Celebriores Controversiae in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti — Tomus Alter (de Scientia Dei et Ideis)

DIGRESSION;

Whether the will can be necessitated by God, all other requisites for the free influx having been premised; chiefly on the side of the judgment, and the deliberate insinuation of the object toward either?

SUMMARY.

The first opinion, maintaining that the created will cannot be necessitated by God if a deliberate insinuation of the object toward either is premised. Num. 28. The placitum of Vázquez, that free choice cannot be necessitated by God with respect to the object of a congruous thought. Num. 32. It is refuted, in the same place.

The other opinion: that God can necessitate the created will, not only through the impression of an intrinsic form; but also through the uncreated extrinsic will; yet so that, on the part of the effect, the created will answers physically unalike in the necessary and in the free operation. Nu. 33. The first part of the true opinion; that the created will can be necessitated by God through the immission of an intrinsic form. Num. 36. The other part of our opinion; that the created will can also be necessitated through the sole extrinsic will of God. Num. 40. We show that the created will, necessitated through the uncreated extrinsic volition, would bear itself otherwise by the motion of the first act, but not by the motion of the second act, as regards the physical and intrinsic mutation which it has when it operates freely: against Suárez, from num. 41 to 45. Although a moral and extrinsic mutation intervene. The foundations of the first opinion are examined. Num. 44. Item, also those of the second opinion of Francisco Suárez. Num. 47. The opinion of a certain more recent author is examined, concerning the composition of the power of God with free choice. Num. 48. The decree concerning the composing of the power of God toward either with created free choice is expounded, and what such a decree posits in the created will? N. 49. Satisfaction is made to certain objections against our opinion concerning the composition of the power of God with created free choice. Num. 50. The oppositions of Alarcón are shown to be impossible, concerning the collation of the divine power, simply weak, toward either, with the free: by which also the foundations of Alarcón are refuted, who maintains that God and created free choice cannot cooperate since from either disputation they concur. Num. 60.

SINCE, with the intrinsic author slackening, or turning back upon himself according to what those maintaining the aforesaid declare, there would be implied an absolute necessity of the influx of the will, if there were premised an indifferent judgment of the intellect and a deliberate inclination of the object toward either part of the contradiction. From this they produce [the conclusion] that not only de facto is liberty not injured by that antecedent motion of the intrinsic form; nay, that even by the absolute power of God it could not be brought about, if the will allows the object proposed by the intellect toward either: the disquisition on the aforesaid pronouncement presses forward, which we touched lightly under num. 15, from which the full confirmation of the Scotistic opinion will be drawn out.

The opinion of the Recent Thomists, that the will cannot be necessitated if there is premised a judgment toward either; and likewise the placitum of Vázquez, that free choice cannot be necessitated with respect to the object of a congruous thought.

COncerning this question, Báñez (1. part. quaest. 19. art. 10. dubio 1. §. Sed dices), Alvarez in De Auxiliis, disput. 26. conclus. 5, and in De libero arbitrio, libr. 4. capite 3, maintain that there is an implication of the necessity of the will, if there is premised a judgment deliberately insinuating the object toward either part of the contradiction.

That placitum is supported, first, by the authority of Augustine (libr. 1. de libero arbitrio, capit. 3), where he persuades that the concept of the will and of liberty falls back into the same thing, so that that cannot be voluntary which is not free; and that it is repugnant to an elicited act of the will that it be not voluntary, just as to the causative heating virtue that there be not a heating; so also it seems to contradict the influx of the will, according to Augustine, that it enter into necessity.

Thus therefore it has it: Si enim necesse est vt velit, unde volet, cum voluntas non erit? And a little later: Voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra potestate; porro quia est in potestate, libera est nobis.

29 It is argued, secondly: because just as an impulsive faculty cannot be borne toward the unknown, so neither can it pursue necessarily that good which is proposed not as necessary, but as a contingent appetible toward either; for otherwise it would pursue the unknown, if it cohered necessarily with that object which is insinuated to it by the intellect not as necessary, but as contingent.

On account of which very reason, the common consensus of the Thomists establishes that the will of the blessed is borne necessarily into God; by reason of the fact that the beatific good is proposed by the clear vision, not contingently, but as to be pursued necessarily.

Then, also, in the first-of-first motions the will behaves in the manner of a necessary agent, for the reason that it does not presuppose a deliberate judgment insinuating the object toward either; therefore an absolute necessity contradicts the will, if there is premised an indifferent proposition of the object.

30 It is argued, thirdly: because the will does not tolerate the coerced or violent in its sense, even by the absolute power of God, as the school of Theologians admits; although it can suffer violence in the commanded acts.

But if, upon a deliberate proposition of the object toward either being premised, the will were necessarily compelled to one side, force would be inflicted upon the will, since it would be carried off against the internal impulse of the appetite indifferent from itself, attempting toward either; therefore the reason of such necessity, coming from an extrinsic principle, contradicts the will.

31 Fourthly: the argument proceeds from the rejection of any creatable form which can be so immitted into the will that it affix it to one part of the contradiction. Because if such a form were possible, it would behave in the manner of a habit, or of an operative supernatural virtue impressed by God; yet no supernatural habit necessitates the will, nor does it infringe its free condition of operating, as is plain; therefore, and without any foundation, there is asserted the possibility of a necessity which would be drawn from the impression of some creatable form.

Then, that if there were possible an absolute contraction and necessity of the will, beyond that which is called necessity of consequence, or ex hypothesi, on account of the immission of a form overcoming, or binding, the power of the will to dissent — even that absolute necessity of the created will which would be sought from the extrinsic will of God could be defended; and accordingly it would come about that, without any intrinsic mutation of the created will, by the mere extrinsic good-pleasure of God, the intrinsic power of the will toward either could be impeded.

The consequence is proved: because just as, in the composition of that form which would be immitted for necessitating the will, there could be looked at either the formal composibility, or the intrinsic nexus, of such an operative virtue with the will, or the entitative contraction, or binding, of the indifference of the will, which would proceed from such a form in the genus of efficient cause; so, although the intrinsic composition in the genus of formal cause could not be exhibited by the extrinsic will of God, yet that effective contraction of the indifference of the will could be supplied, since the uncreated volition, inasmuch as it is the use or causality of the divine faculty executing, can confer itself upon every effect to be produced, toward which the use of any created or creatable efficient agent is available.

But in that hypothesis, nothing would be imprinted upon the will affixing it to one side of the contradiction; therefore, by the mere extrinsic nod and ordination of God, the will would be left proximately impotent toward either; which seems absurd.

And the reason is strengthened against Suárez, and against any others whatsoever who assail physical predetermination; who, although they require a predefinition of the material, as of indifference, or of moral virtue; yet receive a predefinition of good acts. Which will, inasmuch as in their view it began by way of the antecedent intention of the knowledge of vision, the content of the created will; that necessity could be called a necessity simply, which would be drawn from the extrinsic volition of God. For although such a predefinition be not attributed to the use, or causality, of the divine executing faculty, which would immediately infer an intrinsic mutation in the created will, but only an extrinsic denomination, or preordination, of such acts; yet if an absolute and antecedent necessity could be drawn from the extrinsic will of God, it would come about that that predefinition, which they had asserted, (inasmuch as it is absolute, unimpedible, and efficacious) would also import, not a necessity of consequence, and ex hypothesi, but an absolute and simpliciter one.

Then, also, by the aforesaid extrinsic reason for necessitating the will, the followers of Scotus can be thus taken to task. Because it implies that in God there arise contrary denominations, no mutation having been made in things; yet if God, by an extrinsic will, could necessitate the created will, free choice would pass from not being of a necessitating [agent] to being of a necessity, no mutation having been made in the influx of the created will.

Because if God were to necessitate the will, it could behave in no other way than if, by its volition (inasmuch as it is the addition of actual and exercised causality, that is, the use of the divine executing faculty) it reached the created impulse absolutely and independently of the knowledge of the cooperation of the created cause; nay, so as to infer the consent of the will efficaciously and inimpedibly. But yet de facto the divine volition does influx in this way into the free impulse of the created will, according to Scotus and his followers; therefore, by the same reason, the divine volition, as regards being and behaving, would be such when it should infer necessity upon the created will; as de facto, when it concurs freely.

And accordingly, either the will is de facto necessitated through the extrinsic predetermination which Scotus establishes; or the reason of thus necessitating the will through the extrinsic ordination of God is contradictory.

Wherefore Rispole, Zumel, and Alvarez, adhering to Fr. Báñez, constantly maintain, therefore, that free choice composed with full deliberation toward either cannot be necessitated from an extrinsic principle, namely from the first cause; because there suffices the indifference on the side of the intrinsic principle; namely, on the side of the judgment proposing the object, not concluding every reason of the appetible which would determine toward the act of pursuit (as the good in common, inasmuch as it embraces every reason of the good, as it were refined, or purified, from the reason of the evil and of the unfitting, contracts the will toward the species of that impulse which is called pursuit and love), but showing the good mixed with evil and with the unfitting, which can terminate the act of aversion and flight.

That indetermination, on the side of the judgment insinuating the object toward either (which for that reason they call objective indifference), they estimate to confer amply and more than amply, that free choice may subsist whole and sound (sartus et tectus); so much so that, with such a judgment shining before, they imply that the will is necessitated.

Because any virtue whatsoever immitted by God, as soon as it is conceived in the manner of an impulse burdening, and, as it were, pressing the will to act, nevertheless impels it to action when composed with a judgment toward either, and under that reason and manner of acting under which the object is proposed to the faculty as an impulse, with indifference toward the opposite; therefore it does not affix the will to such an impulse as to be able to harm liberty.

32 Nay, and Vázquez too seems to favor this manner of thinking, when in 1. 2. disp. 26 cap. 1. n. mar. 4. et 5. he maintains that the will composed with the congruous thought, on account of the foreknowledge of the future consent, could not be necessitated by God if it were compelled toward that part of the contradiction toward which that congruous thought would excite it; otherwise if it were affixed toward the opposite part, toward which the congruous thought would not be available to the will.

The foundation of Vázquez is nothing else but that coercion of an impulsive faculty from an extrinsic principle toward that object of operation toward which the operative faculty is urged by an intrinsic principle is unintelligible.

