Celebriores Controversiae in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti — Tomus Alter (de Scientia Dei et Ideis)

DISTINCTIO II. ON THE SCIENCE OF GOD WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE CONTINGENTS ABSOLUTELY.

WHEN we compare the Science of God to future things, inquiring as it were into the rationale by which such a science terminates in contingent objects; no controversy is raised over the rationale of foreknowing on the side of the form, which is the increate divine substance itself. Granted these are free in God as regards the extension and termination of them to such an object, and consequently even such as God could do without, just as a future contingent could have failed to exist; (upon the same rationale we have declared free — as proposed in the case of the absolute decree of God as regards its causality and termination to the object — in the seventh controversy on the Immutability of God, on the second article on the Immutability by way of a relation to free acts). Yet such science, like volition, if they are considered in the rationale of a vital predicate in God, are the divine substance itself.

We do not, therefore, ask what the vital form of knowing the future consists in; since we have treated of that in the preceding pages, so far as our small capacity allowed. But we weigh the rationale on the side of the object, dissecting: whether in the future, in its objective being, there lies any contraction or determination which could be the term of the determined extension, or ordination, of the divine science to such a future?

PRELUDE of the dissertation.

Before we attack the controversies, it must be prelibated in regard to the title of this distinction: that a twofold contingence is found in future things. Either from without, which is also called contingence secundum quid; or contingence simpliciter, and from within. For just as that effect is asserted to be contingently future which flows so from its principle that it cannot be elicited by it; and contingence for not existing emanates from a twofold source, either from the power and intrinsic indifference of the cause, or from an extrinsic impediment; so too contingence in future things can be twofold, either from without or from within.

That contingence of futures is secundum quid, or from without; when the causes are natural and not free, as being determined to one, or such as by intrinsic power do not withhold themselves from not producing the effect, all requisites being applied. Contingence from without, moreover, arises from this very thing: namely, that the whole confluence of dispositions required for acting could fail to be put in place because of some extrinsic obstacle. Contingence of this sort fits the effects of lower natural causes, which can be obstructed by other contrary agents.

This is to be understood so that such causes in their application do not depend on some free principle; for if the concourse of free causes were required, those effects, expected through the cooperation of a free principle, would be rendered contingently simpliciter and intrinsically.

Further, although the aforesaid effects, not proceeding from a free cause, import contingence through a relation to this or that natural cause, impeddable from without; yet they do not suffer contingence in respect of the whole collection of causes and dispositions which come together necessarily for acting. For given the confluence of such causes and dispositions, the effect is not contingent, but determined to existing, if the whole collection of causes be applied; or determined to not existing, if the concourse of all requisites should be absent.

The other species of contingence is that which is asserted to be such simply and primarily, which emanates from the intrinsic indifference of the cause; namely that, all requisites being applied, it is integral for it to act and not to act. From the contingence of that causality proceeds the present controversy, inquiring: whether in such futures there is found a determinate cognoscibility which can terminate the infallible gaze of God? For of those first contingents it is beyond controversy in what way they are known by God, since God possesses the whole collection of causes which will come together necessarily for acting.

Yet since this dissertation teems with a multitude of asseverations and obscurity, so that as many pronouncements occur as there are headings; to proceed more clearly, we will first set aside the opposing opinions almost by way of removal; then we will establish the opinion of Scotus, so far as our small capacity allows.

ARTICLE I.

Can future contingents be foreknown by God in their real presence to eternity?

SUMMARY.

The opinion of Saint Thomas on the real presence of futures to eternity. Num. 1. That the deserters of Saint Thomas are manifest, who interpret him of the objective presence alone of futures. Num. 7. The opposing opinion, which is also the common one, confirmed by the reasonings of Scotus. Numer. 8. The useless defenses of the Moderns are refuted, who interpret Saint Thomas of the real presence of futures from the time of their production. where we reject the placita of Albelde and Granada. Num. 9.

Other proofs of Scotus; the encounters of the Neoterics being examined. Num. 11.

The last proof from Scotus; that the Angel in his aeviternal state naturally foreknows future contingents; where also the escapes of the Moderns are blocked. Num. 13.

The foundations of the adversaries are demolished. Num. 15.

To dissolve the third argument in opposition it is inquired whether the knowledge of vision is intuitive, given that the real presence of creatures is not granted from eternity? Where the defense of Scotus is weighed; what belongs to the rationale of intuitive cognition? from Num. 19 to 26.

Interpretation of St. Thomas on the real presence of futures in eternity.

1 Saint Thomas, I. Part. quæst. 14. art. 13, asserted that futures contingent are foreknown by God determinately; because they really coexist with eternity from eternity.

Which opinion is defended by Capreolus, in I. distinct. 38. quæst. 1. art. 2. et distinct. 38. quæstion. 1. art. 2. Ferrariensis, I. contra gentes, cap. 66. Cajetan, I. part. quæstion. 14. art. 13. Báñez and Zumel, q. 1. conclu. 3. Diego Alvarez, lib. 2. de Auxiliis, disp. 8. James Granada, I. part. tract. 4. de Scientia Dei. disp. 3. sect. 2.

The observation of Cajetan for reporting the opinion of St. Thomas.

Which opinion, as Cajetan reports, he observes; that a thing being really present to God in eternity can be understood in a twofold manner.

First; so that this coexistence of things to eternity connotes an intrinsic measure of any temporal duration; so that the real coexistence of Antichrist, for example, to eternity could fall under the measure of present time. So that it may be true to pronounce, that Antichrist is now really present to eternity; referring that now not precisely to eternity, but to the instant of present time; in which sense it is false to assert that created beings really coexist with eternity from eternity.

Or this pronouncement may be weighed in this way; that in every instant of eternity, which encompasses all the courses of time, all created things are according to their real existence; yet not by referring that to any measure of time. And in this acceptance Cajetan asserts that every future thing really coexists with eternity.

2 This opinion they confirm by the authority of Augustine, who in lib. 2. ad Simplicianum. contends there is not properly in God a foreknowledge, but only metaphorically, so that God is said merely translational-figuratively (translatitiè) to foreknow something, just as He is said to repent; for thus he has it:

St. Augustine:

For what is foreknowledge but the knowledge of things future? But what is future to God, who transcends all times? For if in His knowledge you have the things themselves, they are not future to Him, but present; and by that token it can no longer be called foreknowledge, but only knowledge.

The argument is urged: because objective presence does not satisfy presence; otherwise the Prophets are not foreknowers of future things, but of things present.

From which this argument proceeds: either St. Augustine proceeds from the real presence of creatures in the eternity of God; and then the intention is had. Or he speaks of the objective presence alone, by which things are had in the divine gaze; and then he would falsely assert that such objective presence of things hinders God from being asserted a foreknower in the full propriety of speech; since the Prophets are said properly to have had foreknowledge of futures, even though the futures were to them objectively present. Therefore, in order that foreknowledge of futures may be removed from God according to the phrase and sense of Augustine, the real coexistence of creatures from eternity in eternity must of necessity be affirmed.

