical art of its object, are pressed in this way with a burden which cannot be carried by men. For if the knowledge of vision were the cause of its own object; it would come to pass that the principle of the real presence of future things in eternity would be renounced, which (as is evident) presupposes every practical reason of God which cohered with God from his whole eternity. By a like reason, as the followers of St. Thomas assert, the absolute and efficacious purpose of the divine will would antecede the real presence of future things in eternity, as the cause of such real presence from eternity.

But this foregoing pronouncement cannot stand with that most received assertion of the Thomists, pronouncing it to be the mind of St. Thomas; that the real presence of future things in eternity is an entirely sufficient medium on the side of the object for the science of future things. Because every medium on the side of the object, or every reason on account of which the termination of judgment into the object obtains, must antecede that exercised tending of assent into the object under that comparation, and extension of the act to the object, under which the object offers the reason on account of which to assent; but the knowledge of vision looks upon the future as really present in eternity; therefore the real presence of future things in eternity must antecede the extension of such science to the future under such real presence, as a medium on the side of the object, to the infallible judgment of God concerning such a future; and accordingly the knowledge of vision, with St. Thomas, cannot be the practical or artifactive reason of such a real presence.

For otherwise either there would be committed a vitious circuit, while the real presence of future things is assigned as the medium of the science on the side of the object, and on the other hand the knowledge of vision is asserted to be the art, and practical reason, of the real presence of future things; or for some sign (on account of which the knowledge of vision would antecede the real presence of future things as its cause) the knowledge of vision would be able to be conceived as exercised in order to the future object, while there does not persist, or is not conceived, for that sign, the reason on account of which of its own termination into such an object; which is a manifest implication.

And it is effectively pressed from the free decree; because precisely therefore the real presence of future things in eternity cannot be assigned as the reason on the side of the object, on account of which the decree is terminated to such an object; because such presence hangs from the decree as from its cause; therefore, if the real presence of future things is an effect of the knowledge of vision, such presence cannot be conceived as a reason on the side of the object, on account of which the science of God is terminated to it.

25 Then we proceed against the Thomists from that testimony of St. Thomas transcribed by us, at num. 23. Since the intelligible form is related to opposites (since it is the same science of opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect, unless it were determined to one by appetite.

Because in the science of simple intelligence, although it propose the object with an indetermination to opposites, namely to fore, or not fore; yet as it is conjoined to the free absolute purpose contracting the possible being to one part of the contradiction, there is conceived whatever energy can be sought for every causality ad extra, and with an omnimodal application and intimation of the divine power to acting in the second act. Therefore there remains nothing which might accede to such a science conjoined to the absolute decree, of energy and of action about created things, that would be desired and expected from a supervening and posterior act of the intellect: unless we wish to multiply forms, or rationales of acting, to no purpose and without any compelling reason: which, as in created things it is not philosophical, so in God it can be neither philosophical nor theological.

26 If you answer with the more recent Thomists, as may be seen in John of St. Thomas, 1. part. quaest. 14. disput. 18. art. 3. — that although the knowledge of simple intelligence, as conjoined with the absolute decree, claims whatever efficacy is required in the reason of the intention, or immanent and internal purpose; yet not in the reason of execution, and causality ad extra: for which reason they will have the causality of God ad extra constituted in a certain act of the practical intellect, which corresponds to command in created things; by which act of command (the efficacious intention of the end supposed, and the efficacious election of means, and moreover the efficacious impulse of using, or the act of use, and application of means, on the part of the appetitus) the intellect still intimates practicè, and gives signification to the executive faculty, of the exercise, and execution, of the work: so that they refer the function and causality of that act of command to a certain voice of the wise man, as it were of a command: Fac hoc.

Who also, consentaneously hereout, judge the essence of the act of predetermination to consist in such a command of the divine intellect; concerning which, when we treat in earnest in the General Controversy of Predetermination — enquiring whether the essence of predetermination consist in the act of the intellect or of the will? — we shall, with a serious and strenuous effort, repel as superuacaneous and useless, that addition of command on the part of the intellect, added even by the reason of efficacious intention, of election, and of use.

