Celebriores Controversiae in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti — Tomus Alter (de Scientia Dei et Ideis)

ARTICLE II

Does God foreknow future contingents in their causes?

SUMMARY.

Exposition of the question; and refutation of Luis Molina. Num. 1. The opinion of Maurus and Granada, that God foreknows future contingents in causes infallibly inhering in the future morally. Num. 2. The opinion of the Thomists, that God knows the future in free causes intrinsically and physically premoved. Num. 6. The text of Scotus for settling the controversy. Num. 9. Repeated explanation, for which it is weighed what hypothetical necessity is, and the Digression in Scotus. Numer. 11. Four oppositions ad hominem against the preceding doctrine. Num. 14. The true opinion is established against the foreknowledge of futures in their causes; either on account of a moral propensity, or on account of a physical determination which pertains to the first act of operating. Num. 16. Other confirmations of the true opinion against the predetermination of free choice by the immission of an intrinsic form; and satisfaction to certain objections. Num. 20. Scotus's final argument ad hominem against the maintainers of intrinsic premotion; drawn from the necessity of beatific fruition. Num. 21. The foundations of the adversaries are demolished. Num. 25. The final opposition concerning the liberty of the operations of Christ the Lord, and of the blessed, from Numer. 64 up to 69.

Title of the dissertation, and refutation of Molina, who takes away the medium on the side of the object for the foreknowledge of futures.

1 FOR the title of the present dissertation it must be premised that, when we inquire how God foreknows future contingents? the inquiry does not bear upon the medium on the side of the knower; since it is most evident that God, by His essence as by an illumined light, and the most actual form in the order of the intelligible, comprehends whatever He apprehends; and consequently, that there is no difference interposed in the mode of knowing between necessary and contingent objects, but that it is regarded on the side of the apprehending faculty of God.

Wherefore the difficulty presses only concerning the medium of the divine science on the side of the object; for, suppose the intellect, suppose that the fitness of knowing the object through the essence of God is present, nevertheless it imports the reason of the intelligible; so that to foreknow an object determinately, that object does not claim a determinate reason of knowability.

Wherefore Luis Molina did not rightly maintain that future contingents are known by God, not because they have a determinate truth in themselves; but on account of the illumination of the intellectual light, and the omnipotent light conformed to free choice; q. 14. art. 13. disp. 51. and often elsewhere; in which he is refuted by all.

For Molina seems to have followed Aureolus, who, although he denies a determinate truth in future contingents, nevertheless holds that they are foreknown by God determinately, as Catholic doctrine; as we show below in part 4, q. of this dist. from n. 44. up to 49. — defending Aureolus from the stigma which Gregory of Rimini and Vásquez brand upon him.

This therefore having been premised; let us discern whether future contingents in their causes regard that objective determination, or necessity on the side of the object, which as an objective medium can be the indivisibly stable one for shifting contingents.

The opinion of Machado and Granada, that God foreknows futures in their causes by a moral connexion.

2 The first opinion maintains; that future contingents, in their most proximately prepared causes, gain that objective determination, or infallible moral necessity; which can be the object of the science of God.

So among the Neoterics James Granada, 1st part. tract. 4. on the science of God, disp. 4. sect. 4. num. marg. 21. nor does Machado dissent, 1st part. disp. 32. sect. 1. §. Dico secundo.

Where, that they may ascribe to the future the determination in its causes; they expound free choice amid that concourse of circumstances, that judgment of the intellect, that propensity of appetite; such that the consent would be inferred by a certain morally unsurmountable necessity.

Whose opinion can be supported by that testimony of Christ in Matthew ch. 11.

Woe to thee, Corozain, woe to thee, Bethsaida; for if in Tyre and Sidon the virtues had been done which have been done in you, long ago they would have repented in sackcloth and ashes. Where Christ predicts the conversion of the Sidonians and Tyrians, not as conjectural, but infallible, from the virtues and miracles; by which their minds, stirred, would be softened to repentance.

And yet the signs and miracles, as they are suited to stir such men from the torpor of life to repentance, are only moral causes of conversion, and in them the effect is foreknown as infallibly future; therefore the composed cause of a free act, with such judgment, and that concourse of circumstances and objects, must not be denied to have such a moral contraction of acting that it could not elicit an effect necessary by hypothesis.

3 Furthermore James Granada argues; that that certitude of apprehension and of judgment must not be denied to the perspicacity of the divine understanding, which experience assigns as manifest to human capacity. But it is most certain, even with metaphysical evidence; that the will, amid that composition of circumstances and objects, would so act; although absolutely, or in the divided sense, it could conduct itself otherwise. So that any prudent and sensible man, who has known another inwardly and to the quick, would infallibly pronounce that he would so act, and not otherwise, in that encounter of temptation; therefore God also, with the will so anticipated, could be skilled in the consent as infallibly future.

4 Then it is argued thirdly from Machado; that future contingents acquire in their morally determined cause that necessity by hypothesis, which can pertain to the assent of faith, and to theological axioms. Such is the pronouncement asserting; that man, in the state of fallen nature, tossed by the gravest temptation of the demon, not anticipated by any special help, would fall infallibly into sin.

Similarly; that no man, through the whole course of life, will avoid venial sins without the most special foreprevention of God assisting. Moreover, that man not confirmed in grace will at some time commit a mortal sin.

But pronouncements of this sort about the future refer to only moral necessity; and yet they acquire that infallibility which could be the object of the assent of faith; therefore they too will be able to terminate the infallible science of God.

5 Finally; the aforesaid opinion is suaded from the doctrine of Vásquez, which he labors to establish, 1st p. disp. 98. cap. 7. and more purposely, 2nd 1. disp. 128. cap. 5. — that, upon a twofold object being proposed by the intellect, one tepidly or sluggishly, another intensely; the will will of necessity pursue either the more expressive, or the more moderate proposition of the lovable object. In which hypothesis, God would foreknow a future contingent in its cause; while nevertheless between the assent of the will and the judgment of the intellect there intercedes only moral connexion, and necessity; not indeed a physical predetermination.

Second opinion; affirming that God foreknows the future in intrinsically premoved causes. 6 The other opinion defends the foreknowledge of futures in their causes, on account of the physical predetermination, which it asserts is made through the impression of some intrinsic form completing the free power in the order of a most proximately expedited principle for undertaking causality. So most of the Thomists, Báñez, 1st part. question 14. article 13. conclusion 3. and 4. Didacus Alvarez, book 2. on the Helps, disput. 12. Peter Ledesma, book on the Helps, disput. on the science of future contingents, dub. 2. in the response to the principal argument.

Moreover; that, with such a predetermination constituted, namely by the composition of an intrinsic form or virtue completing the created will in the proximate act of eliciting the influx, futures contingents acquire every determination, it is abundantly established. For such an intrinsic premotion, standing on the side of the cause and anteceding the free influx, is that which infallibly brings in the future consent; since only the reason is sought which suades the probability of such a predetermination.

But it is demanded from the aforesaid authors by reason of the essential subordination of the second cause to the first; which necessarily requires that the second cause cannot strive into effect, unless as moved by the first, who completes or applies the operative faculty, that it may influence in the second act.

And indeed such an application is incongruously provided, unless through a form intrinsically composed with the second cause; since by virtue of this excitation it passes from not being the proximate and expedited principle of a free influx, to being the proximate principle of such free causality. But since the denomination of the principle proximately potent for the second act is intrinsic; it remains that it requires a form intrinsically premoving, which should antecede the actual efflux of the free action from the second cause.

7 It is argued secondly; because, if it were supposed that such a premotion is not constituted in a form intrinsically composed with the free cause, and which antecedes the second act, as an operative quality of the species of the power; another intrinsic premotion would be impossible. For this reason: that every predetermination which can be drawn from an intrinsic form, either regards the first act and is had as its intentum; or regards the second act; that it is impossible in this way is shown.

If an intrinsic premotion of the created will were rendered from the second act of the same will, as from God (under which connotation it is called the external action and causality of God); it would come about that such a premotion would not be real, and consequently not physical, but only intelligible or of reason. For since physical premotion tends to this, that it may excite and move the will to elicit the impulse; if such a predetermination were rendered through that very impulse, as from God, just as there would intercede only a distinction or relation of reason between the free action as from God and as from the intrinsic cause; so also only an excitation and premotion only of reason could be asserted.

Since a real excitation of the power, which is rendered from the second act, is implicative of the eliciting of the same second act; for this reason: that there intercedes a connexion of causality between the form exciting and moving the free power to eliciting the influx, and the influx itself really elicited, for whose effecting the virtue of the power is prepared proximately and expedited.

Then, too; that the predetermination which a free influx would afford, as it flows forth from God, does not pertain to the genus of formal cause; such that the second act of the created will, as from God, contracts the will as a form preparing the composition of the will with that same form of causality, as from the created will; or predetermines it to the composition of the will with the same second act of impulse, as exercised from the created will. But such a premotion pertains to the genus of efficient cause, inasmuch as the second act of the created will, as from God, is said to predetermine the will to eliciting the same influx, as from the created cause.

But a contraction, or predetermination pertaining to the genus of efficient cause, necessarily requires a real distinction between the predetermining and that which from such a predetermination is drawn elicitedly; therefore, since between the same influx and itself as it connotes dependence upon God and upon the created will there intercedes only the distinction of reason, even a predetermination only conceptible will have to be assigned.

And consequently, that an intrinsic predetermination can be asserted, it is necessarily to be constituted in some intrinsic form of the operative virtue immitted by God before the second act of the created volition.

8 Nor does Scotus seem to refuse this; while he constitutes that connexion between a second cause moved, and the first moving one; that if by impossibility the first cause were not acting freely, the second cause could not act freely, on account of the impulse of the first cause necessarily influencing, and consequently drawing, by virtue of itself, the second cause to the necessary influx; which connexion could not somehow be shrewdly asserted without the immission of some operative or excitative virtue, which would antecede the free motion of the second cause.

So therefore Scotus holds in 1st dist. 39. q. unico. §. Tertia positio dicit. under num. marg. 12.

«Against these it was argued at dist. 2, where it was proved that God is intelligent and willing other things to exist contingently, by the contingency of things. Because no contingency can be in the causation of any cause with respect to its effect, unless the first cause has itself contingently toward the cause proximate to it, or toward its own effect.

Which is now briefly proved from this: that the moving cause, inasmuch as it is moved, if it is necessarily moved, necessarily moves; therefore any second cause, which produces inasmuch as it is moved by the first, if it is necessarily moved by the first, necessarily moves the cause proximate to it, or produces its own effect: therefore the whole ordering of causes, up to the last effect, would produce necessarily, if the relation of the first cause to the one proximate to it were necessary.

Moreover; a prior cause regards its own effect naturally and simply prior to a posterior cause; therefore in that prior relation, if it has a necessary relation to it, it gives it to be necessary: but in the second instant of nature, the proximate cause cannot give itself to be contingent, because it is already understood to have from the first cause a being repugnant to contingency.

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The text of Scotus, from which we lay the foundations for the true opinion.

THAT the present dissertation may be unfolded, the letter of Scotus must be handled, in 4th sent. dist. 49. question 6. where he asserts; that the blessed in the composed sense (namely, as premoved and anticipated by God to eliciting the perpetual and unceasing act of enjoyment, is impeccable;) but otherwise in the sense of division, the premotion of God predetermining that beatific impulse being set aside; which act Scotus pronounces not necessary, but simply free. Against which doctrine he thus objects, §. against this, under n. mar. 13.

9 The determination of the will by a superior cause takes away its indifference no less than by an inferior cause; therefore if from the reason of its own causality it is indeterminate to operation, it thus repugns its own nature that that indifference should be taken away by a superior cause; as by an inferior: as therefore it is against the nature of the will that a habit determine it necessarily, so it is that God determine it.

It is confirmed; because more does a superior cause determine the inferior, than the reverse:

It is confirmed; because the superior cause determines the inferior more than conversely: therefore a superior cause determining more takes away the indifference of the inferior in acting, than if the inferior were to determine.

10 To which opposition Scotus thus replies, §. Respondeo, quòd voluntas, n. mar. 15. in these words.

It repugns the liberty of the will that the contingency which is necessarily on its own side do not put contingency simply inasmuch as it is on the side of all inferiors; because it takes away that it be the cause in the superior order.

But it does not repugn itself that its contingency does not put contingency on the side of the effect simply, inasmuch as it is on the side of the superior cause; because the superior cause is not determined by itself.

It is not therefore simply against its nature that it be determined by a superior cause, that is, that it be not against its nature to act the opposite; as it would be against its nature to be determined by a habit, or by an inferior nature.

Therefore, to the form: it is against its nature to be determined in its own order, and nothing else primarily repugns itself. But consequently it is against its nature to be determined by an inferior cause; for then itself would not be the superior. But it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause; because with this standing, it is the cause in its own order.

The contrarian argument: — the superior cause certainly determines; therefore the will in its order of causing is determined; therefore in its order of causing it is not contingent.

I reply; on account of its determination in its own order there is an equal contingency: but that the effect which proceeds from itself, not altogether contingently proceeds from its own contingency; this is, because another prior cause is determined to that effect.

Explanation of the letter, for which it is inquired what is the necessity of composition, and of division in Scotus?

11 CIRCUMSCRIBING whom text first observes; that Scotus utterly drives away that premotion of the created will which is made by the immission of any operative virtue anteceding the second act of the created will; as is clear from those words. It would be against the nature of the will to be determined by a habit, or by an inferior nature.

Where by the name (habit) he comprehends any operative faculty taken from an extrinsic principle, namely, sought from God; to contract the will to one side of the contradiction. Which the following words refer, (or by an inferior nature.) wherein by the name of an inferior nature, (whose predetermination with respect to the will he disapproves,) he embraces every operative form, created or creatable; whose intrinsic premotion, completing the will in the order of a first act, he asserts to be utterly contrary to the indifference of the will.

And he does not think that the common evasion concerning the sense of composition or of division should be tolerated; such that the will, intrinsically composed with the predetermining form, should be asserted only as affixed to one side of the contradiction in the composed sense, and by hypothesis; not indeed absolutely and simply.

For if that distinction, which sound and common theology embraces, should admit so much latitude of the divided and composed sense of interpretation; it would come to pass that no contraction of the indifference of the will could be asserted which renounced necessity absolutely and simply, but only in the sense of the composition of the will to such premoving form, and by hypothesis.

And consequently, that the enjoyment of the blessed would not be simply, and intrinsically necessary; as the common scholasticism of the Thomist school defends. For the necessity of that act could be eluded by that evasion of the divided and composed sense; such that the blessed should be asserted necessarily to pursue God through a supernatural enjoyment-producing impulse in the composed sense; namely as it is joined to the facial intuition of God. But otherwise in the divided sense; as it can be divided or separated from the clear vision by the mere will and choice of God, intentionally altering the created mind to the clear inspection of the Deity.

Then, too; that Peter, bound to a beam with an iron chain, would be said to be in readiness, and to have a proximate and expedited faculty for running; not in the composed sense, namely as he is fastened to the stake, but in the sense of division, as he is conceived expedited from the impediments. All which things are absurd, yet would be plainly introduced, if the composed sense could be held in that universality, as to be extended to any composition whatsoever of an intrinsic form, which would antecede the second act of a free power by the mode of a power, or of a first act.

So therefore most accurately, and with the wonted maturity of his genius, Scotus unfolds the divided and composed sense on the indifference simply, and the merely hypothetical necessity of the beatific enjoyment; which he constitutes against the common scholasticism of the Thomists in the same question 6. previously cited §. dico ergo, quòd causa huius perpetuitatis, under number 11.

12 I reply; that the blessed is impeccable in the sense of composition, that is, he cannot at the same time be blessed and sin; but in the sense of division, that remaining blessed he not have the power and possibility to sin; this can be understood in two ways. Either through something intrinsically of himself, which excludes such power; or through an extrinsic cause, which excludes the proximate power from himself.

Thus I say; that there is no intrinsic cause in the will of Michael now blessed, by which the power to sin would be excluded otherwise, in the divided sense; but there is no intrinsic cause prohibiting that power altogether from being brought to act; but by an extrinsic cause, that proximate power to sin is impossible.

Namely, through the will of God pre-anticipating that will, that it may always continue the act of enjoying; and thus it can never bring its power remote from enjoying, or sinning, to act.

For indeed a second cause, once anticipated by a superior cause acting toward one opposite, can no longer have the proximate power to go forth into the other opposite.

13 Concerning which explanation of Scotus on the sense of division and of composition, this occurs as to be set forth; that when he asserts that the will of the blessed does not import a proximate power to sin (for he indeed maintains that same will to be intrinsically indifferent to sinning and not sinning, and asserts it only to be anticipated by the extrinsic will of God, and determined to not sinning); there by the proximate power, which he removes, he understands the will as compatible or subposed to the act of sinning de facto, which repugns in the composed sense, on account of the extrinsic conjoining of the will of the blessed with the premotion of the divine will.

Just as on the other hand; he calls the power of the blessed to sin and not to enjoy, a remote power, on the hypothesis of the anticipation and premotion of the divine will predetermining the will of the blessed extrinsically to perpetual enjoyment; with which premotion the composition of the will with sin, or with not being of enjoyment, is incompossible in the composed sense.

Observe, then, that Scotus openly asserts premotion of the created will, or the predefinition through the extrinsic volition of God; as is clear from those words.

Through the will of God pre-anticipating that will, and from those words. Never can a second cause, once anticipated by a superior cause acting toward one opposite, have the proximate power to go forth into the other opposite. Serious oppositions ad hominem against the preceding doctrine.

Through the will of God pre-anticipating that will, and from those words. Never can a second cause, once anticipated by a superior cause acting toward one opposite, have the proximate power to go forth into the other opposite.

Serious oppositions ad hominem against the preceding doctrine.

But Scotus strives to blunt that strike; by that distinction of predetermination, which is rendered by an inferior and a superior cause. For he maintains; that altogether to injure liberty is that premotion which is taken from a form intrinsically composed; but otherwise that which accedes from the extrinsic motion of the divine will.

Of which this is the reason; that the divine will, so far is it from diminishing the indifference of the created will by itself, that rather from it is drawn the reason of all indifference, and of created liberty; whether such liberty be regarded in the first act, which is that which is enjoyed by the volitive power; or which coheres to the second act of volition.

Wherefore, just as against the liberty of the power of impulse in the first act it is not what flows forth from an extrinsic will of God; (nay indeed that the indifference of the created will to either must be drawn from the indifference of the first and uncreated will, so necessarily that, if the first will were not essentially free, but a principle utterly determined and necessary, neither would the created will assume to itself liberty expedited by the mode of a first act) so by a similar reason it is to be judged of the volition, and of its liberty by the mode of a second act, such that the liberty of a free impulse of a created will is drawn from the liberty of the divine volition.

For the extrinsic premotion of a principle free by essence, and pre-having within its virtuality every mode, or causality of indifference to either of the created appetite, cannot be brought under that supposition which is called antecedent for breaching the rights of liberty. For the premotion, which Scotus assigns, does not consist in the causality of a divine faculty executing, which would be something created; but it is the very substance of God and the uncreated will, unlimited in the reason of pre-having every mode of participable indifference.

Further, the premotion extrinsic to a principle essentially free, which contains within its virtuality the whole mode, or causality, of the indifference-to-either of created appetite, cannot be brought forward as that supposition which is called antecedent, so as to break the rights of liberty. Since the premotion which Scotus assigns does not consist in the causality of an executing divine faculty — which would be something created — but is the very substance of God and the uncreated will, which (unlimitedly) praehaares within itself every mode of participable indifference.

Because, since on Scotus's account action instats in the agent throughout his whole universality, whether he ranges over the created or the uncreated (and is not a passion, as the school of the Jesuits maintains), it follows that God's action coheres with God himself by identity. And just as the executing faculty is not severed from the attribute of will, so the second act of that divine faculty is the very form of uncreated volition, from eternity congruent to the Deity, and for its time producing an effect ad extra; and hence God's action is that very infinite virtue which subjuggles to itself every mode of created liberty, since the latter flows from it as from an illimited fountain of all creatable indifference. On this more precisely in the controversia On the Power of God, where we shall elucidate the act of the executing divine faculty, inquiring: whether it is created or uncreated? — against Aureolus and other more recent writers. And on this also something in this dist. art. 7, at num. 50 down to 56.

15 But you will urge; the difficulty about antecedent supposition is not laid to rest; for the premotion of the created will is not drawn from a form intrinsically inhering, but from the divine volition inferring no necessity simply, on account of the essential liberty of the divine volition precontaining every rationale of participated and participable indifference. Because any premotion whatever, whether of a created or of an uncreated form, whose composition to the will is not placed in the power of the will, (so that it is open to our created appetite to be composed, or not composed, with such a premoving form for influx,) is called antecedent supposition; because it seems more than most certain that God can by his absolute power infer necessity upon our will through his extrinsic volition: since no implication can be assigned on account of which it repugns that the created will be contracted extrinsically to the other part by an absolute and simple necessity; and not only consequently and by hypothesis.

But on such a supposition this necessity would be produced by an uncreated form, essentially free, and within its eminence praehabens the whole causality of created liberty; therefore the Scotists do not extricate themselves from a necessity simply, or of antecedent supposition, given that the premotion which they assert is not drawn from a created form contracted intrinsically to one side of contradiction, but from an uncreated form free by essence, and indifferent to either.

Moreover, that premotion by which God, say, pre-defines the conversion of Peter is not ascribed to the attribute of the divine will insofar as it is conceived for some sign of reason with indifference to either in respect of that object, but as it is determined to one side of the contradiction; yet such a contraction wholly antecedes Peter's consent; therefore it fastens Peter to one side of the contradiction no less than if such a form of uncreated volition were not free by essence.

Hence the doctrine of Scotus which we have transcribed, at margin num. 10, is overturned: that while a contraction by the impression of an intrinsic form repugns to free choice, it is otherwise for one by statute, or by the decree, of a superior cause.

It is answered: that if the extrinsic will of God, or the premotion of the executing divine faculty, does not alter the created will in respect of a first act, but only contracts it by way of a second act, presupposing the intrinsic and expedite indifference to the contrary, together with the provision of concourse to either in the first act; and neither infers absolute necessity but only from hypothesis — such as the will undergoes in the common opinion when it exercises its own causality, contracted by God through the absolute decree of concurring.

Hence, although we should hold it possible that the premotion of the divine will should bind the created appetite with a merely simple necessity — namely, if God's volition imprinted a form in the first act, fastening the created will to one side of the contradiction; or supplemented an operative quality of the species of potency fastening free choice to one side of the contradiction, so that the will should suffice proximately in place of that quality, and supply its causality, not formal but effectual; or should necessity our will by his uncreated volition, according to what we examine below, at num. 40 and 41, not furnishing in the first act, before actual cooperation, the concourse to the contrary; because the will's power to either in the first act would already be impeded. Otherwise if the premotion were by way of a second act, having this look: that it contracts the indetermination of the will to producing this individual of action rather than that; which predetermination, since it cannot be ascribed to any second cause, remains to be attributed to the uncreated will, or to the executing divine faculty. As will be seriously examined in article 5 of this distinction, where we shall raise the physical digression, inquiring from what principle the contraction of the created will to an individual act is drawn?

Finally, on the text at num. 10, those words must be weighed.

It is repugnant to the liberty of the will that the contingency, which is of necessity on the part of the will itself, should not set a contingency absolutely in the way that it is on the part of all inferior causes; for thereby it is deprived of being the cause in the superior order. But it is not repugnant to it if its contingency does not set a contingency absolutely on the part of the effect, in the way that it is on the part of the superior cause; for the superior cause is not determined by the will itself.

Where not only does Scotus confirm and establish the dissimilarity that intercedes between the premotion of the created will through the impression of something intrinsic, and the predetermination of the uncreated volition contracting the potentiality of free choice; as being an illimited form prehaving within its eminence every mode and condition of free influx. But he also pronounces that it is not against the rationale of liberty that the divine premotion be not subjected to it, as actual and exercised by way of concourse; (by which rationale alone it is asserted by Scotus,) as to the positing, or the negation, of such a concurring premotion, or with contingency to non-being on the part of the effect as it is attained by God predetermining, in the sense of composition.

On which account also Scotus rightly establishes that the superior cause is not determined by the will. Because only on that account could the actual and exercised premotion of the divine will be subjugated to the nut of free choice, so that at its discretion it should be composed, in the second act, to such premotion, or to its negation; if the concourse of free choice should antecede in priority of nature the motion of God, and contract it to such a species and individuation of influx. All of which Scotus denies; and they must be seriously handled for what is drawn in the following articles on the composition of the divine will with the created in concourse; especially at margin num. 19 down to 22, and also under num. 31.

Therefore in Scotus there is no obstacle to participaled liberty in that it is so contracted by the first mover that such premotion takes away contingency de inesse, or in the composite sense, of free choice toward such motion of the first cause. Yet it would contradict if the contingency of the operation toward being and non-being were impeded in the will by some created principle. For this is the meaning of that celebrated Scotist axiom. It is not repugnant to it if its contingency does not set a contingency, insofar as it is on the part of the superior cause.

Which those words confirm: It is repugnant to the liberty of the will that it should not set a contingency absolutely, insofar as it is on the part of all inferior causes. Wherefore he constantly concludes: It is not therefore simply against its nature that it be determined by a superior cause; that is, that it be not against its nature to act the opposite. Herein Scotus speaks somewhat obscurely; therefore he intends that it is not against the nature of the will to be determined by the first cause, because the determination of the first cause does not take away. That the created will act the opposite de possibili, though it take away that it act the opposite de inesse, and in the composite sense in respect of concurring motion. Of which the following words of the contexts are the referents: As it would be against its nature to be determined by a habit, or by an inferior nature. Wherein he thereby repels the contradiction, of the will by a quality implanted; because it would take away indifference not only de inesse but also de possibili.

Wherefore Scotus means only this: that it is necessary for the indifference of the will that no inferior principle (which does not praehaare within its virtuality both the impulsive faculty itself and the whole indifference of its exercised motion) determine the created free choice.

For that is shown by those last words. By reason of its determination in his own order there is an equal contingency: but that the effect which proceeds from the will should not proceed altogether contingently from its contingency — this is because another prior cause is determined to that effect.

The true and common opinion is established against the foreknowledge of future contingents in their causes, whether by moral propensity or by physical determination pertaining to the first act of acting.

16. It must be said first: that God does not foreknow future contingents in their causes, however circumstantiated and morally prone toward their future production; this is the common consensus of theologians. And it is proved because every composition of circumstances is either such that it injures liberty, while it infers the consent of the will unimpedibly; or such that the will can strive toward the contrary; and consequently neither does it furnish a medium on the side of the object for God's knowledge to be absolutely infallible.

First of all, on the part of the judgment of the intellect, the will cannot be contracted unimpedibly to one side of the contradiction — this is clear. Because no apprehension of the object, whether the most intense or the most tempered, compels the will to one side; if it is within the will's rights to follow even an opposed and remiss apprehension.

Since in Scotus even the facial intuition of the Deity does not necessity the will to perpetual fruition (the extrinsic premotion of the divine will being set aside), so that in the beatific vision as in its cause perpetual and unending fruition cannot be foreknown by God, the premotion of the divine will being cut away.

Nor is the opinion of Vázquez, contending that the will of necessity pursues the more express or the more tempered insinuation of the intellect, received by authors of notae probationis; as being adverse to liberty.

Further, neither the burning propensity of the appetite nor the most pestilent assault of the demon is of such force as to extort consent infallibly; otherwise the laws of liberty would be trampled. Whence it results that just as man, although most frail, and beset by the strong excursion of the demon, can dissent or withhold consent; so too God would be reduced to fallible judgment about future contingents in a cause however morally prepared, provided only that physical premotion be set aside.

17 Moreover, that such a confluence of circumstances conduces to a knowledge beyond conjecture — so I judge.

Because that confluence of circumstances, by whose composition the will remains necessitated by hypothesis, is either furnished by the will itself composing such circumstances; or by another extrinsic cause. If such a confluence of circumstances emanate from an extrinsic cause, and upon it being posited the consent be inferred unimpedibly, liberty is swept away; since that is not a supposition consequent upon the influx of the will, but one anteceding it: because it is the supposition of the cause, or of what appertains to the cause, as the cause is proximate.

Or the composition of the circumstances is furnished freely by the will itself; and the inquiry returns: how are those circumstances, which are contingently annexed to the will for acting, known by God? Since the collection of those circumstances is also free, and hence the same dissidium presses concerning the conditions and circumstances that freely and confluence to the influx of the will — how do they fall under the infallible judgment of God? And concerning the impulse of the will, which bursts forth of necessity upon those suppositions?

For, to be sure, again: how is that collection of circumstances known by God — in itself, or in its cause? If in itself it bears an all-manner objective determination, so that such a conjunction of circumstances could be apprehended infallibly, even though it were composed freely: the same judgment must be made concerning the future contingent which imports in its own self, by reason of its determined futurition, an all-manner objective determination, the absolute decree of the divine will being set entirely aside — which as false we shall disprove in the fourth following article.

Or such a composition of circumstances must be known in its cause; concerning which I likewise ask: is it necessary, or free? Not necessary; otherwise the exercise of liberty would be impeded. Nor yet free; for then it would be indifferent to either. And accordingly, either we must halt at a cause altogether necessary — and liberty is trampled underfoot; or it must be denied that such a confluence of circumstances can be assigned, that in a cause thus prepared the future should be infallibly foreknown.

18 It must be said second: that future contingents are not known by God in causes intrinsically premoved by the implantation of some quality of the species of potency, or of operative virtue; whether immanent or transitive. So Scotus, with his followers, at the place cited, which we transcribe at margin num. 10.

Which he also maintains in 4. distinct. 1, quaest. 1, in fine, under the section: Ad vltimum, cum dicitur in virtute, at margin num. 34, where he has:

And from this it is clear that when the first cause acts alongside the second cause properly so called, there is no new influx, which should be the creation of some inherents in the second cause; but the influx there is a determined order of those causes in producing the common effect.

On this point all the Jesuit writers adhere to Scotus; and among the Dominicans not a few, to whom such a rationale of predetermining — by the impression of a form contracting the will in the first act — seemed altogether too rigid.

That Scotus, however, acknowledged no causality of predetermining which did not pertain to the exercised cooperation itself but to the principle, or first act of operating, is clear from 1. sentent. distinct. 41, quaestione unica, under the section Sed adhuc contra istud instatur. Which text we transcribe below, in this distinctio, On the Knowledge of Contingents set in the absolute, article 6: How does God foreknow the material of wicked acts? at margin num. 41 and 43. Where Scotus asserts that God foreknows that Judas will sin, not in the permissive act; but because he knows that he will cooperate with him in the substance of the act not circumstanced.

If, however, Scotus had espoused another rationale of predetermining, distinct from the actual cooperation, looking to the first act of operating; he would have assigned as the medium on the side of the object for foreknowing the matter of sin, while he was earnestly and seriously investigating the medium of such foreknowledge.

19. And our assertion is proved as follows: every impression of a form pertaining to the first act of the will — whether it be by way of the immanent or the transitive, or in the manner of a virtuous application, or of the proximate and immediate disposition for the second act, or be called by whatever other rationale by the adversaries, provided it look to the first act of the free potency — is such that its negation takes away the potency expedite proximally toward dissent; therefore it of necessity compels the potency to consent.

The result therefore would be: that the will, composed with the implantation of such a form, would not conduce proximately to the undertaking of free causality; and consequently that a sufficient help for living piously would not be absolutely and simply a sufficient help. Because since such physical premotion is not of the essence of sufficient help (otherwise every sufficient help would be efficacious, and he who lapsed into fault would not have obtained a help sufficient for salvation); it would follow that, this intrinsic premotion being set aside, no sufficient help whatever would be furnished for man's being proximally able to act rightly; since there is not implanted in him the form pertaining to the first act, or the proximate potency for acting.

And therefore neither could the lapse of sin be ascribed to the created will; but to God, withdrawing at his nut the impression of that form which completes, or applies in the first act, the proximate potency of the will for eliciting the second act. Which line of reasoning is drawn from Scotus, in 2. sent. distinct. 37, quaest. 2, under the section Sed quare in voluntate creata non potest esse prima ratio deficiendi, at margin num. 17, where he says:

» Justice is owed from the created will only insofar as it is within its power to act rightly; so that no subtraction is understood of a prior cause on whose defect the will could not act rightly. If, therefore, God were the first cause not acting rectitude, an act not right would not be sin.

Here Scotus concludes acutely: that if God should subtract some form which the created will of necessity pre-requires, in order to be completed in the rationale of the proximate principle of an honest influx; the obliquity of sin would not be attributed to the created will, but to God, fastening the will to an oblique act while he does not confer the proximate potency for pious and right operation.

But that premotion which the adversaries adduce pertains to the first act of the will; therefore the created will, not composed with such a premoving form, is not in proximate potency for an honest act; and consequently is not a debtor so as to elicit a right act.

But you will object, and press ad hominem: that the predetermination which is furnished by the absolute decree of the divine will, among the followers of Scotus, looks not only to the second act, namely the influx of the created will; but also to the very potency of the will, which it contracts and applies, that it should educe such an influx. So that God determines not only that such-shall-be for this act of the will — for consent, say — but that he determines the very principle, namely the will, to consent.

But the determination which looks to the will, so that it elicit such an act, pertains to the rationale of the first act; since it intends not only the contraction of the act but also the contraction of the principle, that it should undergo such an influx. Therefore we pronounce not only a contraction by way of actual concourse, but we assert it by way of a first act anteverting the second act.

It is answered: that God contracts the created will neither by implanting some operative quality, nor by supplementing it, which would be contracting in the first act before the exercised and actual cooperation; nor by the divine will as determining free choice in the first act; but the whole predetermination is exhibited through the extrinsic volition of God, which (as it performs the function of action ad extra) antecedes the actual influx of the created will only by priority of that-from-which, or of nature, though in the same instant of time, or in-that. On which see below the accurate disputation on the composition of the divine potency with free choice to either, at num. 49 down to 63.

But that the created will be applied and contracted by the divine volition, insofar as it performs the function of the mere concurring causality of God ad extra; no intrinsic alteration of the created will is required, which should antecede, for that prior that-from-which, or of nature, the actual influx and cooperation of that will; but the extrinsic application and contraction suffices, by reason of the natural sympathy in acting, whereby the created will is subjugated to God, so that it is contracted without the impression of anything physical.

In the like manner as the motive power obeys the appetite while it suggests the motion without any physical alteration of the potency; and as the will is captured by the intellect for assenting to a credible object, without any implantation of an intrinsic form which the impelling faculty would imprint upon the intellect.

Other confirmations of the true opinion, and satisfaction to certain objections.

Moreover, the aforesaid opinion is assailed from the decree of the Council of Trent, session 6, cap. 5, canon 4, defining: Our will, however much anticipated and roused by the grace of God, can dissent, if it will. But if such an intrinsic premotion be implanted into the proximate potency of the will, it will come about that the will is not in proximate potency to dissent; since there is not imprinted in it a form valid for dissent but one compelling to consent.

Nor does that escape of the composite sense serve, which we rejected at num. 11; on the ground that the impression of such a habit, or operative form, or premoving impulse is an antecedent supposition; as being that which pertains to the first act of operating.

But you will insist further: that the premotion by the impression of an intrinsic form which the Thomists assert — held by not a few of them also to be that which does not pertain to the rationale of a principle — looks merely to be in the manner of an exercised motion and application, yet in such wise that in the instant of cooperation itself it not only contracts the consent to such-future-being but also predetermines the very principle of assenting.

And indeed we also assert this same contraction in the instant of the cooperation of free choice, not only in respect of assent, but also in respect of the principle of assenting, from itself potentiale toward such a species and individuation of acts; therefore we fall back into the same Thomist opinion that we assail.

Nor does it avail to rejoin; that such an intrinsic impulse, or previous motion, must be referred to the rationale of a principle, and not of a mere exercised action; to this end, that such an impulse be really distinguished from the concourse, and action, of the created will, and that an action of an action not be given. Wherefore, if such a motion, or form sent in by way of a transient to acting, be compared in the genus of efficient cause with the operation of free choice, and an action of another created action cannot be given; it remains that that previous motion be set up as the principle of the action, and not as the action. And consequently it does not pertain to the predicament of action; but of quality, under some species of natural or supernatural power, according to the degree of natural or supernatural action.

It is met, in eluding what precedes: that it presses also against our own opinion. For this does not stand in the way; because it presses ad hominem also in our own way of thinking; in which, since we assert that the extrinsic predefinition is the rationale of the contraction of free choice, it would also come about that either an action of an action is given; or that that predetermination pertain to the rationale of a principle, that is, of a first act.

Another of our opponents. Further, that it seems to advance the matter little, that the motion or predetermination be furnished by way of a principle, or by way of an action, if it be furnished by God in the same instant of cooperation and not before. Therefore if the contraction be admitted by way of action, it can also be sustained by way of a principle.

It is shown that our opinion is more consonant with free choice. But these things notwithstanding: to anyone seriously weighing what has been set forth it becomes clear how far our assertion surpasses in the maintaining of the free condition of the created will; since we assert no other genus of contraction save that which, from God concurring, and by the same concurring act, antecedes solely by priority of nature. Nor is it incongruous that an uncreated action be given of a created act; as we shall treat below in this distinction, article 7, at margin num. 50 down to 52.

To the objections of the adversaries. But to that instance which objects: that it injures our liberty no more, nor less, to compel it to assent by the form of an act than by the principle of acting, given the hypothesis that the principle of acting would be implanted and composed with free choice, not before the instant of the exercised cooperation.

Pre-determination by way of concourse does not stand in the way of the provision of the divine potency to either in the first act. It is answered: that predetermination by way of concourse does not obstruct the furnishing of God's concourse to either; since all maintain that God is at hand to free choice to either in the first act, although free choice be contracted in the second act to one side of the contradiction by the concurring act. Nor is there any repugnance between the furnishing of help in the first act to either, and the actual and exercised contraction to one side of the contradiction. But there is contradiction between the furnishing of concourse to either in the first act, as by way of principle; and its involved fastening to one side by way of principle, or first act — even though such a principle of assenting were being imprinted upon the will in the same instant of actual cooperation. On which see below in this art., at num. 38 and 39.

If the objection pressed, it would equally assail the converting action of God. Whence, if the objection pressed, it would also assail the action of God concurring, equally first in the same sign of nature with created free choice; so that God does not operate as if impelled or contracted to such a species of influx by a motion of free choice that runs before him.

Made against the adversaries as ad hominem, who hold that God is not contracted nor yet to the influx in the matter of sin. On which see what we press below in this distinct. art. 5, at margin num. 22, and margin num. 32 throughout, and art. 7, on reconciling liberty with foreknowledge, at margin num. 38. For not a few among the Jesuit authors, pressed by the efficacy of the reasons which assail the decree that involves the condition of cooperation of free choice, having to be purified by the cooperation of free choice, deny that God is excited and contracted by free choice to such a species of act.

If, therefore, God, not determined by free choice, determines from himself to such a species of concourse in the second act; and that determination in the second act is not opposed to the furnishing of concourse to either in the first act; no rationale appears why predetermination of the concourse by way of a second act should obstruct the furnishing of the concourse to either in the first act. On this see the places cited, where the matter is seriously, and of set purpose, handled.

Another reason why predetermination by a form pertaining to the first act ought to be disapproved. Above all, if premotion pertained to the first act or principle of operating, and this necessity were sought from God for every action by reason of the essential subordination of the second cause, then whoever failed to act rightly would lack the principle of honest operation and, consequently, would lack sufficient aid—as we show from Scotus in the preceding number. This does not obstruct, but rather makes it necessary that the created will that does not actually cooperate lack the predetermination of concourse in the second act.

But if you object: that if the contraction we assert looks not only to the determination of the will's assent, but to the contraction of the potentiality of the principle toward such species and individual of assent; such potentiality could not be determined solely by the extrinsic and uncreated will of God; since what this extrinsic composition of the divine will contributes to free choice cannot be shown, whereby the indifference and potentiality of our will should be determined by the sole absolute command, or decree, of God.

We say: that as is clear from what has been set forth in controversia 9, On the Vision of God, dist. 1, sub-distinct. 2, art. 3, On the supplementability of the light of glory: a supernatural habit is supplemented, and the initiated vision of the intellect is carried up, solely by the extrinsic composition of the divine will in the rationale of a particular principle. Why not also, then, that the sole extrinsic will of God, without any intrinsic alteration, contract the created potency, if it carry it up to the elevation of the degrees of the act without any intrinsic alteration?

Scotus's last argument ad hominem against the maintainers of intrinsic premotion; drawn from the necessity of beatific fruition.

21 Further, nor is the refutation of the aforesaid opinion without vigor which we have drawn out from what was said under num. 12. For this is how Scotus stands there, as transcribed by us.

I say that there is no intrinsic cause in the will of Michael now blessed, whereby the potency toward sinning is excluded per aliud in the divided sense; nor is there an intrinsic cause forbidding that potency to be altogether reduced to act. Which Scotus sets up against the opinion of the Thomists, who hold the fruition of the blessed to be an act simply, and intrinsically necessary; because it is inferred by an unimpedible concourse from the clear vision of God. Upon which supposition I thus argue.

Therefore God, among the Thomists, foreknows the fruition of the blessed in an intellect suffused with the light of glory and with facial intuition of the Deity — because the negation of fruition, the vision standing, is repugnant; on account of which unimpedible outflow of fruition such a supernatural impulse is asserted, not only necessary by hypothesis but absolutely and simply.

Either, therefore, God foreknows the future consent of the created will in a cause physically premoved by the impressed form as infallibly as he foreknows the fruition of the blessed in that intellect composed to the intuition of the Deity; or he does not. If he approach the foreknowledge as thus infallible; an equal connection and necessity must be assigned on the part of the object, which should be the objective rationale of the determination, and of the infallibility, of the divine judgment.

And accordingly every influx of the will is of necessity elicited by a will physically premoved, just as beatific fruition is by the impulsive faculty of the blessed presupposing the clear vision of God.

If an equal infallibility do not intervene; then God's foreknowledge, inspecting futures in premoved causes, sustains something of contingency on the part of the object; and consequently it does not claim for itself an all-manner infallibility on the part of the act either.

22 It is wonderful how vastly the opposition will rack the more recent Thomist readers, and what piles of fictions they heap up that they may extricate themselves.

The commoner answer is: that the necessity of fruition is absolute, and simply; because it is drawn from the object through the clear vision proposed to the will; which is so seized by the manifest infinity of such an appetible through the essence of the illimited, and within the compass of that which concludes the whole rationale of good, that it is not open to the will not to be borne into such an object, and consequently not to be fastened to the impulse which most swiftly pursues the Deity. Which fastening to the act, since it does not comport with the premoved will, hence comes about that an equal necessity is not present. But the frivolous evasion is easily precluded, whereby whether from the object, or from the premoving principle, the act be pronounced unimpedibly future in that very contracted principle before actual operation, the indifference to either of the two of true free choice in the first act is forestalled; and consequently it claims for itself an equal necessity, which does not fall under contingency.

Wherefore, if beatific fruition, among the Thomists, is necessary simply and intrinsically by reason of the antecedent supposition of the clear vision anteverting the will, already determined before the exercised fruition; then likewise, by reason of the antecedent supposition of a form predetermining before the exercised cooperation, every influx from the premoved will flows forth absolutely necessary. Whether the antecedent supposition pertain to a motion in the genus of final cause — such as the alluring impulse of the beatific object; or to a motion in the genus of efficient cause, as in a previously premoved will, to elicit the influx. Indeed the physical premotion seems rather to impede the indifference of the will than the metaphorical causality of the finalizing object.

Wherefore Scotus concludes more consistently: just as he pronounces the extrinsic premotion not to infer necessity on the will in the influx, so neither in the fruition of the fatherland; since the same rationale is at work.

You will object: that although Scotus denies the fruition of the fatherland to be a necessary form by comparison with the beatific vision, or with any other intrinsic principle whatsoever; yet he seems to assert it simply necessary by its relation to the will of God premoving the created will to perpetual fruition; so that it cannot — just as it cannot sin — attain, speaking of proximate potency, though it is remotely peccable.

Which the examples of the text plainly elucidate, from the cited distinct. 49. quaest. 6. §. I answer that it is clear that the blessed is impeccable, under num. margin. 11, where he says:

»For example; even though one having sight has an intrinsic power of seeing any body; yet it can be brought about by some extrinsic cause that he be perpetually impossible to see by proximate power; as, namely, if that cause should make a perpetual distance of sight from that body.

Just as, if there were a perpetual obstacle between the empyrean heaven and the eye of the damned; that eye could not see the empyrean heaven, speaking in proximate potency, and this by an extrinsic cause forbidding the potency perpetually; nevertheless it could see in remote intrinsic potency, so that there would be no intrinsic cause of the impossibility.

Herein the Doctor asserts that the will of the blessed is impeccable on that ground, and able to cease from the act of fruition; on the same ground that the eye is asserted to be valid for seeing an object altogether at a distance. But since the eye is not proximally potent to the apprehension of that object which is constituted with the obstacle of perpetual distance; so neither ought the created will to be denied along with a proximate potency toward not-fruition; and consequently in Scotus the will of the blessed, from an extrinsic principle, namely from the divine will, is of necessity compelled to fruition.

I answer: that when Scotus maintains that the proximate power to sin, or to cease from fruition, does not suffice in the blessed; there by proximate power he understands a composed power, or one composable in fact with sin, or with the negation of fruition; in accordance with what we weighed above sub n. mar. 13.

If, however, the aforesaid interpretation should please them less, and they should wish God absolutely to necessitate the will of the blessed to the act of fruition (we grant, for the sake of disputation, that beatific fruition is an operation not free but necessary from an extrinsic necessitating principle, namely from the divine will), still, that being granted and not conceded, it will have to be asserted that the motion of the divine will stands otherwise with respect to the fruition of the fatherland and of the way. For then the fruition of the fatherland would be simply necessary from an extrinsic necessitating principle; because the divine will does not supply a concourse in the first act indifferent to contraries and contradictories, namely to enjoying and not enjoying; but in the first act, and in the sense of division from the second act, a concourse compelling the created will to fruition; which would be to take away the proximate power in the first act not to enjoy. That it is otherwise in the predetermination of the fruitions of the way will be evident from what is to be said below; concerning which see us again in dist. 3, on the foreknowledge of things conditionate, ar. 4, on the causality and necessity of conditionate foreknowledge, n. marg. 7; and in the present article, where we seriously weigh the composition of the divine power with created free choice to either, from numer. 49 up to 63.

Dissolution of the opposing reasonings of the first and second opinion, in favour of the foreknowledge of futures in their causes.

23 Now it will be expedient to refute the opposing foundations.

To the first opinion of Granada and Machado concerning the foreknowledge of futures in moral connexion.

To the first argument, from n. 2, we say: that conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians, on the hypothesis that Christ foretold, was not foreknown in its causes but in a conditional decree; on which in the following distinctio, where we deal with the truth of futures given under a condition.

To the second argument, from nu. 3, it is evident from what was observed under n. 16, where it was shown that no moral certainty can intervene which would surpass a fallible judgment, and consequently such as would not be unbecoming to God; since the will, even in the composed sense, or composed with the assembly of whatever circumstances, is able to dissent.

24 To the third argument, from n. 4: all those axioms that pronounce the future fall of man to be infallibly foreknown by God (are foreknown) in the physical predetermination of the substrate of sinful obliquity; which we shall elucidate most precisely, according to the mind of Scotus, in ar. 6 of this distinctio.

Wherefore consequently we assert that God foreknows that man, assailed by the most urgent assault of the demon, without special aid, will fall — in the negation of the physical predetermination of a premoving (principle) to the right act, or in the positive concursive predetermination of him to the matter of sin.

Likewise, another pronouncement: that man not confirmed in grace will at some time commit a lethal sin — God knows (this) in the predetermination of the substrate of malice.

Then, the other axiom too: that man, through the whole course of his life, without the most special prevention of divine aid, will sin venially; is foreknown by God in the decree denying such a most singular excitation to a most fervent conjunction with God, which can avoid all venial sins.

How it comes about that in mere moral certainty no future contingent can be apprehended by God, but in physical premotion to the contracted object. Which premotion, since with Scotus it in no way pertains to the first act, but to the actual and exercised concourse, as we have shown more than once; the consequence is that the question is the same, whether those pronouncements are not known by God in mere certainty and moral connection, but in concursive predetermination, and are known in the decree of concurring in such a way; and consequently if the argument of Machado should press, it would also press the common opinion concerning the immediate concourse of God to the matter of sin.

25 To the fourth argument, produced from num. 5 out of the doctrine of Vázquez, we say: that it presupposes falsely in the common opinion, which taxes the aforesaid dictum as discordant with the rationale of liberty.

And given that the will, upon the supposition of the opinion of Vázquez, would be necessitated as to specification, so that it could not dissent from a more vehement, or more tempered, insinuation; still it would be free as to exercise, and consequently in the will composed with such a practical dictate of the intellect, the consent could still not be foreknown as here and now infallibly future.

But against Vázquez, who maintains that the will necessarily follows the more express, or the more tempered, proposition of the object, we act below in this distinction, on the science of absolute contingents, artic. 7, from numer. 42 up to 46.

26 To the foundations of the second opinion. To the first: we confess that a premotion anticipating by way of a first act the second act of the will is such as could supply a medium on the side of the object for infallible knowledge, if it did not prostrate the rights of liberty; which we showed to be utterly trodden down, on account of the antecedent supposition. Wherefore we maintain that it pertains to the essential subordination of the second cause that it not inflow unless premoved by the first cause; but that premotion which is by way of a first act we utterly explode; asserting only the premotion through an extrinsic volition of God, in the second act, exciting the created will; of which below.

To the second argument we concede: that, the opinion of Scotus being supposed, no intrinsic predetermination is to be maintained, neither by way of a first act, nor by way of a second act; but only an extrinsic one pertaining to the second act.

Inasmuch as the internal appetition of God can be considered either by way of intention, or by way of execution; inasmuch as, as the action, or causality, of the divine faculty executing, it effects something ad extra. Insofar as no action, or causality, of God ad extra is really at variance with his substance, in Scotus, who constitutes the action of God to be the intrinsic rationale of God acting; as also he pronounces that action, in its whole community comprehending every created and uncreated causality, to cohere to the agent, and not to be a passion.

27 Nor does the opposition drawn from the testimony of Scotus raise any difficulty; because since extrinsic premotion pertains to the second act, and would premise the intrinsic faculty of the will by way of a first act; we assert that it stands harmoniously, that the actual free influx and the exercise of the will be utterly taken away, if God were a necessitating agent. Nor do we admit a divine volition preventing by way of the actual use of the executing faculty, or of exercised causality attaining ad extra the influx of the created cause; but on account of concourse not provided to either in the first act; of which expressly in ar. 5. n. 32 up to 34, and also in this ar. under n. 39 and 57.

Which provision of concourse to either cannot be by way of a second act, since a second act, or exercised influx, cannot be indifferent to either, as is perspicuous; but it is the extrinsic composition of the divine power in the first act with free choice, not determinately to one, but with indifference to the opposite. Of which we treat from num. 49 up to 58 inclusively.

But the composition of the power to one part of the contradiction in the first act with free choice is harmoniously explained in that hypothesis, that the power of God would suffice in the place of a particular necessitating agent, or of an operative form of such a quality, which would be created by God to compel, or affix, the created will to one part of the contradiction in the first act; of which see below, in this art. from numer. 51 up to 54.

DIGRESSION;

Whether the will can be necessitated by God, all other requisites for the free influx having been premised; chiefly on the side of the judgment, and the deliberate insinuation of the object toward either?

SUMMARY.

The first opinion, maintaining that the created will cannot be necessitated by God if a deliberate insinuation of the object toward either is premised. Num. 28. The placitum of Vázquez, that free choice cannot be necessitated by God with respect to the object of a congruous thought. Num. 32. It is refuted, in the same place.

The other opinion: that God can necessitate the created will, not only through the impression of an intrinsic form; but also through the uncreated extrinsic will; yet so that, on the part of the effect, the created will answers physically unalike in the necessary and in the free operation. Nu. 33. The first part of the true opinion; that the created will can be necessitated by God through the immission of an intrinsic form. Num. 36. The other part of our opinion; that the created will can also be necessitated through the sole extrinsic will of God. Num. 40. We show that the created will, necessitated through the uncreated extrinsic volition, would bear itself otherwise by the motion of the first act, but not by the motion of the second act, as regards the physical and intrinsic mutation which it has when it operates freely: against Suárez, from num. 41 to 45. Although a moral and extrinsic mutation intervene. The foundations of the first opinion are examined. Num. 44. Item, also those of the second opinion of Francisco Suárez. Num. 47. The opinion of a certain more recent author is examined, concerning the composition of the power of God with free choice. Num. 48. The decree concerning the composing of the power of God toward either with created free choice is expounded, and what such a decree posits in the created will? N. 49. Satisfaction is made to certain objections against our opinion concerning the composition of the power of God with created free choice. Num. 50. The oppositions of Alarcón are shown to be impossible, concerning the collation of the divine power, simply weak, toward either, with the free: by which also the foundations of Alarcón are refuted, who maintains that God and created free choice cannot cooperate since from either disputation they concur. Num. 60.

SINCE, with the intrinsic author slackening, or turning back upon himself according to what those maintaining the aforesaid declare, there would be implied an absolute necessity of the influx of the will, if there were premised an indifferent judgment of the intellect and a deliberate inclination of the object toward either part of the contradiction. From this they produce [the conclusion] that not only de facto is liberty not injured by that antecedent motion of the intrinsic form; nay, that even by the absolute power of God it could not be brought about, if the will allows the object proposed by the intellect toward either: the disquisition on the aforesaid pronouncement presses forward, which we touched lightly under num. 15, from which the full confirmation of the Scotistic opinion will be drawn out.

The opinion of the Recent Thomists, that the will cannot be necessitated if there is premised a judgment toward either; and likewise the placitum of Vázquez, that free choice cannot be necessitated with respect to the object of a congruous thought.

COncerning this question, Báñez (1. part. quaest. 19. art. 10. dubio 1. §. Sed dices), Alvarez in De Auxiliis, disput. 26. conclus. 5, and in De libero arbitrio, libr. 4. capite 3, maintain that there is an implication of the necessity of the will, if there is premised a judgment deliberately insinuating the object toward either part of the contradiction.

That placitum is supported, first, by the authority of Augustine (libr. 1. de libero arbitrio, capit. 3), where he persuades that the concept of the will and of liberty falls back into the same thing, so that that cannot be voluntary which is not free; and that it is repugnant to an elicited act of the will that it be not voluntary, just as to the causative heating virtue that there be not a heating; so also it seems to contradict the influx of the will, according to Augustine, that it enter into necessity.

Thus therefore it has it: Si enim necesse est vt velit, unde volet, cum voluntas non erit? And a little later: Voluntas igitur nostra nec voluntas esset, nisi esset in nostra potestate; porro quia est in potestate, libera est nobis.

29 It is argued, secondly: because just as an impulsive faculty cannot be borne toward the unknown, so neither can it pursue necessarily that good which is proposed not as necessary, but as a contingent appetible toward either; for otherwise it would pursue the unknown, if it cohered necessarily with that object which is insinuated to it by the intellect not as necessary, but as contingent.

On account of which very reason, the common consensus of the Thomists establishes that the will of the blessed is borne necessarily into God; by reason of the fact that the beatific good is proposed by the clear vision, not contingently, but as to be pursued necessarily.

Then, also, in the first-of-first motions the will behaves in the manner of a necessary agent, for the reason that it does not presuppose a deliberate judgment insinuating the object toward either; therefore an absolute necessity contradicts the will, if there is premised an indifferent proposition of the object.

30 It is argued, thirdly: because the will does not tolerate the coerced or violent in its sense, even by the absolute power of God, as the school of Theologians admits; although it can suffer violence in the commanded acts.

But if, upon a deliberate proposition of the object toward either being premised, the will were necessarily compelled to one side, force would be inflicted upon the will, since it would be carried off against the internal impulse of the appetite indifferent from itself, attempting toward either; therefore the reason of such necessity, coming from an extrinsic principle, contradicts the will.

31 Fourthly: the argument proceeds from the rejection of any creatable form which can be so immitted into the will that it affix it to one part of the contradiction. Because if such a form were possible, it would behave in the manner of a habit, or of an operative supernatural virtue impressed by God; yet no supernatural habit necessitates the will, nor does it infringe its free condition of operating, as is plain; therefore, and without any foundation, there is asserted the possibility of a necessity which would be drawn from the impression of some creatable form.

Then, that if there were possible an absolute contraction and necessity of the will, beyond that which is called necessity of consequence, or ex hypothesi, on account of the immission of a form overcoming, or binding, the power of the will to dissent — even that absolute necessity of the created will which would be sought from the extrinsic will of God could be defended; and accordingly it would come about that, without any intrinsic mutation of the created will, by the mere extrinsic good-pleasure of God, the intrinsic power of the will toward either could be impeded.

The consequence is proved: because just as, in the composition of that form which would be immitted for necessitating the will, there could be looked at either the formal composibility, or the intrinsic nexus, of such an operative virtue with the will, or the entitative contraction, or binding, of the indifference of the will, which would proceed from such a form in the genus of efficient cause; so, although the intrinsic composition in the genus of formal cause could not be exhibited by the extrinsic will of God, yet that effective contraction of the indifference of the will could be supplied, since the uncreated volition, inasmuch as it is the use or causality of the divine faculty executing, can confer itself upon every effect to be produced, toward which the use of any created or creatable efficient agent is available.

But in that hypothesis, nothing would be imprinted upon the will affixing it to one side of the contradiction; therefore, by the mere extrinsic nod and ordination of God, the will would be left proximately impotent toward either; which seems absurd.

And the reason is strengthened against Suárez, and against any others whatsoever who assail physical predetermination; who, although they require a predefinition of the material, as of indifference, or of moral virtue; yet receive a predefinition of good acts. Which will, inasmuch as in their view it began by way of the antecedent intention of the knowledge of vision, the content of the created will; that necessity could be called a necessity simply, which would be drawn from the extrinsic volition of God. For although such a predefinition be not attributed to the use, or causality, of the divine executing faculty, which would immediately infer an intrinsic mutation in the created will, but only an extrinsic denomination, or preordination, of such acts; yet if an absolute and antecedent necessity could be drawn from the extrinsic will of God, it would come about that that predefinition, which they had asserted, (inasmuch as it is absolute, unimpedible, and efficacious) would also import, not a necessity of consequence, and ex hypothesi, but an absolute and simpliciter one.

Then, also, by the aforesaid extrinsic reason for necessitating the will, the followers of Scotus can be thus taken to task. Because it implies that in God there arise contrary denominations, no mutation having been made in things; yet if God, by an extrinsic will, could necessitate the created will, free choice would pass from not being of a necessitating [agent] to being of a necessity, no mutation having been made in the influx of the created will.

Because if God were to necessitate the will, it could behave in no other way than if, by its volition (inasmuch as it is the addition of actual and exercised causality, that is, the use of the divine executing faculty) it reached the created impulse absolutely and independently of the knowledge of the cooperation of the created cause; nay, so as to infer the consent of the will efficaciously and inimpedibly. But yet de facto the divine volition does influx in this way into the free impulse of the created will, according to Scotus and his followers; therefore, by the same reason, the divine volition, as regards being and behaving, would be such when it should infer necessity upon the created will; as de facto, when it concurs freely.

And accordingly, either the will is de facto necessitated through the extrinsic predetermination which Scotus establishes; or the reason of thus necessitating the will through the extrinsic ordination of God is contradictory.

Wherefore Rispole, Zumel, and Alvarez, adhering to Fr. Báñez, constantly maintain, therefore, that free choice composed with full deliberation toward either cannot be necessitated from an extrinsic principle, namely from the first cause; because there suffices the indifference on the side of the intrinsic principle; namely, on the side of the judgment proposing the object, not concluding every reason of the appetible which would determine toward the act of pursuit (as the good in common, inasmuch as it embraces every reason of the good, as it were refined, or purified, from the reason of the evil and of the unfitting, contracts the will toward the species of that impulse which is called pursuit and love), but showing the good mixed with evil and with the unfitting, which can terminate the act of aversion and flight.

That indetermination, on the side of the judgment insinuating the object toward either (which for that reason they call objective indifference), they estimate to confer amply and more than amply, that free choice may subsist whole and sound (sartus et tectus); so much so that, with such a judgment shining before, they imply that the will is necessitated.

Because any virtue whatsoever immitted by God, as soon as it is conceived in the manner of an impulse burdening, and, as it were, pressing the will to act, nevertheless impels it to action when composed with a judgment toward either, and under that reason and manner of acting under which the object is proposed to the faculty as an impulse, with indifference toward the opposite; therefore it does not affix the will to such an impulse as to be able to harm liberty.

32 Nay, and Vázquez too seems to favor this manner of thinking, when in 1. 2. disp. 26 cap. 1. n. mar. 4. et 5. he maintains that the will composed with the congruous thought, on account of the foreknowledge of the future consent, could not be necessitated by God if it were compelled toward that part of the contradiction toward which that congruous thought would excite it; otherwise if it were affixed toward the opposite part, toward which the congruous thought would not be available to the will.

The foundation of Vázquez is nothing else but that coercion of an impulsive faculty from an extrinsic principle toward that object of operation toward which the operative faculty is urged by an intrinsic principle is unintelligible.

But lest it be necessary to return again to this opinion of Vázquez; and having also premised that, in the opinion of Scotus, there is no congruous thought which could claim the infallibility of the effect foreknown except from the preordination of the absolute purpose in God: yet still, with any congruity whatsoever of the thought asserted, our volition would be able to be necessitated from an extrinsic principle, if there were immitted by God a form, in first act, affixing free choice to one part of the contradiction; or if God did not compose His power toward either in first act; as will be clear from what is to be said, chiefly from numer. 49 onward.

The other opinion of Suárez: that God can necessitate the created will, not only through the impression of an intrinsic form, but also through the created extrinsic will; yet so that, on the side of the effect of the created will, there answers a physical unalikeness in the necessary operation, and the free.

33 The other opinion, directly opposed, maintains not only that God can necessitate the created will through the immission of an intrinsic form impeding the expedited dominion which the will freely claims over its own acts, but also through the extrinsic will of God; yet so that, on the side of the impulse of the will, there answers that physical mutation which is not able to be congruent with the motion of the created will while it is not necessitated by the divine will.

Thus Suárez, tomo 1. de Gratia, prolegomeno 1 de arbitrij libertate, cap. 5. numer. marg. 14. That physical disparity, then, in both the necessary and the free influx of the will, Suárez established in this, sub num. 20: that the necessary impulse so emanates from the created will as necessitated by the divine volition, inasmuch as the latter discharges the office of the use, or causality, of the executing faculty; that that impulse is reached by God absolutely and independently of the knowledge of the cooperation of the created will. Whereas, when the influx is freely elicited, it is intended by the will of God, not absolutely, but impedibly, before the knowledge of the created will cooperating.

34 Moreover: that the absolute necessity which is inflicted upon the created will by the extrinsic volition of God is contradictory unless, on the side of the impulse of the will, there answers a physical unalikeness between the free and the necessary in each [case], Suárez shows.

Because the mere extrinsic connection of the divine volition, whether necessitating or not necessitating the created will, cannot be strained toward so discrete a physical effect as is that of depriving the will of the dominion which it acquires above the internal impulse; or of not stripping the will of the expeditious exercise of its causality. Therefore, on the side of some will there must be established a physical and intrinsic discretion.

And that can be nothing other than that, whereas the divine volition which infers the antecedent necessity is nevertheless impeded impedibly and absolutely, without dependence upon the cooperation of the free principle; the divine will, indeed, not necessitating, bends the consent only conditionally and dependently upon the cooperation of the created will; therefore that disparity must be admitted of necessity.

35 Which is further confirmed thus: because from the will of God, then, if necessity were not inferred upon the created cause, a firmer and more immutable influx would be drawn, the will of God having first left free choice proximately expeditious toward either, as seems evident: yet this greater firmness of the tenacity of the will thus wrapped in necessity cannot be the mere extrinsic denomination left behind by the decreed volition of God.

Because either the concourse which is offered to us on the side of God toward acting upon either of the indifferents, and for that reason, while the same will of God stands concerning offering the concourse, contracts itself, as it were, to the consent, by the created will, of the community or determination of that influx whose excellence would be toward consent or dissent.

Hence it comes about that, on the contrary, absolute necessity of such causality, on the side of God, cannot be conceived otherwise than that it move the created will in such a way that from it [the will of God] there is not expected, as it were, the contraction of its universality and indifference toward consenting or dissenting; but that by its own force, independently of the cooperation of the created cause, it decrees the consent of our will.The true opinion: that the created will can be necessitated by God, not only through the impression of an intrinsic form, but also through the absolute purpose of the divine will; yet so that, on the side of the effect, no physical and intrinsic mutation or disparity results, but only extrinsic and moral.

36 BUT it must be said, first: that God, while the judgment stands and the deliberate proposition of the object toward either, can necessitate the created will through the immission of some operative virtue; whether such a form be called a motion of power, as Alvarez speaks, or by any other name whatsoever, provided that it contract the will in first act toward one side of the contradiction, and not only by way of actual concourse. Thus Scotus, in 4. sententiar. distinct. 49. quaestion. 6, whose text we proposed sub num. margin. 10; of which see below, num. 37.

Our opinion is supported, from among the recent Theologians, by Villegas, the chief Professor of Complutum, who, while he constantly defends predetermination through the absolute decree, asserts that the will composed with the indifference of reason can be necessitated. For thus it has it in controuers. 12. de concordia voluntatis diuinae cum nostra voluntate, disputat. vltima. capit. 3. § Ad sensum Scoti, et Cani. Where he says:

Potest Deus voluntatem sub indifferentiae propositionis constitutam necessitare ad actum, argumentum igitur est; voluntatem sub indifferentia non effi formam, vnde ratio liberi conueniat formaliter in actum, sed opus esse ad libertatem actus, vt voluntas indifferentiam propositionis sequatur, which touches upon the efficiency of the will. This author indeed, although he is wholly engaged in refuting the composition of the motion of God with free choice from the conditional foreknowledge of our consent, and contends every nerve in the defense of a premotion through the absolute purpose of the divine will.

And our assertion is proved: because while the clear vision of God stands, the deliberate proposition or insinuation of a prohibited object toward either does not imply [a contradiction]; for by the nature of the thing, the clear intuition of the Godhead and the deliberate proposition of some appetible against honesty and the rule of reason do not conflict. But in the School of the Thomists the blessed would be necessitated in that hypothesis to the fruition of the highest good; and consequently also to not sinning, even with the deliberate insinuation of a prohibited appetible admitted.

Therefore, free choice also is able to be necessitated by some form in first act affixing it to one side of the contradiction, even with a judgment toward either premised; since that quality producible by God would no more necessitate than is the necessity that the clear vision of God infers among the Thomists; as is clear from those things which we weighed, sub num. mar. 21. et 22.

Nor could it be shown why, although de facto the quidditative intuition of the Godhead is not compossible with the proposition and the advertence of the judgment concerning a prohibited appetible, that should nevertheless contradict the absolute power of God? Yet given that confluence of the vision of the blessed and the judgment concerning the prohibited appetible, the will would be necessitated among the adversaries; and consequently, with the proposition of the object toward either.

Moreover, it is argued from Scotus, because, as is clear from the text transcribed, under numer. 3: if God were a necessary agent ad extra, created free choice would be necessitated. For the reason that, just as God would be a principle determined to one, so neither could He compose His executive faculty toward either, but utterly contracted to one part of the contradiction in the first act, and before the entrance of the exercised and actual influx; where Scotus, speaking absolutely, did not distinguish between free choice with deliberation, or without deliberation of reason, toward either.

Therefore it follows that, beyond the intrinsic principle of free operation, with the deliberate insinuation of the object toward either, from the extrinsic principle, or from the first cause, a composition is required with created free choice, which, by way of first act, is not made contracted to one, so that God, by the free statute of His will, may expedite the apparition of, as it were, by the force of the decree, the concourse toward either, in first act. Therefore, conversely: if God compose His power in first act contracted to one, (without having recourse to a decree of preparing the concourse toward contraries and contradictories,) free choice would be necessitated from the extrinsic, although, on the side of the intrinsic principle, there were supposed the deliberate proposition of the object toward either.

Then, because it cannot be shown why the immission of any creatable form, or quality of the species of power, should imply a contradiction, which would so surpass the impulsive force of the rational appetite that it bind it to consent in first act; so that it could not dissent; for that reason the indifference of contrariety toward the positive opposite act, namely dissent, is intrinsically impeded? And that also, by its premotion, it should so impel toward consent that the will cannot restrain consent? For since the impulsive faculty of the will is not unlimited, no reason can be rendered why, by the absolute power of God, a form of some greater operative power cannot be produced, which should thus affix the will, in first act, to consent, so that it could not elicit dissent in first act? Then, also, that in the consent it so contain it that it cannot cease from it; which would be to overcome the will both as regards specification, and as regards exercise.

27 But, lest the adversaries complain that we, with the example adduced, do not open the reason of the aforesaid necessity to the bottom; we produce as an example of that virtue necessitating the will the form which they themselves call the antecedent motion, or the application of power, if it attend to the first act of operating, from which knot they disengage themselves; for nothing further beyond that which they establish in the antecedent physical motion avails for the seeking of an absolute necessity.

For that impulse, or motion of power, if it attend to the proximate ability of the will antecedent to the second act, cannot fail to be an antecedent supposition; as is clear from those things which we touched upon concerning the sense divided and composed, sub numer. 11. and 15. Then, when that form binds the will to consent so that the will, while it is subjected to such a premotion, cannot, in the proximate field [of choice], be considered for dissenting; that brings it about that as regards specification, in first act, it cannot be indifferent.

Moreover, since that virtue, sought from the extrinsic, subjects the efficiency of the will to itself, so that it cannot restrain the consent; that is, to be necessitated as regards exercise. Wherefore it will be voluntary to demand something else for the true and antecedent necessity; unless the adversaries wish [to say] that the contraction, by way of first act, does not necessitate free choice.

Wherefore the heretics, the enemies and mockers of liberty, do not deny that our actions are free in that sole acceptance of indifference which looks, or is referred, to the intrinsic principle; yet they err in the pronouncement about liberty unhurt. Therefore liberty, that it may be whole and sound (sarta tecta), ought to be composed entirely not only in objective indifference, or on the side of the proposition of the alluring good in the genus of final cause, with indetermination toward either; but also by the aid of the first cause, expeditious in first act, that it may influx and concur toward either. Hence it comes about that if, by a free purpose, God had established not to compose His power toward either before the entry of the exercise of the influx; our will would be necessitated from the extrinsic.

Wherefore the assault of the innovators, asserting that free choice is not necessitated by God, full deliberation of reason being given, is not entirely encountered, if, beyond the indifference on the side of the judgment, that is, of the intrinsic principle, there be not assigned an indifference toward either in first act, on the side of the principle sought from the extrinsic; namely of the composition of the divine power with created free choice.

Wherefore Louis Dolan agrees with us in part, in difputat. Quadripartita de modo coniunctionis concursuum Dei, et creaturae, part. 3. cap. 2.

37 For the composition of the executive power of God with free choice, he denies that an immediate concourse of God is required for our free acts, asserting, however, a mediated one.

He asserted, then, that liberty is not saved, according to the principles of the common doctrine, if the immediate concourse of God follows upon wicked acts, unless, beyond the indifferent judgment of reason, there be also assigned the composition and apparatus of the concourse of the divine power toward either (ad verumlibet). On which account, neither is it impeded by such an expedition of the concourse toward either that, even with full indifference given on the side of the judgment, there be not in it that likeness of a traveler, gazing with limpid gaze upon the progress of his own diligence, yet having the allegated rules, lest he follow the lead of his eyes.

From what has been said, it follows that, upon the supposition that the possibility of a motion of power, or of a quality impressed of the species of power, predetermining in first act, and not only by way of an act of immission (from numer. 10), does not involve a contradiction in the pronouncement — Scotus argues that it is against the reason of liberty that the will be determined by some form intrinsically, not by way of first act; that the excellent followers of the mind of Scotus should follow, that it does not imply a contradiction that there be given a form necessitating free choice.

But when Scotus asserts that it is from the necessity of the nature and the reason of liberty that the created will not be determined by a habit, or by some nature intrinsically; he did not distinguish concerning the will composed, or not composed, with full deliberation or the judgment of reason.

But if you should object: that our oppositions be understood concerning that motion of power which behaves in first act, or in the reason of a principle affixing free choice so as to be contracted to one part; yet not in that which ascends to the exercise of the operation; since the things named are reserved to the free will of God, or to the action of the object. Thus, then, that impulse which is called the first motion of the power, which should be such an impulse as is called the first motion of the power.

If it be objected: that that impulse, or quality impressed, which is distinguished by reason of being (respectu) from the cooperation of free choice, cannot be an action; since for a created action there is not given a created action; rather, as is clear to those observing, sub num. 20 — inquire whether, if some influency or impression of an intrinsic form be alleged, it would attend to the first act, and consequently be repugnant to liberty, according to Scotus; of which see below.

Two assertions for the true opinion; and the satisfaction of certain objections.

38 It must be said, secondly: that a will composed with such a form, in first act, demanding indifference, and dominion over its acts, (even though it presuppose the deliberate proposition of the object toward any-whichever,) is not understood with all the requisites on the side of the first cause for the free influx.

Which is also the plain opinion of Scotus, while he wishes that, with free choice given with all the requisites on the side of the uncreated principle for operating toward either; still free choice is necessitated; if God were a necessary agent, or should influx as a principle determined to one. I produce the proof of this pronouncement thus, from the first assertion.

Because, for the liberty of the will in the first act, something would expedite to free causality; the conjunction, by way of the first act, of the divine executing faculty exhibiting a concurrence toward either is set forth. Reason deliberate and voluntary: that it be denied that such an operative virtue be a principle in the first act, touching to assent, contradicts that it be a principle of dissent. When there fails to the will the proximate principle of dissenting, then, for exercising it, there is needed the influx of comparison; for the reason that the will, thus premoved, does not stand back before the exercised cooperation: whence, whether the executive faculty of God bear itself alike toward the opposite assent, and consequently owe assent; and the will, under that composition of the form predetermining in the first act, all the requisites for the free influx being integrated on the part of the first cause composed in the first act with free choice toward either, although it presuppose a deliberate and intuitive objection of contraries and contradictories. God seems to intend two opposite placita: the one, concerning affixing the will to one part of the contradiction in the first act before the actual concurrence, on account of the impression of the virtue of prevenient motion: the other, concerning exhibiting the concourse prepared in the first act toward each part of the contradiction.

But that for the liberty of free choice there is required the physical composition of the power of God toward either, in first act, with free choice: this is handed down by Peter Hurtado, tomo de Incarnatione disp. 21. section. 5. subsect. 2. §. 70. Where he says:

Praeteritùs, posse Deum auferre à quouis creaturam peccabilem mortalem prouisionem peccandi ita, vt aut physice, aut moraliter, non possiet grauiter peccare. Physice, quia aufert concursum in actu primo ad peccatum, etc. Si ergo Deus necessitat ad bonum, quando in actu primo componitur illius potentia cum arbitrio creato ad bonam operationem; igitur, apud Hurtadum, ad hoc quòd liberum arbitrium non necessitetur in actu primo, exposcitur compositio ea vtrulibet in actu primo cum libero arbitrio creato.

39 But you object, from the doctrine of Scotus: that the same thing is brought forth, inasmuch as it comes upon the created will to be premoved by the extrinsic operation of God. For either that premotion would destroy liberty; or that God, in the purposes considered so far as the will of God, that is, as the faculty requiring of that [will], should offer to the created will a concourse in first act indifferent toward either; so that the extrinsic premotion of the same divine will should reach the created will toward one part of the contradiction.

It is answered: that if that premotion were exercised which Scotus came upon, and which would attend to the first act of operating, in the intellect there would obtain the opposition, that God, intuiting the opposite decrees; one, concerning offering the concourse of the will in first act toward either; another, concerning binding the will in first act toward one part of the contradiction. Yet because the extrinsic premotion which Scotus intends looks only to the ultimate influx, therefore the contraction of the will which is sought from such a predetermination does not evert the indifference of the aid, or of the concourse, prepared in first act toward either; just as neither does the contraction of the indifference of the will, which it discharges through the action of the concourses of God, destroy the indifference toward either of the created will in first act, or in the reason of the principle.

For the predetermination which we defend as being the mind of Scotus is joined to it only, and by the mode of the exercised concourse, not affixing the free principle in first act to one part of the contradiction, but only contracting in second act. And accordingly, the determination of free choice, through the action of the divine concourse, in no opinion is opposed to the apparition of the concourse of God expeditious in first act toward either; so neither does the predetermination which we assert stand in the way of the apparition of the aid toward either in first act.

You object, secondly: that we seem to depart from the consequence of the doctrine; since we wish that free choice can be necessitated through the extrinsic will of God; and, in fact, we have expressed, as Catholics, that the absolute will of God predetermining free choice does not necessitate it, even extrinsically.