Arg. 2, from Gregory, on the same foreknowledge of God by way of a relation to the created, as absent.

3 There is added the authority of Gregory, who in lib. 20. Moral. cap. 23. seems to establish that same real presence of futures in eternity, while he affirms:

St. Gregory:

He is called foreknowing who sees those things which to us are future, but to Him are ever at hand; although he by no means has foreseen what is future, who sees it as present.

It seems this pronouncement of Gregory cannot be understood of the objective presence alone.

From which words the following proof is drawn; that on this account, according to Gregory, foreknowledge of futures is ascribed to God only metaphorically: because created things, although they are future to us, are not so to God, with whom they coexist really from eternity; nor indeed can Gregory be understood of the objective presence alone, which things draw from cognition, since futures are even to us present according to objective coexistence: he therefore proceeds from the real presence of creatures in the eternity of God. Nor does Jerome dissent, on that of Jeremiah 1: Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee. Where he subjoins: Not that Jeremiah existed before conception, as the heresy suspects; but that the Lord foreknew him as future, with whom things not yet done are already done. Anselm has similar things, in the little work on the concord of free choice and predestination, chap. 1, and other holy Fathers, whom it would be long to recount.

Then, for the opinion of St. Thomas, Scotus argues, in I. dist. 39. single question, §. Aliter ponitur. sub num. marg. 8.: Eternity is immense, and unlimited in infinitude; so that by its own il-limitation and simplicity it encompasses all the durations of time, and the things which coexist with the temporal courses.

The consequence is clear by parity of reason; for as, because God bears forth infinitude in respect of place, or local immensity, which is wont to be called ubiety, He embraces all the positions of place, not only real but also imaginary, by which He is actually present, as many think; so, because He is illimited in respect of duration, or eternal, He ought to encompass all the durations of time, so that He coexists with them really from eternity; for otherwise eternity would not be immense, or infinite, in the rationale of duration.

This is confirmed by the example of the rod fixed in the river; in whose case, although the whole river flows successively, so that the rod is successively present to all the parts of the river; yet the rod is not affirmed to be immense in respect of the river, because it cannot acquire a simultaneous presence in respect of the flowing water.

Therefore, since the divine duration is something standing and permanent, like the rod; and time flows alongside eternity; if eternity were not simultaneously coexisting with the whole temporal vicissitude, but only successively, as the rod corresponds to the running water; it would follow that eternity would not be immense in respect of time, just as neither is the rod in respect of the river.

Besides; the now of eternity, as it is with a now of time, is not equated to it; therefore the now of eternity, as it is with that now of time, surpasses it: yet it would not surpass the now of time, if the now of eternity, as it is with that now of time, were also not actually with another through real coexistence to other future durations; therefore it really coexists with them.

4 Secondly, for the opposing opinion Scotus argues by the example of a center in a circle. For if flowing time were posited as the circumference of a circle, and the now of eternity as the center; however much the things themselves flowed and stood apart from one another, yet not in respect of eternity.

As the lines and points of the circumference, though they stand apart from one another, yet ever retain conjunction and presence in respect of the center.

Thirdly it is argued: because the knowledge of vision is intuitive cognition, as the common opinion of the theologians sustains; and that is clear from the analogy of it to bodily vision, which is an intuitive apprehension of the object. But to intuition the objective presence alone of the thing which is attained does not suffice; (for otherwise abstractive cognition would be intuitive,) when a thing becomes objectively present through the power of an abstractive apprehension.

But the knowledge of vision requires to be an intuitive inspection of creatures, if creatures were not really present to eternity; because that cognition, which from the mode of tending so bears itself upon the object, that it absolutely seeks and abstracts from real presence for some difference of time, cannot be intuitive but abstractive. And the knowledge of vision, through that whole duration of eternity which antecedes the temporal affection of the creature, would abstract from its real presence; if the creature were to enjoy being really present to eternity only from its production.

Therefore Raphael Auersa, I. part. quæst. 14. de Scientia Dei, sect. 18. conclus. 6. §. Quinto denique, teaches that some Thomists confess that the presence of futures in eternity is not the rationale by which they are known simpliciter; but they say it is the rationale by which the presence of God is made intuitive, because through the rationale of intuitive cognition it is of the present object. So far Raphael Auersa.

But I hold that they proceed consequently in this theory who, having granted the real presence of futures to eternity, yet assert that in respect of that real presence (setting aside comparison to the presence of the primary object, which is the Godhead) the knowledge of vision ought to be affirmed as the proper intuitive cognition; do then further show that such real presence of futures in eternity does not supply a sufficient medium on the side of the object for infallible knowledge. For as, in order that the real presence of futures in eternity should be the object of a cognition properly intuiting, as con-distinguished from abstractive cognition, (so that insofar as it is compared to that presence alone of creatures, it fits the divine science that it be a true and proper intuition;) the objective presence of futures from eternity is not sufficient; but there would be necessarily required a real presence of futures in eternity, not from the time of their production but from the whole of eternity; so likewise a real presence of a thing congruent to it from the whole of eternity, and not from the sole instant of its extraction from the eminence of causes, would supply more than enough of objective determination, or of a medium on the side of the object, for infallible knowledge. Concerning which see what we treat below, in this art. sub numer. marg. 26.

Therefore it is argued, fourthly; because, since the Science of God is of necessary and infallible truth, it regards the object only as necessary simpliciter, or ex supposito; but future contingents sustain no necessity simpliciter, as is perspicuous; nor necessity ex hypothesi apart from real coexistence to eternity; because, supposing that they coexist really with eternity, they cannot not coexist; therefore.

We establish the common opinion of Scotus, with arguments, against the foreknowledge of futures in real coexistence to eternity.

6 The common opinion rightly rejects and cuts off the real presence of futures in eternity. Thus Scotus, in I. dist. 39. q. unica, §. contra istud arguitur. sub num. marg. 9. et 10. whom all his followers follow. So also St. Bonaventure, the same dist. ar. 2. q. 3. Alexander of Hales, I. p. q. 23. memb. 4. ar. 3. et memb. 3. art. 4. Aureolus, in I. dist. 36. artic. 1. prop. 3.

And of the more celebrated Thomists: Hervaeus, in I. dist. 38. Deza, in the same place, q. 1. ar. 2. Sylvester, in the Defense of the doctrine of St. Thomas; Aegidius Romanus, in the little work against the corrupters of St. Thomas — who all, while they are pressed by the obscurity of the aforesaid opinion, interpret St. Thomas of the objective presence alone.

But the manifest deserters of the Thomistic discipline are to be held; as Ferrariensis apparently shows, I. contra gentes, cap. 66.

For when St. Thomas gives the determinate presence or coexistence of futures to eternity as a rationale holding itself on the side of the object, by reason of which God knows determinately the futures contingent; either he proceeds from the real presence of futures, and the intention is had; or he speaks only of the objective presence, which is left behind by the power of the cognition of God, making that future objectively present which He apprehends.