27 Concerning which, let the more recent writers who act against the Thomists be seen, while they set aside the aforesaid command of the intellect as otiose, and tax it, even in created things; whose proofs Herice compounds, 1. part. tract. 3. de Praedestinatione, disp. 22. cap. 4. per totum.

The force of whose proofs goes to this; that although the will, comporting itself sluggishly about the intention of the end, the election of means, and the use or application of them, may need the exhortation of the intellect to excite it, lest the will grow cold or torpid about the efficacious prosecution, or flight of the object; yet the will efficaciously intending, electing, and using, expects nothing of energy from the exhortation of the intellect; so that whatever intimation, and application, is pronounced to be expected for the exciting of the executive faculties, must altogether be esteemed otiose and fabricated.

28 For if the will be that which commands the intellect, indeed more, which compels and as it were captivates the intellect, that it may efficaciously insist upon the cogitation of this object, so that it can call away the intellect from intense cogitation of such a thing, and addict it to the most intense meditation of another opposed object, at the nod and arbitrement of the will; what cause shall there be, that the will, sufficient without the command of the intellect (which the will subjects to itself), shall not of plenary right command the executive faculty, that it execute the work enjoined upon it?

By which rationale we make use below against Vázquez in this distinction, on the science of absolute contingents, artic. 7, under numer. marg. 45, that if the will can, with Vázquez, (which is also undeniable, since it is established by experience itself,) a more efficacious cogitation being preferred to a less efficacious one, without any new dictate of the intellect, turn away the mind from the object more intensely and efficaciously proposed, and apply it to an object previously apprehended sluggishly and remissly; so that the intellect, by the precept of the will, changes its turn about such an object, and subordinates the object preferred, or more intensely cogitated, by the intellect; how can it come about that it be not open to the will to be borne into an object which was remissly, or sluggishly, insinuated or intimated to the will by the intellect?

29 Finally, whatever be the case with such an imperium of the intellect in created things; it seems altogether superfluous in God, nay even repugnant to him. Because since imperium stands in relation to a subject and obedient faculty; and further imperium sounds of the supereminence, or pre-eminence, of the dominant power. As in God no subject or inferior faculty is given, so neither should any commanded act be held to be, unless we fall away from the rigour of scholastic disputation, and decline uselessly to tropes.

No act of sentence therefore is given in God, to which there answers that function of the intellect which, with respect to an executing faculty, can be called practical imperium; and consequently neither can the science of vision be that to which practical causality is ascribed with respect to the object.

30 Lastly it occurs that a certain assertion of Valentín de Herice has not pleased us, restitut. 1. on the Science of God, disput. 10. cap. 3. §. At this place, observe, number 20; where, acknowledging that the asserted science of vision is de facto merely speculative; he nevertheless thinks it certain that the science of vision could be the practical rationale of its object in that hypothesis, that God should will to produce the same thing in number again. For then the science of vision, with respect to the repeated, or iterated, production, could discharge the function of art, or of a practical rationale directing the effecting, or the reproduction, of the thing.

For this doctrine displeases me; nay, I judge that it does not cohere with itself. Because although the science of vision with respect to the first production stands merely speculatively with Valentín de Herice; because it is the intuition of that objective imitation which broke forth from the decree alone. So, since with respect to the second production another absolute decree must be brought in in God, concerning the same thing to be produced again, and from that decree there also accedes to the object another objective mutation with an order to the repeated, or iterated, existence; although, by a wholly like rationale, the science of vision regarding this second mutation flowing from the second decree merely speculates the mutation which it does not produce, but introspects as produced in that objective being, and consequently cannot be esteemed the art, or practical rationale, thereof. Or if the science of vision be compared practically to the second objective mutation breaking forth from the second decree, although it premise it, why does it not also conduct itself practically toward the first mutation? since the same rationale is at issue.

31 From which it is clear against the foundation of the more recent authors set forth, under number marg. 4. For all those testimonies of Sacred Scripture which attribute to the word of God, or to his wisdom, the energy of art, or the causality of an artefactive form, are to be understood of the science of simple intelligence insofar as it is conjoined to the decree immutating a possible being, and contracting it to such an objective mutation. Which we showed to be of the mind of Saint Thomas, under number marg. 23 and 25, and under num. marginal. 17, acting against Cajetan.