We say: that in that hypothesis in which the will of God would necessitate the act of free choice, there would not be given the degraded composition, composing the power of God with free choice toward either in first act; although there is in God de facto, when He predetermines freely, as is clear from what is to be said below in this art. de Compositione of the divine power with free choice toward either, à numer. 49. vfque ad 63.

For in that hypothesis in which God would necessitate the created will, affixing it in first act to one part of the contradiction, God would so behave Himself with respect to the cooperation of created free choice as if He were a necessary agent determined to one; whence, just as if God were a necessary agent, although created free choice were premised with the judgment and the deliberation of reason toward either, it would still be necessitated, according to Scotus; so also it would suffer necessity, when God did not compose His power with created free choice toward either in first act, by the force of the decree preparing [the power] of God toward contraries and contradictories.

4. It must be said, thirdly: that through the uncreated will of God, inasmuch as it is His faculty executing acts ad extra, the indifference of the will in the first act can be contracted, and in consequence the will can truly and really be necessitated without the immission of any inhering form.

This assertion is not found expressly in Scotus; yet it is gathered evidently from what he discusses expressly concerning the supplying of supernatural habits through the will of God alone, specially joined to the vital powers in the genus of efficient cause, and of those powers having been carried up to the degree proportional to the supernatural principle of influx: concerning which, while we discourse at length on the suppliability of the habit of the light of glory, in controuersia 9. Generali de Visione Dei, distinct. 1. subsist. 2. art. 3., this assertion of ours concerning the possibility of necessitating free choice by the uncreated will of God is not gainsaid by Suárez, loco citato, in prolegomeno 1. de Arbitrij libertate, cap. 5. num 9.

And it is proved; because it is more contradictory, that the vital power be carried along by the exterior will of God alone (without the impression of any form) into the series of a supernatural agent, than that a power complete in its own order of acting be affixed to one part of the contradiction; since in the aforesaid elevation the power passes from not being proportionate to being proportionate to the principle of supernatural influx; whereas in the hypothesis of our assertion nothing is expected from the divine will in the way of a complement of virtue conferring an act proportionately, but only the contraction of the intrinsic faculty to one part of the contradiction.

Next; from the same principle we draw that the created will can be necessitated by the exterior volition of God; from which we establish the suppliability of the habit of the light of glory, and of the other supernatural habits, through the will of God, as his faculty exercising acts ad extra.

Because, whatever God is able to bestow through a second cause in the genus of efficient cause, that he can also elicit by himself immediately, although he cannot supply the causality of a formal cause. Whence it comes to pass, that although God through his exterior volition cannot reach that formal contraction which would be demanded of the will by a premoving form intrinsically composed with it, yet he suffices for every effective influx. But that binding of the influx of the will to one part of the contradiction conduces to the genus of efficient cause; therefore through the exterior will of God, in a special manner assisting the created will by the mode of a first act, the will can be affixed in the first act to assent.

In the cooperation of free choice necessitated by God, no intrinsic physical mutation is demanded; against Suárez.

41. It must be said fourthly: that no intrinsic physical change is demanded in the influx of the will, in order that God may meet with the contradictory denominations of necessitating, or of not necessitating, the created will.

This assertion is against Suárez; whose proof I presuppose from what is to be established, in controuersia 13. Generali de Voluntate Dei, where it will be carefully untangled, that the volition of God, even though it be absolute, and of unimpedible energy, does not necessarily infer a physical mutation ad extra. On which see below in hac controu. de Scientia Dei, dist. 3. de scientia futurorum conditionatorum, ar. 2. sub n. mar. 30.

Nay, indeed Suárez could be convinced from his own principles, by what he says, that the praedefinition of good acts is false; whereas, if supernatural acts were not praedefinite by God, the act praedefinite and the act not praedefinite would not thereafter bear themselves differently as to the physical character.

Moreover; Suárez does in fact assert that a free praedefinition of supernatural acts takes place, given a conditional foreknowledge, yet not consenting so far as to pronounce, once that praescision is cut back, that the praedefinition falls upon liberty: although in either hypothesis no intrinsic physical disparity intervenes between the act praedefinite from foreknowledge, and the act not praedefinite from foreknowledge, even though from the beginning there should intercede for the free, or non-free, operation a moral exterior concomitant.

And even if we grant them that in that hypothesis the genus, free choice, is necessitated; because as the act, or operation of free choice, would not bear itself differently physically, and intrinsically, whether it issued forth freely or necessarily; yet it would bear itself differently morally, and exteriorly, in the character of the entitative necessary and free. For a free act connotes the power of God as composed with the created free choice in the first act to either; whereas a necessary operation notes the same power as not applied in the first act to either, but as determined to one part of the contradiction in the first act before the actual cooperation; because under this hypothesis the decree of composing the power of God to either is removed; as is plain ex n. 49. of this article.

Wherefore we hold the pronouncement of Suárez as false, contending that that influx which would proceed from the will of God inflicting by necessity differs physically from that which would be reached from God absolutely, without a pre-existent knowledge of the operation of the created cause; while that influx which is elicited by the will of God, since it does not necessitate free choice, premits and awaits the infallible foreknowledge of the cooperation of the created cause. For this reason of disparity must not be sustained in the school of Scotus, who asserts that the exterior predetermination antecedent to the assent of the created will is as it were a first mover to freely elicited acts; as being one that praedefines and premoves to the eliciting of the influx of a free cause according to its mode, and the condition of its intrinsic indifference; on which see below in ar. 4. and the following.

42. Now, as for what is to be said, if the act ultimately efficax, not inflicting an absolute physical change, would not be necessitated on the side of the physical impulse of the will, whether from the side of the effect or of the intrinsic discretional character, whether the influx issue forth necessarily or freely; that is evident from this:

That the denomination of the necessary and of the free, in the impulse of the will, imports nothing intrinsic and physical, but only an exterior denomination related to the will as operating freely or by necessity; as is plain in the non-deliberated motions; and even in the first of the first principles, which are necessary acts, and with the acceditting deliberation of reason, as it were toward the free acts, with no physical, or intrinsic, change acceding, but with only the exterior denomination.

Next; that if God, by his will, were to necessitate the created will to consent, as we judge we ought to say he did in this; yet, no real change having been made in such an influx, no inference can be drawn from the denomination of free to the denomination of necessary.

43. From this is laid bare the discretion, or interval, that intervenes between the will of God, as electing the total power to the degree proportionate to, or comprehending, the supernatural causal principle, and the same divine will, as compelling the created will to one part of the contradiction. For the divine will, involving as it does the total power in a brief mode of acting toward the intellectual, in the influx of the power of physical virtue would set forth a supernatural change intrinsic to the acting; which however is said to follow upon the will as it were from the will of God, supplying the form of the supernatural habilitude premised; from which, as it were a free principle, no intrinsic character that would be determined to either in the second act should be cited. Wherefore, since no physical acceding, or intrinsic change, is manifested in the influx, there is no demand made from the character of the intrinsic and physical, for from the free principle there is nothing conferred by the change, but from the will only as it were extrinsically determined.

Next; that if God were a necessary agent, free choice would be necessitated, as is plain from the text of Scotus transcribed above, sub num. 8.; because then the power of God would not be composed with free choice to either, but determinately to one, by the mode of a first act; and yet, as to the physical effect, the volition of God would bear itself under the same character as filling the part of action and of concourse, as it bears itself in fact, when it concurs freely. On which see num. 57.; although it would bear itself otherwise as to extrinsic and moral being. From these things we shake loose the opposite foundations without any labor.

The foundations of the recent Thomists, who think that a will composed by judgment to either cannot be necessitated by God, are refuted.

44 To the first argument of the first opinion, drawn from the authority of Augustine, we say: that he there proceeded concerning the indifference of the will to either, considered intrinsically; not, however, by reason of the habitude to the affixing of it to one part of the contradiction, which the first cause could draw.

Whence the intrinsic indifference of the will would be taken away, if it were not able from the intrinsic to either, in such wise that, by its quidditative character, it could not tend into either part of the contradiction; yet the intrinsic faculty of the will, and the native force, would not be consumed, if from the absolute power of God it were necessitated to assent; as neither is it destroyed, because in non-deliberated motions it does not operate freely, but bears itself in some manner after the fashion of a necessary agent.

To the second argument: that then the will would be in pursuit of an unknown object, when that part of the contradiction had not been proposed to it by the intellect, to whose assent, or dissent, it would be necessitated; for neither, in order that the will be carried necessarily to some object, is it demanded that the intellect apprehend such a necessitation of operating: as neither, in order that the will freely will some good, is it demanded that the intellect recognize such a good as freely longed for; but it suffices that the goodness of the object be intimated, without a condition of necessitas, or liberty, being proposed in the impulse of the will.

For the Calvinian heretics, by other arguments, voiding forth their effutiations, declare that in all works, even depraved works, one is compelled by a necessity from God of lapsing into evil, and so of necessity, not freely; since they hinder the fact that the will is not freely operating, but is acted on, or pushed, by God to evil, from being exercised as free.

45 To the third argument: although that the will, indeterminate from itself to either, should be compelled in the first act to one part of the contradiction, in such wise that proximally in the first act it cannot tend into the opposite, would be a kind of appearance of praeternaturalism in the mode of operating of the will; yet that absolute force, or coaction, is not to be renounced, since the will as it were by its absolute force sustains the coaction in the commanded acts, which as we said it cannot suffer in elicited acts, but by coaction of the interior, and as it were by a proximate appointment to one part of the contradiction.

Which point Scotus treats of most acutely, in 4. sentent. distinct. 29. quaest. vnica. §. ad quaestionem igitur sub num. margin. 6.; where he says:

„ Contradictio est, voluntatem simpliciter cogi ad actum volendi; quia cùm violentum sit ex, 3. Ethicorum, (cuius principium est extra non conferente vim passo;) intellige, passo vim, id est, violentiam non conferente, non negatiuè; sed contrariè. „ Quòd est dictu; violentum est, quod est totaliter à principio extrinseco, quod est contra inclinationem passi; et velle non potest sic inesse voluntati, quia tunc nolens vellet, vel volens nollet; et sic sequitur propositum.

Hence it comes about that, just as it implies a contradiction that an act of volition be against the internal impulse of the impulsive faculty, as the upward motion of a stone is against the inclination of its gravity; so also it involves a contradiction that the will, as regards elicited acts, can be acted upon violently. Especially since no impulse which flows forth necessarily from the will, although it be not free, can be not voluntary, in that acceptation of the voluntary which sounds an act budding from an intrinsic principle with cognition. Wherefore, just as the first act, which flows forth from the will as from a principle determined to one, is not violent to the will; so neither would the will, as eliciting its own acts, suffer force, or absolute coaction, however much it be affixed in the first act to one part of contrariety and contradiction.

46 To the fourth argument: that the impression of the supernatural habits, which are subject to the nutus and the free use of the will, is not denied to render the examples of that absolute necessity which could be inflicted by God on the created will; from which, nevertheless, we think the character of that necessitating is most excellently elucidated by the infusion of a prevenient form, or of a motion of power, which is asserted by some, as we showed under n. 37, if that motion be a quality of the order, and species, of the power, or of the principle of action; as indeed it seems ought to be sustained, since there is no other created action to be given of the creating action.

To the confirmation: that, as is sufficiently, indeed amply, evident from the conflictedness under num. 40, the impulsive faculty of the created will can be bound by the sole will of God, so that it cannot be borne proximally to one part of the contradiction. Wherefore, while it is objected to us: that it would follow that the intrinsic power of the will to either would be contracted by the mere exterior denomination;

It is answered: that if the exterior denomination be used in that universality, as to comprehend any exterior physical assistance whatsoever of the divine will, as his exercising faculty ad extra, since it binds the created will to one part of the contradiction without an intrinsic change of the created will, in that acceptation it would indeed be true that the created will is affixed to one part by the exterior denomination; as it is true that the same will is compelled to assent without an intrinsic change.

But truly, because the exterior denomination is extended also to the connotation of the uncreated will as nowise joined by the mode of use, or of causality ad extra of the divine exercising faculty, with the created will, but by the mode of an internal purpose, or of the mere intention of the end; as the praedestination of the elect to a determinate degree of glory before the scientia visionis meritorum denominates Peter as exteriorly destined to glory, without such an uncreated volition being composed with the created will, in the manner of a use, or of a causality ad extra of the divine exercising faculty, for a physical influx;

Therefore the divine will, compelling the created will by its efficacy to assent, in such wise that it cannot dissent, is not to be said to assist the created will by the mere exterior denomination, in that manner in which the act of praedetermining merely exteriorly concerns the praedestinate; but by a true physical conjunction, not in the genus of formal cause, but of efficient cause, as it were after the fashion of that which intervenes between the created impulsive faculty and the divine will, when it supplies the habit of charity, and constitutes the will proximally, and proportionately, valent for the supernatural impulse, without any intrinsic change of the impulsive faculty which should precede the actual influx.

As to the second objection of num. 32., concerning the contradictory denominations of the divine will as necessitating, or not necessitating, the created will, which necessarily demand a physical, and intrinsic, change in the impulse of the created will; it is plain from what has been said, under num. 41. through 43., and still more from what will be said under num. 57. The diluting of the objections of Suárez; and the examination of the opinion of another Neoteric concerning the composition of the power of God with created choice.

§. 1.

To the second foundation of the second opinion, of Francisco Suárez; it is plain from what has been observed, sub nu. 46.; for it only proves that opposite effects, of privating or not privating the will of the dominion which it claims for itself in its own acts, demand a disparity of the physical composition of the divine will (which is the exercising faculty) with the created will in the first act; which physical composition is asserted without an intrinsic change, or in the genus of formal cause, of the created will. In that manner in which the will of God, or his exercising faculty, assists most intimately, by a special physical conjunction, to the vital powers, while it carries them up to the series of the completed, and as it were to the equate agent in the first act of the supernatural act; without an intrinsic change of these powers in the first act.

But that diversity which Suárez intends from the side of the necessary, and of the free, impulse; is altogether disproved in the sentence of Scotus, affirming that God, since he freely praedefines the impulse of the created will, does not premit the science of the cooperation of the free choice.

Wherefore, for the confirmation, we say: that of the will of God inflicting necessity on free choice would be demanded a firmer and more unimpedible affixion in the first act to one part of the contradiction; yet not in the second act, than of the will of God freely premoving the created will to the actual influx. Because that necessity of the exterior predetermination, which Scotus asserts, although it be the necessity of consequence, and from the hypothesis of the second act, is still asserted in such wise that it can in no degree be impeded in fact and in the actual, even before the foreknowledge of the cooperation of the created cause; since it involves the actual composition of the actual cooperation, for it is the predetermination of the concourse. Yet in that hypothesis, in which the created free choice would be necessitated by the exterior, and uncreated, will of God; although the operation of free choice would not be of another character as to the intrinsic physical being, it would nevertheless be altogether a sensible change as to the exterior, and moral, character; by reason of its habitude to the will of God as composing its power to one part of the contradiction, as if he were a necessary agent, and determined to one in the first act; as is plain from what has been said, sub num. 41.

48 Whence falls the examination of the mode of speaking of Villegas of Complutum the First; who, since he expressly upholds the predetermination by the absolute purpose of the divine will, and moreover also constitutes that the free choice composed by judgment, and full deliberation, to either, can be necessitated by God, as is plain from the pronouncements of the aforesaid author, which we transcribed above, sub num. 36., seems to assert only a virtual, and not formal, composition of the divine will with free choice to either.

For thus he holds, in suo opere de Deo vno, in controuersia 12. de Concordia voluntatis diuinae cum nostra voluntate disp. 1. in fine disp. §. Ad secundā rationem. Where he subjoins:

Difficile non est declarare, quomodo ex parte Dei paratum concursum nostra voluntas habeat ad oppositam operationem; quoniam est quidem decretum, quod antecedere defendimus, rationemque concursus Dei sortitur; sic formaliter effectio eius operationis, quam statuit, vt virtualiter sit voluntas opposita. Nam decretum, quod non solùm ad substantiā operationis, sed etiam ad modum contingentiae illius, refertur; praedictam energiā in se concludit.

And afterwards, again untangling the matter, he adds: Nor is it wonderful if the decree, which in relation to this action is formally the volition of it, be by that very fact, as it is ordered to it under such a mode, a virtual volition of dissent, and of the opposite consent. We can therefore, even though the antecedent decree be absolute and efficacious, not pursue the honorable, and embrace the delectable; for you would not see why it should not suffice, that we can do both, the virtual will equivalent to both, included in such a decree.

The placitum of Villegas is refuted, who denies a formal purpose in God concerning the composition of the divine power with free choice toward either in the first act.

But, indeed, in very truth, although Villegas judges that by no toil he composes the power of God with the use of free choice, while he judges that that volition which absolutely preconstitutes the assent of the created will virtually premoves to dissent; yet I judge that the virtual purpose does not expedite the matter.

It is assailed 1.

Then, because (as is plain from what will be said, sub num. 51.) that will, which thus is made one of absolute pursuit of the assent, that it expresses the flight concerning dissent (not only as to the virtual, and implicit, voluntary in God, but also as to the formal, and explicit,) cannot be brought forward as a virtual will of dissent. Unless that virtuality, or eliminative premotion, to the opposite, is recalled to the formal, and absolute, decree of the composing of the power of God to either in the first act with the created will.

It is sifted 2.

Then also; that if we do not confess in God an explicit, and formal, purpose of composing his power in the first act to either, namely, to assent, or dissent, but acknowledge only a formal will of assent, and a virtual one of dissent; it would come to pass that the created free choice would not refer a moral, formal, and proximate power to dissent, but only a remote, and virtual one. For as it implies a formal, and proximate power of operating in any created agent, if there do not assist it proximally in the first act the exercising faculty of the first cause; so also there is repugnant to the formal, and proximate power, of free choice of the will, as it were, of free choice, that it be compared to the power of God as it were in the second act; from which formal and proximate composition of the will is extracted. Truly, however, it is called into question in the hypothesis, in which God does not compose his power in the first act to either with the created free choice; for neither is the free choice, as it were, of the free choice, but of the will alone; and as it were the assent, without whom the free choice, that it be not made of the exercising faculty alone, but of the will; whence there is no free choice, as it were without the exercising faculty, in the first act; and therefore the dividing of the will to either would not be of free choice, but of the will alone.

---

The decree, concerning the composing of the power of God to either with the created free choice, is weighed; and whether such a decree changes the created will?

A twofold consideration of the conversion of the power of God with free choice.

49 But, truly, because the things premitted seem to call forth a stricter discussion; it is to be observed; that as the will, or the created free choice, can be regarded in two ways, either in the first act, inasmuch as it is indifferent to either before the exercise of the action; or in the second act, when it exercises itself to one part of the contradiction. So also the will of God, or its exercising faculty, inasmuch as it connotes the free choice, and is composed to it for influx, can be regarded also in the first act; namely, as the constituent of free choice to either, before the actual influx; and as composed with the free choice in the second act to the exercise of the operation. Which to all must be indubitable, and in confession; because, as no agent is able to operate without the concourse of God, so neither is it able to act to either without the preparation of concourse to either.

The decree of the composing of the power of God with free choice to either is distinct from the decree of creation.

That the decree of preparing the divine power to the created free choice for the concourse to either must be distinct from the decree of creation; since, while the decree of creation stands, the power of God can be composed with free choice in the first act to only one part of the contradiction; and in consequence, that free choice would be necessitated; as will be more evident from what will be said below, sub n. 53. and 54.

It is confirmed from Scotus.

That the decree of the composing of the power of God with free choice to either is to be sustained on the mind of Scotus, and that that decree is distinct from the decree of creation. It is plain in that hypothesis of Scotus, that God would be a necessary agent; in which hypothesis Scotus had affirmed that the free choice would be necessitated. Of which pronouncement no other reason can be assigned, but that, since God would be a necessary agent, and determined to one, he could not compose his power with free choice to either in the first act; of which see num. 57.

If, however, you reply: that if God were a necessary agent, free choice would be taken away with all the requisites from the side of the intrinsic principle, as to operating to either; and in consequence the hypothesis of Scotus would vanish.

Yet although it be so, that the existence of free choice with all the requisites to operating to either would be repugnant, from the side of the intrinsic principle, if God were not a free principle ad extra; nevertheless still the hypothesis of Scotus would not be useless to be conceded, for referring the character of free cooperation. Is it considered praecise by the sole habitude to the intrinsic principle composed of the full deliberation to either? Or also by comparison to the first cause? So that, if the first cause were composed in the first act determinately to one, there would still underlie the liberty of the operation of the created free choice, however much composed of the full deliberation to either.

Therefore Scotus separates the decree of the creation of free choice from the decree of the composing of the power of God with free choice to either; since, when the existence of the terminus of creation is granted, namely, of the created free choice, he disquires whether it can be necessitated from the exterior, on account of the power of God composed in the first act to one part of the contradiction.

But the utility of this hypothesis of Scotus is defended by Vázquez, 1. p. disp. 200. c. 1. n. 1.; although, with Cajetan and Camerarius, he holds, that although the first cause should operate by necessity; yet the created free choice would bear itself freely, if it were free from itself and intrinsically; of which see Vázquez, disp. 100. citato. 1, cap. 3.

50 This presupposed, we say: that in that hypothesis, in which God would impress on the created will an operative formal principle, or a principle of operating, with an unimpedible force, affixing free choice in the first act to one part of the contradiction; the power of God, or its exercising faculty, would not be composed to either in the first act, even though a full deliberation of reason, and a proposition of the object to each part of contrariety and contradiction, should be supposed.

Because otherwise there would be in God two opposite decrees; one, of affixing the created will, by a form altogether contracting, in the first act, free choice, for instance, to assent: and another, of composing in the first act the divine power to either with free choice.

And truly, when it is quite certain with Scotus, that every causality belonging to the genus of efficient cause, which can be bestowed by a created virtue, can be supplied by the power of God immediately; as we treated in the place cited, in controuersia 9. de visione Dei, in ar. de supplebilitate luminis gloriae. Whence it comes to pass, that as no reason can be rendered, which involves an evident contradiction, why God cannot impress on the will some created form of more acute acumen, and energy, which would thus contract the will in the first act, that it compel free choice to one part of the contradiction in the first act, even with the proposition of the object to either granted: in which hypothesis, the power of God, or its exercising faculty, would not be composed in the first act to either with the created will.

Thus God, through his power and will thus composed in the character of a particular principle supplying that created form binding the will by the mode of the first act, would even necessitate the created will; so that in the first act it would not be composed with free choice to either, but only to that part of the contradiction to which that created form would compel it, whose causality the divine will would supply, as if he were a necessary agent determined to one.

51 But you will object against the things premised: first. That, therefore, the will of God in that hypothesis, in which it would necessitate free choice, would not be compossible with another will composing the divine power to either with free choice; because it would thus praedefine the assent, for instance, that it even would exclude the dissent, and the principle of dissenting.

But the praedefinitive willing, which Scotus does in fact affirm, even determines by the mode of a principle anticipating our operation; because the absolute willing of God is so an action of God ad extra, that it even becomes the principle of our assent; and it so prestitutes efficaciously such a part of the contradiction, that it exclude the other part of the contradiction, not only by the implicit, and virtual, voluntary, but also by a formal, and explicit, volition; therefore such a praedefinitive will is not compossible with the preparation, or composition, of the divine power toward either in the first act, or by the mode of a principle.

Objection 2. That free choice would be necessitated by an uncreated volition, which would be the principle of a praedeterminating quality. 52 It is objected secondly; that if God were to determine free choice by the will of God supplently — that is, if God were to determine it in the first act by a pure volition, as we do not maintain; or by a premoving quality, as some others affirm; under such a conjecture the determination of the will, as it were before the actual influx, would not belong to the mode of the concourse, but of the principle: and by the subscription of the act of the first cause; and thus the free choice would be, as it were, necessitated by an external, and not intrinsic principle; whence, since the free choice is not, as it were, of the intrinsic principle of the will, but of the concourse of the free will to either in the first act, the free choice would not be necessitated by the will of God.

To objection 1; in what manner the will of God determines in the first act, and in the second act. 53 It is answered: that the will of God then concurs by the mode of a principle, when it produces the principle of operating; or supplies the principle of operating, while it suffices in the place of such an operative virtue. It will then indeed influx as a pure action, and concourse, when it does not supply the principle of acting, but only contracts by the mode of a second act.

The instance, as noted, can be weighed for direction: Which can be weighed by the instance premised; concerning the supplying of the habit of the light of glory through the will of God, or through its exercising faculty composed in the character of a particular principle. In which hypothesis, the willing of God, bearing the place of the habit of light, would concur as, as it were, a special principle, completing the created intellect in the character of a supernatural principle proportionate to the supernatural influx; but in fact, since the will of God so concurs with the composed intelligence as if with a habit of light intrinsic, it does not bear itself as a principle supplying the intrinsic, but as a principle extrinsic, which would be, as it were, extrinsically, as it were, contrahing the will to either; and thus, the free choice would be, as it were, extrinsically, by a principle exteriorly, as it were, not intrinsic; whence, since the free choice is not necessitated by any intrinsic principle of the will to either in the first act by a non-premoving, but only by the concourse of the exercising faculty of the will to either; therefore the free choice is, as it were, necessitated by the will of God.

Free choice would be necessitated by the will of God, which would be the principle of a quality of the species of power. of a power of acting in the first act; but by the mode of a mere action and actual concourse.

54 Hence, although free choice would be necessitated by that divine volition which would be the principle of a quality determining our assent — because free choice in the first act would be presupposed as contracted by that virtue or quality which would have flowed forth from the will or power of God — such willing of God would therefore, at least mediately, necessitate free choice, inasmuch as it would be the principle of a created virtue necessitating our will immediately and intrinsically.

It is not necessitated by a decree acting the part of a mere action. But free choice is not necessitated by the divine volition which only immediately attains our assent, and does not infuse, nor supply, some principle determining to assent. For this volition, looking only to the contraction of our will as in the second act, is not opposed to, nor does it destroy, the composition of omnipotence in the character of the first act to either of two contraries; just as, conversely, the determination or fixing of the will in the first act to one side of contradiction is opposed to the indifference of the will in the first act.

Satisfaction to the second objection. From what has just been said it is clear as to the second objection.

The argument is turned back against the adversaries in the decoct of concurring absolutely. Further; if the objection premised under n. 51 had any force, it would likewise strike at the common doctrine of the absolute will of God bestowing a concourse determined to the one side of contradiction with an explicit and formal act of will denying the actual concourse to the opposite.

The will of concurring is not opposed to the equipping of concourse to either of two contraries in the first act. Yet that contraction by the mode of the second act, or of actual concourse, is in the common opinion altogether other than a will of God imprinting a principle contracting the created will in the first act to one side of contradiction; for that predetermination which we receive according to the mind of Scotus is only of concourse.

A caution for the followers of Scotus, and something seriously needed by the promoters of Scotus. 55 Finally, on behalf of the disciples of Scotus I wish that this were seriously attended to: that Scotus everywhere hunts down predetermination by an intrinsic form as adverse to liberty; and in addition all predetermination, even extrinsic, which pertains to the first act of operating and not to the second act of operation.

Testimony 1. against intrinsic predetermination. Scotus As is clear from Scotus, transcribed by us under number 10 of this article, where he expressly maintains: that it is against the nature, and the reason, of liberty that the created will be determined by a habit, or by some inferior nature. Where under the name of habit he embraces any created intrinsic form whatsoever, or operative virtue.

Add also the testimony premised from number 18, where he expressly denies predetermination by the imprinting of any intrinsic thing; for he adds: That the first cause in the second cause is not a new influx which would be the creation of some inhering accident of the second cause; but the influx there is a determined order of causes in producing the common effect. In which he plainly establishes the contraction of the created will through a natural sympathy in acting, without intrinsic modification.

That, moreover, such a sympathy imports nothing antecedent to the mode of an antecedent principle — that is, the actual concourse of God and the creature in the first act — he argues from the fact that God is not the cause of deficiency for free choice; Because no subtraction of a prior cause is understood on account of whose defect the will could act rightly.

Satisfaction to certain objects against our opinion concerning the composition of the power of God with created free choice.

56 SED Yet a knot thus far remains to be untied concerning the composition of the divine power with free choice to either of two contraries; for such a preparation seems fictitious, for acting with the created will to either of two contraries.

For if such a composition were granted, it would be the object of some free decree by which God had determined it expedient to furnish a concourse to either side of contradiction, so that the created will might be able to exercise itself toward either side; since no created agent is proximately capable of any operation without the influx of God.

But such a decree equipping the divine power for either of two contraries seems to be a thing requiring the confutation of the reason that it is; that is, because a free will in God, which does not infer a real modification in the object, or in the object as connotate, is repugnant thereto; while no physical modification whatsoever is possible which answers to a decree founding the exercising faculty with free choice to either of two contraries; just as any effect of the exercising virtue also stands in the way, which could be indifferent to either of two contraries.

For although it attains pursuit and flight, love and hate, it does not thereby attain some contracted and physical term which could be indifferent to love or hate. Wherefore a concourse determined to love, and a concourse determined to hate, howeversoever it is elicited by the power of God or by the exercising faculty, cannot be connotated by some free decree composing the exercising virtue of God with created free choice indeterminately and to either of two contraries.

57 Yet surely this argument, which chiefly obtains with Vázquez and some other recent authors, does not press those who maintain that a free decree does not necessarily express or infer physical modification in the object. And this is made plain in conditional decrees concerning those objects which will never be; concerning which see widely in distinction 3 of this controversy.

Next: that if God were to compose his essence to the intellect in the character of a species impressed for the beatific vision, so that he might fecundate the intellect as complete in the first act, both on the side of the power and on the side of the object; and afterwards were to refuse the actual influx as the part of the knowledge of vision;

Then the intellect would pass from not being a complete and fecundated principle of vision to being such; no intrinsic modification having been made in the intellect which could be the connotate of a decree composing the divine essence in the character of a species.

Which is also shown in the article cited on the suppliability of the light of glory through grace in that hypothesis: that the will of God, in the place of a particular agent, would supply the defect of the habit of light in the first act; and that to the intellect thus elevated through the will, or through the exercising supernatural and uncreated faculty of God, there would be denied the actual influx into the beatific vision.

Finally, we also take this for certain: that when the virtue of acting does not require that it be intrinsically composed through inherence with another co-principle, but only intimately assisting it; (as the executive faculty of God stands ready for created free choice,) then such a convention for acting, or the proximate preparation of co-principles in the first act, can be the object of a free decree of the divine will without intrinsic mutation of that faculty, which is completed and expedited in the first act for acting. On which, add what we discuss below, in this controversy, distinct. 3. de Scientia conditionatorum, artic. 2. sub numer. margin. 31.

Another argument from the doctrine of Scotus. Next, a special argument is pressed from the doctrine of Scotus transcribed by us under number 8, where he maintains that, if God were a necessary agent, free choice would be necessitated, because the divine virtue would not be composed with it in the first act to either of two contraries; since in that hypothesis God is established to be a necessary agent, determined to one.

The argument drawn from Scotus is pressed. Therefore in this hypothesis God would be composed differently with free choice in the first act than he is in fact joined, when he stands ready for free choice to either of two contraries; although on the side of the cooperation of the created will no physical modification or disparity would intervene. Nor on the side of the divine volition acting the part of an action; for although, granted that God were a necessary agent, he would not concur by a volition involving the condition of the cooperation of free choice, but by an absolute will; so also he in fact concurs by an absolute volition.

Vázquez is refuted. As we act in article 5 of this distinction, under margin number 33, against Vázquez asserting that God cannot, even by absolute power, praedefine the operation of free choice — because to such a praedefinition no physical modification in the object would correspond; nor would the operation of free choice praedefined comport itself physically otherwise than one not praedefined.

A corollary from the things premised. But that with Scotus — to whom the more celebrated theologians give their vote — it is taken for granted that a free decree does not require the connotation of a physically modified object; we have shown in this controversy, distinction 3, on conditional knowledge, article 2, nn. 29, 30, and 31. With these premises we have without trouble dissolved the objection, which attacks the decree composing the uncreated exercising faculty to either of two contraries with created free choice, on the ground that such a decree does not connote or infer a physical modification.

Another objection against the preparation of concourse to either of two contraries in the first act. § 8. Wherefore the objection of others rather presses, which besieges our opinion thus: Inasmuch as that preparation, or composition, of the divine power with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act, which precedes the exercise of cooperation or of concourse, might seem futile, from that priority of God whereby he establishes the assent of our will. For if he praedecreed assent in the second act, without awaiting the knowledge of the cooperation of free choice, to what purpose is a concourse equipped for the will to dissent?

Satisfaction to the object. It is answered: that the composition of the divine power to either of two contraries with free choice in the first act is altogether to be maintained; because otherwise free choice would not be proximately and morally capable in the first act to either of two contraries, if the exercising faculty of God ready in the first act to either of two contraries were not present to it. Wherefore in that hypothesis in which God would be a necessary agent, created free choice would be necessitated according to Scotus; because God would not compose his power for a concourse in the first act to either of two contraries, but determined to one in the first act.

How the preparation to either of two contraries can coexist with a concoursive predetermination. Predetermination, however, by the mode of the second act is also necessarily maintained on account of the contraction of the created power to such an individual of action; concerning which see in article 5 of this distinction, in the physical digression. For the action of God must precede the action of the creature, since it contracts the potentiality of the creature to such an individual of action; and everything contracting precedes that which is contracted, with its reason consisting in its being in such a contracted, or determined, thing.

The objection is turned back against Suárez. But if the aforesaid objection concluded anything, it would likewise strike at Suárez, who by the absolute praedefinition of good acts establishes the equipment of the exercising power to either side of contradiction; nay, and it could be turned back in this manner against all the adversaries of physical predetermination.

And indeed against the other attackers of physical predetermination. § 9. For when God institutes to call with a vocation not congruous, He concurs to dissent not only with an implicit, and virtual, negation of assent, but with a formal and explicit volition, which the more received theology maintains to exist in God with respect to objects which will never exist; concerning whose non-futurity not only an implicit and virtual voluntary is deferred to God, but also a formal and explicit one. If then God decreed to call a man for that reason whereby He foreknew that he would not consent, excluding consent by an express and formal act of His own; to what purpose is a concourse toward assent equipped for a man so called?

But this composition of the power of God with free choice to either of two contraries is expressly maintained by Scotus in Book II of the Sentences, distinction 37, question 2, § On the solution of these objectors, under margin number 14, where he has as follows.

By giving a free will he gave antecedently right works, which are in the power of the will; and therefore, insofar as lies on his part, he gave rectitude to every act of the will.

Here weigh those words: by giving a free will. Which, in my judgment, mean this: that to a created free will that composition of the divine power with created free choice is necessary which is to either of two contraries in the first act; so that, although it should exercise itself toward evil, there may always be to it a power toward good, on the part of the first cause, altogether furnished. For Scotus did not say that by giving a created will, God also bestowed rectitude insofar as lies on his part; but he immediately added, by giving a free will; as though to the liberty of the will, insofar as it excludes necessity from an extrinsic principle, there is required that God make the will ready in the first act to either of two contraries, and that there be equipped to it in the first act a concourse to either of two contraries.

Wherefore Hugo Caesarius (Canellus) in his scholion on this locus recognized such a composition of God with free choice, according to the sense of Scotus; although in this it displeases him, that he would therein perhaps repel physical premotion; as though the preparation of the power of God with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act did not coexist with premotion through a concourse in the second act; to which objection we have satisfied in the things premised.

Wherefore better, and more conformably to the mind of Scotus, Angelus de Monte Pisano, in the Summa of Theology, second tome, part 1, dispute 30, article 9, under margin number 7, § Finally we say, would have asserted: That the altogether first and adequate root of the divine foreknowledge, in its comparison with things determinately future from free causes, is to be sought precisely from the praedefinitions of the divine will, virtually involving also the active free determination of the aforesaid causes.

Where he plainly defends the praedefinition of concourses with a priority not of (in-what) but of (from-what), that is, of nature; which he expressly maintained in the antecedent article 8 of the same dispute 30. That notwithstanding, he professes the composition of the divine power with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act; which he delivers in the now-cited article 9, § Here we suppose, under margin number 4, where he has:

We suppose that the concourse by which God concurs with fruitful causes for acting together can be considered in two modes: namely, insofar as it is ready; and insofar as it is exhibited. In the prior mode it is the divine virtue proximately applied in the first act, by the absolute decree of the divine will, whereby God from eternity decreed in time to act with second causes and to accommodate himself to them according to the exigency of the connatural mode of acting of the latter. And since these latter have in themselves a connatural mode of acting essentially diverse; hence also in a diverse mode in the first act is the concourse prepared for natural causes, and prepared for free causes; for to the former it is prepared wholly determined to a certain species of act, to the latter however, on the contrary, it is prepared altogether undetermined, and indifferent, both to a certain species of act, and even to the individuals under any species whatsoever, etc.** The objections of Jacobus Alarcón are blunted — who demands the composition of the divine power with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act; wherein also Lessius is refuted, maintaining that God and created free choice are composed to concourse equally and as if by a blind reason —**

Coming to grips with Alarcón, in part 1, treatise 2, On the Knowledge of God, dispute 5, chapter 8, who treats widely against Suárez and Herice, maintaining that some free decree is given whereby the divine power is composed to either of two contraries with free choice before the exercise of operation. Wherefore in the same work, chapter 8, § 3, margin number 33, he asserted that the assistance of the divine Omnipotence for operating with a second cause is a certain moral obligation arising in God from a free decree, whereby he determined himself to be bound to compose with second causes for operating, according to the exigency of the causes.

But from the things said the aforesaid author seems manifestly pressed ad hominem; because it is one and the same thing, and sounds throughout the same — a decree of God inferring a moral obligation to assist free choice according to its exigency, and a decree of concurring with free choice to either of two contraries. For as free choice, according to the exigency of its condition, is entirely indifferent morally and proximately to either of two contraries; so also it connotes the first cause equipped by pact to it in the first act to either of two contraries, before the exercise of influx.

Because with the same author, under § 2, from number 15 through 18, it is impossible for any created cause to have a proximate and moral power, if there is not present to it the power, or the exercising faculty, of the first cause; therefore the potentiality of free choice standing ready in the first act, morally and proximately to either of two contraries, is repugnant, if the power of God is not composed to it to either of two contraries; therefore that moral obligation of bestowing concourse on free choice according to the exigency of such a principle indifferent to either of two contraries, drinks in some free decree composing the power of God with free choice to either of two contraries in the first act.

And indeed the inquiry concerning that decree of God for binding himself to free choice according to its exigency would return: whether it infers, or refers, a determined object? (As the same Alarcón acts against Suárez and Herice, whose foundation we transcribed under number 56.) Unless Alarcón should wish that the obligation of assisting free choice in the first act to either of two contraries be a determined object; by which same reason also the power of God composed in the first act to free choice to either of two contraries is likewise able to be adduced as the determined object of such a decree.

Either therefore it is not of the reason of a free decree that it express or infer a real and physical modification; or there results in God a moral obligation of concurring to either of two contraries from the nature of things, without any free decree on the part of God — which the same Alarcón rightly confutes. § 3, under n. 34.

Further; that it is not of the reason of a free decree to infer a modification in the object, or in the object as connotate, is shown in that hypothesis in which God had not revealed such a decree; nay, he had not even proposed that plan of concurring with creatures according to their exigency; yet he would operate infallibly with them, on account of a natural sympathy in acting.

Just as a habit is infallibly composed to a power for action in a blind mode, not premising the excitation of the power, but infallibly accompanying it; in which fashion Lessius asserted God to comport himself with respect to the concourse of the creature, whom Alarcón follows. Locus cited. § 3. margin number 42.

Therefore in such a hypothesis God would compose his power with free choice in the same manner on the side of the object and of the connotate as he in fact concurs, when there is asserted by the aforesaid authors that moral obligation of concurring arising from a free decree; and yet no free decree would intervene; therefore a free decree does not require a modification in the object, or in the connotate.

62 You will say with Alarcón, in the same place § 3, number 44, that then in that hypothesis in which God had not determined to concur with second causes according to their exigency, things would comport themselves differently for acting, composed. Because then there would not be supplied to them a proximate and moral power for acting, which does not subsist without the decree of God to concur with creatures.

But it does not void the force of the argument proceeding from the hypothesis (which Alarcón admits for the sake of disputation, to elicit the truth), which supposes that God, without a decree, by a natural sympathy in operating would be composed to action with created causes according to their exigency; nor does a habit infallibly accompany the action of the power. For in that hypothesis it could not be denied that there is a moral and proximate power of acting in the creature, on account of the denial of the assistance of God concurring; since, that granted, God infallibly concurs to every action of the created will in the aforesaid supposition admitted by Alarcón; and yet the decree is removed; therefore the decree can be removed, or posited, with the object, or the connotate, unchanged.

63 Yet surely, with respect to the doctrine of Lessius and Alarcón, maintaining that, on the supposition of a decree applying the power of God to act with creatures, the divine virtue is drawn as it were by a blind reason to operate with free choice; so that without any excitation, or determination, of the creature toward love and hate, God concurs toward love and hate — observe: the aforesaid pronouncement attacks the common opinion of the adversaries, asserting that God is determined by the creature to producing the substrate of sin; concerning which see ourselves widely in article 6 of this controversy. Since expressly they — Lessius and Alarcón — maintain that God is no more determined by the creature with respect to the act of hate, than the creature by the creator; so that God and creature are composed equally to eliciting the matter of sin.

Add also: that that instance drawn from the accompanying of the operation of a habit and a power is of no strength. Because a power undetermined to such an individual of action does not seek a contraction from a habit, in the way a created cause is determined by the first cause; on account of which reason we rightly judge that God and creature are not so joined equally for acting, as a power and habit are composed to action with no priority of nature. Concerning which see precisely in article 5 of this distinction, in the physical digression, on the contraction of the created will to such an individual of action.

But whatever the case may be concerning temporal concourse ad extra; yet even so against Lessius and Alarcón we are able to show, that either there is an inevitable determination of the actions of free choice by God — as Scotus wills, with the common opinion; or that God composes his power with free choice while a condition is drunk in that is to be purified by free choice — as Suárez, Vázquez, and other primary authors among the Jesuits assert.

Because God from eternity does not only institute to exact a moral obligation of concurring with free choice according to its exigency; but has also absolutely decreed to cooperate with free choice toward assent, for instance. For as the assent of free choice from eternity is objectively modified toward an infallible futurition; so likewise did God, by that mark, have a determined decree concerning the existence of such an assent.

Either therefore the divine decree, determined to the futurition of our assent, drinks in a hypothesis, if the created will so wills; and in consequence it would follow that that divine volition imports a condition to be purified by the created will; and hence the operation of free choice would be prior in nature to the motion of God. As we show widely and precisely below, in the following article 5, against Suárez and his followers, asserting that conditional composition of the divine will with free choice for so cooperating, if free choice so wills.

Or God from eternity, objectively immutating the act of free choice to futurition, or to non-futurition, bore himself absolutely, not involving the hypothesis, if the created will consent, or dissent; in which way Lessius and Alarcón (that they may avoid the pressure of a conventional application to be purified by free choice) maintain that God cooperates in time equally with free choice, so that he is not excited by free choice to such a species of action. And consequently it would come about that that eternal statute of God concerning our consent, not referring a condition, or the hypothesis of free choice so attempered, or obedient, would be simply predefinitive and predeterminative; since nothing else is, with Scotus and the common view, a predefinitive statute, than an efficacious purpose not importing a condition to be purified by the second cause.

Whichever simultaneous and equal reason of concurring Scotus attacks in Book II of the Sentences, distinction 37, question 2, § Along the second way, margin number 2, where he has:

Either one will determines another, and not our own, the divine — it is plain, because the temporal is not the cause of the eternal: therefore conversely, and the proposition is had. Or neither determines the other, and then neither will be a mover moved; nor will there be between them an essential order.

Which doctrine, although it be handed down by Scotus acting against his own opinion concerning the immediate concourse of God to the acts of our will, proceeds nevertheless from the proper principles of Scotus, in admitting an essential order between second cause and first, and that a second cause does not operate unless as moved by the first; which he supposes throughout that whole question.

A pressing objection; concerning the liberty of the actions of Christ the Lord, and of the Blessed.

64 SED Yet that objection cannot be passed over against the doctrine we have premised — the one that is brought forward from the liberty of the actions of Christ the Lord, and of the blessed (as is clear from number 12); and thus our opinion seems able to be pressed; on the supposition that, with Scotus, the impeccability of Christ is reduced to the beatific fruition, which Christ the Lord has in common with the other blessed.

For if the preparation of a concourse to either of two contraries sufficed for the blessed to have in himself a liberty of endeavor toward enjoying God; and beyond that, a power toward sin — such that impeccability were disclaimed only in the sense of composition, namely insofar as it is composed to the divine premotion toward good — and not in the sense of division, or as it is apprehended with all requisites on the side of the principle of operating, before the exercise of operation;

It would come to pass that either Christ would not be a free principle of his own actions, because there would not be equipped to him an indifferent concourse to either of two contraries; or if by reason of the sole preparation of a concourse to either of two contraries there could be sustained a moral and proximate power to either of two contraries, inasmuch as there had still been granted a perpetual fixing toward good — it would follow that Christ would refer a proximate power to sinning.

So that to the blessed in heaven, and to Christ the Lord, there would be no other reason of impeccability at hand than that which would suit a man confirmed in grace — one to whom the power to either of two contraries would be simpliciter made possible, and the equipment of concourse in the first act to contraries and contradictories; and there would intervene only a perpetual contraction toward good, because of an extrinsic will of God that prevented prevention by the mode of concourse, or of the second act. Whereas, upon examining everything which contributes to the reason of a free, and morally defectible, principle — there is nothing in one confirmed in grace which is not at hand to any other just person; and the difference is only on the side of the will that predetermines by the mode of concourse and of the second act; wherefore, as he who is confirmed in grace is asserted to be peccable absolutely and simpliciter, so also is the blessed in heaven.

65 We say: that if a concourse toward either be equipped to the blessed, and he be not affixed to one part of the contradiction by the extrinsic will of God in the first act before the actual cooperation; then the blessed is to be judged absolutely, and simpliciter, a free principle of his own operation. Since the contraction by way of exercise, and in the second act, does not take away the free, and moral, power toward the opposite; as is clear in the action of the concurrence of the divine will, when the created free choice is contracted to one part of the contradiction.

This being premised, it is nevertheless to be held that the blessed is to be considered and judged impeccable under another, more special title, than he — a just viator confirmed in grace — is to be pronounced impeccable. Because that gift of confirmation in grace is not bestowed at the exigency of the state of the viator, but on account of the sole munificence of God; which is otherwise in the blessed, to whom, on account of the clear vision of God, by which he possesses God, that perpetual premotion toward perpetual fruition is due.

66 Which rather is urged with respect to Christ the Lord; who, on account of his hypostatic and substantial sanctity, more demands, and more claims, the premotion of grace and its governance toward good; from which it comes to pass that he is pronounced impeccable absolutely and simpliciter. Because the fixing to this side of contradiction is due on account of the antecedent supposition of the hypostatic union, which precedes the actual operation.

Hence before the actual influx there intervenes the debt of governance, which obliges God from moral decency, and from the regard for the substantial holiness of the operating supposit; so that such a supposit, though simpliciter free for acting, and to whom there is furnished in the first act a concourse to either of two contraries, is nevertheless always contracted toward good.

Which in Christ the Lord I wish to be understood, so that to him there is not furnished a concourse to either of two contraries, nor even in the first act, unless within the limits of becoming, honest, and fitting appetite — such as suits the ineffable majesty of the Son of God; as has been asserted above, in controversy 9, On the Vision of God, distinction 1, subdivision 2, concerning the supernatural principle of vision on the side of the power, article 1, margin number 53; namely, that the liberty of the actions of Christ is asserted on account of the non-determination to eliciting good under such a motive, or under another, or in such-and-such intention of acts.

Nor is Scotus's pronouncement from the doctrine delivered in the same place an obstacle to this: that a created nature, which by nature would be impeccable and fixed toward good, seems impossible of occurrence. For there Scotus speaks of a nature contracted from within to the operation of rectitude; yet not of that contraction which would be sought from a governance from without.

The peccability of Christ is defended from the absolute power of God, when a perpetual governance toward good is denied him.

67 SED Yet you would insist further, attacking us sharply; because if the impeccability of Christ had to be sought from a perpetual premotion toward good, it would come to pass that, as God could by absolute power refrain from premoving the nature assumed by the Word toward good (as many of the disciples of Scotus assert, with John of Rada, in part 3, controversy 3, On the Immediate Term of the Union, article 3, in the explanation of the opinion of Scotus, conclusion 5; and with Philip Fabro, in Book III of the Sentences, distinction 3, single question, dispute 27, chapter 4, especially under margin number 21 — which opinion Peter of Lorca also judges to be free from every note of disgrace, in part 3, question 15, dispute 57, member 2, § Yet truly in vain, margin number 11), so also in such a hypothesis Christ could have sinned.

We answer: that, granting that opinion of the Scotists, which asserted Christ peccable in such a hypothesis, nothing absurd is inferred. Nor indeed would it come to pass that such a moral lapse were referred to the personality of the Word in the genus of efficient cause, but only to the humanity assumed; although meritoriously the lapse were ascribed to the supposit. For the eliciting principle of any action whatsoever is only the nature; not however the composition of nature and hypostasis.

Which is evident also from this: that if God were to sustain the nature without any hypostasis's assistance, from the nature there would proceed an action of the same species as that which flows forth from a nature composed with a hypostasis.

Whence when actions are pronounced to be of the supposita; that axiom does not regard the eliciting principle of the action, but the principle of denomination alone; namely, that which is denominated from the action on account of the mere composition of the hypostasis with the nature, which alone is the eliciting principle. So that actions are asserted to be of the supposita for this reason: that the nature first contracts itself, through the effecting of its own hypostasis, or of positive persity, before it issue any other causality, whether it operate within itself, or outside itself; for the budding forth of the hypostasis is nearer, and more proximate, to the nature than any other eliciting causality whatsoever, or that which emanates from the nature in the genus of efficient cause.

Wherefore it is for this reason that the actions are called of the supposita: because the nature composes itself previously with a hypostasis, or constitutes itself in the character of a supposit, before it approaches another influx. From which it comes to pass that there is no action which does not denominate the supposit, or which does not proceed from a nature already constituted in the character of a supposit; because such an influx the nature, already constituted in the character of a supposit, exercises before that it elicit another action; not however so that the action flow forth from the composition of nature and hypostasis, or rest on the hypostasis in the fourth mode of persity.

68 But you will insist: that, this having been granted, it would also follow that the divine personality would in the same fashion flow into a sinning action in such a hypothesis, as in fact it flows into a meritorious action. Because even a meritorious operation is not elicited by the supposit, but by the nature; there would therefore arise, that the divine Word would be compared by the same reason of causality to a right action, as to an oblique and sinning one; whereas with respect to each it is the principle of mere denomination, on account of its union with the operating nature, not however an eliciting principle.

69 It is answered: that the divine supposit, with respect to an honest operation, although not a physical eliciting principle, is nevertheless a moral principle; because, in view of the hypostatic union, and on account of the substantial holiness of the Word communicated to the nature, the nature — which is the eliciting principle of action — is premoved toward good. Hence the supposital composition is to be judged the moral principle of holy operation; since, in view of the union with the supposit, that perpetual governance for acting holily is owed to the nature.

From which it comes to pass that the sanctity of the actions of Christ ought to be referred to the supposit, as to a moral principle; since to the moral and meritorious cause belongs that form, or manner, of acting, in view of which there is provided, and furnished, to the eliciting principle the contraction and fixing toward acting holily.

Which would come about otherwise in an oblique action, in that hypothesis in which God would deny premotion toward good, leaving the nature deprived of the governance of all supernatural auxiliaries. For then the concourse toward evil would not be exhibited by God in view of the composition of nature to the hypostasis of the Word; but on account of a covenant of concurring with a free and defectible second cause, according to the stability of the nature.

And accordingly the supposit would not be the moral principle of such an action; since the concourse toward evil is not furnished in view of the composition to the hypostasis of the Word, just as there is furnished a perpetual and continuous premotion toward good.

70 But it is a pleasure to adduce the express judgment of Peter of Lorca, the Complutensian primary, against certain recent sun-gleaners of the doctrine of Scotus; for so it has, in the locus cited, under margin number 10:

Thus the more recent hold that it is altogether absurd that the humanity of Christ could have sinned, so that they judge the prior opinion not only false, but even to deserve some mark of infamy, because of the indecency which it puts forward — namely, to admit sin in Christ, which offends pious ears; and because of the common opinion of the holy Fathers, who so exclude sin from God, that they exclude also the power of sinning.

And afterwards, under number 11, he adds: Yet truly in vain are all those authorities adduced, because the Fathers considered only that which now belongs to Christ, as the incarnation has been made, and that it was fitting and consonant according to the ordinary law; in which way the authors of the first opinion do not deny that Christ is impeccable, because the nature assumed, with the gifts which were bestowed upon it on account of the assumption, and which by the ordinary law were owed to it, could not sin. And this those authors expressly affirm they only dispute the metaphysical question on the hypothesis that human nature, bare, and in pure naturals, would be assumed, as it could be assumed by the absolute power of God; of which the Fathers thought nothing, nor indicated it even lightly by a word.

Wherefore that opinion deserves no censure, since neither do the Fathers say anything against it, nor does it offend pious ears to admit the potentiality of some sin in Christ; if ears, as they are pious, be also learned, (as Gabriel remarks,) namely such as know how to discern in what way, and in what sense, the possibility of sin is conceded in Christ. Thus far the most wise man of the Cistercian Order, General in Spain.

Whom I transcribe, not that I may coerce certain more recent men of the opposite school, who bark at Scotus out of affection, not judgment; but that I may report how intemperately Matthew Ferchius, Provincial of the conventuals of the province of St. Bonaventure, spoke of this opinion of Scotus; who, when he had asserted Scotus with most polished and weighty apologies, and vindicated him from the cavils of the impostors, suffering something human, sprinkled such a blemish upon that most candid history, that the Horatian line is deservedly retorted upon him: Naeui inspersit gregio corpori. Saty. 7., while he thus censures this placitum of Scotus, cap. 7. vitae Scoti.

That the Blessed Virgin was piously defended by Scotus as immune from every sin, I hold; I do not so hold that God could, by absolute power, sin as man; for I would more readily believe that the Virgin, the Mother of God, could be subject to sin, than that Christ could be subjected to sin; so that even for this cause I would have departed from the school of Scotus, bound to swear in the words of no master. Behold the great vindicator of Scotus shaken by a light blow.

To the Franciscan doctor, therefore, and to the Cistercian historian, I oppose an assertor, by whom, as it were, I lay low the effort of Ferchius. That in that hypothesis of the metaphysical dissertation, in which Christ is asserted to be peccable, His mother could have been not only polluted by the original stain, but also dishonored, and defiled, by the sordidness of actual sin; because then she would not have been the exemplar and meritorious cause of the sanctity of the whole body of the Church, and accordingly neither would such a mother have had strength sufficient to crush the head of the serpent, which the most holy Virgin, the parent of the Assertor of our liberty from the servitude of the devil, drew from the foreseen merits of her Son.

Whence I also thus re-convict Ferchius from his own words; and I contend for the piety of Scotus.

That the heart of Duns burned with singular devotion toward the Blessed Mother of God, that most celebrated question concerning the immaculate conception of the Mother of God re-convicts, in which Scotus endeavored to defend her innocent from every contagion of crime, unpolluted, and set apart from sinners; inasmuch as she was to be the mother of that Pontiff who (as the Apostle stood forth as a rich witness) was innocent, unpolluted, set apart from sinners, and made higher than the heavens. Thus Ferchius, in vita Scoti, capit. 5. numer. marg. 12.

From which words I attack Ferchius, and free Scotus from the inconsequence of doctrine which Ferchius fastens upon him. Because just as Scotus asserted her, the Mother of the God-man, to be free from the original stain, who was about to bring forth a Pontiff set apart from sinners; so also, in that metaphysical hypothesis in which the man assumed to the hypostatic union would be deprived of every help of grace, and of the governance of premotion to good, just as He would not be a Pontiff of the Church set apart from sinners, so neither would He claim His mother immune from every stain.

ARTICLE III

Whether ideas are a medium on the side of the object for the foreknowledge of futures? Where also, whether ideas pertain to the knowledge of vision? And whether the knowledge of vision is practical?

SUMMARY.

The opinion which holds that future contingents are apprehended in ideas. Num. 1. The true opinion of Scotus is elucidated and established: that the idea is not a medium on the side of the object for the foreknowledge of futures. Num. 5. Two assertions on behalf of the true opinion. Number 12. Satisfaction to the objections against the foreknowledge of futures in ideas. Num. 18. The last argument in opposition is weighed: whether the knowledge of vision is the cause of its object? from Num. 22. through 31.

The present article also bears upon the refutation of those opinions which render a less exact account of the objective infallible determination of futures; yet it is to be traversed with a more restricted pen, because it does not greatly advance the business.

1 St. Bonaventure, in 1. distinct. 39. art. 2. quaest. 3., seems to intimate that future contingents are foreknown by God in His own ideas; which opinion Scotus thus elucidates in 1. dist. n. 39. q. vnica, §. circa istas quaestiones, sub numer. marginal. 7., where he subjoins:

Certitude is posited of the divine science with respect to all things, as to all the conditions of existence, on account of the ideas which are posited in the divine intellect; and this on account of their perfection in representing, because they represent those things of which they are, not only according to themselves whole, but also according to every ratio and habitude of the extremities.

And so in the divine intellect they are the sufficient ratio, not only of apprehending simply those ideata, but also of apprehending every union of them, and every mode of those ideata pertaining to their existence.

Bonaventure was followed by Cajetan, 1. part. quaestion. 14. artic. 13., who cites for that opinion St. Thomas, while he asserts in the body of the article: Wherefore all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only for the reason that He has the ratios of things present with Himself (as some say), but because His intuition is borne from eternity above all things, as they are in their presentiality. Where St. Thomas seems to prove both ratios of foreknowing futures: that which is sought from the ideal rationes, and that because the divine gaze regards the real presence of futures coexisting with eternity from eternity.

2 The aforesaid opinion, moreover, is commended by the proofs which Bassolius constructs for it in 1. dist. 38. q. vnica. §. quantùm ad secundum articulum., where he has it thus:

The foundation and term is the sufficient ratio of knowing the habitude, or relation, as is plain; because upon these alone they depend. But the cognition and the terms are the foundation and term of the complexion, which is a certain respect, whether it be of the thing or of reason; therefore.

Then: the divine essence most perfectly contains every being, and any mode of being you please, and consequently represents them; but contingency is nothing but a mode of being, or a certain habitude to a determinate time.

Moreover, the same is the ratio of knowing the necessary and the contingent, as the straight is the index of itself and of the crooked; just as also it is the same ratio to know the possible and the impossible, light and darkness. But the necessary things are known through the ideas; therefore also the contingent.

That position is confirmed: because the essence and the actual esse of the existence of a creature are entirely the same; therefore, when the essence is represented determinately by the idea, it seems that the actual esse of existence, and by a like ratio the going-to-be and the having-been, are represented.

From which proofs of Bassolius the following argumentation is produced. The ideas, for example, of Socrates and of running, carry that sufficiency by which they can express the complexion of these terms; since that complexion seems to be nothing else than a certain habitude of reason, which can be known when the coextremes have been apprehended.

But, given a complexion which consists of terms that approach a contingent composition, a medium of the infallible science of God is assigned before the determination of the divine will; since every enunciation, as such, by the force of its own intrinsic commensuration to the object, whether future or not future (any subsequent decree of the divine will being set aside), is strongly asserted to have a determinate truth or falsity.

Strength also from the illimitation of the ideal forms. Then: just as before the free decrees the ideas of necessary complexions express such objects, because on account of the pre-eminence and illimitation of those ideal rationes not only animal and rational are represented separately, but also the complex coalescing out of animality and rationality; so, by a parity of ratio, the ideas of Socrates and running, since they are illimitate, will be able to express not only the terms, as it were, incompossible or incomposite among themselves, but as bearing the nexus of a contingent complexion, namely that Socrates will run.

It is urged against the foreknowledge of futures in ideas. But that connexion which is expressed by the word erit, for example, Socrates will be running, by the force of its own enunciation imports a determinate true or false, just as also a determinate commensuration to the object from which, as from a measure, the truth of the enunciation is drawn; therefore from the ideas, before the arrival of the subsequent decree, is drawn that objective determination, which can be assigned as a medium ex parte obiecti of the infallible science of God.

It is conceded, because the idea is adequated to the cognition 3 Moreover, the idea, as object, is adequated to the divine essence, inasmuch as it is the ratio cognoscendi; but the divine essence, expressed by the mode of a species, is the ratio of apprehending any futures whatever: therefore the idea is the ratio cognoscendi futures on the side of the object.

Whether the ratio that the objective esse of a creature in the science of vision imports an omnimodal determination ex parte obiecti. Next it is argued from the opinion of many Thomist authors maintaining that the science of vision is not merely speculative but practical, because it imbibe causalitatem with respect to its object, or is its proper cause: Because the objective esse which the creature draws from the science of vision imports an omnimodal contraction and determination, which can be the ratio on the side of the object, or a medium ex parte obiecti, for terminating the wholly infallible science; as we have clearly shown, and will show below in this article under the margin number 12. But creatures, inasmuch as they have that objective esse in the science of vision, pertain to the ideal rationes; therefore the ideal rationes supply a sufficient medium ex parte obiecti for the infallible foreknowledge of futures:

That, moreover, the science of vision and its object pertain to the ideal rationes is thus opened up and shown:

It is shown that vision is practical Because the science of vision is the practical ratio of its object, inasmuch as God so conducts Himself by the force of that tendency of the science of vision toward the object, that the Deity is not absolved, as the term of that science, from the connexion of causality with respect to future creatures. For just as the science of vision regards creatures not in themselves, nor from the intentional motion of creatures, but from the motion of the Deity; so the science of vision inspects creatures only as in God, and as conjoined with the power of God according to the connexion of causality. Therefore such a science cannot be compared to the secondary object (which are the future creatures) under a merely speculative, and not practical, connotation.

It is urged against it The consequence is shown from the analogy of the vision of corporeal gaze, which for that reason is not a practical ratio of its object, but a merely speculative intuition of it; because it intuits the object without any comparison of causality and dependence upon another; for corporeal vision, apprehending Peter, does not look into his connexion with a cause; it intuits Peter, indeed, from his intentional motion, and not from the motion of the cause.

Therefore, on the contrary, the vision of future creatures in God, and not in themselves, is not absolved from the connexion of causality which stands between future creatures and God; and accordingly it is not compared merely speculatively to creatures, but as the principle and practical ratio of creatures.

It is objected, that the objective esse of a creature in the science of vision pertains to the ideal rationes Then thus: but the objective esse of an effect, inasmuch as it pertains to the practical science of the artificer, conduces to the ideal rationes; therefore, if such an objective esse as creatures have in the science of vision pertains to the practical science, it will come to pass that it also pertains to the ideal rationes. Yet the objective esse pertaining to the science of vision is a sufficient medium of the infallible science; therefore futures are foreknown by God in the ideas or ideal rationes infallibly.

The pronouncement of the more recent Thomists, that the science of vision is of the making of its object 4 Wherefore the whole foundation of the opinion asserting that the science of vision is practical, or imbibes the comparison of a cause with respect to the object of the science of vision; is such in John of Saint Thomas, a recent professor among the theologians of Complutum, 1. par. quaestion. 14. disp. 18. ar. 3. §. From this, therefore, an efficacious argument is drawn.

Because God is compared to the object of the science of vision not only inasmuch as He imports a virtue for the production of a future being, but inasmuch as this virtue is in the last readiness and application to act. Yet the virtue of God last applied imbibe the imperium of the practical intellect, which, after the manner of an operative art, moves to execution; since it is not enough that that science precede which is the efficacious purpose of the divine will, and which is called of simple intelligence, regarding the possibility of a being with omnimodal potentiality and indifference to futurecence or non-futurecence.

Therefore the science of vision is that to which practical causality is inscribed with respect to the object already contracted by the decree to futurecence; since, from the phrase of Sacred Scripture, the whole energy of operation, quasi ultimate and exercised, is attributed to the word, and to the science of God; as is clear from that Psalm 103: Omnia in sapientia fecisti; and from Proverbs 3: Dominus sapientis fundauit terram; and also from that: Ipse dixit et facta sunt.

From which it follows, that since the ideal rationes pertain to the practical science, or the art of the artificer, if the science of vision were an art, and the practical ratio of God toward the future object, it would follow that the objective esse which creatures have in the science of vision, pertaining to the ideal rationes, would be a sufficient medium ex parte obiecti for the foreknowledge of futures.

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The true opinion of Scotus is elucidated and established: that the idea is not a medium ex parte obiecti for the foreknowledge of futures.

The present dissertation Scotus settles at the place cited ex distinction. 39. quaestion. vnica, §. Contra istas quaestiones, n. 7. Where he subjoins:

On the contrary; the rationes cognoscendi the terms of any complexion do not sufficiently cause the cognition of that complexion, unless it be apt by nature to be known from the terms; but a contingent complexion is not apt by nature to be known from the terms, because then it would not only be necessary, but also first and immediate: therefore the rationes cognoscendi the terms, however perfectly they represent them, are not sufficient causes of knowing that contingent complexion.

Moreover, the ideas merely naturally represent that which they represent, and under the natural ratio under which they represent anything. Which is proved from this: because the ideas are in the divine intellect before every act of the divine will, so that they are in no way there through an act of the divine will; but whatever naturally precedes the act of the will is merely natural.

I take, therefore, two ideas of extremities, which are represented in them, say, of a man and of white. I ask: do these of themselves represent the composition of those extremities, or the division, or both? If only the composition, then He knows it naturally, and so necessarily, and consequently in no way knows the division: the same holds if they only represent the division. If both; then God knows nothing through these; for to know contradictories to be true is nothing at all to know.

Moreover, in the same way are the ideas of possibles that are not futures, as of futures; because that difference of possibles that are not futures from futures exists only through an act of the divine will; therefore the idea of a future possible represents its going-to-be no more than the idea of a possible that is not future.

Moreover, the idea of the future will no more represent it to be possible for deity to be now in this, than in that.

For the explanation of whose letter, and especially about those words, numer. 5. Ideae merè naturaliter repraesentant illud, quod repraesentant, et sub naturaliExplanation of the words of Scotus about ideas. It must first be premised what is to be treated of under the program in controversia 12. on ideas; namely, that the ratio of idea befits the divine essence, as it is the object of its own cognition, and as it performs the function of origin and of the expressed species of creatures; wherefore the primary ratio of idea consists in the objective concept, after the manner of the formal in God: as for the rest, from the mind of Scotus we gather that, although we ascribe to it a secondary ratio, that it be an object, which is left over from the divine cognition when it intends creatures.

For the rest, just as the Theologians hand down the divine science with respect to creatures as twofold, one of simple intelligence and the other of vision; so also chapter 12 teaches the object of creatures to be considered in a twofold way: one, that which is coequated to the science of simple intelligence; but the other, that which accedes to the science of vision.

This premised, it remains briefly to refer: to what divine cognition, regarding creatures, does the primary ideal ratio befit; then, to what objective esse of creatures does the secondary ideal esse cohere?

Scotus plainly asserts that neither the science of vision, nor the objective esse of creatures which is made by such a science, can claim the ratio of idea; and that it proceeds thence. Because an idea is made in the divine intellect before every act of the divine will.

But since the science of vision, and that denominative or objective esse of creatures which is formed by the aforesaid science, presuppose the free decree of the divine will, as is confessed among all Theologians: it follows from this that neither can the divine essence, as it is the thing knowable by the vision of creatures, be affected by a formal idea of creatures; nor can such an objective esse of creatures, which follows upon such a science, even be asserted to be an idea less principally and secondarily.

8 Which we can make plain, moreover, by this manifest proof. Because the science imposing the decree is not extrinsic and terminal, but potent speculative objectio of the end, inasmuch as the adevolution is turned to futurecence; besides, the rest is called the science of vision on account of the analogy to corporeal vision, by which the object is not intuited practically, which it inspects merely speculatively.

Yet in the mind of an artificer not the ratio of idea, but that apprehension which presupposes the artefact constructed according to the prescriptions of the art, but the cognition directing the intellect of the artificer, and as it were specifying, and contracting it to the effecting of such a species of artificial being; nor is it derived into the mind of God that that science will perform an ideal function, which presupposes a being efficaciously adorned objectively for futurecence.

From which it follows, that only the science of simple intelligence, and that objective esse which creatures acquire by the force of the aforesaid science, can pertain to the ideal rationes: about which the inquiry presses, whether it can supply a medium ex parte obiecti of the infallible judgment about future contingents?

9 The matter Scotus settled in a few words, with, however, wonderful subtlety, in those words: nu 5. But the ideas of themselves represent the composition of those extremities, or the division, or both, so that these oppositions are naturally known, they are, and will be then necessarily; and consequently no way does He know the division, etc.

Because the idea, for example, of Socrates and of running, inasmuch as they import an objective something sought from the science of simple intelligence; either refer the composition Socrates and running, so that it be infallibly true that Socrates will run; or express the division, so that Socrates infallibly will not run, before the decree of the divine will. And consequently it would come to pass that a creature would be destined to a determinate futurecence, or a determinate non-futurecence, from itself, before any purpose of the divine will; since the science of simple intelligence, to which alone any ideal ratio belongs, antecedes all free decrees of the divine will.

Which, how false it is, and against the essential ratio of participated being, we shall pursue thoroughly in the following Article, where we shall show it to be contradictory that a determinate truth of the future, absolute or conditional, be not preceded by the free purpose of God, whether absolute, or conditional, by which the thing be determined to composition, or division, as Scotus says, whether to going-to-be, or not going-to-be; unless we wished to place the thing from itself, apart from the light of a class of possibles, into the series of futures, without the preceding decree of the divine will objectively mutating the thing toward futurecence.

10 Whence it comes to pass that, with Scotus, through the science of simple intelligence, and through the ideal rationes which pertain to that sort of science, contingent complexa can be conceived only as neither [inclined] toward truth and falsity; yet not as determinate to either part of the contradiction.

For if the science of God, as it antecedes every free decree, should apprehend determinately either part of the contradiction, the necessity of the created cause would be inferred simpliciter. Since that apprehension of God is infallible, and consequently [there] has been obtained an inimpedible object, and the supposition of a form not free by essence, nor touching the influx by the will according to the mode of its intrinsic indifference (for that reason by which Scotus asserts the extrinsic predetermination of the divine will to touch the impulse according to the mode of the intrinsic liberty and indifference of the created cause) but by a merely natural and necessary ratio, and consequently inferring the necessity of the created cause: since the science anteceding the decree is not a free predicate in God, but essentially necessary, from which the liberty, and mode of indifference of the influx of the second cause cannot be drawn, as it were, from an extrinsic principle.

11 There follows, secondly; that that pronouncement is false on which rests that school of theirs which rejects the physical extrinsic predetermination of the divine will; namely, that every complexion, by the force of its own intrinsic enunciation, which is expressed by the enunciative word about the future, befalls a determinate truth or falsity.

Since the science of simple intelligence, with Scotus, regards the complexions of futures, not as importing a determinate composition toward going-to-be, or a determinate division of the extremities toward not going-to-be; but as neither [inclined] toward truth and falsity, which they draw from the subsequent decree, while it objectively mutates the possible being determinately to going-to-be, or not going-to-be; although nevertheless before the decree the enunciation be apprehended with all the expressive force of the object imported by the copula of the verb enunciating about the future: of which more precisely in the following article, where from Scotus, and from Aureolus, we perhaps attack the determinate truth of future contingents in themselves.

Two assertions on behalf of the true opinion against the foreknowledge of futures in the ideal rationes.

12 With these premised, it must first be said that the objective esse which accedes to creatures from the science of vision is a sufficient medium ex parte obiecti of the infallible science of futures; yet not the first, nor regarding the ideal rationes.

This assertion is clear by mere explication; it embraces three parts. First, that such an objective esse as is made by the science of vision supplies a sufficient medium ex parte obiecti for the science of futures. Second, that such a medium is not first in the order of causality, but necessarily pre-requires another medium of such science. Third, that this kind of medium of the cognition of futures, inasmuch as it is sought from the science of vision, in no way pertains to the ideal ratio; whence it comes to pass that, because of the apprehension of futures in such an objective esse as is drawn from the science of vision, God cannot be said to foreknow futures in ideas.

The first part stands: because the science of vision presupposes the absolute and efficacious decree, and consequently the inimpedible energy concerning future contingents; and even the objective mutation which accedes to the possible being from the decree; whereby it is extracted from the mere heap of possibles into the series of futures.

But such objective mutation, with a habitude to a determinate and unimpedible existence, is a most sufficient medium on the side of the object for that infallible judgment which God adds concerning the determinate futurecence or non-futurecence of a being: therefore the objective being of creatures, which is made through the science of vision premising an objective mutation to futurecence sought from the decree, exhibits a sufficient medium for the knowledge of futures.

The second part of our assertion: namely, that the medium of the knowledge of futures which is taken from the science of vision cannot be the first medium, according to the series and habitude of causality, is evident.

Because such objective being, which follows upon the science of vision, presupposes the objective mutation which the decree supplies, extracting the possible from the mere condition of possibility to the existence of futures; but that objective mutation, which is sought from the decree as a medium on the side of the object, especially for apprehending infallibly the determinate futurecence of a being, since such a mutation is owing to an absolute and infallible purpose, in no way awaits the knowledge of the cooperation of a created cause. Therefore the objective being, which accedes to the science of vision, cannot be set up as the first medium on the side of the object of the knowledge of futures.

The third part also of our assertion stands from those things premised under n. 8, where we showed that neither the science of vision, nor that objective being of creatures which is left by such a science, can pertain to the ideal rationes.

For that it premises the future being infallibly according to the rule of the supreme artificer, and determinately to being for such a difference of time; and the exemplary cause, in that whole amplitude in which it embraces the created and the uncreated, does not presuppose a work already then constructed according to the prescriptions of the art, but directs, and as it were contracts, the mind of the artificer to eliciting such a species of artefacts.

13 Secondly it must be said: that future contingents are foreknown by God in ideas not at all determinately.

Thus Scotus, together with Basil and all his own, to whom Severus adheres, Opuscul. 2. de Scientia futurorum contingentium, lib. 1. cap. 4, especially num. 15; Albertinus, de praedest. 2. Theologic. tom., according to the reasoning from the four principles of the philosophical questions; Machado, 1. p. disp. 32. sect. 4.

The proof of which assertion I bring forward chiefly from that text, 6. In the same way are the ideas of possibles that are not future as of futures: because that difference of possibles that are not future and of futures is nothing through an act of the divine will.

From which I argue thus: every ideal ratio pertains to the knowledge of simple intelligence, which does not premise that efficacious constitution of the thing in objective being which is drawn from the decree. But the knowledge of simple intelligence intends possibles that are not future in the same way as futures: as we shall show below, since by the force of the aforesaid knowledge it follows altogether necessarily that things be contracted to futurecence.

For otherwise the thing, as the object of such a knowledge, would necessarily be uncreated: and a creative force would be inferred of the will, if its consent be predefined not by a form essentially free, such as is the decree of the divine will, but by a predicate altogether necessary, such as is the divine knowledge, as the free purpose of God will set forth before itself. Therefore the object of the knowledge of simple intelligence (to which alone every ideal ratio pertains) does not import a determination on the side of the object, which can be the medium of the infallible knowledge of futures.

14. Which Scotus accurately unravelled, quodlib. 1. 4. §. completo autem toto isto processu, marg. §. 1. of the Cavell edition. As he has.

But the divine essence does not move to the distinct knowledge of a creature of whatsoever complexion: because if it moved, determinately to knowing the other part in future contingents, since a thing naturally moving moves necessarily, it would follow that the divine intellect would necessarily understand this part of the contradiction as the true one: and so either it could err, or the opposite could not come about, and then that which is posited to be contingent would not be contingent but necessary.

And after a few things he subjoins. I answer: it moves naturally, and, speaking per se, necessarily, to the knowledge of whatever can be naturally and necessarily known, whether it be simple or complex: and to every necessary cognition: but such is not any complexum about the existence of a contingent creature, because it is not apt by nature to be determined to truth.

15 And if you ask: why does it not necessarily move to such a cognition of the complexum to be had, as could be had of it? I answer: either it would move to know under distinction that this is going to be, or not going to be; and this cognition is not determinately about either part. Or if it moved determinately to knowing either part; that would necessarily be determinate.

16 Behold Scotus expressly defending that the divine essence, before the arrival of the free decree, cannot move the divine intellect to the apprehension of the determinate truth of any contingent complexum; because that [complexum], by the force of its intrinsic enunciation and of its own commensuration to the future object, is not apt by nature to be the substrate of a determinate truth or falsity, the decree being set aside.