But lest it be necessary to return again to this opinion of Vázquez; and having also premised that, in the opinion of Scotus, there is no congruous thought which could claim the infallibility of the effect foreknown except from the preordination of the absolute purpose in God: yet still, with any congruity whatsoever of the thought asserted, our volition would be able to be necessitated from an extrinsic principle, if there were immitted by God a form, in first act, affixing free choice to one part of the contradiction; or if God did not compose His power toward either in first act; as will be clear from what is to be said, chiefly from numer. 49 onward.

The other opinion of Suárez: that God can necessitate the created will, not only through the impression of an intrinsic form, but also through the created extrinsic will; yet so that, on the side of the effect of the created will, there answers a physical unalikeness in the necessary operation, and the free.

33 The other opinion, directly opposed, maintains not only that God can necessitate the created will through the immission of an intrinsic form impeding the expedited dominion which the will freely claims over its own acts, but also through the extrinsic will of God; yet so that, on the side of the impulse of the will, there answers that physical mutation which is not able to be congruent with the motion of the created will while it is not necessitated by the divine will.

Thus Suárez, tomo 1. de Gratia, prolegomeno 1 de arbitrij libertate, cap. 5. numer. marg. 14. That physical disparity, then, in both the necessary and the free influx of the will, Suárez established in this, sub num. 20: that the necessary impulse so emanates from the created will as necessitated by the divine volition, inasmuch as the latter discharges the office of the use, or causality, of the executing faculty; that that impulse is reached by God absolutely and independently of the knowledge of the cooperation of the created will. Whereas, when the influx is freely elicited, it is intended by the will of God, not absolutely, but impedibly, before the knowledge of the created will cooperating.

34 Moreover: that the absolute necessity which is inflicted upon the created will by the extrinsic volition of God is contradictory unless, on the side of the impulse of the will, there answers a physical unalikeness between the free and the necessary in each [case], Suárez shows.

Because the mere extrinsic connection of the divine volition, whether necessitating or not necessitating the created will, cannot be strained toward so discrete a physical effect as is that of depriving the will of the dominion which it acquires above the internal impulse; or of not stripping the will of the expeditious exercise of its causality. Therefore, on the side of some will there must be established a physical and intrinsic discretion.

And that can be nothing other than that, whereas the divine volition which infers the antecedent necessity is nevertheless impeded impedibly and absolutely, without dependence upon the cooperation of the free principle; the divine will, indeed, not necessitating, bends the consent only conditionally and dependently upon the cooperation of the created will; therefore that disparity must be admitted of necessity.

35 Which is further confirmed thus: because from the will of God, then, if necessity were not inferred upon the created cause, a firmer and more immutable influx would be drawn, the will of God having first left free choice proximately expeditious toward either, as seems evident: yet this greater firmness of the tenacity of the will thus wrapped in necessity cannot be the mere extrinsic denomination left behind by the decreed volition of God.

Because either the concourse which is offered to us on the side of God toward acting upon either of the indifferents, and for that reason, while the same will of God stands concerning offering the concourse, contracts itself, as it were, to the consent, by the created will, of the community or determination of that influx whose excellence would be toward consent or dissent.

Hence it comes about that, on the contrary, absolute necessity of such causality, on the side of God, cannot be conceived otherwise than that it move the created will in such a way that from it [the will of God] there is not expected, as it were, the contraction of its universality and indifference toward consenting or dissenting; but that by its own force, independently of the cooperation of the created cause, it decrees the consent of our will.The true opinion: that the created will can be necessitated by God, not only through the impression of an intrinsic form, but also through the absolute purpose of the divine will; yet so that, on the side of the effect, no physical and intrinsic mutation or disparity results, but only extrinsic and moral.

36 BUT it must be said, first: that God, while the judgment stands and the deliberate proposition of the object toward either, can necessitate the created will through the immission of some operative virtue; whether such a form be called a motion of power, as Alvarez speaks, or by any other name whatsoever, provided that it contract the will in first act toward one side of the contradiction, and not only by way of actual concourse. Thus Scotus, in 4. sententiar. distinct. 49. quaestion. 6, whose text we proposed sub num. margin. 10; of which see below, num. 37.

Our opinion is supported, from among the recent Theologians, by Villegas, the chief Professor of Complutum, who, while he constantly defends predetermination through the absolute decree, asserts that the will composed with the indifference of reason can be necessitated. For thus it has it in controuers. 12. de concordia voluntatis diuinae cum nostra voluntate, disputat. vltima. capit. 3. § Ad sensum Scoti, et Cani. Where he says:

Potest Deus voluntatem sub indifferentiae propositionis constitutam necessitare ad actum, argumentum igitur est; voluntatem sub indifferentia non effi formam, vnde ratio liberi conueniat formaliter in actum, sed opus esse ad libertatem actus, vt voluntas indifferentiam propositionis sequatur, which touches upon the efficiency of the will. This author indeed, although he is wholly engaged in refuting the composition of the motion of God with free choice from the conditional foreknowledge of our consent, and contends every nerve in the defense of a premotion through the absolute purpose of the divine will.

And our assertion is proved: because while the clear vision of God stands, the deliberate proposition or insinuation of a prohibited object toward either does not imply [a contradiction]; for by the nature of the thing, the clear intuition of the Godhead and the deliberate proposition of some appetible against honesty and the rule of reason do not conflict. But in the School of the Thomists the blessed would be necessitated in that hypothesis to the fruition of the highest good; and consequently also to not sinning, even with the deliberate insinuation of a prohibited appetible admitted.

Therefore, free choice also is able to be necessitated by some form in first act affixing it to one side of the contradiction, even with a judgment toward either premised; since that quality producible by God would no more necessitate than is the necessity that the clear vision of God infers among the Thomists; as is clear from those things which we weighed, sub num. mar. 21. et 22.

Nor could it be shown why, although de facto the quidditative intuition of the Godhead is not compossible with the proposition and the advertence of the judgment concerning a prohibited appetible, that should nevertheless contradict the absolute power of God? Yet given that confluence of the vision of the blessed and the judgment concerning the prohibited appetible, the will would be necessitated among the adversaries; and consequently, with the proposition of the object toward either.

Moreover, it is argued from Scotus, because, as is clear from the text transcribed, under numer. 3: if God were a necessary agent ad extra, created free choice would be necessitated. For the reason that, just as God would be a principle determined to one, so neither could He compose His executive faculty toward either, but utterly contracted to one part of the contradiction in the first act, and before the entrance of the exercised and actual influx; where Scotus, speaking absolutely, did not distinguish between free choice with deliberation, or without deliberation of reason, toward either.

Therefore it follows that, beyond the intrinsic principle of free operation, with the deliberate insinuation of the object toward either, from the extrinsic principle, or from the first cause, a composition is required with created free choice, which, by way of first act, is not made contracted to one, so that God, by the free statute of His will, may expedite the apparition of, as it were, by the force of the decree, the concourse toward either, in first act. Therefore, conversely: if God compose His power in first act contracted to one, (without having recourse to a decree of preparing the concourse toward contraries and contradictories,) free choice would be necessitated from the extrinsic, although, on the side of the intrinsic principle, there were supposed the deliberate proposition of the object toward either.

Then, because it cannot be shown why the immission of any creatable form, or quality of the species of power, should imply a contradiction, which would so surpass the impulsive force of the rational appetite that it bind it to consent in first act; so that it could not dissent; for that reason the indifference of contrariety toward the positive opposite act, namely dissent, is intrinsically impeded? And that also, by its premotion, it should so impel toward consent that the will cannot restrain consent? For since the impulsive faculty of the will is not unlimited, no reason can be rendered why, by the absolute power of God, a form of some greater operative power cannot be produced, which should thus affix the will, in first act, to consent, so that it could not elicit dissent in first act? Then, also, that in the consent it so contain it that it cannot cease from it; which would be to overcome the will both as regards specification, and as regards exercise.

27 But, lest the adversaries complain that we, with the example adduced, do not open the reason of the aforesaid necessity to the bottom; we produce as an example of that virtue necessitating the will the form which they themselves call the antecedent motion, or the application of power, if it attend to the first act of operating, from which knot they disengage themselves; for nothing further beyond that which they establish in the antecedent physical motion avails for the seeking of an absolute necessity.

For that impulse, or motion of power, if it attend to the proximate ability of the will antecedent to the second act, cannot fail to be an antecedent supposition; as is clear from those things which we touched upon concerning the sense divided and composed, sub numer. 11. and 15. Then, when that form binds the will to consent so that the will, while it is subjected to such a premotion, cannot, in the proximate field [of choice], be considered for dissenting; that brings it about that as regards specification, in first act, it cannot be indifferent.

Moreover, since that virtue, sought from the extrinsic, subjects the efficiency of the will to itself, so that it cannot restrain the consent; that is, to be necessitated as regards exercise. Wherefore it will be voluntary to demand something else for the true and antecedent necessity; unless the adversaries wish [to say] that the contraction, by way of first act, does not necessitate free choice.

Wherefore the heretics, the enemies and mockers of liberty, do not deny that our actions are free in that sole acceptance of indifference which looks, or is referred, to the intrinsic principle; yet they err in the pronouncement about liberty unhurt. Therefore liberty, that it may be whole and sound (sarta tecta), ought to be composed entirely not only in objective indifference, or on the side of the proposition of the alluring good in the genus of final cause, with indetermination toward either; but also by the aid of the first cause, expeditious in first act, that it may influx and concur toward either. Hence it comes about that if, by a free purpose, God had established not to compose His power toward either before the entry of the exercise of the influx; our will would be necessitated from the extrinsic.

Wherefore the assault of the innovators, asserting that free choice is not necessitated by God, full deliberation of reason being given, is not entirely encountered, if, beyond the indifference on the side of the judgment, that is, of the intrinsic principle, there be not assigned an indifference toward either in first act, on the side of the principle sought from the extrinsic; namely of the composition of the divine power with created free choice.

Wherefore Louis Dolan agrees with us in part, in difputat. Quadripartita de modo coniunctionis concursuum Dei, et creaturae, part. 3. cap. 2.

37 For the composition of the executive power of God with free choice, he denies that an immediate concourse of God is required for our free acts, asserting, however, a mediated one.

He asserted, then, that liberty is not saved, according to the principles of the common doctrine, if the immediate concourse of God follows upon wicked acts, unless, beyond the indifferent judgment of reason, there be also assigned the composition and apparatus of the concourse of the divine power toward either (ad verumlibet). On which account, neither is it impeded by such an expedition of the concourse toward either that, even with full indifference given on the side of the judgment, there be not in it that likeness of a traveler, gazing with limpid gaze upon the progress of his own diligence, yet having the allegated rules, lest he follow the lead of his eyes.