But the rationale of St. Thomas would then be so futile, begging the principle: for it would presuppose what it had to prove for him, namely for what reason futures can be objectively present. Because it is the same for a future to be objectively present and to be known as future; and consequently it is the same for futures to be apprehended by God because they are objectively present, as to be known by God because they are known by God.

7 But now let us support the common opinion of Scotus with arguments; the first of which is had in the text already cited.

The argument is made, first, reducing against them what they there adduce of immensity. Because, given that place could grow continuously to infinity, so that as time is in a continuous flux, God would augment place to infinity; nevertheless the immensity of God would not be to Him the rationale of coexisting with any place in any now, except one existing.

For God does not through the immensity of Himself coexist with anyone in a place, except what is in that place; although He could cause a place outside the universe, and then through His immensity He would coexist with it.

Therefore, if immensity is not the rationale of coexisting with a place except one actual, and not potential, but — because it is not; by parity of reason eternity will not be the rationale of coexisting with anyone, except one existing.

That proof of Scotus goes to this: that if God were to create successively real places or spaces, God would not coexist with them by the power of His immensity, or infinitude in respect of place, from eternity, but in the time in which those places or real spaces were drawn out from nothing; therefore likewise the eternity of God does not coexist from eternity with a created duration, except when it itself is in the state of position outside the eminence of causes.

The consequence is clear by parity of reason; because the eternity of God, related to created durations, is no more simple or illimited than the infinitude of God in respect of place, or the immensity connoting real spaces. Therefore, as eternity by the power of its simplicity and infinitude encompasses every created duration coexisting with it from eternity; so the immensity encompasses all places producible successively through the course of time, so that they really respond to the immensity by positive and actual coexistence from eternity.

Or vice versa; if from the simplicity and il-limitation of the attribute of immensity it is not drawn that God actually coexists with future spaces before their effectuation; therefore neither will it be able to be sought from the simplicity and infinitude of the divine duration, that He coexist really with created durations before their production.

For as immensity is indivisible in itself and divisible on the side of the space connoted; so also eternity, though it be wholly indivisible in itself, is yet divisible, yea and successive, extrinsically on the side of the time connoted; just as likewise immensity would be successive on the side of the thing connoted, if God through the course of time, and successively, were to create real and positive spaces.

But that in the opinion of St. Thomas it cannot be conceded that God by the power of His immensity is actually in real spaces before their production, is evident. Because God is in place through His own operation; but in future places, before their existence, God operates nothing; therefore in them He does not exist really.

For if He were to operate something about the futures, He would draw them out of the state of futurition and contract them to the state of reality and present position; so that those spaces, not future but actual, would be, against the hypothesis of our proof; which compares the immensity of God to real spaces as future before their exercised existence, not as present.

Further; although many Modern Thomists assert that God actually exists in imaginary spaces, no one has yet pronounced that God actually exists in future real spaces.

That argumentation taken from immensity, as being evidently sound, Raphael Auersa, General Preposit of the Clerics Regular Minor, worthily esteems, in I. p. q. 14. sect. 16. conclus. 3. arg. 4.

Where it will be permitted to join the assessment of the aforesaid author concerning the real presence of a being in the extrinsic measure of eternity, and not in its own measure and intrinsic duration; which is commonly sustained by the stricter assertors of the opposing opinion. For thus he has it in the place cited, conclus. 2.

Thirdly, it cannot be said that all things at some other time are present to eternity according to their existence, but not according to their own duration and measure; as if, namely, to this present time there were indeed given an existence of Antichrist present to eternity, but not his own duration. Which indeed seems to be signified by the Thomists in certain of their manners of speaking; but it must not be thought that this is intended by them, etc.

And a little below he adds: It would also be against the faith to say that the existence of things has been at every time, and is now, the existence of future things; even though one might say that the proper duration of things is not always given. For the faith does not teach only that the duration of things, or their proper measure (as the Thomists say), is not always; but it teaches this above all of the existence of things.

In which Raphael Auersa holds the same opinion with him: Suárez, transcribed by us, in the following numer. 8. at the end of the number.

8 Nor does the second confirmation of Scotus press the adversaries less; which thus contributes against the opinion opposed.

That which is not, can coexist with no one, because to coexist denotes a real relation; but a relation is not real whose foundation is not real. Therefore the creature, since from eternity it has no real being, cannot be the extremity of the relation of coexistence.

And the rationale can be urged thus. Either it is the same with the adversaries to coexist with eternity from eternity, and to coexist with eternity from the instant of the extraction of the thing from the eminence of the cause; or it is something entirely diverse. If those pronouncements express the same sense, it will follow that the Thomists, dissenting, concede nothing different from the common opinion. And consequently, that they render futile the rationale of the infallible determination of the science of futures, sought from real coexistence of futures with eternity; since this determination does not antecedently precede the instant of the production of the thing, and accordingly is a necessity ex hypothesi of the futurition of a being, for some difference of time, and not of real coexistence from eternity.

Since, when the inquiry presses concerning such a determination ex hypothesi of a being future, from what principle does it emanate? From the decree? Or from the cause nearest prepared? Or from the determinate truth of such futurition? Under no aspect is any difficulty perceived, so long as beneath the mask of a real coexistence of the future with eternity there is rendered only that contraction, or necessity, which fits the thing from the time of its emanation from the cause.

Or those propositions, futures coexist with eternity from eternity; futures coexist with eternity from the time of their emanation, savour of an opposite sense. And consequently it would follow, that the thing before its production coexists really with eternity, and therefore truly exists: which is an unintelligible pronouncement.

Wherefore Soarius, in his little work on the knowledge of future contingents, lib. 1. cap. 7. numer. margin. 5., observed shrewdly: That the opposite opinion, given the certain principles from the doctrine of the faith, is so difficult that one can scarcely understand what it could say that is in fact any different.

The useless defenses of the more recent commentators on St. Thomas are refuted, who interpret him as holding a real presence of future things from the time of their production.

9 But if you candidly admit, together with Granada at the place cited, section. 2. §. From what has been said it is inferred, sub num. marg. 16., that when future things are asserted to be really present to eternity from eternity, it is not meant that the thing before its production be really present to eternity, since for a thing to exist in its own measure of duration precedes, by a priority of "from which," that is, of nature, its existence in an alien measure, which is eternity itself—

but that it is thereby declared that the thing coexists really with eternity from eternity, even though it coexists with it only from its production; because in eternity there is no this and that, nor a prior or a posterior that runs successively; and accordingly it is the same for the thing to coexist really with eternity from the instant of its production as to coexist with the whole of eternity, since eternity is an infinite, indivisible now.

But who does not see that the Neoterics, worsted in the arguments of Scotus, devised this contrivance, by which the doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the infallible foreknowledge of future things in eternity might be overturned altogether and from the foundations? For if, with St. Thomas, the real presence of such future things were the medium on the side of the object for foreknowing future things infallibly; and besides, the real existence of such future things (now present) preceded, by priority of "from which," that is, of nature, their real presence in eternity, whether in an extrinsic measure: it would follow that God could not apprehend future things before their real emanation from their principles, since before that they do not exist really in eternity.