For Scotus argues that if a determinate truth could befit a contingent complexum through its habitude to the science of God before the free purpose of the divine will, then either the divine apprehension could be deceived; or the created will would be necessitated, while it is contracted by a necessary form, from which, as from an extrinsic principle, the mode of the contingency of the cooperation of free choice cannot be sought. For the confirmation of this proof of Scotus, see the following article from num. 32. through 34. inclusive.

17 But Cajetan comes forward at the place cited, ex 1. part. quaestion. 14. art. 13. versiculo. Ad secundum Scoti; against the proof of our second assertion. To wit, that the Ideas represent something merely naturally, namely the quiddities of things; and something not merely naturally, but naturally upon the supposition of free will; namely the existences of things, and contingent complexions. Because the quiddities of things are expressed by the Ideas before the act of the will; but the contingent complexions, after the antecedent decree of the divine will.

But the onset of Cajetan is routed; because no ideal reason presupposes the decree that changes the thing objectively unto futurity; otherwise the idea would have to be, not a practical construction of the entity exemplified, but a merely speculative inspection of that futurity-in-unimpedibility which has been constituted by the decree; and accordingly the exemplary cause would not attain the construction of the exemplified entity: it would contemplate it merely speculatively, as already constructed.

Nay, Cajetan seems here to fall short of the doctrine of St. Thomas; because (as we showed below at margin. num. 23) St. Thomas assimilates the practical science of God about things to the practical cognition of the artisan about his artificial work; but the art, or practical cognition, of the artisan does not look upon the fabricated work as factum, but as factibile. For the cognition of an artificial entity not as factible but as factum, and already present in its own proper existence (as is the intuitive cognition flowing from the species cut away by the already-constructed thing), does not avail as a practical reason that would direct the artisan's intellect to construct the artificial entity, in the state anteceding the existence of that entity.

Therefore by parity of reason that knowledge, which directs the power of God, or his faculty that executes it, that it may contract being into a state entirely determinate, cannot be the knowledge of vision, which presupposes the objective mutation bursting forth from the decree; but the knowledge of simple intelligence, which proposes the object not changed but changeable; which we also showed below out of St. Thomas at num. 23, already cited. Of this Valentius de Herice also teaches well, 1. part. tractatu 1. de Scientia Dei; disput. 10. capit. 2. sub nu. marg. 9.

Satisfaction to the objections for the foreknowledge of future things in the Ideas, as in a medium holding itself on the side of the object.

18 From the above swept together the foundations of the opposing arguments collapse. To the first opposition, which on the side of the opposing opinion instructs Basolius, an assertor of our own opinion:

It is answered; that the ideas of Sortes and of cursus, although they confer upon the knowledge of that complexum, Sortes curret, under a neutral state with respect to truth and falsity, yet not under a contracted state to one part of contradiction; because no object of the knowledge of simple intelligence, to which the ideal reasons look, bears an infallible objective determination before the decree; as will stand forth more fully from the following articles.

19 To the second opposition we say; that the essence of God, as it is subserved beneath the free purpose of his will predetermining the complexum of the future to one part of contradiction, imports every determination on the side of the object that can be sought to determinate foreknowledge of future things; but otherwise, in that it antecedes the free constitution of his volition; of which we treat below by disposition.

To the third opposition of the same Bassolius it is answered; that it is precisely by the ideas that those complexa are apprehehended which consist of necessary terms; because such terms coalesce together into such a complexum of necessity, and intrinsically, so that it is contradictory for them not to be composed with each other. Which is otherwise in the case of the terms contingently con-liberable, whose complexion awaits the good-pleasure of the divine will, that it may be contracted to being-future or not-being-future.

Wherefore it is urged as an objection; that by the same ideal reasoning both the necessary and the contingent are apprehended; just as also the right and the oblique, the possible and the impossible.

It is answered; that such opposition labors in the equivocation of the word (contingens). We say therefore, that by the ideas that is apprehehended as contingent in the signified act, insofar as it is opposed to the necessary entity; for the very same ideal reason that expresses it to be a necessary complexum, whose extremes converge of necessity into one nexus, also makes it known to be a contingent complexum, whose terms do not coalesce intrinsically and of necessity into one composition. Such a contingent, in the signified act, insofar as it imports the quidditative concept of the contingent entity, just as the necessary is — for (as is asserted) the quiddity of any entity whatever is necessary insofar as it refers a quidditative grade of entity in such an order of entities — so also the contingent, as such, insofar as it stands opposed to the necessary entity as such, is apprehehended by the knowledge of simple intelligence, through which all the quiddities of things are comprehended.

Yet the one part of contradiction is not foreknown determinately by the knowledge of simple intelligence in the contingent complexum, on account of the defect of determinate truth, which is sought from the subsequent decree. Which we call the not-apprehending of the contingent in the act exercised, or insofar as contingency is exercised in such a determinate object.

1 To the last confirmation of Bassolius we say; that just as by the knowledge of simple intelligence, which attains the entity as it is absolved from existence, the actual existence of the object is not apprehehended; so neither by the ideal reasons, which pertain to the knowledge of simple intelligence anteceding the decree.

But when it is objected; that essence and existence are in no manner to be severed; therefore the idea, which renders avail to the expression of the thing's quiddity, will also avail to the representation of existence for any difference of future time.

It is answered; that the essence, in the status negatiuo, or state of non-repugnance to exist (under which it terminates the knowledge of simple intelligence), does noticeably diverge in a negative way from that other positive reason of the objective mutation, with respect to the positive actuality which the possible entity acquires from the decree; by the force of which objective mutation it is congruous for the possible entity to be determinately future, which it did not cohere with before the decree; because the objective mutation adds the decree of God contracting the possible being into a determinate fore, or not fore.

20 To the remaining oppositions, at num. 2, the response to the first is; that it is false to suppose that every proposition concerning a future contingent, by the force of its intrinsic enunciation and its commensuration to its object, acquires determinate truth or falsity, with the predetermining decree set aside; as we touch at num. 11, and it will be more fully treated in the next article.

To the confirmation: that the ideas of Socrates and of running represent a complexion neutral to truth and falsity, yet not determinately true or false; because from the object there cannot be drawn a determinate conformity, or

or the dissimilarity of the enunciation, if there precisely lie hidden the objective mutation which is required by the predetermining decree.

We say that the idea is adequated to the Deity as the Deity is the knowledge of simple intelligence; but not as it is the science of vision: since ideas in no way pertain to the science of vision.

But because futures are not foreknown by God through the knowledge of simple intelligence, but through the science of vision; hence it comes about that futures cannot be apprehended by God in the ideas as in a medium on the side of the object.

21 To the instance concerning the practical causality of the science of vision; on account of which ideas ought to pertain to the science of vision.

We say that it is not gathered that the science of vision is a practical ratio in respect of the object, from the fact that it represents the future being not in itself, nor from its intentional motion, but from the motion of the Deity; because it would follow that the beatific vision of creatures in God also, for a like reason and from the intentional motion of the Deity, would not be a merely speculative intuition of creatures, but the cause of the futurecence of the object; for that it represents the connexion of the future object with the decree.

Nor is that analogy between the science of vision and the intuition of a body, blunt though it be, of any moment; because although the corporeal eye could represent a secondary object from the intentional motion of the primary object; that aspect would not on that account turn out to be not merely speculative, in that it would express the connexion of causality between the primary and the secondary object, if the vision did not produce that connexion; but it would intuit it most simply.

Hence; because the science of vision does not produce an objective mutation of the future being, nor the contraction of a possible being to a determinate de facto existence from the decree of its futurecence, nor its connexion with the decree, if it so evidently premise it, as in the science of vision, which is called the said science of simple intelligence, but of all ideal rationes — according to the opinion of Scotus.

Indeed from those transcribed words, under n. 5, as though to establish that they represent that which is represented... And those following words: The ideas are in the divine intellect before every act of the divine will.

For the discussion of the last opposition it is weighed; whether the science of vision be the cause of the object.

22 For the dissolving of the last reason to the contrary, there falls in a disquisition concerning the comparison of the science of vision to its object, whether it be merely speculative or practical? From the decision of which question it will appear whether the ideal rationes conduce to the science of vision? which pertain to the practical knowledge of the divine artificer.

From the doctrine of Scotus it appears more than sufficiently that every ideal function precedes the free decree of God, and conduces to the knowledge of simple intelligence; which, as with Scotus it directs the decree objectively immutating creatures as possible, and contracting them to the state of its ratio, so the knowledge of simple intelligence alone is the practical, artefactive ratio of the object; but the science of vision is a certain mere intuition, and speculation, of that objective mutation which has been produced by the decree.

In which we have St. Thomas consenting, whatever the more recent Thomists may gainsay; which the words from 1. p. q. 14. ar. 8. sufficiently lay open, where he teaches.

I answer, it must be said; that the knowledge of God is the cause of things, for thus the knowledge of God bears itself to all created things, as the knowledge of an artificer bears itself to the artefacts; but the knowledge of an artificer is the cause of the artefacts in that the artificer operates through his intellect, whence it appears that the form of the intellect is the principle of operation, as heat is the principle of heating.

23 And that he speaks here of the knowledge of simple intelligence is evident from the very context; together with that sentence: But even if the form of intelligence bears itself to opposites — or the same power of the will to opposites — it does not produce a determinate effect, unless it be determined to one by appetite. And after a few words: Whence the science of God, according as it is the cause of things, is accustomed to be named the science of approbation.

In which place St. Thomas expressly teaches that that science is the cause of things which exists indifferent to opposites, and which is contracted to one by the efficacious appetition of God. But since the knowledge of vision does not look upon its object as indifferent to either of two, but contracted to one by the force of an antecedent decree; it comes to pass that the knowledge of vision, with St. Thomas, nowise appertains to the art of God, or his practical reason, about created objects.

It is then inferred: that the knowledge of simple intelligence is that which is valued by St. Thomas as the knowledge of approval. Because with St. Thomas, as is plain from the transcribed context, the knowledge of approval is held to be that which is the cause of things, and which represents the creature comporting itself potentialiter towards opposites; but this knowledge, comporting itself potentialiter on the part of an object indifferent to either of two, cannot be the knowledge of vision, as is manifest and evident. Therefore the knowledge of simple intelligence, as approving whatever the divine will shall have chosen, and as consenting to the decree contracting the object to one part of contradiction, ought to be called by the name of knowledge of approval, according to the context and mind of St. Thomas.

24 Moreover, the more recent Thomists, holding that the knowledge of vision is the practical art of its object, are pressed in this way with a burden which cannot be carried by men. For if the knowledge of vision were the cause of its own object; it would come to pass that the principle of the real presence of future things in eternity would be renounced, which (as is evident) presupposes every practical reason of God which cohered with God from his whole eternity. By a like reason, as the followers of St. Thomas assert, the absolute and efficacious purpose of the divine will would antecede the real presence of future things in eternity, as the cause of such real presence from eternity.

But this foregoing pronouncement cannot stand with that most received assertion of the Thomists, pronouncing it to be the mind of St. Thomas; that the real presence of future things in eternity is an entirely sufficient medium on the side of the object for the science of future things. Because every medium on the side of the object, or every reason on account of which the termination of judgment into the object obtains, must antecede that exercised tending of assent into the object under that comparation, and extension of the act to the object, under which the object offers the reason on account of which to assent; but the knowledge of vision looks upon the future as really present in eternity; therefore the real presence of future things in eternity must antecede the extension of such science to the future under such real presence, as a medium on the side of the object, to the infallible judgment of God concerning such a future; and accordingly the knowledge of vision, with St. Thomas, cannot be the practical or artifactive reason of such a real presence.

For otherwise either there would be committed a vitious circuit, while the real presence of future things is assigned as the medium of the science on the side of the object, and on the other hand the knowledge of vision is asserted to be the art, and practical reason, of the real presence of future things; or for some sign (on account of which the knowledge of vision would antecede the real presence of future things as its cause) the knowledge of vision would be able to be conceived as exercised in order to the future object, while there does not persist, or is not conceived, for that sign, the reason on account of which of its own termination into such an object; which is a manifest implication.

And it is effectively pressed from the free decree; because precisely therefore the real presence of future things in eternity cannot be assigned as the reason on the side of the object, on account of which the decree is terminated to such an object; because such presence hangs from the decree as from its cause; therefore, if the real presence of future things is an effect of the knowledge of vision, such presence cannot be conceived as a reason on the side of the object, on account of which the science of God is terminated to it.

25 Then we proceed against the Thomists from that testimony of St. Thomas transcribed by us, at num. 23. Since the intelligible form is related to opposites (since it is the same science of opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect, unless it were determined to one by appetite.

Because in the science of simple intelligence, although it propose the object with an indetermination to opposites, namely to fore, or not fore; yet as it is conjoined to the free absolute purpose contracting the possible being to one part of the contradiction, there is conceived whatever energy can be sought for every causality ad extra, and with an omnimodal application and intimation of the divine power to acting in the second act. Therefore there remains nothing which might accede to such a science conjoined to the absolute decree, of energy and of action about created things, that would be desired and expected from a supervening and posterior act of the intellect: unless we wish to multiply forms, or rationales of acting, to no purpose and without any compelling reason: which, as in created things it is not philosophical, so in God it can be neither philosophical nor theological.

26 If you answer with the more recent Thomists, as may be seen in John of St. Thomas, 1. part. quaest. 14. disput. 18. art. 3. — that although the knowledge of simple intelligence, as conjoined with the absolute decree, claims whatever efficacy is required in the reason of the intention, or immanent and internal purpose; yet not in the reason of execution, and causality ad extra: for which reason they will have the causality of God ad extra constituted in a certain act of the practical intellect, which corresponds to command in created things; by which act of command (the efficacious intention of the end supposed, and the efficacious election of means, and moreover the efficacious impulse of using, or the act of use, and application of means, on the part of the appetitus) the intellect still intimates practicè, and gives signification to the executive faculty, of the exercise, and execution, of the work: so that they refer the function and causality of that act of command to a certain voice of the wise man, as it were of a command: Fac hoc.

Who also, consentaneously hereout, judge the essence of the act of predetermination to consist in such a command of the divine intellect; concerning which, when we treat in earnest in the General Controversy of Predetermination — enquiring whether the essence of predetermination consist in the act of the intellect or of the will? — we shall, with a serious and strenuous effort, repel as superuacaneous and useless, that addition of command on the part of the intellect, added even by the reason of efficacious intention, of election, and of use.

27 Concerning which, let the more recent writers who act against the Thomists be seen, while they set aside the aforesaid command of the intellect as otiose, and tax it, even in created things; whose proofs Herice compounds, 1. part. tract. 3. de Praedestinatione, disp. 22. cap. 4. per totum.

The force of whose proofs goes to this; that although the will, comporting itself sluggishly about the intention of the end, the election of means, and the use or application of them, may need the exhortation of the intellect to excite it, lest the will grow cold or torpid about the efficacious prosecution, or flight of the object; yet the will efficaciously intending, electing, and using, expects nothing of energy from the exhortation of the intellect; so that whatever intimation, and application, is pronounced to be expected for the exciting of the executive faculties, must altogether be esteemed otiose and fabricated.

28 For if the will be that which commands the intellect, indeed more, which compels and as it were captivates the intellect, that it may efficaciously insist upon the cogitation of this object, so that it can call away the intellect from intense cogitation of such a thing, and addict it to the most intense meditation of another opposed object, at the nod and arbitrement of the will; what cause shall there be, that the will, sufficient without the command of the intellect (which the will subjects to itself), shall not of plenary right command the executive faculty, that it execute the work enjoined upon it?

By which rationale we make use below against Vázquez in this distinction, on the science of absolute contingents, artic. 7, under numer. marg. 45, that if the will can, with Vázquez, (which is also undeniable, since it is established by experience itself,) a more efficacious cogitation being preferred to a less efficacious one, without any new dictate of the intellect, turn away the mind from the object more intensely and efficaciously proposed, and apply it to an object previously apprehended sluggishly and remissly; so that the intellect, by the precept of the will, changes its turn about such an object, and subordinates the object preferred, or more intensely cogitated, by the intellect; how can it come about that it be not open to the will to be borne into an object which was remissly, or sluggishly, insinuated or intimated to the will by the intellect?

29 Finally, whatever be the case with such an imperium of the intellect in created things; it seems altogether superfluous in God, nay even repugnant to him. Because since imperium stands in relation to a subject and obedient faculty; and further imperium sounds of the supereminence, or pre-eminence, of the dominant power. As in God no subject or inferior faculty is given, so neither should any commanded act be held to be, unless we fall away from the rigour of scholastic disputation, and decline uselessly to tropes.

No act of sentence therefore is given in God, to which there answers that function of the intellect which, with respect to an executing faculty, can be called practical imperium; and consequently neither can the science of vision be that to which practical causality is ascribed with respect to the object.

30 Lastly it occurs that a certain assertion of Valentín de Herice has not pleased us, restitut. 1. on the Science of God, disput. 10. cap. 3. §. At this place, observe, number 20; where, acknowledging that the asserted science of vision is de facto merely speculative; he nevertheless thinks it certain that the science of vision could be the practical rationale of its object in that hypothesis, that God should will to produce the same thing in number again. For then the science of vision, with respect to the repeated, or iterated, production, could discharge the function of art, or of a practical rationale directing the effecting, or the reproduction, of the thing.

For this doctrine displeases me; nay, I judge that it does not cohere with itself. Because although the science of vision with respect to the first production stands merely speculatively with Valentín de Herice; because it is the intuition of that objective imitation which broke forth from the decree alone. So, since with respect to the second production another absolute decree must be brought in in God, concerning the same thing to be produced again, and from that decree there also accedes to the object another objective mutation with an order to the repeated, or iterated, existence; although, by a wholly like rationale, the science of vision regarding this second mutation flowing from the second decree merely speculates the mutation which it does not produce, but introspects as produced in that objective being, and consequently cannot be esteemed the art, or practical rationale, thereof. Or if the science of vision be compared practically to the second objective mutation breaking forth from the second decree, although it premise it, why does it not also conduct itself practically toward the first mutation? since the same rationale is at issue.

31 From which it is clear against the foundation of the more recent authors set forth, under number marg. 4. For all those testimonies of Sacred Scripture which attribute to the word of God, or to his wisdom, the energy of art, or the causality of an artefactive form, are to be understood of the science of simple intelligence insofar as it is conjoined to the decree immutating a possible being, and contracting it to such an objective mutation. Which we showed to be of the mind of Saint Thomas, under number marg. 23 and 25, and under num. marginal. 17, acting against Cajetan.

ARTICLE IV

Whether future contingents are known by God in themselves, or in their determinate truth?

SUMMARY.

Setting forth the view of the more recent Theologians, that future contingents are foreknown by God in themselves, or in their determinate truth. Num. 1. The text of Scotus, from which we lay the foundations for the true opinion. Num. 11. Explanation of the text, and refutation of Hurtado and Theodor Smising, who maintain that a proposition concerning a future contingent is essentially true, or essentially false; wherein the enunciation concerning a contingent object in the neutral state is asserted according to the mind of Scotus. Num. 15. Other observations on the text; and the refutation of Fabri and Cavel, who fall short of Scotus. Num. 19. An accurate observation of Aureolus on the matter. Num. 23. We open up that no determinate truth is given in propositions concerning the future by the intrinsic force of their commensuration to their objects, if the absolute decree of God be set aside. Num. 29. We go to meet the opposing foundations. Nu. 35. Satisfaction to the other objections of the more recent authors; and an elucidation of the mind of Scotus out of Mairon, against the Scotizing neoterics. Num. 40. Aureolus is vindicated from the censure of Gregory and Vazquez, who attribute to Aureolus that he denied a determinate foreknowledge of future things in God. Nu. 44.

1 Neoteric Authors, who reject physical predetermination, affirm with one mouth that future contingents are known by God in themselves; so that their determinate truth, apart from a preceding absolute decree of the divine will, one that does not await the cooperation of a free cause, is the medium on the side of the object for the infallible knowledge of future things; for they ascribe to propositions concerning a future contingent, by the force of their intrinsic enunciation, which is expressed by the copula of the verb of the future, a determinate truth by reason of their habitude to an object altogether determinate, or contracted to one side of the contradiction by hypothesis of futurition.

This is the view of Vázquez, 1st part, disputation 65, chapter 4, who asserts himself to be the first author of the aforesaid pronouncement among the Spaniards, and afterwards glories that, diligently turning over Scotus's commentaries at Rome, he found it in that same Subtle Doctor, in 1st distinction 39, unique question, §. Viso de contingentia. And thereafter he boasts to have seen this opinion of his used freely by other Theologians.

But later it will evidently appear, from the very text that Vázquez cites in his own favor, that either Scotus was not seriously engaged with the matter, or that Scotus has not been perceived, when he takes the Doctor as his leader for confirming a new doctrine against the foreknowledge of future things in the absolute and predetermining decree of the divine will; from which, in Scotus, the infallible determination of future things is drawn.

Vázquez is accompanied by all the Jesuit Authors: Suárez, Opuscul. 2, on the science of future contingents, book 1, chapter 8; Franciscus Albertinus, in question 2, Theological, upon the second corollary from the 4th philosophical principle, marginal number 22; Petrus Arrubal, 1st part, disp. 40, ch. 2, num. 7; Valentin. de Herice, 1st part, tract. 1, on the knowledge of God, disp. 6, c. 7; Pet. Hurtado, disp. 9, on the soul, sect. 4, subsect. 4.

That view, as Suárez reports it in the place cited, is this: that a future contingent from eternity claims to itself to be determinate, and that this is the cause of the determinate truth of the enunciation about the future contingent; on the ground that the truth of a proposition is its conformity to the object, just as the determinate truth of a settled proposition is the settled conformity to the determinate being of the object. Wherefore, although the future, considered in its cause, is simply indeterminate and contingent; nevertheless considered precisely as future, and as importing existence for such a difference of time, it puts on that necessity from the hypothesis of futurition which could serve to terminate the infallible judgment of God.

Now that aforesaid necessity of futurition, according to Suárez, asserts nothing else than this very being which the thing will import for its time; which, if it is referred to the time antecedent to the effecting of the thing, is called future; just as, if it is compared to the time that follows the production of the thing, it is called past. And just as the thing, as it is referred to the time that follows its production, and precisely as it is called past, exhibits a determinate true, or intelligible, object, so also, insofar as it objectively antecedes the time of its production, it cuts out for itself a determinate intelligibility, by reason of the hypothesis of futurition.

Nor indeed is it demanded for the aforesaid fundamental truth, which is as it were the reason of the formal truth of the divine apprehension and judgment, that the future claim to itself from eternity some real being; but it suffices that it acquire a certain mode of being, necessary by hypothesis of futurition, which mode could be the reason on the side of the object of scibility for the whole infallible judgment.

2. That this is plain is persuaded thus: because the divine intellect, by reason of its apprehensive power simply unlimited, ought to exhaust the universal intelligibility of being, or its truth; and yet the future, considered in itself, according to that being which it will import for some difference of time, is especially determined yet not necessary, by the supposition of futurition: therefore the divine intellect gathers that determinate truth, or intelligibility, in the thing itself.

That proof is evident, as Vázquez says, if the minor is demonstrated — which we frankly grant to that author. For he was setting forth theorems, in which their correspondent [truth] seems to be posited; and it hangs upon the controversy concerning the Truth of future contingents, which Aristotle resolved in book 1 of the Interpretation, chapter 9, and which even at present is more fruitful in use, as is apparent from the accounts read before many Theologians of truth.

Nor is the disagreement everywhere given between the truth of a proposition conveyed by the extrinsic commemoration of the enunciation with the object as future, made by the motion of the efficacious and absolute volition of the divine will; and the truth flowing from the objective alone, which is drawn from the decree — the point on which the whole apex of the disputation consists.

3. The Neoterics, who condemn the efficacious and absolute decree of the divine will — one that does not involve a condition on the side of the object, nor expect the knowledge of the cooperation of the created will — contend that a determinate truth inheres in propositions about the future contingent by reason of the enunciation and its connexion with the contemplation of futurition, however the determining decree be awaited as the principle of futurition depending on it absolutely. Thus the Antwerp professors teach, after Vázquez, on the contingency of things, book 1, dispute 2, chapter 8, number 20, and dispute 2, chapter 9, and dispute 3, chapter 1: that which cannot be denied; which they attempted to prove quite plainly in book 1, chapter 12.

For which opinion Aureolus argues thus, in 1st distinction 38, question 3, and dist. 39, question 1. The question of these [questions] is whether it ought to be seen to stand up against God. Where he says:

The first principle of anything being able to be or not be, that it can be, cannot [fail]; therefore, a singular proposition being assumed, it is either true or not true; if true, the point is in hand.

If not true; therefore it is false. Because true and false are immediate contraries, and from the negation of one of them there immediately follows with it the positing of the other in a subject aptly suited [to receive it]. For there follows: it is not a straight rod, and then... But it is evident that every proposition is a subject aptly suited by nature to receive truth or falsity; therefore it follows, if a singular proposition about the future is not true, that then it is false.

4. Furthermore, the law of contradictories is that, if one is true, the other is false; and if of necessity one is true, the other is false. Therefore either both will be, or this one is true: the Antichrist will be; and the other false, namely, the Antichrist will not be; or conversely, since they are opposed contradictorily.

5. Furthermore, assuming the future instant with time intervening, by the variation of the first principle, it is true what is said: Socrates will be, or will not be; because it follows that at each instant either an affirmation or a negation is said to be, and of none at once. But if it is said truly that he will be, the affirming proposition will be true; if truly that he will not be, the negative proposition will be true: therefore of a future contingent, either the affirmation is always true or the negation.

6. Thereupon the Neoterics, the assertors of the aforesaid opinion, arguing thus have borrowed the force of their proofs from Aureolus. Because from Aristotle, 4 Metaphysics, text 27, whatever affirms and denies either expresses truth or falsity; because it either enunciates determinately what is fitting and conformable to the nature of the thing, or determinately signifies what is dissonant and disconformable.

Nor indeed can any medium be assigned between a proposition conformable and disconformable to its object; just as neither on the side of the object does a medium occur between the thing that will be or will not be, since "will be" and "will not be" are opposed contradictorily: therefore either the proposition about the future enunciates the thing to be, and so it is determinately true; or it expresses that the thing will not be, and it is determinately false.

FinallyDeinde; because if the affirmative proposition about a future contingent, for example, Peter will sin, does not signify what is true, nor what is false, determinately, but true or false confusedly — on the ground that the future thing enunciated by such a proposition is indeterminate as to being and not being — it would come about that the negative proposition about a future contingent, which is its contradictory, namely, Peter will not sin, would not express what is true or false determinately, but true or false indeterminately and confusedly.

And consequently propositions about the future contingent could not carry their own proper contradiction; since one enunciation would not be falsified by what the other affirms, but both enunciations would subsist double and as it were suspended, nor would their proper contradiction subsist until one of them pronounce truth determinately and the other falsity, now that [the thing exists] in the present.

It is confirmed; because it would follow that a proper contradiction could only intervene in enunciations about the future contingent which embrace both parts of the contradiction; for example, Peter will sin, or will not sin; Peter will neither sin, nor not sin; of which the former, the affirmative, will be true, because necessary; the latter, however, the negative, will be false, because impossible.

The consequence is evident; because the law of contradictories requires that one be determinately true and the other determinately false; if therefore determinate truth and falsity cannot subsist except in propositions which either affirm or deny both parts of the contradiction: then a proper contradiction could belong only to those enunciations about the future.

7 It is argued secondly; because when now, in the present, the effect contingently enunciated of the future comes to pass (for example, when Peter now sins), it evidently shows that the enunciation about the future that was uttered (for example, Peter will sin) fortiter [= at some earlier time] was a determinate truth; therefore, if the aforesaid proposition was determinately true before the present time, it also acquired that truth from eternity; since the same reason holds for the whole duration antecedent to the real positing of the future outside its causes — nor is it anything other for an enunciation to claim to itself a determinate truth than actually and in re to acquire truth.

Moreover, that from the truth of the present there follows the truth of the enunciation about the future, is established thus. Because the truth of the proposition about the future does not begin in that instant in which Peter sins; but rather, in a sense, its truth as about the future then ceases, and the truth of that proposition as about the present begins. And indeed especially; because that enunciation was always antecedently conformable to its object, on the ground that in very truth it was so to be, as was explicitly expressed through that proposition: therefore the existence of the thing in the present, outside the causes posited, does not confer truth anew, but rather brings forth the truth which before was not known.

8 It is argued thirdly; because the enunciation about a future contingent either expresses only the indifference of the thing to being and not being — and then it would come about that the affirmative and the negative proposition would import one and the same pronouncement, if the affirmative enunciated the indetermination of the thing as to being and not being, and likewise the negative —

Or the proposition about the future contingent enunciates something besides the indetermination of the thing as to being and not being; and such a signification can be nothing else than a determinate being, or a determinate not-being: therefore the proposition is determinately true or determinately false, by the force of its intrinsic commensuration to the object, future or not future determinately; even with any extrinsic decree of God's predetermining set aside.

Furthermore; if the enunciation about a future contingent did not express the thing absolutely future, but indeterminate as to being and not being, it would follow that that proposition which signifies the thing absolutely to be, for example (Peter will sin), would be determinately false; on the ground that it would assert the object to be absolutely future, which is merely indifferent to being and not being.

Which objection also presses upon the negative propositions about a future contingent, which enunciate that the thing will not be, for example, Peter will not sin; because absolutely to deny the futurition of that object which is indeterminate as to being and not being, is absolutely and simply false: and consequently it would come about that contradictory enunciations about a future contingent would be false at once.

9 It is argued fourthly; because from Aristotle, all universal propositions in contingent matter, whether affirmative or negative, are determinately false; as every man will sin mortally tomorrow; no man will sin mortally tomorrow; every man will run; no man will run.

That being supposed, the objection presses thus: therefore the contradictory particular enunciation ought to be determinately true; wherefore, if this proposition (every man will sin mortally tomorrow) is determinately false, its contradictory particular, namely (some man will not sin mortally tomorrow), will be determinately true.

But for the determinate truth of a particular proposition about a future contingent, there is necessarily demanded the determinate truth of some singular enunciation about a future contingent; because just as the falsity of the universal affirmative proposition, whose subject supposits distributively, is gathered by copulative descent, from the fact that some singular is false; so also in the contradictory particular negative enunciation, whose subject supposits determinately, its truth ought to be shown by disjunctive descent, descending to some singular determinately true, for example (Peter will not sin mortally tomorrow). But that enunciation is a singular proposition about a future contingent; therefore there can be assigned a proposition about a future contingent determinately true, by the force of its intrinsic enunciation imported through the verb of the future, with every predetermination of the first cause set aside.

Then, from the same Aristotle in the place cited, this disjunct, (Peter will sin; or will not sin), is necessary and determinately true; therefore it imports truth by reason of some determinate part of such a disjunct. For just as, for the truth of a disjunctive enunciation, it is required that one part be true; so, for the determinate truth of a disjunctive enunciation, it is demanded that one part be determinately true.

There is given, therefore, a proposition about a future contingent which claims to itself a determinate [truth], either truth or falsity; and consequently all enunciations about the future contingent attach to themselves a determinate truth or falsity: since the same reason presses universally upon all.

10 The last reason is: that God knows future contingents, and reveals them through the Prophets; but He does not apprehend an object which is not determinately true; for that which has not acquired a determinate truth, or intelligibility, could not be apprehended even by the excellence of infinite light; just as neither can that which is not possible, or feasible, be made by the divine power.

On account of that reason Suárez and Vázquez have maintained that the determinate truth of future things is gathered from the principles of faith; but in what way such a pronouncement is to be understood, will appear below.

The text of Scotus, from which we lay the foundations for the true opinion.

11 The present controversy Scotus treated most thoroughly, in 1 Sentences, distinction 39, unique question, §. Quantùm ad secundum articulum dico, under marginal number 23, where he says:

Having considered the contingency of things as to existence, and this with respect to the divine will; there remains to see, secondly and principally, how with this there stands the certainty of His knowledge.

This can be posited in two ways; in one way by this, that the divine intellect sees the determination of the divine will; namely, that that thing will be for (A), because that will determines it to be for that [time]; for He knows that will to be immutable and unimpedible.

12 Or otherwise; because that way seems to posit a certain discourse in the divine intellect, as if from the intuition of the determination of the will and of its immuta- bility it concluded that this would be.

It can be posited otherwise: that the divine intellect either offers simple [objects], whose union is contingent in the thing; or, if it offers a proposition, it offers it as neutral; and the will, choosing one part, namely the conjunction of these for some now in the thing, makes that determinately true: this will be for (A.)

But this being determinately true; the essence is the reason for the divine intellect's understanding that truth; and this naturally, as far as the essence is concerned. So that, just as it naturally understands all necessary principles, as it were, before the act of the divine will, because their truth does not depend upon that act, and they would be known by the divine intellect if, per impossibile, it were not willing: so the divine essence is the reason for knowing them in that prior instant of nature, because then they are true.

Not indeed, that those truths move the divine intellect, nor even their terms, for the apprehending of such truth; because then the divine intellect would be debased, because it would suffer from another than its essence; but just as the divine essence is the reason for knowing simple [objects], so also for knowing propositions of that kind. But then contingents are not true, because there is nothing then by which they have a determinate truth.

But the determination of the divine will being posited, they are now true, namely for that second instant; and this same will be the reason for the divine intellect (which it was in the first) for understanding those things which are now true in the second instant, and which would have been known in the first instant if they had been in the first instant.

13 Example; just as if in my eye, from my visual power, there were one act of seeing an object, which would always remain; then, if by some presentant now this color were present, now that one, my eye would see now this, now that, and yet through the same vision; there would only be a difference in the priority and posteriority of seeing, on account of the object presented first, and later.

And if one color were made present naturally, and another freely; there would not be a difference formally in my vision, but from its own side the eye would see both naturally; yet contingently it could see one, and of necessity the other, inasmuch as one becomes present to it contingently, and the other of necessity.

14 In the same question, §. Ad tertium it can be conceded, under marginal number 30, he subjoins.

So in our case; the divine will, determining something shown by the intellect to be, makes such a proposition true, and therefore intelligible; and from this that [object] is present to the intellect in the ratio of the object.

And just as the will can make that thing willed, and not make it; so it could be true, and not true: and so it can be known, and not known, by that natural intellect.

Not indeed on account of some contingency which should be prior in that natural agent; but on account of the contingency on the side of the object, which is contingently true on account of the act of the will verifying it.

Explanation of the text; and refutation of Hurtado and Theodor Smising, who maintain that a proposition about a future contingent is essentially true, or essentially false; wherein a statement about the neutral state is brought forward according to the mind of Scotus.

15 In which text, first it must be observed that almost all the ancient Theologians held that future contingents obtain a determinate truth, or intelligibility; on account of which they can be apprehended certainly and infallibly by the divine gaze. Which pronouncement, considered absolutely, must be altogether undoubted, as being that which is very closely allied to the dogma of faith asserting that future contingents are determinately known by God; since that cannot be determinately foreknown which does not obtain a determinate knowability.

Wherefore in this Vázquez and Suárez in no way fight against the school of Scotus, which ascribes to propositions about the future contingent a determinate truth by reason of the preceding determination of the divine will; but they [fight] with Molina, who asserted that future things are determinately foreknown by God because of the swiftness of the infinite divine light over-comprehending the strivings of the created will, even though no determinate truth should inhere in future things — a thing handed down inadvisedly, and disapproved by all the Jesuit authors.

The whole dissent, therefore, intervenes concerning the root from which this determinate truth of future things is drawn: whether, namely, from the intrinsic commensuration of the proposition to an object that has acquired a determinate intelligibility, the preceding absolute decree of the divine will being removed? Or rather, whether such truth proceeds so from the extrinsic that, although the proposition about the future contingent be considered with all that intrinsic enunciative expression which is imported through the verb of the future, yet the enunciation is not conceived true or false from itself in any way, but rather, from the extrinsic — namely, from the free, absolute and pre-determining decree of the divine will — a truth quasi superadded comes to the enunciation from without?

So that, if the proposition does not enunciate the object under that objective change and contraction which it draws from the absolute decree establishing, through the explicit and formal voluntary [act], that the thing be determinately, or determinately not be; it enunciates nothing determinately true, nor determinately false. So that, for the determination of that objective being which is assigned, the reason on the side of the object from which the determinate truth of the judgment is drawn is not any decree whatsoever of God about furnishing concourse; but the absolute decree not involving a hypothesis "to be purified by free choice."

16 To be noted, next, in the text which we transcribe under number 12: that in the knowledge of God with respect to future contingents Scotus contemplates two instants, or moments of reason. The first, which antecedes the free decree of the divine will; the other, which follows the determination of the divine will. In the first moment there are offered to the divine comprehension propositions whose terms agree in the composition from the intrinsic side; of which sort are the terms of necessary propositions; for example, Man is a rational animal, and so of the rest.

In that presupposition of reason, if we would have the knowledge of God embracing future contingents: it will not regard them as determinately true, or contracted to one side of the contradiction, but as neutral with respect to either; until, in the second moment of reason, the absolute decree of the divine will passing on [that is, after it], that proposition is drawn from non-being of a determinately true, or intelligible, [thing] to the being of such.

Whence it comes that, regarded with the intrinsic enunciation of the proposition about the future, and with that opposition which it bears to the other contradictory proposition about the future (which objects the mind of God turns over, according to Scotus, for that moment of reason which precedes the decree), still those propositions are not the substrata of a determinate truth or falsity; but are merely neutral, or indeterminate as to truth or falsity, which adhere to them by reason of the decree that follows.

17 Wherefore, since it is beyond doubt in Scotus, as will appear more broadly in the following article, that which we premised about the neutral state of the enunciation about a future contingent before the absolute and unimpedible decree of the divine will, even given a contradictory enunciation in propositions of that kind before the efficacious determination of the divine will; and since with Vázquez and the other Jesuit Authors the determinate truth or falsity of enunciations about the future contingent is sought from the contradictory opposition of those enunciations: there is reason to wonder that Vázquez pronounces Scotus to stand apart from himself, with that apparatus of words, unless either he himself hallucinates, or he wished us to see blind in full daylight.

Hence it is inferred that Theodor Smising fell short of Scotus, tome 1, On the one God, treatise 3, disputation 1, On the transcendent Attributes of God. Question 2, marginal number 33, where, following Petrus Hurtado, he holds that the enunciation concerning an object not necessary, or contingent, to be essentially true, or essentially false; so that truth, or falsity, is of the quiddity of the enunciation. Which being granted, the enunciation would imply a contradiction in some moment of reason under the neutral state; concerning which we have treated at length above, in arguing against Hurtado, in controversy 3, On the Truth of God in being, art. 2, from marginal number 4 up to 10 inclusively.

Wherefore, and consequently, under marginal number 9, we taught: that, although the truth is essential and quidditative of the knowledge of God as to the being of the vital and intrinsic form; it is not, however, so as to its extension and termination to a contingent object. By a like reason in which we assert every free operation of God to be necessary as to vital and intrinsic being; but free, or contingent, by comparison, or extension, of it to a contingent object. Because just as thus God foreknows that Peter will in such manner freely comport himself, that He could have not foreknown such an object, if God had not decreed to contract such an object to futurition; so the conformity to such an object under such an objective immutation is not of the quiddity of the knowledge of God: since that very certainty could be removed, the object being taken away for the pleasure of God otherwise disposing concerning the futurition, or non-futurition, of the object.

But you will insist: that to the knowledge of vision (inasmuch as vision) it is contradictory to comport itself otherwise with respect to an object so immuted, because otherwise God could be deceived; therefore to the knowledge of vision the truth is essential and quidditative, inasmuch as it expresses the convocation and comparison to such an object simply contingent, and necessary only by hypothesis.

I answer: that when the knowledge of vision is asserted to be essentially conformable to an object so immuted to futurition, there is already involved the composite sense of such knowledge, as extended to the object; which extension is simply contingent, and necessary only by hypothesis. As when an enunciation about a contingent proposition, while it is composed, [relates] its object, not future but present (for example, Peter runs, with Peter running), is able to be asserted necessarily and essentially conformable, as it is composed to such conformity in the composite sense; just as man, as white, is essentially white.

Yet nevertheless that conformity of the created judgment with an object necessary by hypothesis is not of the essence of the judgment; because, the same judgment persisting, such conformity can be removed just as the contingent object [can]; whence also it comes about that a created judgment can be falsified, if, the object being changed, the assent and judgment about the object be not varied. Therefore an object so comporting itself is not of the essence of the judgment, although it be of the quiddity of the judgment as true; because although it be of the essence of the created judgment to be extended and compared to the object by a transcendental habitude; yet it is not of the quiddity of the assent that the object so comport itself as is expressed by the judgment; whence it comes that, the same assent persisting as to substance, and the object being changed, the accident of the judgment, which is truth, can be destroyed, the substance of the act remaining.

In God, however, there exists no necessity of the comparison, or extension, of His knowledge and volition to a contingent object; wherefore, just as it befalls the divine knowledge and volition that it be extended and terminated to the contingent connotate, so also it befalls the truth of the knowledge, under that respect under which it connotes the contingent object. For that connotation of conformity to the object could be removed, if God had not immuted such an object to futurition; although from the hypothesis of the comparison of the knowledge to the object contracted to futurition (under which connotation it is called the knowledge of vision) it implies that it is not conformed to the object which it sees, just as it implies that a created judgment (as composed with truth and conformity to the object) is not true and conformable. The truth, therefore, of the divine knowledge, as extended to a contingent object, is essential; but it befalls the knowledge of God that it be extended to a contingent object; in which it differs from a created judgment, to which, indeed, the connotation and extension to the contingent object which it expresses is essential; but to the extension itself, or tendency into the object, conformity to the object, or truth, befalls: whence it comes about that a created judgment is falsified. Concerning which see the pronouncements of the most Subtle Scotus transcribed by us, explained below in this distinction, On the Knowledge of absolute contingents, art. 7, under num. 28 and 29, especially those words, from 1 Sentences, distinction 39, unique question, under num. 27.

For it does not follow; God cannot be deceived, and A may not be; therefore God does not know that A will be. But it follows; that He does not know of necessity that A will be.

Which is apparent, because if my intellect always followed the mutation in the thing, so that with you sitting I would opine you to be sitting, and with you rising, I would opine you to be rising, it could not be deceived.

And a little after. Although the divine intellect does not follow things as effects their cause, nevertheless this accompanies it there, that just as the thing can not be, so the divine intellect can not-know it; and therefore it never follows that the divine intellect knows the thing otherwise than it is.

Whence arises that unlikeness between the divine and the created judgment which we premised, that because the created judgment leans upon the object as upon a cause, therefore comparison and extension to the object are essential to the judgment; although it is not of the quiddity of the judgment that the object so stand, as it is represented by the judgment, whence even it comes about that the created judgment is falsified, the object being changed.

Which implicates the judgment of God; that just as it does not look upon the object as the cause of itself, so neither is comparison, and extension exercised to such an object, of the essence of the judgment; and therefore, the object removed, there does not remain in God an extension, and comparison exercised to the object, which is falsified by the mutation of the object; as in creatures there remains the comparison and extension of the judgment to the same object, the object being varied, and therefore the judgment is falsified.

Which, that we may elucidate it quite purely, let those words of Scotus proposed by us under n. 11 be weighed.

The divine intellect sees the determination of the divine will, namely that that thing will be for it, (A) because that will determines that thing to be for it; for it knows that will to be immutable, and not impedable.

Which words elucidate clearly how much Scotus differs from those authors who ascribe a determinate truth to enunciations about a future contingent without a pre-going absolute decree, efficacious and unimpedable; namely inasmuch as they involve no condition on the side of the object on account of the cooperation of the created will. For if Scotus had acknowledged a determinate truth, or intelligibility, in the future free assent of the created will, which would not consist in an objective mutation erumpent from the absolute decree, he would have rendered it the rationale on the side of the object, on account of which the gaze of God could be terminated to such a future.

For such a determinate truth would be the proximate rationale on the side of the object of the science of futures; nor would the decree of God (granted that a sufficient rationale of such foreknowledge could be assigned to it) be pronounced the proximate, but only the remote, rationale on the side of the object of the termination of the divine cognition to a future contingent; inasmuch as it would be the cause or principle of the determinate truth, or intelligibility, of the future being.

18 Moreover, that, upon the principles of the school of the Jesuits, the decree of God cannot be asserted a sufficient rationale, (even remote,) of the science of futures; I demonstrate thus evidently. Because they with one mouth explode the absolute and unimpedable decree involving no condition on the side of the object, which antecedes the truth or determinate intelligibility of the free assent; for they contend that such an efficacious purpose of the divine will overthrows the rights of liberty; wherefore they concede only a conditional decree, or one involving a condition on the side of the cooperation of the created cause.

Which being supposed, it is evident that such a decree is not a sufficient medium on the side of the object for infallibly apprehending the free consent of the created will. For although God may inspect that free decree involving the condition of the cooperation of the created cause, He does not know the determinate future of the free consent unless the condition be purified, or — what falls into the same — unless the cooperation of the created will be apprehended. But whereas such a cooperation is a future contingent, and cannot be foreknown in a decree which has not the character of a prior to that cooperation, as one that by its efficacy unimpedibly infers such a cooperation; but rather of a purpose involving the condition of the cooperation of the created cause (that is, I will the conversion of Peter; if Peter consent), it remains that such a cooperation of the created will is to be regarded not in the decree of God (which in these Authors is not asserted with an unimpedible force inferring such a cooperation), but in itself, or in its determinate truth and intelligibility, and not otherwise.

Therefore Scotus, who assigns only the unimpedible decree of God as the sufficient rationale of the foreknowledge of futures; as is clear from those words, for it knows that will to be immutable, not impedable: can by no rationale defend the placit of the Jesuits.

Other observations on the text, and the expugnation of the placit of the more recent writers departing from the doctrine of Scotus.

19 WHEREFORE Vázquez clearly fell from the consequence of the doctrine, 1. part. disput. 65. capit. 2., whilst he asserted the decree of God to be a sufficient rationale, although remote, of the foreknowledge of futures. Since that author himself often condemns the decree about the future assent of the created will as absolute, or as involving no condition on the side of the object; and the decree importing a condition, (if the created will consent,) is an insufficient medium for the apprehension of the free cooperation, as we have made quite plain.

Whence, with Scotus, no other truth is to be brought in a contingent complexión, except that which is left as it were an extrinsic denomination by the absolute decree; so that this enunciation, Peter will run, is true, or determinately intelligible, on no other rationale except because it is volited efficaciously, and drawing an objective mutation with a habitude to future existence from the absolute and unimpedible purpose of God. But if that will of God about the existence of the future should involve the condition of the cooperation of the created will, it would not be immutable, but impedable, on account of the nod of the created appetite not cooperating; against the express testimony of Scotus teaching that God knows his will, (which is the medium on the side of the object of an infallible judgment concerning futures,) to be immutable, and not impedable.

20 Whence, in my judgment, there are to be held in this matter manifest deserters of the Scotistic discipline, Hugo Cavellus, Scotus's scholiast, in 1. distinct. 39. quaestio. unica, ad numer. margi. 23.; and Philip Faber, in 1. sententiar. distinct. 39. quaestio. unica, disp. 54. num. marg. 51.; who pronounce that will, from which Scotus produces the determinate truth of futures, not absolute, but importing the condition of the cooperation of the created cause.

In which they patently fall away from the camp of Scotus; both because Scotus everywhere calls that will unimpedable; and because, referring seriously and by design the truth of the future contingent, he did not assign that futures are attained in themselves, or in their own proper truth, but in the decree alone. But if the decree should involve the condition of a creature not predetermined to infallible assent, the cooperation of the creature ought to be inspected in itself; and consequently it should acquire its proper truth, since it cannot be apprehended in the statute of the divine will alone; as we showed.

How far that is diametrically against Scotus, the words of the text declare, which we shall transcribe under n. 14.

The divine will determining that something shown by the intellect will be, makes such a complexión to be true, and therefore intelligible; and from this that thing is present to the intellect in the rationale of object: and as the will can make that thing volited, and not make it, so it could be true, and not true.

What more open, if the determinate intelligibility of the future be sought from the will alone, and the statute of God, the knowledge of free choice not awaited?

21 Furthermore; those words of the text require an elucidation, num. 12.

Not indeed that those true things move the divine intellect, nor yet are their terms for apprehending such a truth; because then the divine intellect would be vile, because it would suffer from another than its essence.

Where Scotus seems to have spoken somewhat obscurely, whilst he surmises that no necessary complex can move the divine intellect; otherwise the mind of God would be vile, if it suffered from another than its own essence. For it does not easily stand, what it is, in Scotus's phrase, for the intellect of God to suffer from a created object, if that should carry before it a motive intelligibility with respect to the divine intellect?

Which words are to be taken in accordance with those which we drafted in the present general controversy on the science of God, in distinct. 1. art. 2. on the Science of God compared to possible creatures, especially under margin number 11.; where we showed that it is repugnant to the illimitation of the divine apprehension that any created true thing should be able to look as it were first, and per se, as the motive rationale of the termination of the divine science to a created object; for otherwise the divine intuition would be specified, and consequently would depend upon a created object; which, according to the placit of Scotus, would be for the mind of God to suffer from a participated true, and to be made vile.

For nor can to suffer from a necessary complexión be taken in any other sense; since a proposition of necessary truth, as it antecedes the divine decree, is nothing other than the non-repugnance of the terms of such a complexión to existing; which can no way avail (since it is a merely negative being) nor have force to mutate intentionally the created mind. Other things we pressed by design in the place cited.

22 Finally it is to be observed, in those words of the text under margin number 13.

And if one color were made present naturally, and another freely; there would not be a difference formally in my vision; but on its part the eye would see both naturally.

Where is insinuated the right understanding of that common pronouncement of the Theologians surmising the knowledge of vision to be free; and therefore distinct from the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is the natural and necessary apprehension of its object. For Scotus asserts both sciences, both that which antecedes the decree of the divine will in the first moment; and that which in the second moment follows the decree; to be an apprehension formally, and intrinsically necessary, as regards the predicate of the vital apprehension of the object.

Inasmuch, however, as the science extends to the object, neither is that science itself as it were the practical rationale of its own extension or comparison to the object so mutated, but a mere speculative intuition of that objective mutation, which is accepted from the free purpose. Whence such a science is not asserted the first rationale of its own extension to the object simply contingent, and necessary by hypothesis; but presupposing the free extension of the decree to the object; which extension of the decree presupposed, there accrues a necessary comparison of the science to that object simply contingent, and necessary by hypothesis.

Which Scotus elucidates with a most apposite example of corporeal vision; for if the eye should obtain that rationale of apprehending in the form of intuition, which would stand whilst objects run past, and of that capacity and sufficiency of representative power, that it could express whatever object; and there should be objected to it some object necessarily, another indeed freely; it would represent both objects necessarily by the force of its intrinsic and formal causality; although the expression of an object applied freely could be asserted free objectively, and presuppositively, on account of the object, which freely, and not necessarily, would be objected to that gaze.

Thus God, by the force of that same most unlimited and apprehensive intellect, embraces both kinds of object, the natural and the contingent, necessarily and naturally, as far as lies on the side of the act of knowing; although the knowledge of vision of future things can be called free objectively, and presuppositively, because its object is so freely proposed by the divine will that it could not be proposed, since the whole reason of the determinate intelligibility of future things is sought from the absolute proposal of the divine will: nevertheless, from the hypothesis of the objective mutation, which is freely left by the decree, such objective being is necessarily inspected by the knowledge of vision.

Therefore the knowledge of vision is not formally free, inasmuch as it is referred to the power of understanding, which is a faculty, and a predicate altogether necessary in God; but it is free presuppositively, and quasi-denominatively, inasmuch as it presupposes the decree as the medium on the side of the object, or as supplying to the science itself the medium, in which the object of such a science is foreknown by God. Because, as we have often shown elsewhere, in respect of future contingents, the medium in which is not only the attribute of the power, or only the attribute of the will, inasmuch as it expresses the predicate necessary in God, under which rationale will, or power, is joined in the place of species to the science of possible creatures; but the will itself, or power, inasmuch as it is joined to the free determination, performs the offices of impressed species and of the medium on the side of the object to the knowledge of vision in respect of future contingents.

From which letter of Scotus it is also manifestly patent against certain Thomists; that the knowledge of vision is not practical, nor the cause of the object, but the speculative intuition of it. Which either quite clearly appears; both from the analogy of corporeal gaze, which Scotus uses for opening the termination of the knowledge of vision to the object; since the inspection of corporeal sight is a mere speculation.

Then most of all; because Scotus calls the termination of the knowledge of vision to the object necessary formally, and only presuppositively, and objectively free; or free, because it intuits the object freely mutated, and simply contingent, although it be necessary secundum quid, by hypothesis of the decree.

But if the knowledge of vision is, according to Scotus, a necessary predicate in God formally and intrinsically, and only presuppositively and objectively free; it follows that such a predicate is not the formal reason of acting ad extra, nor tends into the object so as to immute it physically; because, according to Scotus, God exercises no real causality, nor intentional, ad extra except through a formally free principle of acting. For which reason, in controversy nine, On the Vision of God, distinction 2, article 2, we showed, according to the mind of Scotus, that the will of God concurs in the place of the species to the beatific vision, and not the Deity itself immediately, because it is a necessary predicate in God.

An accurate observation of Aureolus on the matter; and the best argument for our opinion, which denies the determinate truth of future contingents in themselves.

23 THE best proof of the indeterminate truth of futures Aureolus produces nervously, and subtly; from the fact that before the instant of production the thing lies under the indifference of a principle utterly indeterminate to either; thus therefore he has it in the precited dist. 38. artic. 3. §. But these things not withstanding. Where he elucidates and weighs whatever the ancient school of Theologians judged about the truth of futures.

It is to be considered; that the truth of a proposition is taken from the entity of the thing, since the truth of a sign is taken from the condition of the thing signed; whence from the fact that the thing is, or is not, the speech is called true, or false, as is patent in the predicaments.

It is evident, moreover, that a contingent ad utrumlibet has no determination to one of the two from its order to its causes; for the causes regard it under an altogether complete indifference; then, therefore, is the contingent first determined to one of the two, when it is actually posited, and exists.

But the actuality which gives determination to the contingent can be referred to every instant that precedes, and is distant in the past; or to every instant that succeeds, and is distant by posteriority from that actuality.

Therefore actuality gives the contingent its determination in every instant following the actuality, tatem, although it not be in those instants; whence it is always determinately true that such an actuality was; but it does not give it determination for any preceding instant; whence it is never determinately true that which it says.

For the determination which actuality gives to the contingent is drawn to the instants subsequent; but not to the instants preceding.

24 The rationale of which is; because actuality in respect of futures following posits the contingent outside its causes; whence it does not remain within the causality of any, nor can active power fall upon it.

But conversely, in all the instants which precede, the actuality leaves the contingent itself beneath the causality and power of its own principles; but those are ad utrumlibet, and indeterminate: and consequently a determination taking its rise from the actuality cannot be drawn back to the instants which precede.

25 Another rationale also can be assigned more immediate; because when something arises from something, it follows it; and does not precede. But the determination of the contingent arises from actuality, as was said; therefore that determination cannot be posited for the instants preceding actuality, but for those following.

Thus therefore, since the nature of the contingent is altogether indeterminate for every instant preceding its actual existence; necessarily both parts of the contradiction are owed to it without any determination for that time.

26 And therefore no proposition is true except one that encloses both parts of the contradiction under indifference, and disjunctively; but one that determinately expresses one part is neither true nor false; because if it were false, the opposite part would be determinate.

And hence it is; that this proposition is true; Socrates will be, or will not be; and that false, Socrates will be, and will not be; and that true; that one of these will fall out indeterminately; namely that Socrates will be, or will not be; and that false; namely that neither will fall out determinately.

27 From which doctrine of Aureolus the proper foundation of Suárez is diluted, and falls, and of his echoers surmising, that as the actuality of a thing, as it connotes the instants subsequent to its effection, claims for itself a determinate intelligibility under the denomination of a past being; so, as it is drawn to the instants preceding the production of it, it acquires a determination, or necessity by hypothesis, under the denomination of a future being.

For the opposition of Aureolus vigorously attacks that feigned subtlety as frivolous; because the thing, inasmuch as it connotes the duration subsequent to the instant of the extraction of the thing from the eminence of the cause, and as it is called past, retains the determinate rationale of the true, or cognoscible; because after its outflow from the virtuality of the principle, it no longer remains within the potentiality of a cause altogether indeterminate to either; and consequently it does not exhale that indetermination of the principle indifferent to either, under which it might be subjected wholly anew.

On the contrary, indeed, the thing, as it is drawn back to the instants which antecede its effection, although it be conceived under whatever rationale of necessity by hypothesis; as it ought not to be brought in not supposed, or subjected to the indifference, and indetermination of the free cause, and within the potentiality of it; so neither can it escape that indetermination, which the free cause claims for itself, fully subjecting to its dominion and elicitive power the influx which it holds within its eminence for the whole of that presupposition of duration which antecedes the instant of the effection of the future proceeding from a cause indeterminate to either.

28 Whence; because Aureolus has attacked the absolute and unimpedible decree, from which there is sought by Scotus the determinate cognoscibility of the future contingent; so also, and consequently, he has attacked the determinate futurity carrying a necessity by hypothesis, which is not put underneath contingence; for the reason that the future lies under a cause neither premoved extrinsically, nor intrinsically, nor contracted to one part of the contradiction, but utterly indeterminate to either.

Wherefore, any given future being assigned, and under whatever supposition of necessity, just as such a necessity cannot be submitted to a principle altogether indifferent ad utrumlibet before the instant of the production of the thing; so neither can it avoid the indifference to not-being, which follows from subjection to a principle indeterminate and beyond; and consequently, neither can it supply the medium on the side of the object of any knowledge that is beyond conjecture.

For the full elucidation however of Aureolus, those words must be weighed, from number 24. which at first gaze insinuate something of obscurity. Actuality in respect of futures following posits the contingent outside its causes; whence it does not remain within the causality of any, nor can active power fall upon it. Where by futures following the actuality Aureolus understands future contingents not in the state of futurity, whilst they lie hid within the eminence of the causes; but futures after the real emanation of them from their principles; whether those objects themselves exist really at present, through a real duration, or whether they pre-existed really, and have now been destroyed, and have gone away into nothing; so that thus they do not import the determination, and actuality, which is required for verifying an enunciation about the past; which those preceding words of Aureolus express.

Therefore actuality gives the contingent its determination in every instant following actuality, although it not be in those instants; whence it is always determinately true that such an actuality was.

---

Firm confutations from Aureolus of the determinate truth of contingent complexións by the force of comparison to the object, secluding the mutation which is drawn from the absolute decree.

29 THESE things prescribed; it must be said, that future contingents, the absolute decree going before being set aside, obtain no determinate cognoscibility of futures; no determinate truth, or falsity. So all Theologians, except Suárez, Vázquez, and others; who devised that new placit of the determinate truth of futures in themselves, to avoid the absolute determination of the divine will anteceding the assent of the free cause.

But that our assertion was the dogma of all Theologians before the times of Luis de Molina, (as often as Scotus, the Disciple, testifies it expressly, it will more amply stand from the following articles. It is also the perspicuous consensus of the Thomists, who do not surmise that future contingents in the real coexistence of them with eternity are prefined; nor those to whom such real coexistence pleases less, fly to the predetermination of causes. Yet none of the ancient Theologians will be able to be cited, who pronounces that future contingents are known by God in themselves, or in their determinate truth, the decree set aside; from which the omnimodal objective determination, or absolute contraction to one part of the contradiction, perishes; Aureolus also consents, inasmuch as although he denies the real coexistence of futures in eternity, and also attacks the predetermination, he nevertheless condemns the determinate truth of futures.

And our assertion is supported as well; because comprehensive cognition, just as it exhausts the object according to every moment of its scibility, so also it cannot contemplate that object except according to the mode of its truth. But it is destructive of the hypothesis that whatever moment of necessity, taken on hypothesis in an inner consent, is drawn out toward the moments antecedent to the instant of its production, should lie below the potentiality of a free cause; so that, by full right, the active power, which on the side of the assertors of the opposite opinion is indeterminate both intrinsically and extrinsically to acting, escape above such an influx: therefore it is destructive of the hypothesis that any cognition should taste that contingency of not-being, while it holds the object beneath the eminence of the cause, to which it lies fully subject.

If you object: that God does not know these future things as they exist within the potentiality of a free cause.

On the contrary; therefore God is ignorant of the future according to the moment of its own scibility; and accordingly he would suffer deception, while he contemplates as outside the potentiality of causes that to which the active power of a free cause, indeterminate to either, extends by full right.

Further; that is not a necessity on hypothesis which essentially imbibes indifference, or a power of not-being, within the determination of infallible futurition; but any supposition of a future consent, whereby it precedes the instant of germination from an indifferent cause, can not be laid beneath a principle utterly indeterminate to dissenting; therefore it essentially imports a contingency of not-being.

30 If you say: that God does not regard future things as lying within the potentiality of their causes; but according to that being which is determinate and actual, which they draw from their causes for that instant of their production.

On the contrary; that actuality of the future, as it is drawn toward the duration which precedes the effecting of the thing, and as it is apprehended by God in the state of futurition; just as it is not conceived as actually issuing forth from its cause, but as about to issue under such a difference of time, so neither can it be contemplated as not subject to a principle utterly indeterminate. Therefore the active power falls determinately upon a free consent, as it is the object of the divine cognition; and accordingly it is conceived as lying within the potentiality of a cause indifferent to either: and so a futurition is impossible which is clothed with an infallible determination, or with a necessity on hypothesis, upon the principles of the adversaries.

For that objection of Aureolus obtains force, transcribed under n. 25: "When something arises from something, it follows it, and does not precede it. But the determination of the contingent arises from actuality, as was said; therefore that determination cannot be posited for the instants preceding actuality, but for the following ones."

Because among the adversaries the whole actuality and determination of the truth of a proposition about the future (insofar as it is opposed to the potentiality and indetermination of future things in their causes, indifferent to either) is taken from the actuality and determination of the proposition about the present, as is plain from the foundations of the opposite opinion, especially from n. 1 and 7. And also because such determination is neither sought from causes indifferent to either; nor from an extrinsic determining or predetermining principle, since the assertors of the opposite opinion banish every predetermination; there remains, then, only that such determination be drawn from the contraction of the proposition of the present, or from the determined actuality of the object of the proposition of the present.

This supposed, they press the pronouncements of Aureolus. When something arises from something, it follows it, and does not precede it. That determination cannot be posited for the instants preceding actuality, but for the following ones.

Because if the whole determination of this enunciation, Peter will sin, is taken from the actuality and the contraction of this complex about the present, Peter sins; therefore it implicates that the enunciation about the future be conceived as determinately true, without first conceiving the enunciation of the present, as of the present, and as drawn from the eminence of causes; since the proposition about the future does not refer an objective determination which can avail as a medium on the side of the object, unless it is contracted in its potential power by the actuality of the proposition of the present.

Therefore, that God may conceive from eternity a proposition about the future; he first conceives it as about the present from eternity; so that for every now or sign of eternity, connotating the course of time, it be true to say that Peter now sins; seeing that the proposition about the future does not import an objective contraction which would furnish a medium for an infallible foreknowledge, except insofar as it is contracted by the proposition of the present, and is drawn from the eminence of a principle potential and indifferent to either. Therefore either God suffers deception, while he contemplates as present in that now, which is not present but future for the now and the following sign; or he conceives the object not as present, but as future; and accordingly as potential and lying subject to a contingency of being or not being, seeing that the whole determination of the future is drawn from the objective proposition of the present, and is not known as present act, that which act is not, but will be of the future.31 Whence it is inferred; that a necessity on hypothesis involves a contradiction in a free effect for all that duration, for which there can fall upon it an active power utterly indeterminate to either, such as is the state of universal futurition; if a free cause of such a future be not determined to one side of the contradiction by an absolute decree. In this Aureolus, transcribed under sub n. 24, exercises force and plants his foot.

In all the instants that precede, actuality leaves the contingent beneath the causality and power of its principles; but those are to either, and indeterminate: and in consequence a determination having its origin in actuality cannot be drawn toward the instants which precede.

But if you insist, by turning back the objection of Aureolus against our opinion; in which also he ought to have something true, that future things, for the whole anteriority of their duration, be submitted to a free cause indifferent to either.

It is answered; that with Scotus the indifference of the created will is contracted by the absolute purpose of God, so that such an efficacious volition performs the function of the use ad extra, or of the causality of the executive faculty of God. Whence it comes to pass, that the future consent of the created will is not foreknown by God as lying within the potentiality of a principle utterly indeterminate, but as contracted to one side of the contradiction by the extrinsic determination of the divine will; but that such a composition extrinsic of the efficacious decree with the created will does not injure liberty, we shall pursue in the following article.

Another argument for our opinion against the determinate truth of future things in themselves.

32 A second confirmation of our opinion is drawn from the text of Scotus which we have submitted under n. 12; because contradictory enunciations about a future contingent, for example, Socrates will run, Socrates will not run, are apprehended by God before the absolute purpose of the divine will, not as having attained a determinate truth or falsity; but in the neutral state as to truth or falsity. Therefore a complex about a future contingent, by the virtue of the intrinsic commensuration of itself to the future object, (the antecedent absolute purpose of the divine will being set aside) does not claim for itself a determinate truth or falsity.

The pronouncement of Scotus, namely, that enunciations about a future contingent are conceived before the absolute decree of the divine will in the neutral state, is confirmed thus.

Every future being, qua it imports futurition, is not a being from itself, or from its own quidditative moment it is not drawn out of a mere collection of possibles toward the series of futures; therefore it is changed toward determinate futurition by the first cause.

But this objective change must not be sought from the first cause, as it stands beneath the attribute of cognition anteceding the free decree; since such cognition is a predicate altogether necessary, from which a change toward a futurition which is not simply necessary cannot be drawn, and take away liberty; therefore such an objective change toward being-about-to-be must be drawn from a form essentially free; such as is the efficacious and absolute volition of God.

33 This proof Scotus instils into us in 1. dist. 39. q. unica, §. Supposito ergo isto, under margin. n. 14, where he subjoins.

I say; that on account of the first argument made against the third opinion (which is more fully expounded in dist. 2, in the question on the being of God) no causation of any cause can save contingency, unless the first cause be posited contingently to cause immediately; and this by positing in the first cause perfect causality, as catholics posit it; but the first being causes through intellect and will.

*And if there be posited a third exe-

cuting power other than these, it does not help toward the purpose; because if it understand and will necessarily; it produces necessarily.**

Therefore this contingency must be sought in the divine will; or in the divine intellect: Not, however, in the intellect, as it has the first act before every act of the will; because whatsoever the intellect understands in this mode, it understands merely naturally, and by a natural necessity: so no contingency can be in knowing something that it does not know, or in understanding something that it does not understand by that first intellection.*

Therefore the first contingency must be sought in the divine will.*

Where Scotus argues subtly; both that the futurition of a contingent free thing is sought from the first cause; and that from the attribute of cognition, as it antecedes the decree, the future in that objective being of determinate futurition cannot be produced; because there would be inferred a necessity upon the created will.

Next he unravels; that from the absolute and pre-defining purpose of the divine volition there should flow forth an infallible futurition of contingents; inasmuch as the free will of God antecedently possesses eminently every substance and mode of indifference and of created liberty; for that is the sound of those words of Scotus. "Therefore the first contingency must be sought in the divine will." Whence it comes to pass, that this does not stand in the way with Scotus, that a supposition of the absolute decree weaken liberty; that rather from it the determinate futurition of a thing germinates, according to the mode of an intrinsic liberty and indifference.

34 But you will object; that the aforesaid contradictory complexes about a future contingent, with which Scotus proceeds, do not pertain to absolute but to conditional cognition; since those complexes, (Socrates will run; Socrates will not run), before the decree from which is sought the absolute futurition of the thing, necessarily involve this condition. If Socrates have existed in the nature of things for such a difference of time, he will run; or he will not run.

It is answered; that also in conditional futures the argument of Scotus presses, that before the conditional free decree, on the side of the object and the act exercised on the side of the act and the free purpose, conditional futures should not refer a determinate truth or falsity, but should only be cast in the neutral state before the divine inspection; as we shall show by design in the following Distinction on the cognition of conditionals.

Because also in conditionals the objection of Scotus presses; that either a conditional future, qua such, be a being from itself, and not from the first cause; or that the objective change of it toward a conditional being-about-to-be be sought from the necessary form of the cognition of God; and accordingly such a future would be a being simply necessary, and not a supposit, or lying subject to the indifference of a free principle. Or finally, that the whole of its determinate scibility emanates from a free decree; as Scotus contends, of which see below n. 36.

Moreover; we hand down below, in art. 7 of this Distinction, a testimony of Scotus express and vivid, seeking the determinate futurition of our consent from the absolute decree of the divine will; so that such a decree be the moment on the side of the object, for the foreknowledge of the consent of created free choice, and for the reconciling of the infallible divine judgment with our liberty; where we weigh how the certainty of foreknowledge coheres with our liberty according to the principles of Scotus; especially under margin. n. 27.

The foundations of the adversaries are refuted for the determinate truth in themselves of complexes about contingents, wherein their principal foundation, sought from the contradictory enunciation, is undermined.

For although truth and falsity in an enunciative proposition are opposed as it were contrarily; nevertheless that opposition is not immediate except in respect of a fit substrate, such as the complex concerning the future is not, as an object for the divine gaze, before the free, efficacious, and predetermining decree of the divine will.

To the other confirmation of Aureolus, under num. 4, insofar as from the contradictory enunciation which is available to propositions about a future contingent, as they are set before the divine knowledge before the decree, he tries to fish out a determinate truth, or falsity.

To the other confirmation of Aureolus, under n. 4, inasmuch as from the contradictory enunciation, which suppeditates to the complexes about a future contingent, as they are cast before the divine cognition before the decree, he attempts to fish out a determinate truth or falsity.

Ambrose Machado answers, 1. p. disp. 34. sect. 1. §. the truth of conditionals about contingents is none of it independent of the divine decree: that those propositions, which are cast before God before the free statute of the divine will, although at first gaze they may appear absolute, yet are to be judged simply conditional; because they import a condition concerning the existence of the object. For example; Socrates will run; and Socrates will not run, as they are referred to the cognition of God before the decree, involve a condition concerning the existence of Socrates, which is necessarily supposed for the running.

But granting that propositions import their own proper contradiction before the decree; and that between any position and its negation, adequately contradicting the position, for any moment of reason whatsoever there is given a proper contradiction even before the decree; Aureolus nevertheless more solidly and more acutely blunts the blow in the place cited there, §. non procedunt ergo instantiae. Where he subjoins.

The second instance, therefore, does not hold; because although it is a law of contradictories that, if one is true, the other be false; yet it is not a law that one be true and the other false always: nay, the Philosopher excepts the proposition about a future contingent, 1 Perihermenias.

Therefore the second instance does not avail; because although the law of contradictories be, that if one is true, the other be false; yet it is not a law, that one be true, and the other be false always: indeed, the philosopher excepts the proposition about a future contingent, 1 Periermenias.

For if that pronouncement could be sustained, it would come about that, not only with the objective mutation which breaks forth from the predetermining decree set aside, but also with the absolute decree of concurring, or of furnishing concourse, set aside, the thing would be determinately contracted to a determinate future, or to a determinate non-future.

The consequence is shown in the hypothesis of Scotus admitting contingent complexes in the gaze of God before every free decree of the divine will; which being premised, if those contradictory complexes, framed from contingent terms, for that sign before every decree of the divine will, were not neutral as to determinate truth and determinate falsity, as to a contracted future and a contracted non-future, as Scotus will have it; but were determinately true, or determinately false, by reason of the contradictory enunciation; it would follow that a free participated being would be contracted by itself (the habitude to the first cause set aside) to a determinate future, or a determinate non-future; which is more than false, and absurd.

The sequence is shown in the hypothesis of Scotus, admitting complexes about contingents in the gaze of God before every free decree of the divine will; which premised, if those contradictory complexes, fused from contingent terms, for that moment before every decree of the divine will, were not neutral as to determinate truth and determinate falsity, as to contracted being-about-to-be and contracted not being-about-to-be, as Scotus wills; but were determinately true or determinately false, on account of the contradictory enunciation; it would follow that participated free being would be contracted by itself (the habitude to the first cause set apart) to a determinate being-about-to-be, or determinate not being-about-to-be; which is more than false and absurd.

Seeing that a determinate truth or falsity sought from the contradicting complexes in that moment, and in the hypothesis of Scotus, would not only antecede the decree of predetermining, but also the decree of concurring; therefore the doctrine of Aureolus is to be preferred, that it does not pertain to the laws of contradictories that one be determinately true, and the other determinately false; but that if one be determinately true, its opposite be determinately false.37 Nor can there be answered for the adversaries: that for that moment, before the exercised and real existence of the decree, there is conceived the existence of such a decree as to objective being, which existence, prior to the exercised and real existence of the same decree, suffices in order that a future contingent be conceived in cognized being, and determinate, by connotation and habitude toward the decree of concurring, not in the being of existence, but in objective and cognized being.

For against the doctrine premised militate those foundations, which assail that the divine decree be not pre-amended, statutes by God, for any moment before existence, or as to the logical habitation of its drawn-out cognition, inasmuch as the divine decree before the exercised existence does not import a determinate truth, whereby it can be a medium on the side of the object for an infallible foreknowledge; of which we treat more fully in the following Distinction on the cognition of conditionals, q. unica. sect. 1. throughout, and specially n. 17, 18, and 19.

To the third objection of Aureolus, under n. 5. It is answered, that if there be cut away the antecedent statute of the divine will pre-defining the thing for a determinate being-about-to-be or not to be; by the virtue of this constituting principle (of which Scot. in 1. dist. 38 and dist. 39, not p. d.) there cannot be predicated a determinate distraction of the thing toward futurition, or non-futurition; as will be shown more fully from the contraction of the objections which the more recent authors instruct against the common opinion.

38 Whence, to the foundation of the more recent authors proposed by us, under the preceding number 6. We say; that a proposition about a future contingent, the decree of the divine will not preceding, is left neutral, or indeterminate as to truth, or falsity: so that it subsists as it were suspended, until from the supervening divine volition there be said of it a truth or falsity from conforming or disconforming to the thing, lest it be referred to a destined futurition or non-futurition.

As to the objection which presses: that no medium is given between the enunciation of futurition, and of the definition of the object; as between the being-about-to-be, and not being-about-to-be, of the object, from which such enunciation is drawn.

It is answered; that a created thing, before the decree of the divine will, is not contracted to that objective change which it receives from the decree for being-about-to-be, or not to be; but is indifferent and neutral, in order that it lie subject to that change which may accede at the nod of God.

Wherefore, if you insist; that no medium is given between enunciating a thing determinately to be, and not enunciating a thing determinately to be. This we freely grant; yet we assert, that of these two contradictories the affirmative is false; namely, that, the absolute decree anteceding the stability of the future being cut off, the enunciation about the future exacts the object determinately to be: on the contrary, that the negative proposition be true, viz. that, the habitude of this decree set aside, the enunciation not pre-announce the thing determinately future.

Whence, for that moment of reason, in which complexes of this kind are offered to the divine intellect before the efficacious purpose of the divine will, either of the two contradictories is not determinately conforming to its object, or neutral as to conforming and disconforming; not, however, determinately disconforming. For wider runs the not-conforming than the disconforming: since the enunciation in the neutral state (which antecedes the efficacious statute of the divine will) is not determinately conforming to the future object; not, however, determinately disconforming.

As before the quantity is substantiated to a quality inferring similitude, or dissimilitude, toward another quality; although it may be affirmed that such a quantity is not similar, it cannot be dissimilar; because similitude and dissimilitude presuppose a form of quality to be induced proximally by such a relation of convening, or disconvening; yet the quantity antecedes the form of whiteness, and in that state (under which it is conceived neutral as to whiteness and blackness) is understood not similar, or neutral as to similitude and dissimilitude.

For the not-similar extends more widely than the dissimilar, insofar as similar and not-similar are opposed contradictorily; but similar and dissimilar bear an immediate opposition only around a fit substrate; such as quantity is not, as it precedes the quality of the habitude of similarity or dissimilarity, proximately introduced.

So also in the matter at hand; an enunciation about the future, as conceived before the decree from which is sought the determinate scibility of the object; for that anteriority of reason, is not determinately conforming to the object; and also not determinately disconforming, quasi-precisively; yet not conforming or disconforming, quasi-contraritly; since for that moment it is prescinding from the determinate futurition or non-futurition of the object, from which the determinate similitude or dissimilitude of the complex about the future is taken.

39 To the objection ¹^; that if propositions about a future contingent did not attain to a determinate truth or falsity; it would come to pass, that they would not bear a proper contradiction.

It is answered; that a contradictory proposition about a future contingent negates the whole that the other affirms, yet under indetermination, and indifference to the opposite, by the virtue of the intrinsic commensuration of such a complex to the object; if the pre-defining decree be prescinded. For example, this complex, (Socrates will not run,), negates whatsoever the other contradictory complex enunciates, (Socrates will run), yet that does not take away, that each enunciation express the object with indifference to the opposite.