From what has been said, it follows that, upon the supposition that the possibility of a motion of power, or of a quality impressed of the species of power, predetermining in first act, and not only by way of an act of immission (from numer. 10), does not involve a contradiction in the pronouncement — Scotus argues that it is against the reason of liberty that the will be determined by some form intrinsically, not by way of first act; that the excellent followers of the mind of Scotus should follow, that it does not imply a contradiction that there be given a form necessitating free choice.

But when Scotus asserts that it is from the necessity of the nature and the reason of liberty that the created will not be determined by a habit, or by some nature intrinsically; he did not distinguish concerning the will composed, or not composed, with full deliberation or the judgment of reason.

But if you should object: that our oppositions be understood concerning that motion of power which behaves in first act, or in the reason of a principle affixing free choice so as to be contracted to one part; yet not in that which ascends to the exercise of the operation; since the things named are reserved to the free will of God, or to the action of the object. Thus, then, that impulse which is called the first motion of the power, which should be such an impulse as is called the first motion of the power.

If it be objected: that that impulse, or quality impressed, which is distinguished by reason of being (respectu) from the cooperation of free choice, cannot be an action; since for a created action there is not given a created action; rather, as is clear to those observing, sub num. 20 — inquire whether, if some influency or impression of an intrinsic form be alleged, it would attend to the first act, and consequently be repugnant to liberty, according to Scotus; of which see below.

Two assertions for the true opinion; and the satisfaction of certain objections.

38 It must be said, secondly: that a will composed with such a form, in first act, demanding indifference, and dominion over its acts, (even though it presuppose the deliberate proposition of the object toward any-whichever,) is not understood with all the requisites on the side of the first cause for the free influx.

Which is also the plain opinion of Scotus, while he wishes that, with free choice given with all the requisites on the side of the uncreated principle for operating toward either; still free choice is necessitated; if God were a necessary agent, or should influx as a principle determined to one. I produce the proof of this pronouncement thus, from the first assertion.

Because, for the liberty of the will in the first act, something would expedite to free causality; the conjunction, by way of the first act, of the divine executing faculty exhibiting a concurrence toward either is set forth. Reason deliberate and voluntary: that it be denied that such an operative virtue be a principle in the first act, touching to assent, contradicts that it be a principle of dissent. When there fails to the will the proximate principle of dissenting, then, for exercising it, there is needed the influx of comparison; for the reason that the will, thus premoved, does not stand back before the exercised cooperation: whence, whether the executive faculty of God bear itself alike toward the opposite assent, and consequently owe assent; and the will, under that composition of the form predetermining in the first act, all the requisites for the free influx being integrated on the part of the first cause composed in the first act with free choice toward either, although it presuppose a deliberate and intuitive objection of contraries and contradictories. God seems to intend two opposite placita: the one, concerning affixing the will to one part of the contradiction in the first act before the actual concurrence, on account of the impression of the virtue of prevenient motion: the other, concerning exhibiting the concourse prepared in the first act toward each part of the contradiction.

But that for the liberty of free choice there is required the physical composition of the power of God toward either, in first act, with free choice: this is handed down by Peter Hurtado, tomo de Incarnatione disp. 21. section. 5. subsect. 2. §. 70. Where he says:

Praeteritùs, posse Deum auferre à quouis creaturam peccabilem mortalem prouisionem peccandi ita, vt aut physice, aut moraliter, non possiet grauiter peccare. Physice, quia aufert concursum in actu primo ad peccatum, etc. Si ergo Deus necessitat ad bonum, quando in actu primo componitur illius potentia cum arbitrio creato ad bonam operationem; igitur, apud Hurtadum, ad hoc quòd liberum arbitrium non necessitetur in actu primo, exposcitur compositio ea vtrulibet in actu primo cum libero arbitrio creato.

39 But you object, from the doctrine of Scotus: that the same thing is brought forth, inasmuch as it comes upon the created will to be premoved by the extrinsic operation of God. For either that premotion would destroy liberty; or that God, in the purposes considered so far as the will of God, that is, as the faculty requiring of that [will], should offer to the created will a concourse in first act indifferent toward either; so that the extrinsic premotion of the same divine will should reach the created will toward one part of the contradiction.

It is answered: that if that premotion were exercised which Scotus came upon, and which would attend to the first act of operating, in the intellect there would obtain the opposition, that God, intuiting the opposite decrees; one, concerning offering the concourse of the will in first act toward either; another, concerning binding the will in first act toward one part of the contradiction. Yet because the extrinsic premotion which Scotus intends looks only to the ultimate influx, therefore the contraction of the will which is sought from such a predetermination does not evert the indifference of the aid, or of the concourse, prepared in first act toward either; just as neither does the contraction of the indifference of the will, which it discharges through the action of the concourses of God, destroy the indifference toward either of the created will in first act, or in the reason of the principle.

For the predetermination which we defend as being the mind of Scotus is joined to it only, and by the mode of the exercised concourse, not affixing the free principle in first act to one part of the contradiction, but only contracting in second act. And accordingly, the determination of free choice, through the action of the divine concourse, in no opinion is opposed to the apparition of the concourse of God expeditious in first act toward either; so neither does the predetermination which we assert stand in the way of the apparition of the aid toward either in first act.

You object, secondly: that we seem to depart from the consequence of the doctrine; since we wish that free choice can be necessitated through the extrinsic will of God; and, in fact, we have expressed, as Catholics, that the absolute will of God predetermining free choice does not necessitate it, even extrinsically.

We say: that in that hypothesis in which the will of God would necessitate the act of free choice, there would not be given the degraded composition, composing the power of God with free choice toward either in first act; although there is in God de facto, when He predetermines freely, as is clear from what is to be said below in this art. de Compositione of the divine power with free choice toward either, à numer. 49. vfque ad 63.

For in that hypothesis in which God would necessitate the created will, affixing it in first act to one part of the contradiction, God would so behave Himself with respect to the cooperation of created free choice as if He were a necessary agent determined to one; whence, just as if God were a necessary agent, although created free choice were premised with the judgment and the deliberation of reason toward either, it would still be necessitated, according to Scotus; so also it would suffer necessity, when God did not compose His power with created free choice toward either in first act, by the force of the decree preparing [the power] of God toward contraries and contradictories.

4. It must be said, thirdly: that through the uncreated will of God, inasmuch as it is His faculty executing acts ad extra, the indifference of the will in the first act can be contracted, and in consequence the will can truly and really be necessitated without the immission of any inhering form.

This assertion is not found expressly in Scotus; yet it is gathered evidently from what he discusses expressly concerning the supplying of supernatural habits through the will of God alone, specially joined to the vital powers in the genus of efficient cause, and of those powers having been carried up to the degree proportional to the supernatural principle of influx: concerning which, while we discourse at length on the suppliability of the habit of the light of glory, in controuersia 9. Generali de Visione Dei, distinct. 1. subsist. 2. art. 3., this assertion of ours concerning the possibility of necessitating free choice by the uncreated will of God is not gainsaid by Suárez, loco citato, in prolegomeno 1. de Arbitrij libertate, cap. 5. num 9.

And it is proved; because it is more contradictory, that the vital power be carried along by the exterior will of God alone (without the impression of any form) into the series of a supernatural agent, than that a power complete in its own order of acting be affixed to one part of the contradiction; since in the aforesaid elevation the power passes from not being proportionate to being proportionate to the principle of supernatural influx; whereas in the hypothesis of our assertion nothing is expected from the divine will in the way of a complement of virtue conferring an act proportionately, but only the contraction of the intrinsic faculty to one part of the contradiction.

Next; from the same principle we draw that the created will can be necessitated by the exterior volition of God; from which we establish the suppliability of the habit of the light of glory, and of the other supernatural habits, through the will of God, as his faculty exercising acts ad extra.

Because, whatever God is able to bestow through a second cause in the genus of efficient cause, that he can also elicit by himself immediately, although he cannot supply the causality of a formal cause. Whence it comes to pass, that although God through his exterior volition cannot reach that formal contraction which would be demanded of the will by a premoving form intrinsically composed with it, yet he suffices for every effective influx. But that binding of the influx of the will to one part of the contradiction conduces to the genus of efficient cause; therefore through the exterior will of God, in a special manner assisting the created will by the mode of a first act, the will can be affixed in the first act to assent.

In the cooperation of free choice necessitated by God, no intrinsic physical mutation is demanded; against Suárez.

41. It must be said fourthly: that no intrinsic physical change is demanded in the influx of the will, in order that God may meet with the contradictory denominations of necessitating, or of not necessitating, the created will.

This assertion is against Suárez; whose proof I presuppose from what is to be established, in controuersia 13. Generali de Voluntate Dei, where it will be carefully untangled, that the volition of God, even though it be absolute, and of unimpedible energy, does not necessarily infer a physical mutation ad extra. On which see below in hac controu. de Scientia Dei, dist. 3. de scientia futurorum conditionatorum, ar. 2. sub n. mar. 30.

Nay, indeed Suárez could be convinced from his own principles, by what he says, that the praedefinition of good acts is false; whereas, if supernatural acts were not praedefinite by God, the act praedefinite and the act not praedefinite would not thereafter bear themselves differently as to the physical character.

Moreover; Suárez does in fact assert that a free praedefinition of supernatural acts takes place, given a conditional foreknowledge, yet not consenting so far as to pronounce, once that praescision is cut back, that the praedefinition falls upon liberty: although in either hypothesis no intrinsic physical disparity intervenes between the act praedefinite from foreknowledge, and the act not praedefinite from foreknowledge, even though from the beginning there should intercede for the free, or non-free, operation a moral exterior concomitant.

And even if we grant them that in that hypothesis the genus, free choice, is necessitated; because as the act, or operation of free choice, would not bear itself differently physically, and intrinsically, whether it issued forth freely or necessarily; yet it would bear itself differently morally, and exteriorly, in the character of the entitative necessary and free. For a free act connotes the power of God as composed with the created free choice in the first act to either; whereas a necessary operation notes the same power as not applied in the first act to either, but as determined to one part of the contradiction in the first act before the actual cooperation; because under this hypothesis the decree of composing the power of God to either is removed; as is plain ex n. 49. of this article.