Whence it comes about that the real presence of futures before their production from eternity must consequently be maintained, if that be the medium on the side of the object for the foreknowledge of futures; in which sense Scotus, having legitimately interpreted the aforesaid opinion, assailed it.

Albelda seems to give his suffrage to Jacobus Granada, 1. part. dispu. 43. section. 3. §. But still they object, sub num. marg. 52., insofar as he asserts that a thing exists in its own measure by a priority of "from which" before it exists in an alien one; but not by a priority of "in which."

Yet that he may escape the force of the arguments by which we taxed the opinion of Granada, he subjoins: that the existence of a thing in its own measure (which by priority of "from which" precedes its real existence in eternity) is not an existence in the present, but one abstracting from existence present, past, and future.

But the opposite is argued: that neither ought the foundation and ground of the actual, exercised, and contracted coexistence of things in eternity be a universal substrate, abstracting from the real positing of the thing outside causes; for the presence of a thing in its own measure, abstracting from existence past and future, is a presence of reason.

Since the actual presence in itself, or in its own measure, of a past and future thing is a something of reason, and what is abstracted from beings of reason cannot be a real predicate; and therefore neither can it conduct itself as a "that by which," that is, as the foundation of the real and exercised presence of future things in eternity.

Moreover, that what Granada and Albelda concede to us is undeniable—that the existence of a thing in itself conducts itself as a "that by which," that is, as the foundation of the thing's existence in eternity—is manifest. For this causal proposition is true: therefore the thing coexists with eternity, because it exists in itself. But conversely, this is false: therefore the thing exists in itself, because it exists in eternity.

For if, per impossibile, God were omnipotent but not eternal, then although the existence of a thing in eternity, or in the alien measure of eternity, would be removed by the intrinsic argument; yet not the existence of the thing in itself, or in its own measure.

10 Nor is that confirmation of the present proof ineffective, which Aureol supplies to us at the place cited: If future creatures actually coexist with eternity, either that coexistence (which is a middle habitude and relation of the creature to God) is measured by eternity; or by present time; or by future time.

But not by eternity; since such a relation is a something created. Nor by present time; for then the relation would be in the present, whereas its foundation does not yet exist, namely the creature. Nor is it measured by future time; for what is future actually is not; and consequently by such a coexistence, which actually is not, the creature does not actually coexist with God: therefore it cannot be posited.

The force of that proof is placed in this: that if future things coexisted with eternity from eternity, they would infer a relation of coexistence to God measured by eternity. For although such a coexistence of creatures with God is, on the side of God, only a habitude of reason; yet on the side of the creatures it is a true real relation. It would therefore come about that some created relative form would exist from eternity; which, given the common opinion asserting that predicamental relation is a true real positive entity, would be altogether discordant and absurd.

But if you deny that the coexistence of creatures from eternity is a real habitude, that will indeed be guaranteed by the defect, or want, of a real and positive substrate, not able to infer such a habitude. Which makes plain perspicuously that such a coexistence, just as it is not positive, so neither actual, but only potential; and accordingly, that you may escape the absurd sense, you will be constrained to adhere to the opinion of Scotus.

Other proofs of Scotus, with the encounters of the Neoterics sifted.

11 Another argument of Scotus for our opinion is the following.

Item, if an effect has being in itself with respect to the first cause, it is simply in itself; because with respect to nothing does it have truer being. Whence that which is said to be such with respect to the first cause can simply be said to be such. If therefore some future thing is in act with respect to God; therefore it is simply in act; therefore it is impossible that it be afterwards posited in act.

The Thomists meet this: that Scotus proceeds from what is said secundum quid to what is said simply; because they think that the coexistence of the creature to eternity is not an absolute and intrinsic existing, but an existing secundum quid.

But the escape is cut off, because Scotus does not urge, from what is said secundum quid to what is said simply, as the adversaries attempt; but from the inferior to the superior affirmatively, which is the best ratio for concluding. Since existing conducts itself as a superior predicate, which is quasi-contracted by existing in eternity, existing in time, or in the aevum, as by differences of existing.

And that indeed above all: because existing in eternity is not a condition diminishing the existing of the thing in itself; but it superadds to existing simply a connotation or ordination of simultaneity to another coexisting existent.

For when a thing is asserted to coexist really with eternity from eternity, the "coexisting" (as considered on the side of the creature) is not a mere denomination accruing extrinsically to the created entity from the existence and eternity of God. First, because the denomination of an existent is essentially intrinsic; and therefore, just as a substrate is not said to be wise by an extrinsic wisdom, neither is it existent by an extrinsic existence.

Then, because created things would be said to exist from eternity, with an extrinsic denomination taken from the eternity of God; as a wall is denominated seen or right from the vision and dextrality of an animal: and thereby the creatures would not be asserted to coexist with God according to their own intrinsic position and actuality, but rather according to an inherent, denominative, and extrinsic being. It must therefore be asserted: that the coexisting of creatures, as it stands on their side, imports actuality and intrinsic position.

This premised, the argument is advanced thus: a thing coexisting with eternity claims for itself the form of an actual and intrinsic position, by which it is apart from the negative state of the non-repugnance to existing; therefore the "to exist in eternity" adds, over and above the form of existence and of actual position outside causes, only a connotation and simultaneity in existing with the eternity of God—which presupposes essentially the intrinsic existence of the creature, if the thing is not declared existent by a denomination taken from the extrinsic coexistence of eternity. And accordingly to argue from existing in eternity to the absolute existing of the thing in itself is not to proceed from what is said secundum quid, but from an intrinsic and simple existing.

12 Nor is it unlike that which Scotus pursues in the following proof.

If my future sitting, not only as to the entity which it has in cognoscible being, but also as to the entity which it has in the being of existence, is now present to eternity: therefore it is now produced in that being by God; for it has nothing else from God in the flux of time, unless it be produced by God according to that being.

But God will produce that sitting, or the soul of Antichrist, which is the same; therefore that which is already produced by him is produced again in being; and thus it will be twice produced in being.

This argument of Scotus the adversaries elude in the same manner; for they contend that he proceeds from a production secundum quid to a production simply. For they grant that Antichrist is produced in eternity, as in an extrinsic measure, and coexisting in eternity; but they refuse that it be rightly argued from production in eternity to production simply, just as neither from existence in eternity to existence simply.

But that evasion is shut off, as also the preceding one, because the intrinsic existence of a creature prerequires a true and proper action, according to the acceptance of a real and proper action which elicits such existence.

And since the existence of things in eternity must be actual and intrinsic, as we showed; it therefore demands a true and proper action; and accordingly Antichrist would from eternity be really and simply produced; and so would be produced twice, as Scotus handles it.