For the affirmative proposition thus enunciates Socrates about to run, that the running lie subject to an indifference of not being, as that which stands within the potentiality of a free cause, and indeterminate to either; and the negative proposition, namely, Socrates will not run; thus negates Socrates about to run, that such a negation of running be supposed of a contingency to being. Because of this, in order that the object of such an enunciation be left within the indetermination of a principle not efficaciously premoved to one side of the contradiction; in that way of thinking, which repudiated the predetermination of the decree, not involving a condition on the side of the cooperation of the created cause.

Whereas, however, the objection instils; that the law of contradictories demand, that one enunciate determinately true truths, the other falsity; this we have exploded from Aureolus, under n. 35. and 36.

From which also is unnerved that confirmation contending; that a proper contradiction alone could intercede in enunciations about the future, which encircle both parts of the contradiction; because to those alone could determinate truth, or falsity be congruous.

For we reprove, that it be of the reason of a contrary opposition of enunciations, that one proposition be determinately true, or false; but that it pertain to a proper contradictory opposition, that if one be determinately true, the other be determinately false; as we have opened out from Aureolus.

Satisfying the other objections of the Recentiores; and unfolding the mind of Scotus out of Maior against the Scotizing Neoterics.

40 TO the second argument of the Recentiores, sub num. 7. it is answered from what has been laid down: the enunciation about the future is not true or false by the force of the intrinsic adequation or inadequation of such a proposition to the object, the extrinsic proposition of the divine will being set aside, from which the contraction of the object to one side of the contradiction is drawn.

Wherefore from the fact that that enunciation, (Sortes currit, "Socrates runs,"), is determinately true, the truth of this proposition about the future (Sortes curret, "Socrates will run,"), does not break forth, since that actuality of running which inheres in Socrates for the present duration cannot be drawn back to the instants preceding the motion of running, without the thing's being subjected again in its entirety to a free principle dominating by full right and pre-possessing such a motion together with indifference to the contrary.

But when you object that the truth of the enunciation about the future does not begin (inasmuch as it is truth about the future) in that time in which Socrates runs in the present; whereas rather the truth about the future then ceases, and the truth about the present begins — I answer by denying the supposition; namely, that a determinate truth which begins, or which ceases, in that instant in which the truth of the enunciation about the present flows forth, can be owed to a proposition about a future contingent (the prevenient decree being set aside); wherefore the objection voluntarily assumes that which it ought to have shown.

41 To the third argument, from num. 8. it is answered: that the enunciation about a future contingent (the contraction set aside, by which the object receives from the decree establishing the futurition or non-futurition of the object) neither affirms nor negates the object determinately; for otherwise both contradictorily opposed propositions would be false. Nor indeed does it express the indifference of the free cause to acting toward either; for then both contradictorily opposed propositions would be true. But the affirmative enunciates the effect, as future for such a difference of time, in such a way that it remains subject to indeterminacy as regards not being about to be; and the negative denies the future object, yet so that it remains subject to indeterminacy as regards being about to be.

Wherefore the proposition about the future signifies more than the indifference of a principle able to determine itself to either; since it advances further to affirming or denying the futurition of the object; nevertheless, because the futurition of the object is expressed together with indifference to the contrary, therefore the enunciation, the absolute and predetermining decree being cut off, cannot be asserted to be determinately true or false.

Toward the confirmation the matter is likewise clear; for it is displayed on the same thread of doctrine.

42 To the fourth argument, under number 9. it is answered, by conceding the universal proposition, both affirmative and negative, in contingent matter to be determinately false; and hence the particular contradictorily opposed proposition, both affirmative and negative, to be determinately true; nevertheless the truth of the particular proposition does not emanate from that hypothesis of determinate futurition which the opposing opinion mingles in, banishing the absolute and precedent decree of God; but from the universal and particular sign which is attached to the subject of the enunciation and contributes to falsifying or verifying the proposition. For the universal proposition affirms or denies a power in moral readiness for acting in the whole collection and universality of individuals, which is evidently false; since throughout the whole throng of individuals there is no moral expedition composed for an act of the same rational character, for instance, for running, standing, sitting, for sinning or for working piously.

Wherefore the particular proposition, both affirmative and negative, which does not express the universal power (but pronounces, or removes, in some particular supposit such a faculty girt for the work), attributes to itself a determinate and necessary truth by hypothesis; for which there is not demanded that some singular enunciation about a future contingent be determinately true, by reason of its adequation and commensuration to the infallible futurition of the object, the precedent and unimpedible proposition of the divine will being set aside; but that from the decree, as from the cause of the scibility of the future being, its determinate truth flow forth.

Because God did not establish himself to concur, according to the exigency of secondary causes, to the positing of a contingent act, or to its negation, throughout the whole collection of individuals; but that he pre-defined certain individuals, by the office of the first cause and according to the exigency of secondary causes, to the positing of such a contingent act, and others indeed to its negation.

43 To the confirmation it is answered: that (however it may be from what we premised out of Aureolus under num. 26.) we concede that the disjunctive proposition embracing both parts of the contradiction (for instance, Petrus peccabit, vel non peccabit, "Peter will sin, or will not sin,") is determinately true; not on that hypothesis of futurition which the opposing opinion erects; but by reason of the copula embracing both parts of the contradiction; which takes care that such an enunciation be constituted not only determinately true but also simply necessary.

But since, among the adversaries, the proposition about a future contingent, although it be determinately true, is not yet asserted to be simply necessary; whereas the disjunctive enunciation, which coalesces from both extremities of the contradiction, claims for itself a truth not only determinate, nay, even simply necessary (so much so that the contradictorily opposed proposition is not only determinately false, but rather simply impossible and self-contradictory); it follows from this that the truth, or falsity, of these propositions which are re-integrated from both extremities of the contradiction is not to be sought from that hypothesis of futurition with which the opposing opinion obtrudes itself; but from the necessity of the copula embracing both parts of the contradiction.

From which we elicit, that in no way do the determinate truth or falsity of such enunciations favor the adversaries toward confirming their opinion; since Aureolus, denying the determinate truth of future contingents, candidly admits a determinate truth in propositions re-integrated from both disjuncts, as is plain from his words transcribed under n. 26.

Nulla propositio est vera, nisi quae claudit vtramque partem contradictionis sub indifferentia, et disiunctim; quae verò determinatè alteram partem exprimit, non est vera, nec etiam falsa. — "No proposition is true, except that which embraces both parts of the contradiction under indifference and disjunctively; whereas that which determinately expresses one part is neither true nor even false." [The words of Aureolus transcribed in the place cited. — Tr.]

As to the last argument the matter is plain from what has been said; for it holds only that future contingents draw their determinate truth from the decree, and on that account are foreknown by God and revealed through the Prophets.

Which doctrine I judged should be established against the Recentiores Cavel and Faber, straying from Scotus, by the perspicuous doctrine of Franciscus Maior, Doctor Illuminatus, and auditor of Scotus, which he delivers in 1. sententiar. distinctio. 39. quaestion. 4. where he asks in his own terms, Vtrùm futura contingentia habeant veritatem determinatam? — "Whether future contingents have a determinate truth?" §. Quantùm ad secundum — "As to the second." There he has it as follows.

Hoc ergo probo primò sic, satis euidenter. Omn. productioni actiuae correspondet necessariò aliqua passiua; sed diuina voluntas actiuè producit ista futura cōtingentia in esse volito, quod non est aliud nisi actiuè ea determinare. Et paulo infra: Sicut productiuum requirit producibile, ita determinatum productiuum determinatum producibile; et eodem modo sicut determinatiuum requirit determinabile, ita determinans, determinatum. Voluntas autem diuina est determinans; ergo aliquid est determinatum: illud autem non potest esse nisi futurum contingent. — "This therefore I prove first thus, sufficiently evidently. To every active production there necessarily corresponds something passive; but the divine will actively produces these future contingents in acted-upon being, which is nothing else but to determine them actively. And a little below: As the productive requires the producible, so the determinate productive the determinate producible; and in the same way, as the determining requires the determinable, so the determining, the determined. But the divine will is the determining; therefore something is determined: but that cannot be anything except a future contingent."

Where Maior judges it evident in the doctrine of Scotus, that the determinate truth of the future contingent consists in its production in acted-upon being according to Scotus's familiar way of speaking; or in the objective change breaking forth from the divine will determining. Therefore the operation of created free will, foreseen in itself, or in its determinate truth, is not the contracting and determining ratio at which the divine will, as absolute, wheels its proposition about the futurition and existence of such an operation of free will; if this operation does not have a determinate truth, which can be foreseen, so as to rouse and contract the divine will, except with the absolute proposition going before, from which it is produced in the being of the true and intelligible, as also in the being of the willed and objectively mutated.

Aureolus is vindicated from the charge which Gregory of Rimini and Vázquez brand upon him.

44 But as for the rest, this one thing remains to be dispatched: that since we have used the aid and acumen of Aureolus to establish the common view, and since our Franciscan communion of the Religion presses, over which the most learned Cardinal eminently shone forth, that we vindicate him as far as we can from the carping of the adversaries; and since in the present matter he is in ill repute concerning the foreknowledge of future contingents, on account of Gregory of Rimini, in 1. distinct. 38. quaestion. 2. art. 1, and Gabriel Vázquez, 1. p. disput. 66. capit. 1. numer. 6, having cavilled that Aureolus babbled, that it is false to assert that God distinctly and determinately knows that the Antichrist will be; but that he will be, or will not be, under a disjunction.

It must therefore be shown how far removed this was from the mind of Aureolus; which is plainly evident from the aforesaid distinctio. 38. art. 1. §. Quòd actualitas futuri contingentis exemplatur à Deitate sub versiculo Nunc ergo procedendum est affirmatiuè. — "That the actuality of the future contingent is exemplified from the Deity by the verse, Now therefore we must proceed affirmatively." There he says.

Actualitas futuri contingentis exemplatur à Deitate, ita quòd Deitas est eminens similitudo illius; hoc autem potest multipliciter declarari. Constat enim quòd nullius est Deitas similitudo ex tempore, quin sit ab aeterno, et immutabiliter illius similitudo; aliàs esset apud Deum vicissitudo, et variatio. — "The actuality of the future contingent is exemplified from the Deity, so that the Deity is its eminent likeness; but this can be declared in several ways. For it is evident that the Deity is the likeness of nothing only from time, without its being that thing's likeness from eternity and immutably; otherwise there would be in God vicissitude and variation."

But it is manifest, that while the actuality of the future contingent is posited and exhibited in time, the Deity of necessity is its likeness and exemplar; for it is certain that God knows the contingent when it actually is, and so the Deity is the exemplar and eminent likeness of that actuality: therefore from eternity and immutably it was that likeness.

45 Furthermore; in the same article 1. §. Quòd secundùm hoc sola Deitas potest esse similitudo sine fallacia repraesentans actualitatem futuri contingentis — "That according to this the Deity alone can be a likeness without fallacy representing the actuality of the future contingent," he subjoins.

Tertia quoque propositio est, quòd Deitas sola potest esse similitudo sine fallacia repraesentans actualitatem cõtingentis futuri: Declaratum est enim suprà, quòd Deitas abstrahit in essendo ab omni tempore; et ab omni duratione formali; ita quòd terminare non potest aliquam habitudinem pertinentem ad tempus, seu successionem: vnde nihil est sibi praeteritum, nilque futurum, nilque simultaneum, seu coexistens positiuè. — "There is also a third proposition, that the Deity alone can be a likeness without fallacy representing the actuality of the future contingent: for it was declared above, that the Deity abstracts in being from all time; and from all formal duration; so that it cannot terminate any habitude pertaining to time or succession: whence nothing is past for it, nothing future, and nothing simultaneous or coexisting positively."

Yet from this, that it does not stand off from anything according to the prior, because nothing is future to it; nor according to the posterior, because nothing is past to it, it is necessarily conceived as non-standing-off from all time: not however as simultaneously, or presently coexisting, as the first opinion above attacked was feigning.

But it was said straightway that the actuality of the future contingent can have a likeness unable to deceive, if such a likeness be posited that in no way does it stand off according to prior and posterior; but rather coexists simultaneously, or exists indistantly.

Therefore the Deity, which exists indistantly in every way from the actuality of the future contingent, will be able to present and exemplarize it infallibly.

45 With these testimonies I have nothing that could be opposed, such that Aureolus might be dragged to a sense absurdly negating; since he plainly defends that God from eternity apprehends the future with the same certitude of judgment before its effecting, as also after its extraction from the virtuality of the cause; for in otherwise mutable divine judgment there would steal in a vicissitude, if God knew how to know the future when it is produced in the present, which before its production he had not foreknown.

Then, in the words cited under nume. 45. he candidly professes the intimate objective presence, or indistance, of futures from the Deity, so that it performs the function of the exemplary form, that is, cognition exemplarizing futures; for although Aureolus rejects that real presence, or coexistence of futures in eternity, which the Thomists asserted, he nevertheless asserts an objective presence which contributes to the infallible judgment of God concerning such futures.

Moreover; even from thence can Aureolus be re-conquered [revindicated against himself — Tr.]; and pressed under man, by that excursion by which some from the school of St. Thomas [Tr.: text corrupt here; the print runs the sense on: "we intercepted and shut out the Refugees of the school of St. Thomas, interpreting of Futurs an objective and not real presence from eternity, rendering the same presence a sufficient medium on the side of the object for the infallible foreknowledge of futures;" against whom we wrought pressing out the principle from the Ferrariensis, as is plain from ar. 1. huius dist. n. marg. 6.]

By the same blow is Aureolus cast down, who although with Scotus he sharply assails the real presence of futures in eternity; as is manifest from that proof of his which we there transcribed, under num. marg. 20. nevertheless inconsequently assigns the indistance of the Deity exemplarizing the exemplified futures as the ratio on the side of the object, or the objective medium toward the foreknowledge of futures; as is plain from those words.

Ex hoc quòd non distat ab aliquo secundùm prius, quia non est sibi quidquã futurum, nec secundùm posterius, quia non est sibi quidquam praeteritum, necessariò concipitur ut indistans ab omni tempore; non tamen ut simul, aut praesentialiter coexistens, ut fingebat prima opinio superiùs impugnata. — "From this, that it does not stand off from anything according to the prior, because nothing is future to it, nor according to the posterior, because nothing is past to it, it is necessarily conceived as non-standing-off from all time; not however as simultaneously, or presently coexisting, as the first opinion above attacked was feigning."

Nor does Aureolus escape the pressure, urging that God is not present to things by positive contiguity, or contact of presence, but by negative indistance; as is plain from the Aureolus transcribed by us in controu. 6. de Immensitate Dei, ar. 2. à numer. 1. vsque ad 5. and refuted there à numer. 6. vsque ad 10.

Because, given that the presence of God would not claim a positive contact of presence toward things, but a negation of distance, or negative indistance, as Aureolus hails it; there still stands the reason pressing Aureolus. That God from eternity was not really indistant from futures before the real existence of futures, because futures before their production had attained no real being, by which they could really stand off, or not stand off, from the substance of God; therefore the substance of God was to them indistant according to objective coexistence, which is left over from the knowledge of God as something posterior and consequential to knowledge; therefore such indistance cannot be assigned the objective medium, or medium on the side of the object, toward the infallible foreknowledge of futures; since Aureolus falls again into that snare of begging the principle, in which we showed implicated those who interpret St. Thomas of objective presence alone.

47 But setting these aside; since in the present matter we labor to assert Aureolus against the criminations of those who opine him to have denied the determinate foreknowledge of futures in God; the Catholic sense concerning the determinate foreknowledge of futures Aureolus more fully disclosed in eadem dist. ar. 1. in initio — "in the same distinction, article 1, at the beginning," — so that he plainly lays bare the imposture of the adversaries; for he has it thus.

Circa primum ergo considerandum; quòd licet Philosophus, et Commentator, et alij plures Philosophi, ut Seneca, et quidam Morales, negauerint diuinã praescientiam propter hoc, quòd non patet, qualiter stet cum contingentia rerum, ut apparebit in quaestione sequenti; Catholicè tamen concedere oportet, quòd omnis futura quantumcunque sint contingentia, Deus determinatè praenouit. — "Therefore concerning the first it must be considered; that although the Philosopher, and the Commentator, and several other Philosophers, as Seneca, and certain of the Morals, denied the divine foreknowledge on this account, that it is not apparent how it stands with the contingency of things, as will appear in the following question; nevertheless it must be conceded in the Catholic manner, that all futures, however contingent they may be, God foreknew determinately."

And this can be concluded demonstratively; because it seems to be a common conception of the mind, from making toward the divine perfection; and universally, the things which were inducted above to prove that God knows singulars, can by parity of reason be inducted to prove that God knows future contingents, and every cognoscible whatever it may be.

Therefore this supposed, there remains to inquire; because the difficulty is in the mode, how the future, which in itself is indeterminate and uncertain, can be known certitudinally by God before it be made. What more manifest? Since that presupposed as the outset of the question by Aureolus, namely the determinate and infallible foreknowledge of futures in God, he proceeds to disquisition upon the medium on the side of the object of the apprehension of futures.

48 But to the aforesaid there seems to oppose another testimony of Aureolus ex praedicta dist. 38. artic. 3. §. Quòd notitia diuina. — "From the aforesaid distinction 38, article 3, § That divine knowledge." There he says: Secunda verò propositio est; quod notitia diuina, quam de actualitatibus futurorum contingentium habet, non dat ut propositio affirmatiua praecisè, vel negatiua praecisè formata de futuro sit vera, vel falsa; imo relinquit utramque nec veram, nec falsam. — "The second proposition indeed is, that the divine knowledge which he has of the actualities of future contingents does not make it happen that a proposition about the future, formed precisely affirmatively or precisely negatively, be true or false; nay, it leaves both neither true nor false."

From which the doctrine of Aureolus seems to be produced [said to bring it about — Tr.], that the foreknowledge of God concerning futures is impossible; if to such objects there be not forthcoming truth, or determinate scibility. Therefore Aureolus, who denies the determinate truth of the future, is also denominated to deny the infallible foreknowledge of God concerning such objects.

49 It is answered, that that [passage] serves only as an objection; [and that] Aureolus spoke less metaphysically, in which he found acolytes among certain of the Recentiores; Ludovicus Molina, and others professing the determinate foreknowledge of futures in God, even though to those futures there should be no determinate truth.

Wherefore, just as the reprobated doctrine is not ascribed to these authors by the denial of an infallible foreknowledge of future things in God, on the ground that they have rejected the determinate truth of future things; so neither ought such a lapse to be attributed to Aureolus, against his express meaning and so many of his perspicuous assertions.

Article V.

Whether the decree is the medium on the side of the object of the foreknowledge of future things?

Summary.

The opinion of Aureolus, and of the more recent authors; universally rejecting that the decree is the medium on the side of the object of the infallible foreknowledge of future things. Nu. 1. Other objections against the decree, not involving the hypothesis to be purified by free choice. Num. 7. Another opinion of Suarez, maintaining that the predefinition is the medium of the foreknowledge of supernatural acts; yet not the first, but presupposing another. Nu. 10. The text of Scotus, and the foundations for the true opinion: wherein it is shown against Suarez that the subordination of the second cause to the first is overthrown, if the decree of God involve the condition of the cooperation of the second cause to be purified by free choice. Num. 13. The opinions of Herice, Lessius, and Alarcon are examined, who deny the priority of nature, or of the "from which", in the concourse of the first cause. Num. 21. The first argument for our opinion, directed against the person of Suarez and others, who reject predetermination through the extrinsic decree of the divine will, and admit the predefinition of supernatural acts. Num. 23. The other, physical argument for the opinion of Scotus; which is drawn from the potentiality of the created will with respect to such an individual act. Num. 27. The dilution of the opposed arguments. Nume. 30. Satisfaction to other objections, wherein that hypothesis of Scotus is treated, concerning the composition of the divine power with the created free choice, if God were an agent determined to one thing ad extra. Nu. 34.

Confuted hitherto are the other media on the side of the object of the foreknowledge of future things; now there presses a more painstaking examination of that solution which Scotus embraces, namely, of the absolute and unimpedible decree, from which the determinate scibility of the future contingent is produced.

1 Concerning the question at issue: Aureolus, at the place cited, from 1 Sent., dist. 38, art. 1, §. Quid dicendum sit secundum veritatem, vigorously assails the decree, which can be the sufficient medium on the side of the object of the foreknowledge of future things; whose arguments we do not transcribe here for this reason, because they press specially the determination of the divine will, which is the medium of the foreknowledge of wicked acts; concerning which, because of the grave clash of the authors, the following article will be woven in specially.

The whole school of the Jesuits follows Aureolus, with one exception, Vázquez, who judged the decree to be a sufficient, though remote, medium of the infallible divine judgment; in which he plainly fell short of the consequence of the doctrine, as we showed in the preceding article.

But that the decree is not a sufficient medium of the foreknowledge of future things is maintained by Bellarmine lib. 2. De amissione gratiae, cap. 2, 4, et 7; Molina in Concordia, disp. 28 and 32; Leonard Lessius lib. De efficacia gratiae, cap. 3; Francis Albertinus tom. 1. corollariorum, q. 2, theologica, in secundum corollarium ex 4. principio philosophico, à n. 9 usque ad 11; Valentine of Henrique(s), tract. 1. de scientia Dei, disp. 6, cap. 3, praecipuè n. marg. 37.

2 This opinion is first propped up on the ground that such a decree must either be an insufficient medium of the foreknowledge of future things, or must acquire an iron force of predetermining the created will, and of infusing the future consent, which tramples the laws of liberty.

Namely, because either such a decree, by which in Scotus future things are infallibly foreknown, is the will applying the omnipotence of God so that it be present to the created will for operating; without the conjunction of which executing divine faculty, the created cause cannot be understood as in the nearest proximity to influx, because of that essential dependence upon the first principle which it implies.

Which conjunction, or application of the power of God to the created will, so that the latter may be constituted proximally valid for influx, is not placed in the local indistance alone, or in the entitative contact, which befits God by the force of His immensity filling all things; since this kind of conjunction could also subsist, even though no operative force should be available to created things: therefore a composition in the genus of efficient cause is exacted between the executing divine faculty and the created will for the common influx.

Therefore either that decree, applying the power of God so that it be present to the created will for acting, offers, or seeks, the concourse of the second cause to only one side of the contradiction; and thus the created cause would be proximally valid for that side, and not for the opposite; and hence it would incur antecedent necessity, inasmuch as it would belong to the force of a principle proximally furnished for acting.

Or it offers, and provides, the concourse ad utrumlibet; and accordingly in the will thus concurring with the created cause ad utrumlibet, the future consent could not be determinately apprehended.

3 Or that decree, in which in Scotus God inspects future contingents, does not concern the immediate conjunction of the divine power with the created cause for operating; but the very consent of the created will itself. Concerning which a disquisition presses: whether that will of God decrees absolutely the consent of the created will, not involving a condition on the side of the cooperation of the created cause? So that God unimpedibly constitute the future conversion of Peter, with the cooperation of Peter not awaited; and then such a decree would crush the rights of liberty.

Or such a volition of God imports the condition of the cooperation and concourse of the created cause; so that it intends the conversion of Peter upon the hypothesis that Peter be willing to consent, and not otherwise. And then the mere intuition of the divine decree could not afford the medium of the infallible foreknowledge of the conversion of Peter; but the inspection of the cooperation of the created cause would be required.

Which, since in Scotus it does not carry within itself a determinate truth, but rather its cause is in the decree; it follows, that if it is not foreknown in the decree because that decree involves the condition of the cooperation of the created cause: then neither can such a conversion be apprehended in itself; since no free future contingent, in Scotus, acquires within itself a determinate truth, but in the decree alone.

4 Next, secondly, it is shown that such a decree utterly destroys liberty by those efficacious arguments which Scotus frames against his own doctrine in 2. dist. 37, q. 2, §. Iuxta secundam viam, sub numer. margin. a, where he subjoins:

Secondly it is argued thus: that which is determined by another to something has not that perfectly in its own power; the created will, upon the hypothesis, is determined to this by the divine volition; therefore.

The minor is proved; because either one will determines another, and it is not ours that determines the divine; this is evident because the temporal is not the cause of the eternal; therefore the converse; and the proposed conclusion is had.

Or neither determines the other; and then neither will be the moving of the moved; nor will there be an essential order between them.

Nay, if the divine will does not determine ours, as the second argument urges, it could will something that would not come to be, because of our will not according with it.

5 Furthermore, the second way argues thus. That is not contingent because of the relation of itself to some cause, to the outcome of whose cause the superior cause is determined; and the determination of which cause all the inferior causes follow of necessity.

Example; were my will now determined to one side about writing tomorrow; and were it not impedible nor mutable; my writing tomorrow would not be contingent ad utrumlibet, by reason of its relation to my hand; because just as the will is now determined to the other side, so in it virtually are all the inferior causes for the same.

Likewise; since that has been determined, whose determination a determinate effect shall be; the outcome of that effect is not simply indeterminate to either: at least its being is not contingent because of the power of the inferior cause.

But were the divine will the immediate cause of my volition, there would already be some determinate cause with respect to it; because the will of God is eternally determined to one of the contradictories.

And the determination of this cause is necessarily accompanied by the determination of my will with respect to the same; otherwise God's willing this and this not coming to be would stand together: therefore that willing is not contingent ad utrumlibet because of the power of my will.

6 From that doctrine of Scotus, and especially from those things which he there hands down about the essential order between the second cause moved, and the first moving, through the immutable and unimpedible decree, the following objection is furnished.

From the condition of the participated agent it is essentially required that it not be able to influence except inasmuch as it is moved by the first agent; by that motion of an efficacious design, which cannot be at all hindered by a refusing created appetite; nor indeed ought such a decree involve the condition of the cooperation of the created cause, so that it can be the sufficient medium of the foreknowledge of the free consent. Yet it is not in the power of the created will to be moved, or not moved, by the efficacious volition of the uncreated God; therefore neither is that causality of influx free to the created will, which, because of the essential subordination of the second cause to the first, premits an efficacious motion by the absolute decree of God.

This is illustrated by Scotus's example of the hand writing of necessity, because of the antecedent and unimpedible design of the commanding will. For thus the action of writing, although it is free by the relation to the will, is nevertheless necessary by the order to the hand executing such an action; because the hand premits an unimpedible decree about exerting such an action, the supposition of which decree is in no way in the power of the writing hand.

But it is not within the competence of the created will to be moved, or not moved, by the absolute decree; and the created will, upon the hypothesis of the divine determination, remains fixed to one side of the contradiction; therefore it suffers an antecedent and a simply [absolute] necessity.

Other objections against the decree not involving the hypothesis of a condition to be purified by free choice.

7 Moreover; that the composition, or non-composition, of that [decree] cannot in any way be subject to the nod of the created appetite, is evident from the following.

Because were such a supposition able by any reason to be submitted to the created will; it would be chiefly by reason of some act of our will meriting to be thus premoved by God; but concerning any act of positive disposition, in view of which God approaches this absolute decree, the same disquisition presses: by what reason is it in the power of the created will?

Since, because of the essential subordination of the created will to God, the absolute decree of God is also necessarily pre-required, unimpedibly decreeing the futurition of an act which behaves like a positive disposition, in view of which God efficaciously destines the created will to assent; we must therefore halt at that absolute statute of God, which falls not at all under the power of the created will, and with which premised, it is not within the competence of the created will to dissent from such a motion; and hence the antecedent and absolute necessity can by no escape be eluded.

If you object out of the doctrine of Cabrera of the Hieronymian order among the Spaniards, 3rd part, quaestion. 18, art. 4, disputat. 2, §. 11, numer. 137, who asserts that the efficacy of prevenient grace hangs upon the negative disposition of liberty of our will, namely upon the negation of resistance. For in that author the will of itself confers that it not resist the efficacious help of God; on account of which quasi-negative preparation foreseen by God, the will is granted the efficacious help with Cabrera, which the refusing will is deprived of; which is foreknown by God as restored to efficacious motion.

So in the matter at hand: the supposition of the decree which God makes concerning the consent of the will could be asserted to be free to the created will because of the negation of resistance; on account of which God made, or constituted, such a supposition of the decree, which decree He would not have made had He not foreseen such a negation of resistance.

That manner of speaking is widely refuted by Alvarez in opusc. de concordia liberi arbitrij, lib. 3, cap. 6; but we forestall the frivolous evasion thus, with no difficulty.

Because every disposition, whether positive or negative, under that respect under which it appears to be the substrate of a form, of which it is the disposition, ought to precede that form; as is evident. But that negation of resistance in no way antecedes the decree, which is assigned to be the sufficient medium of the foreknowledge of future things; since it does not involve the condition of the cooperation of the created cause, and hence does not await the will as about to consent or not; but by the energy of an inimpedible [power] infuses the consent.

For were it to involve the condition of a second cause cooperating to be purified by free choice, it could by no reason be the sufficient medium for the infallible apprehension of the future consent, as we plainly uncovered in what precedes; therefore the composition of the created will with the decree of God is not in the power of our will by reason of that negative disposition of non-resistance which Cabrera invented.

Next; since the negation of resistance, or the will not going to dissent from the decree, is a future contingent, the difficulty is not put to sleep; nay the same presses concerning such a future: how is it foreknown by God? Whether in the determinate truth of such a future? which we denied in the preceding article with the decree set aside. Or in a decree antecedent to such a truth, inasmuch as it is the principle of its scibility? And hence the composition of the absolute decree, which is altogether outside the power of free choice, could by no reason be avoided.

If, therefore, the future negation of resistance does not import an objective determination, which could be the reason on the side of the object for the infallible foreknowledge before the decree; therefore it cannot be apprehended by God before the decree, and hence neither can that negation of resistance, known by God, avail to be the reason why God thus freely premoves our choice.

8 Thirdly it is argued from the doctrine of Scotus in 1. dist. 39, q. unica, §. Tertia positio dicit, num. margin. 12, whose text we proposed supra art. 2, sub num. marg. 8, where he establishes that the created will does not influence except as moved by God; so that were God a necessary, and not a free, agent, the created will by that force of its quidditative subjection, by which it relates to the first cause, would act not freely but of necessity: from which such an objection is drawn forth.

Were God a necessary agent, and not a free one, and hence one also necessarily compelling the created will to one side of the contradiction; He would behave with respect to the will in no other way than He in fact does, upon the supposition of Scotus's principles, when He decrees the future consent of the created will, with the science of its cooperation not awaited.

For this seems indubitable: that on the side of the consent of the created will no intrinsic mutation responding to a necessarily operating will is assignable in that hypothesis; since the consent is compared to the will de facto upon the same account (when Scotus pronounces the created will to be a free principle) as also in that supposition which premits God to be a certain agent necessarily drawing, by the force of an unimpedible decree, our will to one side of the contradiction.

If you respond out of what was prescribed in the aforesaid art. 2, under marginal number 41, that in the impulse of the will an intrinsic physical mutation is not exhibited in that hypothesis that it would of necessity flow forth from God and the created will; but that the act has the same intrinsic character on its own part, whether it be elicited necessarily or freely; and that only a difference should be assigned in the will itself, or the impelling faculty, considered in act first.

Which disparity is placed in this: that were God to concur with the created will as a necessary agent, He would not apply His power to the created will with indifference in act first to contraries and contradictories, but would fasten it in act first to one side only. Which is otherwise upon the supposition of the Catholic truth, which professes God to be a free principle ad extra; for He adapts His power to the will with an indifference ad utrumlibet, which contributes to this: that the will, in the account of the first act, would behave otherwise when necessitated by God than it does de facto, when it is freely premoved by the first cause to influx.

But contrarily; because, given that God decrees beforehand absolutely, or institute, the consent of the created will without the foreknowledge of the cooperation of that same will, the like preparation of the divine concourse toward either side of the contradiction seems vain and fictitious.

For then such an application of the divine power ad utrumlibet, whether to contraries and contradictories, would be usefully and wisely brought forward when God does not premove the created will by an antecedent decree, but leaves it in the hand of His own counsel, that it may contract itself at its own discretion to either side of the contradiction, and for each nod avail itself of the aid provided for it; for were God about to predefine unimpedibly either side of the contradiction, with the cooperation of the second cause not awaited, to what purpose was the concourse ad utrumlibet provided for the created will?

9 Fourthly it is argued, from the aforesaid doctrine of Scotus, that sufficient grace is destroyed. Because that virtue, or power, of acting is asserted to be insufficient for the act, which in the whole collection of the supposita, none excepted, does not break forth into act; as is certain, and constituted in every philosophy. But that absolute decree destroyed, which Scotus asserts; no sufficient grace is assignable, by the force of which a sinner is in fact converted; therefore that whole collection of men whose conversion God does not intend by the absolute and premoving design of His own will does not receive sufficient grace unto salvation.

That Henrice(s) labors to establish, 1st part, tract. 2, disp. 19, cap. 2, n. 8, out of that passage of Isaiah cap. 5, where God is introduced expostulating with the people about the transgression of the law in these words: Nunc ergo habitatores Hierusalem, et viri Iuda iudicate inter me, et vineam meam; quid est, quod debui vltra facere vineae meae, et non feci ei? An quòd expectaui vt faceret vvas, et fecit labruscas.

Wherein, given that by the vineyard, with which the Lord expostulates, is understood the house of Judah, and Benjamin, and, under these two tribes, the whole collection of the faithful of Synagogue and Church, the following argumentation is produced:

Either God, making that decree as a pre-definition, proceeded concerning the salvation and honorable operation of all the faithful; and hence no one has committed a deadly sin, nor has any vine of this vineyard brought forth wild grapes; since the right and pious operation is asserted to be unimpedibly connected with the decree of God instituting such a pious operation.

Or God has not decreed by the absolute and unimpedible design of His will the pious and right operation in all the vines of this vineyard; and thus it would not be true what the Lord so seriously insinuates: that He ought to have done nothing further for His vineyard, and did not do it. For one could complain of that; that God could have so premoved all the powers of His vineyard to good by an absolute decree, that they should bring forth the sweet grapes of good works, and not the wild grapes of impieties.

Lastly, that decree which antecedes the consent of the created will is assailed out of Chrysostom, Hom. 12. ad Hebraeos, where he says: Quòd non antecedit Deus sua voluntate nostras, ne nostrum laedatur arbitrium.

And out of Damascene lib. 2 de fide, c. 30, where he teaches. Deum praescire omnia, non praedefinire; ea enim, quae in nostra potestate et arbitrio sita sunt, praescit, non praefinit; quia virtuti vim non affert. The opinion of Suárez, maintaining that the predefinition is the medium on the side of the object of the foreknowledge of supernatural acts; yet not the first, but presupposing another.

But the predefinition is not the first medium of knowing in Suárez, but a right, conditional science is premised. For before God infallibly institutes the conversion of Peter, He apprehends by conditional science; that if He be excited by such a congruous vocation, he will infallibly be converted. So Francis Suárez opusc. 2. de praescientia futurorum contingentium, lib. 1, cap. 6, num. marg. 4, to whom many of the more recent Jesuits adhere, who all constantly teach that, with such foreknowledge of conditionals set aside, the predefinition of supernatural acts would injure liberty.

Which difference interposes between the opinion of Suárez, and the sentiment of Scotus That opinion is commended by the difference which interposes between it and the sentiment of Scotus, who asserts that God premove the created will to act by the efficacious decree of His will.

Premotion in Scotus is the causality of God ad extra, altering the object. For such a premotion, which is furnished through the medium of the uncreated volition of God, as a causality, and by the use of the executing divine faculty, compels the will physically to one side of the contradiction; so that it is not within its competence to strive toward the opposite side, because of the lack of that physical premotion which is required for the influx of the second cause, because of its essential subordination, and dependence upon the first moving cause.

In Suárez only an internal predefinition is admitted But in Suárez, and his adherents, the predefinition of supernatural acts does not behave like the use or the causality of the divine power, or of the executing faculty, which would fasten immediately ad extra, or would physically, or by a physical influx, compel the created will to one side of the contradiction; since it only decrees the supernatural act, by the mode of an internal and immanent design, or of a mere intention, not passing, by the force of its causality, to the external execution that would alter the condition of the acting of the created appetite; therefore the aforesaid manner of speaking of Suárez is not intercepted by those knavish tricks, from which Scotus and his men scarcely extricate themselves.

Ground of Suárez: that the predefinition is not the first medium of foreknowledge. 11 But that such a predefinition cannot be the first medium on the side of the object of the foreknowledge of future things, but that it necessarily premits the truth of those things, as it is attained by conditional science, is thus shown.

A conditional science of the object is premised in Suárez. Because one who acts through intellect and will, unless he conduct himself imprudently, cannot efficaciously institute some end without foreknowing the means by which the end ought infallibly to be committed to execution; therefore, if that statute of God, by which He predefines the supernatural motion of the created will, is credited with such an energy as that it be implicatory, upon the hypothesis, that such an act of the created will be not put into being; an infallible science is necessarily pre-required in God, through which He should know that congruity of vocations which the created will will not at all reject; otherwise God, imprudent, would make a rash statute about the conversion of Peter, were He not to foreknow: if I shall excite Peter thus, or thus, he will infallibly be converted.

The predefinition is asserted. Suarez. 12 Moreover, the predefinition of supernatural acts Suarez eruditely defends, Opuscul. 1, On the aids of divine grace, book 1, chapter 16, number 5, where he shows that it pertains to the efficacy of the power and preordination of God that He can pre-establish absolutely the act of the created will; so that the opposite would be to enervate, or to elevate, the most powerful and hidden powers of the wisdom and providence of God; and so to subject the power of God to the created appetite, that, the condition of created liberty being preserved, it be not in God's power to decree its act absolutely.

Against the mind of Augustine, so often inculcating that it belongs to the omnipotence of God, that He be able to soften the rebellious strivings of man unto repentance by an unimpedible force; especially lib. 1. ad Simplicianum, quaest. 2, where he teaches; that God was able to bend the soul of Pharaoh to a good issue, had He willed. Which he follows out luminously in the books, de gratia et libero arbitrio; de praedestinatione sanctorum; et de bono perseuerantiae; so that nothing is more familiar to Augustine.

There is added an elegant and pressing testimony of Augustine, ex tomo 7. libr. de Corrept. et gratia, c. 14, where, speaking of the election of Saul as King, he subjoins. Quando Deus voluit Sauli regnum dare, sic erat in potestate Israëlitarũ subdere se memorato viro, siue non subdere, Quòd vtique in eorum erat positum voluntate, vt etiam Deo valerent resistere; qui tamen hoc non facit nisi per ipsorum hominum voluntates, sine dubio habens humanorum cordium, quò placeret inclinandorum, omnipotentissimam voluntatem. Thus Augustine.

But toward what would that most omnipotent energy of the divine will, concerning the created free choice, tend, were it able to decree beforehand or institute the designs of free choice, or of the human heart, only by a conditional velleity, and not by an absolute decree?

And the following words of Augustine press this the more. Si ergo, cùm voluerit Reges in terris Deus constituere, magis habet in potestate voluntates hominum, quã ipsi suas. What could pressing more?

And a little before, in the same cap. 14, the Holy Doctor speaking of the assumption of David as King of the Israelites, and weighing those words of Abisai to David ex 1. Paralipom. 12. Tui sumus Dauid, et tecum futuri fili Iesse. Augustine subjoins. Nunquid ille posset aduersari voluntati Dei, et non potiùs eius facere voluntatem, qui in eius corde operatus est per spiritum suum, quo indutus est, vt hoc vellet, diceret et faceret. Et subdit. Ac per hoc Dominus omnipotens, qui erat cum illo adduxit istos vt eum Regem constituerent. Et quomodo adduxit, nunquid corporalibus vllis vinculis alligauit? Intus egit, corda tenuit, corda mouit, eosque voluntatibus eorũ, quas ipse in illis operatus est, traxit.

Hence also tend the words of Augustine at the beginning of the same cap. 14. Deus, cui volenti saluũ facere nullum hominum resistit arbitrium. Et in cap. 12. in fine. Fortissimo quippe dimisit, ac permisit facere, quod vellet; infirmis seruauit ipso donante, inuictissimè quod bonum est vellent, nec hoc deserere inuictissimè nollent. Let every prudent man weigh: whether these voices of Augustine, concerning the designs of God for the salvation of men, imbibe a conditional volition, to be purified at the nod of the created choice, with respect to the future being or not being?

That assertion countless testimonies of Sacred Writ confirm; for in Job 12 it is said: Qui immutat cor principum. And in Prov. 21. Cor Regis in manu Dei est, et quaecunque voluerit inclinabit illud.

There is added also that celebrated prayer of the Church ex Dominica, 4. post Pentecoste. Ad te nostras, etiam rebelles, compelle propitius voluntates.

Let Suárez be consulted eodem opusc. 1. lib. 3. à n. marg. 8, where he shows that it seems incredible that the consent of the immaculate Virgin to the conception of the Redeemer was not absolutely praedefinitum by God; but that the decree awaited the consent of the Virgin by a conditional velleity. For with that word, and with such emphasis, Paul thundered ad Galat. 4, that God awaited that point of the fullness of the destined time, that He might destine His Son for the redemption of the world; in those words. Postquam venit plenitudo temporis misit Deus Filium suum.

Add; that those arguments by which he disproves the predefinition of supernatural acts also censure the absolute volition of giving glory before the foreknowledge of merits; for they intend that that absolute decree infringes the rights of liberty. Which being premised, it would also consequently have to be asserted that that almost immense heap of graces and merits which the divine preordination destined for the Blessed Virgin flowed forth from an inefficacious volition of the divine maternity, and not from the absolute purpose of her election to an inaccessible degree of glory, on account of the dignity of the Mother of the Word. Whatever Vazquez may snarl, 3rd part, tome 1, disp. 74, chapter 6, num. 39; for one may not tarry on these things.

The text of Scotus, and the foundations for the true opinion, wherein it is shown that the subordination of the second cause to the first is overthrown, if the decree of God concerning the actual concourse involve the condition of the cooperation of the second cause to be purified by free choice.

IN the preceding article we proposed what Scotus in the Oxford writing on the Books of the Sentences had asserted concerning the medium on the side of the object of the foreknowledge of future things; now that text is to be transcribed which he furnishes us in the books of the Reportationes Parisienses, which he afterwards published; so that it may become clear even openly how consonant the mind of Scotus was concerning the absolute decree not involving the condition of the cooperation of the created cause, which he assigns as the medium of the foreknowledge of future things. Thus, therefore, it stands in the said work of the Reportationes, or Repetitiones, of the questions on the four Books of Sentences, lib. 1. dist. 38, q. 2, §. Dico igitur ad quaestionem, n. mar. 7, of the edition of Hugh Cavellus.

13 I say; that whatever precedes the act of the will in God is merely natural; since therefore the essence of God offers all quiddities: therefore God knows all by a natural necessity in simple intelligence.

That simple intelligence does not determine the intellect to the cognition of a complex truth, unless it itself is included in the account of the terms, or follows necessarily from the truth included in the account of the terms; but contingent truths have neither relation to simple cognition, because nothing is known from the account of the terms, nor does it follow necessarily from the virtue included in the account of the terms, unless it be necessary: therefore before the act of the will God is indifferent with respect to future contingents, just as I am with respect to this, that the stars be equal.

14 Therefore the natural apprehension of simples is followed by either willing, or nilling; and thus He can choose the union of the extremes, or the division; and thus He wills Socrates to be blessed, uniting Socrates and blessedness; and He divides blessedness from Judas; and then He knows the complex truth.

But this can be understood in two ways: either that the intellect of God sees which part His will will choose, and thus it sees the determination of the will, and its omnipotence; just as if I knew that tomorrow you will wish to run, and your will is immutable, and that it can be impeded by none; then I would know that you are going to run tomorrow.

15 But because this seems to posit a discourse, it can be said secondly: that this proposition (Sortes is blessed) offered to the divine will is neutral before the acceptance of the will; when it accepts, then it is a certain made truth; and in whatever way this is true, the essence of God is the ratio of knowing that truth.

And thus God knows that truth, either in the first mode; because this is a truth made by the will conjoining blessedness with Sortes: or in the second mode, that by the act of the intellect the extremes are conjoined, and the proposition still remains neutral, and by the acceptance of the will it has been made true, and then the essence is the ratio of knowing that made truth.

But, you ask, does God know infallibly? I say: that because His will is immutable and omnipotent, therefore whatever He knows is infallible. Or if it is posited that the essence is the ratio of knowing this contingent necessarily, the same is the ratio of determining the will.

16 To this text from the Reportata, or the Parisian Repristinations, besides those things which we noted in the preceding article, transcribing the letter from the first book of the Sentences of the Oxoniense, which coheres with and corresponds to the whole present text; the following things are to be observed.

First; upon those words, from num. 14. But this can be understood in two ways; either that the intellect of God sees which part "His will will choose, and thus He sees the determination of the will, and its omnipotence. Where Scotus seems to concede that the divine intellect sees the determination of His will for some moment of reason before such a volition is exercised; for those words seem to signify this. The intellect of God sees which part His will will choose. Because the verb (eliget), since it is in the future, appears to insinuate that Scotus holds that the divine decree is known as it were in the state of futurition before it exists in the thing.

But it must be said that that futurition does not fall upon the act, but upon the object; so that it is an actual, and exercised termination to a future object for some difference of time. For the decree of God is not knowable according to its determinate contraction to one side of the contradiction, before its exercised existence and actual termination to such an object; because the free propositions of the divine will, before the actual as-it-were budding forth of reason, or of the logic, from the faculty of impulsion, or of appetite, do not have a determinate truth which could be the infallible medium of foreknowledge; as we showed more fully below in the following distinction, on the foreknowledge of future conditionals, article 5, especially from marginal number 17 up to 20.

That, however, this is the genuine interpretation of the aforesaid letter, is clear from the context itself under the same number 14. Just as if I knew that tomorrow you will wish to run; and your will is immutable, and that it could be impeded by none: then I would know that you are going to run tomorrow. Here it is evidently apparent that Scotus speaks of an actual and exercised volition, and of an absolute resolve of running tomorrow; for if not only the running, but also the resolve of running were future in Peter, an infallible science of the future running could not be had, even if it were foreknown that the will would be immutable and unimpedible regarding the execution of those things which Peter had decreed absolutely: since for the present he had constituted nothing about having a future running, but was potential to either.

The apt interpretation of the aforesaid text is also confirmed from the preceding article, under marginal number 11, where we transcribed the letter from the Oxoniense expressly proceeding about the science of the decree as present, and not future; for thus it has it. The divine intellect sees the determination of the divine will; namely that it will be so for (A.), because that will determines it to be so for it; for it knows that will to be immutable and unimpedible. Where clearly that word (determines) is of the present; for he does not say, it will determine, of the future.

Secondly to be observed, in those words of the letter of the present article transcribed under num. 15. But because this seems to posit a discourse, it can be said secondly. That this text, which is somewhat obscure, receives its elucidation from the text of the preceding article transcribed under marginal number 12, where Scotus has it thus. Or otherwise, because this way seems to posit a certain discourse in the divine intellect, which having sought from the intuition of the determination of the will, and of its immutability, concludes this to be.

Where Scotus rejects that foreknowledge of futures which savors somewhat of discourse; insofar as from two acts distinguished by reason, of which one comprehends the decree of the divine will, and the other inspects the attribute of immutability, by reason of which any shadow of vicissitude stands in God's way, so that it fall short of the absolute resolve: from these two acts of science, as it were from premises, it would infer the infallibility of the future object.

Therefore Scotus drives away this way of upholding the foreknowledge of futures, and receives two others: either that the divine intellect proposes to its will contingent complexes, as neutral with respect to truth or falsity, and that the divine will, immutably the complex proposed by the intellect objectively toward being or not being, renders it determinately true and intelligible. Or that the divine intellect offers to its will terms contingently, and composable toward either, without an actual nexus and composition of terms; and that the will of God makes this complex, because the will is a collative, or comparative potency, which by the union of terms can produce in objective and volited being.

For to this refer those words of Scotus, transcribed in this text, under n. 14.

Therefore to the natural apprehension of simples there follows either to will or not to will; and thus it can choose the union or the division of the extremes, and it divides blessedness from Iuda, and then it knows the complex truth. And those words also from number 15. And thus God knows that truth; because this is a truth made by the will conjoining blessedness with Sortes. Where Scotus calls the act of prosecution a conjunction, because it makes the conjunction of Sortes and blessedness; and the act of flight he names division, because it divides blessedness from Iuda the damned.

17 Thirdly to be observed; in those words from num. 15. And then the essence is the ratio of knowing that made truth. This letter is also explained from the pronouncements of Scotus transcribed by us in the preceding article under marginal number 12, where Scotus has it thus.

Not that those truths move the divine intellect, nor even their terms, to apprehending such a truth; because then the divine intellect would be cheapened, because it would suffer from another apart from its essence: but as the divine essence is the ratio of knowing simples, so also such complexes. Where the Doctor intends that God does not apprehend any created thing in itself, or by the intentional motive force of it, but by the motion of the Deity; with a similar reason to that by which, in the ninth controversy on the Vision of God, distinct. 3, on the Act of vision, subdistinct. 2, ar. 4 and 5, we showed that possible and future creatures are inspected by the blessed through the beatific act not in themselves, but in God; because creatures do not terminate the beatific gaze by the motive force of their intelligibility (which is to be seen in themselves), but by the motion of the Deity as clearly and quiddatively visible.

This being supposed, we say: that future contingents (even before the decree contracting the contingent complex, and determining it to one side of the contradiction) are not foreknown in themselves, or by their own motive force, in such a way that the truth of such futures would move the divine intellect, so that it be terminated to such an object: but they are foreknown by the motion of the Deity, which, as conjoined with the absolute decree establishing the futurition of the thing, performs the function, as it were, of an impressed species for science, and the expression of future creatures in God.

Wherefore that text of Scotus about the cheapness of the divine intellect, if it were to regard some created being in itself, or by its intentional motion, and not by the motion of the Deity performing the duties of a species; is to be understood according to those things elucidated by us in this controversy on the Science of God, distinct. 1, ar. 2, on the science of possible creatures in God, especially under marginal number 12, where from the mind of Scotus it has been shown that it implies in God some science which is not Theological, or which does not inspect creatures in God and by the intentional motion of the Deity, but by the motion of the truth participated from creatures, which is to see creatures in themselves. For otherwise the science of God would hang from creatures as from a specifying motive object; on which see the citation, the article on the science of possibles in God, under num. 13 and 14. Which dependence of the science of God upon a created object as upon a motive and specifying object, so that with the object removed some intrinsic predicate of God could be taken away; Scotus rightly called the cheapness of the intellect of God, and that it would suffer from a created object; for Scotus judged such a dependence to be a thing unworthy, that the divine intellect should suffer from a moving and specifying object.

From what has been said about the science of futures in God, and not in themselves; it follows that it does not stand in the consequence of the doctrine of those who, while admitting the beatific vision of future contingents in the Word, deny in God the science of futures in the Word essentially taken, or in the essence of God, as conjoined with the free resolve immuting creatures to futurition. Since that determination on the side of the object, or the objective infallibility, which suffices for the termination of the beatific act, which imbibes an infallible judgment; would also suffice to terminate the divine science regarding future creatures in the Word, or in the essence of God. On which see those things we treat below in this article, under n. 26, assailing Molina and Suárez falling short of the consequence of doctrine. 18 Fourthly to be observed, in those words from n. 15.

By the act of the intellect the extremes are conjoined, and the proposition still remains neutral; by the acceptance of the will it has been made true, and then the essence is the ratio of knowing that made truth. But why did God will infallibly? I say, that because His will is immutable and omnipotent.

Where Scotus plainly establishes that every ratio of the knowable and of the true in a future contingent is produced from the good pleasure of the divine will; but the infallibility of the divine judgment regarding such objects is sought from an immutable or unimpedible will, which it would not be if it involved the condition of the cooperation of a created cause.

But because Scotus asserts that from the predefinition of God, as from an unimpedible principle, is drawn the determinate scibility of the future contingent; and that the absolute will of God can be brought down into an efficacious resolve by the mode of intention and by the mode of execution; it remains to inquire, from which decree does the pronouncement of Scotus proceed?

Wherefore I premise: that every decree of the divine will, from which as from a principle the truth of the future flows forth, must be asserted to be prevenient and antecedent to that truth or scibility of the object which it produces; since every principle under that habit of causality under which it inflows into its principiates, whether according to the real mutation and existence, or according to the objective existence and mutation, must go before its effect; as is more evident than to need proof.

Therefore, if with Scotus the absolute will of God pertaining to the order of intention produces the future in objective being; or accepts it as determinately about to be, for some difference of time; (in which sole ratio of futurition, sought from the decree unimpedibly, is posited with Scotus the whole truth of such an object,) although that will pertained to the order of intention alone, and meanwhile of resolve, nor would the thing be drawn immediately by the force of causality from the eminence of the cause to the state of real and positive actuality; still such a will must go before, according to the order of intention, that object which it constitutes in the being of determinately true and intelligible.

Therefore what we assert of the will of God according to the order of intention, we consequently pronounce also of the same will according to the order of execution. Namely, that the decree of God, insofar as it performs the function of the causality of the divine faculty executing ad extra, must go before, by a priority of nature, the influx of the second cause, which is produced from the decree of God as from the action of the same first cause. For the school of Scotus constitutes the action of God ad extra, not in the influx of the second cause as hanging from God, but in the very uncreated volition of God; consequently it constantly defends, in accordance with what it had asserted of action as such in all its community and abstraction, that it does not suffer inexistence in the thing acted upon, but inheres in the agent.

Wherefore just as, with Scotus, the executing faculty of God, or its operative potency, in no way dissents from the attribute of will, as we shall unfold more diffusely in the controversy on the Omnipotence of God; so also the use, action, or causality of such a faculty can be nothing else (if it intrinsically coheres with God) than that very uncreated and inelicited volition, inexisting in God from eternity by identity, and drawing the object from nothing in the course of time.

19 Moreover; just as that volition which is asserted, by the mode of intention, to be the principle of the determinate truth of futures, must be absolute, and not involving the condition of the cooperation of a created cause; otherwise it could not be the principle of infallible futurition, as we have often shown; so by a like reason, that volition which, by the mode of the use, or of the causality of the executing potency of God, attains the object, must also elicit it so as to be in it unimpedibly, and in the sense of composition, nor involving the condition of the cooperation of a created cause; unless we should wish to invert the essential subordination of the second cause to the first, so that we assert the second cause determining itself first in the order of nature, the first indeed as a follower, and first in name only, but second in reality.

But that the opinion of Scotus may be established more firmly; there must be premised from Suárez the exposition of the opposed opinion, which he delivers in Opusc. 1, on the Auxiliaries, lib. 1. cap. 15, marginal number 3, asserting: that God offers the concourse to the created will for acting in a confused and potential reason for this reason: that although the decree of God does not predetermine the created will to such a species of act, nor does it absolutely decree that species of impulse, for example, assent; but involving the condition, if the created will should wish to cooperate. Nevertheless, because God most clearly foresees all the individual acts which the created will is able to elicit here and now, and under that confluence of circumstances, or composition; He applies His potency to concurring with the created will toward this action in number, and not another of the same species; therefore such an application of the divine potency to the concourse is not to be judged potential and confused, but contracted and most special, since it regards and intends such an individual of action, and not another within the same species.

20 But the aforesaid mode of holding, insofar as it constitutes that concerning contracting the created will to this action in the individual, and not to another within the same species of impulse, is to be discussed below in the present article; and it must be treated by us that it does not cohere with the doctrine of the same Suárez about the volition of God involving the condition of the cooperation of a created cause.

But as to that which he asserts of the decree offering the concourse under that condition, if the created will consent; now it must be shown that, together with the aforesaid pronouncement, the subordination of the second cause to the first cannot stand; but that the action of the creature necessarily antecedes, by a priority of what and of nature, the concourse of God.

Because when two concauses are composed toward a concourse under condition; that one acts by a priority of nature which applies the condition required by the confluence. For example; the resolve of Peter to walk with Paul, if Paul should consent, just as he applies the locomotive potency of Peter, not absolutely, but from the hypothesis that Paul wills, so the absolute will of Paul, by an order and anteriority of nature, antecedes the absolute decree of Peter, so that he attain local motion. Which is done for this reason: that Peter so adapts himself to the nod of Paul, that he does not decree the walk, except from the hypothesis of the will of Paul establishing such a concourse of walking: wherefore just as Paul purifies that confluence about walking, and renders it absolute, while Peter contracts himself efficaciously toward walking; so the walking of Paul antecedes, by a priority of nature, the walking of Peter.

But the will of God applies the concourse to the created will with an explicit, or implicit hypothesis, of the cooperation of the creature; therefore while the created will purifies that as-it-were confluential application of the divine potency, and contracts it to assent, which of itself was indifferently pre-stood toward dissent, it antecedes, by a priority of nature, the absolute and efficacious volition of God; and consequently also the influx which proceeds from God by the mode of the use of the divine executing faculty.

And thus some assignable instant of nature could be posited, in which the assent of the created will could be conceived as hanging from a created cause, and not from God; which although in every participated being it bears an absurdity, yet in supernatural motions it sounds more dissonantly; as is perspicuous.

The opinions of Herice, Lessius, and Alarcón are shaken out, denying a priority of nature in the concourse of the first cause.

21 Wherefore Valentin de Herice, 1. part. tract. 1. on the Science of God, disput. 6. cap. 3. num. 47, does not approve the doctrine of Suárez, which he even judges insufficient for untying the knot; indeed, that it had given an occasion of offense to adversaries.

Wherefore, exhibiting another elucidation of the aforesaid view, he adds, under num. 48, that that hypothesis concerning the cooperation of the second cause which the will of God imports does not carry the character of an antecedent or predetermining condition, but of a concomitant one. Which he illustrates by the example of supernatural habits, in that hypothesis that they were endowed with reason and will; for then such habits would so adapt their operative force to the will for concourse, that they would predetermine our will, nor would they will, nor could they, since such a force of predetermining is not available to them; and consequently they would exhibit a simultaneous concourse with the will.

But Herice ministers slight succors to Suárez; for the example does not elide the force of the opposition. For if, with reason and liberty, a supernatural habit flourished, and offered to the will as it were as a concause the concourse to contraries and contradictories indeterminate, importing the condition of the cooperation of the will; by what reason could it be done, that the impulse of the will purifying the condition would not contract, by a priority of nature, the habit to such a species of influx, which habit, before the foreknowledge of the cooperation of the will, had intended, not absolutely, but conditionally? Wherefore Herice vainly labors to open the unknown by the more unknown.

But if you respond on behalf of Suárez: that the contraction of the concause of an efficient cause can be understood without a priority of nature in the concourse of the other comprinciple determining to such a species of causality.

Just as the intellect, which is pure potency in the genus of intelligibles, and altogether indeterminate toward the birth of such a notion, is contracted by the other concause, namely by the intelligible species, without a predetermination, or a presupposition of the influx of such a species: otherwise the vital act, namely intellection, would be pre-conceived as hanging from the species, before it was from the intellect, which is the vital faculty.

Next; the agent intellect is a potential principle toward the effecting of this rather than another impressed species; but it is determined by the material phantasm, which is illuminated by the agent intellect, and elevated as the instrumental comprinciple of the impressed species; yet such a contraction of the agent intellect subsists without a priority of the causality of the phantasm itself contracting the universality, or potentiality, of the agent intellect; for otherwise the causality of the instrumental principle would go before, by a priority of nature, the influx of the principal cause.

But the aforesaid instances do not aid Suárez; for the causality of the phantasm contracting the agent intellect to such a species of intentional influx is not posterior by nature to the causality of the agent intellect; because the phantasm does not apply to the agent intellect, nor offer to it a concourse indeterminate toward contraries and contradictories, but altogether contracted to such a species of intentional causality; which we likewise asserted of the possible intellect compared to the intelligible species with respect to the generation of the mental word.

For if those concauses, which hold themselves on the side of the object, and contract the indifference of the intellect toward the production of the image of this rather than another object, composed the agent and possible intellect toward operating only conditionally, and from the hypothesis of the cooperation of the potency; with the aforesaid application of such comprinciples holding themselves on the side of the object with an indifference toward contraries and contradictories premised, a priority of nature in the influx of the intellect could not be avoided: if the intellective faculty should purify the conditional application of the concause holding itself on the side of the object, and contract it to such a species of influx and not another.

By a similar reason, as the created will purifies the condition which the decree of God involves, defining the assent of Peter, if Peter wills; endowed with that application of the divine concourse toward dissent, so that, the substance of the same divine decree surviving, Peter can in fact dissent, and in the sense of composition with the decree.

22 That, however, neither is the assertion of a decree involving a condition to be purified by free choice avoided, it being granted that God and the creature come together equally and simultaneously to operate, so that neither is God moved by the creature to such a species of influx, nor conversely the creature by God; is clear from those things which we treated above in art. 2, of this distin., under marginal number 63.

Where, against the pronouncements of Lessius and Alarcón, we showed that the aforesaid authors either precisely defend: that the eternal decree immuting objectively the assent of free choice imports a hypothesis to be purified by the created will; or that such a decree is made free, predefinitive, and predeterminative.

Whence that assertion about the simultaneous cooperation of the first and second cause toward acting is pulled up by the roots, if the disputation is recalled or drawn back to the resolve from eternity immuting objectively the act of our will toward being or not being; insofar as if such a decree involves in that moment of eternity the hypothesis to be purified by free choice, it must be that also in time the executing action of God is contracted by the action of free choice. Or if the divine decree immutes our acts objectively toward absolute futurition, not involving the condition of the cooperation of free choice; that would be absolutely to pre-establish and predetermine the acts of free choice.

Wherefore that paint of the solution, or the painted evasion, which the adversaries have devised, about the simultaneous, and as it were blind, composition of the first and second cause toward acting, without any determination on the side of some comprinciple; utterly vanishes, if the disputation is recalled to the eternal decree of God immuting objectively the acts of free choice toward a determinate being or not being, involving, or not involving, the condition to be purified by free choice.

But if it be objected: that that decree immuting objectively the operation of free choice toward futurition is not executing; but pertaining to the order of mere internal intention, from which the physical predetermination of free choice cannot be sought.

That would be to fall back into the position of Suárez about the predefinition of acts without immediate execution; which opinion we refuted at length from n. 23, as being of that kind which, on account of the inconsequence of the doctrine, is driven away by the majority of Jesuit authors.

The first argument for our opinion, pressing Suárez ad hominem, and others who reject predetermination by the extrinsic decree of the divine will; and who receive the predefinition of supernatural acts.

23 Premising the foundations laid down, we judge the more probable the opinion of Scotus holding that, in the absolute and antecedent decree of the divine will, future contingents are foreknown by God without prejudice to freedom. So all those authors whom we shall cite in the following article, asserting that future contingents of depraved acts are known by God in the absolute decree of futurition, the moral malice being the substrate; excepting those who subscribe to Scotus, Durandus, in 1. distin. 38. qu. 3, and from the more recent theologians Villegas, Primarius Complutensis, lib. on God as one, controversy 3. cap. 2 and 3, where he treats at length that future contingents do not have truth in themselves, but in the decree.

Therefore it must be strenuously maintained by us that future contingents are foreknown by God, not only in that predefinition by the mode of mere intention, and of the internal absolute resolve of the divine will, which Suárez asserts; but as it performs the function of use ad extra, or of causality, of the divine executing faculty.

Because if the internal predefinition of supernatural acts, which is affirmed to be the absolute resolve decreeing the futurition of such acts, nor involving a condition on the side of the object, does not conflict with freedom, indeed and even it must be conceded from the sense of the holy Fathers; the consequence of doctrine urges, that neither should the absolute will of God, by the mode of execution or concourse ad extra of the executing potency, diminish the rights of freedom; since all those instances which militate against that will by the mode of execution also assault the predefinition by the mode of intention. Which I thus lay open against Suárez and his followers.

Because therefore the will of God, by the mode of influx ad extra prefining the assent of the created will, not involving the condition of the cooperation of a created cause, conflicts for this reason: that such a decree would import an antecedent supposition, which would not be subject to the command and nod of the created cause, and which would necessarily infer a created assent. But the absolute will, by the mode of intention, although it does not immediately execute the assent of the created will toward which it efficaciously and absolutely intends; is yet such that it unimpedibly infers that will, by the mode of execution, immediately attaining by physical influx the assent of the created will absolutely predefined, and not expecting a condition; so that it implies that God thus predefines the assent of Peter, and that Peter dissent, or that God does not apply His executing faculty, so that it unimpedibly obtains the assent.

Therefore, if the decree, by the mode of concourse ad extra, injures freedom; because it is not in the power of the will to be composed, or not composed, with this absolute volition of God premoving toward assent; so also the internal predefinition, which is also not subject to free choice (for it is not in the hand of man to be predefined, or not predefined, toward assent,) and which infallibly applies the executing potency toward the assent, so that the created will cannot struggle against it, breaks the rights of freedom.

For little it avails that free choice be injured, that the absolute volition of God forces our will mediately or immediately to one side of the contradiction; if it be not integral to our will to strive toward the opposite side.

24 If you object: that on that account the predefinition does not take away freedom; because with Suárez it premits the free assent of the created will, as apprehended through conditional foreknowledge. Wherefore the predefinition ought not to be estimated an antecedent supposition, since it supposes the free impulse of our will, as the object of conditional foreknowledge; because God absolutely pre-established such an assent, because He foreknew that the will, excited by such a congruent vocation, would infallibly consent.

On the contrary; if on account of the conditional foreknowledge of a future assent the use of freedom is not precluded from the divine will absolutely predefining the assent, nor involving the condition of the cooperation of the creature, although the created will be fixed unimpedibly by the force of that predefinition to one side of the contradiction; therefore whoever has admitted the conditional foreknowledge of a future assent will also be able to defend the predetermination, or extrinsic premotion, by the absolute decree of God; since the created cause is not less infallibly contracted to one side by the predefinition, which Suárez gladly receives, than by the premotion through the antecedent decree, which Scotus asserts; although that consequence is expressly against Suárez and the school of the Jesuits.

Next; that the aforesaid instance could be urged against Suárez, not only because, given the conditional foreknowledge, and the absolute predefinition of good acts admitted, he would be forced also to maintain that that premotion, which is offered by the mode of concourse from the uncreated volition, does not injure freedom; but neither that intrinsic predetermination, by the mode of principle and first act, which is attributed by some Thomists. For if the predefinition preserves freedom, not because it is drawn from the extrinsic form of the divine volition without the intrinsic immutation of the created will, but because it predecrees that which is apprehended as future, through conditional foreknowledge; that also would have to be asserted of predetermination by the intrinsic form, the same conditional foreknowledge being applied.

25 Moreover it is shown that that sufficiently inculcated opposition, by which the aforesaid authors labor to press us, is retorted with the same force against the adversaries; namely, that the application of the divine concourse toward either would be futile, if the will of God, not involving the condition of the cooperation of a created cause, did not predefine absolutely one side of the contradiction. For by the aforesaid assault (if it be efficacious) who does not see that the predefinition of Suárez is struck by the same force? For if the assent of Peter has been absolutely predefined, why is a concourse prepared for Peter toward dissenting?

Whence a good part of the authors of the Society assail the predefinition of supernatural acts, on account of the consequence of doctrine. So Vázquez, 1. part. disp. 99. cap. 3. num. 14, to whom Herice accedes, 1. part. tract. 3. on Predestination, disp. 23, especially under number 106. But as far as Vázquez is concerned, we showed him not to cohere with himself, in the preceding art. 4, under num. 17, because a decree sufficient as the medium of the foreknowledge of futures can by no reason be assigned, if it involve the condition of the cooperation of a created cause; or if it be not absolute.

Next I show: that if the predefinition injures freedom if it does not premit the conditional foreknowledge of a future assent; the predefinition with such a foreknowledge applied is also against freedom.

Because therefore the absolute predefinition of the assent of our will diminishes freedom, the conditional foreknowledge being set aside; because it would not premit the free use of the created will, as viewed conditionally by the science of God, but the whole ratio of the infallibility of such an impulse would be sought from the decree predefining and going before our assent. But the whole ratio also of the truth, or of the determinate scibility, of the object of the conditional foreknowledge is produced from the free conditional decree, without which the assent would claim to itself no objective determination; therefore the conditional decree would be an antecedent supposition, not subject to the nod of the created will; and consequently breaking the rights of freedom.

And thus the same opposition would be retorted against the object of conditional science, which the adversaries object to us against the decree predetermining futures absolutely; unless they contend that the conditional assent is determinately true of itself, and not from the decree going before; which by design we shall assail, in the following distinction on conditional foreknowledge. Where we shall show, that the foreknowledge of conditionals is useless for conciliating freedom: because the conditional truth necessarily pre-requires the free conditional decree wholly antecedent to our assent future under condition; and consequently there holds the same difficulty about this decree, that it infers necessity, since it is not subject to the nod of our will.

26 Another also and an excellent proof, holding that future contingents are foreknown by God in the determination of the divine will; is to be sought from the text transcribed under marginal number 15, and elucidated under marginal number 17. By the act of the intellect the extremes are conjoined; and the proposition still remains neutral, and by the acceptance of the will it is made true; and then the essence is the ratio of knowing that made truth. There must be added besides, from contr. 9, on the Vision of God, diss. 3. subdist. 2. art. 5, on the comparison of the vision to creatures, as they involve an actual or future existence, from number 14 up to 16, and also number 19, where from the mind of Augustine it is asserted that the vision of future contingents is in the Word; and consequently the determinate truth of future contingents must necessarily be upheld in the determination of the will; as there we make clear, striking Suárez and Molina ad hominem.

Because, if the blessed does not intuit futures in themselves, insofar as the ly [the word] "to see futures in themselves" is opposed to the vision of futures in the Word, or sounds a vision outside the Word essentially taken, or outside the essence of God; but the blessed introspects such contingent complexes in the essence of God through the beatific gaze; it is evident, that God knows future contingents in the essence of God, with which He joins the free determination in no way distinct from the substance of the Deity.

Then therefore thus against Molina and Suárez ad hominem; the blessed, inspecting the individuals of future contingents in the essence of God as conjoined with the free decree, which he intuits such futures of contingent acts (even depraved ones) in the absolute decree not involving the condition of the cooperation of free choice, to be purified by free choice; and consequently such a decree would be prefining, even of depraved acts, as regards their matter.

Or that decree, in which the blessed inspects such future creatures as free, involved the hypothesis to be purified by free choice; and consequently such a decree would not furnish the medium of infallible science (such as the beatific is), since the Deity, nor anything identified with the substance of God, can furnish the medium of infallible judgment, the cooperation of free choice not inspected in itself; by which accensing the decree of cooperating is purified, and from the conditional and inefficacious passes to the absolute and efficacious, especially regarding the matters of depraved acts.

Therefore neither the Deity, nor any predicate identified with God, can import, with Molina and Suárez, a sufficient medium on the side of the object toward a certain science of a future contingent; and consequently such futures are not seen by the blessed in God, but outside God, and in themselves. Since neither the Deity, nor anything identified with it, can be a sufficient motive on the side of the object toward the determinate vision of a future contingent, which has no objective and absolute determination in the potency of God, nor in His decree, unless the decree pass from the conditional to the absolute, on account of the foreknowledge of the cooperation of free choice known in itself, or in its determined truth, and not in the decree.

But you will say on behalf of Suárez: that the decree, as purified and absolute, on account of the foreknowledge of the future contingent in its determined truth, could be a sufficient medium for the blessed, so that in the decree he apprehends future contingents.

On the contrary; therefore the blessed does not see, by the beatific vision, creatures. I prove the consequence; because the beatific act inspects nothing except by the intentional motion of the beatific object; nor does it pre-require the motion of a non-beatific object; but the operation of free choice, as true in itself, and as purifying the condition of the decree (so that it pass from the conditional to the absolute,) is inspected in itself, and not in God; and consequently science not beatific; therefore neither is the decree, as absolute, seen by the beatific science, since, as such, it premits a non-beatific science, and the motion of a non-beatific object.

Or conversely, since the same reason holds in the comparison of the objective infallibility of futures by their relation both to the science of God and to the beatific vision; (for each assent, whether divine or beatific, demands an objective infallibility corresponding to the infallibility of the judgment) if with the aforesaid authors the Deity with the decree is a sufficient medium of beatific science with respect to futures, so also of the divine science.

Another physical argument for our opinion; which is sought from the potentiality of the created will toward such an individual of action.

27 But, because the proof premised strikes ad hominem only those authors who admit the predefinition of good acts; but not those who universally disallow every absolute resolve of God destining efficaciously the acts of our will toward futurition, without expecting the cooperation of the second cause; a universal argument must be constructed, which, drawn from physical principles, assails all the adversaries.

Which we bring forth from the common consent of metaphysical proofs; of those maintaining that a free cause is left altogether indeterminate and potential for eliciting this individual action rather than another of the same species; so that it needs the first cause to contract such potentiality and indetermination. Which is common to a free cause together with the whole collection of inanimate agents, and those which lack liberty; concerning which, on account of the necessity of the doctrine, we shall raise a physical digression at the end of this article.

Therefore it must be treated by us that such a physical doctrine in no way stands together with the pronouncement of the adversaries asserting that God does not prede absolutely such a species of act, but only from hypothesis, involving the condition of the cooperation of a created cause; so that there is offered to our will by God a concourse indifferent to such or such a species of act, and the created will contracts the community and indetermination of such a concourse.

28 Thus therefore I form the argument; the created will is not premoved by God first and principally toward such a species of impulse, for example, toward love or hatred, as the adversaries themselves are forced to assert; for otherwise the created will would be contracted first and principally by God toward the species of the act of hatred, by that reason by which it is asserted that the created will is determined first and principally to this individual of action before another within the same species.

And consequently, just as it is pronounced that the created will is of itself altogether indeterminate toward such an individual of influx, and determined by God, in such a way that that physical contraction of God may be the ratio or principle wholly antecedent to the determination of the created will toward such an individual of action before another, so that the second cause could not respond, unless the decree of God concerning such an individual action to be elicited was premised. So also it would have to be asserted that our will is physically indeterminate toward the absolute futurition of such a species of act, for example, perjury, hatred of God, and so of the rest, and would await the determination from the first cause: therefore it would follow that God would premover our will toward the matters of depraved acts; which is taxed and proscinded by the adversaries as an absurd and incongruous pronouncement.

The consequence is clear; because the supposition of the specific predicate toward the grade of individual being is essential; therefore that physical influx, which attains the act first and per se, according to its numerical condition, cannot not pre-intend the specific predicate, which is essentially presupposed toward the ratio of an individual such action.

Further, that contraction of the second cause to such an individual action, which is furnished by the first cause, is not conceivable, or a matter of reason, but physical and real; therefore it does not curtail its tendency in the terminus, nor does it reach it under one metaphysical grade of being and not under another; and consequently, if it is primarily attributed to God, and not to the second cause, that the created will be physically contracted to such an individual action rather than another, then to God likewise must be deferred the decree furnishing absolutely that predicate of the species of which he preordains the individual.

29 That opposition greatly shook Suárez, as is clear from his repeatedly insistent presentation of it, glossed back; for he often attempted to extricate himself from the aforesaid knot, and did not succeed; as is plain from Opusc. 1, lib. 1, cap. 7, from num. 4 up to 7, and often elsewhere, and in Metaph., tom. 1, disp. 22, sect. 4, num. 35, where he teaches that the contraction of the created will to such individual causality springs from the will of God, not absolute, but involving a condition on the side of the cooperation of the created cause; yet since that concourse which the divine will offers to the created will for operating regards not only such an individual of this species but many individual acts of other species (for example, within the species of hatred, such an act in the individual; within the species of love, likewise such an act in the individual; and so on), it follows that the created will, within any species of impulse whatever, is contracted by the divine will to such an individual action, and nevertheless is left indifferent as to whether to use the divine concourse or not to use it; or to use the concourse in this species of acts or in that.

But on the contrary; that just as the essential supposition of a specific predicate to the numerical degree of being is inevitable; so also it implies a contradiction that the contraction of the will to the individual degree of the act, and not to its species, could be assigned to God: or on the other hand; if God commits and leaves to the created will that it determine the universality of the divine concourse to such a species of act; therefore also to its individuation. Whereas such a contraction is not some conceivable precision, but a real and physical causality attaining the product, not under any abstraction of the metaphysical degrees, but under a contracted and individual reason of effecting, such as is that by which the physical influx is conveyed.

Wherefore, on account of the real identity of the specific and the individual grade in the impulse of the will, if the physical contraction of the indifference of the will to such a species of impulse is not attributed to God, neither will the physical contraction of the indifference of the will to such individual causality be able to be deferred to him.

Hence the aforesaid doctrine of the community of the divine concourse to several species of actions (in such wise that the contraction to such a species is drawn from the created will) seems in no way to cohere with the physical pronouncement about the contraction of the created will by the first cause to elicit such an individual action; and consequently, consistently, Scotus, just as he derives the physical determination of the created will to such an individual action from the first cause, so also wills its physical determination to such a species of impulse: so that the contraction of such a species is drawn from the absolute decree first and per se. But on this see below, under num. 59.

30 But if you object: that the rationale is altogether disparate regarding the determination of the created will to such a species of act, and regarding the contraction to such an individual.