Wherefore we hold the pronouncement of Suárez as false, contending that that influx which would proceed from the will of God inflicting by necessity differs physically from that which would be reached from God absolutely, without a pre-existent knowledge of the operation of the created cause; while that influx which is elicited by the will of God, since it does not necessitate free choice, premits and awaits the infallible foreknowledge of the cooperation of the created cause. For this reason of disparity must not be sustained in the school of Scotus, who asserts that the exterior predetermination antecedent to the assent of the created will is as it were a first mover to freely elicited acts; as being one that praedefines and premoves to the eliciting of the influx of a free cause according to its mode, and the condition of its intrinsic indifference; on which see below in ar. 4. and the following.

42. Now, as for what is to be said, if the act ultimately efficax, not inflicting an absolute physical change, would not be necessitated on the side of the physical impulse of the will, whether from the side of the effect or of the intrinsic discretional character, whether the influx issue forth necessarily or freely; that is evident from this:

That the denomination of the necessary and of the free, in the impulse of the will, imports nothing intrinsic and physical, but only an exterior denomination related to the will as operating freely or by necessity; as is plain in the non-deliberated motions; and even in the first of the first principles, which are necessary acts, and with the acceditting deliberation of reason, as it were toward the free acts, with no physical, or intrinsic, change acceding, but with only the exterior denomination.

Next; that if God, by his will, were to necessitate the created will to consent, as we judge we ought to say he did in this; yet, no real change having been made in such an influx, no inference can be drawn from the denomination of free to the denomination of necessary.

43. From this is laid bare the discretion, or interval, that intervenes between the will of God, as electing the total power to the degree proportionate to, or comprehending, the supernatural causal principle, and the same divine will, as compelling the created will to one part of the contradiction. For the divine will, involving as it does the total power in a brief mode of acting toward the intellectual, in the influx of the power of physical virtue would set forth a supernatural change intrinsic to the acting; which however is said to follow upon the will as it were from the will of God, supplying the form of the supernatural habilitude premised; from which, as it were a free principle, no intrinsic character that would be determined to either in the second act should be cited. Wherefore, since no physical acceding, or intrinsic change, is manifested in the influx, there is no demand made from the character of the intrinsic and physical, for from the free principle there is nothing conferred by the change, but from the will only as it were extrinsically determined.

Next; that if God were a necessary agent, free choice would be necessitated, as is plain from the text of Scotus transcribed above, sub num. 8.; because then the power of God would not be composed with free choice to either, but determinately to one, by the mode of a first act; and yet, as to the physical effect, the volition of God would bear itself under the same character as filling the part of action and of concourse, as it bears itself in fact, when it concurs freely. On which see num. 57.; although it would bear itself otherwise as to extrinsic and moral being. From these things we shake loose the opposite foundations without any labor.

The foundations of the recent Thomists, who think that a will composed by judgment to either cannot be necessitated by God, are refuted.

44 To the first argument of the first opinion, drawn from the authority of Augustine, we say: that he there proceeded concerning the indifference of the will to either, considered intrinsically; not, however, by reason of the habitude to the affixing of it to one part of the contradiction, which the first cause could draw.

Whence the intrinsic indifference of the will would be taken away, if it were not able from the intrinsic to either, in such wise that, by its quidditative character, it could not tend into either part of the contradiction; yet the intrinsic faculty of the will, and the native force, would not be consumed, if from the absolute power of God it were necessitated to assent; as neither is it destroyed, because in non-deliberated motions it does not operate freely, but bears itself in some manner after the fashion of a necessary agent.

To the second argument: that then the will would be in pursuit of an unknown object, when that part of the contradiction had not been proposed to it by the intellect, to whose assent, or dissent, it would be necessitated; for neither, in order that the will be carried necessarily to some object, is it demanded that the intellect apprehend such a necessitation of operating: as neither, in order that the will freely will some good, is it demanded that the intellect recognize such a good as freely longed for; but it suffices that the goodness of the object be intimated, without a condition of necessitas, or liberty, being proposed in the impulse of the will.

For the Calvinian heretics, by other arguments, voiding forth their effutiations, declare that in all works, even depraved works, one is compelled by a necessity from God of lapsing into evil, and so of necessity, not freely; since they hinder the fact that the will is not freely operating, but is acted on, or pushed, by God to evil, from being exercised as free.

45 To the third argument: although that the will, indeterminate from itself to either, should be compelled in the first act to one part of the contradiction, in such wise that proximally in the first act it cannot tend into the opposite, would be a kind of appearance of praeternaturalism in the mode of operating of the will; yet that absolute force, or coaction, is not to be renounced, since the will as it were by its absolute force sustains the coaction in the commanded acts, which as we said it cannot suffer in elicited acts, but by coaction of the interior, and as it were by a proximate appointment to one part of the contradiction.

Which point Scotus treats of most acutely, in 4. sentent. distinct. 29. quaest. vnica. §. ad quaestionem igitur sub num. margin. 6.; where he says:

„ Contradictio est, voluntatem simpliciter cogi ad actum volendi; quia cùm violentum sit ex, 3. Ethicorum, (cuius principium est extra non conferente vim passo;) intellige, passo vim, id est, violentiam non conferente, non negatiuè; sed contrariè. „ Quòd est dictu; violentum est, quod est totaliter à principio extrinseco, quod est contra inclinationem passi; et velle non potest sic inesse voluntati, quia tunc nolens vellet, vel volens nollet; et sic sequitur propositum.

Hence it comes about that, just as it implies a contradiction that an act of volition be against the internal impulse of the impulsive faculty, as the upward motion of a stone is against the inclination of its gravity; so also it involves a contradiction that the will, as regards elicited acts, can be acted upon violently. Especially since no impulse which flows forth necessarily from the will, although it be not free, can be not voluntary, in that acceptation of the voluntary which sounds an act budding from an intrinsic principle with cognition. Wherefore, just as the first act, which flows forth from the will as from a principle determined to one, is not violent to the will; so neither would the will, as eliciting its own acts, suffer force, or absolute coaction, however much it be affixed in the first act to one part of contrariety and contradiction.

46 To the fourth argument: that the impression of the supernatural habits, which are subject to the nutus and the free use of the will, is not denied to render the examples of that absolute necessity which could be inflicted by God on the created will; from which, nevertheless, we think the character of that necessitating is most excellently elucidated by the infusion of a prevenient form, or of a motion of power, which is asserted by some, as we showed under n. 37, if that motion be a quality of the order, and species, of the power, or of the principle of action; as indeed it seems ought to be sustained, since there is no other created action to be given of the creating action.

To the confirmation: that, as is sufficiently, indeed amply, evident from the conflictedness under num. 40, the impulsive faculty of the created will can be bound by the sole will of God, so that it cannot be borne proximally to one part of the contradiction. Wherefore, while it is objected to us: that it would follow that the intrinsic power of the will to either would be contracted by the mere exterior denomination;

It is answered: that if the exterior denomination be used in that universality, as to comprehend any exterior physical assistance whatsoever of the divine will, as his exercising faculty ad extra, since it binds the created will to one part of the contradiction without an intrinsic change of the created will, in that acceptation it would indeed be true that the created will is affixed to one part by the exterior denomination; as it is true that the same will is compelled to assent without an intrinsic change.

But truly, because the exterior denomination is extended also to the connotation of the uncreated will as nowise joined by the mode of use, or of causality ad extra of the divine exercising faculty, with the created will, but by the mode of an internal purpose, or of the mere intention of the end; as the praedestination of the elect to a determinate degree of glory before the scientia visionis meritorum denominates Peter as exteriorly destined to glory, without such an uncreated volition being composed with the created will, in the manner of a use, or of a causality ad extra of the divine exercising faculty, for a physical influx;

Therefore the divine will, compelling the created will by its efficacy to assent, in such wise that it cannot dissent, is not to be said to assist the created will by the mere exterior denomination, in that manner in which the act of praedetermining merely exteriorly concerns the praedestinate; but by a true physical conjunction, not in the genus of formal cause, but of efficient cause, as it were after the fashion of that which intervenes between the created impulsive faculty and the divine will, when it supplies the habit of charity, and constitutes the will proximally, and proportionately, valent for the supernatural impulse, without any intrinsic change of the impulsive faculty which should precede the actual influx.

As to the second objection of num. 32., concerning the contradictory denominations of the divine will as necessitating, or not necessitating, the created will, which necessarily demand a physical, and intrinsic, change in the impulse of the created will; it is plain from what has been said, under num. 41. through 43., and still more from what will be said under num. 57. The diluting of the objections of Suárez; and the examination of the opinion of another Neoteric concerning the composition of the power of God with created choice.

§. 1.

To the second foundation of the second opinion, of Francisco Suárez; it is plain from what has been observed, sub nu. 46.; for it only proves that opposite effects, of privating or not privating the will of the dominion which it claims for itself in its own acts, demand a disparity of the physical composition of the divine will (which is the exercising faculty) with the created will in the first act; which physical composition is asserted without an intrinsic change, or in the genus of formal cause, of the created will. In that manner in which the will of God, or his exercising faculty, assists most intimately, by a special physical conjunction, to the vital powers, while it carries them up to the series of the completed, and as it were to the equate agent in the first act of the supernatural act; without an intrinsic change of these powers in the first act.

But that diversity which Suárez intends from the side of the necessary, and of the free, impulse; is altogether disproved in the sentence of Scotus, affirming that God, since he freely praedefines the impulse of the created will, does not premit the science of the cooperation of the free choice.

Wherefore, for the confirmation, we say: that of the will of God inflicting necessity on free choice would be demanded a firmer and more unimpedible affixion in the first act to one part of the contradiction; yet not in the second act, than of the will of God freely premoving the created will to the actual influx. Because that necessity of the exterior predetermination, which Scotus asserts, although it be the necessity of consequence, and from the hypothesis of the second act, is still asserted in such wise that it can in no degree be impeded in fact and in the actual, even before the foreknowledge of the cooperation of the created cause; since it involves the actual composition of the actual cooperation, for it is the predetermination of the concourse. Yet in that hypothesis, in which the created free choice would be necessitated by the exterior, and uncreated, will of God; although the operation of free choice would not be of another character as to the intrinsic physical being, it would nevertheless be altogether a sensible change as to the exterior, and moral, character; by reason of its habitude to the will of God as composing its power to one part of the contradiction, as if he were a necessary agent, and determined to one in the first act; as is plain from what has been said, sub num. 41.

48 Whence falls the examination of the mode of speaking of Villegas of Complutum the First; who, since he expressly upholds the predetermination by the absolute purpose of the divine will, and moreover also constitutes that the free choice composed by judgment, and full deliberation, to either, can be necessitated by God, as is plain from the pronouncements of the aforesaid author, which we transcribed above, sub num. 36., seems to assert only a virtual, and not formal, composition of the divine will with free choice to either.