After these things, ready for the fray, I read that John of Saint Thomas, professor at Complutum, had employed such a reply, 1. part. quaestio. 10. disp. §. artic. 3. §. Nevertheless it is necessary. this. Where, first setting forth the mind of Saint Thomas, quaest. 1. de potentia, art. 1. ad octauum. That the power of God is always conjoined to operation, but effects follow according to the command of the will. And from 1. part. quaest. 46. art. 1. ad decimum. That from the eternal action of God an eternal effect does not follow, but such a one as God willed. (In which Saint Thomas also has Scotus agreeing with him, who, since he constitutes action in the agent, does not separate the action of God from his eternal substance.) The aforesaid author subjoins.

That because the action of God is not always joined to the passive immutation of the effect as is created action, but existing in itself immutable and eternal, it im mutates creatures in time according to the free decree of the will; therefore it gives place to a twofold measure of the thing which is the terminus of this action: namely to the eternal and immutable measure, insofar as it measures the eternal action existing in act, and consequently its terminus, as it is precisely regarded by the action and as it is the terminus of it; and to the temporal measure, insofar as in its own time it is im mutated by the action and is posited in its own proper measure. So far John of St. Thomas, transcribed word for word.

But this does not blunt the edge of the proof of Scotus; nay, it even affords an occasion for whetting and expounding that edge against the Thomists ad hominem. For the divine action, which is the very uncreated volition of God, as Scotus wills (or the very knowledge of vision, insofar as it bears the office of practical command, as many Thomists feel; or something else, concerning which I do not care, provided it be something eternal really identified with the substance of God)—this action, then, although from eternity it be actual and exercised on the side of the substrate (namely on the side of God, who is conceived as the substrate of such an action), is nevertheless signed on the side of the terminus; for it is not exercised from eternity in order to the terminus, nor does it extend itself in act in order to the terminus: otherwise the terminus would truly have been produced from eternity.

But the form, or manner of acting, which abstracts from the exercised attaining of the terminus, is also absolved from the real and exercised presence, or coexistence, of the terminus as answering an action conducting itself as signed in order to the terminus; therefore from the divine action, actual on the side of the substrate and signed on the side of the extreme connoted, or the producible terminus, it is falsely collected that there is an actual and exercised coexistence and presence of the terminus, as answering the actual measure of the eternal action.

The argument is pressed ad hominem with the common opinion of the Thomists lending aid, that relations are not multiplied with the multiplication of termini; on which supposition that manner of speaking is sharply rebuked.

Because therefore paternity, before the generation of the second son, does not demand the real coexistence of the second son as answering, or coexisting with, the paternity; since paternity, although exercised as to the actual "in," or on the side of the composition to the substrate, is nevertheless potential and signed as to the actual "ad," with respect to the second son.

But the action of God (whether it be his volition, or the knowledge of vision, which the aforesaid author asserts to be a practical ground answering the command of the intellect in things created, which is the act of the practical intellect) is only exercised on the side of the substrate, that is, as to the actual quasi "in," or the actual existing of it in God; but it is not from eternity exercised as to the actual "ad," that is, as to its extension to the terminus: therefore it is frivolously and inconsequently required that there be an actual and exercised coexistence of the terminus with respect to the measure of the action, which does not express an exercised, but only a signed, extension or composition to the terminus from eternity.

To that proof that subtle instance of Scotus adds sinews. If my future sitting, not only as to the entity which it has in cognoscible being, but also as to the entity which it has in the being of existence, is now present to eternity; therefore it is now produced in that being by God. Where the "now" infers from the absurd an exercised action, not only on the side of the substrate, for example, on the side of God, but also on the side of the extension to a terminus produced from eternity; supposing that there be admitted a real and actual presence of the terminus with respect to the eternal action in the proper measure of such an action. Last proof from Scotus, that the Angel in its aevum naturally foreknows future contingents; wherein also the escapes of the Neoterics are cut off.

13 Finally Scotus argues from the absurd thus.

Moreover, these men posit that the aevum of the Angel is altogether simple, coexisting with the whole of time; therefore the Angel, which is in the aevum, is present to the whole flux of time and to all its parts: therefore, according to that reason of theirs, it seems that the Angel can naturally know future contingents.

To this argument, which crucifies the adversaries, they meet in various ways. Cajetan, at the place cited, asserts that it does not suffice that the substance of the cognizing supposit be measured by a duration altogether simple and indivisible, which embraces every course of time; but that the very act of cognition of future things be required to lie under the same measure; as is clear in God, whose substance is measured not only by eternity, but also his cognition regarding future things. But whereas, although the substance of an Angel is measured by an aevum environing all the differences of time, yet his cognition is measured not by the aevum but by the discrete instant of time; therefore the foreknowledge of contingents does not befit the Angel.

Vázquez attacks the aforesaid solution of Cajetan thus, 1. part. disp. 64. cap. 3. sub numer. 19.: If for the cognition of future things there were not more than enough their real presence to the substance of the Angel, but there were required, beyond that, a presence of the future things to the Angelic cognition measured by the aevum, which would be the apprehension of future things; it would follow that the presence of the future objects to a cognition measured by the aevum would be the ground on the side of the object of the science of future things, and accordingly that the foundation of St. Thomas would be a begging of the question, or a certain useless repetition, as we showed above from Ferrariensis, sub numer. 7.

Further, Vázquez proves the same thing; because the real coexistence of future things to the aevum of the Angel's substance does not suffice that they may be apprehended, since there is demanded a coexistence of the future things to the Angel's cognition measured by the aevum, which becomes the apprehension of such future things. And since the coexistence of the object to the cognition, as cognition is, must be asserted to be the objective presence or coexistence; therefore the argument of St. Thomas from mere objective presence proceeds; and accordingly it would be a certain idle repetition. For if the objective presence is left behind by the cognition, it would be the same thing to assert that future things are known because they are objectively present, and to declare that future things are known because they are known.

But in truth, Vázquez brings in paltry succor for Scotus; for his defense appears nerveless.

For it could be answered by the adversaries by denying that it is inferred from the solution of Cajetan that the objective presence of the future things is the ground on the side of the object of their apprehension. For even if the coexistence of the future things to the aevum of the cognizing substance does not suffice, but there be necessary a coexistence to the invariable cognition measured by the aevum; yet that presence is not an objective coexistence, which is made as the tendence of the apprehension into the object, or a denomination left by the cognoscitive act, but rather a certain real presence of the objects to the aevum of the cognition; so that the coexistence should precede, by priority at least of nature, the actual termination of such a cognition into the objects. Which reply without any labor stays and breaks the thrust of Vázquez.

Wherefore we can the more expeditiously meet Cajetan thus. God among the Thomists does not know futures as they coexist with the attribute of science, but under the predicate of his eternity, which is not essentially imbibed in the attribute of science. For science does not express the proper concept of eternity distinct from the eternity of the substrate, which is the Deity; whence, just as among the followers of Saint Thomas God is not asserted to foreknow future contingents as they answer to the attribute of mercy, or of justice, (which is not essentially eternity, just as it does not quidditatively imbibe existence either, which is of the ultimate concept of the Deity,) so neither does he foreknow futures as they coexist with the eternity of science.