Because the will is determined from within to such a species of act precisely because it imports an intrinsic principle of such a determination as regards the species of the action, namely the cognition of the object to be pursued or fled; yet it is not cognized that the object is to be pursued or fled under this individual impulse and not another within the same species. Wherefore the contraction of free choice to this individual in preference to another is deferred to an extrinsic principle, namely the first cause; and the contraction to such a species of impulse is attributed to the intrinsic principle, namely to the free agent itself operating from cognition.

But on the contrary, this: the reason we argue that the created will is determined, besides the intrinsic principle, also by an extrinsic principle, namely by God as regards the species of the act, is that the intrinsic principle does not determine to the individual of the action; and it becomes an impossible physical causality reaching a specific grade not contracted to such an individuation of the form. For if the will has no intrinsic principle by which to contract itself to the individual of the action, then neither to the species of the action.

You will say: from the premises it is only inferred that God determines to the species of the act materially and identically, or on account of the real identity of the specific grade with the numerical condition of the act; not however formally. By a similar rationale as that by which the light of glory, to which supernaturality is formally attributed and corresponds in the act of vision, materially and identically reaches the predicate of vitality, on account of its real identity with the predicate of supernaturality.

On the contrary: therefore God, at least identically, or on account of the identity of the specific and numerical grade in the substrate of sin, determines to the material data of wicked acts. By that rationale by which, although vitality of vision is not deferred to the light by way of some accommodation, yet in reality and physically vitality is attained by the infused habit, on account of the identity of supernaturality with vitality. Therefore, although the will is not determined by God to the matter of sin formally as regards the species of the act, it is nevertheless contracted materially and identically.

Next; that it would follow that the creature would not contract God absolutely and simply to such a species of influx; but only, by comparison, or accommodation of the aforesaid formality, in which respect it is not composed into the term of a physical action. So that God and the free choice would conduct themselves on an equal account with respect to determination to the material of sin; insofar as they determine one another, God contracting the free choice as to the individuation of the act, and the free choice determining God to the species of influx; whereas nevertheless the material of sin (as the term of a physical action) does not subsist in reality except as it expresses the species composed with the numerical degree; so that the material of sin corresponds equally to God and to the free choice; and to each primarily in its own order of acting, or of contracting.

Therefore, just as with the adversaries, even granted that God determines to the individuation of the action, it is not asserted that he determines to the matter of sin, because he does not contract to the species of the action; so also vice versa, neither would free choice be determined by God to the matter of sin, if free choice did not contract to the individuation of the act; since the physical existence of the action is thus implicative on account of its indetermination according to species, just as on account of potentiality as regards individuation, and conversely.

As regards the intrinsic indetermination of the will to such an individual action in preference to another, and that it does not presuppose the cognition of such an individual action insofar as it is numerically distinguished from another, note the acute doctrine of Gregory of Rimini, transcribed by us below in art. 6 of this dist., under num. 77, where he has it:

When the will effects some evil act, the created will stands indifferently disposed toward any one of them, and it distinctly cognizes none of them; and for that reason neither can it will to produce any one of them distinctly. Ad locum citatum.

Examination and discussion of the opposed arguments against the foreknowledge of future contingents in the decree not involving a condition on the side of the object.

31 The opposed foundations are difficult; not, however, such that they cannot be diluted.

Wherefore to the first we say: it plainly obtains that future contingents are not foreknown by God in the decree applying its power to concur with our will, since the power of the decree offers to our will a concourse to either in the first act; whence it must necessarily be asserted that such futures are apprehended by God in the decree furnishing absolutely the unimpedible futurition of the acts of our will, as is clear from what has been said.

To the second argument: that therefore the action of writing, inasmuch as it is deferred to the hand, is not free but necessary, because neither does the hand have at its service the free power of operating, as is perspicuous; and because, once the absolute decree predefining the writing has been posited, there is not furnished to the hand, by force of the decree, a free concourse to either in the first act; just as, once the absolute determination of the divine will with respect to one side of the contradiction is supposed, there is offered to the will a concourse to either in the first act; as we have said, and as will become more evident from what is to be unfolded below.

To the objection urging that in no way is that absolute predefinition, not involving a condition on the side of the object, to be subjected to our will; since in our will it is not within our power to be thus or thus predetermined by God.

It is answered: that for the rationale of a free cause only this is exacted, that before the influx of the help it be supposed with sufficient virtue by way of first act, namely with intrinsic indifference expedited for operating, and that there stand ready to it a concourse to either in the first act by force of the decree of the prime mover; not, however, that it be exacted that whatever is necessary by way of actual premotion on the side of the first cause lie subject to the nod and arbitrament of our will; so that God under a condition only decree the impulse of our will on the hypothesis that it wills.

Because that would be so to compose God and creature for operating that our will held first place in such a concourse; which is against the condition of a participated entity, as we showed in n. 20 and 21.

But you will press from Suárez, opusc. 1, lib. 3, de auxiliis divinae gratiae, c. 8, under n. 4, at the end: that although that predetermination which Scotus constituted does not pertain to the rationale of first act in a free cause, but only to actual influx, it ought nevertheless to be such as to be subjected to the free cause, unless we wish the agent to be simply necessary.

Because the moral and proximate power of free action ought not only to be complete in its own order of acting by way of first act, but also to import within its power whatever is pre-exacted for operating actually; otherwise it would not be conceived in the last readiness for acting, or as a proximate faculty, but only as remote and insufficient.

It is answered: that if the aforesaid objection pressed us, it would also touch Suárez; because although our will be situated in the first act, complete for acting by force of sufficient help, yet the exercise of this action would never be entered upon without a congruous vocation ex the foreknowledge of the future consent. Yet it is not within the power of our will to be forestalled by God with a congruous vocation; and yet the congruous vocation is so necessarily exacted for infallible assent, that without it no one would in fact consent, even granted he could assent and possesses a proximate and expedited faculty for assenting; therefore it is not of the rationale of a free cause that within the compass of its power it circumscribe whatever is necessarily exacted on the side of the first cause for actual operation, so that according to its nod it be composed to the position or negation of it.

And lest it be asserted that it is within the power and pleasure of man to be congruously called — since in punishment of sins he is deprived of congruous illumination on the side of the intellect and inspiration on the side of the will, though he would receive a congruous vocation had he not placed impediments of sins — let the argument proceed from the first operation of man, not presupposing another fall.

We say, therefore, that for the rationale of a free cause proximately expedited for operating, only this is required: that in the first act it not be affixed to one side of the contradiction, but that before the actual influx it be supposed with a concourse to either furnished in the first act, by force of the decree of the first cause. For that premotion which is furnished by God by way of actual concourse is according to the exigency of that same will endeavoring freely upon the object; although it is not within the nod of the created appetite to be thus premoved or not premoused de inesse, in the composed sense with respect to the second act, according to the sense to be weighed below. Just as neither, with the adversaries, is it subjected to our power to be called congruously or incongruously; for if such an option were made to man, no one would be called incongruously before the fall: and consequently neither would he perpetrate mortals throughout his whole life. On which see art. 7 of this controversy, num. 36.

32 But if Suárez's opposition should touch us, affirming priority of the "from which," or of nature, between the predetermination of the divine will and the influx of free choice, insofar as it would not lie within the counsel of its own power to be composed or not composed de inesse to the divine premotion; by the same force it ought not to militate against the adversaries, while they deny that the influx of the created will is prior by nature to the causality and motion of God. For this motion and causality of God ad extra could be conceived, by that very rationale alone, beneath the nod of free choice, insofar as it would be integral to it to be composed or not composed de inesse, and in the second act, to the divine causality, if the influx of free choice preceded as the ratio contracting the exercised divine determination, as regards its position and negation.

But if God, not expecting the determination of the second cause in the second sign of nature, exerts his causality equally first in the same sign of nature, then he does not subject his motion to our arbitrament, as regards the position or non-position of such a determination de inesse, and in the very composition of actual and exercised cooperation. Although in the divided sense the motion of God ought to be judged subject to our free choice, inasmuch as it is consonant with the laws of liberty, as being furnished by the first cause which introspects the exigency and proneness of free choice; and inasmuch as it can be removed in the sense of division, or inasmuch as the first act, or power of operating, is divided from the concursive premotion: because the premotion of actual concourse does not pertain to the cointegration of the power in the rationale of first act, even proximate, but to the bare exercise of operation. But on these see and consult the cited place from art. 7 of this controversy, on the reconciliation of our liberty with foreknowledge, where we press these points seriously and deliberately.

We add further; that when it is objected by the adversaries that the divine pre- A twofold state of free choice is set forth for settling the disputation. motion ought to be beneath the nod of free choice, as to its position, or negation; either they proceed concerning that whole duration which antecedes the actual cooperation of free choice, in which we assert the created will to be proximally ready in act first for contraries and contradictories, and with the furnishing of the divine concourse ad utrumlibet in act first.

In sensu divisionis praemotio exercita subijcitur libero arbitrio And in this sense, as is certain, it is integral to the created will to operate thus or thus in the sense of division and separation from the exercised premotion of the concourse; such also is its signed power, or by way of first act, that it can be composed to the divine premotion toward such causality, or to the negation of such premotion, while in the first act, or in the sense of division, it can be composed to the premotion of the opposite influx.

In sensu compositionis cum praemotione concursiva, qualiter non subijciatur arbitratui voluntatis creatae. But if they speak of the very instant of the cooperation of free choice and of the exercised divine premotion to such a species and individual of action, the composed sense of actual concourse is already involved, because that premotion is only a concourse, and in the same sign in which, or instant of time, it is exhibited to the will, that it contract it not to the power to, but to the mere exercise of influx. This premised, it is true that the exercised premotion of God, as regards its position and negation, lies subject to free choice considered in the first act, and in the sense of division, before that cooperation itself; just as it is indubitable with us that the created will is furnished and expedited with a concourse in the first act to contraries and contradictories. For if there is offered to the will, before actual cooperation, a concourse in the first act to assent and dissent, the consequence is that before the exercised cooperation it is integral to it, as it exists in the first act and in the sense of division, not to be composed to the divine causality premoving, in the second act, to dissent, while it is also expedited by an extrinsic principle proximately in the first act for assenting.

Exaratur, et illustratur doctrina praecedens. In the second act, however, of actual concourse, since it expresses the hypothesis of the composed sense, the premotion is not subjected to the arbitrament of our will, as regards the position and negation of such premotion de inesse; just as neither does the cooperation of the very will itself lie under free choice, so that when it exists, it could not exist. For we pronounce the whole causality of the divine premotion merely concursive, such that for no instant in which, or of time, does it antecede the cooperation of the created will; although it antecedes it for the sign "from which," or of nature.

Compositio cum cursu divini cum libertate ex Rubio atque Basolio Which contraction de inesse together with the indifference of the created will to compose itself, from possibility, with the divine determination, or with its negation, is expressly handed down from the old disciples of Scotus by William of Rubio, a pupil of Scotus, transcribed by us below in the present dist., art. 6, under num. mar. 53; and Bassolius likewise, a pupil of Scotus, transcribed in the same art., num. mar. 48.

Oppositiones adversariorum oppugnant decretum concurrendi Rather, if the aforesaid objections pressed in predetermination concursive, or by way of the bare exercise of concourse, as regards the point that it does not lie under the arbitrament of the exercised will of the created will to be composed de inesse, and in the second act, to such concurrent premotion or not composed; they would also impugn the absolute will of concurring with free choice; since God concurs at least equally first with the creature without any posteriority of sign on the side of the action of God. Therefore no reason appears why it should rather be attributed to the creature that it concur thus than to God, if God does not expect, in the posterior sign, the antecedent, in the prior sign, contraction of the action of the creature in the same sign of nature of the concurrent; if, therefore, God and creature concur equally first to such an influx (for example, to the matter of sin), then no reason is available why it should rather be attributed to the creature that it operate thus and not otherwise, since it cannot operate otherwise de inesse without the influx of God; and God, the cooperation of the creature not awaited, concurs thus and not otherwise.

Occursus Unless it be alleged, with Suárez and Vázquez, that the will of concurring involves the condition of operating thus, if free choice so wills.

Praeludiatur And that would be to ascribe openly the priority of nature of free choice to the concourse, since free choice would purify that conventional application of the power of God for operating thus: on which see art. 2 of this dist. 4, n. 49 up to 63.

But if it be objected with Lessius and Alarcón (that such a composition of the divine power with free choice, involving a condition to be purified by free choice, may be avoided), that God assists free choice quasi blindly, with a pact of concurring posited, so that neither does free choice contract the first cause to such a species of influx, nor conversely does God free choice — the aforesaid mode of thinking we premise as refuted in this art., under num. mar. 22.

33. To the third argument, from num. 8, which touches that axiom of Scotus: that if God were a necessary agent, the created will, on account of its essential subordination to God the mover, would operate not freely but necessarily.

We say: that the aforesaid pronouncement abundantly shows a consort of the doctrine of Scotus about the absolute decree of God anteceding the consent of our will. For if God were not to pre-determine absolutely the acts of the created will, but only by convention or condition that it should will — even granted that God were a necessary agent, he would not diminish the expedited power of free choice; since God would have decreed nothing regarding the endeavors of our will except according to the nod and pleasure of our will, and on the hypothesis that it should offer assent. But since Scotus expressly maintains that if God were a necessary agent, the created will could not inflow freely, this demonstrates, clearer than light, the constant judgment of Scotus about the decree furnishing the acts of our will.

Wherefore, wisely Gabriel Vázquez, 1 part., disput. 100, capit. 3, numer. 6 and 7, saw fit to reject the absolute decree of God anteceding our consent, and accordingly, consequentially, asserts that although God were a necessary agent, the will would still retain its own indifference in operating.

But that he has herein proceeded inconsistently, nay, and has failed manifestly from the consequence of doctrine, we have laid open; since, when he had demolished with all his nerves the decree not involving a condition on the side of the cooperating created cause, he pronounced the decree involving a condition to be a sufficient medium ex parte obiecti for the foreknowledge of futures.

Satisfaction to other objections, wherein is treated that hypothesis of Scotus about the composition of the divine power with created free choice, if God were an agent determined to one thing ad extra.

34. To that objection from the same num. 8, contending that if God were a necessary agent, no other rationale of the elicited impulse of the will would be available than de facto. Indeed, in that hypothesis, the whole necessity of the impulse of the will would be placed in this, that it were pre-intended by God absolutely, not involving the condition of the cooperation of the created cause; which in fact the School of Scotus asserts the same, while it professes that God furnishes the acts of our will absolutely, and without the condition of the cooperation of the second cause. For the impulse of our will, elicited by God operating freely, does not otherwise stand than it would stand if it issued from God as from a necessary principle.

To which opposition, succumbing, Vázquez, 1 p., disp. 99, cap. 8, num. 51, asserts: that not only in fact has God not absolutely pre-defined our free actions before the determination of our will; nay, that he could not even have furnished it. Because our impulse could not otherwise be compared to God, nor otherwise stand, if God pre-determined it absolutely; whereas in fact, according to the thought of Vázquez, it is intended only conditionally, and on the hypothesis that our will wills.

But it seems harsh thus to enervate, or to elevate, the powers of the first cause regarding the motion of the acts of free choice; so that God cannot even from His absolute power absolutely pre-establish the motions of free choice. Whereas Augustine, transcribed under num. 12, declares the most omnipotent power of God in the direction of human hearts, to be inclined whither it pleases; so that God has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have their own.

Nor do I see why the Jesuit authors reject the opinion of the Thomists asserting that God cannot even by absolute power necessitate created free choice, given a deliberate proposition of the object to either; if they assert with Vázquez that God cannot, even by absolute power, pre-decree absolutely the operations of free choice; since either opinion appears equally to enervate the unlimited energy of the power of God regarding created free choice.

It is answered, therefore, from what was said in art. 2 of this distinct., under num. mar. 39, and from num. 49 up to 63, where the composition of the divine power with free choice to either is treated: that for God, regarding the acts of our will, to bear the contradictory denominations of a free and a non-free principle, no intrinsic mutation or physical dissimilarity on the side of the effect is exacted, on account of the rationales which we formed there.

Nevertheless, on the side of the created will considered in the first act, an extrinsic physical disparity, by habitude to the first cause, would intervene in either supposition; because to our will in fact there is furnished in the first act a concourse to contraries and contradictories, and the divine power stands ready for either; but granted that God were a necessary operator ad extra, then he would affix the will in the first act to one side of the contradiction, nor would he compose the executing power with free choice to either, or by the force of the free decree of the first cause apply a concourse by way of first act indifferent to contraries and contradictories; on which, to the cited places. For if God were a necessary agent, determined to one thing, he could not furnish to free choice a concourse to either; as is evident.

35 But when the objection presses: that the furnishing of such a concourse to either would be futile and frustraneous, the doctrine of Scotus being supposed, asserting that God furnishes our consent, the condition of the cooperating second cause not awaited.

It is answered: that the aforesaid objection also militates in the opinion of Suárez, admitting the predefinition of good acts; for if God has already pre-ordinated absolutely the act direct and of supernatural honesty, not involving the condition of the cooperation of our will, to what purpose does he offer the concourse to contraries and contradictories, indeterminate?

And that the objection may be turned against all the adversaries of physical predetermination, it also assails those who reject the predefinition of good acts in the congruous vocation from the infallible foreknowledge of the future consent. For if God decreed to call thus, that with moral infallibility, from the conditional foreknowledge of the future consent, he should affix the created will to assent unimpedibly; to what purpose was the concourse to dissent furnished?

We say, therefore: that although God, on account of the essential dominion of the first cause, cannot not premove the second cause absolutely to such a species and individuation of the act — because it would offer a concourse altogether indeterminate and contractible by the created will to such a species, and the order of agents would be inverted; by that rationale, that the created will would hold first place in operating, inasmuch as it would purify the condition from that conventional application of the divine concourse to assent, if the will wills.

Nevertheless, although the preordination of such an act absolutely, for example of assent, is essentially pre-required from the subordination of the second cause to the first; yet in order that it be elicited freely, and with the indifference of a principle ready ad utrumlibet, the application of the divine power offering concourse in act first to contraries and contradictories is altogether necessary, that the will, according to its intrinsic indifference, may be able to strive to either. Which application of the divine power ad utrumlibet in the manner of act first being supposed, it is the office of the first cause, according to the exigency of a free cause valid ad utrumlibet in act first, to contract our will in act second to one side, and to pre-decree the act as infallibly future, through a volition discharging the office of action; to art. 2 of this distinction, from num. 49 up to 63.

But that it does not attain its effect in those whose conversion to good fruit God does not intend absolutely does not diminish the sufficiency of the virtue of that help, which of itself furnishes a proximate and expedited power, although in the second act it be not composed to actual operation; for it is one thing for an operative faculty to be proximately valid for the act, another to be composed to actual influx.

But such an objection is turned back against the adversaries; because if the sufficiency of help were enervated or diminished, so that, the premotion of God set aside, it does not issue into act — it can be objected even to those (who reject physical predetermination, sustaining only moral excitation) that the sufficiency of help would be enervated in that whole collection of supposits to whom there is not available a congruous vocation importing the foreknowledge of infallible consent; since no one not endowed with such a vocation is converted in fact, although he receive a help furnishing toward salvation and simply sufficient. But on the sufficiency of this help again in art. 7 of this distinct., where will be weighed how the certainty of divine foreknowledge with our liberty stands according to the principles of Scotus?

37 To the objection from the same num. 9, which Henrique produces from Isaiah 5: What is it that I ought to have done further to my vineyard, and have not done to it? It is answered: that there the Lord, expostulating with his vineyard about the transgression of the law, intends only that he has provided most sufficiently for the salvation of his vineyard; nor is it excusable that it bore wild grapes instead of the fruits of justice on account of the weakness of the helps; for it stood endowed by God with helps in abundance.

But if (ly, what ought I to have done further?) should be extended beyond the supply of sufficient help to that whole efficacious immission of vocations by which the Lord could have drawn from the treasures of his wisdom and power for softening the hardness of the human heart — even to a heart hardened and impenitent, upon the supposition of the adversaries' principles, an objection could be raised against God. Why, Lord, pouring out thy compassion upon thy beloved vineyard, dost thou so seriously assert that thou oughtest to have done nothing further to it which thou hast not furnished; if, being able, by a congruous vocation from the foreknowledge of the future consent, unimpedibly to allure it to the pursuit of good, thou didst not wish to confer that benefit upon the vineyard?

But that the aforesaid testimony of Isaiah ought not to be extended to all those helps which could be furnished by the power of God, but to the supply and sufficiency of help furnishing abundantly toward salvation — such as is the whole collection of sufficient helps — is clear from those words: what ought I to have done further? Where he said not: what could I have done further, but what ought I to have done further? Because if God in the justification of a sinner conferred all those gifts of grace which he can exhibit, no one would be damned; whereas nevertheless he supplies those helps of grace which he ought on the hypothesis; the will of the good pleasure of giving glory to all being supposed. For thus the aforesaid place is elucidated by our John de Sepúlveda, a theologian of good note; and by Ecclus., in his Quadragesimal, Feria 6 after Domin. 2 of Quadragesima.

38 To the authorities of Chrysostom and Damascene, which are objected against us by the same Henrique, we can satisfy with one answer; if first it be observed that Damascene is cited mutilatedly. For thus it stands in libr. 2, Orthodoxae fidei, capit. 30:

That must be known, that God indeed foreknows all things, but does not pre-finish all things. For he also foreknows those things which are in our

It is necessary to know this, that God foreknows all things indeed, but does not predefine all things. For He foreknows even those things which are in our own power and choice; but He does not likewise predefine them: for He neither wills that vice be admitted, nor again does He take force from virtue. Wherefore the divine command joined with foreknowledge effects predefinition.

Where (if by the name of command Damascene intends only the insinuation of the law or divine precept together with foreknowledge of the work to be carried out in execution; as is evident from those words, Wherefore the divine command joined with foreknowledge effects predefinition) Damascene would also strike the adversaries, and the whole assembly of Theologians asserting that in God commanding a right work, or forbidding a wicked one, there is from eternity a foreknowledge of our operation; which can be denied by no Catholic.

Wherefore by the name of command joined with foreknowledge, which sounds in Damascene as that predefinition which he disapproves, is to be understood coercion, which takes away the liberty of our choice, inferring an antecedent necessity which in the manner of act first fastens our will to one part of the contradiction; in which sense Chrysostom also explodes predefinition.

Moreover; that among the Fathers Anselm does not shrink from the word predefinition, not only of good acts, but also of wicked operations as regards the material; is evident from what is said in art. 6, On the predetermination of God to the material of sin, under num. 72. Where he admits the predestination of God to the substrate, and the material of sin; as is evident from those words: Predestination is not only of good things, but can be called of evils.

To the foundation of Suarez we say; that it makes no difference for necessitating free choice, that the absolute purpose of God, fastening our will to one part of the contradiction, be in the manner of execution, or of the use of the divine executing faculty, or in the manner of intention, or of a mere internal purpose; on account of the foundations which we formed above against Suarez, from num. 23.

Wherefore we also add; that the conditional knowledge of means is not necessary, in order that the absolute appetite of the end in God be not precipitate and rash; since for prudently and rationally intending the end it suffices to foreknow, as Scotus teaches, that the will of God is of unimpedible energy, and one that is in no way in fact rejected by the striving of the created will, however rebellious. But of these things more at large in the following distinction, where we shall show that the foreknowledge of conditionals is not necessary for reconciling the efficacy of grace with free choice.

DIGRESSION

Physics: from what principle is the contraction of the created will drawn to such an individuum of action?

SUMMARY.

The improbans opinion, that the same numerically-one effect is pre-had within the virtuality of several causes. Num. 47. Another placitum of the Metaphysicians, which Vázquez and John Capreolus sustain; that no second cause under such a coalition of time, place, and the other circumstances, is indifferent to the production of this individuum before another. Num. 44. The text of Scotus the agent; that the same numerically-one effect is contained within the eminence of several causes. Nu. 48. The sentiment of Scotus concerning the precontaining of the same effect in several causes is founded. Num. 55. The other part of our sentiment concerning the indetermination of the cause under the composition of those circumstances, to this rather than to another individuum, is shown. from N. 58. unto 59. The foundations of those who deny that the same numerically-one effect is pre-had in several causes are infringed; where it is dealt with, that it implies, that the action of this agent flow forth from another, which we demand from the reason of the mode after the mind of Scotus; whence also we infer, that the vital quality advanced by this agent could be effected by another of the same species. Num. 60. Whether the hypostasis of one individuum could be ef-fected by another individuum of the same species? Num.65. Other objects against the true sentiment are struck down. Num. 68. The substantial inaquality of individua of the same species is asserted against the placitum of Peter Hurtado. Nu 70 The response to the arguments which contrive that the second cause under such a confluence of circumstances is not indeterminate to the effecting of this individuum before another; where it is asked whether an intraneal virtue may suffice to the natural cause for reproducing the corrupted? Num.71. The objects against the sentiment of Scotus, concerning the virtue of nature for producing the corrupted, are enervated. Num.74.

39 SINCE what we have done against Suárez, having prefaced that the contraction of the created will to the producing of such an individuum is furnished by the first cause; the necessity of the doctrine urges to digress somewhat, and to disport in the field of physical speculation. Especially since the authors, who assert that the determination of the second cause to such an individuum of influx is drawn from God, also sustain that any efficient principle, within its virtue of acting, concludes the same series of individua which surrounds that other efficient cause of the same specific quiddity: and accordingly at the nod and pleasure of God it comes about that such an individuum is effected by this cause, and not by that. Which assertions, although they are received by authors of the better note, are yet not those which do not demand a special and accurate weighing of judgment.

That this may be more openly untangled, it is to be observed; that the indetermination, on account of which such an agent is contracted by the first cause to the producing of that individuum before another, can issue from a twofold head; either on the part of the effect; or on the part of the cause.

For on the part of the effect an indetermination can stand between, demanding the contraction of the first cause, that such an effect proceed from this cause, and not another; if it be true, that such an effect in its numerical identity is naturally pre-had within the eminence of several causes.

On the part also of the second cause the contraction from the first cause would be desired; if the second cause here and now, under such a confluence of circumstances, were indeterminate to eliciting this individuum rather than another.

The improbans opinion, that the same numerically-one effect is pre-contained within the eminence of several causes.

40 Concerning the first point therefore; there is an improbans opinion, that the same effect in its numerical identity is naturally pre-contained within the eminence of several causes; whether causes of this sort be univocal, or equivocal. Thus St. Thomas, Quodlibet. 5. artic. 8. Capreolus, in 2. sentent. dist. 20. quaest. 1. Marsilius, 1. de Generat. quaest. 8. Soto in 4. dist. 34. q. 1. ar. 3. to whom Cardinal Aureol is suffragan, in 2. sentent. dist. 20. quaest. vnica. artic. 1. §. Dicetur quòd ad hoc. Where he says.

Dicetur, quòd vt effectus sit idem, non oportet semper agens esse idem; quia quodcunque agens applicatum eidem passo potest vnum numero inducere; idò ex alio, et alio parente non est inconueniens idem numero generari.

Sed haec opinio non videtur esse vera; quòd scilicet idẽ homo possit à diuersis parentibus generari.

Et si dicatur; quòd nihil distinguitur per agens. Dico; quòd verum est formaliter; tamen efficaciter, et originaliter facit, quòd illud se ipso (formaliter tamen,) efficeretur; et originaliter, quòd illud se ipso formaliter distinguatur.

And first such an opinion is proved; because to the numerical unity of the effect the numerical unity of the action is necessarily pre-required; since the action is identified really with the term. But the action necessarily demands the numerical unity of the agent, for this reason, that by its essence it flow forth from such an agent; for if it did not proceed immediately, and by its essence, from such an agent in this number, it would be elicited by another, with the mediation of resulting aids, and accordingly of the action there would be given an action, which is absurd: be it therefore, that to the numerical condition of the effect the individuaal unity of the agent necessarily attains, as also the unity of the action conduces.

41 Next it is argued secondly; if any individuum whatever were pre-had within the virtuality of the principle of the same species, and only at the nod and pleasure of God it should come about, that such an individuum be effected by this cause, and not by that; it would follow, that no agent would be of itself the cause of such an effect connected with it in the fourth mode of perseity, but only by accident; if indeed this actual dependence of the effect upon the cause were drawn from the sole external beneplacitum of God, and not from the intrinsic connection of things; which seems alien from all philosophy.

It is argued thirdly; if any individuum whatever produced by this cause could also be effected by another; it would follow that the object, or matter around which [acts] the activity of any individuum whatever, would be the universal series of individua of the same species, which seems false; otherwise it could generate its own generator, if it were not the product.

Which appears absurd to every reason; for this reason, that, as to the real influx a real discretion of the producer and the product is demanded, so also a real independence of the physical cause from its effect is required, which no individuum whatever can import with regard to its own generator, within whose elicitive power it is truly and physically pre-contained: therefore the generator of any individuum whatever is not concluded within the ambit of the potency and activity of its own genitum, and accordingly the genitum does not relate, as to the adequated object of its own activity, to the universal series of individua of its own species.

42 The reason is urged in the vital faculties, which respect motions so intraneously composed with the eliciting principles, that they seem by their own essence to flow forth from such principles; on account of the concept of life by way of second act demanding an intraneal vicinity with the radical principle of the vital motion.

But if the will of Peter were regarded as the adequated object, or matter around which [acts] the elicitive of its own virtue, for the whole collection of volitions which could be produced from a cause of the same species; it would come about, that the volition of Paul could connaturally be effected by the will of Peter. Which seems to militate, not only against the concept of actual life, or by way of second act, which is congruous to a volition; but also against the reason of the voluntary, which demands an intrinsic principle together with cognition.

Next; that philosophy seems to deceive, of the virtue of acting of any individuum whatever enfolding the universal assemblage of individua of the same species; in intentional causality. For the intentional species of Peter, and of Paul, diverge by sole number, and not by species, as also the objects themselves, from which they are intentionally excerned; and yet it cannot be true, that Peter could elicit the representative species of Paul, as is certified more certainly than certain.

Similarly; the intensive grades are of the breadth of the same species, and yet the heat as one cannot effect that heat which adequately answers to heat as four, and which is pre-had effectively within the virtuality of that one; otherwise heat as one would operate beyond the apex of its own intens-ion; and accordingly insofar as it is not in act, which is absurd.

43 Moreover; out of the aforesaid sentiment it would be inferred, that since the hypostasis is an entity really discrete from the nature, which it contracts, and draws to the state of positive perseity, and accordingly issues in the genus of efficient cause from the same nature which it terminates; it would therefore come about, that as the nature of Peter pre-contains within its own virtuality, in the genus of efficient cause, the hypostasis of Peter, so it would also pre-had the suppositality of Paul, and of the other individua of the human species; and that at the sole external statute of God it would come about, that Peter be such a supposit, and not another; all which things seem to be new glosses, contrived against the common way of thinking of the philosophers.

Lastly; the universality, or commonness of the virtue of acting in any individuum whatever, enfolding the universal congeries of individua, is assailed; for this reason, that individua are not substantially equal according to the numerical condition. For as haeccceities, or individuaal reasons, are first diverse, so they constitute individua substantially unequal according to the numerical grade of essence; because as from the specific discretion it is received, that one species cannot be equal to another, so from the omnimodal, and as it were first diverse dissimilitude of individua according to numerical being, the substantial inaquality should be drawn.

But a cause does not act, except insofar as it is in act, or insofar as it imports an actuality of virtue adequately [measuring] the perfection of the effect; therefore the more imperfect individua do not pre-had within their own virtuality more perfect individua; and accordingly it cannot be true, that the sphere of the activity of any individuum whatever encompasses the whole collection of individua of the same species.

Another opinion of Vázquez, and of Dolan the Capuchin; that no second cause under such a confluence of circumstances is indeterminate to the effecting of this individuum before another.

44 Concerning the other point indeed concerning indetermination on the part of the cause; namely that the second cause, as here and now under such a concourse of circumstances, is indeterminate to such an individuum of action; on account of which potentiality it demands the contraction from the first cause. The aforesaid doctrine Vázquez attacks keenly out of the Neoteric writers, 3. part. tom. 1. dispu. 74. cap. 7. numer. margin. 45. vsque ad 53. To Vázquez subscribes Ludovicus Dolan the Capuchin, in Quadripartita disputatione de modo compositionis concursuum Dei, et creaturae. parte 4. huius tractatus, capit. 18. numer. margin. 4. et arguitur.

First: if it were true, that any second cause whatever under such a confluence of place, time, and the other circumstances, were indeterminate to the producing of this individuum rather than another; it would follow, that it would also be intrinsically valid for naturally reproducing that individuum which has been corrupted.

For if a cause could be alleged with such a common and indifferent virtue with respect to the collection of individua; no sufficient reason could be rendered, on account of which, the same portion of matter consenting, man could not be able to resolve upon the resuscitation of the now-dead son; which granted, according to the exigency of natural causes, and without miracle, God could not fail to infuse the soul again into the same numerically-one body: and accordingly the resurrection would be possible by the forces of nature.

45 Nor is the force of the argument eluded, if it be alleged that God does not determine the second cause to eliciting that effect which has already pre-existed: for this reason, that the marvelous and manifold multiplication of individua would more refer to the unlimitedness of the divine power than the repeated effecting of the same ones.

Against; because if the created cause were intrinsically valid for reproducing an effect already corrupted; it seems undeniable that God either once was not ready to this effective potency for eliciting such an effect; otherwise such a virtue would be vain, and accordingly also impossible, and the force would be inferred to it from the first cause, if a concourse expedited for operating were not furnished to it, so that it might burst forth into act even but a single time from the beginning of the world.

46 Secondly Vázquez argues, sub numer. 49. because if it could philosophically be alleged that the created cause here and now were not determined to the production of this effect, and not of another within the same species; it would follow, that it would also be valid as indifferent to infinite effects of another sort, since no assignable reason exists why rather to ten effects than to a hundred, and thus it would be pronounced indeterminate to infinity? Which seems to militate against the limitation, and native condition, of the created agent.

Wherefore Vázquez opines more advisably, and more aptly for the philosophical matter; to profess candidly that no reason is found why the created caual here and now is potent to this numerically-one effect, and not to another within the same species? Referring it to the unknown arcana of nature, rather than merely by divination blurting out that the created cause is utterly indeterminate in this subject place and time to several numerically-one effects within the same species, and that the contraction of such potentiality is to be demanded from the first cause.

47 Lastly Vázquez argues nume. 51. specially in free causes. Because, if the will were entirely indeterminate to such an individuum of action before another, in such a way that a contraction of this sort would have to be drawn from the external beneplacitum of God; a necessity would be inferred to our will from God, for this reason, that it ought to be whole for the created will, salva the right of liberty, not only to be able to love and not to love, but also to be able to pursue the object by this act of impulse, and not by another.

For as the action of our will puts on meritorious causality, not only according to the common and specific predicates of such a form, but also according to the numerical grade of its essence, so it ought to be free according to the numerical being of such an impulse; and accordingly also to be subject to the nod of the will with respect to the individuaal reason of such a volition: so that with full right the will could be borne into the object by this act of volition before another within the same species of the pursuing of the appetitive.

The sentiment of Scotus, concerning the precontaining of the same effect within the virtuality of several causes, is elucidated, and propped.

48 BUT notwithstanding these things; the opposite sentiment is to be sustained, which Scotus clearly constituted in 2. sent. dist. 20. quaestion. 2. sub numer. margin. 2. Where he says.

Dico, quòd soli nunc electi fuissent in statu innocentiae nati.

Ratio huius est; quia omnis ordinatè volens, post volitionem finis, immediatè vult illud, quod est immediatius, vel proximius fini; Deus est volens ordinatè: ergo primò vult seipsum, vel bonitatem suam tanquam finem. Secundò vult bonum creaturae rationalis vltimatum, quod est communicatio creaturae, siue communicatio beatifica suae bonitatis, creaturae tali; et postea vult gratiam, quae ordinatur ad beatitudinem huius, vel ad fruitionem eius: posteriùs vult istum beatum, vel beatificabilem, esse nasciturum à tali parente, quod esse supponit argentiae.

49 Cùm ergo (vt dictum est,) priùs sint beatitudini determinati, quàm quòd nascantur à talibus parentibus; per quoscunque parentes nascantur, ex quo habent rationem posterioris, huiusmodi parentes non poterunt variare determinatos beatificandos à voluntate diuina, quin ijdem in numero nascantur.

50 Dices; quòd identitas numeralis in effectu, non solùm requirit identitatem numeralem materiae, sed etiam efficientis; sicut tangit primum argumentum.

Dico; quòd non oportet. Ignis enim, (A) quantitatis, et virtutis tantae si ex tali materia ignem talem generaret; ignis (B) eiusdem virtutis, et qualitatis, pro eodem instanti, si in istam materiam ageret, eumdem ignem in numero produceret, non obstante quòd generans sit aliud, et aliud numero: quia generatum non sequitur praecisè vnitatem, vel pluralitatem, ex generante.

51 Concerning which text, and especially concerning the letter which we transcribe under num. 50., it is to be noted; that God, with respect to the destination of the predestinated to a determinate grade of glory, and with respect to the supposits to be beatified, had that absolute efficacious purpose aiding, that such a will by no means awaited the conditional foreknowledge of the fall of Adam; for this reason, that if God by conditional science had foreknown Adam not about to fall, still the same numerically-one decree would not have been infused to God, as is treated more broadly in the general controversia concerning Predestination. But since in the state of innocence reprobrate men would not have subsisted; be it, that those predestinated, who de facto are procreated by reprobrate parents, would have to be generated by other predestinated parents, salva the numerical unity of the predestinated: and accordingly it follows, that to the unity of the effect the unity of the generator is not necessary.

Moreover, that in the state of innocence no reprobrates would subsist, from whom the elect would be generated, Scotus produces out of Gregory in the aforesaid q. 2. sub num. marg. 1. where he says.

Oppositum patet per Gregorium. 4. Moralium. Si parentem primum nulla peccati rubigo corrupisset, nequaquam ex se filios gehennae generaret; sed ilii, qui nunc per redemptorem saluandi sunt, soli ab illo electi nascerentur.

Although Suárez rejects this doctrine as uncertain in sua Metaph. tom. 1. disp. 26. section. 5. num. margin. 11.; yet with Scotus we adhere more securely to Gregory, rejecting the generation of the elect from reprobrate parents in that hypothesis that the first parent had not sinned; for in those things which cannot be asserted without divine revelation, the sentiment of the holy Fathers of the Church is to be embraced most of all, who are believed to have handed it down suffused with celestial light.

52 Nor does the replica of Suárez infringe the pronounce-ment of Scotus, opining; that although the predestination of all the elect forestalled the absolute foreknowledge of the fall of the first parent, yet not the conditional, which alone furnishes that God decreed the generation of the elect from reprobrate parents, for this reason, that by conditional science he foresaw the fall of Adam before the predestination of the elect.

For these things do not stand in the way; for this reason, that with Scotus the absolute destination of the elect to glory is so independent from the foreknowledge, whether absolute, or conditional, of the fall of Adam, that grant that God by conditional foreknowledge had foreseen Adam not about to fall, whom de facto he foreknew about to fall, the same numerically-one would have been infused to God with respect to the elect; in which hypothesis, the same numerically-one elect, who de facto are generated by the reprobrate, would have had to be produced by others not reprobrate. This concerning the theological axiom, of which concisely in the controversia of predestination.

53 Concerning indeed the physical reason, why it does not stand in the way of the numerical unity of the effect, that it could be effected by several agents? which Scotus insinuates in the letter which we proposed under n. 50. in those words.

Ignis (A) quantitatis, et virtutis tantae, si ex tali materia ignem talē generaret; ignis (B) eiusdem virtutis, si in istam materiã ageret, eumdẽ ignẽ in numero produceret.

The aforesaid doctrine of Scotus Suárez thus interprets at the place cited sub n. 12.; that Scotus intends in that place nothing else, than that from the equality of virtue, which the agents of the same species have available, to hunt out the numerical identity of the same series of effects.

Which proof Suárez expels as weak; for this reason, that from the equality of virtue only an aquality is drawn out between the effects of either cause, yet not numerical identity; in such a way that the same individuum would be valid to make the effects which [the other could effect] around that matter applied to itself, that the other efficient of the same species could elicit.

Which opposition of Suárez rightly indicates, that Scotus did not produce the inclusion of the same number of the effect in a duplicated principle from the precise aquality of virtue, which alone seems to convince aquality, yet not numerical identity of effects; for such a aquality could stand between faculties of acting utterly diverse, and not converging into the same predicate of operative virtue, if that virtue only made available acting within its own species as the other of dissimilar potency within another species respecting a diverse series of products, (for we have more than once taught that the aquality of virtue between forms, and potencies dissite in species, is possible,) but from the identity of virtue, which is congruous to the agents of the same operative virtue, insofar as they converge, and are gathered together into the same faculty of effecting.

Which is clear from those words of the proposed text. Ignis (B) eiusdem virtutis eumdem ignem in numero produceret; for he did not say, of unlike virtue, as Suárez objects, but of the same. More explicitly another text of Scotus concerning the virtual precontaining of the same effect in several causes; not on account of parity, but on account of identity of virtue, see below sub n. 71. which is of the matter for blunting the blow of Suárez.

54 Indeed the reason for Scotus can be thus instructed; it does not stand against the numerical unity of any effect whatsoever that it be pre-had within the eminence of several causes on account of their natural sympathy in acting; as is plain concerning the mental word, which is pre-contained within the virtuality of the intellect, and of the intelligible species; and concerning the accessible idol, or the image of the sensation of vision, which is pre-had within the eminence of the visual faculty, and of the intentional species. Therefore it stands no more against the numerical unity of any effect whatsoever, that it be pre-contained within the eminence of several causes; if those converge into the same predicate of operative virtue, whether formal, or eminential.

Which I would say on account of the equivocal cause, which therefore pre-contains the same numerically-one effect, which the univocal cause pre-had within its own eminence; for example, the Sun the same numerically-one heat, which the hot thing produces; because, although the Sun, and the hot thing, do not converge into the same formal predicate of heat, they nevertheless converge into the same, at least eminential, reason of the operative faculty.

Therefore therefore this matter is to be untangled; that the universal, and equivocal cause, which indeed within the ambit of its own elicitive potency encompasses the whole collection of the individua of the inferior species; be able to elicit any individuum whatever of such a species. But the univocal cause would not pre-had the universal assemblage of individua of such a species; for this reason, that such a cause is one out of the individua of this species, and the same individuum cannot truly, and causally, pre-contain itself. Wherefore any individuum whatever does not intend a distinct series and line of producenda, which another individuum cannot elicit, as the opposite opinion fawns; but the same numerically-one class of products.

Because with Scotus all its asseclae, ancient and Neoteric, prop up that sentiment; especially Bassolius, in 2. sentent. distinct. 20. quaestione vnica. §. Ad primum istorum dici potest. Where he says.

A diuersis in numero potest idem in numero in eadem numero materia generari, sicut à diuersis calefacientibus potest idem calor numero in eodem subiecto generari; sic etiam idem homo potest generari à diuersis hominibus, etc.

Suárez follows Scotus, in sua Metaphysic. disput. 26. section. 5. especially from num. 14.

Which sentiment William of Rubione, Auditor of Scotus, firms up, and almost too slightly weighs, in 1. sentent. dist. 38. quaest. 1. conclusion. 3. et in 2. distinct. 34. quaest. 2. §. Sed hic sunt duo dubia. Whose words, on account of the subtlety of the doctrine, and for showing out of the testimonies of the ancient asseclae of Scotus how open a professor of physical predetermination Scotus was, I transcribe below in the following article; where the predetermination of God to the material of sin is urged.

Thus also, besides Suárez, the Jesuit authors so think: Peter Hurtado, as is plain from num. 73. And Valentinus de Herice, see the following article concerning the predetermination to the material of sin, sub num. 63. The same sentiment Gregory of Rimini props up, see the following article num. 77. where he almost… elucidates the matter with some spirit.

And besides the reason which we formed in the preceding number for the defense of Scotus, thus we can act ad hominem against the Thomists, out of a very common and received sentiment of the Thomists opining; that the same effect of the absolute power of God can be elicited from several total causes principally operating; since moreover the principal cause, insofar as it dissides from the efficient instrument, ought to operate by its own proper virtue; be it, that several causes by their own proper virtue conclude the same numerically-one effect within their own eminence.

For in such a hypothesis God alone would furnish that of miracle in that supernatural action with respect to the mode, so that he would supply the concomitancy of the influx; in such a way that he would predetermine both causes, and apply them for eliciting the same numerically-one effect simultaneously, and conjointly, which nevertheless severally, and divisively, the laws of nature regarded, they could effect.

Further; nor is that confirmation of our view a weak one, which is drawn from the connatural conservation of the same numerically-one effect by a wholly distinct cause. As is plain in light, which depends on being made and conserved in being by its own efficient principle, yet in such a way that, if another luminous body of the same virtue be substituted in place of the efficient, it conserves connaturally the light produced by the other efficient.

For it neither is to be asserted, that the light producted from the first luminous thing perishes instantaneously at that one's absence, and another numerically distinct one sprouts forth from the following luminous thing; since that is a voluntary commentum against the common way of sensing and speaking of all.

But the light could not be conserved connaturally by the second luminous thing, if it were not pre-contained within its virtuality; therefore it does not stand against the numerical unity of such a form, that it be pre-had within the eminence of several total agents.

Because since the conserving cause is a true efficient principle, so much so that if the illuminative action bursting forth from the second luminous thing would not presuppose the producted light, it would effect it; from this, so that also the same effect could be elicited divisively from several causes.

The other part of the sentiment of Scotus is firmed, concerning the potentiality and indetermination of the second cause to the effecting of such an individuum, whenever any composition of time and place is assumed.

56 TO which things being presupposed concerning indetermination on the part of the effect, that it be effected by this generator rather than by that; on account of which indifferency the contraction of the aforesaid indetermination is demanded from the first cause predefining, that this numerically-one effect be elicited by this efficient rather than by another; from the hypothesis that within the virtuality of either it is concluded.

Now it can be luculently made plain, and let it be referred, the indetermination on the part of the cause; on account of which the created efficient under that composition of time, place, and the other circumstances, is asserted utterly indifferent to this numerically-one act rather than another of the same species; in such a way that such universality, or commonness of operating necessarily expects the predefinition of the first cause constituting such an individuum of action before another within the same species.

So the cited authors, especially Suárez at the place cited; to whom subscribes Peter Hurtado in sua physica. disputat. 10. de causa prima. sectione quarta. praecipuè sub. §. 61. and out of the ancient Theologians Gregory of Rimini handed it down, in primo. distinction. 17. quaestion. quarta. articul. secundo. ad 7. et distinctione 35. quaestion. prima. articul. 1. Where because he opined all the grades of intension homogeneous, and not individuaally heterogeneous, so also he pronounced, the hot thing to be an agent utterly indeterminate to the production of heat as one rather than to the effecting of heat as eight; in such a way that the contraction of such an efficient cause to such an individuum of intension rather than another is drawn from the sole preordination of God.

Which placitum of the Riminate, although as to the homogeneity of the grades of intension, be not proved to us, who esteem them individuaally unequal, dissimilar, or heterogeneous; yet it is suffragan to our sentiment, insofar as he asserts, that the created efficient cause composed to such a confluence of circumstances is of itself indeterminate to the effecting of this individuum before another. The indetermination also of the created will to such an individuum before another, Gregory props up, in secundo. distinctione 35. quaestion. prima. articul. tertio. in secunda probatione conclusionis, whose words I transcribe below, in the following article sub numer. margin. 77. the same sentiment William of Rubione most strongly defends, see the following article concerning the Predetermination of God to the material of sin, from nu. 49. unto 52.

But the express testimony of Scotus for the indetermination of the thing, as it corresponds to such or such an extension of time; see in this art. under num. 75. where especially those words of Scotus are to be observed: Sicut est in Sole respectu radij; cùm non dependeat identitas radij in secundo instanti ad se ipsum in primo instanti, vel ab existentia ejus in tempore intermedio. Add the place cited; where also Scotus consequently maintains, that the same thing, the connatural state due to it being preserved, could after corruption be reproduced again; for the reason that it happens to an entity to be composed with this, or with that, circuit of time.

57 The truth of this pronounce-ment is produced out of what has been said; because the dependence of the thing upon the generator is more connatural, and intraneal, than upon place, time, and the other extrinsic circumstances; but the effect is indifferent from the intrinsic, and, the connatural state of its own production being kept, so as to be able to be effected by this, or that generator; therefore it is more indeterminate to be produced in this place, and time, than in another. And, accordingly, the created cause under any composition whatever of extrinsic circumstances is utterly indeterminate, so as to effect such an individuum rather than another within the same species; and hence it demands the contraction of such an indifferency from the first cause. I hold this reason most efficacious, granted the truth of the preceding assertion; that that effect is pre-contained within the virtuality of several causes.

Next; if a free cause were affixed to the producing of this individuum of act rather than of another; I ask, by what principle is such a will contracted, so that it elicit this individuum of act rather than another of the same species? For is this contraction drawn either from the intrinsic individuaal condition of such a cause, or from the extrinsic conditions, namely place, and time? If it be taken from the intrinsic individuaation of such a cause, that it be forced to the effecting of this individuum; on that reason, that that will is affixed to the effecting of this numerically-one act, and not of another, because the will is such an individuum; that is asserted gratis, since the same numerically-one agent can effect several acts numerically distinct.

Nor does the objection stand; that although there is nothing repugnant to the individuaation of the will to elicit, in diverse times, and places, several acts numerically distinct; nevertheless it is repugnant that in this place, and time, it not be forced to such a numerically-one act.

Because that is to flee vainly to circumstances utterly extrinsic; for that is the very thing we ask about: why, when time, and place so extrinsically adjoin the immanent, and spiritual motion of the will, do they so affix the will to such an individuum of action, that it is no longer whole with it to attempt another impulse within the same species?

Ludovicus Dolan the Capuchin answers otherwise at the place cited, parte 4. cap. 18. §. Responderi posset secundo. sub num. marg. 5. That such a contraction to a determinate individuum of action, given that coalition of place, time, and circumstances, is not demanded from the concursual action of God, (for the aforesaid author denies the immediate concourse of God to the actions of free arbitrium,) but that free arbitrium is contracted to such individua of action by habits sent in by God for that office, if such a contraction is to be demanded from an extrinsic principle, and not from the intrinsic virtue of each principle. And it is quite credible (he says) that as God sends into our wills habits inclining them to a certain species of act, so he can send in others determining them to some singular, and individuated act.

But this doctrine halts, and falls short in many things; wherefore it is shaken out, and cast down, first. Because although God, salva liberty, sends in habits inclining to the various species of acts, yet he cannot, salva liberty, send in habits determining free arbitrium to such a species of operations. Which we show luculently out of Scotus in this dist. ar 2. n marg. 11. where we elucidated that testimony of Scotus. Quòd esset contra naturā voluntatis determinari ab habitu, siuè à natura inferiori.

Whence we also manifestly produce against Dolan: that it implies a habit determining to such individua of actions; because since a physical action does not prescind in its tending toward the term, nor can it contract to individuum grades without determining to the higher predicates identified with the numeric grades: so that, if it stand in the way of liberty that it be determined by a habit to the species of the act, so also that it be determined to its individuation.

Moreover, I thus either shove at the assertion of Dolan; because either the habit, contracted to the individuum of action, submits its operative force to the will, or not? If it subject its force to the arbitership of the will, and leave it free, so as to be able to operate otherwise; the volition still remains potential, and indeterminate to another individuum of action. Of which indetermination, namely, again, by what is it contracted? by the same habit; or by another numerically distinct? If by a distinct habit, so that each habit inclines only to a single act in num. alone; it would follow, that in the same instant of operation there would be given infinitely many habits sent in by God, so that the will could freely, and at its arbitership, determine itself to any act whatever, which it virtually pre-had, as also the virtue of the will stands ready for the innumerable acts of the same species to be elicited through the whole aeternity.

But if you say, that the same habit is potent to determining the will to several acts numerically distinct; then the same difficulty returns concerning the habit, and its potentiality to several acts diverse in sole number, which urges in the will potential, and indeterminate here and now, to several individua of actions. Because if this habit sent in by God stands ready here and now for several acts in a discretely different number, (for if it were potent only to one, the unimpaired potency of the will would not be preserved salva toward either, and it would be necessitated,) I ask, by what principle is the habit contracted, so that here and now it produce this act rather in num. than another? Not from another intrinsic principle; therefore extrinsic, namely from the first cause.

Nor of greater moment is another refugium of Dolan, for which he cites Arriaga; that although free arbitrium hangs upon the permission of the first cause, so that it should be whole with it, or permitted, to elicit this individuum of action before another; yet not so as to need for that a positive determination of God.

For that does not stand in the way; because then only a permission is demanded, which bears itself in the manner of a removing, prohibiting [obstacle]; when an intraneal virtue stands ready for the act, and for the mode of contracting, and unfolding itself toward the exercise of the act. But no created cause, especially one operating through cognition, acquires an intrinsic principle such that it determine itself, or unfold its proper virtue to eliciting this individuum of action before another; because a free cause determines itself through cognition, and no cognitive agent understands itself to cognize this act with that num., and not another of the same species, or to appetize by this appetite in this num., and not another of the same species. As Gregory of Rimini argues sharply, in 2. sen. dist. 35. q. 1. art. 3. Cùm nullus talium actuum sit pro tunc magis possibilis quàm alius; voluntas ipsa creata indifferenter se ad quemlibet illorū habeat, nullumque distinctè cognoscat antequam ipse actus sit; ac per hoc non possit velle distinctè aliquem illorū determinatè producere. Et tandē post pauca cõcludit: sed talis causa libera distinctè illos cognoscens nõ potest esse alia quàm Deus.

58 Moreover, I urge the reason from those things which we premised in controu. 8. de aeternitate Dei, ar. 2. de duratione creata. à n. mar. 30. vsque ad 33. where we disclosed, that the thing is not composed immediately, and by its own essence, to this determined duration of the first mobile; but through the successive medial form of presentiality, or of coexistence, running out to the flux of the motion of the first mobile; which successive presentiality constitutes the praedicamentum Quando.

Wherefore, a thing, of itself, and from the connatural state of its own production, is so indeterminate, that it lies under the nature of this Quando, as also of another; that is, under this temporal presentiality with which it coexists at this time, rather than another; from which it is manifestly drawn out, that to the numerically-one unity of the action it does not belong to flow forth from the agent at this time rather than in another; but that the cause composed to such place and time is indifferent to several actions within the same species. To those things which we sketched at the place cited, which untangle that matter quite neatly.

59 Out of the things prefaced there emerges an efficacious confutation of Suárez, and of his asseclae, who expel the predetermination by the divine will. Because after God has excited our will by a congruous vocation, he does not foreknow, that it will consent, loosely, and according to the specific reason only of the pursuit of the impulse, as such; but he understands infallibly the created will to be about to consent by such an appetite with that num.; since the science of God does not attain the object according to the common and specific predicates, or in potential, and abstract being; but in the contracted, and the numericized: otherwise there could be attributed to God a science that would inspect man before this man, and so of the rest.

But any will whatever, excited by a congruous vocation, is not conceived the determined principle of this numen of impulse before another within the same species, unless the volition of God accede, contracting the created will, potential of itself, to such an individuum of impulse; therefore the divine volition, on account of the aforesaid causality of determining, cannot fail to be praefinitive, or predeterminative, of the whole created action.

Which reason Vázquez judged so nervous at the place cited sub nu. 53. that he opines it cannot be consistently sustained, before the principles of the controversies, by the school of the Jesuits; that the liberty of the created will stand with its determination to such an individuaal action, which is drawn from the first cause.

And rightfully did Vázquez censure that Suárez and the other authors fall away from the consistency of the doctrine; while they assert that the potentiality of the second cause to such an individuum of action is contracted by God, yet expel the predetermination. Because since with the aforesaid authors this contraction is not made on the part of the contingent effect alone, but on the part of the principle; it is consistent that the predetermination be censured absolutely, and simply. Since every motion of the first cause, which does not stop at the sole contraction of the effect to a determined futurition, but also passes through to contracting the principle, is a true, and rigorous premotion; not only on the part of the effect, but also on the part of the cause, so that from it, thus contracted to act, the influx also proceeds contracted.

The foundations are shaken [by us] of those who, when it is dealt with that the effect is pre-contained in several causes, assail it; where it is shown, that it implies, that the action of this agent flow forth from another, which we demand from the reason of the mode after the mind of Scotus; whence also we infer, that the vital operation produced by this agent could be effected by another of the same species.

60 FROM what has been said the foundations of the adversaries can be dislodged.

To the first argument of the first opinion improbans, that the same effect in its num. is naturally pre-had within the eminence of several causes. It is answered; that the action is not at all identified with the term, in the sentiment of Scotus, who opines that the action is in the agent, and not in the patient; which premise granted, it could also be alleged that, as the unity of the agent is not pernecessarily required for the numerically-one unity of the effect, so neither the unity of the action; and accordingly that although this act with its num. is so effected by this generator, yet it could have been generated connaturally by another; so also that it is so produced through this act of generating as medial, that it also could have been generated connaturally through another act.

It could be answered secondly; that the implication is not apparent in this, that as the numerically-one unity of the effect does not stand in the way of its being produced by several agents; so neither does it stand against the unity of the action, that it could flow forth from several agents taken severally.

But when the opposition acts, that therefore the unity of the action essentially demands the unity of the agent, for this reason, that by its essence it hang from the agent, and sprout from him,

It could be said: that such a pronouncement involves an amphibology; for if by the action's depending upon the agent through its own essence he intends the same as depending immediately, and not by any other mediating causality, or influx; in this sense it is true, that the action sprouts from its own principle through its own essence, and is not made by another medium; for otherwise of the action there would be given an action. But if he intends that it be of the quidditative reason of such an action to flow forth from this agent, and not from another; that could be denied, since as yet no assigned reason appears which demonstrates it; however else Suárez may feel at the place cited under n. 10.

Yet the prior solution is preferable, since it rests on the more common doctrine and expressly follows Scotus's mind, as will be clear from what follows in the next number. Further, even if we grant—but do not concede—that an action flowing from this numerically individuated agent could have been elicited by another, if we consider only the action's relation to its agent as an efficient cause, the contrary holds insofar as the action depends on the agent as its material cause, namely, as the subject in which it is received. In that sense, therefore, we must admit the proposition that an action depends essentially on its agent: its composition with its substratum—which is the efficient agent itself—is predicated of the essence of the action as a modal form. For Scotus holds that action inheres in its agent, so that not even by God's absolute power can an action be preserved without the agent from which it was elicited; the action depends on that agent both as efficient cause and as material cause, by virtue of the abstract notion of a mode.

Whence, granted that, with only the dependence of the action upon the agent in the genus of efficient cause regarded, there would be nothing repugnant to the action's being elicited by another agent, (which we hold false; since the action by its own essence flows forth from this agent;) there nevertheless stands against it the intrinsic dependence in the genus of material cause; according to those things which we assert below in the following number.

61 Moreover, that the agent is the substratum of its own action, or that the action is subjected in the agent, is certain-mostly with Scotus; as is plain from 4. fen. distin. 13. quaest. 1. §. dicetur ergo. fub n. marg. 10. et §. istorum trium fub n. marg. 11. vbi habet.

And this is confirmed out of the Philofophim, 5. Metaph. who defined active potency (effe principium transmutandi a-liua, inquantum aliud, ficut autem potentia actiua est principium transmutandi, ita actio, quae eft actus potentiae actiuae, erit transmutatio alterius, id est passi, inquantum alterum est.) And further below. fub num. marg. 14. §. si obijcias. he subiicit. Ex hoc patet folutio ad quamdam obiectionem prius factam ex illa litera; concedens enim Aristoteles ibi, actionē eße in passo, et non in agente, quia tunc agens moueretur; loquitur de actione fecundùm hanc quintam fignificationem; non autem fecundùm quòd actio est genus distinctum contra passionem. Illo enim modo accipiendo actionem. Actione formaliter aliquid est agens; ficut relatione eft relatum; et fic necesse eft illud, (quo) eff intrinfecum illi, quod dicitur effe tale per ipfum, ficut fimilitudinem eße in fimili.

Wherefore in controu. 9. de Vifione Dei. dist. 3. fubdist. 1. ar. 1. de Vitalitate vifionis fub n. marg. 25. 26. et 32. we showed, that the action is not, by formal reason, intrinsic, on account of which the patient might hang from the agent: but that the formal effect of the action consists in this, that it contract the potency of the agent, so that it pass from the being of a potential principle into the being of an actual principle.

Which Scotus also asserts perspicuously, loco citato ex 4. fen. dist. 13. q. 1. fub nu. mar. 16. §. isti duo respectus. where he teaches. Praemifit enim Aristoteles ibi in principio illius capituli de actione, quòd oportet ineffe actū vtriq; fcilicet, motiuo, et mobili; mobile enim est in ipfo passo, motus autē in operari; ergo illū actū modēatis, quē ponit operari, vult inefe motiēti. Vt fcilicet cōtrahat mouēs in potentia, et reddat illud fiue cōftituat in ratione principij actualis, et mouentis in actu.

Since moreover the action is the intrinsic form of the agent, and not an entitative form, but modal, of which the composition toward such a substratum is not made really distinct from the same form, (as, in entitative forms, the actual composition toward substrata is really severed from the forms, which are not modes, but entities,) thence it accedes, that it implies that the same form of action could also, divisively, hang from several agents. Of which see those things which we dispatched above in cōtro. 2. de vnitate Dei in Append. metaph. de distinctione entis, ar. 3. de dift. modali praecipuè n. mar. 20. et 23. where, de expressa Scoti mente, we taught that the composition of the relation toward the foundation is not really distinct from the relation.

And that the same judgment must be made concerning all the other accidental forms, which Scotus calls all modal forms, with quantity and quality excepted, is proved out of Scotus, in Quodlib. 3. §. habemus ergo primum membrum. sub n. mar. 3. editionis Cauelli. vbi habet ita.

Secundo modo accipit Boëtius, distinguendo rem contra modum rei; ficut loquitur lib. de Trini. (patet, inquit, qua fit diffẽrẽtia predicationũ, quia aliae quidem quafi rem mõnstrãt, aliae quafi circãftãt:ã rei; quia ifta praedicatur fic, quòd fecundùm rem aliquam monstrant, illae verò vt non esse, fed potiùs extrinfecùs aliquid apponunt.)

Vult ergo distinguere rem cõtra circũftantiam, et fic fecundùm eum folâ tria genera, fubftantia, qualitas, et quantitas, rem monstrant; alia verò rei circumftantias.

Hoc ergo nomẽ (res) in fecũdo membro acceptum dicit aliquod ens abfolutũ diftinctũ cõtra circumftãtiã fiue modũ, qui dicit habitudinem unius ad alterum.

Where Scotus, out of Boëthius, by the name of mode, comprehends all the accidents, with quantity only, and quality excepted; wherefore as, with him, in the same Quodl. 3. §. repõdeo, ftandum in ipfa relatione, fub n. 15. he asserted, that the composition of the relation toward the foundation is not really distinct from the relation; whence it comes about, that this relation cannot cohere to another substratum, nor even divinely; the same must be pronounced concerning action, passion, and all the other accidental forms, which Scotus calls modal forms; with quantity and quality excepted, which are entitative forms.

That the mode is thus used Hugo Cauel elucidates in Schol. 1. Quodlib. 3. vbi disquirit Scotus; an relatio fit res, vel ratio? where Cavelius thus has. Resumit tripliciter. Primò, cõmuniffimè pro omni conceptibili reali et rationis. Secũdò, communiter pro ente extra animam, vt opponitur modo rei. Tertiò, pro ente per- fe. Et quaeftio eft an relatio fit ref primo modo extra animam? Quia certum eft non effe rem fecundo modo, vel tertio, quia nec fubftãtia, nec aliud. Intellige quantitatem et qualitatem iuxta trãfcriptum teftimonium Scoti.

62 To the second argument, from num. 41. which also imbibes an amphibology; insofar as a principle sole and unique (which excludes the fellowship of another principle, within whose potency the same effect is contained, so that it be able to be effected by any cause whatever, divisively) seems to run together with the principle per se of such an effect.

For of a cause per se it is not required that the effect so hang from her, that she cannot connaturally be effected by another, divisively; but that it be so elicited by this cause, that from another its being is not actually received, although it could have asked it of her, within whose virtuality it is connaturally pre-had, had the premotion or predetermination of God acceded.

But when the opposition subsumes; that that is a dependence per accidens of the effect upon the cause; which is taken from the sole libitum, and the extrinsic statute of God.

That granted, we deny that the dependence of this effect upon this principle rather than upon another is drawn from the sole nod of God; but from the intrinsic, and natural precontaining of such an effect in such a cause; while from the external beneplacitum of God it is only expected, that, the aptitudinal connection premised in the fourth mode of perseity, and the natural precontaining of the same effect in several causes standing, he actually, and in second act, premote this one rather than that one to such an effect; since moreover such a premotion presupposes, by way of first act, the natural faculty of acting of such a cause and its connection with this effect, therefore it must not be said to be demanded from the sole extrinsic nod of God, but from the nature of things.

To the third argument; that, although de facto no individuum produces its own generator, for the reason that it has already pre-existed, placed outside the causes; and corrupt individua cannot again be produced, from the hypothesis of their past extraction outside the causes; and corrupt individua, the law of divine predetermination supposed, as will more plainly stand below from the solution of the first argument of Vázquez. Nevertheless, with the force, and native faculty of acting of any individuum whatever regarded, as that individuum could have been produced not by this generator from which de facto it issued, but by another; so also that same individuum could have availed, by which de facto it issued, (in that hypothesis, though, it would not have issued,) to generate.

63 As for the objection from vital faculties, which seem to produce through the intrinsic union and dependence of their operation on their principle—so that an impulse produced by this will could not be produced by another impulsive faculty—the same point presses in the case of intellection and other vital operations.

Suárez answers at the place cited, sub numer. 17. that it must be thought otherwise of the faculties that alter external matter, and of the potencies operating immanently; for this reason, that immanently-operating agents, of which sort are all the vital faculties, since they operate from themselves, and in themselves, are not only the elicitive principles of acts, but also the substrata, and material principles of them. Hence it comes about that, according to the numerically-one discretion of the efficient principle, there must also be alleged a distinction of the substratum, or material cause, of such accidents; and moreover, since the accidental forms, which imbibe a special connection with such a substratum, are pluralized in number according to the plurality of the subjects: thence it accedes, that as one and the same intellection cannot connaturally act upon several intellective potencies, so neither can it be elicited, divisively, by several intellective faculties.

But against this is; that as there would be nothing repugnant to the act of an immanent faculty from an aptitudinal dependence upon several potencies in the genus of efficient cause taken divisively; so neither does an aptitudinal dependence upon several potencies in the genus of material cause, even taken divisively, seem to be repugnant. Because although the actual dependence, and composition of a vital act upon several substrata necessarily imports a partition, and plurality of the form affording several subjects: yet an aptitudinal dependence upon several subjects does not convince a partition of the form, since it is actually composed with that potency alone from which it is elicited, although it be able to inhere aptitudinally in other potencies, upon which it could also hang in the genus of efficient cause; for the reason that it is actually composed with that substratum alone from which it flows forth in the genus of efficient cause.

Wherefore, as the heat, which is actually composed with one subject only, is not pluralized in number by the reason that it could be aptitudinally composed with several other substrata; for neither is the informative force of the heat exhausted around that substratum alone which it actually acts upon; since it is not a modal form identified with the composition toward this substratum, (otherwise neither could it be conjoined to another subject even by the absolute power of God, since God cannot supply the informative force;) so neither from this, that a volition, which is elicited by the will of Peter, could act upon the will of Paul; (as also proceed from the will of Paul in the genus of efficient cause;) is it pluralized in number on account of an aptitudinal dependence in the genus of material cause upon the will of Paul; although it cannot actually hang from several substrates, conjointly, but only in aptitude, and divisively.

Which mode of speaking has great probability: granted that vital quality does not savour of the nature of a mode by its essence affixed to a substratum; but rather that this, it seems, must necessarily be sustained after the mind of Scotus, with whom there is not a more essential comparison of the operation, or vital quality, to its intrinsic principle in the genus of material cause; than is that intimate comparison of the same quality to the same principle in the genus of efficient cause. Wherefore as there does not stand in the way of the vicinity, and intimacy of the comparison of vital quality in the genus of efficient cause to the intraneal, and conjoined principle, that the intellection flow forth from the intellect of Peter, or from the intellect of Paul, since it would be elicited from whatever agent as from a conjoined principle; so neither does the intellection more demand that it be composed in the genus of material cause with this intellect than with another: since the comparison of the intellection to the intellect in the genus of material cause is not more intimate than in the genus of efficient cause.

Of which take thus the philosophizing Scotus in Quodl. 13. §. de quarto principali dici potest. n. mar. 32. where he says. » Illa qualitas, qua vel est operatio, vel includitur in operatione, no habet relatione ad subiectũ magis essetiãle quã alia qualitates, alias qualitates » non esse essentialiter relatas ad subiectum, nec ista ponetur essentialiter relata ad subiectum.

64 But it can also be said otherwise for Suárez; that vital acts, which flow forth from potencies operating from themselves, and in themselves, or premoulding such a substratum of their influx, and not another, cannot be elicited by other agents numerically distinct. Because, although the same form in num. can be produced connaturally, divisively, by several agents, for the reason that such a dependence is altogether extrinsic; yet it is otherwise with the dependence in the genus of educutive material cause, which is intrinsic, if the form by its connatural exigency demands to be educed from such a substratum. Which distinction Scotus seems to have insinuated in the place transcribed by us, sub num. 50. Ignis (A) si ex tali materia ignem talem generaret; ignis (B) eiusdem virtutis, et qualitatis pro eodem instanti, si in istam materiam ageret, eumdem ignem in numero produceret. Where although he does not demand the unity of the agent for the numerically-one unity of fire; yet he demands the unity of the matter, which belongs to the quiddity of such a composite. Therefore, if the vital form by its connatural exigency demanded to be pre-had in such a conjoined principle, and to be drawn out from its educutive virtuality; it could not be connaturally educed from another substratum.

Which Scotus also seems to insinuate in 4 sentent. dist. 43. quaest. 3. whose text we transcribe in full below sub num. marg. 71. for he says. Quando cunque materia tota eadem approximatur agenti eidem sine impedimentis, potest idem reduci; (understand of non-being to being.) Nec tantùm eidem agenti numero, sed eidem secundùm speciem; quia identitas secundùm speciem in agente aequiualet identitati numerali.

Where also there incidentally occurs the thing to be noted, that which we showed against Suárez sub num. 53. that Scotus did not seek the containment of the same effect in several causes from an equality of virtue, but from a specific identity; as is plain from those words. Identitas secundùm speciem aequiualet identitati numerali. But that for the numerically-one unity of the effect, although the unity of the agent be not required, the unity of the material cause is exigible, is plain from those words. Quādocunque materia tota approximatur agenti; potest idem reduci.

Since moreover the intellect of Paul cannot subject to itself the intellect of Peter as the matter, and substratum of its intentional causalitatem, but can by necessity act only within itself; hence it comes about that it is not potent as to eliciting those forms of vital acts, which are connaturally pre-had in the genus of educutive material cause within the mind of Peter.

But it is answered; that for the intellect of Peter to elicit the intellection which is produced by the intellect of Paul, it is not required that it subject to itself the intellect of Paul; as neither has the intellection elicited by the intellect of Paul a greater connection with the intellect of Paul insofar as it is compared to such an intellect in the genus of material cause, than as it is referred to it in the genus of efficient cause. Whence as vital quality does not by its essence hang from this intellect in the genus of efficient cause; so neither in the genus of material cause; concerning which we at large above in controu. 9. de Visione Dei, dist. 3. subdi. 1. art. 1. de Vitalitate visionis beatificae praecipuè, à nu. 40 vsq; ad 45. Wherefore the answer of Suárez cannot be sustained in the way of Scotus; nor do the testimonies of Scotus requiring the identity of matter for the numerically-one unity of the same individuum favour Suárez. Because there Scotus proceeds concerning an individuum composite from matter and form; for example, concerning fire; not however concerning a simple form, and irresoluble according to physical being; and one which by its essence is not composed to a substratum.

To the instantia of the intentional species; we confess, that on account of their dissimilitude, or heterogeneity in representing, (although the representative species of objects distinct in sole number diverge only numeraliter, and not essentially) Peter cannot produce the intentional species of Paul.

Which same we assert concerning the grades of intension, in which with authors of better note we also receive heterogeneity; on account of which heat as one is not in act toward the grade of intension which is called as-eight, and exceeds the actuality of heat as one.

To the oppositio-n that the hy-postasis of Pe-ter can be pro-duced by Pau-lo

65 Concerning the opposition indeed of num. 43. contending, that if any efficient cause whatever virtually pre-contained the whole series of effects of its own species; it would follow, that the nature of Peter would pre-had the whole collection of human hypostases, which are distinguished in sole number; and accordingly also, that it could naturally cause the suppositality of Paul.

This objection we premised in part dissolved, in controuersia 1. in Appendice Metaphysica de subsistentia creata. à num. margin. 34. vsque ad 36. yet it can still be answered: by conceding that it is not inconveniens that the nature of Paul pre-had within its own eminence the suppositality of Peter; and accordingly that the contraction of the nature of Peter to eliciting this hypostasis before others would have to be drawn from the first cause.

Nor out of the aforesaid assertion is it to be inferred; that from the sole extrinsic statute of God it is sought that Peter be such a supposit, and not another of the same species. Because, as is plain from what was said to the 3. argument. sub nu. 61. as from this, that this effect, which is pre-contained within the eminence of several causes of the same species, is elicited by this rather than another cause by the volition, and predetermination of God, it does not follow that such an effection is drawn from the sole extrinsic nod of God, but from the intrinsic connection of things, and the eminence of the causes; which premised, so far as it touches the first cause, granted that this effect is pre-contained within the virtuality of several causes, that it be effected by this, and not by that; so concerning the virtue of the substantial nature to eliciting the hypostasis, and the indetermination of the hypostasis, so that it flow forth from this, or the other nature of the same species, it will have to be judged.

66 Yet the aforesaid answer seems to be assailed by those things which Scotus teaches in the place cited, sub num. 64. concerning the principles immanently operating, and premoulding for themselves a determinate substratum of their causalitatem; so that they cannot alter external matter, nor operate outside themselves. Of which sort that force seems to be; which we yield to any nature whatever, that it contract itself, and draw itself from the state of negative perseity to positive perseity; for neither does that elicitive force of the hypostasis suit the nature, so that it flow into an extrinsic patient, but that it perfect itself intraneously.

It is confirmed concerning the subsistence of prime matter. Which can be shown in prime matter, to which we ascribe such an effective potency toward the production of its own hypostasis, and toward the production of its own ubication; while nevertheless we profess that, by the common sense of the philosophers, matter lacks an effective force for altering an external patient.

Wherefore since the substantial nature, as the efficient principle of suppositality, is operative from itself and in itself; hence it comes about that the numerically-one discretion of the efficient principle imbibes the discretion of the material cause: Moreover, since a distinct material cause necessarily infers a distinction in the effect; thence it accedes, that the hypostasis of Paul, which demands to be drawn out from the eminence of the nature of Paul in the genus of material cause, cannot be educed from the nature of Peter in the genus of material cause; and accordingly neither be elicited in the genus of efficient cause by that same nature of Peter: since the productive force of the hypostasis is identified with the substratum of the eduction of the same hypostasis.

And as far as Scotus is concerned; it seems to be asserted that neither is the nature naturally inclined into an alien hypostasis, even though it be of the same species as its own; nor does it virtually pre-have it; as an adequate, and connatural, principle. For if the nature of Peter were a connatural principle virtually pre-having the hypostasis of Paul; it would naturally tend into that one. Of which hear thus the philosophizing Scotus: in Quodlibeto 19. a. 3. §. Tertio etiam negatio non sufficit, sub n. mag. 19. editionis Hugonis Cauelli.

For it itself (he speaks of the humanity of Christ the Lord assumed by the Word.) Since it is of the same reason with my nature, it has the aptitude for subsisting in itself; and it has not the aptitude for depending upon an external person.

Nor is it inconueniens that possibility be without aptitude; because for supernatural forms, although there be some potency in an insusceptible [subject], yet it is not properly an aptitude; since that is proper only for the forms that naturally perfect.

Where, absolutely, and without any distinction between hypostases of the same, or of diverse species, Scotus pronounced; that there is not given in nature a natural inclination toward union with the hypostasis of another supposit. But if the nature of Peter naturally pre-had within its own eminence the hypostasis of Paul, it would be naturally inclined toward that one; as appears perspicuous.

But this present dissertation must be lulled to sleep according to those things which we handed down after the mind of Scotus concerning the nature of the mode identified with its actual composition toward the substratum; so that incidentally the mode could be composed with another substratum even by the absolute power of God; from which there bursts forth the plain decision of this question.

For if the suppositality be the mode of the nature identified really with the actual composition toward this nature; there will be implied a contradiction, that the suppositality of Peter flow forth in the genus of efficient cause from the nature of Paul; as also that it hang in the genus of material cause from the nature of Paul; since the suppositality of Peter is its own composition exercised toward the nature of Peter; whence it comes about that the dependence of this suppositality upon this nature in the genus of material cause also imbibes the affixion of this suppositality, as of a modal form, to this nature in the genus of efficient cause.