For thus he holds, in suo opere de Deo vno, in controuersia 12. de Concordia voluntatis diuinae cum nostra voluntate disp. 1. in fine disp. §. Ad secundā rationem. Where he subjoins:

Difficile non est declarare, quomodo ex parte Dei paratum concursum nostra voluntas habeat ad oppositam operationem; quoniam est quidem decretum, quod antecedere defendimus, rationemque concursus Dei sortitur; sic formaliter effectio eius operationis, quam statuit, vt virtualiter sit voluntas opposita. Nam decretum, quod non solùm ad substantiā operationis, sed etiam ad modum contingentiae illius, refertur; praedictam energiā in se concludit.

And afterwards, again untangling the matter, he adds: Nor is it wonderful if the decree, which in relation to this action is formally the volition of it, be by that very fact, as it is ordered to it under such a mode, a virtual volition of dissent, and of the opposite consent. We can therefore, even though the antecedent decree be absolute and efficacious, not pursue the honorable, and embrace the delectable; for you would not see why it should not suffice, that we can do both, the virtual will equivalent to both, included in such a decree.

The placitum of Villegas is refuted, who denies a formal purpose in God concerning the composition of the divine power with free choice toward either in the first act.

But, indeed, in very truth, although Villegas judges that by no toil he composes the power of God with the use of free choice, while he judges that that volition which absolutely preconstitutes the assent of the created will virtually premoves to dissent; yet I judge that the virtual purpose does not expedite the matter.

It is assailed 1.

Then, because (as is plain from what will be said, sub num. 51.) that will, which thus is made one of absolute pursuit of the assent, that it expresses the flight concerning dissent (not only as to the virtual, and implicit, voluntary in God, but also as to the formal, and explicit,) cannot be brought forward as a virtual will of dissent. Unless that virtuality, or eliminative premotion, to the opposite, is recalled to the formal, and absolute, decree of the composing of the power of God to either in the first act with the created will.

It is sifted 2.

Then also; that if we do not confess in God an explicit, and formal, purpose of composing his power in the first act to either, namely, to assent, or dissent, but acknowledge only a formal will of assent, and a virtual one of dissent; it would come to pass that the created free choice would not refer a moral, formal, and proximate power to dissent, but only a remote, and virtual one. For as it implies a formal, and proximate power of operating in any created agent, if there do not assist it proximally in the first act the exercising faculty of the first cause; so also there is repugnant to the formal, and proximate power, of free choice of the will, as it were, of free choice, that it be compared to the power of God as it were in the second act; from which formal and proximate composition of the will is extracted. Truly, however, it is called into question in the hypothesis, in which God does not compose his power in the first act to either with the created free choice; for neither is the free choice, as it were, of the free choice, but of the will alone; and as it were the assent, without whom the free choice, that it be not made of the exercising faculty alone, but of the will; whence there is no free choice, as it were without the exercising faculty, in the first act; and therefore the dividing of the will to either would not be of free choice, but of the will alone.

---

The decree, concerning the composing of the power of God to either with the created free choice, is weighed; and whether such a decree changes the created will?

A twofold consideration of the conversion of the power of God with free choice.

49 But, truly, because the things premitted seem to call forth a stricter discussion; it is to be observed; that as the will, or the created free choice, can be regarded in two ways, either in the first act, inasmuch as it is indifferent to either before the exercise of the action; or in the second act, when it exercises itself to one part of the contradiction. So also the will of God, or its exercising faculty, inasmuch as it connotes the free choice, and is composed to it for influx, can be regarded also in the first act; namely, as the constituent of free choice to either, before the actual influx; and as composed with the free choice in the second act to the exercise of the operation. Which to all must be indubitable, and in confession; because, as no agent is able to operate without the concourse of God, so neither is it able to act to either without the preparation of concourse to either.

The decree of the composing of the power of God with free choice to either is distinct from the decree of creation.

That the decree of preparing the divine power to the created free choice for the concourse to either must be distinct from the decree of creation; since, while the decree of creation stands, the power of God can be composed with free choice in the first act to only one part of the contradiction; and in consequence, that free choice would be necessitated; as will be more evident from what will be said below, sub n. 53. and 54.

It is confirmed from Scotus.

That the decree of the composing of the power of God with free choice to either is to be sustained on the mind of Scotus, and that that decree is distinct from the decree of creation. It is plain in that hypothesis of Scotus, that God would be a necessary agent; in which hypothesis Scotus had affirmed that the free choice would be necessitated. Of which pronouncement no other reason can be assigned, but that, since God would be a necessary agent, and determined to one, he could not compose his power with free choice to either in the first act; of which see num. 57.

If, however, you reply: that if God were a necessary agent, free choice would be taken away with all the requisites from the side of the intrinsic principle, as to operating to either; and in consequence the hypothesis of Scotus would vanish.

Yet although it be so, that the existence of free choice with all the requisites to operating to either would be repugnant, from the side of the intrinsic principle, if God were not a free principle ad extra; nevertheless still the hypothesis of Scotus would not be useless to be conceded, for referring the character of free cooperation. Is it considered praecise by the sole habitude to the intrinsic principle composed of the full deliberation to either? Or also by comparison to the first cause? So that, if the first cause were composed in the first act determinately to one, there would still underlie the liberty of the operation of the created free choice, however much composed of the full deliberation to either.

Therefore Scotus separates the decree of the creation of free choice from the decree of the composing of the power of God with free choice to either; since, when the existence of the terminus of creation is granted, namely, of the created free choice, he disquires whether it can be necessitated from the exterior, on account of the power of God composed in the first act to one part of the contradiction.

But the utility of this hypothesis of Scotus is defended by Vázquez, 1. p. disp. 200. c. 1. n. 1.; although, with Cajetan and Camerarius, he holds, that although the first cause should operate by necessity; yet the created free choice would bear itself freely, if it were free from itself and intrinsically; of which see Vázquez, disp. 100. citato. 1, cap. 3.

50 This presupposed, we say: that in that hypothesis, in which God would impress on the created will an operative formal principle, or a principle of operating, with an unimpedible force, affixing free choice in the first act to one part of the contradiction; the power of God, or its exercising faculty, would not be composed to either in the first act, even though a full deliberation of reason, and a proposition of the object to each part of contrariety and contradiction, should be supposed.

Because otherwise there would be in God two opposite decrees; one, of affixing the created will, by a form altogether contracting, in the first act, free choice, for instance, to assent: and another, of composing in the first act the divine power to either with free choice.

And truly, when it is quite certain with Scotus, that every causality belonging to the genus of efficient cause, which can be bestowed by a created virtue, can be supplied by the power of God immediately; as we treated in the place cited, in controuersia 9. de visione Dei, in ar. de supplebilitate luminis gloriae. Whence it comes to pass, that as no reason can be rendered, which involves an evident contradiction, why God cannot impress on the will some created form of more acute acumen, and energy, which would thus contract the will in the first act, that it compel free choice to one part of the contradiction in the first act, even with the proposition of the object to either granted: in which hypothesis, the power of God, or its exercising faculty, would not be composed in the first act to either with the created will.

Thus God, through his power and will thus composed in the character of a particular principle supplying that created form binding the will by the mode of the first act, would even necessitate the created will; so that in the first act it would not be composed with free choice to either, but only to that part of the contradiction to which that created form would compel it, whose causality the divine will would supply, as if he were a necessary agent determined to one.

51 But you will object against the things premised: first. That, therefore, the will of God in that hypothesis, in which it would necessitate free choice, would not be compossible with another will composing the divine power to either with free choice; because it would thus praedefine the assent, for instance, that it even would exclude the dissent, and the principle of dissenting.

But the praedefinitive willing, which Scotus does in fact affirm, even determines by the mode of a principle anticipating our operation; because the absolute willing of God is so an action of God ad extra, that it even becomes the principle of our assent; and it so prestitutes efficaciously such a part of the contradiction, that it exclude the other part of the contradiction, not only by the implicit, and virtual, voluntary, but also by a formal, and explicit, volition; therefore such a praedefinitive will is not compossible with the preparation, or composition, of the divine power toward either in the first act, or by the mode of a principle.

Objection 2. That free choice would be necessitated by an uncreated volition, which would be the principle of a praedeterminating quality. 52 It is objected secondly; that if God were to determine free choice by the will of God supplently — that is, if God were to determine it in the first act by a pure volition, as we do not maintain; or by a premoving quality, as some others affirm; under such a conjecture the determination of the will, as it were before the actual influx, would not belong to the mode of the concourse, but of the principle: and by the subscription of the act of the first cause; and thus the free choice would be, as it were, necessitated by an external, and not intrinsic principle; whence, since the free choice is not, as it were, of the intrinsic principle of the will, but of the concourse of the free will to either in the first act, the free choice would not be necessitated by the will of God.

To objection 1; in what manner the will of God determines in the first act, and in the second act. 53 It is answered: that the will of God then concurs by the mode of a principle, when it produces the principle of operating; or supplies the principle of operating, while it suffices in the place of such an operative virtue. It will then indeed influx as a pure action, and concourse, when it does not supply the principle of acting, but only contracts by the mode of a second act.

The instance, as noted, can be weighed for direction: Which can be weighed by the instance premised; concerning the supplying of the habit of the light of glory through the will of God, or through its exercising faculty composed in the character of a particular principle. In which hypothesis, the willing of God, bearing the place of the habit of light, would concur as, as it were, a special principle, completing the created intellect in the character of a supernatural principle proportionate to the supernatural influx; but in fact, since the will of God so concurs with the composed intelligence as if with a habit of light intrinsic, it does not bear itself as a principle supplying the intrinsic, but as a principle extrinsic, which would be, as it were, extrinsically, as it were, contrahing the will to either; and thus, the free choice would be, as it were, extrinsically, by a principle exteriorly, as it were, not intrinsic; whence, since the free choice is not necessitated by any intrinsic principle of the will to either in the first act by a non-premoving, but only by the concourse of the exercising faculty of the will to either; therefore the free choice is, as it were, necessitated by the will of God.

Free choice would be necessitated by the will of God, which would be the principle of a quality of the species of power. of a power of acting in the first act; but by the mode of a mere action and actual concourse.

54 Hence, although free choice would be necessitated by that divine volition which would be the principle of a quality determining our assent — because free choice in the first act would be presupposed as contracted by that virtue or quality which would have flowed forth from the will or power of God — such willing of God would therefore, at least mediately, necessitate free choice, inasmuch as it would be the principle of a created virtue necessitating our will immediately and intrinsically.