For the science of God, from its quidditative character, does not express eternity or duration, just as neither existence; but from its identical conjunction with the Deity, to whose essential constitution the attribute of science does not belong, as we handled in controu. 1. art. 4. numer. marg. 35.

Wherefore science is distinguished from eternity just as from mercy or justice. Therefore let it be that a coexistence with the eternity or the aevum of science, or of cognition, is not necessary (since neither does the science of God refer eternity from itself, but from the substrate, which is the Deity); but let there avail a coexistence with the aevum of the substrate apprehending such objects.

Then, that in the opinion of the Thomists that cognition by which the Angel apprehends his own substance is measured by the aevum, because the Angel cannot cease from the intuition of his own substance; since the substance of the Angel, conjoined in the place of a species, is a natural principle necessarily moving to the intuition of itself.

Therefore since, by the force of this cognition measured by the aevum, whereby the Angel inspects his own substance, he can—on account of the perfection of his nature, which demands a greater universality in representing—apprehend many other objects; why should he not intuit such future objects, as answering the aforesaid cognition, or the expressed species?

Nor indeed can a reason be rendered why it is implied that by the same cognition of the supreme Angel, by which he apprehends his own substance, other contingent complexes cannot also be foreknown? If the opinion of the Thomists be true, that the Angelic species, on account of the excellence of its representation, comprehends many objects, especially if such complexes pertain to the effects of the Angel, to the cognition of which the very virtuality of the cause can concur by the mode of the species.

But if you should meet this: that, Granted that by that expressed species, through which the Angel expresses his own substance, other contingent complexes would be represented; still that cognition, even though it be measured by the aevum inasmuch as it expresses the substance of the Angel, from whose intuition he cannot cease, is otherwise as it is compared to the other objects, which he can express or not express at will.

On the contrary: that, on the given hypothesis that by the same expressed species by which the Angel makes his own substance present vitally and in second act, he also expresses other contingent complexes; it could not be open to the Angel to cease from the cognition of such objects. Or else it is not the same form, really and identically, which expresses the Angel and other things; since it implies that the same form, composed with a fitting substrate, does not bestow its every formal intrinsic effect; therefore the representation of future things is measured by the same invariable duration. On which see above, in the controversy on the Vision of God, distinct. 3. sub-distinct. 2. on the object of the act of vision, articul. 5., where we handle that the blessed seer intuits future creatures through the same form by which he intuits the Deity; nor can the same creatures not be apprehended by him at once and once. See the place cited, from num. 24 to 26.

14 The Recentiores saw the strength of the Scotistic argumentation; that they might meet it, they devised other helps of replies. Wherefore the Salmantic College of the Discalced Carmelites, 1. part. tractatu 3. on the Science of God, disp. 8. dub. 2. § On the second confirmation, marginal num. 66., first answers together with Cornejo, likewise a professor of the Salmantic College: that this difference intervenes between eternity and the aevum—that although the aevum be a measure more excellent than all the other temporal durations which run according to prior and posterior parts, yet the aevum is not a superexceeding measure, and one gathering and comprehending, as it were within its own compass, the other inferior measures; by that reason by which eternity environs all created durations as a superexceeding measure of them; with a like circuitous compass by which the concavity of the last heaven embraces, as it were within the bosom of its cavity, all the other bodies.

But on the contrary, that for an omnimodal contraction, which is a medium on the side of the object, so that it may terminate an infallible judgment, it is not required that the judgment import a superexceeding measure with respect to the object so contracted to this part of the contradiction. Otherwise it would come about that the free decree of God would not refer omnimodal determination on the side of the object with respect to the knowledge of vision; since vision is not a superexceeding measure with respect to the decree, nor does it imbibe any comparison of causality with respect to the decree; rather the decree precedes the science and is the ground of the science, as extended and terminated to such a decree.

Therefore, that a future contingent may refer omnimodal determination on the side of the object with respect to itself, it is not required that the aevum be a superexceeding measure according to the surpassing of causality, which is altogether materially ordered to the determination in the being of the object.

Other instances of the adversaries for escaping the thrust of Scotus.

Then the aforesaid authors heap up many examples to buttress their mind, which also seem of little avail for eluding the force of the argument. For they urge from the mode of union and presence of the rational soul in the body, which is indeed indivisible on the side of the rational soul—which exists wholly in the whole body and in each part of it—yet that it ought not be brought in and compared under the character of a measure with respect to the information and composition of the form of the stone to matter, although that mode of composition and presence of the form of the stone to matter be divisible and an imperfect presence than that of the rational soul. They subjoin the like about the mode of the indivisible presence of Christ the Lord in the Eucharist; because on account of its excellence it does not measure, nor contain, the extended and divisible mode of the presence of quantity.

The objections set forth are blunted.

But these things are not to the purpose for deciding the knot: for if these modes of presence, whether more or less perfect, were endowed with a living cognoscitive power, they would more than suffice for cognizing other modes, if there availed in them that omnimodal determination which is required for a medium on the side of the object. But who can deny that if the presence of Christ in the Eucharist were vigorous by the power of the intellect, it would not apprehend the presence of quantity, since it is altogether contracted on the side of the medium or object?

The argument is pressed, from the extrinsic measure.

Therefore the whole difficulty lies in this: how can real and physical existence accrue to a creature from the indivisibility of eternity, an extrinsic measure that does not physically or really alter the creature connoted from eternity? Such existence is an intrinsic predicate issuing from an extrinsic measure that does not alter its connoted object from eternity with respect to any physical and intrinsic being, but only objectively and extrinsically.

But for the concluding assault upon this escape, which takes its rise from the superexceeding illimitation of eternity with respect to all created duration, seek it from the edge of Scotus elucidated by us, sub marginal num. 7, where he argues ad hominem from the immensity with respect to space. Note also those golden words of Scotus transcribed below in this article, sub num. 17, at the end of the number.

Scotus

And therefore all these arguments proceed from the insufficient, namely from the immensity of eternity, from which coexistence does not follow, unless something be had in the other extreme; and such cannot be a non-being, such as all time is except the present.

Sufficient foundations for the opposite opinion concerning the real coexistence of future things in eternity are mustered.

On the authorities of the Fathers for the opinion of St. Thomas.

15 The authorities of the saints with which the opposite opinion assails us do not press; for they only try to derogate from the divine science a conjectural and confused knowledge, such as that which avails to us while we investigate the future. In which sense Augustine, with an equal balance, rejects from God foreknowledge, just as repentance; because, speaking in a human manner, things foreknown are not apprehended so exactly as objects present.

Moreover, that the testimonies of the Fathers necessarily sustain that interpretation is manifest from this openly: that they ascribe to God in the whole propriety of speech predestination, according to that saying of Paul, Ad Rom. 8. Those whom he foreknew, he predestined, etc. But predestination— By the same reason it ought to be removed from the illimitation of God, just as foreknowledge too, if this imbibed imperfection in its concept, since predefinition and predestination import a certain antecession of act with respect to the object. So much concerning Augustine and Gregory.