But if subsistence be not a modal form, but entitative, not identified with the actual composition toward this substratum; which we judge the more probable in the way of Scotus, who asserts it more probable that a created supposit can by the absolute power of God assume an extraneous nature. Which could not be sustained, if the hypostasis were identified with the real composition toward the substratum; since the hypostasis is not identified, nor can it be identified really with the actual composition toward an extraneous nature: as neither can a relation be composed divinely to another foundation, or substratum, insofar as the actual composition, (or actual accidentalitas, as Scotus speaks,) by which it coheres to this substratum, is identified with the relation.

Therefore, granted that the hypostasis is not a mode but an entity; it must be said, consequently, after the principles of Scotus, that the suppositality, which flows forth connaturally from the nature of Peter, could have been elicited connaturally from the nature of Paul.

Nor does that opposition stand in the way; that the nature with respect to the sprouting forth of its own hypostasis is a principle immanently, or within itself operating. Because if the nature of Peter would effect the hypostasis in whichever mode it is elicited by the nature of Paul, it would also operate from itself, and in itself, the same hypostasis in num. By a similar reason, by which under num. 64. we taught; that for Peter to elicit from himself, and in himself, that intellection which is effected by the intellect of Paul, it is not required that he alter the intellect of Paul, or that he subject to himself the intellect of Paul; since Peter around his own intellect can elicit the same form of vital quality which Paul effects in his own intellect, for the reason that the intellection is an entitative form, and not a modal one, which is identified really with such an accidentalitas exercised, or actual composition toward the substratum.

67 Nor yet do those words of Scotus give any trouble. Natura habet aptitudinem ad subsistendum in se; et non habet aptitudinem ad dependendum ad personam extrinsecam.

For Scotus wills only this, that the nature of Peter is not naturally inclined into the suppositality of Paul as the compositive of the nature of Paul, and as flowing forth from another nature than that of Paul; yet he did not deny that the nature of Peter be inclined into the hypostasis of Paul, as flowing forth from the nature of Peter, and as the compositive of the nature of Peter; since such suppositality, from its intrinsic reason, is potential, and indifferent, so that it depend upon any nature whatsoever of the same species in the genus of efficient and material cause. Nor in that hypothesis would the nature of Peter be said to depend in the genus of formal cause upon an extraneous person; because the hypostasis of Paul, as flowing forth from the nature of Peter, and as the compositive of the nature of Peter, would not be an extrinsic, or extraneous, personality.

By an unlike reason, as although the intellect of Peter is not naturally inclined to eliciting that intellection which is effected by Paul, insofar as it hangs from Paul, and is composed to Paul as to an intrinsic principle; yet it tends toward that intellection, which from its intrinsic reason is potential, and indifferent, so that it flow forth from the intellect of Peter, or of Paul, as from an intrinsic principle. In which sense those things are to be taken which we handed down above, dealing with subsistence, in controuersia 1. de Essentia, et simplicitate naturae diuinae. art. 3. in Appendice Metaphy. de subsistentia creata. Membro 2. à numer. 34. vsque ad 36. inclusivè.

The other objects against our sentiment are struck down; and the substantial inaquality of individua is defended against the placitum of Peter Hurtado.

To the last argument it is answered, that since the action, or causalitatem, regards the formal principle of operating in the agent, and also the formal reason of terminating the influx in the term, if in the formal reason of terminating the influx, and in the formal principle of acting, or in the principle (Q. 9.) there be given an aquality, neatly enough there will be assigned a first act dispatched to eliciting the effect.

Yet since the formal principle of operating, or the principle (Q. 10.) does not cohere to the nature as contracted, in such a way that the operative potency flow forth from the composition of the nature with its own singularity, but rather suits the nature insofar as it antecedes its singularity, (for the nature of fire, insofar as it is formally supposed to singularity, imports that it be ignifactiue, as also the human nature that it be risible;) so also the formal terminus of the operation of nature is not the nature insofar as it is determined through singularity, or the composition of the nature with singularity.

Otherwise no univocal action would be assigned in the individua of the same species, since the formal terminus would not answer to a like producing principle; and because in singularity no similitude is found, since individua, insofar as they are such, are first diverse. Wherefore only this seems to be demanded, that the individuated agent import an aquality with the product according to the specific reason; however not according to the individuated condition.

Which, however, are not to be taken so that nature in abstract and specific being is operative, without the concretion of singularity; for otherwise it would come about that it could act even without existence, since existence is not closer to essence than singularity, and conversely. But, that the power of acting follows the specific predicate, as a passion of its essence; so that the power of acting coheres to the individual nature, speaking specifically, not however reduplicatively, as it is individual; but as it refers to the specific constitution, from which such power of acting flows, or to which it responds as a passion.

Next, that what Suárez had asserted does not seem to hold true, in Metaphy. disp. 26. sect. 5. num. 25. that, given the opinion of the substantial inequality of individuals, an individual could not produce, just as it could not precontain within its eminence, the whole collection of individuals, but only those individuals which would be equal or inferior to the generator according to individual perfection; but not those that are more excellent according to numerical actuality.

For against this is the fact that from the aforesaid assertion of Suárez it seems to be inferred that a generated individual ought never to exceed the individual perfection of its generator; which indeed cannot hold in the parents of the Blessed Virgin, and it also fails in other generators, who are found to be of less worth in genius and in the use and functions of the other vital faculties than those begotten: whence it is detected a posteriori that the begotten sometimes surpass the individual perfection of their parents.

Another argument ad hominem against Suárez. Next, that if the quality of perfection is not admitted in predicates which differ specifically; much less will it have to be asserted in individuals, inasmuch as they refer an individual reason primarily and per se diverse. Wherefore it will come about that an individual neither can produce individuals equal according to numerical actuality, but only inferiors, against the pronouncement of Suárez; for Suárez admits that an individual is capable of the generation of equal individuals.

Objection against our assertion. 69 But you will insist; that although the singularity of the effect is not the formal term of the productive action, yet it is truly and really attained by it; but it implies that the more imperfect cause elicit (just as it does not precontain within its eminence) the more perfect effect: therefore an individual is not able to be the efficient cause of an effect nobler according to numerical perfection.

Unbinding of the objection. It is answered; that since such inequality does not pertain to the principle, Quo, nor to the formal term of the action, and consequently is not regarded in the agent as the agent is formally, it will not hinder such an individual from being produced by another less perfect according to numerical condition; especially with divine premotion intervening, which can complete the second cause for that preeminence, or material excess of the action and term.

To others, the objection that the individual would produce an instrumental cause with respect to the inferior. Nor is it inferred from this, that the more imperfect individual attains the more perfect effect as an instrumental principle; because it produces the more excellent product not by its own power alone, but with the aid of divine predetermination.

The objection is blunted. Because there there intervenes disparity in the principle Quo of generating, and in the formal term of the action; but the ratio of a principal and instrumental agent is not regarded at the material term, but the formal one.

A fitting response on behalf of our opinion. Next; that just as it does not contradict the ratio of a principal cause, that it operate as moved; because it needs divine premotion contracting its indetermination to such an individual before another; so much so, that with such predetermination ceasing, it is not in act, so as to elicit such an individual; so neither will it be contrary to the concept of the same principal agent, that the executing faculty of God, or its executive power toward the outside, while it contracts the indetermination of the principle to such an individual of action, also supply that material [element] of inequality.

Another way of speaking, from the dilution of the last argument. But, he to whom these please less, will be able to answer; that since substantial individuals claim substantial heterogeneity for themselves; what wonder that they are not in act for the production of others, which surpass their substantial actuality; for which reason also degrees heterogeneous according to intension, and unlike, do not afford for producing a form of more perfect intension.

It can be said, that an individual is capable of generating equals and inferiors, yet not superiors. Wherefore it will be able to be said; that individuals will be able to produce only those which are inferior according to numerical actuality; and those which are equal; not indeed those which are superior.

Nor do those instances about individuations primarily diverse greatly make for the case; for equality can be asserted between individuals primarily diverse; just as we showed that parity of perfection can intervene between specific differences, in controversia 9. de Visione Dei. distinct. 3 subdistin 1.art. 2. num. 15. Where we transcribed from Basil such a pronouncement. Non apparet impossibilitas, cur non possent esse aequales duae differentiae indiuiduales sub eadem specie licet sint alterius rationis, sicut etiã dicetur de differentijs specificis.

To the instances about the generation of the B. Virgin from parents not equaling the individual perfection of the Virgin. That objection indeed about the individual preeminence of the Virgin also seems to be diluted; because by the special providence of God she was generated from parents not equaling the individual nobility of the most pure fetus.

The judgment of the Author about this twofold way of thinking. But because in good philosophy one must not have recourse to miracles (as far as it can be done,) therefore I judge the first way of speaking more probable, which asserts that every substantial individual precontains within its eminence all the other individuals of the same species; because equality is available in the principle Quo of generating, and in the formal term of generation, to which individuation does not pertain; otherwise, as we showed, no generation would be an univocal action. Next; that this way of speaking is more conformable to the mind of Scotus: who, speaking absolutely, used no distinction in more or less perfect individuals, but taught universally; that the elect begotten by reprobate parents would be generated by other elect during the state of innocence: and that identity according to species in the agent is equivalent to numerical identity.

70 Moreover, because Peter Hurtado, disp. 2. de Anima. sect. 7. subsect. 5. §. 94. assails the substantial inequality of individuals with no slight contention; it will be to the point to cast down his objections.

Thus therefore he argues; because the degrees of specific constitution in individuals refer quidditative equality; but these before the intellect do not differ from hecceities, or individual reasons, as it is established in the common school of the Thomists; it implies therefore that hecceities sustain substantial inequality, since equality and inequality are opposed privatively, as the position of a form and its non-being.

For inequality expresses nothing else than the negation of the quantity of virtue equaling the actuality or perfection of the other; but it implies the position of the form and its non-being coexisting in the same entity: therefore, given the disparity of the specific predicate, inequality in the individual degree of being will not be able to fail to be repugnant.

Nor would one go expediently against an opposition of this kind, who would adduce that only virtual distinction, or that which is called of reasoned reason (such as intervenes between the specific and numerical degree of being) could afford for inferring habitudes of equality and inequality of this kind, with respect to diverse formalitates.

Because whatever agrees to one formalitas reduplicatively; that agrees to the other formalitas materialiter, and identically: Just as the ratio of life, which formally coheres to supernatural appetite through a habitude to the living and intrinsic principle; also agrees materially to the supernaturality of such an act, and through identity with the predicate of vitality.

But the negation of the quantity of virtue, which inequality formally imbibes, can neither materially, nor through identity, agree to the position of the virtual quantity which equality refers, or conversely; otherwise forms, and the non-being of that, could agree in an identical conjunction; therefore if two individuals infer a habitude of equality by reason of the specific predicate, it implies that they import inequality on account of the numerical degree of being.

But the aforesaid doctrine collapses with no trouble; for besides that it supposes something false in the opinion of Scotus, namely that specific and individual degrees are distinguished by reason alone, when they differ by a metaphysical discretion from the nature of the thing: still, with only the virtual distinction of the specific predicate and individual reason admitted, the aforesaid opposition of Hurtado is demolished.

For he presupposes a falsehood, namely, that the respect of inequality is posited in the negative; when equality and inequality are real habitudes demanding positive substrata. Therefore the foundation of the relation of inequality is not the negation of the quantity of virtue, but the position of such a degree of being, which precisely because, as quidditative of its constitution or reason, it has acquired such a quantity of virtue, (no other negation being awaited,) infers the habitude of disparity to another virtual quantity, which surpasses the quantity of that one. Whence, although such a lesser quantity of virtue is necessarily accompanied by the negation of the quantity surpassing it, nevertheless the aforesaid negation is not the foundation of the relation of inequality; otherwise inequality would not be a real habitude, but of reason, against the common opinion; according to which no negation is the substratum illative of a real positive form, such as relation.

Then again; that just as, according to the common placitum of the Thomists, which Hurtado defends, the mere virtual discretion which intervenes between the generic and the specific grade of being obtains, so that the grade of animality infer the relation of identity, of equality, or of essential conveniency, between man and horse, and the grade of rationality the habitude of essential disconveniency and inequality; why, then, should not the mere virtual discretion between specific and individual reasons contribute to inferring a real and positive habitude of equality between individua, as they import quidditative predicates; and to the emanation of a real and positive habitude of inequality, as they express individual reasons?

Satisfaction to the foundations of Vázquez about the determination of the second cause to this individual, with such a coition of circumstances premised, where the physical power of nature is asserted for producing a corrupt [thing].

71 TO the Arguments of the second way of speaking about indetermination on the side of the cause; inasmuch as the second cause here and now, and under any composition of time, place, and the other circumstances, is asserted indeterminate for the effection of this individual before another; and consequently needing the effectual contraction and premotion of the first cause: it is answered.

To the first foundation of Vázquez contending, that if the cause here and now were indeterminate to this individual before another; it would follow that it would also be intrinsically capable of producing an individual which is corrupted; and consequently that resurrection would be possible by the forces of nature.

I answer with Scotus, in 4. sent. dist. 43. q. 3. where he inquires. Whether nature can be the active cause of resurrection? where §. de secundo articulo principali sub n. marg. 19. he says.

» The first conclusion is proved; because if the third opinion in the preceding article is true, whenever the whole same matter is approximated to the same agent without impediments, it can reduce the same [thing].

Nor only to the same agent in number, but to the same according to species; because identity according to species in the agent is equivalent to numerical identity.

Proof; if in this instant, this fire from that log generates this fire; and if in the same instant, that other fire were approximated to the same log, it would generate the same fire. But it is possible that the whole matter, from which this body was formed otherwise in natural generation, be again under the form of seed and of the menses in another womb; as is proved by the saying of Gregory, Moralium. 4. and is posited libr. 2. dist. 20. quaestione. 2. therefore then in another womb the same mixed body would be formed.

72 The second conclusion is more certain to me; because that one depends on certain [things], if the third opinion said is true.

I prove that second one; because the whole active nature is bound to a certain order of forms in transmutation, so that the whole of nature could not immediately after vinegar induce wine: but God alone in acting is not limited to that order, and that order is most necessary with respect to a natural agent, when one proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect; because that cannot be produced by more or fewer ways.

Now this mixed [body] is perfect among those corruptibles, and therefore a great order of forms preceding it is determined to it according to the natural order, as perhaps of seed, blood, and flesh, etc.

Now such forms do not precede that formation of the body in the mode in which it will then be repaired; because it will suddenly be repaired from ashes, or dust, or other things in which it had previously been dissolved; therefore the whole of created nature will not be able to repair that body in the same mode in which it will then be repaired.

Where Scotus establishes two things. First; that, the numerical unity of matter being given, even though a plurality of agents of the same species intervene, the same effect in number can be generated; which he hands down expressly in those words: Identitas secundùm speciem in agente aequivalet identitati numerali. Where he repeats, and confirms, that doctrine about the pre-containment of the same effect in number in several causes of the same species, which he had handed down from the mind of Gregory the Great, in 2 sentent. distin. 20. quaestion. 2., and which we transcribed, under numer. 48.

The other; that from the aforesaid it does not follow that the general resurrection of men at the end of the world can be asserted to be from the forces of nature. Because although nature should have the forces for reproducing the same effect in number; yet not for a reproduction so miraculous, by which human nature will suddenly be repaired from ashes, or dust, without the coition of male and female, and childbirth.

Guilielmus Rubionus expounds Scotus, in 2. sentent. dist. 34. quaest. 2. § Sunt hic duo dubia. Where with wondrous erudition he elucidates the arcane doctrine of Scotus about this matter, so as to exhibit himself not only a true follower of Scotus, but a hearer of him: thus therefore it stands at the place cited.

This can be the reason assigned why the same corrupted thing cannot be repaired naturally: namely because no second cause can act, except toward the effect to which it is determined by the first cause; but the first cause does not determine the second, nor did it assign to it the necessity for any corrupted effect to be repaired the same in number.

For since this corrupted fire is no more nothing, nor impossible, after it is corrupted, than it was before it was produced by another fire; consequently, that it could then be produced naturally, and not now, this does not seem able to be from anything else than from the first cause unwilling to assign to the second the necessity for the same effect in number, except once.

Peter Hurtado also follows Scotus in sua physica. disp. 10. de causis prima. sect. 4. § 78.

75 But when you press on behalf of Vázquez; because the second cause would be intrinsically capable of reproducing the effect; God, from the office of the first cause, could not fail to have been at hand to this power for expediting it to such a reproduction; otherwise the power of the second cause would be inferred.

It is answered; that just as by all authors, none excepted, natural passive power is asserted in matter for forms after their separation; when nevertheless the composition of such forms to matter is asserted impossible by the forces of nature. So neither is natural active power for producing a corrupt [thing] repugnant, although this power is never reduced to act; because the first cause, from whose office and function it comes that the second cause be premoved and contracted to such an individual of action, never predetermines to the reproduction of the same individual, but to eliciting diverse ones: because the new multiplication of individuals displays more the inexhaustible diffusion of divine goodness than a repeated, or iterated reproduction of them. So Hurtado at the place cited, following Guilielmus Rubionum, of whom in the following article sub numer. marg n. 51. et 52. although Hurtado does not cite Rubionus.

That indeed remains to be weighed, which seems toHover relying upon the placit of Vázquez and Dolan; namely that the unities of place and time determine the principle, and contract it to the numerical unity of this action before another.

For those words of Scotus transcribed, sub num. 71, seem to intimate this. Si in isto instanti, hic ignis ex illo ligno generat gnem hunc, et si in eodem instanti, hic alius ignis esset approximatus eidem ligno, generaret eumdem ignem. Where Scotus appears to demand, once and again, the unity of the instant for the numerical unity of the fire to be produced.

But the mind of Scotus could not be, that the unity of the instant is demanded for the numerical unity of the effect; since with Scotus the numerical unity of the agent is not required for the numerical unity of the effect, and it is more certain than certain, and most evident, that the numerical unity of the agent is more demanded, and conduces more to the effecting of this individuum, than circumstances altogether extrinsic of place and time. Nevertheless Scotus granted this to the adversaries, so that, the identity of the extrinsic circumstance of time being supposed, and, as it were, expedited by it, he might the more press the adversaries who demand the numerical unity of the agent for the numerical unity of the effect.

Which openly appears from the context of the same quaest. 3. §. Quantum ad istum articulum respondeo. sub num. margin. 12. where he also thus shows, that there is in nature a power to produce a corrupted effect, inasmuch as it happens to the effect, (the numerical condition of it being saved,) to be produced in the present, or the past, extension of time; the example being proposed of a ray breaking forth from a luminous body, and preserved for one hour without any physical addition, or intensive accretion. For just as the ray, as produced by the conserving action in the last instant of that hour, does not depend, as regards the numerical identity of such a ray, upon the coexistence of such a ray, and its presential composition with the successive extension of the extrinsic time of the first movable measuring through the course of a whole hour; (since it would be the very same ray, physically unchanged, although it had been produced only in the last instant of the hour, and had not been successively composed to the extrinsic duration for one hour,) so neither does it conduce to the numerical unity of the ray that it be composed, or correspond, to this or that extrinsic measure of time through coexistence. Whence also it is brought about that after corruption it can again be naturally reproduced; since it is no more distant from nothing after corruption than before production; and from its intrinsic reason it claims no more to coexist with that extrinsic instant than with another; take the words of Scotus, which we transcribe entire in numer. 75 of the present article.

Since that identity of the ray in the second instant does not depend upon itself in the first instant, or upon its existence in the intermediate time; because without that existence the same in number could have been produced, etc.

The objections against the opinion of Scotus concerning the power of nature to produce a corrupted thing are enervated.

74 But against the natural power of reproducing the product, you will object from Scotus, objecting against his own opinion in the above-cited distinction 43. quaestion. 3. §. Praeterea rationes quatuor ponuntur. sub numer. 8. where he says:

Moreover, the same could not return, unless the same power were for it; but this is false, because either the same power always remaining; or newly reduced. Not in the first way; because the power is corrupted at the arrival of the form; and consequently after the first reduction to act the same power does not remain. Nor in the second way; because as one privation succeeds another privation than that which preceded it; so the form is resolved into another power, if it be resolved into any.

It is also proved at the same time that it is in neither way: because there is no power toward the past; this form is past.

Where the mind of Scotus goes to this, that just as that privation of the form is distinct in number which follows the power after the corruption of the form, from that privation of the form which affected the power before the production of the form; (where with Scotus, that the power to the form does not remain when the form arrives is nothing else than that the lack of the form be taken away from the subject;) so also the form itself must be distinct in number; since the unity of the privation is taken from the unity of the form, of which it is the non-being; therefore after the corruption of the form there is not given in the agent a power to the same form in number.

Then again; that toward the past no power is given; therefore there is not left in nature an effective force for eliciting the same form in number, which is now past.

Which objections are torn down by the doctrine of Scotus without any trouble. For the first assumes that which was to be shown by him; namely, that the privation of the form of fire after its corruption is distinct in number from that privation which preexisted in the power before the generation of such a form.

Because since the unity of the privation is sought from the unity of the form; of which it is the non-being; just as we assert with Scotus the same form in number to be within the eminence of the same power before the production of the form, and after the corruption of the form; so also we cannot deny the numerical unity of that privation: whence, as it were, the same nothing of the form revives, the form being corrupted, which preexisted before the production of the form.

The second objection also obtains nothing; because, as Scotus most excellently demonstrates, when we assert that there is in the power a force for eliciting the corrupted form, we do not then intend that such a faculty of the power be available to the form as past, but as future; thus, then, Scotus has it at the place cited, n. 18.

Although it be argued against both members that there is no power toward the past; it is true, as it is past. Whence it is not properly a power, that what was, were not; but the power is toward that which was past, inasmuch as it can nevertheless be future.

75 For since a thing (as we opened above under n. 58 and 73) is not composed through its essence to such a duration of time, but is altogether of itself potential, and indeterminate, so as to coexist with such a succession of time; to such a degree that it needs a form of successive coexistence, or of presentiality, really and modally distinct, by which it be contracted so as to be conjoined to such a measure of time, and not to another: hence it comes about that the same form altogether in number can, on account of the diverse composition to a distinct course of time, sustain the denominations of past and of future being.

Which Scotus neatly untangles in the same dist. 43. q. 3. §. Quantum ad istum articulum respondeo, under margin number 12, where he adds:

It does not appear why nature cannot reduce something the same in number; for if, where there is a continuous action of a natural agent with respect to the product, as is the case in the sun with respect to the ray, it be posited to produce the ray in the first instant, and to conserve it in the time had, in the last instant (say B) the same ray will be there; since that identity of the ray in the second instant does not depend upon itself in the first instant, or upon its existence in the intermediate time: because without that existence the same in number could have been produced in the same instant. It follows therefore; that, that intermediate being destroyed, the same could be in either extreme.

Where Scotus therefore contends that there is in the sun a natural power for the reproduction of the same ray in the same subject; for the reason that, just as the numerical identity of the solar ray being saved, it can coexist with diverse courses of time, through diverse intrinsic forms of coexistence, and of presentiality to time, which pertain to the predicament Quando; so also it would not contradict it, according to the existence of a natural state, to answer, or be composed, to a distinct extension of time after its corruption, from that with which it coexisted in its first efflux from the sun. Yet, although these things be so, the same effect in number is never reproduced; for the reason that God is never at hand to premove the second cause to the reproduction of the same individuum; which we showed from William Rubio, transcribed under margin number 72.

76 To the second argument of Vázquez; we grant frankly, that every created cause pre-has within its eminence collectively the whole company of individua of the same species; yet not that it collectively effect the whole class of individua, but that from that indeterminate collection it elicit the one, or the other, divisively, at the nod of the divine predetermination contracting the potentiality of that individuum with respect to the whole collection of individua. Nor indeed is it repugnant to the limitation of a finite principle that it pre-have within its virtuality an innumerable multitude of individua; but that this power of acting can be reduced to act to infinite effects collectively; not so to infinite divisively, or to so many, or so many, out of infinite ones, at the placitum of the divine predetermination.

77 To the last argument of Vázquez; it is answered, that it in no way touches the opinion of Scotus, which, liberty being saved, maintains not only the premotion of God to this individuum of action in preference to another, but also to this species in preference to another; nay, it draws from the necessity of the divine premotion to such an individuum of action the necessity also of that same premotion to such a species of act; which we also did above in the present art., from nu. 27 to 29.

ARTICLE VI

How does God foreknow future contingents, the acts of the wicked?

Summary.

The opinion of Aureolus, and of those who deny the predetermination of God concerning the matters of wicked acts. Num. 1.

Objections of the contending Adversaries, that God be determined by the creature to the matter of sin; where Vázquez is refuted, as opining that God does not produce the substrate of sin insofar as it is moral and free. Nu. 9.

The escapes are foreclosed; and the reasons against the predetermination of wicked acts are pressed. Nu. 12.

The excuse of the divine innocence concerning predetermination to the matter of sin, on account of the intention of a right end, is refuted. Num. 15.

The testimonies of Scotus are opposed, which seem to disapprove the premotion of God to the matters of wicked acts. Nu. 19.

The placitum of Aureolus, who asserts that God does not concur immediately to the matters of wicked acts. Nu. 24.

Aureolus is defended from the charge of an improbated doctrine, from Bonaventure, Scotus, and Gregory of Rimini. Likewise also the censure of the placitum of Ladou. Dola the Capuchin, adhering to Aureolus. Num. 30.

It is shown against Aureolus that God concurs immediately to the matter of sin; where the proofs of Scotus are weighed, and the foundations of Gregory of Rimini, whom Vázquez follows, are rejected. Num. 32.

The letter of Scotus for confirming the true opinion. Num. 40.

Observations on the text; where we demonstrate that the predetermination of the substrate of moral malice must necessarily be sustained from the mind of Scotus. Nu. 43.

The testimonies of Basolius and William of Rubione, Auditors of Scotus, for the promotion of God to the matter of sin, and for the potentiality of free choice toward an individual use of action. No. 48.

That Bonaventure does not expel the concursive predetermination of God to the matter of sin, but expressly guards it. Num. 56.

Reasons for the opinion of Scotus. Nu. 58.

To imply, not only in the thing and physically, but also through our conception, that the divine will is contracted by the created will for the concourse to the matter of sin; against Scotus and his partisans. Num. 61.

What causality does the permission of sin import? To the first objection of Aureolus. Num. 64.

Why is God not the cause of sin? To the second objection of Aureolus; where we weigh the excellent reason of Scotus and of Alensis. Num. 68.

What did Anselm judge concerning predetermination to the matter of sin? and something from Basil. Nu. 72.

For the dilution of the opposed reasons it is shown; that either one must opine with Aureolus, that God does not concur immediately to the matter of sin; or that the arguments which are opposed to us do not specially press the assertors of physical predetermination. Nu. 75.

Answer is made to the foundations of the Recentiors. Num. 79.

For the eliding of the cavil of the Neoterics we show that God is not excused from the causality of sin on account of the intention of a right end; where we assail the Adversaries ad hominem from Alensis. Num. 87.

The testimonies of Scotus which are opposed against our opinion are weighed. Num. 93.

The testimonies of Maior, and of other followers of Scotus, for the promotion of God to the substrate of sin; and how the priority of nature between the concursive premotion of God and the operation of created free choice is established; on the mind of Scotus. Nu. 97

The objections of Vázquez and of others against our opinion are shattered; where the reason is also weighed, why, the premotion standing, the sin of omission is not attributed to God? Num. 101.

The objections of Card. Aureolus, disapproving the immediate concourse of God to the matter of sin, are discussed; and the vindication of the same Aureolus from the rigid censure of the Neoterics; together with the crown of noble Theologians added, who subscribe to Aureolus. Nu. 106.

Examination of the placitum of Ambrosius Machinus concerning the predetermination of God to the substrate of sin. Nu. 113.

1 That opinion is celebrated which denies the premotion of God concerning the matters of wicked acts; so that from it it seeks sharper foundations for impugning the predetermination which is a medium on the side of the object of the foreknowledge of futures; inasmuch as it judges such a medium to be wholly to be exploded in the foreknowledge of wicked acts. Which doctrine Cardinal Aureolus weighs most acutely and most eloquently from the ancient Theologians; with such force of judgment and weight of reasons, that from the sworn enemies of physical predetermination nothing further is furnished that is to the purpose, and presses the adversaries.

But while Aureolus assails us with that vehemence, having slipped into another extreme, he entered upon the claim, that God concurs immediately to the positing of the entity of the sinful act, and, as I reckon, consequently; because the machinations of the adversaries either plead that God is not the immediate physical cause of the wicked act, or they accomplish nothing, as will be clear from what is to be said.

Aureolus, insofar as he attacks the predetermination of the wicked act, is followed by the whole school of the Jesuits; Suárez Opuscul. 1. de Auxilijs. lib. 2. cap. 3. à n. 12. usque ad 20.; Peter Arrubal 1. parte. disput. 66. capit. 3.; Valentinus de Herice 1. pars. tractat. 1. de Scientia Dei. disp. 6. cap. 3. praecipuè numer. 40.; Didacus Ruiz de Voluntate Dei, most extensively from disp. 27. usque ad 45.; and so vast a work, which he composed on the will of God, he almost wholly insinuates in the confutation of the predetermination of God to the matter of sin. Which predetermination to the matter of sin Curiel confutes, 1. 2. q. 79. a. 2. dub. unico. §. a. cond. 2..

And not a few authors adhere to the Jesuits, who, while they defend predetermination in good acts; under the guise of piety, and the mask of religion, fail in the consequence of the doctrine. So Zumel, whom Machinus reports and follows, 1. p. disp. 35. sect. 5.

But it pleases to confirm this opinion from Aureolus, and, on account of the eminent subtlety of his arguments, to begin from those things which he hands down, in 1. sententiar. distinctio. 38. art. 1. §. Restat ergo nunc dicere. folio 875. Vaticanae editionis. where he has it thus.

2 That God does not know by the determination of his will, in respect of which there is no determination of his will: but it is manifest that the divine will does not determine the created will to sinning; therefore it cannot be said that, by knowing the determination of his will, God knows that Judas at such a now will be about to sin.

But perchance it will be said, that although God does not determine the will to sinning, he nevertheless permits; and according to this he has a will of permission, according to which he knows that Judas at such an instant will sin; inasmuch as he himself will permit.

But if it be so said, it does not avail; for that, it being posited, the effect still remains indeterminate to either part of the contradiction, because being possible to be made, or not to be made, does not lead by certitude, and determinately, into the one part of the contradiction; but the will of permission being posited, the created will still remains indeterminate, and the sin is possible to be made, or not to be made. For permission does not determine to sinning, but beyond this there is required the determination of the created will, which wholly remains indeterminate, however much it be permitted; therefore God does not know determinately the future sin in such a now from this, that he knows the permission of his will.

And it is confirmed; because the cause which does not posit the effect determinately, does not lead certitudinally into the cognition of it.

3 Further perchance it will be said; that in the aforesaid there is always something positive; namely the act substrated to deformity; therefore although the divine will does not determine to the deformity of sin, it nevertheless determines to the act substrated, since it is something positive.

But if it be so said, it does not avail; for it is impossible that something determine to the act, without determining to the deformity inseparable from that act; but the deformity is inseparable from that numerical act in which it is; and altogether the deformity cannot be separated from the act of hatred of God; therefore if God determine the created will to the act; he will determine also to the deformity, and to sin.

It is confirmed; because neither does the created will intend the deformity per se, but the delectation, and that which is positive in the act; for no one looking to evil operates according to Dionysius; moreover it displeases that the deformity is annexed to the act; and if he could, the sinner would will to enjoy the delectation, and to have whatever is positive in the act, the deformity excluded. And yet notwithstanding this he is said the author of sin; on account of that he is the cause of the act, which the deformity necessarily accompanies.

Wherefore if God determined the created will to such an act, he would necessarily be the author of sin; and again it ought not to be imputed to the sinner, if he be determined to an act of this kind, positive, by the divine will which is efficacious, and which is always fulfilled.

4 Further perchance it will be said; that God knows to whom he has proposed to give grace, and to whom not to give it; by knowing therefore this proposal, he may know who will sin; because he to whom he will not give grace, and he who will have grace, will not sin.

But if it be so said, it does not avail; because it happens that one having grace sins; and one not having grace, sometimes does not sin.

5 Further perchance it will be said; that although by the determination of the will God cannot know evils; he can nevertheless know other futures.

But neither does that avail; in the first place, because there remains to us the difficulty, how does he know the acts of free choice, in which sins occur? In the second place, because the difficulty is general about all futures; and some he knows in himself, without the determination of the will; it seems that he can also know all things in this way.

In the second place, because although of some futures God is the author by his will; he is not nevertheless of all. Whence it is not because God foreknew futures that they are; according to the Master in the present dist.

Thus therefore it is demonstratively concluded for any believer; that God does not know all futures by the cognition of the nods of his will, and of its determination.

Thus far Aureolus, from whose last pronouncement, which we transcribe under numer. 5., it is held that they manifestly fail in the consequence of the doctrine, who, while they deny to future contingents a determinate truth from the hypothesis of futurity, and receive the predetermination of the divine will as the sole medium of objective determination, nevertheless judge otherwise of the futures of wicked acts; opining that in the predetermination of the divine will they are not foreknown: for Aureolus evidently convicts them. Because the difficulty is general about all futures, and if he knows some in himself, without the determination of the will; it seems that he can also know all things in this way.

Then from those words of Aureolus; although of some futures God is the author by his will, he is not nevertheless of all; the opinion of this author, which he established by design in 2. sentent., is sufficiently openly gathered; namely that the wicked acts as to the matter, or as far as their positive entity, are not effected by God.

6 Then, against the predetermination of wicked acts, the more recent Adversaries argue thus.

First; because, as is clear from that of James, chap. 1. Deus intentator malorum est, ipse autem neminem tentat, unusquisque verò tentatur à concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus. — "God is not a tempter of evils, and he himself tempts no man; but each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence." — it is plainly deduced that God cannot be asserted the moral cause of a wicked action, even materially accepted, and by reason of the substrate of the sin-stricken obliquity.

For, in order that one be held the moral cause of sin, it is not required that he formally intend the malice; for as a man holds another to the perpetration of malice it does not exact that he suggest the privation of due rectitude, but the utility, or the pleasure from the base deed. Add, that concupiscence also tempts the will, insofar as it allures it to the appetition of a delightful good, the formal character of malice not being sought, which is not perceived by the sensitive and material apprehension, by which the concupiscible faculty is directed. Wherefore, just as the sensitive and material insinuation of the object regards only the delightful good, and does not perceive the good or the moral evil; so, in order that concupiscence be asserted to tempt the intellectual appetite, it will be more than enough if it draws to the pursuit of a sensible good; but it does not incline immediately to moral deformity.

But if God physically predetermine the created will to the matters of wicked acts; he would also morally influence acts of this kind, to which moral deformity is intrinsically composed: therefore God could be asserted the tempter, and the planter, of man in the perpetration of a wicked action.

7 Which seems to be produced aptly enough from the principles of the opposite opinion; because just as the aforesaid authors seek the predetermination of all the acts of the created will from the essential subordination of the second cause to God; so consequently they are obliged to confess that God predetermines the intellect and the imagination to all those apprehensions of base objects, to the appetition of which the cunning and craftiness of the demon instigates man. So that the imagination can elicit no proposition of a forbidden object, unless it be premoved and predetermined by God to an effection of this kind; however much the demon harasses the phantasy, and composes phantasms for the insinuation of a dishonest act.

Therefore that proposition of the forbidden object, which allures the will to a culpable assent, must be ascribed to God as the premoving and predetermining principle; but since such a motion of the imagination, which excites the will on the side of the object, or in the genus of final cause, is a certain moral drawing and causality; it will come about that God must be renounced the moral cause tempting and alluring the will to the fall.

For just as God on that account is asserted the moral cause of an honest and pious operation; insofar as he sends in indeliberate thoughts and inspirations, or predetermines the intellect and the will of man to the first-first motions of holy illuminations and inspirations; which are therefore said to be made by us without us, because the vital faculties are premoved by God to the indeliberate production of such supernatural motions, to this end, that by the mediation of those motions God obtain from the sinner the assent of a holy operation. If God were also asserted the promoter and predeterminator of wicked apprehensions; why should he not also be asserted the moral cause, exciting and sending in suggestions of this kind to this end, that, a physical premotion to evil afterwards acceding, the sinner may be unable not to assent, both to that moral and to that physical motion?

8 Moreover let the argument be invigorated from the temptation of the demon; for while he instigates the sinner to elicit an act of hatred of God, he conducts himself in no other way than by applying in the imagination such a composition of phantasms as may elicit the apprehension of God as a truculent and most hostile enemy; and by harassing the sensitive appetite, that he may enter upon the indeliberate motions of wrath and rage, with such contention that the sinner, succumbing to the suggestion, then deliberately pursues God with hatred; whereas the demon's power does not proceed further to changing immediately the spiritual faculties of the intellect and will. But God, the principles of the adversaries being supposed, seems so to complete the demon's assault, as to defeat the man and lay low his powers: both by predetermining the imagination, and the sensitive appetite, to eliciting those indeliberate acts, which the demon's powers cannot effect without divine premotion: and further, by immediately premoving the rational faculties to the fall: therefore God so efficaciously consummates the defeat of the sinner, which the devil suggests, that he must be judged the chief tempter of man, and the vanquisher of human frailty. Objections of the acting Adversaries, that God be determined by the creature toward the matter of sin; in which Vázquez is refuted, as opining that God does not produce the substrate of sin as it is a thing moral and free.

9 Secondly it is argued; because if God does not set forth a concourse which in itself is indeterminate toward good and evil; but rather contracts his concourse, not stirred up by our malice, but from the office and function of the first cause, toward the eliciting of an act contrary to the divine law, for instance, hatred of God; it would come about that it could not be avoided in God, that he be held the author of sin.

Which is opened up by the example of a man harassed by the suggestion of a demon; who before he rushes into the fall is supposed, with an indifference and deliberate insinuation of the object, to lie open to either alternative, so that he can embrace good as well as evil; such that no assault of the demon, however sharper and more troublesome, can extort an assent to the evil, God not pre-establishing or pre-defining the one part of the contradiction, or driving the sinner to his fall. Such that it does not occur, what God could answer to that just complaint of the sinner, which Soarius, at the place cited, libr. 2. capit. 2. numer. 14. throws up under the supposed principles of the adversaries.

Far from God be that: for indeed he could have determined my will to dissent, and would not, not by my fault, but of his own will; for before I sinned in any way, he so decreed and so acted.

Truly he could even say, he himself implanted me; for he himself determined my will, and made me act: and unless he himself had begun such a will in me, I could not have begun; nor after he himself had determined me, could I have avoided the malice, while I had it conjoined with such an act: in truth nothing occurs which could be answered to such a man.

And under marginal number 17. the aforesaid author storms thus against the opposite opinion. Denique non video, quomodo illud verum sit; perditio tua ex te, tantummodo in me auxilium tuum. Hosea 13. — "Finally I do not see how that is true; thy ruin is of thee, in me alone is thy help." Expendantur, quaeso, primùm exclusiua illa, (tantummodo.) Haec nam determinatio ad malam voluntatem, quantumuis addas pro materiali, est ne auxilium? Quis enim tale auxilium desideret? Si ergo à Deo tantummodo est auxilium; quomodo ab illo est haec praedeterminatio, et ab illo solo, et ex sola eius voluntate? Deinde ponderentur illa verba (perditio tua ex te) nam si vera est praedicta sententia, quanto impugnamus magis est perditio nostra ex Deo, quàm ex nobis, etc. — "Let those exclusive words, I beg, first be weighed out, (in me alone.) For this determination toward an evil will, however much you add for the material, is it then help? For who would desire such a help? If therefore help is from God alone; how is this predetermination from him, and from him alone, and from his will alone? Then let those words be weighed, (thy ruin is of thee) for if the aforesaid opinion is true, the more we assail it, the more is our ruin from God than from us, etc."

10 Moreover the aforesaid assault is pressed; because in that state in which the sinner is constituted, actually attacked by the devil, with that whole presupposition [presupposed] in which the sinner, still wavering, does not lend consent to the temptation. I ask, whether God, as first cause, can equally well predetermine assent to the shameful object, as indeed dissent? Neither can this indifference of the first cause toward granting a concourse to either be denied; nor can it validly be asserted in the Catholic way, that the will of the sinner, throughout that whole course of the temptation before he is fought down, is not indifferent, and proximately and morally charged toward good as well as evil; since either lies in the hand of his own counsel.

But if God is not asserted to set forth a concourse which lies open to either, the created will would not be able to be claimed as a proximate and moral principle expedited toward either; therefore, given any vehement temptation of the demon, it is unconditional for God, saving the office and functions of the first cause, to pre-establish the good or evil operation of man. Accordingly the fall of man is to be ascribed to God as his primary mover and promoter; not only because he was able to avoid it; but because he gladly preordained to consummate the temptation and defeat of the demon, when he could have premoved the created will toward good.

Wherefore it follows that God would be the planter of the impious man; as of Ecclesiasticus, chap. 15. Wherefore that of Ecclesiasticus, chap. 15. seems to militate against the aforesaid opinion: Non dicas ille me implanavit, non enim necessarij sunt illi homines impij; — "Say not, He planted me; for they are not needful men, those impious men;" since from the pronouncements of the adversaries it seems to be inferred that God is the planter of man, drawing him morally and impelling him physically into the fall.

Objection; that God predetermines toward evil according to the exigency of free choice. If you object; that God predetermines toward evil according to the exigency of the created will; because it is not equally prone toward good and evil, but rather is so inclined toward evil that it seems to await the concourse of God, that it elicit a perverse act.

Refuted in the will before the first mortal sin. That such a refuge be shut off; let the objection go forward about the first sin of man, presupposing [which presupposes] no mass of other sins, which by the weight of depraved custom would drag him into other falls; for instance, about the first fall of Adam, and about the first sin of the Angel, in which any disposition, or inclination toward the fall preceding consent could not have been culpable. And therefore the whole root of that sin-stricken obliquity seems to be reducible to the sheer absolute decree of God, not involving the condition of a cooperation of the created cause; which, in that by his nod he could have predecreed dissent, he predetermined assent toward evil.

The reason is pressed, even given a vehement propensity toward evil. Then especially; because that greater propensity toward evil being given, by the mode of a first act before the actual consent; if it belonged to the office of the first cause to premovet the created will toward evil according to the force of that inclination; it would come about that as often as the demon, vehemently attacking man, while he stands in such a state, that agonizing in vehement danger of a fall he leans more toward shameful assent; then it would belong to the function of the first cause to premovet and consummate the temptation of the demon, and to drive the sinner, even the wavering one, into the fall; which the pious mind in Soarius recoils even to think.

Arg. 3. that God would be the cause of sin, as sin, formally. 11 It is argued thirdly; because if God, without expecting the transgression of the sinner, determined assent absolutely toward evil, nor from his side offered a concourse indifferent though to be contracted from the operation of the failing sinner; there would be no reason why God should not be renounced in the whole rigor as a sinning and failing cause? Since whatever is physical and moral in a sinful act is effected from a failing will.

Evasion out of the doctrine of Vazquezii; that God is not the cause of moral character in a perverse act. Nor, indeed, does that answer of Vázquez please: t. 2. tom. 1. disput. 129. capit. 9. numer. 25. that God is therefore not the cause of sin, because he does not produce moral character in the perverse act; since such a predicate is not something intrinsic in the act, but only an extrinsic denomination connoting the intrinsic principle freely failing; not truly the extrinsic principle, such as is God.

Vázquez refuted. For this does not stand in the way; because that which is the efficient physical cause of a form, from which the extrinsic denomination is drawn, is also the true principle of the extrinsic denomination that accrues toward such a form. But God effects, not an influx which is indeterminate and indifferent in himself toward truth, but an influx contracted toward such a species of action, whatever physical can be considered in the act, as it is the substrate inferring moral character; therefore he also attains secondarily, and consequently, the denomination of a moral and free being, which infallibly follows upon such a substance of an act, elicited under such a composition of circumstances.

In what way an extrinsic denomination consequent upon an intrinsic form is effected. Nor indeed can any other genus of emanation be ascribed to extrinsic denominations than a certain sequel and accretion upon such an intrinsic form, which is truly effected physically and primarily by the agent; as the denomination of dexterity recognizes no other physical principle than local motion, which, while it constitutes the located thing under such a where and situation, denominates the located thing secondarily and consequently right or left; for the local motion, by which the animal advances toward the right hand of the man, while the animal first intends to locate in such a space, consequently and secondarily denominates that located thing right.

It follows that God would not be the principle of moral character in an upright act. Then; that if the effecting of the predicate of moral character, or of liberty, in a sinful act, could not be ascribed to God, since it is not something intrinsic and physical, it would also come about that God could not be the cause of an honest act, since moral goodness also presupposes the predicate of a free being in the act, which carries the habitude of the connotation not toward an extrinsic cause, such as is God, but toward an intrinsic principle. And accordingly it would follow; that while Vázquez strives to avoid God as author of sinful obliquity, he would be compelled to pronounce him also not the principle of the right action, (by which he dons moral honesty.)

Moreover, and more efficaciously; because it does not express grammatical justification for the predicate of moral character and liberty, nor more than the predicate of vitality; as is perspicuous to all and on the whole acknowledged. But though the act imports vitality through a habitude of the principle intrinsically aimed at; undeniably the predicate of vitality is effected by God, since it is a real and intrinsic grade of being: therefore, grant that moral and free being expresses a connotation to the intrinsic principle; that will not stand in the way of its being attained by God, if the causality of God immediately attains whatever is elicited by a created cause as the foundation of such an extrinsic denomination.

There is added, on behalf of the liberty of an act not only elicited by God, but rather more priorly pending toward the first cause than toward a created free choice, an elegant testimony of Scotus ex 1. sent. dist. 39. quaest. unica §. Ad aliud de tertia opinione. at the end of the question, under marginal number 35. where he has it as follows.

Dico, quòd contingentia non est tantum privatio, vel defectus entitatis, sicut est deformitas in actu secundo, quae est peccatum; imò contingentia est modus positivus entitatis, sicut necessitas est alius modus; et omne positivum, quod est in effectu, principaliùs est à causa priore. — "I say, that contingency is not only a privation, or defect of entity, in the way that deformity is in a second act, which is sin; nay, contingency is a positive mode of entity, as necessity is another mode; and every positive that is in an effect is more principally from the prior cause."

Et ideò non sicut deformitas est ipsius actus à causa secunda, et non à causa prima, ita est contingentia; imò contingentia perpriùs est à causa prima, quàm secunda: propter quod nullum causatum esset formaliter contingens, nisi à prima causa contingenter causaretur; sicut ostensum est. — "And therefore not as deformity is of the act itself from the second cause, and not from the first cause, so is contingency; nay, contingency is more priorly from the first cause than from the second: wherefore no caused thing would be formally contingent, unless it were caused contingently by the first cause; as has been shown."

Where Scotus argues that the predicate of liberty in a human and moral act is not deferred to the secondary free cause alone, as Vázquez wills; but more priorly to the first, than to the second. But we subjoin below a fuller elucidation of this testimony of Scotus in hac controuer. de Scientia Dei. distin. 3. de Scientia contingentium absolutorum. art. 4. marginal numbers 5 and 8. which text is to be recited, since it refers the constant mind of Scotus on the premotion of the concursive God with respect to every created operation.

But in the use of those words there remains this to be noted. Contingency is a positive mode of entity, as necessity is another mode: namely, that when Scotus asserts contingency, or indifference, and liberty, in the operation of free choice to be a mode of operation; there he does not take the intrinsic mode insofar as it is opposed to the thing, or entitative form, which, as con-distinguished from the mode, is not identified really with the composition of its mode to the substrate. In which sense Scotus, in Quodlibeto 3. §. Habemus ergo primum membrum, under mar. num. 3. holds that relation is not a thing, but a mode; in which use of mode, too, he judged that substance, quantity, and quality alone were things, but relation, and the other categories, modes: of which we have treated visibly in the preceding article, in a physical digression on the potentiality of the will toward such an individual, *marginal num. 61.*omitting the action composed intrinsically to this agent, not even by the absolute power of God composable to another agent; since it is a mode identified with the actual composition of the latter to this agent.

Therefore contingency and the liberty of an act are to be asserted as the mode of the act in that use of the mode affixed to the substrate per its essence; since liberty, and necessity in the act of the will, as we have more than once shown, are not intrinsic predicates, but mere extrinsic denominations, which accrue to an act and recede, saving its physical substance. As is plain in an impulse of the will not free, because of a defect of deliberation, which, with the deliberation of reason then itself acceding, continues freely without any mutation, and physical addition, from the side of the impulse.

Therefore the mode is called liberty, and contingency of the act, in that acception of mode which does not say the substance of being, but the circumstance of the thing, insofar as it abstracts from an intrinsic, or extrinsic circumstance. Of which take the testimony of Scotus at the place cited, ex Quodlib. 3. mar. num. 3.

Secundo modo accipit Boetius distinguendo rem contra modum rei; sicut loquitur libro de Trinitate. Patet (inquit) quae fit differentia praedicationum; quia aliae quidem quasi rem monstrant, aliae quasi circumstantiam rei; quia istae praedicantur sic; quòd secundùm se rem aliquam monstrant, illa verò, ut non esse, sed poriùs extrinsecùs aliquid apponunt. Vult ergo distinguere rem contra circumstantiam; et sic secundùm eum, sola tria genera, substantia, qualitas et quantitas, rem monstrant: alia verò rei circumstantias. — In that second way Boethius takes it, distinguishing the thing against the mode of the thing; as he speaks in the book On the Trinity. What is apparent, he says, of the difference of predications; because some indeed point out as it were the thing, others as it were the circumstance of the thing; because those are predicated thus: that they point out some thing in themselves, but those as though not being, but rather as applying something extrinsically. He shall therefore carry the thing, that there be distinguished the thing against the circumstance; and thus according to him, the only three genera, substance, quality and quantity, point out the thing: but the others the circumstances of the thing.

It is to be added moreover; that although contingency insofar as it is taken for the liberty of an act, and necessity insofar as it is opposed to liberty, are intrinsic modes of being; nevertheless contingency insofar as it is opposed to necessity in being the sign, and as it imported a convertibility into nothing, or a logical power of not being, is not an extrinsic mode of created nature, but an intrinsic mode transcending the quiddity of created being, according to that use of mode which sounds a predicate imbibed in the quiddity of the thing. As infinity is a mode of Deity in Scotus; and finity is a mode of a participated being transcending the quantity of its virtue, or perfection. Of which see, what we have sketched out above, in contro­versia 2. de Unitate Dei. in the appendix of the distinction of being. art. 3. de distinct. modali, et quadditate modi. marginal number 5. These things premised for the expugnation of the mode of speaking of Vázquez; let us pursue the machinations of the other adversaries against the premotion of God toward the matter of sin.

12 WHEREFORE it is argued for the fourth time; if God, without our fall being awaited, were to adopt an absolute proposition of determinately effecting an act contrary to the divine law, for instance, hatred of God; the sinner would be held to so assent to that divine premotion, that he could not hold himself back from hatred of God without the lethal crime of the attempt on the divine omnipotence.

Which opposition, that it may strike at the adversaries the more, supposes; that someone by a divine revelation should be intimately acquainted with the absolute decree of God for the predetermining of the will of Man toward such a perverse act, for instance, toward hatred of God. Then, either would that one be bound to labor something against the absolute proposition of God not involving the condition of the cooperation of the created cause; which would be to attempt the violation of the divine omnipotence; or he would be held to pursue God with hatred.

A man might confirm it; because thus far no reason has been delivered by the adversaries, nor can one be rendered, why God cannot not be the moral cause of the perverse act materially claimed, or insofar as it is a substrate of moral malice, if God is asserted to be the premover, and physical predeterminer of every perverse act as to its every positive reason? For if nothing absurd results in this, that God, not as stirred up and moved by our malice, but upon the ground of the sole statute of his will, pre-establish before the consent of the created will the effecting of a shameful act; why should he not elicit the indeliberate motions in the intellect and will of the sinner for this end, that the sinner consent more sweetly and more freely into the shameful object? But the first, concerning the moral causality of God around the materialia of perverse acts, even when the formal ratio of malice is not intended, cannot be asserted without the heavy note of error; therefore neither can such a physical predetermination, which God would perform, be defended.

13 Moreover; nor does that sufficiently tested response of the Theologians seem to satisfy the foregoing objections; that God bears himself by the same ratio when he predetermines and premoves toward the act of hatred, as he would bear himself in that hypothesis in which, by himself alone, without the cooperation of the created cause, he would effect the same act of the hatred of God, (which we have more than once taught to be essentially posited not in action, but in vital quality,) and would compose it to the same will. But that God, on account of the production of that quality, should not be credited author of sin, although by the force of the composition of such a form to the created will, the created will would pursue God with hatred: therefore neither in fact, when the will cooperates, does God flow into such an act.

The hypothesis of the producibility of the act of hatred of God, in that it is performed by the first cause without a concourse of the second cause, Didacus Ruiz expels, tome on the will of God, disput. 27. section. 7. num. 21. although the other vital qualities could be elicited by God without the concourse of the living faculty.

But gratuitously, and against the common opinion of the ancient Theologians; for although some Authors sustain that the production of a vital quality without influx of a power is self-contradictory, nevertheless to esteem the other vital qualities producible by God alone, and to declare only the form of the hatred of God unproducible, seems a voluntary pronouncement.

Nor indeed does a probable reason occur why, admitted the possible production of the other impulsive qualities by God alone, without the concourse of the vital faculty, we should deny that virtue in God around the materialia of perverse acts, whose effecting he concurs in stepping into without injury to his supreme sanctity, not contracted from the absolute decree prior to the exercised cooperation of the failing free choice; since such a contracted operation of free choice, not prodding from a determined will of God, is unintelligible and contradictory, as we evidently show in this article.

Then therefore; since many Theologians sustain that an act of volition, from God without an efficacious influx of the will, cannot constitute the will in the vitally pursuing object; yet the more common opinion of the Thomists affirms that a vital quality (as being that which depends not immediately and by its essence upon a vital faculty) can be effected by God without the cooperation of the vital power; although they declare the same impossible concerning the action, or vital influx.

Wherefore, given the producibility of the act of hatred of God, Ferrariensis extracts the matter; whom I transcribe, that it stand clearly how open an assertor of the physical premotion of God toward the materialia of perverse acts he was; toward certain Authors of the Jesuits, who aver such a premotion to be not the pronouncement of the ancient Theologians, but a new invention of the recent Thomists. Thus, therefore, he has libr. 3. contra gentes capit. 71. §. Aduerte, quod ex ista responsione. vbi subdit.

Sed occurrit unum dubium. Nam movens causam secundam ad actionem, quam semper, et inseparabiliter concomitatur defectus, et malum; videtur non solùm esse causa bonitatis actionis, sed etiam malitiae concomitantis; unde ut habetur ex 2. Physic. quod pro maiori parte euenit, non dicitur esse praeter intentionem. — "But one doubt occurs. For the one moving a second cause into action, from which defect and evil always and inseparably are concomitant; seems to be not only the cause of the goodness of the action, but even of the malice concomitant; whence, as is held from Physics II, what happens for the most part is not said to happen against the intention."

Sed sunt aliquae operationes humanae habentes semper annexam malitiam, puta odium Dei; ergo si Deus est causa entitatis actionis, oportet dicere quòd etiam sit causa malitiae et deformitatis coniunctae; et sic non refertur illa operatio, inquantùm deficiens est, solùm in causam proximam deficientem. — "But there are certain human operations having malice always annexed, for instance hatred of God; therefore if God is the cause of the entity of the action, one is obliged to say that he is also the cause of the conjoined malice and deformity; and thus that that operation is not referred, insofar as it is a defect of the good, to the proximate failing cause."

Respondetur ex doctrina Sancti Thomae; quòd malitiam consequi inseparabiliter actum aliquem, dupliciter potest intelligi; uno modo ut consequatur ipsum absolutè consideratum secundùm entitatem suam: alio modo ut consequatur ipsum secundùm quòd à tali agente, puta à libero arbitrio, procedit. — "It is responded out of the doctrine of Saint Thomas; that malice's inseparably following upon some act can be understood in two ways; in one way, that it follow it itself considered absolutely according to its entity: in the other way, that it follow it insofar as it proceeds from such an agent, for instance, from free choice."

In the first way no deformity of sin is concomitant with any act; because if the essence of that act of hating God, produced by the free choice of the creature, were produced by God alone, the act would not be an evil and deformed act; because it would not be done badly. For although that act cannot proceed from man without deformity, because it never proceeds from him except insofar as it disagrees from its own rule; nevertheless the first agent can move the cause to acting the entity of the action, and not act toward deformity. But in this Ferrariensis displeases; for he judges that through the form of the act of the hatred of God, without the efficacious concourse of the vital faculty, there cannot be constituted in being one hating God; for thus he subjoins.

Ad hoc vt aliquit per actum odij dicatur alium habere odio, non sufficit quòd essentia illius actus sit à illo immediatè causata; sed requiritur quòd sit operatio à ipsius voluntate deficiente immediatè elicita; etc. — "For it to be said by any act of hatred, that one has another in hatred, it does not suffice that the essence of that act be immediately caused by him; but it is required that it be an operation immediately elicited by the failing will; etc."

*Quod latè expugnatum praemittimus, in contrauersia 9. generali de Visione Dei: dist. 3. subdist. 1. ar. 1. chiefly from n. 46. up to 49.

Quare melius sic res explicat Aureolus, in 2. sent. dist. 38. q. 1. art. 1. §. Ad primum patet: in quolibet peccato actuali sunt tria: where he says.

Ad propositum dico; quòd absolutè de potentia, posset Deus ponere in voluntate mea odium sui; ita quòd actus ille esset virtute diuina in voluntate mea, et esset malum, et defectus voluntatis; non tamen esset peccatum nec culpa. — "For the purpose I say; that absolutely in power, God could put into my will hatred of himself; so that that act were in my will by divine power, and were an evil, and a defect of the will; nevertheless it would not be a sin, nor a fault."

Primum probo; quia esset disconueniens voluntati; malum est autem coniunctio disconuenientis, vt patet suprà. — "I prove the first; because it would be unconforming to the will; but evil is the conjunction of what unconforms, as is apparent above."

Second; that it is not sin, I prove. For sin is said in order to an agent, but the will would not be there actively, but passively; therefore with respect to the will there would be no sin there.

Because guilt connotes a dominion in the agent with respect to the act of the will; but the will would then be necessitated by God to that act; therefore it would not be a guilt of the will, nor imputable to it. Nor is it incongruous that God place in the will anything whatever absolutely, without imputability.

Here Aureolus admirably teaches by what rationale — even granted that the created will pursued God with hatred by a form infused by God without any influx of the power — the will would not sin in that hypothesis; which we too seriously opened up at the place cited.

But still, from those things we observed there, the following opposition is formed against the assertors of the physical predetermination of the substrates of moral malice. Because, as is clear from what we established there: given the infusion of a vital form without the power influencing in the first production of that form — if, however, the will afterwards concurred effectively in the conservation of such a quality with deliberation and use of reason — the created will would truly sin. But by a better right the deformity inseparably connected with such an act ought to be ascribed to God predetermining the will to the act of hatred, than that it could be deferred to the created will, not first producing such an act but only deliberately conserving the form of hatred infused by God; therefore.

Then, or thus, I press the argument in that hypothesis: that free choice would elicit the act of hatred of God; and, given the free production of such a sinful act, it would be necessitated by God to the continuation of such an evil act. For free choice could be necessitated according to our principles if God infused some quality of the species of a power which would affix free choice to one in the first act; or by His power specially composed in the role of a particular principle He would supply the effective force of that quality and determine free choice to one in the first act; so that the power of God be composed with free choice not to either-in-the-first-act, but determinately to one in the first act.

In this hypothesis, then, in which free choice would be necessitated to the continuation of the evil act freely elicited by the created will, free choice would not sin in the continuation of that act, because it would be necessitated by God to such a continuation. But it would no less be affixed to continuing the matter of sin in that supposition than it is in fact affixed to its first production by the predetermination through the absolute purpose of the divine will; therefore neither in fact does free choice sin, predetermined by an absolute and efficacious decree.

Then also, because free choice would not conduct itself otherwise on the side of the effect in that supposition — or the cooperation of free choice would not be otherwise, nor would it be more fixed to one part of the contradiction — than it exists in fact when the will is said to be freely predetermined by God to the continuation of the evil act; therefore nor on the side of the decree composing the power of God with free choice would there be any dissimilarity, since it implies a disparity of decrees of the divine will without a diverse change on the side of the effect answering to them.

Or, contrariwise, I produce the argument thus: if it were against the essential sanctity and innocence of God that He necessitate free choice to the continuation of an evil act, because the author and cause of sin would be renounced — so much the more does it contradict the supreme purity of the divine nature that God, not excited by the foreknowledge of a freely acting will actually deficient, should contract free choice to the fall.

14 Nor does that solution avail which Scotus intimated, in II Sent., dist. 37, q. 2, §. Ad solutionem istorum obiectorum, under marginal num. 14, where he labors to have God avoid being the cause of sin on the ground that He is not subject to the law; for thus it runs:

Thus therefore if two wills concur to the willing of the created will — namely the created will and the divine — there can be a defect in the willing itself from the defect of the other cause; and this because that cause could give rectitude to the act, which it is bound to give, and yet does not give it; while the other, although not bound to give it, nevertheless as much as in it lies would give it, if the created will cooperated.

For such doctrine does not untie the knot; rather it seems to have offered an occasion of falling to the Sectaries, as is evident from the Catholic Treasury of Jodocus Coccius, vol. 2, book 2, on the sin of man, art. 1, where he introduces Zwingli blaspheming in this manner against the essential sanctity of God:

God impelled him to kill; and he who impels acts without all suspicion of crime; for he is not under the law. One and the same deed — say adultery or homicide — as much as it is of God, the work of the author, mover, impeller, is no crime; but as much as it is of man, it is a crime and a foul deed.

Wherefore Scotus, in the aforesaid solution, does not stand fixed; nor did he assert that God is precisely not the cause of sin because He is not subject to the law. Whence he subjoins: §. From this the objections are answered, under marginal num. 16.

But then there is a doubt with respect to the principal question: for although it is saved that sin is not ascribed to God as cause, but to the created will, still it is not shown that God cannot be the first cause of the defecting.

Here the mind of Scotus seems to tend to this: that although from the fact that God is not subject to the law it may be inferred that God cannot act against a law that is coercively superior, still it is not shown why He should not be the first reason of defecting with respect to the created cause, if He premoves to the substrate of moral malice.

The excuse of the Divine innocence concerning predetermination to the matter of sin, on account of the intention of a right end, is refuted.

15 But in very truth, neither does the other reply any more evacuate the difficulty — the one that excuses God from the causality and influx of sin on account of the intention of a right end. So that, granted that God attains in the act of the law and right reason the very same terminus which man sinning and the devil tempting intend, nevertheless God is not had as the author of sin, because He produces that matter, or substrate of moral malice, only for this end: that He may satisfy what is owed and to the functions of the first cause.

Against this solution Diego Ruiz objects such figments, disput. 30, section. 1. It would come about, he says, that if God, on account of the intention of an honest end, could premove the created will to an act contrary to right reason and the divine law, the authority of the divine veracity could waver; indeed, the faith of the whole Church could waver.

As if God were to infuse into a man, whether sleeping or waking, the material entity of false assertions; not intending the formal reason of lying, but predetermined the intellect to assent to a false enunciation, on account of some good end.

Or if He were to form in the air human voices enunciating something false, and join miracles for the confirmation of that falsehood, the formal reason of lying not being intended — as if, at the voice sounding in the air from one excited four days after death, that miracle exhibited by God were for the attestation of some falsehood. All which things are most absurd and execrable; yet those are the ones which do not seem to be able to be fittingly avoided by the adversaries, if it can be asserted that the created will can be predetermined by God to an evil act on account of the intention of a right end.

16 Moreover; because although such a defense of the divine causality around evil could be sustained on account of some honest ends of His providence, still the disquisition presses: why should it belong to the functions of the first cause to premove the created will to that almost immense multitude of base acts, which in number and weight far outweigh the pile of pious operations?

Nor does that common reply about the fragility of the human condition — which demands rather to be premoved to evil than to good — elude the difficulty.

Because, supposing that the created will cannot work evil unless predetermined by God, that excuse of human fragility seems to involve a manifest begging of the principle: since it is the same thing for the will to be predetermined more often to evil than to good on account of its fragility, as for it to be predetermined by God to most frequent falls because it is predetermined by God.

Because since the sinner is morally impotent for the fall if he is not premoved by God, no other rationale of fragility is to be admitted which does not lean on the divine premotion, so that by the same the will be said to be such that it is frequently premoved by God at His nod into falls, and the will of man to be changeable — unless we wish to play with words.

17 Then, too, another escape of the theologians is precluded, contending that God is not the cause of sin because moral malice does not follow upon the act unless it proceeds from a deficient cause:

Because if God were to command, or counsel, the sinner to elicit the act of hatred of God as to its matter, God would not be freed from the note of a moral principle, or cause, of sin.

Nor would he elude the difficulty in that hypothesis who should assert that that act does not carry the sinful obliquity as it is from God, but as from a created cause that is deficient. Therefore, not even in virtue of the fact, given the physical predetermination attaining the whole positive substance of the act, which is the infliction of the privation of the rectitude that is owed.

Then Ruiz argues, disput. 27, section. 7, num. 19. Because if God were to predetermine, as to the material entity of such lies, to the enunciations of error all the Authors of Sacred Scripture, and all the Pontiffs, founders of the Sacred Canons, and besides the Catholic Church itself — still, the aforesaid escape being supposed, could anyone contrive that the eternity of the lie does not follow upon the substance and entity of the false enunciation as from God, but from a deficient cause? Therefore that reply is to be exploded which seems to favor heretics and absurd pronouncements.

18 Add that even the weakest confutation of the opposite opinion is not that one which argues that nothing supernatural is required to persevere for a long time without sin, even in the heat of a most grave temptation, if premoving the created will to the matters of evil acts belonged to the functions of the first cause.

For who will deny that it is integral to God (the gift of the first cause being safe) to predetermine, or not to predetermine, man to the matters of evil acts for a long time; therefore, upon the onset of a most grave temptation, the sinner in the state of fallen nature could, without any gratuitous aid, not sin, or for a long time hold himself from the ruins of sin — since it is more certain than certain that such a negation of physical premotion to evil cannot be numbered among the aids of grace.

But if, abusing the word grace, you should reckon such a negation of the predetermination to evil for a long time, or in the struggle of a most troublesome assault of the devil, among the series of the aids of grace — it would come about that, since the sinner is unable to carry out horrendous deeds, such as the destruction of himself or of his sons, without physical premotion, if the subtraction of physical predetermination for a long time be a benefit of grace; it would follow that infidels and barbarians, who avoid that truculent savagery their whole life long, would achieve it by the aid of grace; all of which are most false and absurd.

The testimonies of Scotus are opposed, which seem to disapprove the premotion of God to the matters of evil acts.

Finally it is argued from the authority of Scotus, who seems to attack this predetermination to evil, in II Sent., dist. 37, q. 2, §. Ad solutionem istorum obiectorum, under num. 14, where he says:

Universally, whatever God gives antecedently, He would give consequently as much as in Him lies, unless there were an impediment; but, giving the will free, He gave antecedently the right works, which are in the power of the will; and therefore as much as lies on His side He gave rectitude to every act of the will, and in consequence He would give it to the will, if the will itself elicited any act whatever rightly as far as its own side goes.

Therefore there is a defect in the effect of the two causes; not on account of the defect of the superior cause, but of the inferior. Not because the superior cause would cause rectitude in the effect, and the inferior crookedness; but because the superior cause, as much as lies of itself, would cause, if the inferior cause were to cause in accordance with its causality; and therefore that rectitude is not caused is on account of this, that the second cause, as far as it concerns itself, does not cause.

Now to that text Hugo Cauellus, scholiast of Scotus, appends his Scholium. "From which it is plain clearly, that God does not predefine absolutely the act of sin, with no cooperation of ours foreseen; otherwise, certainly, He would not be prepared, inasmuch as He is of Himself, to cause a good act: since before He should see what I was going to do, He decreed that such an act ought to be done by Himself and by me."

Wherefore the aforesaid Scholiast, expelling predetermination as it were upon the mind of Scotus, joins to the cited text these marginal annotations. Note against the predetermination, intrinsic and extrinsic, of the will toward its own acts. And a little below. The divine will does not therefore always cause good, because the created one does not will it: this therefore determines toward evil.

20 Moreover; that the second cause is determined by the first cause to operative effect; but not conversely, that the second cause is from the first premoved; the aforesaid author contends is held by Scotus, in 2. physic. question 8. §. As regards the fourth thing to be noted. where he says.

Third mode; there is called an immediate cause that which is not determined through another agent more particular to produce this, or that; and a mediate cause is called that which is determined by one, or by several, particular agents, toward the production of that effect, more than of the other.

For instance; the universal causes, such as God and the heaven, are said to be mediate causes of the effect here produced; inasmuch as they are determined toward the production of that effect by particular agents, such as, say, by fire, and by heat.

And so fire is said to be an immediate cause, or heat also; because it is not determined through any agent more particular to produce this, or that.

Here is Scotus expressly asserting; the first cause to be determined by the second as regards the species of its influx; and, not on the contrary, the first cause premoves and contracts the second as regards the species of such a causality, especially in depraved acts.

21 Nor does another testimony of Scotus press less, in 2. sentent., in the same cited place, dist. 37, q. 2, §. 'And if it is objected of those two instants', under marginal num. 15, where he seems to disprove that the action of God is prior by a priority of nature to the action of the creature; from which pronounced statement is plainly evinced (ma*ni-*mifestè producitur) that the influx of God is not a premotion or a predetermination: thus therefore he frames it.

"And if it is objected of those two infants of nature, as it is objected; that God in the first gave rectitude to the act."

I answer, and say; that the priority which includes that those [causes] can be without each other mutually without contradiction, is not an order in causes as they cause the common effect; but simultaneously they cause.

For just as, speaking of the different genera of causes, matter is not first by nature materiated before the efficient effects; as if without contradiction it could be matteriated and not effected, or conversely; but only by nature prior, that is, more perfectly one causes than the other; so in the same genus of cause: different ordered causes, although they have an order according to more perfectly and less perfectly causing; nevertheless do not have a priority of nature, which should say that [they] can be without each other mutually, with respect to a third.

Nay rather, just as in one instant of nature matter materiates, and the efficient effects; so two efficient causes, ordered in one instant of nature, cause the common effect, so that neither then causes without the other.

But that the effect not right be caused, that is not now on account of the prior cause, which, as far as it is of itself, would cause rightly, if the second were to cause; but on account of the defect of the second cause, which has in its power to co-cause with the first cause, or not co-cause; and if it does not concause with it, as is held, there is not rectitude in the common effect of both of them.

In which text of Scotus, not only every priority of nature, being other than a priority of perfection, and which cannot be sustained without an improbated premotion, seems to be driven out; as is clear from those words: Nay rather, just as in one instant of nature matter materiates, and the efficient effects, so two efficient causes, ordered in one instant of nature, cause the common effect. But even it seems to deny premotion concursive; while he asserts: that the sinning will has in its power to co-cause, or not co-cause, the depraved act; and that the first cause, as far as it is of itself, would cause rightly, if the second caused. Therefore it itself determines and is not determined to the matter of sin.

22 There is added another pronouncement of Scotus, which also seems to attack predetermination, in the same question cited. §. 'But why in the uncreated will there cannot be a first reason of deficiently willing', n. mar. 17, where he subjoins:

I answer; if God does not cause freely the rectitude, which ought to be in the act of the created will, and this on account of the liberty of His own will, nor however on account of the defect of the created will not voluntarily cooperating; then there is not then in the created will a cause of sin, because there is not there a lack of due justice.

For it is not a justice due from the created will, except in so far as it is in its power to act rightly; so that no subtraction of a prior cause is understood, on account of whose defect the will could not act rightly.

If, therefore, God were the first cause not causing rectitude; the act not right would not be a sin. Against divine premotion, from which words the following opposition is formed.

Then, according to Scotus, a sinful action could not be ascribed to the created will when something prior, necessarily required for eliciting a pious operation, would be subtracted from God. Otherwise the base operation [turpis operatio] would not have to be imputed to the created will, but to the first cause, for the nod and vote of Him that takes away that which, as something prior coming before the created influx, is necessarily required for acting honestly. Therefore the predetermination of God toward the good either does not conduce to the action of the creature by the way of the prior and the pre-acting, and consequently predetermination, or premotion, will not be; or sin will not be imputed to the creature, but to God.

That Scotus's argument seems to press especially in the sin of omission; which, if the premotion of God is insisted on for the fulfillment of the precept, therefore God omits before, who does not premote toward the observance of the precept.

23 Finally; since Scotus expressly and frequently repudiates intrinsic predetermination, whether by the influence of some form sent into the will; it remains that, if any premotion were to be sustained according to the principles of Scotus, it would be extrinsic – whether through the absolute decree of God, inasmuch as it is an influx ad extra, or the causality of the divine faculty as executing – because the action of God, in Scotus, (as being that which is intrinsic to God himself, just as every action coheres to its agent,) is the absolute volition of God itself.

Which assertion seems greatly to favor the errors of the Innovators who bark that God, by his absolute and unimpedable will, necessitates our will to act; as can be seen in the Catholic Treasury of Jodocus Coccius, tom. 2, book 2, On the Sin of Man, art. 1, where he transcribes the blaspheming rabble of heretics on this point. On which our own Franciscus Feuardentius also treats at length, piously and learnedly, in the Calvinistic Theomachy, book 2, On the Perfection of the Holy Trinity, chap. 12, On the Supreme Integrity of the Innocence and Sanctity of God, against the 31 heresies by which the Calvinists strive to deform it, and to make it the author and guilty party of all the sins of the world.

The opposing tenet of Aureolus is discussed, asserting that God does not concur immediately to the matters of wicked acts; and whether it merits the note? In what way it differs from Durandus?

24 The foundations which we set forth from Aureolus for the negative opinion shook him so greatly, that they drove him into the diametrically opposite opinion; for in order to escape the predetermination of God to the matters of wicked acts, he denied that God concurs immediately to wicked acts. Although, the emanation of those acts and their efflux from the created will being premised, he opined that they hang immediately upon God in their conservation: that however

That Aureolus expressly taught that God concurs immediately to the conservation of wicked acts, is plain from his testimony transcribed by us in this article under margin-n. 33, near the end of the number. Nevertheless, because although Aureolus embraced a less approved opinion, he yet confirmed it acutely, as the quality of the matter required, and confuted the opposite one with his wonted dexterity; therefore I transcribe his words. Then especially, that it may appear openly how far he dissents from the opinion of Durandus; who although he maintains that God does not inflow immediately into wicked acts, nevertheless sustained this generally of all the effects of secondary causes; moved by those foundations, slight as they are, which are ill received by very many. Thus therefore has Aureolus, in 2 Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, §. Alia est opinio opposita. Where, while he reports the tenet of certain unnamed authors, to which he subscribes, he subjoins.

Not every act is from God, even as to what is positive, elicitive-wise; and this they say to be true especially of the act of our will. And if it be asked of them, how does that act depend on God? They answer, that it does so in the habitude toward the conserver, because according to them the habitude is not the same as the habitude of the producer. Now I lay down certain propositions. The first is, it seems to me that the second opinion is the more rational; nor do I see what they say, that every act is from God, granted that it is positive, unless perhaps by way of desiring the power which elicits, and the nature of the elicited act. And so I say, that God does not act immediately into the act of the will deformed by sin; nor is it necessary that he act immediately into every creature.

25 I prove this proposition; because if he acted into the positive act as substrate, he would necessarily act toward the deformity; the contrary of which the Saints say, and they themselves also who hold the other opinion.

I prove the consequence; since when certain things so stand that one is a privation in the other, inseparable from it, the agent acting into the one necessarily acts into the other; but deformity so stands toward the act: therefore.

The major is plain; for because the privation of whiteness in blackness is annexed inseparably to blackness, therefore he who produces blackness necessarily produces what is not white.

I prove the minor; I take this, which is to hate God; I say, that so does deformity attach to that act, that it is impossible for it to be separated and taken away.

And this is what the Doctors say: that God cannot dispense in the precepts of the first table; because they have from themselves annexed deformity.

26 Second; because things that are evil from the object cannot come to be without deformity; the reason is, because they are of themselves entangled [conuoluta] with evil.

I confirm this through Aristotle, Ethics 3: for he inquires, whether habit is in us voluntarily? And he says, that it is; because we elicit voluntarily the acts, from which it is necessarily generated.

Because whatever is the cause of a cause, is necessarily the cause of the thing caused by that second cause; but deformity in an act follows the nature of the act necessarily, no less than [does] habit; therefore if God causes the act as to the substrate, necessarily he will cause the deformity.