It is not necessitated by a decree acting the part of a mere action. But free choice is not necessitated by the divine volition which only immediately attains our assent, and does not infuse, nor supply, some principle determining to assent. For this volition, looking only to the contraction of our will as in the second act, is not opposed to, nor does it destroy, the composition of omnipotence in the character of the first act to either of two contraries; just as, conversely, the determination or fixing of the will in the first act to one side of contradiction is opposed to the indifference of the will in the first act.

Satisfaction to the second objection. From what has just been said it is clear as to the second objection.

The argument is turned back against the adversaries in the decoct of concurring absolutely. Further; if the objection premised under n. 51 had any force, it would likewise strike at the common doctrine of the absolute will of God bestowing a concourse determined to the one side of contradiction with an explicit and formal act of will denying the actual concourse to the opposite.

The will of concurring is not opposed to the equipping of concourse to either of two contraries in the first act. Yet that contraction by the mode of the second act, or of actual concourse, is in the common opinion altogether other than a will of God imprinting a principle contracting the created will in the first act to one side of contradiction; for that predetermination which we receive according to the mind of Scotus is only of concourse.

A caution for the followers of Scotus, and something seriously needed by the promoters of Scotus. 55 Finally, on behalf of the disciples of Scotus I wish that this were seriously attended to: that Scotus everywhere hunts down predetermination by an intrinsic form as adverse to liberty; and in addition all predetermination, even extrinsic, which pertains to the first act of operating and not to the second act of operation.

Testimony 1. against intrinsic predetermination. Scotus As is clear from Scotus, transcribed by us under number 10 of this article, where he expressly maintains: that it is against the nature, and the reason, of liberty that the created will be determined by a habit, or by some inferior nature. Where under the name of habit he embraces any created intrinsic form whatsoever, or operative virtue.

Add also the testimony premised from number 18, where he expressly denies predetermination by the imprinting of any intrinsic thing; for he adds: That the first cause in the second cause is not a new influx which would be the creation of some inhering accident of the second cause; but the influx there is a determined order of causes in producing the common effect. In which he plainly establishes the contraction of the created will through a natural sympathy in acting, without intrinsic modification.

That, moreover, such a sympathy imports nothing antecedent to the mode of an antecedent principle — that is, the actual concourse of God and the creature in the first act — he argues from the fact that God is not the cause of deficiency for free choice; Because no subtraction of a prior cause is understood on account of whose defect the will could act rightly.

Satisfaction to certain objects against our opinion concerning the composition of the power of God with created free choice.

56 SED Yet a knot thus far remains to be untied concerning the composition of the divine power with free choice to either of two contraries; for such a preparation seems fictitious, for acting with the created will to either of two contraries.

For if such a composition were granted, it would be the object of some free decree by which God had determined it expedient to furnish a concourse to either side of contradiction, so that the created will might be able to exercise itself toward either side; since no created agent is proximately capable of any operation without the influx of God.

But such a decree equipping the divine power for either of two contraries seems to be a thing requiring the confutation of the reason that it is; that is, because a free will in God, which does not infer a real modification in the object, or in the object as connotate, is repugnant thereto; while no physical modification whatsoever is possible which answers to a decree founding the exercising faculty with free choice to either of two contraries; just as any effect of the exercising virtue also stands in the way, which could be indifferent to either of two contraries.

For although it attains pursuit and flight, love and hate, it does not thereby attain some contracted and physical term which could be indifferent to love or hate. Wherefore a concourse determined to love, and a concourse determined to hate, howeversoever it is elicited by the power of God or by the exercising faculty, cannot be connotated by some free decree composing the exercising virtue of God with created free choice indeterminately and to either of two contraries.

57 Yet surely this argument, which chiefly obtains with Vázquez and some other recent authors, does not press those who maintain that a free decree does not necessarily express or infer physical modification in the object. And this is made plain in conditional decrees concerning those objects which will never be; concerning which see widely in distinction 3 of this controversy.

Next: that if God were to compose his essence to the intellect in the character of a species impressed for the beatific vision, so that he might fecundate the intellect as complete in the first act, both on the side of the power and on the side of the object; and afterwards were to refuse the actual influx as the part of the knowledge of vision;

Then the intellect would pass from not being a complete and fecundated principle of vision to being such; no intrinsic modification having been made in the intellect which could be the connotate of a decree composing the divine essence in the character of a species.

Which is also shown in the article cited on the suppliability of the light of glory through grace in that hypothesis: that the will of God, in the place of a particular agent, would supply the defect of the habit of light in the first act; and that to the intellect thus elevated through the will, or through the exercising supernatural and uncreated faculty of God, there would be denied the actual influx into the beatific vision.

Finally, we also take this for certain: that when the virtue of acting does not require that it be intrinsically composed through inherence with another co-principle, but only intimately assisting it; (as the executive faculty of God stands ready for created free choice,) then such a convention for acting, or the proximate preparation of co-principles in the first act, can be the object of a free decree of the divine will without intrinsic mutation of that faculty, which is completed and expedited in the first act for acting. On which, add what we discuss below, in this controversy, distinct. 3. de Scientia conditionatorum, artic. 2. sub numer. margin. 31.

Another argument from the doctrine of Scotus. Next, a special argument is pressed from the doctrine of Scotus transcribed by us under number 8, where he maintains that, if God were a necessary agent, free choice would be necessitated, because the divine virtue would not be composed with it in the first act to either of two contraries; since in that hypothesis God is established to be a necessary agent, determined to one.

The argument drawn from Scotus is pressed. Therefore in this hypothesis God would be composed differently with free choice in the first act than he is in fact joined, when he stands ready for free choice to either of two contraries; although on the side of the cooperation of the created will no physical modification or disparity would intervene. Nor on the side of the divine volition acting the part of an action; for although, granted that God were a necessary agent, he would not concur by a volition involving the condition of the cooperation of free choice, but by an absolute will; so also he in fact concurs by an absolute volition.

Vázquez is refuted. As we act in article 5 of this distinction, under margin number 33, against Vázquez asserting that God cannot, even by absolute power, praedefine the operation of free choice — because to such a praedefinition no physical modification in the object would correspond; nor would the operation of free choice praedefined comport itself physically otherwise than one not praedefined.

A corollary from the things premised. But that with Scotus — to whom the more celebrated theologians give their vote — it is taken for granted that a free decree does not require the connotation of a physically modified object; we have shown in this controversy, distinction 3, on conditional knowledge, article 2, nn. 29, 30, and 31. With these premises we have without trouble dissolved the objection, which attacks the decree composing the uncreated exercising faculty to either of two contraries with created free choice, on the ground that such a decree does not connote or infer a physical modification.

Another objection against the preparation of concourse to either of two contraries in the first act. § 8. Wherefore the objection of others rather presses, which besieges our opinion thus: Inasmuch as that preparation, or composition, of the divine power with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act, which precedes the exercise of cooperation or of concourse, might seem futile, from that priority of God whereby he establishes the assent of our will. For if he praedecreed assent in the second act, without awaiting the knowledge of the cooperation of free choice, to what purpose is a concourse equipped for the will to dissent?

Satisfaction to the object. It is answered: that the composition of the divine power to either of two contraries with free choice in the first act is altogether to be maintained; because otherwise free choice would not be proximately and morally capable in the first act to either of two contraries, if the exercising faculty of God ready in the first act to either of two contraries were not present to it. Wherefore in that hypothesis in which God would be a necessary agent, created free choice would be necessitated according to Scotus; because God would not compose his power for a concourse in the first act to either of two contraries, but determined to one in the first act.

How the preparation to either of two contraries can coexist with a concoursive predetermination. Predetermination, however, by the mode of the second act is also necessarily maintained on account of the contraction of the created power to such an individual of action; concerning which see in article 5 of this distinction, in the physical digression. For the action of God must precede the action of the creature, since it contracts the potentiality of the creature to such an individual of action; and everything contracting precedes that which is contracted, with its reason consisting in its being in such a contracted, or determined, thing.

The objection is turned back against Suárez. But if the aforesaid objection concluded anything, it would likewise strike at Suárez, who by the absolute praedefinition of good acts establishes the equipment of the exercising power to either side of contradiction; nay, and it could be turned back in this manner against all the adversaries of physical predetermination.

And indeed against the other attackers of physical predetermination. § 9. For when God institutes to call with a vocation not congruous, He concurs to dissent not only with an implicit, and virtual, negation of assent, but with a formal and explicit volition, which the more received theology maintains to exist in God with respect to objects which will never exist; concerning whose non-futurity not only an implicit and virtual voluntary is deferred to God, but also a formal and explicit one. If then God decreed to call a man for that reason whereby He foreknew that he would not consent, excluding consent by an express and formal act of His own; to what purpose is a concourse toward assent equipped for a man so called?

But this composition of the power of God with free choice to either of two contraries is expressly maintained by Scotus in Book II of the Sentences, distinction 37, question 2, § On the solution of these objectors, under margin number 14, where he has as follows.

By giving a free will he gave antecedently right works, which are in the power of the will; and therefore, insofar as lies on his part, he gave rectitude to every act of the will.

Here weigh those words: by giving a free will. Which, in my judgment, mean this: that to a created free will that composition of the divine power with created free choice is necessary which is to either of two contraries in the first act; so that, although it should exercise itself toward evil, there may always be to it a power toward good, on the part of the first cause, altogether furnished. For Scotus did not say that by giving a created will, God also bestowed rectitude insofar as lies on his part; but he immediately added, by giving a free will; as though to the liberty of the will, insofar as it excludes necessity from an extrinsic principle, there is required that God make the will ready in the first act to either of two contraries, and that there be equipped to it in the first act a concourse to either of two contraries.

Wherefore Hugo Caesarius (Canellus) in his scholion on this locus recognized such a composition of God with free choice, according to the sense of Scotus; although in this it displeases him, that he would therein perhaps repel physical premotion; as though the preparation of the power of God with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act did not coexist with premotion through a concourse in the second act; to which objection we have satisfied in the things premised.

Wherefore better, and more conformably to the mind of Scotus, Angelus de Monte Pisano, in the Summa of Theology, second tome, part 1, dispute 30, article 9, under margin number 7, § Finally we say, would have asserted: That the altogether first and adequate root of the divine foreknowledge, in its comparison with things determinately future from free causes, is to be sought precisely from the praedefinitions of the divine will, virtually involving also the active free determination of the aforesaid causes.