But concerning Jerome it is plain that he speaks only of the objective presence of future things, since he expressly declares: that to God things not yet made are already made. But if he were asserting a real coexistence of future things to eternity, he would be bound to declare them made absolutely and simply; just as an existence not secundum quid, but simply and intrinsically, as we showed from Scotus, sub n. marg. 12., although Jerome expressly confesses that Jeremiah was not before conception.

16 Scotus elides with such dexterity, at the place cited, § On the arguments for the second opinion, sub num. mar. 34., the arguments he builds for the opposite opinion, that there is no need but to transcribe the text.

To the first argument therefore from immensity, (Scotus says,) I concede that immensity is present to every place, but not to every place actual and potential, as was cut finely in the first argument against that opinion; and thus neither will eternity, by reason of its infinity, be present to any time except one existing.

And by this (Scotus pursues) it is plain for that example of the rod in the river; for since the rod has not whence it could be present to all the parts of the water, therefore it is not immense with respect to them; but the now of eternity has, as much as lies on its side, what would make it present to all the parts of time, if they were.

17 By this, to the further argument: when it is said that the now of eternity, as it coexists, is not equal to the now of time — that is true, because the now of eternity is formally infinite, and therefore formally exceeds the now of time, yet not by coexisting with another now. Just as the immensity of God, present to this universe, is not coequal to this universe; and therefore it formally exceeds it, yet it is not anywhere except in this universe.

By the same token the other case is clear: for if all time existed simultaneously, eternity would embrace it; and so I concede that eternity, of itself, has infinite sufficiency to embrace the whole of time, were it all at once. But however great the immensity is supposed to be on the side of one extreme — precisely because it could coexist with however much in the other extreme, since coexistence signifies a real relation between two extremes and therefore requires both — from the immensity of one extreme it cannot be concluded that there is coexistence with the other, except only with that with which the other extreme coexists.

Therefore all these arguments proceed from what is insufficient, namely from the immensity of eternity; from which coexistence does not follow, which denotes a relation to another, unless there be something in the other extremum which can be the terminus of coexistence with that foundation; and such cannot be a non-being, such as every time except the present.

18 But you will object against the last words of the Doctor: God, actually coexisting by force of his eternity with this present now, does not coexist with another now at one and the same time, but afterward; therefore eternity imports succession.

The answer is: although eternity is in itself a permanent and indivisible duration, nevertheless its coexistence with the temporal course is divisible and successive, because above eternity it adds a relation of reason, or the connotation of a flowing extremum. Nor is there any inconvenience in this, that in this coexistence a succession of prior and posterior be assigned, since it is an extrinsic denomination on the side of God, consequent upon the position of the other co-created extremum, which flows according to prior and posterior.

Just as actual ubiquity (by which God actually coexists with real spaces) is divisible on the side of the space; nay, it could even be successive, if God were to produce real spaces successively. Which actual ubiquity, above the immensity of God, or his infinitude according to place, by which God aptitudinally fills spaces, adds nothing but a relation of reason together with the connotation of a place really existing; as we reported in the controversy on the divine immensity.

To the other objection about the center of the circle, Scotus answers: since time is not a standing but a flowing circumference, of whose circumference nothing is in act except the instant; nothing of it either will be present to eternity, which is as it were the center, except that moment of time which is assigned as present. Yet if, per impossibile, it were posited that the whole of time were at once standing; the whole would be at once coexisting with eternity as with a center.

Toward dissolving the third argument in opposition, it is examined whether the knowledge of God, with respect to creatures, is intuitive, no real presence of future things from eternity being admitted? Where, from Scotus's meaning, what belongs to the ratio of intuitive cognition is elucidated.

19 Toward dissolving the third objection from num. 4, he appeals to Scotus, at the place cited, under marginal num. 35, where he says:

» Authoritates omnes sanctorũ, quae videntur sonare, omnia esse praesentia aeternitati, intelligẽdae sunt de praesentia in ratione cognoscibilis, et nõ tãtũ cognoscibilis quasi cognitione abstractiua, sicut rosa nõ existens est praesens intellectui meo per speciem: sed de cognitione vera intuitiua. Quia nõ aliter cognoscit Deus facta, quã fienda; et ita perfectè sunt praesentialiter cognita ab intellectu diuino fienda, sicut facta. All the authorities of the saints, which seem to sound as though all things are present to eternity, are to be understood of presence in the order of what is knowable — and not only knowable as if by abstractive cognition, just as a rose not existing is present to my intellect by a species — but of true intuitive cognition. For God does not know things done other than as to-be-done; and thus things to-be-done are presentially known by the divine intellect just as perfectly as things done.

From this text it is established that the foreknowledge of future things in God is an intuition, because from eternity he beholds with limpid swiftness the existence and real presence of the creatures that will at any given time be; although he does not inspect the real existence of future things as responding to eternity from eternity.

But when the objection is pressed — that the knowledge of vision abstracts from the real coexistence and presence of creatures for that entire duration which precedes their extraction from the eminence of the cause, and therefore cannot be intuitive, but abstractive —

To which objection, surrendering, Luis Molina, prima pars, q. 14. art. 13. disp. 14. §. ex dictis patet. asserted that the knowledge of God, insofar as it precedes the real existence of its objects, is not of vision, nor intuitive.

It must be said: since the ratio of intuitive and abstractive apprehension pertains to the species of cognition, and the species of cognition is drawn from the primary and not from the secondary object, hence it follows that no knowledge of God with respect to creatures can be called abstractive, just as no cognition can be assigned which beholds creatures primarily and per se, or in themselves, and not in the virtuality of the first cause. As we broadly excavated in the preceding distinction, in article 2, showing from Scotus that in God a knowledge of creatures that would not be theological is impossible, that is, which would primarily and per se attain creatures in themselves and not in God. In that sense those words of Scotus are to be taken: Quia non aliter cognoscit Deus facta quã fienda; et ita perfectè sunt praesentialiter cognita ab intellectu diuino fienda, sicut facta. For there Scotus beheld creatures inasmuch as they are introspected in the presence of the Deity,moving intentionally to the vision of creatures not in themselves, but in God; whence that vision asks to be a proper intuition, even though creatures are not really present from eternity.

Hence, although creatures for that whole duration which anticipates their effecting in time claim for themselves only an objective presence, with order to real coexistence for a certain difference of time, the knowledge of vision will nevertheless be held to be a true and proper intuition, inasmuch as it is the apprehension of creatures in the eminence of the Deity, which it attains intuitively.

Next, a special ratio of intuition is ascribed to the knowledge of vision, which does not befit the knowledge of simple intelligence; the ground of this being that the knowledge of simple intelligence abstracts from all real coexistence of its secondary object, while the knowledge of vision concerns the real coexistence of the secondary object for its whole positive and real duration.