27 Second, principally to the same [point] thus. If God co-acts with an act of the will, either this is because it follows the determination of the will in that act; so that the will first by nature determine itself to that act, and from this God co-act with the determined will.

Or conversely; first God determine himself to action, and our will follow the determination of such a kind, and come to that action; but it is by neither of those modes; therefore: the major is plain by a sufficient division.

I prove the minor; first, that not in the first mode; because then it would be held as proposed that in that determining God does not co-act; and thus it is not a cause with respect to every positive act.

Nor can the second mode be given; because the will would be determined by God toward sin; therefore it would not act from itself, but from another; and thus the will would not sin, because it would not have of itself whence it might be a cause of sin, because it would not be free: for it would be determined from without.

28 In Aureolus's doctrine take these observations. The first is about the text n. 25: that the difficulty which bursts forth from the premotion of God to the substrates of sins equally touches those who constitute the essence of sin in the negative, just as also the others, who constitute it in the positive; nor by any reason can a refuge from this present rending [praesurae] be sought by those who deny that sin formally is a positive something.

Because, as in the opinion of Scotus asserting that sin formally is a privation of due rectitude, the is [the] being right-claimed [affruictur] of the created will, truly and properly (as) the cause of sin; inasmuch as it elicits the positive act, as it is inductive [inductiuum] of that sinful privation; so if God should attain whatsoever is positive in the depraved act, inasmuch as it imports the defectibility [defectibilitatē] of the bearing [illatioā] of the privation of due rectitude (or inasmuch as it does not express the carrying-together [compatationē] of the essential continuation and conjunction with God in the reason of the end, which carrying-together removes [ablegat] crookedness, according to those things that we hand down from the Alensian and from Scotus in the present articulus from n. 68 up to 70) — that granted, God could not be held properly and rigorously the author of sin. Because the privation cannot be otherwise the terminus of the positive influx than inasmuch as it is necessarily connected with the positive, which is the terminus of physical causality; and under that comparison of causality, or quasi-causality, by which it infers the negation: in that manner in which, with Aureolus and the common opinion, the privation of whiteness in blackness is not effected, except inasmuch as blackness is produced inseparably, and necessarily inferring the not-being of whiteness. For that obtain those responded utterances of Aureolus: Because the privation of whiteness in blackness is annexed inseparably to blackness, therefore producing blackness, necessarily it produces what is not white.

The other observation is: around those words of Aureolus put forward under n. 27, that if the created will should determine God to such a species of sinful influx; it would follow that in that determining God does not co-act, and thus it is not a cause with respect to every positive act. For if it were true, that the created [creatā] and the uncreated [volūtātē] will were so composed together into the concourse, that the created will, as exercised in the second act, might determine the divine will to inflowing [influendū] into the matter of sin; it would be done, that the influx of the creature, inasmuch as it is the determining reason of the divine concourse toward the depraved act, should have to be conceived (under such a causality, or quasi-causality, of contracting [contrahendi] the influx of God) as immediately independent [of God].

Because, if the hatred of God, under which reason it expresses [rationeexprimit] the flight from God, and is conceived to determine God, indifferent of himself toward the influx of pursuit and of flight, were to depend on God; it would not determine God, but would proceed from God already determined to such a species of act; since an action cannot flow out from a principle not determined, or not contracted, in the sense of composition, or inasmuch as it is composed with the action. I judge that this probation of Aureolus is of such pressing force that I judge it conclusive: of which see below under number 61.

Therefore either the action flows out from God determined to such a species of influx; and consequently the action of the creature does not determine the will of God, nor contract it to the species of act. Or such an action is produced, or flows out from God, inasmuch as from a principle indeterminate, and potential, to such a species of impulse; and it would be done, that the principle, inasmuch as it is composed with the exercised influx, would be indeterminate to such a species [speciẽ] of exercised causality; which involves an implication in the predicate.

Next; that if the created causality were apprehended as hanging from God for that sign, by which it manifests the divine influx; for that presupposition the causality of God could not be conceived (which is not distinguished really from the created influx as from God) under an indetermination or potentiality contractible to assent or dissent, but contracted to the species of such an action, for instance, of the hatred of God. Indeed, for that anteriority of our conception, the act of the hatred of God is understood, not only as hanging from the created will, but also from God; and consequently for that prior [priori] [consideration] it is of no avail to be regarded as the divine influx, as potential toward love and toward hatred, but as contracted to hatred; since the causality of God, with the adversaries, is the operation of the creature, (as it hangs from God in that sign,) is the hatred of God; the causality of God was unable to be conceived under the commonness of the indetermination to assent or dissent, love or hatred. Because the determinate act of flight, as hanging from God, is the action of God; and consequently it is an action, not potential and contractible, but determinate and contracted to such a species.

Or it would have to be brought forward, that the action of the creature, according to the determinate species of such an action, is of avail to be pre-conceived for a certain sign of causality, as future infallibly, and absolutely, by comparison with the sole created cause, without the habitude of immediate dependence on God (whom in that prior [priori] [consideration] we conceive indeterminate to either [alternative]); and Aureolus would have his intent; which we shall pursue more broadly below, shutting out the evasions of the adversaries, under n. 61.

39 Third, the words of Aureolus are to be noted, under n. 24: I say, that God does not act immediately in the deformed act of the will, through sin; nor is it necessary that he act immediately in every creature. From which it stands that the said author has taught, once indeed, deliberately [rãtùm ex instituto], and under assertion, that the act of sin is not effected from God immediately; and held only incidentally, and as an opinion [opinatiuè], that it is not necessarily required for the influx of any cause, that God concur immediately to the first instant of effective production; provided he supply a conserving influx.

That however Aureolus in the other pronouncement [spoke] of the action of other secondary causes without the immediate cooperation [cooperatiohe] of God; and did not disprove that the first cause concurs immediately with any secondary cause whatever, as Durandus asserted; stands from the cited place, §. the third reason is this, where he subjoins: Not of lesser power is the will with respect to its own act, than other natural things are with respect to their own proper acts; but some natural principles so elicit their own acts of themselves, that God there cooperates actively only by conservation: therefore.

Where, around those words, some natural principles so elicit their own acts of themselves, that God there cooperates actively only by conservation, it is to be observed that although Aureolus asserts, God does not concur immediately to the matter of sin in the first effecting of the act; he nevertheless maintains the immediate conservation [cõseruationẽ] of the depraved act by God, as we show below under n. 33.

Next; §. secondly, by his reasons: concerning the judgment of certain solemn Doctors, whom he does not name, he says that it does not appear why God cannot communicate to the creature an action without the immediate concourse of God; inasmuch as for such a reason an infinite power is not required. Whence Aureolus never esteemed it implicatory (which he deservedly taxes in Durandus) that God concur with the creature to its operation, since in fact he maintains this in very many cases. But in order to pave the way for showing that God does not concur immediately to a wicked act, he was moved by this: that it is not implicatory that a natural cause can act without the immediate cooperation of God. Which stands from those words: Some natural principles so elicit their own acts of themselves, that God does not there operate actively except by conservation. If therefore some natural causes act without the immediate concourse of God, therefore not all, according to Aureolus; and accordingly, in his view, the immediate cooperation of God with the creature is not implicatory, as it is in the view of Durandus.

Wherefore I judge Peter Hurtado manifestly deceived, in his Physics, disput. 10, On the First Cause, sect. 2, subsect. 2, §. 32, where, disallowing the tenet that God can concur immediately with the creature, he attributes it to Aureolus; whereas Durandus alone expressed it, in 2 Sent., dist. 1, q. 5, where he deliberately asks: Whether God acts immediately in every action of the creature? For under margin-n. 14: It is plain therefore, that the things which are produced through the action of the creature are not produced immediately by God: God could nevertheless produce them immediately, if he willed, but then the creature would do nothing there.

Which assertion is judged by Hurtado, and commonly by others, worthy of a note and of a sharp censure. In this, however, Hurtado proceeded skilfully, in that he asserted that the pronouncement which he sustained is not so far disallowed: that God can, at his nod, concur immediately with the creature; and can, at his will, not concur.

Nevertheless, because Aureolus deliberately treated in the cited question only of this, that God does not concur immediately to the matters of wicked acts; as is plain from the title of the article, where he inquires: Whether an evil act is from God? And only incidentally, and as it were from the opinion of others, he hints that some created cause can act without the immediate cooperation of God; the same note of a disallowed doctrine ought not to be branded upon Aureolus, which is affixed to Durandus by many – and that for asserting it not specially of the immediate production of a wicked act, but universally of the causality of any creature whatsoever – and for the asserted implication of the immediate concourse of the first cause with second causes, as is plain from what has been said.

Aureolus is defended from our disallowed doctrine by Bonaventure, Scotus, and Gregory of Rimini; and the tenet of Ludovicus Dolanus, an adherent of Aureolus, is examined.

30 It now remains to inquire whether, on account of the denial of the immediate divine concourse to the matter of sin, which Aureolus delivers ex professo, he ought to be ill reputed. Gabriel Vázquez, in 1. 2, tom. 1, disp. 129, cap. 2, num. 5, does not disallow the opinion of Aureolus disallowing that God concurs immediately to the act of sin; nay, he even labors to fortify it with many authorities of Augustine, which I pass over, because they seem able to be easily eluded, and to be interpreted of the formal, and not of the material, of sin.

The tenet of Aureolus was judged probable by the Alensian, book 2 of the Summa, tract. 27, cap. 3; to whom Gregory of Rimini assents, in 2, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3, where he says.

It is a doubtful matter, concerning which there are the solemn opinions of the Doctors; by rashly asserting neither of them, I hold the affirmative conclusion in this matter as the more probable, and, as it seems to me, the more consonant with the sayings of the Saints; and so too it is more commonly held by the modern Doctors. For the defense also of this tenet Peter Hurtado cites the Alensian, 1 p. q. 3, memb. 2; but what he says seems to me to the purpose, and to favor Aureolus.

Bonaventure nevertheless favors it, in 2 Sent., dist. 37, art. 1, q. 1, where he asks: Whether every action, inasmuch as it is an action, is from God? where he teaches, under §. the response to the arguments.

It is to be said, that as the Master says in the text, concerning this question there were diverse positions of men so great, and so reasonable, that not even the Master dared to define which of them contains more truth. Nevertheless, because by much discussion doubts are led to manifestation, it is now commonly held that that opinion is the truer which says that every action, whether a substrate of sin or not, inasmuch as it is an action, is from God. To this Scotus also accedes, who in 2 Sent., dist. 37, q. 2, §. If this way were true, margin-n. 6, does not condemn the aforesaid opinion, which Aureolus afterwards holds; nay, he even dissolves the arguments opposed to it; for thus he has:

If this way were true, it could easily be assigned according to it, how God is not the cause of sin; for, speaking either of the material or of the formal in sin, the whole would be caused by the will, as by a total cause, and yet in no way by God, except mediately, who as God produced such a will, which could will thus and thus.

But against this way it is objected, because this way would not save that God is the cause of merit, since merit is as free as sin. And similarly it would not save the essential order of causes; because according to the first proposition concerning causes (every primary cause, etc.). But according to this way the primary cause would not inflow into the effect, except because it produced this cause. To the first of these it can be said, that God is in some way the cause of merit, in the way that he is not the cause of sin; because he immediately causes in the soul grace, or charity, which by way of nature inclines to meriting; and whatever active form is by way of nature is from some agent, and the action also of that form is from it. And from this it would also be plain how the effects of other causes would be from God otherwise than the effects of the will: because those causes, being determinate, received from God an inclination and a necessity toward such effects, but not so the will. To the second it would be said: because although sometimes there is an order of principal and less principal causes, of which neither moves the other, as the object and the cognitive power stand toward the act of knowing. Sometimes, however, the order comes about thus, that the principal moves the less principal, whether to the second act or to the first, in such a way nevertheless that these two causes are partial, and by themselves integrate one total cause; as the hand and the staff with respect to the motion of a ball; or as the sun and the father with respect to a son. Nevertheless in total causes with respect to their immediate effects there can also be an essential order, so that the second cause be a total immediate cause with respect to its effect, just as the first cause with respect to its effect, and yet be essentially second; because according to its causation, as according to its being, it depends essentially on the first: not however in such a way that this dependence be the immediate dependence of the effect itself upon it and upon the prior cause.

Thus far Scotus; where he contends that it can in some way be sustained, without the peril of a condemned doctrine, that God does not concur immediately to the free supernatural operations of the created will.

In support, however, of that response of Scotus which assigns to God specially the supernatural operations of free choice – even granted that they do not flow immediately from God – this much remains to be noted. That the supernatural operations of free choice which pertain to cooperating grace are ascribed to God as their special author not only because they are immediately elicited by a supernatural habit sent in by God; but also because God immediately elicits the indeliberate motions of holy illuminations and inspirations, which look to exciting grace, and morally allure to the supernatural free consent which is called cooperating grace.

For although in this way of thinking God is not the immediate principle of supernatural free cooperation – inasmuch as the aforesaid opinion contends that the cooperation of the free created will is not composable with the immediate concourse of God – nevertheless the immediate concourse of God is not denied as to non-free operations, such as are the first-first motions of holy illuminations and inspirations, which are therefore asserted to be made by God in us without us, because they are made without us freely, or deliberately, cooperating; although there have not been wanting some Theologians who have thought that such supernatural excitations are made by God alone, in that they esteem that it is not implicative of the vitality of qualities that it be effected immediately by God alone, and sent into a living faculty comporting itself merely passively. Which nevertheless is not approved by us: because although we sustain that the intellect can be constituted in the account of one understanding, and the will in the being of one pursuing or fleeing, through the forms of qualities sent in by God alone; yet that this is done preternaturally, and not according to the connatural exigency of such forms.

From these, those words of Aureolus transcribed under margin-n. 29 receive a congruous interpretation: Some natural principles so elicit their own acts of themselves, that God does not there operate actively except through conservation.

That Aureolus denies the immediate concourse of God only as to free actions, but not as to non-free ones; which I evidently infer from other words of Aureolus transcribed under n. 27, at the end of the number.

Nor can the second mode be given; because the will would be determined by God to sin; therefore it would not act from itself, but from another, and so the will would not sin, because of itself it would not have whence it might be the cause of sin, because not free; for it would be determined from without. Which argumentation of Aureolus blocks not only the immediate concourse of God to the matter of sin, but also to any free operation whatsoever.

He never, however, sought the implication of the immediate influx from the repugnance of a concourse, or convening, of several co-principles which would be partial with the partiality of a cause, and not with the partiality of an effect, as Durandus prattled, transcribed by us under margin-n. 29; whose doctrine is blunted and evidently routed in the conjunction of power and object for the generation of knowledge.

Whence it is inferred that Hugo Cauellus has not only often overleaped the Scholastics, but even fallen short of Scotus; while he appears to condemn the opinion of Aureolus, which Scotus in some way defends, so as even to labor to dissolve the opposing arguments. Thus therefore Hugo has it, in his scholium on the text, §. Against this opinion it is argued, under mar.-n. 8.

He resolutively rejects the said opinion denying that God inflows immediately into our volition, because it takes away the knowledge and the omnipotence of God; on which the Doctors cited, and their opposite is esteemed against it – Job 10 (Thy hands, Lord, have made me) and Psalm 146 (Who produceth grass on the mountains), John 5 (My Father worketh until now), on which Augustine, 3 On the Trinity, cap. 3 and 4.

But as far as it can pertain to Augustine, read below in this article under n. 110; as far as Scotus, however, it is clear that he did not so far reject the aforesaid opinion as to condemn it; for he subjoins, §. Therefore, under mar.-n. 9.

For these two reasons, concerning God’s omnipotence and omniscience, if we do not follow this path, it remains to inquire how sin can be from the created will with respect to the first question, and how it is not from God with respect to the fourth question.

Behold where Scotus calls this manner of thinking a path; yet it would be not a path but a precipice if it could not be upheld while preserving the canon of faith.

31. After these matters had been prepared for the press, I came upon the treatise of Ludovicus Dolanus, a Capuchin, entitled A Four-Part Disputation on the Manner in Which God and the Creature Concur in Free Acts of the Natural Order, Especially Evil Ones. This work, sanctioned by the signatures of very eminent theologians and prelates, supplies ample material; in it Dolanus vigorously refutes the immediate concourse of God to evil actions and all other free acts. At the outset of his treatise, chapter 1, no. 1, he prefaces it thus: He is not minded to compose subtle or thorny disputations that, without any fruit, weary and torment the minds of theologians; rather, he chooses what is most useful for curbing the innovators, who take their cue from a philosophical assertion in which all the Neoterics—both those called Praeterminantes, because they assert physical predetermination with stubborn insistence, and the proponents of middle knowledge—agree in assigning an indispensable necessity of divine cooperation, immediately proximate and identified, to each and every one of our acts, good and evil. They blaspheme by making God the cause of sin and deny free choice.

In which matter, that I may candidly open my judgment such as it is: first, I have proved and do prove the man's piety and zeal of faith, and I pray God that this study of his turn to his felicity; yet I judge he has undertaken a great enterprise, and I fear lest such a manner of reconciling liberty with foreknowledge be in vain, so as to close the mouths of the drivellers. Because the impious mind, while the yoke of faith is thrown off and the bridle of Christian modesty cast aside, once it has imbibed heresy, rusheth upon all things sacred, and labors to blacken that essential innocence and sanctity of God. Therefore if with Dolanus those axioms common to every school about the immediate concourse of God upon every effect of a created cause do not effectively withstand this immedicable disease; how shall they press the heretics with the pronouncements of Aureolus, denying the immediate concourse to all free acts, which are disapproved by the great part of the Scholastics, so that their defense wearies us not a little and compels us to sweat?

And how anciently procacious is this crimination of the heretics against God as the author of sin, take from Tertullian adversus Marcionem, book first, at the beginning: Languens enim, (quod et nunc multi, et maximè haeretici,) circa mali quaestionem: unde malum? Et obtutis sensibus ipsa enormitate curiositatis, inueniens creatorem pronuntiantem, ego sum, qui condo mala; quanto ipsum praesumpserat mali authorem, et ex alijs argumentis, quae ita persuadent peruerso cuique, tanto in creatorem interpretatus malam arborem malos fructus condentem scilicet mala; alium Deum praesumpsit esse debere, in partem bonae arboris bonos fructus. — "For being sickly, (as many also now, and especially heretics,) about the question of evil, whence evil? and with the senses sheerly dazed by the enormity of that curiosity, finding the Creator pronouncing, I am he who create evil; by how much he had presumed him the author of evil, and by the other arguments which so persuade every perverse man, so much did he interpret of the Creator the evil tree bearing evil fruits, that is evil; and he presumed there must be another God, on the side of the good tree bearing good fruits."

Behold the most ancient expostulation of the heretics with God about the concourse of sin, and how many absurdities it has begotten! Therefore in vain labors he who persuades the perverse doctrines of Aureolus, denying the immediate concourse of God to free acts, that he may coerce the blaspheming heretics; since it is more useful to traverse the trodden ways of our Fathers, distinguishing between the concourse to the substance of the act and its defectibility. On which see Anselm, transcribed in this article under n. 72. and Alexander of Hales under n. 89.

It is added, that the most subtle and verily golden wit of Aureolus, following this way, is bound up with these mites, from which it could not disentangle itself; it remains to be seen whether Dolanus can disengage himself? Because Aureolus, although he denied the immediate concourse of God to the production of free acts, yet did not dare deny it about their conservation. Because if there appeared a probable reason why such a creature should not hang upon God for being conserved, the way lay open that no creature should require to be conserved essentially by God; but that it be conserved only by a secondary cause. Therefore if God immediately concurrs to the conservation of a free act, then I press the reason.

Either free choice, consenting with God for the conservation of the operation of free choice, has in its power the concourse of God tempered to the free concourse of our will; or it has not? If God tempers his concourse to free choice about the immediate conservation of its act; therefore also he can temper the concourse about its first production; so that free choice have in its power its own operation, although this hang immediately upon an extrinsic principle: against what Aureolus labors, transcribed by us in the preceding number.

For to this tend those words of Aureolus: Therefore the will would not act of itself, but from another, and so the will would not sin, because of itself it would not have whence it should be the cause of sin, since it is not free: it would be determined from without. Or the operation of free choice, insofar as it is immediately conserved by God; and thus, hanging upon an extrinsic principle as regards its conservation, it would not be free, but necessary from a necessitating extrinsic principle; and accordingly it would follow, that through the conservation of the act, and its duration, even without any intensive decrease added to the act in its first effecting, the will could not merit and demerit, which is absurd.

Moreover, that the reason which chiefly moved Scotus to assert the immediate concourse of God to the matter of sin was the foreknowledge of future contingents, and the determinate objective truth of those, which Scotus requires from a decree immutating a future objectively to be such, or not to be; which objective immutation, bursting forth from the decree, demands the immediate concourse of the divine will concerning such a thing willed, or one thus objectively immutated.

Wherefore, on the contrary, as Aureolus disapproved the immediate concourse of God about free acts, so he denied the determinate truth of free acts before their actual emanation from their causes: whence he also asserts, less truly, that futures of this kind are known from eternity by God: although determinate truth is not available from eternity to futures. On which matter we have read in freeing Aureolus from those who brand him with the note, that he denied in God a determinate foreknowledge of futures, as is evident from what was premised below, in this distinction, article 4, from num. 44 up to 49.

Since these things therefore are so, I am not deceived as to how Dolanus defends the determinate truth of future contingents; since he drives out the immediate concourse of God to free acts, and wars against all the Predeterminants, and the assertors of middle knowledge. Because those who assert middle knowledge, just as they profess a determinate objective truth that is conditioned, so also they admit the determinate truth of conditionals, not only on the side of the object, but also on the side of the act; which, although it is not actually in God, would nevertheless be in him if the condition were fulfilled. And for the same reason, just as they assert decrees concerning such objects, so also they maintain the immediate concourse of God in a conditioned way, without which such determinate conditioned truth does not subsist among them. In what way therefore Dolanus, without any immediate conditioned concourse, asserts objective truth; I do not perceive. Of which again against Dolanus in the following distinction, on the foreknowledge of conditioned contingents, 4. 2. 4. margin-n. 53 up to 57.

Lastly, I object against the aforesaid author that he presses his attack and charge against the Predeterminants with great insistence, on the assumption that all or most of them hold that God concurs in acts of free choice through an action identified with the action of free choice. Yet this view, common among Jesuit authors, differs from the common Thomist account: Thomists do not distinguish God’s action from his eternal substance. On this point the Scotist school agrees with them, holding habitually that action belongs to the agent and not the patient, as though it had not thought otherwise. Given this, the action of God, intrinsically conjoined with and identified with him, cannot really be identified with the influx of a created cause. Further, if God were to predetermine the created will through that same cooperation of the will as proceeding from God, such predetermination could not be real and physical, but only conceptual and rational, as we have often observed.

These points arise in the aforesaid disputation of Dolanus; they may divert the reader and strengthen the opposing opinion of the theologians concerning God’s immediate concourse to the free acts of the created will (whether identified with the act or not—a distinction that matters little to the disputation’s principal aim). Nevertheless, I dare not condemn Dolanus’s opinion, which Scotus did not disapprove and which the judgment of weighty men has confirmed.

Moreover—and this is important to me—every created cause, whether natural or free, cannot be determined from an intrinsic principle to this individual action; therefore it needs the determination of the first cause’s concourse. Aureolus did not extricate himself from this knot, although he denied that an individual produced by one cause could be generated by another cause of the same species; nor did Vázquez, who, speaking less philosophically and yielding under pressure, when he saw that this opinion conflicted with the Jesuit position disapproving the determination of free choice by God, wished to number it among nature’s hidden secrets. We discuss this at length in article 5, in the physical digression under numbers 46 and 57, in our arguments against Dolanus and Vázquez.

Lastly, that the aforesaid opinion, rejecting the immediate concourse to the matter of sin, rests upon no slight foundation, Petrus Hurtado asserts among the more recent writers, in his Physica, disp. 10, on the first cause, sect. 2, subsect. 3, § 35. But on freeing Aureolus from a new censure, on account of the denial of the concourse of God to the matter of sin, see below from n. 107 up to 111.

It is shown against Aureolus, that God concurs immediately to the matter of sin; where the proofs of Scotus are weighed, and the foundations of Gregory of Rimini, and of Gabriel Vázquez are rejected.

21 Moreover; because we do not receive Aureolus, whom we wish immune from us, his placitum must be stormed; and first, even with a light pen, the weak attacks of such an opinion are to be confuted. Thus therefore against Aureolus Vázquez constructs a reason from Gregory and Gabriel in the cited place, capit. 3, under num. 11. Both the terminus of an action that is immanent and vital, and that which is produced through exterior illumination, depends immediately upon its own cause not only in becoming, but also in being conserved. But those termini, while they draw the benefit of conservation from their causes, depend also immediately upon God; therefore, just as they are conserved immediately by God, so are they effected; since no reason appears why they should draw conservation from God, and their production not so?

But that, while the terms of vital actions, and of external illuminations also, are immediately conserved by their causes, namely by the living faculties and by luminous bodies, they are also immediately conserved by God, is thus shown.

For it would come about, that if God did not immediately conserve forms of this kind, he could not bring it about that the vital faculties, and the luminous agents, should be able to cease from their actions; unless either by destroying the operative principles, or by sending in a form positively contrary to such an operation; yet not through the mere cessation of the divine influx: which seems absurd, and unworthy of God.

The sequel is plain; because the causality of any operative principle cannot be impeded otherwise than in a threefold way: as if by a more powerful agent a contrary form be impressed; for example, if while snow chills, a more vehement fire heats, by retarding and weakening the action of the contrary; or if the operating principle be destroyed; or on account of the negation, or suspension, of the divine concourse. Therefore, if God did not immediately conserve the action, it would follow that by no other means could he blunt the energy of the agent except by destroying the agent itself. Or by sending in a contrary form more powerful than its energy; yet not through the mere negation of himself; which seems to be judged altogether alien to the power of God.

And the argument is pressed in forms that lack a positive contrary, as in the illuminating action of the Sun, which, since it cannot be taken away by the immission of a contrary action, it would follow that God could not bring it about that, the Sun surviving, it should not exhibit its illuminating action.

33 But the aforesaid proofs do not seem to compel; both because they do not conclude universally, but specially against the term of illumination, and of vital action. Wherefore one might cavil; that the collection is enervated which is drawn from the aforesaid terms of actions, to all the other remaining ones, which do not hang upon created causes in their conservation. For one might contrive; that just as it is singular in terms of this kind, that they hang immediately in their conservation upon their created causes: so also that they hang immediately in their conservation upon God; so that such a doctrine must not of necessity be extended to the terms of other actions.

Next, that although Durandus intimate that the actions of secondary causes do not hang upon God immediately in their conservation; that nevertheless Aureolus openly reproves, asserting that although an action can be given which in its first efflux from the created cause does not hang upon God; it yet implicates a created action, which may happen not to hang in its conservation upon the first cause. From which it is deduced, that God could by a mere suspension of the concourse impede the conservation of any created action whatever; nay even, that by a mere suspension of the influx he could not take away the first emanation of the action from a created principle.

But when you press Aureolus; that if God is the immediate cause of the conservation of all creatures, so much ought he to be the immediate principle of their production.

He answers by denying the syllogism; for that immediate universal conservation of creatures is more proper to God than their production; since God assumes every operating creature to the fellowship of the productive action of its effects; yet not to the fellowship of the conservative action of them. For that de facto God conserves by himself alone, without the consent of secondary causes, all creatures (besides the terms of vital actions and of external illuminations, which are conserved by created causes) nevertheless he does not effect creatures without the concourse of secondary causes. Therefore the conservative action of creatures is more proper and singular to God than their production; since to all created agents he communicated the elicitive power, yet not the conservative power of their effects; and accordingly not from this; that he conserve immediately the actions of all created agents, is it inferred that he elicits them immediately.

Thus therefore says Aureolus in the place cited, in his answer to the first. Ad idem facit; quia Deus communicat actiones creaturae, et non communicat eis conseruationem: quaelibet enim res immediatè, et totaliter conseruatur à Deo, sed non quaelibet res totaliter, et immediatè producitur à Deo, sed per causas secundas; ergo non est idem creatio, et conseruatio. — "To the same it tends; because God communicates to the creature the actions, and does not communicate to them the conservation: for every thing is conserved immediately and totally by God, but not every thing is produced totally and immediately by God, but by secondary causes; therefore creation and conservation are not the same."

But if you press against Aureolus; that, given the immediate conservation of a wicked act by God; the same inconveniences follow which war against the immediate effecting of a sinful act.

It can be answered by denying the disparity; because it is one thing to premote, or to concurr, to the first effecting of sin; another, upon the supposition of the emanation of such an act from a deficient created cause, according to the exigency of secondary causes and for the office of the first cause, to concurr to the conservation of the wicked act.

34 These assaults therefore being lost; against Aureolus one must go with the reasons of Scotus, which although they proceed specially about the immediate concourse of God to the acts of created will; yet also aim at God's operating immediately with every created agent upon the production of every effect whatsoever.

Which proofs Scotus instills upon us, in 2. sententiar. dist. 37. quaest. 2. vbi inquirit.

Whether the created will be the total and immediate cause of its own willing, so that God with respect to it have no immediate efficacy, but mediate? For there, §. Contra istam opinionem arguitur dupliciter. sub n. marg. 8. he contends by two reasons that God immediately concurr to the acts of created will.

The first is; that if God, through his absolute volition, inasmuch as it is of an objecting external causality, or of his divine faculty of execution, did not immediately touch the acts of the created will; such acts would not bear that objective determination which can be the object of the infallible divine judgment; and consequently God would not be foreknowing of futures. Which reason we shall lay open below for the principal confirmation of our position; where we shall also transcribe it textually, under n. 45 and 46.

The other reason is: that if God did not contribute immediate concourse to the acts of the created will, he would not be omnipotent; which proof Scotus supports in a threefold way in the cited place, where he subjoins.

35. The proof of the second consequence in three ways. First; because whatever the Omnipotent is able to do, this comes to pass; but if he wills that my volition be, and this is in the power of my will, as of a total cause bearing itself contingently toward that; therefore the volition itself can be determined of itself to one part, or to the other, indifferently; and so the act can fail to obtain that to which the divine will determined it.

36 Secondly; because the divine will cannot impede my will, save by doing violence to it; for if it be determined of itself to one part, from the very fact that it has been determined to one thing it cannot be impeded except violently: but that the will be violated involves a contradiction; therefore God cannot impede the thing willed by my will. Concerning the second proof, however, of Scotus, who contends that if the will could operate without the immediate cooperation of God, God would not be able to incline the created will to the other part of the contradiction opposed to that which the will had pre-chosen, except by doing violence to the will; whereas it is nevertheless implicatory that the will be able to be violated as regards elicited acts, though indeed as regards commanded acts it can be.

Against the aforesaid reason of Scotus it is also objected; that if the will had resolved to hold God in hatred; God could, by himself alone, have effected in the created will a most vehement act of love, without its effective concourse; by which form, positively contrary to the act of hatred, (a more intense love prevailing,) the opposite hatred would be checked without violence to the will; since an act of love elicited by God alone, although it be not free, is nevertheless voluntary (inasmuch as voluntary signifies that which, according to natural exigency, demands to be elicited from an intrinsic principle with cognition, as we showed, in controversy 9, On the Vision of God, distinct. 3, subdistinct. 1, art. 1.) and consequently not against the internal impetus of the will, nor inferring violence upon it.

Which opposition shows that the proof of Scotus, which we transcribed under num. 36, is not conclusive, the principles of his school being presupposed, which is wont to hold that the created will can be constituted in the being of one pursuing, or fleeing, an object through the form of volition sent by God into the will bearing itself merely passively. Although the proof of Scotus has force in the more common opinion of the Thomists, who assert that the created will cannot add the vital denomination of one willing, or nilling, through a form not elicited by itself. On which see the Ferrariensis transcribed by us in this ar. under num. mar. 13.

39 The third reason of Scotus, from num. 37, is the firmer and more common one, inasmuch as it shows that not only the acts of the created will, but not even any participated being, can be effected without the immediate concourse of God. For to this tend those pronouncements of Scotus: The will of the Omnipotent produces the object willed in being for that time, for when he wills that it be; for there is no other act of the divine will in respect of an angel, or of any other created being, whereby it is produced into being. Because the acts of our will are produced by the divine will into willed being by the same reason; just as an angel is produced, and any other created being. But that a creature be produced by the divine will into willed being, according to the phrase of Scotus, which we have often weighed, is nothing other than that the creature be objectively changed to futurition; so that it be drawn out from the mere collection of possibles, and drawn to the class of futures.

But indeed, no created being can be drawn from itself, or from any created cause, from the aggregate of possibles into the series of futures, but only from the efficacious act of the divine determination: since for that sign, and presupposition of reason, for which possible creatures antecede the free proposals of the divine will, they are conceived only with a non-repugnance to existing, but not with an objective mutation toward futurition. Nor for that sign of reason is the created thing understood as the principle, or efficient cause of another, but from the decree of the divine will it is drawn that such an effect proceed from this cause, and not from another; since it is precontained within the virtuality of several agents of the same species, and is of itself potential that it be elicited from this cause rather than another.

Then especially; that a possible thing, for that sign of presupposition to the decree, is conceived in negative being, or in non-repugnance to existing, without production into willed being, as Scotus speaks, or without objective immutation according to the common manner of speaking; and hence there is not force available to it to immutate another possible thing to an absolute and infallible futurition for some difference of time; since a possible being cannot transfuse into an effect that mutation, or habitude to existing, which it does not itself have: therefore every objective mutation of creatures to futurition is drawn from the free volition of God.

Nor again can a cause already objectively mutated to futurition by the absolute decree of God be the objective ratio of the mutation to absolute futurition in a free act; because the objective mutation of a future, or the passive production in being willed according to the phrase of Scotus, demands a real volition exercised from all eternity; and efficacious also, and unimpedable, from all eternity, such as the volition of any created principle is not, so that from it could be awaited the passive production of some future object in being willed, or the objective mutation through which the future is drawn out from the mere collection of possibles, and contracted to the series of futures.

Therefore from the decree of God is drawn the absolute and objective mutation of every created future; and accordingly, also from the absolute decree of God, (that it performed the function of the externa causality, or the use of that divine faculty executing,) the existence of every created being ought also to be effected immediately. The sequel is proved; because real existence essentially premits the absolute futurition of the thing, as a being existing essentially supposes a being future, or objectively mutated to an absolute futurition. But the thing cannot be objectively mutated to an absolute and infallible futurition without the immediate efficacy of the divine will; therefore neither can the thing be drawn from the eminence and virtuality of causes to the state of position outside causes, without an immediate dependence upon the will of God, or upon that faculty of his executing.

With these proofs of Scotus we join that which has sinews, and makes much trouble against the deniers of the premotion of the first cause to the matter of sin; which we ask from the subtle Theologian and Metaphysician William of Rubuse, auditor of Scotus, as is plain from those things which we transcribe from him below, in the present article sub num. marg. 52. where he so far sustains that the secondary cause be determined by the first to the matter of sin; that free choice cannot be determined by an intrinsic principle to such an individual of operation. By which reason also Gregory of Rimini has made use, transcribed by us sub numer. marginal. 77. although inconsequently he alters it, that God is roused, or moved, by our wicked operation to influx into the substrate, or matter of sin; as we observe there.

The text of Scotus for deciding the dissertation; from which we evince, of the mind of Scotus, that the premotion of God must of necessity be sustained to the materials of the acts of the wicked.

40 THUS luculently did Scotus report the premotion, or predetermination, to the substrate of sin; so that he alone can be in doubt who blinds himself willingly. Thus therefore teaches Scotus, in 1. sentent. distinct. 41. q. unica. §. Sed adhuc contra istud instatur. num. marg. 13. vbi inquit.

» It is urged; because God would not certitudinally foresee that Judas should be evil, upon that way. For the mere permission of any act, and certitude about the permission, does not make a certitude about that act, because there ought to be had some efficient cause; therefore from this alone, that God foresees, that he wills to permit Judas to sin, he will not be certain of Judas about to sin, or that Judas will be about to sin.

» Moreover; what is that willing to permit Lucifer to sin? If this is some positive act of the will with respect to sin; therefore it seems, that he wills him to sin. If it is not a positive act with respect to the act of sin; but with respect to the act of permission; then it will be a reflex act, and then one will have to ask of that permission, what act it is? If a positive act of the will; therefore it seems still, that God have a positive act with respect to the sin which he permits.

» 41 The first of these is solved by this, that God foresees that he will concur to the substance of that act, which will be sin; but this he foresees, because he wills to concur to it; if it be a sin of commission.

» Or he foresaw that he would not concur to an act — Scotus — any act, if he does not will it, and this having been known, the first act is a sin of omission: and by knowing that he would concur to such substance of an act with circumstances not due, or that he would not concur to it for a necessary act, and consequently which he will omit, he will know that he will be about to sin.

So that he knows this one about to sin, not only because he knows that he would permit; but also because he knows that he would concur to this one about the substance of an act not circumstantiated; consequently he commits; or that he would not concur to him for a necessary act, and consequently he omits.

» 42 The second doubtful difficulty inquires, touching the divine will, of which not now, but elsewhere.

» Of those opinions, because the Apostle seems, disputing about that matter, in the final part of the Romans, to leave all as it were unsearchable: (O the depth of the riches, of the wisdom, and of the knowledge of God! and who hath known the sense of the Lord, or who was his counsellor?) Therefore lest by searching, and profoundity, according to the saying of the Master, one should go into the depth, let that be chosen which more pleases, provided however that the divine liberty be saved without any injustice, and the other things which must be saved about God; so that he who chooses liberally; and whoever shall hold another opinion, let him answer to the things that have been done against it.

43 From which words it liquidly patesceth, how confiting an assertor Scotus was of physical predetermination (of the determined malice of moral evil; which those words especially demonstrate which we transcribed under num. 41. He knows this one about to sin, not only because he knows that he would permit, but also because he knows that he would concur. Where Scotus, distinguishing the permissive and the cooperative will of God, teaches, that in the will of permitting sin, it cannot be that sin be foreseen by God; but in the will of cooperating; for that the will of permitting the lapse can be so interpreted, as to involve an indeterminate concourse to contraries and contradictories, and only to decree the wicked act by hypothesis, and importing the condition, if created will wills.

And accordingly upon the mere permissive will, viewed by itself, the determinate and infallible futurition of the wicked act cannot be apprehended by God; if the very determination of the creature be not observed. But when the act of created will, upon Scotus, for the whole state of futurition, and as it is drawn out toward all duration antecedent to the production of such an act (if the objective mutation, or the infallible determination to futurition, which accrues to our volition from the absolute proposition of the divine will, be removed) does not have determinate truth in itself; even upon the supposition of any hypothesis whatever (since every supposition of futurition, the objective mutation to being-determinately-future being cut off, which is sought from the absolute decree of God, is beneath the potentiality of a free principle indeterminate to either.)

There remains; that besides the permissive will, which does not appear to have an influx contracted to such species and individuation of the act, that will be required which is called cooperative by Scotus; which certainly determines in second act, and by way of actual cooperation, our will to one part of the contradiction, with such energy of concourse, that it obtain assent, or dissent, infallibly.

But if such disparity between the permissive and the cooperative will be not constituted, according to the mind of Scotus; it would be pronounced stolidly, that in the mere permissive will the future contingents of wicked acts cannot be apprehended: yet indeed in the cooperative will. Moreover, if we were to assert the cooperative will, that which contracts the community of the divine concourse, and moves determinately by way of second act to one part of the contradiction, (without our cooperation being awaited as determinative of the communicated or potential causality of the divine ę, indifferent to contraries and contradictories) we cannot sustain such cooperation, not predetermining or premoting.

Lastly, from those words; He knows that this man will sin, not only because he knows that he will permit, but also because he knows that he will cooperate. It is sufficiently and more than sufficiently clear, that Scotus acknowledged no other rationale of predetermining, which does not pertain to the act second, or to actual cooperation. For if God otherwise predetermined the created will to the matter of sin, Scotus would have rendered that rationale of determining, distinct from the actual and exercised cooperation itself, a sufficient medium on the side of the object for the foreknowledge of the material, or substrate, of moral malice; whereas he so seriously turns over and searches out the contraction of the second cause by the first toward the matter of sin.

44 From which is uncovered the frivolous and extorted interpretation of Hugo Cavel, which in a marginal annotation of this place he invents; subjoining. That the aforesaid letter of the Doctor is not understood of the absolute decree, unless our free cooperation be foreseen. For if the foreknowledge of our free cooperation be necessarily required for this, that God in his decree foresee the future contingents; why was it denied, that such futures be apprehended in the mere permissive will? Whereas yet the will of permitting, our cooperation being taken in, may well be a sufficient medium of infallible judgment?

Next; that if, upon Scotus, our operation has not in itself a determinate truth, or a determination, from eternity by hypothesis of some futurition, which does not erupt from the absolute proposition of God; wherefore it imports extrinsic contraction only that which accrues to it from the decree; which is the very objective mutation to a determinate fore, or the infallible destination of such a cooperation to existing for such a difference of time. When however the principle of the objective mutation antecede, by causality, the mutation, which it produces; so far is it away, that the divine volition, which produces the acts of created volition in acted willed being, according to the phrase of Scotus, or denotes those unimpedibly to futurity, should depend in its determination upon the knowledge of created will; but, on the contrary, the operation of created will (the divine motion being cut off) is left neither neutral nor indifferent to being about to be, or not about to be; and accordingly not attaining that objective determination which might be the object of infallible foreknowledge, and contract the divine will to such a species of motion and influx.

Two other testimonies of Scotus for the concursive premotion of God to the matter of sin.

45 THIS doctrine I fortify with another most excellent proof of Scotus; which he constructs against those who asserted that God does not immediately concurr to the acts of our will; which he delivers in the place cited, ex 2. sent. dist. 37. q. 2. §. cõtra istam opinionem arguitur sub n. mar. 8. where he says.

From it itself it follows; that God be not naturally prescient of futures. Because he has no science about future contingents, unless because certitudinally he knows the determination of his own will with respect to those things, toward which his will is immutable, and unimpedible; but if the created will be the total cause with respect to its own willing, and itself holds itself contingently toward that willing: therefore however much the divine will be posited determined to one part of those things which depend upon the created will, the created will could will otherwise; and thus no certitude follows from the cognition of the determination of the divine will.

But that we may proceed with a purified exposition of the Scotican proof, I premit. That if God did not immediately concurr to the acts of our will, (as Durandus feigned, and as Aureolus asserted about the wicked acts,) but such acts flowed forth from the created will alone as from the immediate principle; if the opinion of the Jesuits about the infallible determination, by hypothesis, of futurition, or about the determinate truth of future contingents in themselves, were true; the determinate truth in the very acts of created will could not be rejected, on the hypothesis of futurition; nay even that God did not immediately concurr to such acts.

But Scotus, on the contrary, just as he rejected all that truth of futures which is not posited in an objective mutation, which is drawn from the decree; supposing that God could effect nothing physical concerning the acts of our will could immediately perform, so neither would he have been able to produce them into willed being, or to destine them to an unimpedible futurition. That objective mutation which is left by the decree being cut off, the whole rationale of futurition vanishes, or the determination of the truth of acts of this kind.

Having set out these preliminaries, I construct the argument in this way. No hypothesis (or supposition of a determined futurity, with the production of the creature in the willed being taken away, or with the objective mutation that is drawn from the decree) is such as imports an objective infallible determination; so that the act of our will — however much it be asserted to be most determined to be about to be, by the hypothesis of futurity — if it were not contracted by the decree of God to one side of the contradiction by an objective mutation toward existing for such a difference of time, would not be determinately true, nor knowable by God.

Therefore, that a wicked act could be foreknown by God, not only is required the will that offers a concourse indeterminate, common to contraries and contradictories; but there is required a volition that objectively mutates the act of our will to the infallible existence for such a difference of time. So that the wicked act, before the mutation toward being-about-to-be which it draws from the decree, is conceived as neither true nor false; upon the advent, however, of God's statute, it passes over into the infallible class of future things.

But a contraction or objective mutation of this kind, in which is placed the adequate reason of the truth of the contingent wicked act, presupposes the decree as the efficient principle of such a mutation; therefore such a determination is a predetermination, as being the reason of the whole determination of our volition.

46 Moreover, the argument proceeds against Hugh Cavellus, [Fabri], Smisingius, and other Neoteric Scotists manifestly departing from the camp of Scotus. For as is plain from those words: Non habet scientiam de futuris contingentibus nisi quia certitudinaliter nouit determinationem voluntatis suae respectu eorum, ad quae voluntas est immutabilis, et inimpedibilis — "He has no knowledge of future contingents unless because he knows with certitude the determination of his will regarding those things toward which the will is immutable and unimpedible."

Scotus would have exhibited an empty and futile proof, if he had proceeded from a will involving the condition of the cooperation of a created cause, at the arbitrament of one contracting the divine will as possible to himself toward such a species of action; for such a will would be impedeible by a created will (upon its dissenting nod).

Nor would the divine will be said to be frustrated, since in the said hypothesis it decrees the act of our will only conditionally, supposing that the will itself wills. Just as neither would the will of Peter, disposing himself to walk with Paul, be frustrated if he will it, Paul not giving consent; for as Peter had provided nothing about the walking except at Paul's arbitrament, so the will of Peter, which precedes the foreknowledge of Paul's cooperation, could not be accounted absolute, immutable, or unimpedeible.

Whence, just as if Peter had not determined to run except at Paul's wish, inept could be rendered the reason of the futurity of such a course, looking at the will of Peter alone; so, if that determination in which God, with Scotus, foreknows the future were to import the condition of the cooperation of a created cause to be purified by the created will, there would be sought from the divine will alone an insufficient and inept reason of futurity. And yet Scotus, while he most frequently unravels the medium on the side of the object of the foreknowledge of future things (as is plain from the places we have frequently cited throughout that whole distinction), has not once named the foreknowledge of the cooperation of a created cause, which might be the reason for the contraction of the divine will to such a species of influx; and if it were required, [Scotus] would manifestly show that in a matter of such weight [his opponent] had proceeded drowsily and stupidly. I add, and that he expressly asserted that God is not determined by a created will to act in such a manner; see on this infra, under n. 61, at the end.

47 There is added, further, another perspicuous testimony of Scotus for the determination to the matter of sin, ex 1. sentent. dist. 41. quaest. unica, at the section on Uiterius in particular, under margin-num. 9, in which, while he argues against Henry, who asseverates that the foreseen good use of free choice from grace is the cause of the predestination of the elect, he subjoins: Deus non praeuidet, istum bene usurum libero arbitrio, nisi quia vult, vel praeordinat, istum bene usurum eo. Quia sicut dictum est dist. 39. certa praeuisio futurorum contingentium est ex determinatione voluntatis diuinae. — "God does not foresee that this man will use his free choice well, unless because he wills or pre-ordains this man to use it well. For as was said in dist. 39, the certain foresight of future contingents is from the determination of the divine will. Si ergo offerantur voluntati diuinae duo aequales in naturalibus; quaero, quare istum praeordinat bene usurum libero arbitrio, et illum non? Non est huius, vt videtur, assignare rationem, nisi voluntatem diuinam; et haec est prima distinctio inter eos, quam sequitur electio, vel reprobatio: ergo in prima distinctione pertinente ad praedestinationem, sola ratio est diuina voluntas." — "If therefore two equals are offered to the divine will in natural things, I ask, why does he pre-ordain this one to use his free choice well, and not that one? The reason of this, as it seems, is not to be assigned except the divine will; and this is the first distinction between them, which election or reprobation follows: therefore in the first distinction pertaining to predestination, the sole reason is the divine will."

There Scotus performs several things most to the purpose; first, that he reports and stabilizes that doctrine which he had delivered in 1 sent. dist. 39, q. unica, which text we transcribed in article 4 of this distinction from margin-n. 11 to 14, in which we had confirmed, as Scotus's own assertion, that doctrine which recognizes in a future contingent no other determined truth or intelligibility except a production in the willed being, or an objective mutation erupting from the absolute decree.

Second, that with most express words he defends that God pre-ordains the good use of free choice from grace, and also the wicked as to its matter, without expecting any other reason of knowing the oblique use that would be sought from a determined truth of the act in itself (which there he openly rejects), but from the absolute decree of the divine will, as is plain from those words: Non est huius assignare rationem nisi voluntatem diuinam; et haec est prima distinctio inter eos. — "The reason of this is not to be assigned except the divine will; and this is the first distinction between them."

That the testimony of Scotus also wholly rejects a science of conditionals in the determined truth of those conditionals, with the actual decree about the conditioned complex removed — just as it admits a science of conditionals in a free decree — wherefore with that text we strengthen our own doctrine in the following distinction on the foreknowledge of conditionals, art. 1, margin-n. 21, in which we also defend Scotus from the attack of Vitalis Zuccolius, the expounder of Henry, who assails Scotus because he asserted that God pre-ordains the wicked use of free choice as to its matter.

The testimonies of Bassolius and William of Rubione, Auditors of Scotus, for the determination of God to the matter of sin, and for the potentiality of free choice toward such an individual of action.

48 Wherefore John Bassolius, Auditor of Scotus, defended the determination of God to the matters of sin expressly; in 1 sentent. dist. 38, quaest. unica, art. 2, at the section on Ad primum eorum, where he thus teaches.

Ad confirmationem; quòd Deus non potest determinare aliquem ad odiendum se ipsum, scilicet Deum. Dico; quòd sicut Deus potest creare actum odiendi se ipsum, et id quod est sibi positiuum, et propter se ipsum, vt propter finem naturalem actus, non obstante quòd sumè diligat se ipsum; ita etiam potest determinare aliquem ad actum odiendi se ipsum, dato quòd ipse Deus in hoc non peccet, sed summè diligat se ipsum. — "Toward the confirmation; that God cannot determine someone to hating himself, namely God. I say, that just as God can create an act of hating himself, and that which is positive to himself, and for himself, as for the natural end of the act, notwithstanding that he loves himself most supremely; so also he can determine someone to the act of hating himself, granted that God himself does not sin in this, but loves himself most supremely."

Ad aliam confirmationem; quando dicis; quòd saltim aequalis necessitas te peccaret peccator, sicut ignis calefacit. — "Toward the other confirmation; when you say, that at least an equal necessity would make you, sinner, sin, as fire heats."

Dico; quòd verum est quantum ad hoc, quòd stante diuina voluntate, quòd ignis calefaciat praesente combustibili, impossibile est quòd ignis non calefaciat; ita necessitate consequentiae impossibile est, quòd iste non peccet. Non tamen naturaliter peccat, nec à principio naturali sicut ignis; sed à principio libero, quod quidem determinatum est ad peccandum, non naturaliter, sed liberè. — "I say; that this is true in this regard, that, the divine will standing that fire heat with combustible matter present, it is impossible that fire do not heat; so, by the necessity of the consequence, it is impossible that this man not sin. Yet he does not sin naturally, nor from a natural principle as fire does; but from a free principle, which indeed has been determined to sinning, not naturally, but freely."

Where Bassolius acutely, or thence, brings it out, that God can, without injury to his supreme sanctity and innocence, determine free choice to elicit an act of hatred of God; because he can, without the effective concourse of the created will, produce an act of hatred of God in the created will, it bearing itself merely passively: in which hypothesis God would not be the cause of sin, as is evident, since neither would the created will bearing itself merely passively sin; and under the same comparison of causality the power of God would be terminated to the act of hatred, and without a mark of sin in either hypothesis, whether when he concurs with the will that sins, or when without sin on the part of the will bearing itself merely passively, he produces an act of hatred in the created will.

For that is what those pronouncements of Basolius intend: just as God can create the act of hating himself and on account of himself, as on account of the natural end of the act; so he can determine someone to the act of hating himself, etc. On which see what we did against Didacus Ruiz, who denies that God can cause an act of hatred in the created will bearing itself passively; and against Ferrara, who asserts that the will bearing itself passively could not hold God in hatred, against whom we disputed from Aureolus: see n. 13 of this article.

49 To Basolius assents that other distinguished auditor of Scotus, Guil. Rubionus, or de Rubione, who published four most learned volumes on the four books of the Sentences in the year of the Lord 1323, under Gerard, Minister General of the Order, under whom the aforesaid Guil. de Rubione administered the Province of Aragon as its Minister Provincial: that this Guil. de Rubione was a disciple of Scotus, the learned man Dermicius Thadaei accurately observed, in his Nitela Franciscana Religionis against Bzovius, fol. mihi 27. And the reason and the series of times agree, because Scotus died in the year 1308. Scotus therefore obtained two distinguished adherents from among our Spaniards and from the kingdom of Aragon, and auditors: Antonius Andreas, a most faithful follower of the Master, and Guilielmus de Rubione.

But William not only confirms that doctrine which, in the preceding physical digression, we established concerning the indetermination of the second cause to the production of this individual rather than another; nay rather, he also seeks from it the necessity of the divine determination, in that, such determination being removed, there is left no second cause, whether natural or free, proximately expedited to actual influx. Thus therefore he teaches in 1. sen. distinct. 38. quaest. 1. conclusione 3. The second cause, in the manner touched upon in the conclusion, is determined; not by any other than by the first cause.

Proof; for either the second cause (say, this fire) is determined to produce this fire, and not another; and the created will to produce this act of willing, or nilling, rather than another, by itself, or by another second cause, or by the first. But not by itself; nor by another second cause: therefore by the first.

The minor is proved; and first as to its first part; namely, that not of itself. For neither fire, nor any other natural agent, which of itself is a uniformly productive principle of all effects of the same kind, and consequently is equally indeterminate toward all of them, can determine itself to produce one rather than another; nor to produce this one first and another second, rather than the contrary.

The created will also, although it freely wills or nills, cannot nevertheless will or nill through every act of willing or nilling; for the will cannot elicit any act already produced by another: nor can it again elicit an act once elicited by itself. Nor even, in regard to the same object often willed or nilled, does it seem that an act elicited in the second instance could have been elicited in the first: nor one elicited in the first, in the second: therefore the second cause does not seem to be of itself determined, but rather indeterminate; since it is no more productive of this effect than of another of the same rationale, as far as lies in itself.

50 The aforesaid author also most highly supports this opinion in 2. sent. dist. 34, where he weighs the question Whether God is the cause of sin; for there in q. 2 of the aforesaid distinction, under the § There are here two doubts, he supplies us with the following doctrine learnedly enough. To the first, in which they argue against another dictum given above, concerning the determination of the first cause as necessary to the second cause for acting. To the first, it must be said; that although a natural cause is determined to act, or to produce a determinate effect in species, as fire fire, it is not determined to an individual: and therefore, although fire does not need something determining it to produce fire, it yet needs something determining it to produce now this fire, now another. For unless some cause thus determined it to produce a certain and determinate individual, this fire would no more produce now this fire, and afterwards another distinct from the former, than the converse; so that it would either produce both at once; or be able to produce neither.

51 And this reason can be assigned, why the same thing, corrupted, cannot naturally be repaired; namely, because no secondary cause can act except toward that effect to which it is determined by the first cause: but the first cause does not determine the second, nor does it co-act it toward any corrupt effect to be repaired, the same in number.

For since that fire, once corrupted, is no more nothing, nor impossible after it has been corrupted, than it was before it existed, having been produced by another fire; consequently, that then it could be produced naturally, and not otherwise — this does not seem able to be except from the first cause unwilling to co-act the second toward the same effect in number except once.

52 To the second, about a free agent, it must be said in like manner; that neither can it determine itself to one act rather than another, of itself and by itself. For although the will can will or nill whatever is presented to it; yet that, regarding that object understood, it elicit now this act of willing or of nilling, and afterward another distinct from the former, rather than the reverse — this cannot be except from the uncreated will determining it, and co-acting it now toward this act, and afterward toward another.

53 To the confirmation; it must be said that the first cause determines the created will to one of the two opposites by a determination de inesse only; but not de possibili; nay, in that way it is indeterminate.

And therefore, although de inesse it is determined to one only, yet it is not necessitated; since it remains indeterminate de possibili. Wherefore it can [be about] that to which it is not determined; it can (I say) de possibili: yet it does not make it de facto.

From this it appears that it does not follow, what is inferred; namely, that it is not sufficiently determined. For it is thus sufficiently determined de inesse, that nothing else de inesse, or de facto, ever happens than that to which it is determined; although it could de possibili happen.

And by this the free agent is distinguished from the natural agent, which is so determined de possibili and de inesse, that, of itself, it can neither do, nor does do, anything other than that to which it is determined.

There the aforesaid author renders that the best physical reason, which we set forth in the preceding digression under n. 73, showing against Vázquez why — that because every individual, within its own virtuality, has pre-had all the individuals of the same species, it cannot reproduce a corrupted effect? Namely, because God does not premove or determine the secondary cause to the reproduction of the same individual.

Next; since the aforesaid author, weighing the concourse of God toward the matter of sin, establishes universally that God determines our will, wholly indifferent of itself toward the production of this sinful individual before another; he plainly judges that [God determines] toward the matters of wicked acts; as is plain from those things which we have done against Suárez, articul. 5. of this distinction, from n. 27. to 29.

That predetermination William's doctrine reports, which we set forth under n. 53 of this article; where he asseverates that that contraction which the secondary cause seeks from the first — that it is that unimpedeible determination, asserted de inesse, or de facto; which is to asseverate a will absolute about the matters of wicked acts, and not expecting the knowledge of the cooperation of a created cause.

See the coherent opinion of that other most celebrated Auditor of Scotus, Francis Maironius, below under number 98, where especially occur those words to be recalled, which instil the general doctrine of the determinate truth of all contingents, even of wicked acts. For thus he has it, in 1 sentent. dist. 39. quaest. 4. §. Quantùm ad secundum.

This then, namely the first, being proved, sufficiently evidently. To every active predestination there corresponds necessarily some passive; but the divine will from eternity produced those future beings into willed existence, which is nothing else than an action unto determining. To the cited place there, ar. 98.

54. In support of the physical predetermination also of the substrate of moral malice, Franciscus Lycheus, Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor and a learned interpreter of Scotus, is deservedly cited; who in 2. sen. dist. 39. q. 4. a. 2. there inquires, whether it can be from God through a cause, under 4; there, from the profane way, he says.

I suppose one thing for myself, that between the first and the second cause there is simply an essential order in causing; so that every second cause acts in the virtue of the first, and moves in that manner in which it is moved by the first.

Therefore, in Lycherus, the motion of God to the matters of wicked acts being weighed, the created will that fails does not determine God to concourse, as the adversaries speak; but on the contrary the created will is moved by God and contracted to the matter of such deformity.

Peter Tartaret, professor at Paris, concurs, in 1. sent. dist. 39. de praescientia futurorum contingentium. §. et hoc quantum ad tres quaestiones. where in concl. 3 he says.

The third conclusion: a future contingent, for this that it be made determinate to one side of the contradiction, must have an extrinsic cause determining it to one side. For the confirmation of which conclusion he very often turns over, as a Scotist axiom, that which we showed above: that the act of the created will obtains from eternity no other rationale of determinate sciibility, besides that which is posited in the objective mutation drawn from the absolute decree.

In order, therefore, that a wicked act about to be may be foreknown by God, there must necessarily be premised, of the mind of Scotus, an absolute determination of the futurition of an act of this kind, in which the adequate rationale of its knowability consists. But that that extrinsic determination, which the aforesaid author assigns as the adequate rationale of the determinate truth of a contingent future, is the divine will, is plain from the same author in the cited place under concl. 6, where he says: The primary and extrinsic cause determining a contingent future to one part of the contradiction is the divine will.

Therefore, in Tartaret, the created will, failing, does not excite and move the uncreated will, of itself indeterminate, to give assent to the matter of sin. Because the created determination, for that priority for which the indifference of the divine will stands, just as among the adversaries it must be maintained as determinately true, and consequently as knowable by God, so that after it contracts the indifference of the divine will, which it could not determine unless such a created determination to evil were foreknown by God infallibly and determinately; so the created determination would not derive its knowability from the absolute purpose of God; which is against the common consensus of the Scotists.

The same has Jacobinus Batgius, a celebrated disciple of Scotus, whose doctrine we transcribe below in this article under nu. 97, where especially those pronouncements are to be observed. The sixth conclusion: the first extrinsic cause determining the future contingent to one side is the divine will.

55 Moreover; among the recent adherents of Scotus, Franciscus de Herrera, Professor of Salamanca, expressly sustains the premotion of God to the matter of sin, in 2. sen. tom. 2. disp. 38. quaest. 6. conclus. 5, where he says.

The divine will, under the aspect of the executive power, promotes the created will to every action of that will itself, whatever action it be, real; (even if it be of sin,) with a physical promotion; for it implies a contradiction, that the created will should work anything not premoved by the first cause.

Moreover, St. Bonaventure’s commentators embrace the aforesaid opinion of Scotus with open arms, as though it were Bonaventure’s own; among them is the Capuchin Peter Trigosus (1st part, q. 1, art. 4, dub. 3, sect. 5). Certain points must therefore be noted to refute this opinion; these will be explained more fully below in the reply to Trigosus’s third argument. Francis Coriolanus, also a Capuchin, agrees with Trigosus; in his commentary on St. Bonaventure (*2nd part, q. 19, art. 3, § “I say fifth”), he writes: “God predestines, or has predestined, the assumption of sin insofar as it is assumed.”

That Bonaventure does not expel the concursive predetermination of God to the matter of sin; nay, expressly guards it.

But a certain testimony of the Seraphic Doctor seems to militate against the opinion of Scotus; it remains for us to subject it, and to dilute it. Which is objected to us from 2. sen. dist. 37. art. 1. quaest. 1. where Bonaventure, opposing against his own opinion the following objection, which is the sixth in order, says.

If God cooperates with free choice in the action which is the substrate of sin; either therefore free choice moves more principally than God, or conversely. It is certain, that free choice in that operation can move neither more principally, nor equally principally as God; since God, as much in moving as in causing, of whatever thing he is said to be the cause, or is understood as the most principal mover: therefore God moves more principally. If therefore the principal mover excites and moves the non-principal mover, it seems that in a culpable operation free choice is excited by God; therefore when the adulterer is wanton, and the thief steals, they are excited by God to such actions: which is altogether absurd.

To which opposition St. Bonaventure thus answers, at the end of the question. To that which is objected, that God is the principal mover in such actions. It must be said; that it is different. For it does not follow from this, that he excites free choice to do that operation, an excitation of this kind denotes a certain strengthening of grace preventing the will itself, which by nature is required in good meritorious works. But in other works indifferent, or even evil, there is not need of the cooperation of the divine power alone; which, existing in the creature potentially, essentially, and presentially, as it conserves it in being, so it assists it in operating: on which account there is conceded there cooperation alone, not prevention, or subsequution.

From these last words, where Bonaventure confounds the prevention of God toward a wicked work, the adversaries take their boldness, as though Bonaventure seemed to explode even physical predetermination, since prevention appears to sound the same as a certain previative predetermination. But so far is it from being the case that Bonaventure leans toward our opinion, that he expressly confirms it; since he plainly concedes that God, even in the operation underlying sin, is the first mover; as is evident from those words. To that which is objected, that God is the principal mover in such an action. It must be said; that it is true. What is more open? Saint Bonaventure therefore asserts God to be the principal physical mover toward the substrate of sin, and denies him to be the moral mover and exciter. Therefore, in Bonaventure, the operation of the deficient creature does not excite, move, or endeavor by exciting the indifference of the divine will, so that the will of God furnish the concourse to the wicked act. Wherefore, since the holy Doctor rejects only that excitation which is made after the manner of the moral causality of prevenient grace; so that God inflicts indeliberate movements morally impelling to a fall, and those, that he may obtain a wicked assent; in that manner in which he effects in us without us the movements of holy illuminations and inspirations, so that they render the cooperation of the created will consequent. Which those words plainly demonstrate: It does not follow from this, that he excites free choice to performing that operation (you understand, a wicked one); for excitation implies some effect of grace forestalling the will itself. That is, it expresses the excitation toward sin, which Bonaventure explodes, to be the moral causality of God inviting free choice to a fall; by that similitude, (if any such there be, which can be taken from the contrary reason of operating honestly) or analogy, which holds between the moral causality toward good and toward evil, through the immission of indeliberate apprehensions and appetitions, which allure to consent. Whence it comes about, that although God is asserted to be the moral cause of a pious operation; he nevertheless cannot be a moral principle of an impious or wicked action; although he premove to the physical entity of the inordinate action.

Next; since Bonaventure rejects every motion of God toward the substrate of sin, which is not that very cooperation; although he may reprove that doctrine which asseverated that the created will is pre-moved by God through the immission of some form, or quality of the species of power pertaining to first act, or the principle of operating; and consequently really co-distinct from second act, the actual influx or cooperation of the created will. The doctrine of Scotus, however, it does not touch; which recognizes no other predetermination except the actual cooperation of the divine will, as fulfilling the function of external causality, or the use-toward-the-external of the divine faculty as executing; which causality of God, although it not precede the influx of the creature by priority in-what, or of time, yet it antecedes it by priority from-which, or of dependence; about which more fully infra.

There is added, also, on behalf of the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, his judgment about the doctrine reprobating the immediate concourse of God toward the matter of sin, which we transcribed in the present article under margin-n. 30, for freeing Aureolus from the mark of a reprobated doctrine: Attamen (inquit,) quia per multam discussionem dubia ducuntur ad manifestationem; nunc communiter tenetur, quòd illa opinio verior sit, quae dicit, quòd omnis actio, siue substratum peccato, siue non, secundùm id quod est actio, est à Deo. — "Nevertheless, (he says,) because by much discussion doubts are led to manifestation; now it is commonly held, that that opinion is the truer which says, that every action, whether a substrate of sin or not, insofar as it is an action, is from God." That testimony of Bonaventure I judge to be most to the purpose for confirming the pre-motive concourse of God toward the matter of sin; because, as I showed above, the same urgent reasons hold of a pre-motive concourse as of an absolute decree to concur, as is plain from those things with which we assail Suárez infra under n. 62. Wherefore I judge that from that much discussion, which St. Bonaventure reports, there erupted that perspicuous pronouncement: Ad illud, quod obijcitur, quòd Deus est principale mouens in tali actione; (substrata peccato) dicendum, quòd verum est. — "Toward that which is objected, that God is the principal mover in such an action; (substrates of sin) it must be said, that it is true."

Lastly, there remains to be weighed in the pronouncements of St. Bonaventure this: that in this matter he carries great weight against those denying the immediate concourse of God toward the matter of sin. That Bonaventure draws the immediate concourse of God toward the matter of sin from the immediate conservation of a wicked act; as is plain from those words: sicut conseruat creaturam in essendo sic adiuuat in operando — "as he conserves the creature in being, so he aids it in operating." Whence it is inferred that there must necessarily be asserted an immediate conservative causality of God regarding the matter of sin, which Aureolus did not dare to deny; because if the immediate dependence of a wicked operation, as to its matter, upon God as conservant were taken away, even the foundation upon which rests the immediate dependence of a secondary cause upon God as conservant would likewise be prostrated.

57 Wherefore, although we do not receive those authors who asseverate a physical predetermination through a form composed intrinsically to the will, and really dissolved into the actual cooperation of the will; on the ground that such a predetermination would have itself on the side of the principle, and not of a mere action, and consequently look toward first act, adverse to liberty — as Scotus pursues [them]. Yet we adhere to the same authors insofar as they constitute that the created will does not move, or contract, a quasi-universality, community, or indifference of the divine will toward concurring or not concurring toward the matter of sin. Nay, on the contrary, we defend the potentiality of the created will being contracted by God; and that such a determination can not be conceived without a priority of nature, or of causality, in the divine influx.

Wherefore, the passage from Ferrariensis that we transcribed above under no. 13 plainly states that the creature is premoved by God toward the matter of sin. Capreolus maintains the same in Distinction 37, q. 1, art. 3, reply to the second principal argument, where, speaking of God’s influx toward the matter of sin, he adds:

As to every positive thing that is in the act of the will, the created action willed is posterior to the action of God in producing any such thing; because no creature acts unless moved by God.

And afterwards: The motion of God to determining the created will to something is not of itself evil, but is toward that which is of itself good by its own nature, although it be evil as regards the deformity which it has in respect of the second cause.

Wherefore, there is reason why we marvel, that it came into the mind of Didacus Ruiz, lib. de voluntate Dei disp. 37. sect. 1. n. 10. and of other recent Jesuit writers asserting, that the opinion pronouncing that God premoves to the matter of sin is not in the mind of the ancient Theologians; whereas Scotus expressly sustains it with the proofs of his school, as we have made plain, and among the more ancient Thomists Ferrariensis, and Capreolus, to whom, from the more correct, assent Domin. Banez. 1. par. q. 14. art. 1. dub. vlt. Nunius Cabezudus. 3. p. q. 62. ar. 5. q. 1. et 2. de auxilijs, Cabrera. 3. p. q. 18. art. 4. disp. 2. s. 12. Nauarrete. 1. p. to. 2. contro. 25. concl. 6. et 7. Aluarez de auxilijs. dispu. 24. conclus. 2. et alibi saepe. Ledesma q. 2. de auxilijs ar. 18. concl. 3. Albelda, and all the other Thomists of the Dorithican family.

And lastly, the Salmantic College of the Discalced Carmelites defends the predetermination of God through an absolute decree to the matter of sin: 1. p. tract. 4. On the Will of God, disp. 10. dub. 7. from num. marg. 124 up to 223; and lastly Ioan. de S. Thoma, professor at Complutum, 1. p. q. 14. disp. 19. ar. 3. §. Aduertendum principium. But I pass these over, and hasten to the proof of the Scotist opinion.

It is shown, that God predetermines our will to the matters of wicked acts.

With the sense therefore and mind of Scotus concerning the predetermination of God to the matters of wicked acts having been touched upon; the rest remains, that our opinion be established by reasons. And first there deservedly occurs to be censured the opinion of Ludovicus Molina in concordia quaestion. 14. articul. 13. disputat. 53. numbr. 3. who teaches that he guides himself so as to avoid the premotion of God to the matter of sin; in that he esteems the divine concourse potential and indifferent, and contractable by the influence of the created cause to such a species of act; which pronouncement we touched on somewhat more obscurely above under num. 29. For since, with Molina and the whole Jesuit School, the action or causality of God to the outside is nothing else than the influence of the created cause, as hanging upon God; whereas the action of the creature does not hang upon God according to common and universal predicates only, but also according to the contracted specific and numeric degree of being; it comes about that the influx of the creature is the causality of God, not only according to the most common concept of the action viewed in its term as a universal degree of being, but also according to such a specific and individual rationale.

Wherefore, if the act of God, as it imbibes the ultimate concept of such an act of flight, and of aversion from God, depends not only on the created will, but also on God, for any presupposition of reason; (otherwise there would be given some sign of reason, in which a created being could be conceived as objectively immutated to an absolute futurition without immediate dependence on God; and hence could also be produced without its flowing immediately from God, as Aureolus willed) therefore the action of God is not contracted by the causality of the creature, as a common thing by a particular. Moreover; that a physical action does not prescind in its tendency to the terminus, or does not attain it under one predicate, and not under another; inasmuch as such an action intends the existence of the terminus, so as to draw it out from the potentiality and eminence of causes; but existence does not agree with a thing according to abstract concepts, but as it puts on the ultimate rationale of a singular being; therefore the action of God cannot be potential, and contractible, but contracted to such a species of influx.

59 Hence; Francis Suárez does not establish the community, or universality, of the concourse of God, which is contracted from the created will to the causality of sin, immediately in the divine influx itself — for he asserted this influx to be determinate — but in the will of God, which does not absolutely pre-establish the fall before the absolute knowledge of our cooperation, but rather appears offering, and presents the concourse toward several individuated acts of diverse species, for example, toward such an individuated act within the species of love, or of hate, etc. So that with a free principle it is integral that in the divine influx one either follow God, or flee from him; yet flight is not pre-established, nor is the species of hate determined, before the absolute knowledge of the deficient will, for that would be to pronounce God the author of sin; so that author often teaches in Opusculo 1. de concursu Dei cum voluntate, especially lib. 2. cap. 3. num. marg. 17.

But the doctrine of Suárez premised above does not evacuate the present difficulty: For, just as God, presenting the concourse in the first act for the various species and individuations of acts, in very truth does not exercise the executive power, or executing faculty, except about that species of influx which free choice elicits; so about that one species alone does God bestow actual concourse, about the others, however, only potential, and by way of first act.

Let the inquiry therefore be recalled to the sole determination of the actual and exercised concourse to such a species of influx: into which principle should it be deferred? into deficient free choice? or into the first cause?

Either, therefore; that God actually flows together with our will into a depraved act, and not into a studious one, must be attributed to free choice contracting, as it were, the potentiality of the divine will offering the concourse to either alternative; or to God determining the species of his influx; or to both principles concurring equally and without any order of presupposition.

If this contraction of the species of influx be deferred to both wills, namely the divine and the created, simultaneously cooperating, without any habit of priority; it will already come about that God, not excited by our malice, but by the sole function of the first cause, bestows such a species of a sin-prone concourse; and therefore that useless accumulation of arguments would collapse, which is constructed against the opinion asserting God's premotion to the matter of sin; since it proceeds equally against the concurrent will, with every reason of predetermining set aside. Since in either hypothesis (namely, given God's predetermination to the matter of sin; or given the denial of a natural priority in the action of the deficient creature, so that such a fall, by a priority by which God's insufficiently congruous influx to the matter of sin does not excite God to bestowing such an influx), the contraction of God's influx to such a species of sin-prone action could not be attributed to the creature; since in either hypothesis the malice of the creature does not precede the determination of the divine influx as the reason of such determination, or of the exciting of God to bestowing the concourse toward evil; of which again below.

Either God and the creature are composed together for the effecting of depraved acts; so that by a priority of nature, or causality, God's action precedes our cooperation, with an anteriority, namely, by which it precedes, not in which it coexists; and the intent of Scotus's opinion would have.

Or finally, that the oppositions of the adversaries may be pressed, it will have to be said; that the determination of the influx of God to such a species of causality is to be reduced to the created will, as to the formal rationale contracting the concourse to such a species; so that God, not as answering to the functions of the first cause, but excited by our malice and as it were contracted, enters upon such a deficient concourse.

The third part of this pronouncement is assailed from the admitted comparison. 60 But in very truth, that the third part of this pronouncement, which Molina and others defend, is false and impossible, is shown thus. Because the influx of the creature cannot really and physically determine the equal concourse of God, given the opponents' principles; as we said under num. 55, since God's concourse toward ad extra can differ from the concourse of the creature by reason alone, because the creature's cooperation is the very action of God among the opponents; and the same individuated act, under a diverse comparison of habitude to another concurrent cause, cannot really and physically contract the elicitive power for effecting the same individuated act from another concausa. Therefore the influx of the creature, as from a created cause, cannot truly and really determine the executing faculty of God for effecting the same numerically one influx as from God; which is asserted by reason to be the action and causality of God.

Escape from the contraction of influx amid real identity in causes agreeing through natural sympathy. If you object: to that physical contraction which obtains between the causalities of principles mutually agreeing through natural sympathy toward acting, a real discretion of the contractor from the contracted, or of the determiner from the determined, is not required; as is clear in the influx of the intelligible species and the possible intellect toward the production of the mental word; for the very effecting of the mental word, as it flows forth from the impressed species representatively of such an object, contracts the potentiality of the intellect, and its indifference, so as to elicit the very same action as proceeding from the possible intellect, indeterminate of itself, toward the production of the expressed image of such and such an object. So neither will it obstruct that the influx of the creature, determined by the second cause to such a species of deformed action, contracts physically the faculty of God as executing, so as to elicit such a species of influx in preference to another.

The opposing instance is met. But the escape is precluded with no trouble; since it obtrudes, and voluntarily assumes, that which by the same right we explode; namely, that the production of the word, as it flows forth from the impressed species, truly and really determines the intellect to eliciting the same numerically-one causality, as it imports a habitude to the possible intellect, inasmuch as it is a mere potentiality in the genus of intelligibles; for there is affirmed a physical determination that is implicatory, which the action supplies with respect to the elicitive power, so that the same numerically-one action emanate from such a power.

The preceding doctrine is disentangled in the principles of Scotus and the Thomists. Hence; the Thomists, who maintain physical and real predetermination, do not establish it in the second act elicited by the created will insofar as it depends upon God; but in an intrinsic form really distinct from the second act of our will. The Scotists, however, who while receiving physical predetermination renounce premotion by way of first act, accordingly maintain predetermination through the extrinsic volition of God; because, since such volition, as it exercises the office of causality toward ad extra, is really distinct from the second act of the created will, there intervenes between them a real discretion, which could supply the habitude of determiner and determined; or for this, that the divine causality by way of an actual concourse premoves and contracts our will to such a species and individuation of influx.

Corollaries from the premises. Whence it comes about that, although the indetermination and potentiality of the possible intellect toward the expression of this image in preference to another is physically contracted — either immediately by the object, on account of the natural sympathy of the intellect and the object, toward the intentional causality to be exercised; or by the species as the vicar of the object, and what suffices in its place — nevertheless it cannot be contracted by the influx of that same intellect, as it emanates from the impressed species, so that the same influx (as indeterminate from the intellective power) it would contract effectively and elicit; since there is no real discretion between the exercised elicitive influx of the word, as from the impressed species, and as from the intellective faculty, which of itself is a mere potentiality in the genus of intelligibles.