Where he plainly defends the praedefinition of concourses with a priority not of (in-what) but of (from-what), that is, of nature; which he expressly maintained in the antecedent article 8 of the same dispute 30. That notwithstanding, he professes the composition of the divine power with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act; which he delivers in the now-cited article 9, § Here we suppose, under margin number 4, where he has:

We suppose that the concourse by which God concurs with fruitful causes for acting together can be considered in two modes: namely, insofar as it is ready; and insofar as it is exhibited. In the prior mode it is the divine virtue proximately applied in the first act, by the absolute decree of the divine will, whereby God from eternity decreed in time to act with second causes and to accommodate himself to them according to the exigency of the connatural mode of acting of the latter. And since these latter have in themselves a connatural mode of acting essentially diverse; hence also in a diverse mode in the first act is the concourse prepared for natural causes, and prepared for free causes; for to the former it is prepared wholly determined to a certain species of act, to the latter however, on the contrary, it is prepared altogether undetermined, and indifferent, both to a certain species of act, and even to the individuals under any species whatsoever, etc.** The objections of Jacobus Alarcón are blunted — who demands the composition of the divine power with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act; wherein also Lessius is refuted, maintaining that God and created free choice are composed to concourse equally and as if by a blind reason —**

Coming to grips with Alarcón, in part 1, treatise 2, On the Knowledge of God, dispute 5, chapter 8, who treats widely against Suárez and Herice, maintaining that some free decree is given whereby the divine power is composed to either of two contraries with free choice before the exercise of operation. Wherefore in the same work, chapter 8, § 3, margin number 33, he asserted that the assistance of the divine Omnipotence for operating with a second cause is a certain moral obligation arising in God from a free decree, whereby he determined himself to be bound to compose with second causes for operating, according to the exigency of the causes.

But from the things said the aforesaid author seems manifestly pressed ad hominem; because it is one and the same thing, and sounds throughout the same — a decree of God inferring a moral obligation to assist free choice according to its exigency, and a decree of concurring with free choice to either of two contraries. For as free choice, according to the exigency of its condition, is entirely indifferent morally and proximately to either of two contraries; so also it connotes the first cause equipped by pact to it in the first act to either of two contraries, before the exercise of influx.

Because with the same author, under § 2, from number 15 through 18, it is impossible for any created cause to have a proximate and moral power, if there is not present to it the power, or the exercising faculty, of the first cause; therefore the potentiality of free choice standing ready in the first act, morally and proximately to either of two contraries, is repugnant, if the power of God is not composed to it to either of two contraries; therefore that moral obligation of bestowing concourse on free choice according to the exigency of such a principle indifferent to either of two contraries, drinks in some free decree composing the power of God with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act.

And indeed the inquiry concerning that decree of God for binding himself to free choice according to its exigency would return: whether it infers, or refers, a determined object? (As the same Alarcón acts against Suárez and Herice, whose foundation we transcribed under number 56.) Unless Alarcón should wish that the obligation of assisting free choice in the first act to either of two contraries be a determined object; by which same reason also the power of God composed in the first act to free choice to either of two contraries is likewise able to be adduced as the determined object of such a decree.

Either therefore it is not of the reason of a free decree that it express or infer a real and physical modification; or there results in God a moral obligation of concurring to either of two contraries from the nature of things, without any free decree on the part of God — which the same Alarcón rightly confutes. § 3, under n. 34.

Further; that it is not of the reason of a free decree to infer a modification in the object, or in the object as connotate, is shown in that hypothesis in which God had not revealed such a decree; nay, he had not even proposed that plan of concurring with creatures according to their exigency; yet he would operate infallibly with them, on account of a natural sympathy in acting.

Just as a habit is infallibly composed to a power for action in a blind mode, not premising the excitation of the power, but infallibly accompanying it; in which fashion Lessius asserted God to comport himself with respect to the concourse of the creature, whom Alarcón follows. Locus cited. § 3. margin number 42.

Therefore in such a hypothesis God would compose his power with free choice in the same manner on the side of the object and of the connotate as he in fact concurs, when there is asserted by the aforesaid authors that moral obligation of concurring arising from a free decree; and yet no free decree would intervene; therefore a free decree does not require a modification in the object, or in the connotate.

62 You will say with Alarcón, in the same place § 3, number 44, that then in that hypothesis in which God had not determined to concur with second causes according to their exigency, things would comport themselves differently for acting, composed. Because then there would not be supplied to them a proximate and moral power for acting, which does not subsist without the decree of God to concur with creatures.

But it does not void the force of the argument proceeding from the hypothesis (which Alarcón admits for the sake of disputation, to elicit the truth), which supposes that God, without a decree, by a natural sympathy in operating would be composed to action with created causes according to their exigency; nor does a habit infallibly accompany the action of the power. For in that hypothesis it could not be denied that there is a moral and proximate power of acting in the creature, on account of the denial of the assistance of God concurring; since, that granted, God infallibly concurs to every action of the created will in the aforesaid supposition admitted by Alarcón; and yet the decree is removed; therefore the decree can be removed, or posited, with the object, or the connotate, unchanged.

63 Yet surely, with respect to the doctrine of Lessius and Alarcón, maintaining that, on the supposition of a decree applying the power of God to act with creatures, the divine virtue is drawn as it were by a blind reason to operate with free choice; so that without any excitation, or determination, of the creature toward love and hate, God concurs toward love and hate — observe: the aforesaid pronouncement attacks the common opinion of the adversaries, asserting that God is determined by the creature to producing the substrate of sin; concerning which see ourselves widely in article 6 of this controversy. Since expressly they — Lessius and Alarcón — maintain that God is no more determined by the creature with respect to the act of hate, than the creature by the creator; so that God and creature are composed equally to eliciting the matter of sin.

Add also: that that instance drawn from the accompanying of the operation of a habit and a power is of no strength. Because a power undetermined to such an individual of action does not seek a contraction from a habit, in the way a created cause is determined by the first cause; on account of which reason we rightly judge that God and creature are not so joined equally for acting, as a power and habit are composed to action with no priority of nature. Concerning which see precisely in article 5 of this distinction, in the physical digression, on the contraction of the created will to such an individual of action.

But whatever the case may be concerning temporal concourse ad extra; yet even so against Lessius and Alarcón we are able to show, that either there is an inevitable determination of the actions of free choice by God — as Scotus wills, with the common opinion; or that God composes his power with free choice while a condition is drunk in that is to be purified by free choice — as Suárez, Vázquez, and other primary authors among the Jesuits assert.

Because God from eternity does not only institute to exact a moral obligation of concurring with free choice according to its exigency; but has also absolutely decreed to cooperate with free choice toward assent, for instance. For as the assent of free choice from eternity is objectively modified toward an infallible futurition; so likewise did God, by that mark, have a determined decree concerning the existence of such an assent.

Either therefore the divine decree, determined to the futurition of our assent, drinks in a hypothesis, if the created will so wills; and in consequence it would follow that that divine volition imports a condition to be purified by the created will; and hence the operation of free choice would be prior in nature to the motion of God. As we show widely and precisely below, in the following article 5, against Suárez and his followers, asserting that conditional composition of the divine will with free choice for so cooperating, if free choice so wills.

Or God from eternity, objectively immutating the act of free choice to futurition, or to non-futurition, bore himself absolutely, not involving the hypothesis, if the created will consent, or dissent; in which way Lessius and Alarcón (that they may avoid the pressure of a conventional application to be purified by free choice) maintain that God cooperates in time equally with free choice, so that he is not excited by free choice to such a species of action. And consequently it would come about that that eternal statute of God concerning our consent, not referring a condition, or the hypothesis of free choice so attempered, or obedient, would be simply predefinitive and predeterminative; since nothing else is, with Scotus and the common view, a predefinitive statute, than an efficacious purpose not importing a condition to be purified by the second cause.

Whichever simultaneous and equal reason of concurring Scotus attacks in Book II of the Sentences, distinction 37, question 2, § Along the second way, margin number 2, where he has:

Either one will determines another, and not our own, the divine — it is plain, because the temporal is not the cause of the eternal: therefore conversely, and the proposition is had. Or neither determines the other, and then neither will be a mover moved; nor will there be between them an essential order.

Which doctrine, although it be handed down by Scotus acting against his own opinion concerning the immediate concourse of God to the acts of our will, proceeds nevertheless from the proper principles of Scotus, in admitting an essential order between second cause and first, and that a second cause does not operate unless as moved by the first; which he supposes throughout that whole question.

A pressing objection; concerning the liberty of the actions of Christ the Lord, and of the Blessed.

64 SED Yet that objection cannot be passed over against the doctrine we have premised — the one that is brought forward from the liberty of the actions of Christ the Lord, and of the blessed (as is clear from number 12); and thus our opinion seems able to be pressed; on the supposition that, with Scotus, the impeccability of Christ is reduced to the beatific fruition, which Christ the Lord has in common with the other blessed.

For if the preparation of a concourse to either of two contraries sufficed for the blessed to have in himself a liberty of endeavor toward enjoying God; and beyond that, a power toward sin — such that impeccability were disclaimed only in the sense of composition, namely insofar as it is composed to the divine premotion toward good — and not in the sense of division, or as it is apprehended with all requisites on the side of the principle of operating, before the exercise of operation;

It would come to pass that either Christ would not be a free principle of his own actions, because there would not be equipped to him an indifferent concourse to either of two contraries; or if by reason of the sole preparation of a concourse to either of two contraries there could be sustained a moral and proximate power to either of two contraries, inasmuch as there had still been granted a perpetual fixing toward good — it would follow that Christ would refer a proximate power to sinning.

So that to the blessed in heaven, and to Christ the Lord, there would be no other reason of impeccability at hand than that which would suit a man confirmed in grace — one to whom the power to either of two contraries would be simpliciter made possible, and the equipment of concourse in the first act to contraries and contradictories; and there would intervene only a perpetual contraction toward good, because of an extrinsic will of God that prevented prevention by the mode of concourse, or of the second act. Whereas, upon examining everything which contributes to the reason of a free, and morally defectible, principle — there is nothing in one confirmed in grace which is not at hand to any other just person; and the difference is only on the side of the will that predetermines by the mode of concourse and of the second act; wherefore, as he who is confirmed in grace is asserted to be peccable absolutely and simpliciter, so also is the blessed in heaven.