To the fourth argument, from marginal num. 5, which contends that it is not possible that any objective determination in future contingents stand unless the real presence of those things in eternity be established below; where we shall open up the ratio on the side of the object, by which such future things can be foreknown infallibly by God.

20 But concerning intuitive cognition, insofar as it regards the existence of the primary object, what we touched on above, in the ninth controversy on the Vision of God, second distinction on the principle of vision on the side of the object, article 3, marginal numerals 49 and 50, remains to be seriously recalled and weighed: that for the intuition of an object it does not suffice that it apprehend its existence, but that it inspect the existence of the thing as present. Nor, indeed, would one existing in Madrid, were he to apprehend the Pope existing in Rome, know him by intuitive cognition. Whence for intuition it is required that the object be apprehended within that sphere of presence under which it avails to affect the intellect intentionally, by the immission of the image, or the species impressed upon the intellect; for we taught that to any object, even a material one, there is available the power to affect the intellect by a productive intentional action of the impressed species, in controversy 3, on the Truth of God in His being, article 1, from marginal num. 35 up to 47.

Which assertion is also confirmed from this: that as intuition is referred to intellectual inspection, by analogy to the vision of bodily gaze — and the eye cannot intuit an object except as present within that sphere of agency within which it avails to affect the eye intentionally — so neither is the intellect to be asserted to intuit an absent object, and outside the sphere of agency intentionally, within which it avails to affect the intellect by emitting its image.

21 Wherefore in controversy 9, on the Vision of God, distinction 2, already cited, article 2, marginal numeral 50, we judged that a clear abstractive species of the Deity is possible, which although it could not prescind from the existence of the Deity, would nevertheless abstract from the infinitude of the Deity according to the co-notation of place, according to which he is present to the intellect, and is joined to it by the contact and entity-distance, or rather entity-contiguity, of indistance, by reason of which he affects the created mind by the intentional, productive influx of the image of the Deity in the intellect. For although God, from the ratio of agent as such, does not require vicinity to things nor an illapse into things, he does nevertheless claim, together with the illapse, the intimacy of contact, from the ratio of an agent immense and unlimited not only in the ratio of being, but infinite according to the co-notation of real and positive place; as we showed in controversy 6, on the immensity of God, article 2, marginal num. 39.

Whence we further infer that, if God were cognized quidditatively as existing and as unlimited in the being of entity; yet if he were not inspected as present and conjoined to the intellect through indistance and the entity-contiguity of illapse, which befits God by force of his immensity, or the infinitude of his contact with created things; God would not be seen intuitively, but abstractively.

22 Which teaching I draw from Scotus, in II Sent., dist. 3, q. 9, where he treats of the quidditative and abstractive species of the Deity, which he defends as de facto possible in an Angel; where, §. ad quaestionē igitur respondeo, under marginal num. 6, he subjoins:

This too, the latter member, is clarified by this: that we do not expect a cognition of God such as could be had of Him, He Himself (per impossibile) not existing, or not present by His essence; rather we expect the intuitive one, which is called face to face; because just as sensitive cognition is face-to-face, namely of a thing insofar as it exists present, so is that which we expect.

23 The second clarification of this distinction is by a simile in the sensitive powers. For in one way the particular power or sense knows the object, in another the phantasm. The phantasm knows the same object insofar as it is present by the species, which species could be of it even if it were not existing and present; so that phantastic cognition is abstractive with respect to the particular sense — because the things dispersed in the lower are at some point united in the higher. So those modes of knowing, which are dispersed in the sensitive powers on account of the organ (for the organ is not one and the same that receives well and that retains well), are united in the intellect, to which, as one power, both acts can belong.

With this distinction premised, I reply to the question (and a little later) that an Angel can have an abstractive cognition of God, understanding this to mean that some species distinctly represents that essence, although it does not represent it as existing in itself presentially.

24 From which words, especially from those under n. 22. prescribed by us. We do not expect a knowledge concerning God, such as could be had concerning him, he himself (per impossibile) not existing, or not present through his essence. Where Scotus means that the intuition of the fatherland, which we expect, is such as to be terminated at God as existing, or present through his essence, or immense; it is more than sufficiently clear that there is a disagreement between the clear abstractive and the intuitive vision of the Deity. Insofar as for intuition it does not suffice to know God quidditatively as existing; (for neither can God be known quidditatively, the absolute existence of the Deity not being seen, which we have more than once shown to be as it were the ultimate constitutive and distinctive element of the divine nature,) but it is essentially required that he be known as present according to essence, or immense.

Then; that Scotus calls intuition facial cognition; the analogy being sought from bodily gaze, which regards the thing not only as existing, but as presentially coexisting and near to the power, within that sphere of the intentional agent acting within it, within which the power can be immutated intentionally by the object: for those words of the text transcribed by us express this, under the same numer. 22. we expect the intuitive cognition, which is called face to face; because as the sensitive cognition is facial, namely of a thing insofar as it exists presentially, so also is that which we expect.

25 Hence it is inferred; that although a thing be apprehended as existing, if it be not apprehended as coexisting, or present to the power, it does not suffice for intuition. As is clear in the cognition of the phantasy and of the imagination, by force of which the object is known as existing, yet absent according to local presence, (although the object is otherwise present in intentional being, inasmuch as it shines back in the image of the phantasm) still the sensation of the phantasy is not intuition.

I take the words of Scotus from the text transcribed by us, under numer. 23.

The phantasm knows the same thing insofar as it is present through the species; which species could be of it, even if it were not existing, or present.

Wherefore in the place cited in controu. 9. on the vision of God, we accordingly showed the possibility of a quidditative, abstractive cognition of God inspecting the existence, which is of the ultimate and, as it were, metaphysical constitution of the Deity; and prescinding from the infinitude according to the connotation of place, or from presence according to essence, in the intellect cognizing abstractively.

26 From what has been said it follows what is to be judged concerning the intuition of the free science, or of vision, in that hypothesis which would not imply that such a science be terminated at creatures in themselves, or from their intentional motion, and not from the motion of the Deity as of the primary object; because just as in that hypothesis creatures would be the primary object of the science of vision, so too the rationale of intuitive or abstractive cognition in such a science would have to be sought from the existence and presence of creatures.

For we say that since such a science abstracts either from the inspection of real existence, while it regards the objective presence of the thing in the state of futurecence; or from objective existence, when it is terminated at the thing existing outside its causes; therefore it cannot be intuitive cognition, properly and strictly, through a habitude to creatures.

For a like reason to that by which Scotus judges that the operation of the phantasy is not an intuition, although it sometimes knows that which is present; the species of the phantasm could be of it, even though the object were not existing and present; because from its mode of representing it does not exact the real existence and presence of the object, although it sometimes represents the existence of the object; so likewise it is to be said concerning the real existence of creatures with respect to the science of vision, which abstracts from real presence while it regards the presence of creatures in objective being; that if it regarded creatures primarily and per se, it would not be intuitive with respect to them; because it abstracts from the real presence of creatures, while it regards them under objective presence.