65 We say: that if a concourse toward either be equipped to the blessed, and he be not affixed to one part of the contradiction by the extrinsic will of God in the first act before the actual cooperation; then the blessed is to be judged absolutely, and simpliciter, a free principle of his own operation. Since the contraction by way of exercise, and in the second act, does not take away the free, and moral, power toward the opposite; as is clear in the action of the concurrence of the divine will, when the created free choice is contracted to one part of the contradiction.

This being premised, it is nevertheless to be held that the blessed is to be considered and judged impeccable under another, more special title, than he — a just viator confirmed in grace — is to be pronounced impeccable. Because that gift of confirmation in grace is not bestowed at the exigency of the state of the viator, but on account of the sole munificence of God; which is otherwise in the blessed, to whom, on account of the clear vision of God, by which he possesses God, that perpetual premotion toward perpetual fruition is due.

66 Which rather is urged with respect to Christ the Lord; who, on account of his hypostatic and substantial sanctity, more demands, and more claims, the premotion of grace and its governance toward good; from which it comes to pass that he is pronounced impeccable absolutely and simpliciter. Because the fixing to this side of contradiction is due on account of the antecedent supposition of the hypostatic union, which precedes the actual operation.

Hence before the actual influx there intervenes the debt of governance, which obliges God from moral decency, and from the regard for the substantial holiness of the operating supposit; so that such a supposit, though simpliciter free for acting, and to whom there is furnished in the first act a concourse to either of two contraries, is nevertheless always contracted toward good.

Which in Christ the Lord I wish to be understood, so that to him there is not furnished a concourse to either of two contraries, nor even in the first act, unless within the limits of becoming, honest, and fitting appetite — such as suits the ineffable majesty of the Son of God; as has been asserted above, in controversy 9, On the Vision of God, distinction 1, subdivision 2, concerning the supernatural principle of vision on the side of the power, article 1, margin number 53; namely, that the liberty of the actions of Christ is asserted on account of the non-determination to eliciting good under such a motive, or under another, or in such-and-such intention of acts.

Nor is Scotus's pronouncement from the doctrine delivered in the same place an obstacle to this: that a created nature, which by nature would be impeccable and fixed toward good, seems impossible of occurrence. For there Scotus speaks of a nature contracted from within to the operation of rectitude; yet not of that contraction which would be sought from a governance from without.

The peccability of Christ is defended from the absolute power of God, when a perpetual governance toward good is denied him.

67 SED Yet you would insist further, attacking us sharply; because if the impeccability of Christ had to be sought from a perpetual premotion toward good, it would come to pass that, as God could by absolute power refrain from premoving the nature assumed by the Word toward good (as many of the disciples of Scotus assert, with John of Rada, in part 3, controversy 3, On the Immediate Term of the Union, article 3, in the explanation of the opinion of Scotus, conclusion 5; and with Philip Fabro, in Book III of the Sentences, distinction 3, single question, dispute 27, chapter 4, especially under margin number 21 — which opinion Peter of Lorca also judges to be free from every note of disgrace, in part 3, question 15, dispute 57, member 2, § Yet truly in vain, margin number 11), so also in such a hypothesis Christ could have sinned.

We answer: that, granting that opinion of the Scotists, which asserted Christ peccable in such a hypothesis, nothing absurd is inferred. Nor indeed would it come to pass that such a moral lapse were referred to the personality of the Word in the genus of efficient cause, but only to the humanity assumed; although meritoriously the lapse were ascribed to the supposit. For the eliciting principle of any action whatsoever is only the nature; not however the composition of nature and hypostasis.

Which is evident also from this: that if God were to sustain the nature without any hypostasis's assistance, from the nature there would proceed an action of the same species as that which flows forth from a nature composed with a hypostasis.

Whence when actions are pronounced to be of the supposita; that axiom does not regard the eliciting principle of the action, but the principle of denomination alone; namely, that which is denominated from the action on account of the mere composition of the hypostasis with the nature, which alone is the eliciting principle. So that actions are asserted to be of the supposita for this reason: that the nature first contracts itself, through the effecting of its own hypostasis, or of positive persity, before it issue any other causality, whether it operate within itself, or outside itself; for the budding forth of the hypostasis is nearer, and more proximate, to the nature than any other eliciting causality whatsoever, or that which emanates from the nature in the genus of efficient cause.

Wherefore it is for this reason that the actions are called of the supposita: because the nature composes itself previously with a hypostasis, or constitutes itself in the character of a supposit, before it approaches another influx. From which it comes to pass that there is no action which does not denominate the supposit, or which does not proceed from a nature already constituted in the character of a supposit; because such an influx the nature, already constituted in the character of a supposit, exercises before that it elicit another action; not however so that the action flow forth from the composition of nature and hypostasis, or rest on the hypostasis in the fourth mode of persity.

68 But you will insist: that, this having been granted, it would also follow that the divine personality would in the same fashion flow into a sinning action in such a hypothesis, as in fact it flows into a meritorious action. Because even a meritorious operation is not elicited by the supposit, but by the nature; there would therefore arise, that the divine Word would be compared by the same reason of causality to a right action, as to an oblique and sinning one; whereas with respect to each it is the principle of mere denomination, on account of its union with the operating nature, not however an eliciting principle.

69 It is answered: that the divine supposit, with respect to an honest operation, although not a physical eliciting principle, is nevertheless a moral principle; because, in view of the hypostatic union, and on account of the substantial holiness of the Word communicated to the nature, the nature — which is the eliciting principle of action — is premoved toward good. Hence the supposital composition is to be judged the moral principle of holy operation; since, in view of the union with the supposit, that perpetual governance for acting holily is owed to the nature.

From which it comes to pass that the sanctity of the actions of Christ ought to be referred to the supposit, as to a moral principle; since to the moral and meritorious cause belongs that form, or manner, of acting, in view of which there is provided, and furnished, to the eliciting principle the contraction and fixing toward acting holily.

Which would come about otherwise in an oblique action, in that hypothesis in which God would deny premotion toward good, leaving the nature deprived of the governance of all supernatural auxiliaries. For then the concourse toward evil would not be exhibited by God in view of the composition of nature to the hypostasis of the Word; but on account of a covenant of concurring with a free and defectible second cause, according to the stability of the nature.

And accordingly the supposit would not be the moral principle of such an action; since the concourse toward evil is not furnished in view of the composition to the hypostasis of the Word, just as there is furnished a perpetual and continuous premotion toward good.

70 But it is a pleasure to adduce the express judgment of Peter of Lorca, the Complutensian primary, against certain recent sun-gleaners of the doctrine of Scotus; for so it has, in the locus cited, under margin number 10:

Thus the more recent hold that it is altogether absurd that the humanity of Christ could have sinned, so that they judge the prior opinion not only false, but even to deserve some mark of infamy, because of the indecency which it puts forward — namely, to admit sin in Christ, which offends pious ears; and because of the common opinion of the holy Fathers, who so exclude sin from God, that they exclude also the power of sinning.

And afterwards, under number 11, he adds: Yet truly in vain are all those authorities adduced, because the Fathers considered only that which now belongs to Christ, as the incarnation has been made, and that it was fitting and consonant according to the ordinary law; in which way the authors of the first opinion do not deny that Christ is impeccable, because the nature assumed, with the gifts which were bestowed upon it on account of the assumption, and which by the ordinary law were owed to it, could not sin. And this those authors expressly affirm they only dispute the metaphysical question on the hypothesis that human nature, bare, and in pure naturals, would be assumed, as it could be assumed by the absolute power of God; of which the Fathers thought nothing, nor indicated it even lightly by a word.

Wherefore that opinion deserves no censure, since neither do the Fathers say anything against it, nor does it offend pious ears to admit the potentiality of some sin in Christ; if ears, as they are pious, be also learned, (as Gabriel remarks,) namely such as know how to discern in what way, and in what sense, the possibility of sin is conceded in Christ. Thus far the most wise man of the Cistercian Order, General in Spain.

Whom I transcribe, not that I may coerce certain more recent men of the opposite school, who bark at Scotus out of affection, not judgment; but that I may report how intemperately Matthew Ferchius, Provincial of the conventuals of the province of St. Bonaventure, spoke of this opinion of Scotus; who, when he had asserted Scotus with most polished and weighty apologies, and vindicated him from the cavils of the impostors, suffering something human, sprinkled such a blemish upon that most candid history, that the Horatian line is deservedly retorted upon him: Naeui inspersit gregio corpori. Saty. 7., while he thus censures this placitum of Scotus, cap. 7. vitae Scoti.

That the Blessed Virgin was piously defended by Scotus as immune from every sin, I hold; I do not so hold that God could, by absolute power, sin as man; for I would more readily believe that the Virgin, the Mother of God, could be subject to sin, than that Christ could be subjected to sin; so that even for this cause I would have departed from the school of Scotus, bound to swear in the words of no master. Behold the great vindicator of Scotus shaken by a light blow.

To the Franciscan doctor, therefore, and to the Cistercian historian, I oppose an assertor, by whom, as it were, I lay low the effort of Ferchius. That in that hypothesis of the metaphysical dissertation, in which Christ is asserted to be peccable, His mother could have been not only polluted by the original stain, but also dishonored, and defiled, by the sordidness of actual sin; because then she would not have been the exemplar and meritorious cause of the sanctity of the whole body of the Church, and accordingly neither would such a mother have had strength sufficient to crush the head of the serpent, which the most holy Virgin, the parent of the Assertor of our liberty from the servitude of the devil, drew from the foreseen merits of her Son.

Whence I also thus re-convict Ferchius from his own words; and I contend for the piety of Scotus.

That the heart of Duns burned with singular devotion toward the Blessed Mother of God, that most celebrated question concerning the immaculate conception of the Mother of God re-convicts, in which Scotus endeavored to defend her innocent from every contagion of crime, unpolluted, and set apart from sinners; inasmuch as she was to be the mother of that Pontiff who (as the Apostle stood forth as a rich witness) was innocent, unpolluted, set apart from sinners, and made higher than the heavens. Thus Ferchius, in vita Scoti, capit. 5. numer. marg. 12.

From which words I attack Ferchius, and free Scotus from the inconsequence of doctrine which Ferchius fastens upon him. Because just as Scotus asserted her, the Mother of the God-man, to be free from the original stain, who was about to bring forth a Pontiff set apart from sinners; so also, in that metaphysical hypothesis in which the man assumed to the hypostatic union would be deprived of every help of grace, and of the governance of premotion to good, just as He would not be a Pontiff of the Church set apart from sinners, so neither would He claim His mother immune from every stain.