Objection from the doctrine of Scotus But if you answer otherwise to our proof from the doctrine of Suárez; by conceding, that the concourse of the created will does not immediately contract the divine influx to such a species; because among the adversaries there does not intervene a real distinction between the influx of the created will, as from our will, and from God, whence it is evidently inferred, that the exercised concourse of God must be determined, and as it were really identified with the specific degree of such an influx, which is attributed to, and answers, the deficient second cause. Nevertheless, that it does not follow from this, that the influx of the created will, as it hangs upon our deficient will, does not determine the divine will, of itself indeterminate, to several species of influxes; since between the cooperation of our will and the divine will exhibiting a concourse to the diverse species of causalities, there intervenes a true real discretion.

To imply, not only in the thing and physically, but also through our conception, that the divine will is contracted by the created will for the concourse toward the matter of sin; against Suárez and his partisans.

61 BUT Against; it is to be contended that this determination of the divine will, which is drawn from the foreknowledge of the influx of the deficient created will, is implicative, not only in the thing and physically, but also through our conception.

Because every determiner, under that concept under which it contracts the potentiality of another, must precede the thing determined or contracted, as its reason in such being; otherwise the foundation would be utterly uprooted, upon which universal philosophy, built, professes a priority of nature (or of-from-which), with simultaneity existing (in-which) or of time, for any grade of being, and its constitutive reason in such being, which is conceived as a whereby in respect of it.

Therefore, if the operation of the defi-[Marginal note: If the created operation determines the will of God terminated to such an act, it must be prior to such by the reason of an extreme determination of the divine will.]cient creature is the contracting reason of the community of the divine will toward bestowing the concourse toward the various species of causality, so that the will of God, before the determination of the created will, is conceived only with an aptitudinal preparation for concurring toward this or the other species of influx; and our intellect, among the opponents, must seek from the deficient created cause, not from God himself, the foundation for apprehending the contraction to such a species of action; so that the divine will, on that presupposition of reason, because of which it is conceived to precede the absolute foreknowledge of the determination of the created will to evil, is not understood as exercised, and actually terminated to such a species of influx, but only conditionally, and applied in first act to such a species of operation which the created will will in fact elicit, as also to the other species, toward which it will by no means be determined:

It would therefore come about, just as with respect to those species of influx toward which the external causality is prepared to our will by God, yet which our will will never in fact elicit, that the divine will, offering the concourse, behaves aptitudinally and in a merely designated reason, but not actually and exercisedly; so with respect to that species of sin-prone causality which the deficient will will in fact bestow, before the absolute foreknowledge of our cooperation, the divine will is conceived only as potential, but not as contracted:

So that the will of God, on that designation, could not supply the foundation for our conception to this end, that the will of God be understood as determined to that species of influx, unless the operation of the creature accedes, presupposing the absolute knowledge of the existence of the sin-prone operation, from which the whole reason is drawn of the contracting of the divine will, potential of itself, to such a species of causality.

Add from Aureolus (as we did under num. 29), that if our operation determined God to such a species of act; it would come about that the motion of the created will, as contracting the causality of God toward ad extra, either would not proceed from God; or would proceed from God as from a principle indifferent, or indeterminate, to such a species of influx; though it is implicative that the action flow from a principle indifferent in the sense of composition, or as it is composed to the action contracting the potentiality or indifference of the principle in second act. Or if the motion of our will proceeds from the divine will as determined to such a species of influx, therefore the motion of the created will neither contracts nor determines the will of God to such a species of influx.

Either, therefore, the philosophical axiom must be rejected, which universally constitutes a priority of nature (or of-from-which) sought from dependence of this upon another as upon the constitutive reason of it in such a determinate order of being. Or a sign, or instant, of nature must be assigned, in which the creature can be conceived determined equally to such a species of influx, without dependence upon the actual and exercised termination, or extension, of the divine will to such a species of causality; but with a merely potential or aptitudinal termination. And therefore a created being could also be conceived immutated objectively toward the absolute and infallible futurition, with only that determination of the divine will which could subsist around the acts and operations of free choice, which will never exist, for the sake of some difference of time; as we showed.

Hence, either it will have to be brought forward that God is not excited by the exercised act of the deficient creature, so as to approach the absolute intention of concurring toward such a species of influx; but rather that the absolute intention of God precedes the contraction of the created causality to such an exercised species. Or it must be maintained that our operation can be conceived with an absolute objective immutation toward futurition, indeed and with a real exercised existence for some sign of from-which, without the actual and exercised termination of the divine will into our depraved cooperation conceived and foreseen by God as exercised.

Whence Aureolus, skillfully transcribed by us under num. 27, teaches; that if God were to concur to the matter of sin, determined or comoved by our deformed operation; that our operation determining God, upon that presupposition of causality (because of which it anticipates the will of God as contracted and determining), would undergo an absolute and infallible immutation toward existing, without an actual and exercised will of God; and therefore could even be produced without the immediate influx of the divine will.

If the will (he says) first determines itself by nature to that act, and from this God co-acts with the determined will, then the intention is had; because in that determining God does not co-act, and thus is not the cause with respect to every positive act.

Hence Scotus; just as he steadfastly denied that the actual and exercised premotion of God is subject and subjected to free choice, as regards the positing or negation of such predetermination of in-esse and of fact, so he deduced the aforesaid pronouncement from another axiom most familiar to himself; namely, that the first cause is not determined by the created will.

For so it stands in 4. sentent. dist. 49. quaest. 6. num. margi. 15. Non repugnat sibi, (intellige voluntatem creatam,) quòd contingentia eius non ponat contingentiam ex parte effectus simpliciter, quantum est ex parte causae superioris; quia causa superior non determinatur ab ipsa. What could be plainer?

Therefore, with Scotus, the premotion of God could be subjected to the arbitrament of our will only by that reason, as regards the positing or negation of it of fact and in-esse: if free choice were to contract, as it were, the potentiality of the divine will; so that God would undergo such an influx because the created will had so constituted itself. For those words sound that: Non ponit contingentiam ex parte causae superioris, quia causa superior non determinatur ab ipsa.

62 But that from the pronouncements of Suárez it is evidently inferred, that he thinks the determination of the created will to evil to be seen by God, and understood for some sign of nature as proceeding from the power of God, as in signified act, and before the exercised termination of the divine will upon the matters of wicked acts; is plain from Suárez himself, in Opusculo 1. de Concursu, et motione Dei Dei. lib. 2. de concursu Dei ad actus ordinis naturalis. cap. 3. §. Voluntate quasi generali concurrit Deus ad actus malos. num. margin. 7. Where, when he had censured the manner of thinking of those who hold, that God, the conditioned foreknowledge of a wicked act being supposed, concurs with a determinate and absolute will to the wicked act; he afterwards subjoins the assertions following, which I transcribe, that it may be clear from the words of Suárez, that he asserts the matter of sin to be understood not only as absolutely future, but also as actually exercised, with only an aptitudinal dependence upon the power of God, without actual and exercised dependence; for thus he has it.

Hence that will of God is not idle, or superfluous, since it tends to this, that the will of the deity in very truth be expedited toward an act of whatever species, which in that instant it could effect; but since that will is conditioned, it is not necessary that it posit something in the effect without the condition being applied, but that it be only in affection, or preparation, on the part of God. Where weigh those words: sit tantùm in affectu seu praeparatione ex parte Dei. For there he openly opines that the exercised emanation of the act of free choice can be understood from the power of God, not actually operating, but prepared in affection, or expedited in first act toward acting.

And that this is the clear mind of Suárez is evident from the antecedent pronouncements; where, opening the composition of the power of God toward depraved acts, he subjoins: Vocatur autem illa voluntas generalis; quia Deus, quantum est de se, nõ limitat concursum ad istum actum seu adfersitum ad alios, bonos, vel malos; etiam in particulari, quos in eodem momento posset voluntas hominis facere si vellet.

If, therefore, with Suárez, the concourse which the will of God offers for cooperating with free choice, in the issuing of the depraved operation from the deficient will, is not limited to such a species, but indifferent toward good and evil acts; therefore it does not import the composition of the divine power as actually operating, but as operating in aptitude; since the exercised influx is not indifferent and potential toward the various species, as we evidently showed.

The remainder therefore is, that with Suárez it can be conceived, for that first sign, that the operation of deficient free choice issues from the created will with only that composition of the divine power toward operating which is potential and merely designated, and therefore also which could subsist without that exercise of the deficient created will; just as in very truth, with Suárez, it subsists around those other species of pious operations which are not in fact elicited by free choice.

That placitum, if it is not maintained openly with Aureolus, that God does not concur immediately to the materialia of depraved acts, nevertheless lays firm foundations beneath him; granted, namely, that nothing obstructs, from the participated being, that it can be understood to issue forth physically from a created cause without exercised dependence upon the first cause (that is, with that comparison of causality on the part of the first cause which would in fact remain, with Suárez, even if the depraved act were removed); consequently, that the existence of the operation of free choice would not imply dependence exercised immediately upon God, as Aureolus willed.

Therefore Suárez loco citato, sub nume. margin. 18., when he had objected against the premised doctrine: Ergo exponitur in rerum natura aliquis effectus positiuus, et realis, sine absoluta, et efficaci voluntate, qua Deus velit, illum esse. To that blow he either meets thus: Respondetur, concedendo, aliquem realem effectum à voluntate creata fieri, quem Deus absoluta voluntate beneplaciti non vult esse. Per voluntatem vero conditionatam tantùm intelligit voluntatem in affectu praeparatam ad agendum, non tamen actu agentem; quia dum actu agit (contracta iam à cooperatione liberi arbitrij) est efficax in actu secundo, et absoluta; quatenus purificata existit conditio ob scientiam visionis terminatam ad operationẽ liberi arbitrij actu deficientis.

Hence Suárez concludes, at the end of that number 18: “Therefore, it is not necessary that God simply will the will to act, but only that he will to provide concurrence and leave it to use its voluntary faculty of acting.” Accordingly, if there is only a will to provide concurrence, without God’s exercised concurrence, then at least in some natural sign an exercised volition could be understood in relation to the created cause alone. That either amounts to falling back into Aureolus’s position or undermines those foundations of essential, exercised dependence with which the whole school of theologians attacks Aureolus and Durandus.

There accrues against Soarius this strength, that since in Soarius the action of God toward without is the very cooperation of the creature, as from God; if it were understood that for some sign the cooperation of free choice proceeds from the divine will not yet contracted to one part of the contradiction; it would follow that from a principle indifferent, as indifferent, and undetermined, in the composite sense, the action would proceed; or that insofar as the action is compounded with the agent in act second, the agent would be undetermined, which is implicatory, and evidently absurd.

63. The other confirmation of our opinion is that which we draw from the potentiality and indetermination of our will toward such an individual instance of action rather than another; which it may suffice even to have touched upon, for we weighed it pressingly against Suárez, art. 5 of this distinction, from num. 27 up to 29. Let the physical digression be seen, where the present doctrine concerning the indetermination of the created cause to such an individual instance of action is seriously defended against Vázquez.

Now in passing I would have that only noted; that besides Suárez and Hurtado, who assert that the first cause determines the second cause to such an individual of action; Valentine de Herice sustains the same opinion, 1. part. tract. 2. de voluntate Dei. disput. 19. capit. 4. §. Quod attinet ad specialem modum dicendi. sub n. 33.

Although Vázquez not undeservedly opines that the aforesaid Jesuit Authors fail of the consequence of their doctrine; because that opinion concerning the contraction and determination of the second cause by God to such an individual of action appears not to cohere with the placitum of authors of this kind, who attack predetermination with all their might. See the cited places; for it is not permitted to inculcate the same things. Yet Vázquez accomplishes nothing the more to the purpose, in that he does not explicate the rationale of the contraction of the will to such an individual of action, as we observed in treating against Dolanus in this article under numer. 31, near the end of the number.

Confutation of the opposing reasons of Aureolus; where, for the enervation of the first objection, there is expounded by design what is to be understood by the name of the permission of sin. The Tridentine definition is weighed; and the oppositions of Suárez are lopped off.

64 It remains now to break the subtleties of the adversaries; and because the first reason of Aureolus, which we proposed under number 2, labors that God does not foreknow the future contingents of wicked acts in the permissive will of such acts; it will be worth the while briefly to unknot, what under the name of permission should occur as to be understood among the classic authors? Our Alensis thus resolves the matter, parte 2. Summae Theologicae, quaestione 94. articul. 6. §. 2. An actio mala, inquantum mala, sit à Deo? In responsione ad secundum, where he says.

Concerning the will of permission, it is true that, God willing, evil comes about; so that there is noted here a concomitance through that ablative, and not any causality: because permission, as such, does not posit a cause in respect of the thing permitted.

But the will of approbation posits some causality in respect of the object willed; and so, speaking of this will, it is not to be conceded that evil is done with God willing; because if that ablative imports causality, whereas no causality is in God in respect of evil.

He admits this, that the substrate of malice is authored by God. Because, however, he does not weigh whether such a will of approbation, intending the matter of sin, involves the condition of the cooperation of the created cause, or absolutely pre-establishes it; whence it comes about that from this place it is not perspicuous, whether such a will, terminated upon the matter of sin, according to the mind of Alensis supplies a medium on the side of the object for infallible foreknowledge?

But Alensis, transcribed by us below, seems to insinuate the premotion of God to the matter of sin; see numer. 70 of this article, where, weighing it seriously, in summa Theologica part 2. quaest. 94. art. 6. §. 3. Whether an evil action, insofar as it is an action, is from God, under the versicle Afterwards it is asked, he openly concedes; That free choice is a mover under God. So that in the action substrated to sin free choice is a mover under God, and subordinates, and subjects, itself to God in eliciting the substrate of malice; therefore the cooperation of free choice does not contract God to effecting such a species of act.

Then, which for this matter is of greater moment for observation, it is evident from the text of Alensis, who also expressly takes up that celebrated elucidation of the Tridentine Council; that God concurs only permissively to wicked works, and not properly and perfectly, so that the permission is referred to the malice, and the causality of God to the substance of the work: as is evident from those words. Therefore let not malice be from God as author, but that which is subserved to malice, because the will of God is compared to that, in the aspect of the object willed. Alensis, transcribed in this article above 69, and above n. 89, has similar things.

Now also the perfected permission, having been supposed, presents the objective rationale of the infallible judgment in that acceptation which Scotus, transcribed by us under number 40, employs, where he maintains that in the permissive will the future fall of Judas is not apprehended by God, but in the cooperative will. For elsewhere, that we might be able to discern the cooperative will from the permissive, as regards that which, more operatively, can supply a medium on the side of the object for infallible foreknowledge, whereas the permissive does not so: we have called that will permissive, which assists the executing faculty of God to operate, and is reduced, if we wish, to the apparent concourse indeterminate to either of two in act first, before God enters upon the absolute purpose predefining one side of the contradiction: but we have asserted that will to be cooperative, which absolutely contracts the indetermination of the created will in act second, and in exercise, to such a species and individuation of act.

Moreover; because the common phrase of the Saints calls the positive causality of God concerning the substrates of wicked actions permission; by the name of permission there can also be understood a will positively, and absolutely, intending the matter of a deformed action; and bearing itself merely negatively toward the deformity which follows upon the action, not as from God, but from a deficient cause; in which acceptation, permission would afford a determination of every kind objective to the foreknowledge of God; in which sense Alensis seems to speak, transcribed and elucidated in this number.

§ 5 But while we weigh the permission of sin, and inquire in what manner it can import causality in respect of the sinful action; it will be to the purpose to report the dogma of faith from the Tridentine Council, which is opposed to us by the adversaries with that contention, as if it shook the firmness of our opinion, or in some way.

Thus therefore the Tridentine Council, sessione 6. de iustificatione. Canone 6. Siquis dixerit, non esse in potestate hominis vias suas malas facere, sed mala opera, ita vt bona, Deum operari, non permissiuè solùm, sed etiam propriè, et per se; adeò vt sit proprium eius opus, non minus proditio Iudae, quàm vocatio Pauli, anathema sit. From which definition of faith Suárez assails our opinion thus. Opusculo 1. de diuina motione, et concursu. libr. 2. capit. 2. §. Assertio ex Tridentino confirmatur. numer. 22.

And first; it is objected from those words: Esse in potestate hominis vias suas malas facere. Because, supposing that man cannot sin if he be not premoved to the matter and substrate of malice; it follows that to be in the power of man, to make his ways evil, is not; just as neither does it rest in his arbitrament to be premoved by God in this way or in that.

Second; it is objected from those words: Sed mala opera, ita vt bona, Deum operari. Where, since the Council disapproves of God properly and per se operating evil works; it seems to show, not only that the malice of depraved works is not from God, which was incontrovertible and confessed even among the heretics themselves; but that neither is the very substance of the evil act effected by God through a will determined of itself to such a species of sin-prone influx, for that those words (mala opera) seem to intimate, which sound not only malice, but also its substrate.

Third; it is objected against our opinion from the following words: Nõ permissiuè solùm; sed etiam propriè, et per se. Where the permissive action, as distinguished from the action properly and per se intending the depraved work (which the Council execrates as utterly impious and unworthy of God), imports nothing else than an offering, or presentation, of the concourse toward either alternative, so that the created will is not fastened to the evil operation; because that would no longer be to permit the evil, but to preordain, predefine, or predestine it; as the heretics speak.

66 But from the premises it will be no laborious task to demolish the aforesaid objections. To the first of the acting arguments: that from our opinion it follows that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil. We say: that, since the predetermination which we defend as of the mind of Scotus does not take away the indetermination of the possible, but only of in-esse, as we shall more fully weigh in the following art.; it is from there that, although man, premoved to the matter of sin, may sin necessarily of in-esse, that is, hypothetically, yet not of the possible, and absolutely. For this reason, that although, on account of the essential dependence of the participated being upon God, the cooperation of the created will cannot but first hang upon God by a priority of from-which, that is, of dependence (since otherwise those inconveniences would follow which we disclosed against Suárez, of the absolute immutation of the created being toward futurition without the actual termination of the divine will into it); yet with Scotus the created will is not contracted in first act to one part of the contradiction, nor is it fastened to the fall; since rather the concourse appears to it toward either alternative in first act; as is clear from what has been said, and from what is to be more fully written out below in the following art.

Whence, if such an excursion should pretend any acuteness, it would also assail the immediate concourse of God to the matter of sin without any posteriority of sign, or nature, on the side of the concourse of the first cause; since that premotion which we maintain is only concursive, involving the hypothesis and necessity of in-esse, or of second act; not of the potentiality, or in first act; and therefore it does not fasten in first act to the fall, just as neither does it take away the proximate power toward a pious operation. On which see what we discourse below in the following art. 7, on the conciliation of our liberty with the foreknowledge of God, sub n.mar. 38.

But when you press; that the premotion to evil is not subjected to the nod of our will; and consequently that it is not left in the power of man to make his way evil; since he cannot bring this about without the premoving causality of God.

To the aforesaid objection we have sufficiently and abundantly replied in art. 5. huius distinct. num. margin. 30. et 31., where we showed that it pertains to the condition of the free agent only that it be moved by God according to the exigency of its indifference and the rights of its liberty; but not that God be so composed to the created cause for acting, as to expect from it the motion and contraction; so that a priority of nature in operating must necessarily be ascribed to the created cause, as to the principle, or quasi-contracting principle, of the community or potentiality of the divine executing faculty toward such a species of influx. Which priority of nature, although the adversaries deny it, as it were playing with words, they nevertheless embrace it in the thing; since a priority of nature is nothing else than a sign of presupposition, because of the dependence of this upon another in such a grade of being or order of causing; and God, among the aforesaid Authors, waits upon the operation of the deficient creature, as the excitation and motive of it toward such a species of causality.

Dissolution of the second objection from the Council of Trent.

67 The second objection, sought from those words of the Council: sed mala opera, ita vt bona, Deum operari — it sufficiently demonstrates how tortuously and violently the definition of the sacred Council is opposed to us; which those last words of the Canon chiefly attest: Adeò vt sit proprium eius opus, non minus proditio Iudae, quã vocatio Pauli.

The Council damns a moral causality in God with respect to the depraved act.

From which it is clear that the intention of the Council was only to censure the madness of the heretics snarling; suggesting that God be the moral cause of the fall of Judas, urging his sin by the introduction of depraved thoughts into the intellect and of impious affections into the deliberations of the traitor's will; just as he was the moral cause of the calling of Paul, anticipating him by the motions of his holy illuminations and inspirations. For if the mind of the Council had been to remove from God all the exercised and absolute political causality with respect to the substance of the depraved act; and to exhibit the divine will as so permissive that it would behave merely negatively around our fall; it would also impugn the concourse of God to the matter of sin.

St. Bonaventure proceeds in the same sense.

In which sense of moral causality, St. Bonaventure denies the predetermination of God to the matter of sin; as is clear from the premises under num. marg. 56.: namely, inasmuch as he morally allures to sinning. For those words openly express it: Non sequitur ex hoc quòd excitet liberum arbitrium ad faciendam illam operationem; excitatio enim dicit aliquem effectum gratiae praeuenientem ipsam voluntatem. And that the Council speaks in the sense intended by Bonaventure is clear from those words: Sed mala opera, ita vt bona, Deum operari.

Nor has SoÁrez's replica any force at all: that in respect of premotion to evil, God carries himself not only as a physical but also as a moral principle; on the ground that such premotion proceeds from God freely, and applies man to moral action.

For if that objection accomplished anything, it would surely establish that God, in respect of the concourse with the matter of sin, is not only a physical but also a moral cause; since he inflows freely, and bestows causality toward the moral operation of the will that is deficient. Wherefore, just as SuÁrez is bound to answer — that moral causality toward the substrate of sin is not denied to God in that sense, because he does not operate freely, or does not concur with a free action; but because he does not wickedly suggest or morally allure to the fall — so likewise we, or else we would have broken SuÁrez's objection in this way, ought not to displease him.

Another excursion of SuÁrez is overthrown.

But if SuÁrez should have recourse to the contraction of the divine will to such an oblique influx on account of the foreknowledge of free choice's failing, we premised the overthrow of this doctrine in this article under num. 62, on the ground that it is unintelligible and selfcontradictory, unless the immediate exercised and absolute concourse of God with the matter of wicked acts is driven away together with Aureol.

Reply to objection 3.

The third objection of Suárez is also without force; for, as is clear from what has been said, before the actual premotion to evil (which we maintain only by way of concourse, or actual cooperation, and not by way of a principle or form belonging to the power of acting), God prepares for our will a concourse toward either alternative in first act. Thus, before the actual premotion takes place, this concourse must be regarded as a proximate moral principle, ready for either alternative, and therefore not contracted in first act, nor—before the operation is exercised—necessitating a fall, as the heretics blaspheme.

The heretics are therefore condemned because they assert that concourse to sin takes away the power of not sinning, and the virtue of sufficient aid unto salvation; and besides, because they do not distinguish between the substance of the act, and the malice or moral disconvenience, in respect of which God bears himself permissively, and not through positive causality, as is clear from Alensis transcribed under numer. 64 and under numer. 89, and from Bonaventure transcribed under nu. 30.

Why God, determining to the matter of sin, ought not to be reckoned the principle of moral deformity? To the second opposition of Aureolus; where we weigh the excellent reason of Scotus and of Alensis.

68 The second opposition of Aureolus, which we premised under num. 3, scrutinizes and investigates the reason; why God, determining to the material, or substrate, of moral deformity, to which that is inseparably annexed, should not be censured as the author of such malice? For the dilution of which argument, the doctrine of Scotus must be turned over from 2. sen. dist. 37. q. 2. §. Sed tunc est dubium. num. marg. 16. where he has it thus.

I answer; that God cannot sin in himself; this is plain from the fact that he cannot turn away from himself, neither formally, because he cannot fail to love himself, and that ordinately, and with all the circumstances required, otherwise he would either not be able to love himself ordinately; or could be changed; both of which is impossible. Nor can he even virtually turn away from himself; because nothing other than himself is necessary to him for willing himself, for whatever else is other than himself, because it is willed by him, and willed in this manner, both for now, and for then, is on this account to be willed in an ordered way.

Where Scotus contends to this end, that a deficient or sinful causality cannot be attributed to God; in that, in all his causality, God cannot turn away from himself, either formally or virtually; because every created being, insofar as it is attained by God, and as the term of his causality, is essentially referred to God, and subjected to him, not only in the genus of efficient cause, but also in the genus of final cause.

Wherefore the hatred of God, although, as it is elicited by the created will not subjecting and subordinating itself to the first cause in the production of such an act of flight, it falls short of God; yet as it is effected by the first cause touching that substrate, or matter of sin, on account of the uncreated goodness, as on account of the intrinsic motive rationale of the action eliciting such an act in the being of nature; so far is the effecting of such a form, as it flows from God, from importing an aversion from God, in which the rationale of sin is posited; that rather it essentially imbibes a continuation with God in the genus of end; or coheres with the divine goodness, as with the final rationale of its production.

69 Alensis acutely writes the matter out, in summa Theologica, par. 2. quaest. 94. ar. 6. §. 3. Whether an evil action insofar as it is an action is from God? where under the versicle Afterwards it is asked: objecting against his own opinion asserting that God concurs immediately to the matter of sin; separately he sets before us these assertions, which confirm the pronouncements of Scotus. And it seems that not; because free choice is a mover under another, namely God; whence it is a particular mover. But this particular agent is sometimes conjoined with the supreme agent God, who is a universal agent; sometimes it is discontinued, and separated from him: when however it con-

From this it is objected thus: nothing, that proceeds from free choice itself through discontinuation and separation from God, can be said to proceed from God in any way: but an evil action is of this kind, etc.

He enervated this opposition in his reply to the first; where he says. It must be said: that when I speak of the discontinuation of free choice from God, I say two things. For there I speak of the separation of free choice from God, as regards the affection, or effect: I speak also of its conjunction as regards being. That separation therefore induces deformity, or malice: (for this belongs to the will that is deficient,) but that conjunction with the supreme good as regards being, induces the action.

Therefore the evil action, by reason of the malice or deformity, proceeds from free choice through its discontinuation from God, but not by reason of the action; but rather by reason of the action it proceeds from him through its continuation with God. And therefore an evil action, inasmuch as it is an action, is from God; but inasmuch as it is evil, from free choice failing, however, or discontinuing itself from God.

70 Where, concerning the doctrine of the Alensis, it occurs to be noted; that free choice is called a particular mover, or a mover under God; as appears from that pronouncement which the Alensis subjoins, and premits to the objection against the concourse with the matter of sin: Free choice is a mover under another, namely God, whence it is a particular mover. As though in every motion free choice subordinated itself to God as a mover moved; and consequently did not contract, as it were, a potentiality of the divine will, but rather was contracted and determined by it. Which assertion of the Alensis seems to confirm that sufficiently hackneyed axiom of Scotus, which he alleges; that free choice acts so as moved by God, that if God were a necessary agent, and not free, the created will too would operate necessarily; because God does not preconstitute our actions by involving the condition of our cooperation, or ex hypothesi, but absolutely, and consequently as unimpedible. Next; it is gathered from those words (where the Alensis calls the motion of God to evil as substrate, and matter, a continuation with God in the being of entity; although there is annexed to such a continuation a discontinuation in the genus of morals, on account of the subsequent moral deformity,) that the Alensis manifestly indicates the dependence of any created entity on God, as it is the terminus of the divine action, not only in the genus of efficient cause, but also in the genus of final cause.

On account of which quidditative continuation, or conjunction of the creature with God in the genus of end, as a created entity, as it is attained by the first cause, it cannot fail to be referred to the goodness of God, as in the ratio of his final end; thus God, as eliciting that terminus, under such a motivative and final ratio, can neither be formally nor virtually averted from by God; and consequently is neither the author nor the cause of sin, since sin quidditatively imbibes aversion from God.

71 To the same belongs Basolius, transcribed by us under num. 48, where he treats of this, that God in the production of the act of hatred of God cannot be the author of sin; since he elicits such an act of flight on account of his uncreated goodness; not as on account of an end that is per accidens and accidentally appendant and adjunct to such a form, as it is the terminus of the divine causality; but as on account of an end essential to any created entity, as it is beheld and intended by the influx and motion of God.

To which argument for removing from the influx of God all causality of sin, there would subscribe, as the probabler one among recent theologians, Ludouicus Montesinos, Primarius professor at Complutum. 1. 2. tom. 2. q. 79. arti. 2. disput. 10. quaest. 4. versiculo. Dicendum ergo est. numē. 42.

Which doctrine can be illustrated by the instance of the first-first motion, or of the indeliberate act of hatred of God; which, just as it induces no peccaminous obliquity, inasmuch as it anticipates the deliberation and judgment of reason; so also it is touched by God, on account of the end of his uncreated goodness. But with deliberation supervening, without any physical immutation of such an act of flight, or hatred of God; although moral deformity accedes to it from the created cause not subordinating, nor subjecting itself to God in the conservation of such a form; it does not accede from the first cause, which attains the term in the being of being, conserves it, and beholds it under the same final rationale, under which it first elicited it before the deliberation of reason, and the free conservation of such a form.

From which doctrine of the Alensis and of Scotus concerning the essential composition of the causality of God, or the essential continuation with the divine goodness in the genus of end, the edge of that objection could be blunted which would attack the immediate concourse of God with the matter of sin in this way.

Because, if per impossibile, God had constituted the supreme Angel of such energy to create; that he should suffice as it were in the place of a first cause, on which all the other Angelic substances should hang in operating. That supreme Angel would be bound not to concur with the inferior Angels toward the substrates of wicked actions; in such a way that the will of bestowing such a concourse would imbibe and transcend that turpitude which cannot be defecated or depurated on any title whatsoever of exigency of such a concourse on the side of the lapsability of the inferior failing spirits: whence, ex hypothesi, that Angel would be bound to leave all the others weary and inert unto eternity, rather than supply them with a concourse toward millings wicked by nature and object, although those desert spirits would be caused, bereft of the due concourse, nor could that concourse toward evil be colored under any pretext whatsoever, however masked.

That, therefore, which would defile the goodness of that supreme Angel — why should it not displease the illimited sanctity of God? Therefore it cannot be asserted that God answers to his gift of first cause, and universal provider, when he not only concurs but even predetermines toward the substrate of sin.

To which opposition we meet, taking what is sought from the similitude of the things premised; insofar as no creatable nature can express the essential continuation with the divine goodness in the genus of end; and consequently neither can there suit that apparati[on] of a concourse toward the substrate of sin, so that it can be depurated from the deformity annexed; just as there suffices for the essential innocence of God that composition or continuation of the action with its rule of reason and goodness, so that to fall from it implies: for which see another excellent pronouncement of the Alensis transcribed by us below: in hoc art. sub nu marg. 89.

What Anselm judged concerning predetermination to the matter of sin? and something from Basil.

72 Last of all at length I observe; that the aforesaid opinion concerning the predetermination of the substrate of malice is also buttressed by the authority of Anselm; for when he weighs the argument, why sin is assigned to the failing will, but the work rightly to God? So it stands tom. 3. libr. de concordia praescientiae, et praedestinationis. §. Quòd sit praedestinatio, et quòd praedestinatio nihil inferat necessitatis libero arbitrio.

For there, when at the beginning he had opposed to himself: That predetermination seems to be the same thing as preordination, or preconstitution; and therefore that when God is said to predetermine, he is understood to preordain; which is to establish that a thing is to be in the future. But that God establishes a thing to be in the future, it seems to be in the future by necessity: wherefore whatever God predetermines, it is necessary that it be in the future.

Therefore if God predetermines goods and evils, which happen, nothing comes about through free choice; but all things from necessity. But if he predetermines only goods; only the goods are from necessity, and there is no free choice except toward evils, which is too absurd: therefore God does not predetermine only goods.

Thus he dilutes the objection; subjoining. In the first place therefore, before the answer of the question, it is to be seen; because predestination is not only of goods, but can be said of evils; just as God is said to do the evils which he does not do, because he permits. For a man is said to be hardened when he is not softened, and to be led into temptation, when he is not delivered; it is not therefore incongruous that he predestinate in this way, while he does not correct the wicked and their wicked works. But goods he is said more specially to foreknow and to predestinate, because in them he makes that they are, and that they are good; in evils, however, not, except that they are essentially; not that they are evil, as was said above.

Where, from Anselm it is to be noted, that the word of predetermination to evil with respect to the material, or of the preconstitution or preordination of God toward the substrate of sin, does not abhor; but rather that he admits it expressly. As is clear from those words: Predetermination is not only of goods, but can be said of evils. Where he makes much of that word of preconstitution, or preordination of evils as material, which he had objected to himself as incongruous under: That predetermination seems to be the same as preordination, or preconstitution, etc. For he only wishes that God be said to foreknow and predetermine goods more specially; not however that he does not preconstitute or predefine evils. Of which see also n. 32. at the end.

Wherefore Anselm, with the said discretion between pious and wicked acts, admits the predetermination of all future contingents, which are the objects of divine foreknowledge; as is clear from the words following. Let us now consider, whether any things can be predetermined through free choice to be in the future? By no means ought it to be doubted, because its predetermination and foreknowledge do not disagree: but as he foreknows, so too he predetermines. And a little below, near the end of the same, §. he subjoins. Therefore it is clear from those things which have been said, if they be well considered; that neither does predetermination exclude free choice, nor does free choice oppose predetermination; since all those things which we showed above, that free choice does not resist foreknowledge, equally show that it agrees with predetermination.

Next it is to be noted, that with Anselm there intervenes this distinction between the preordination of a wicked and of a pious action; that God does not only attain the right work as it is an entity, but also as it is good; but the wicked he elicits only as it is an entity, or inasmuch as it is born of entitative goodness, but not as it bears moral deformity. So that in the causality or concourse of God toward the oblique and the right operation, Anselm did not assign that rayon of discerning which has been devised by the neoterics; namely, that toward the right operation God moves and determines of himself; but toward the evil he is excited and contracted by our malice. Whereas Anselm, seriously investigating the disparity of the predetermination of God toward evil, or toward good, did not intimate such a rayon of discrimination; which demonstrates that it did not even come into his thought.

Whence he subjoins, or rather this dissimilitude between the concourse toward a good and an evil operation: That in goods God makes that they are, and that they are good; but in evils not, except that they are essentially, not that they are evil. What could be more luculent from Anselm to our purpose? For he does not even mention its contraction toward the concourse of a wicked action, with the fall of free choice beheld; as the oppugners of physical preconstitution, or predetermination, would have; which (the very word of preconstitution retained) Anselm seems to have defended in respect of the concourse toward evil.

Besides, those words of Anselm do not disapprove the premotion of God toward the matter of sin: a man is said to be hardened, when he does not soften, and to be induced into temptation, when he does not liberate, etc. which seem to deny the absolute purpose of God preconstituting the matter of sin. For therein, as appears from the sequel, he treats only that he does not concur nor premote toward the wicked work, as it is wicked, but as it is an entity: for otherwise, if those words were intended, that God carries himself merely negatively toward the substrate of sin; they would also attack the concourse of God toward the matter of the acts of the wicked.

73 Something also to the purpose seems to have been touched by St. Basil. in the Homily Quod Deus non est author malorum. Where, while he pronounces that God is not the author of sin, just as neither of a bodily disease, in that sense, that he intends the evil of pain, as evil to man, but as a medicament for man; so too he denies that sin is from God. But since Basil does not deny that the physical reality of the disease is effected by the first cause; it is consequent also, that he should affirm the immediate concourse toward the matter of sin.

Further, since this account says nothing of the excitation and contraction toward the matter of sin posited by the more recent authors—namely, that God asks free choice, in its act of failing, to furnish concourse toward the substrate of a wicked act—but speaks in precisely the same way of the production of disease and of concourse toward evil materially, it remains that this way of thinking is not the meaning of this Father, when he seriously investigates why God is not the author of sin. This, then, is what he says. ¹

Whence therefore (you will say) has it essence, if it is neither without principle, nor was it made? Such things are asked by those inquiring. Whence disease? Whence the lesions of the body? For disease is not uncreated, nor is it the work of God. Behold where Basil appears to have spoken equally concerning the disease of the body and concerning the substrate of sin. Then a little after he renders no other reason, except that God neither intends the disease as an enemy of nature and deficient from health; which also fits, not only to the concourse, but even to the premotion con coursive toward the matter of sin.

For he says: And so God made the body, but by no means the disease; and in like manner God made the soul, but not sin. Yet he does not assign that reason for avoiding the concourse of God toward evil; because the appetite, failing in the second act, excites God to bestow the concourse; since such an excitation by free choice, in the second act, is selfcontradictory, inasmuch as it imbibes the dependence of the second act itself upon God, already determined toward such an exercised action; as Aureol acutely gathered.

Wherefore Basil, in the concourse of God toward evil, although he seems to have respected the lapsability and liberty of free choice in the first act, or by way of potency; as appears from those words. But whence is it at all capable of evil? Because it was made with free choice, which best befitted a rational creature. Yet Basil did not regard free choice in the second act composed with its elicited volition or inclination, on account of which God is contracted, or excited, to bestow such a determined concourse, since that implies; as we have evidently shown from Aureol.

74 To the third opposition of Aureol, from n. 4. we say: that with grace prevening, namely with the motion of holy illumination on the side of the intellect, and of inspiration on the side of the will, just as non-assent can stand, so too sin; yet not with grace accompanying, to which we assert the premotion of God toward supernatural works to belong; because we maintain that predetermination, which we constitute from the mind of Scotus, is that which does not regard the principle of operating, but the actual operation, with which, as a matter of fact, the negation of the concourse, or of the concursive premotion, cannot stand. But the aforesaid objection of Aureol is wholly diluted in the following article, where we shall reach: whether it conduces to the ratio of sufficient aid, that, suppar data in physico esse being posited, one be converted in fact, another however not?

To the last instance of Aureol, from n. 5. where he inveighs against those who hold that future contingents of honest operations are foreknown in the determination of the divine will; but not so the future of wicked actions.

It is answered; that Aureol plainly obtains; that the aforesaid authors are not consistent with themselves, who, when they explode the determination ex hypothesi of futurition, with the decree secluso, which does not involve the condition, and drive the determined truth of future contingents into the things themselves; acknowledge no other medium on the side of the object of infallible determination in free future contingents, than the absolute purpose of God changing objectively the thing to one side of the contradiction for any difference of time. It is consequent, therefore; either that future contingents of wicked actions are not foreknown by God; or that the absolute decree of God is admitted, destining objects of this kind to be determinately. Which decree must at least antecede, by prioritas à Quo, the influx of our will, as the ratio and principle of its contraction to one side of the contradiction; which objective alteration not involving the condition to be purified by the cooperation of the created cause, we call preconstitu- tion, preordination, or predetermination of the future entity, according to the phrase of Anselm. For the purpose of blunting the subtleties of the More Recent, it is urged; that either it must be held with Aureol, that God does not immediately concur with the substrate of sin; or that we are not specially touched by the millings of the adversaries.

59 The agents against SuÁrez, under nu. 59. we touched that which is now to be investigated briefly; whether, the priority of nature having been removed between the determination of God and the created will (in such a way that the motion of our volition does not antecede, by prioritas à Quo, the absolute volition of God concerning the bestowing of a concourse toward the matter of sin) they can touch by the Scotist opinion the foundations of the adversaries, which they attack concerning the predetermination of God toward the matter of sin?

For we asserted, that if such a priority of nature be disapproved; there remains, that that excitation and determination of the absolute divine volition, which the adversaries pronounce to be drawn from our failing volition, fall. Wherefore, either there must be sustained the priority of nature on the side of the act of our volition, which we there seriously overthrew; or there must be overthrown the determination of the divine will, which is supposed to be drawn from our determination: and consequently it would come to pass, that God inflows into the matter of sin, not excited by our wicked operation (as it were, from a reason, on account of which he expires his absolute purpose of bestowing such a concourse); since the presupposition of our determination is selfcontradictory, which is understood to antecede, even by prioritas à Quo, the absolute purpose of God concerning the bestowing of a concourse.

Therefore if God does not operate the substrate of sin as comoved by our deformed operation, on account of any antecedent sign of supposition of nature of the absolute statute of God concerning the bestowal of such a concourse; it will come to pass, that the refuge be precluded to the adversaries, while they constitute that as the mark of discrimination between the two opinions; that the assertors of the predetermination of God toward the substrate of sin cannot assert that God is excited by our evil operation, since our deformed operation is posterior in nature to the motion of God. But with the adversaries, however, the excitation and contraction of the divine will toward such a species of causality in respect of the substrate of malice can be defended on this ground; that the determination of our volition is the ratio of determining the divine will toward such a species of influx.

For it appears selfcontradictory, that there should be an assignable excitative and motive ratio of the determination of any cause, which cannot be conceived as prior to that cause as contracted and determined; and consequently, either the priority of nature on the side of the influx of the created cause must be sustained, which the adversaries deny with one mouth; or that ratio of discrimination which they constitute between the two opinions is prostrated, so that they would wish the arguments which they infer from the absurd, that God is the author of sin, to militate only specially against the mind of Scotus.

Whence Ambr. Machado seems to have labored in vain, while he endeavors to expedite the matter otherwise, or thus. 1. par. q. 22. artic. 4. disp. 45. sect. 5. §. Ad hanc difficultatem. That the determination of the created will, if it be taken in the genus of formal cause, as insofar as as a form it inwardly contracts the will to one side of the contradiction, is posterior to the determination of God; nevertheless, if the will be conceived in the genus of efficient cause, or as the principle eliciting its own determination; as so apprehended, it is understood to antecede the absolute determination of the divine will, as the ratio on account of which God is said to decline to decree thus the act as wicked as material, because the created free choice shall have preconstituted it.

But on the contrary; because this created will, which is affirmed in the genus of efficient cause as the contracting ratio of the divine will, is conceived merely in the first act; and thus it is altogether potential and indifferent toward contraries and contradictories; and consequently cannot be apprehended as contracting the divine will toward such a species of act.

Or it is conceived as composed in the second act; and thus it is not the bare and naked faculty of the will, but also its exercised appetition. And consequently the pressing opposition of Aureolus would return; that either the second act of the created will is not effected by God; or that, if it proceed from God, it is elicited by him as contracted to such a species of influx; since it is implicatory that an action flow from a principle indeterminate in the second act, or indeterminate to such a species of action, insofar as it is compounded with a real action.

You will say again with Machado in the same place, that although the created volition be posterior to the divine determination in the genus of efficient cause; it is nevertheless prior in the ratio of terminus, or connotate of the divine will, from which the divine will is contracted. By a like reason, by which the eternal production of the Son is prior, by a priority of origin, than the Son himself as produced through such a generation; the Son, however, is prior in the ratio of terminus of the divine cognition, which cannot comprehend a generation without the term of such a production being preconceived.

But who does not see that the similitude is altogether beside the matter? since the priority of origin in things divine does not at all obstruct the connection and simultaneity of cognition; as we seriously weighed in controuersia 9. de Visione Dei. distinct. 3. subdistin. 2. ar 2. nu. margi. 22. in which we have also the consenting school of the Thomists.

Nor is it more elegant, what the aforesaid author subjoins concerning practical cognition, which, although it be prior in the genus of efficient cause than its effect, is nevertheless posterior in the ratio of terminus specifying; since cognition is specified by the effect, as by a terminus.

Because that being granted; therefore be it that it were true, that the influx of the created will concerning the matter of sin was prior in the ratio of terminus, or connotate, than the absolute termination of the divine will; it would nevertheless be posterior to that in the genus of efficient cause. And consequently it would come to pass, that our wicked operation would earlier be from God, as from an efficient, than from the created free choice; as practical cognition is a principle contracted and determined by itself, the efficient of its effect.

Nor does even the last reunir of the aforesaid author avail; that since the effective causality in the influx of free choice is inseparable from the causality of the terminus or connotate determining the divine will toward such a species of influx; so, although the divine will antecedes our determination in the genus of efficient cause, it is by no means to be judged to determine toward evil; since this dependence of our volition upon the will of the first cause in the genus of efficient cause does not subsist without the presupposition of our volition in the ratio of terminus or connotate contracting the divine will.

But on the contrary; because this determination of the divine will by the created will, either is fictitious; or it premits the subsistence of the created volition, as hanging from the first cause, since it is a participated entity: see by what argument the oppugners of physical predetermination concerning the matter of sin extricate themselves.

76 Wherefore; Gabriel Vázquez. 1. p. q. 13. ar. 6. disp. 99. cap. 4. num. 16. thought; that Gregory of Rimini in 2. dist. 28. q. 1. ar. 3. in responsione ad 12. argumentum, taught; that the action of the failing creature is prior to the determination of God.

But Gregory is cited falsely; unless Vázquez derived such a priority from the pronouncement of Gregory, alleging that God is excited and comoved by our wicked cooperation, to concur toward the matter of sin. Truly, if the aforesaid illation compels, that the Ariminensis be held the assertor of such a priority of nature; it is consequent, that the Jesuit authors are bound to assert the same priority of nature on the side of the determination of the created cause; since they pronounce that the will of God is contracted from our deformed operation toward such a species of causality. So therefore has Gregory, cited by Vázquez; for we shall transcribe Gregory, that we may discuss the pronouncement of Vázquez against it.

Thus therefore I say to the argument; that God helps us by immediately effecting the very act, and that he does not alone effect the act, but the will also co-effects; but, as I already touched, God helps to good willing not only by co-effecting partially, which is the common mode by which he concurs to any effect of any created agent, as was said in the argument; but by a certain other, special one: namely by making the will itself partially co-cause, so that the will itself partially co-causes, applied and as it were instrumentally moved by God to thus partially causing. In which motion, however, the will is not necessitated, but, existing as a free instrument, in whose power it is to follow the motion of the first agent, accordingly, so that it do what, not so aided, it could by no means have done.

But toward the production of the evil act, God alone concurs, because he does not make the will act the evil act, as he makes it act the good act.

Thus far Gregory, where he asserts nothing of the priority in nature of the determination of the created failing will; but rather he expressly denies such a priority, in the same. 2. sen. dist. 35. quaest. 1. artic. 3. in responsione ad 8. argument. where he says.

I say, according to the manner of speaking of the arguer; that God follows the determination of the will; not that the determination of the will is any entity distinct from the will and its act, which is first made by the will; as the argument seems to imagine.

Nor even understanding, that the will acts that act by nature earlier than God, speaking properly of the priority of nature; because then it would follow, that it could act it with God not coacting, as appears from the definition of the prior according to nature.

But in this sense I say: that God follows the determination of the will; because God acts that act because the will acts it; and not because God acts it, therefore the will acts it: and therefore it is more properly said that God coacts with the will in causing toward such an act, than that the will is said to coact with God.

Where Gregory asserts nothing of the contraction of the divine will to concur toward the matter of sin, which is sought from our deformed operation; which scarcely any of the Jesuit authors would except with open arms; wherefore, as with them, neither is there inferred from such a determination a priority of nature, in the consent of our volition, in respect of the divine determination; so neither is there reason why such a pronouncement should be ascribed to Gregory. But if from the contraction of the divine will toward such a species of influx, which is sought from our determination, there is necessarily inferred a priority of nature, whether à Quo, in our operation, in respect of the absolute determination of God; consequently they deny that priority, the authors of the opposite opinion.

77 Yet indeed, in very truth, that the Ariminensis also consequentially enlarged it, that God is excited or moved by our wicked operation to inducing the matter of sin; but that, according to his principles, it must necessarily be asserted that the created will is premoved by God to the substrate of the sinful action, is plain from what he hands down in the same dist. 35. q. 1. art. 3., in the second proof of the conclusion, where he says.

I suppose, that in no species of evil act is there only one act producible from the will in number; nay rather, many are producible altogether similar and of the same rationale, whether more of them can be in the will at once, or not.

I suppose also, that none of these is of itself producible more at one time than at another; nor even, in any given time, is one more producible than another. These things are proved in dist. 1. and 35., and are also sufficiently conceded in common; although perhaps the opposite might be said by some.

These supposed, I prove the proposition thus. When the will produces some evil act, not every possible one similar to it is produced; therefore it is not produced from the will alone.

The consequence is plain; because since none of those acts is then more possible than another, and the created will itself is indifferently disposed toward each of them, and cognizes none distinctly before the act itself is; and by that token neither can it distinctly will to produce any of them determinately, unless another cause naturally determined to the production of one determinately only concur — which is evident to be false — or some free cause, which cognizes them distinctly, will to co-produce one determinately, it would never produce any; because by the reason by which it would produce one, by the same it would produce any whatsoever.

But such a free cause, cognizing those distinctly, cannot be other than God, as is certain; therefore, etc.

Where he constitutes as asserted, that which in the physical digression of the preceding article we weighed concerning the indetermination of the created will to such an individual of action rather than others, from which we have shown that the premotion, or predetermination, of all the acts of our will is manifestly inferred, against Suárez and others who, having asserted such a contradiction of the created will by the divine will, labored to escape, so as to maintain that it is not a predetermination. Nor is it even to be passed over, from the Ariminean, that he constructed an excellent proof against Aureolus, to show that the created will cannot effect its acts without the immediate influx of God; because, the causality of God being removed, by which our will is contracted to such an individual of action rather than another, the created will is not left as a proximate, or expedited, principle for operating.

78 But Gregory being dismissed, that we may come to the chief point of the undertaking; either the priority of nature in the wicked acts of our will in respect of the motion of God must be altogether exploded; and consequently God would not be excited by our lapse, as by a motive rationale contracting the indetermination of the divine will. For if, equally, and without any priority, in the aforesaid Authors, God and the creature are compounded to influence into a wicked act, every habitude of presupposition being removed; and the creature is therefore not moved by God to the substrate of sin, because the motion of God is not presupposed as the rationale of the determination of the failing will; it is also consequent that neither is God asserted to be moved, or excited by our lapse; since our failing cooperation cannot be conceived as prior, and consequently as the rationale of the contra-action of the divine will to such a species of causality.

Or if a priority of nature on the side of the determination of the created cause be asserted; it would come about that, for some sign of preconception, there would belong to the created being an infallible destination to futurity, nay, and real existence without immediate dependence upon God; and accordingly also that the wicked acts of our will could be effected without the immediate influx of God; as Aureolus acutely inferred, and we made plain from him under n. 62.

Beaten by these reasons, perhaps, some recent writers, compelled to sing a palinode, maintain; that God and free choice are so equally composed for operating, that neither does free choice determine God to the species of act, nor conversely. Thus Alarcon 1. par. tract. 2. de Scientia Dei. dispu. 5. cap. 8. §. 3. num. margin. 4. where, following Lessius, he subjoins.

That the omnipotence of God being once applied, and assisting in act first to the created will through an antecedent applied decree, in a certain blind manner and as it were by compulsion, from the force of such application divine virtue is attributed to the will, that it may will, nill, since it produces indivisibly love, or hatred, without any excitation between either agent; and without God antecedently foreseeing in the created will any inclination, by which it may be inclined to love rather than hatred.

What more open for vanquishing the determination of God by the creature to the matter of sin? On which we treated in this distinction, art. 2, n. marg. 63.

Granada seems to belong to that blind tendency of God’s concourse with the second cause, since he denies that ideal rationales for producing the substrate of moral malice are present in God, indeed even rationales for producing a vicious habit. On this, see below, Contra 1.2, De ideis, art. 2, n. marg. 14.

Answer to the foundations of the Recentiores against God’s predetermination to the matter of sin.

79 With these points premised, the foundations of the Recentiores can be refuted more readily. Accordingly, to the first argument from no. 6, we say: although God premoves the imagination, and the other apprehensive faculties, material and immaterial, by a concursive influx toward the presentation of wicked actions; and although apprehensions of this kind morally allure the will to assent; nevertheless, God does not premove the powers to elicit a proposition concerning shameful objects in order to induce our will to assent, but rather to discharge the office of the first cause and stand ready to the motive power of the objects and the composition of the phantasms, without doing violence to such physical agents by withholding from them the concurrence due for acting. Therefore, he cannot be called the moral cause of the substrates of sins, as he is called the moral cause of pious actions, which he elicits primarily and through himself by means of the indeliberate motions of holy illuminations and inspirations, intending our consent.

To the objection, however, concerning concupiscence tempting the will, where also the formal rationale of malice is not sought, as is evident from num. 6.

We say: that although the sensitive appetite does not formally intend moral evil, it allures nevertheless to the wicked act, to which moral deformity is not repugnant, as it is referred to the sensitive appetite insofar as it is compounded with free choice. But to the substrate of sin moral deformity is contradictory, inasmuch as it is the terminus of the divine causality; since it expresses an essential continuation with God in the genus of end; as we have made plain from the Alensis.

Whereby also it is clear against the instance from num. 8: for the devil is therefore the moral cause of our fall, because he assaults and harries the imaginative power and the appetite, and composes the phantasms to acting, so that he may suggest assent to foul objects.

80 To the second argument, from num. 9, that God, before he premoves the created will, by the mode of actual cooperation, to the substrate of sin, exhibits in act the first concourse to contraries and contradictories; so that, before actual cooperation is entered, free choice be supposed in the nearest battle-array toward either, so much so that nothing is lacking to the will on the side of the principle for acting freely.

Should you object, however: that the premotion of God is wanting. We say: that in the same sense there is not available to our will, before its operation, premotion (which we posit only by the mode of concourse), just as there is lacking to it actual cooperation and the concourse of the first cause.

Whereby, just as the created will lacks the second act because it does not exercise its operative virtue, which is wholly supposed sufficient and at hand for the act; so also it is not actually premoved to good by the mode of exercised concourse, because it does not explicate itself and in fact exercise toward the right operation, for which it is supposed to be furnished with the virtue and sufficient aid. For although the motion of God is prior, by the priority of the from-which (a Quo), that is, of nature, to our cooperation, owing to the essential subordination of the created agent to the first cause; it is not nevertheless prior by the priority in-which (in Quo): see what we set out below under num. 94, disputing against Hugo Cauellus. Therefore it is always true, that if the creature in any instant of time had exercised itself toward assent, it would have received the premotion of God, by the mode of concourse, and of the second act.

Whereas when you press: that, according to our opinion, therefore the causality of sin seems rather to be ascribed to God than to the devil; because without such a premotion no most valid invasion of the devil could prostrate man.

We say: that if such an objection were efficacious, it would also argue that God does not concur to the matter of sin; because although the devil should rush upon man with all cunning, if God does not concur to the fall, man cannot in fact and de inesse relapse into evil.

81 To that painted-over complaint of justice, which Soarius， in the person of the sinner, lodged against the principles of our opinion. It is answered: that since, among the adversaries, our wicked operation is not prior in nature to the concourse of God, but God influences into the substrate of sin equally first with the creature (our deformed operation not premised as some sign of presupposition), the sinner might likewise murmur, or take exception, against the divine providence.

Before I committed any sin, or God premised my transgression as if binding by pact to the providing of concourse to evil; he cooperated to evil equally first with my will, my fall not awaited as some sign of presupposition following upon the absolute will of God concerning the bestowing of concourse I ought therefore no more to be in fault than God, who cooperated to evil equally first with me.

Nor is that opposition any firmer, which Soarius instructs from the words of Hosea: your perdition is from you, only in me is your help. For there the Prophet only intends this: that whatever of aid is assigned for right and pious operation, that is to be sought from God alone; not yet that whatever concourse our will awaits from the first cause merits the name of aid, taken strictly and narrowly, inasmuch as it sounds a concourse within the order of grace.

Otherwise, indeed, the argument could be turned back against Soarius thus: If aid for the sinner is from God only, how is the concourse to the matter of sin from God; since the concourse to the substrate of a wicked action is by no means reckoned among the aids of divine grace? But if the name of aid be extended to the concourse toward actions of the natural order; the premotion also to the matter of sin, which regardsthe good only in the being of nature, can be called aid; if among the adversaries the concourse of God to the matter of sin be called by that name.

82 To the instance from num. 10, we say: that for the whole course of temptation which precedes the assent of our will to evil, just as it is true that the created will has the power of dissenting, even on the side of the extrinsic principle, when the concourse in act the first is presented to it toward either; so also it is certain that God is able to premove our will toward either. Nevertheless, in that instant of duration in which God, by the mode of concourse or of actual cooperation, premoves the created will to assent, it has not the power of predetermining to dissent; because such premotion involves, by the necessity de inesse of the created cooperation, that is, by hypothesis, the sense of a composite attending the divine motion. Wherefore, as it implicates that the will be compounded to assent while dissenting; so also it is repugnant that the will of God premoving in exercised act to dissent should contract our will to assent.

Whereas when the opposition urges: that the premotion to a wicked act is imputable to God, because he could have established the right act.

It is answered: by denying that he could have de inesse and de facto premoved to the right act in the same instant of duration, that is, in which the created will operates the oblique act; since in no instant of time does such a motion to the wicked act flow forth from God, in which the created will does not compound itself to a wicked determination; and consequently the sense of a composite is already involved, of actual cooperation on the side of the creature, and of concursive premotion on the side of God: because God, with Scotus, predetermines by the concursive action alone, and not by any form attaining to the first act.

Should the objection, however, be drawn back to the instants of duration antecedent to the cooperation of our will; it must be said: that just as the created will, for that whole extension of duration before it is compounded to cooperation and to concursive premotion, in the sense of division and separation from the exercised cooperation of free choice, is proximately at hand toward either, but will exercise itself freely toward one only of the two parts of the contradiction; so, although God is able to premove toward either (just as the created will also can act toward either), he will de inesse establish only the one part, and premove to the other, eliciting his influx at once with the created cause, deficient in the same instant in Quo; to the second cause, however, the sinful obliquity is ascribed, because it is not subordinated to God in its causality; as, on the contrary, the terminus of the divine motion, as it is attained by it, is essentially conjoined and subjected to God in the genus of end, as we have said.

The opposition would indeed strike home, if for some presupposition of the instant in Quo, God, without the fellowship of our will, were to premove to the fall; or contract in act the first, and in the sense of division or of separation from the act of concurring. To elicit, however, the one part of the contradiction at once with the created cause, admitted only the priority from Quo (which is unavoidable, owing to the quidditative dependence of the participated being upon the first cause), and with the concourse presented toward either in act the first, is not for God to compel us to the fall, which he might have forestalled were the laws of a general providence supposed. Then, because the concourse was most readily exhibited toward either in act the first before the entrant actual influx contracted to one part of the contradiction; then, above all, because God, having now suffered a necessity de inesse, by reason of the fellowship of the created cause deficient in the same instant in quo, that is, of duration, could not de facto, by the hypothesis of the creature's attending operation, premove to good.

Should the adversaries, however, wish us entangled amid these subterfuges, why do they not also free themselves? For with the supposition that they disapprove the priority of nature in the fall of the cooperation of the created cause, it follows that they will have God equally first concurring with the created will to evil, and consequently not excited by our prevenient malice.

Lastly, in place of a coronis, I oppose to this grave calumny of the adversaries against the concursive premotion, Anselm, tomo 3. libro de Concordis gratiae et liberi arbitrij, where he has it thus. For it is not the fault of God, who created in him the will with liberty of choice, and bestowed on it justice, that it should will nothing but justly; but the fault of man, who deserted the justice he was able to keep. God therefore has in goods, indeed, what things are good through justice; in evils, however, only what things are good through essence; not what things are evil through the absence of the justice owed, which is not something.

Where Anselm, closely weighing the reason why, to God concurring with a wicked operation — nay, with Anselm's own phrase, to God predetermining the matter of sin (as is plain from his own words transcribed under num. 72 of this article) — sin is not attributed? He delivers that reason: because free choice, before it be compounded to a wicked operation, is supposed indifferent toward either, and altogether free: moreover there is available to it whatever is required, that it may be able to operate with a just and right influx, by the virtue of sufficient aid: for that is established by the pronouncements of Anselm. For it is not the fault of God, who created in him the will with liberty of choice, and bestowed on it justice, that it should will nothing but justly; but the fault of man, who deserted the justice he was able to keep.

Then, when he reports why our good works especially are ascribed to God, but not our evil ones, he does not deliver that reason which Molina, Soarius, and their followers weigh, namely that God concurs to the matter of sin, excited and contracted by the wicked operation of free choice; but because in good acts he attains the substance and rightness; in wicked ones, however, the entitative goodness, but not the malice, which, with Anselm, is not something, that is, consists not in something positive but in mere privation.

Take Anselm: God therefore has in goods, indeed, what things are good through justice; in evils, however, only what things are good through essence: not what things are evil through the absence of the justice owed, which is not something. Hang upon those words: which is not something: for the opinion of Scotus, who constitutes the essence of sin not in something positive, but in the privation of the rightness owed; which privation Anselm called the absence of the justice owed, which is not something.

83 To the third argument, from num. 11 — although it specially directs itself not against our opinion, but conspires against the whole company of the Theologians, insofar as the argument seems to disprove the immediate causality of God with respect to the substrate of sin; wherefore Vazquez, that castigator of predetermination, framed the same argument against his own opinion concerning the immediate concourse to the matter of sin.

We say: that with the response of Vazquez discarded — which is there left sufficiently disapproved — we maintain that not therefore is God not the author of sin, because he is unable to be the cause, in that whole abstraction, of the extrinsic denomination, or of the predicate of morality as such; since God elicits such a denomination of a moral and free operation while he concurs to a pious and right act; but on the reason which we weighed at length in the response to the second opposition of Aureolus, from num. 68 vsque ad 71. Namely because the terminus of the divine causality is essentially referred to God in the genus of end; just as it quidditatively depends upon him in the genus of efficient cause; so that the created thing, inasmuch as it is attained by God, is essentially subjected to God, and consequently, as the terminus of the divine causality, cannot be averted from God; and therefore can neither put on the morality of sin. Ad ea, quae inibi ex inftituto aperimus.

84 To the fourth argument, from num. 12, it is answered: that if it struck us, it would obtain likewise against the adversaries admitting the absolute will of God to bestow a concourse upon the matter of sin, with the absolute foreknowledge of the fall of the created will supposed; if such an absolute will of God were made known to the sinner by revelation.

Therefore we say: that just as God, premoving de inesse and de facto to the substrate of sin, does not compel the will to that part of the contradiction, so as not to present a most ready concourse in act the first toward either, together with sufficient aid for pious operation; so, upon any revelation whatever in insinuating that the created will is as it were pinned to the fall, it will be lawful, with the sufficient aid which such a will has attained for pious operation, to strive in act the first toward the right operation. But de inesse, and in act the second, it will not strive toward the opposite of the premotion: for the premotion we maintain is merely concursive, and the will does not receive a concourse opposite to the premotion, because that would be to receive an exercised concourse opposite to the same exercised concourse: although in act the first it can strive toward the opposite. Nor would this be an attempt at violating the divine omnipotence; for just as with the omnimodal determination de inesse to such a fall, which is a determination in the sense of a composite, or by hypothesis, there is compossible an indetermination of the possible proximate, in the sense of division, which is an indifference simply; so simply and absolutely there can be a power proximate and morally expeditious to the will, that it intend and effect the right act.

It would be, however, an attempt of violating the divine omnipotence, thus compounded as to the exercised concourse, de inesse and de facto; for as is plain from Scotus, transcribed by us in this article under num. 21: The priority, which includes that the things can be without one another without contradiction, is not an order in causes, such that they cause a common effect; but they cause it at once. Whence it comes that the concursive premotion cannot be frustrated, because it is such as to import the necessity of consequence, and an infallible attendance de inesse, which corresponds on the side of the exercised cooperation of free choice; whence it implicates a contradiction, that free choice should attempt something in act the second against the concursive premotion which involves the sense of a composite of the created cooperation, just as it contradicts that Peter, as sitting, should run.

And although free choice, sinning, can tend to the opposite, and refert a full and moral power to acting piously by the virtue of sufficient aid; yet that would not be an attempt, or the contriving of a violation of the divine omnipotence, as Didacus Ruiz speaks and wills; because the divine omnipotence, although it is compounded determinately to one in act the second of the concursive premotion, is compounded nevertheless with the created free choice toward either in act the first; and so there becomes to free choice a proximate power toward either, even on the side of the extrinsic principle.

85 To the confirmation of the fourth argument, under the same num. 12: that if such an opposition were efficacious, it would press the adversaries likewise on moral causality, not so that the will respond to the premotion, but to the concourse upon the matter of sin. For, as among the adversaries, although God does not premove to the matter of sin, he concurs physically to it nonetheless; so it could be objected that as the immediate physical concourse to the matter of sin does not contradict the divine goodness, so neither would a moral influx alluring the created will seem repugnant — not so that it should follow the physical predetermination of the divine will, but so that the created will should bestow the concourse; so that God would send in the undeliberate apprehensions and appetitions of wicked objects to this end, that the created will, harried by these motions, should bestow the concourse and respond to God physically premoving to the matter of sin.

Therefore, just as the adversaries are compelled to answer, that the moral causality alluring to the physical concourse of sin is altogether alien to the goodness of God — although the physical causality concurring to effect the substrate of malice is not unworthy of God; so we also blunt that blow by the same argument.

Which presses the more, not only in the opinion of Corduba, who wills the action of the creature to precede the action of God, or his determination, for some priority of nature; but in the doctrine of the Jesuits denying the priority of nature in the action of the creature. Which being premised, the argument concerning the moral causality of God to the matter of sin can be retorted thus.

Because although, with the mind of Scotus supposed concerning a concursive predetermination antecedent by the priority of nature, the sending in of undeliberate apprehensions and appetitions of the forbidden object would be easy, to the end that the will should freely and efficaciously cooperate with such an impulse, for instance, of hatred — because, with Scotus, the creature is determined by the concursive premotion, with which the negation of cooperation in the deficient creature is not de facto compossible; consequently that moral determination alluring to the matter of sin would come to nothing, since the physical predetermination more than suffices to render infallible such an impulse; because the motion of the creature follows the prevenient motion of God.

But with the supposition that God and the creature are compounded equally first, without any sign of priority, to the eliciting of the matter of sin; the impression of undeliberate actions morally alluring free choice to concurrence in the matter of sin does not appear idle, seeing that the creature is not established as determined by the first cause, nor following the prevenient determination of the first cause; God, therefore, could allure the second cause morally, that it bestow the concourse upon the matter of sin, just as God in fact assists and co-aiding physically the created will toward the matter of sin, that the concourse of the creature to the wicked act, as to the matter, be rendered infallible; and so the adversaries are pressed by the same instance of moral causality to the substrate of sin, by the mode of a simultaneous concourse, by which they contend that we are pressed, on account of the physical concursive premotion.

Response to the other objects urged against the premotion of God to the matter of sin.

§ 6

The other instance, concerning the implication of the production of the hatred of God, from num. 13, does not press, once those things are premised which we there supposed. For it is answered: that although the will, deliberately conserving, by the influx elicited from itself, the form of the hatred of God, infused into the will having it merely passively from the first cause, would sin; because although it did not comport itself actively in the first production of such an act, it exhibited afterwards an active and sinful influx for the conservation of such an act. But the influx of God, which is called premotion, cannot be defective; because it is repugnant to the terminus of the divine causality as it is attained by it, that it be able to refer an obliquity, aversion, or deordination from God; since it essentially imports a subordination to God, or a continuation with God, not only in the genus of efficient cause, but also in the genus of final cause; as we showed from the Alensis.

To the other opposition, from the same num. 13, which presses in that hypothesis, that free choice would elicit the act of hatred of God freely, and afterwards be necessitated by God to the continuation of the act. It is answered: admitting the hypothesis, that free choice can be necessitated by God to the continuation of the act. But then God would not be renounced as the author of sin in that hypothesis; just as there would be no sin in that necessary continuation of the act; nor would the created will sin in the continuation of the act, although it sinned in the first effecting of it.

Whence, although that act would be physically individual, and altogether undiscerned; yet morally, and as to the extrinsic predicates of a free, and necessary, operation, it would be different. Because in the first efflux it would proceed from the will in first act indifferent to either; not only on the part of the intrinsic principle, but on the part of God composing his power to either in first act with free choice. But in the continuation of the act, free choice would be necessitated by an extrinsic principle composing its power determinately to one in first act; in the way in which it would comport itself, if he impressed a quality of the species of potency, which would affix free choice to the continuation of the act of hatred of God; or through his own will immediately, or through the executive faculty composed in the aspect of a particular agent, he would supply that quality, and so by himself immediately necessitate free choice in the genus of efficient cause, just as it could be necessitated through that quality in the genus of efficient cause, according to what we wrote at length in this dist., in the digression to the 2nd art., Whether the will can be necessitated by God?

Whereby also the instance to the contrary is elided, which labors, that by the same reason free choice, necessitated to the continuation of the act, would comport itself on the side of the effect, and not necessitated to its first effecting; with the supposition that free choice is premoved also by a concursive action to the first effecting of the act of hatred of God.

For we say, from what has been discussed at length in the digression cited, that the operation of the created will would comport itself otherwise morally, not however physically; and that for the distinction of those efficacious decrees, which terminate upon the first act of a power not requiring the formal composition of another co-principle inhering intrinsically, but only assisting extrinsically in the genus of efficient cause (in whatever manner the power of God is compounded to the concourse with free choice), a physical and intrinsic disparity is not required on the side of the terminus and of the connotate, but only an extrinsic and moral one.

To the last objection, however, that it would be against the essential sanctity of God, that he necessitate free choice to the continuation of the act of hatred of God. We say: that there he concurs to that act inasmuch as, in the rationale of the terminus of the divine action, there is imbued an essential continuation with God in the genus of final cause: as we showed from the Alensis, Scotus, and Bassolius.

For the eliding of the cavil of the Recentiors we show that God is not excused from the causality of sin on account of the intention of a right end; in which we assail the adversaries with an argument from the Alensis (ad hominem).

§ 7 Against the Opposition, from num. 15, arguing that God is not excused from the causality and influx of sin on account of the intention of a right end, if he premove to the matter of sin; because it would be unworthy of the divine goodness to intend evil, on account of the extrinsic apposition of the honest end.

We say: that God does not intend evil, on account of the extrinsic appetition of the right end, when he premoves to the substrate of malice; but only premoves to the entitative goodness of the wicked act, inasmuch as, as the terminus of the divine causality, it imports an essential continuation with God in the genus of final cause. Wherefore, although we confess ingenuously that to desire evil, on account of the extrinsic ordination of it to the right end, is altogether alien from the essential innocence and sanctity of God; yet accidentaliter, and per accidens, compounded to the wicked act. Nevertheless God does not intend the natural goodness of the sinful act, on account of the apposition of an extrinsic honest end; but on account of the right end quidditatively imbued in every created nature, as it is the terminus of the divine causality: because for any participated entity, as it is attained by God, the quidditative connection and continuation with God in the genus of efficient cause is no less than in the genus of final cause; as is plain from what has been said. To the absurdities, however, which Didacus Ruiz objects against our opinion, in one word we say: that God cannot intend a foul object on account of an honest extrinsic end; and consequently all those fictions and detestable aberrations, just as they are opposed to us by mere nod, and a voluntary assertion, not by judgment; so they collapse by mere denial. For although God predetermines, by the mode of actual concourse, to the substrate of sin, that he be at hand to the motion of objects, to the composition of phantasms, and to free choice prone to evil; nevertheless that God, without the cooperation of the deficient created will, should form in the air voices uttering falsehood, and put forth miracles attesting falsity; the impiety of the Atheist could not fall into that.

Wherefore, although we confess that God can concur, according to the excitement of a phantasy assaulted by the devil; and according to the exigency of the composition of phantasms, to the production of some false assertion; just as also he concurs in fact, at once with the will, to the first first-movements, or undeliberate appetitions of foul objects; nevertheless in that hypothesis he would not attain evil, on account of the extrinsic apposition of the right end; but he would elicit the entitative goodness of the act, quidditatively subordinated to God in the genus of end, inasmuch as it is the terminus of the divine causality: which he bestows, that he may take away all moral obliquity, inasmuch as such an act is the terminus of the motion of God.

88 But I retort the argument against Ruiz: because he assails our opinion, premising that we defend that God premoves to evil, on account of the extrinsic apposition of the right end; so that such a continuation with the divine goodness neither transcends, nor is essentially imbued in every terminus of the physical causality of God, insofar as it formally exists as the terminus of that causality, according to the doctrine of the Alensis and of Scotus. Which assertion, if it were true, would carry no less an impiety, the premotion of God to the matter of sin supposed, than that which we assert; than that supposing a will concurring immediately to the matter of sin, which the adversaries uphold.

Because it is no less unworthy of the sanctity of God to predetermine to evil, than to cooperate to evil; as is perfectly evident in human affairs. For not only does he sin who excites another to the fall; but he also who, another already moved to sin, cherishes and aids him to ruin. Therefore as Ruiz is compelled to answer: that God concurring to the substrate of sin does not cooperate to evil, on account of the intention of the honest end; but the terminus of the divine causality is the entitative goodness of the wicked act; so we also, without any trouble, and ad hominem, break the blow of the aforesaid Author.

89 But it is pleasing to seek the elucidation of this pronouncement from the Alensis, in part 2 of his Summa Theologicae, quaest. 94. art. 6. §. 3., Whether an evil action, inasmuch as it is action, is from God? arg. 2., where he thus assails the common opinion.

Whoever aids the thief in the work of theft is a partaker of the theft, according to that Psalm (if you saw the thief, etc.); which is found in the gloss there; therefore he who aids the sinner in the work of sin. But God is never, nor can be called, a partaker of sin or evil; therefore since an evil action is sin, God never aids the sinner in an evil action: therefore he does not aid free choice itself in the evil action.

But he would aid, if with it he made an evil action; therefore in no way is that action evil, inasmuch as action, from God; nay, only from free choice.

Which objection the Alensis so dilutes in his response to the arguments.

To the second it must be said, that God himself does not aid free choice in the evil; for he aids it only as to the action, but not as to the malice, or defect.

For he gives the power to the action, inasmuch as the action names a nature, or something good; but he does not give the power to the will itself, or to free choice, toward evil, or defect; because that is not a being-able, rather it is a not-being-able.

For nature or power does not have this from God, that it be deficient, but from itself, because from nothing: nevertheless that defect cannot be without some good which God makes; nor yet does God make the defect. Whence Dionysius: the good sustains privation.

Where the Alensis hands down that celebrated distinction (which Anselm, and all the ancient and classic authors observed against the heretics), concerning cooperation to the entitative goodness of the act, but not to its malice.

To the Alensis subscribes Scotus in Sent. 2, dist. 37, q. 2, §. On account of those two rationes, num. marg. 9, where he has: From this is apparent that way, of the cause per accidens; for although that cause does not cause formally, what is in sin, by effecting, but by deficiency; it causes nevertheless, by effecting, something positive, to which that defect, caused by deficiency, is annexed; and thus the authorities of Dionysius stand on the side of the accidentality as it comes from the effect.

Whereby Scotus there establishes that God is not the cause of sin, because the privation of the rightness owed is inflicted upon the positive substrate as deficient from God, or not continued essentially with God in the genus of end, just as the substrate of sin is continued, as it is the terminus of the motion and causality of God: for that is what the words of Scotus will: For although that cause does not cause formally, what is in sin, by effecting, but by deficiency: and the following: It causes nevertheless, by effecting, something positive, to which that defect, caused by deficiency, is annexed.

90 To the instance from num. 16. It is answered: that just as, with the Authors of the opposite opinion, although God does not premove to the matter of sin, he bestows nevertheless an immediate concourse upon wicked works, which incomparably surpass in number the pious operations; because the proneness to sinning of our fallen nature, and the natural fallibility of free choice, demand that God, according to the exigency of our will, be thus at hand to the deficient second cause; so by the same reason God, premoving the created will according to its internal impulse of propensity, and accommodating himself to the laws of free choice exercising itself, predetermines so many sinful operations, as one who knows thoroughly and comprehends superabundantly the strivings of free choice.

Whereas you thrust upon us: that the most frequent premotion to evil cannot be thrown back upon the inconstancy of our nature; because they regard the same, and cast themselves back into the same, that our will is premoved to evil, and that it is fragile; since no other condition of our fragility appears which is not cast back into the premotion of God to evil.

It is answered: that the same argument also wars against the will of God concerning the bestowing of an immediate concourse upon the act of sin, no priority of nature being assigned on the side of the created cooperation contracting God; for if the immediate operation of God concerning the matter of sin be removed (which God bestows in the same sign of nature with the creature, and consequently is not contracted by it), the created will would never relapse into evil; God would nevertheless infringe the rights of liberty, if to the faculty striving toward evil he did not present, and render expeditious, the concourse.

91 To the opposition from num. 17: that although it is repugnant to the terminus of the divine causality (as it is physically attained by it) that it be deficient from God, or not be essentially subjected to it in the genus of final cause; and consequently, although God were the moral cause alluring to the physical production of the substrate of malice, he would not be said to attain the wicked act physically as deficient from God; or physically not continued with God in the genus of final cause, as the Alensis speaks; Nevertheless it contradicts God, that he be the moral cause of sin as to the matter, not on account of the aforesaid reason; but because it is altogether alien from the essential goodness and innocence of God, to effect in us, without us, that is without our deliberation and assent, wicked undeliberate motions, to this end, that he should allure our will to the matter of sin, from which the deformity is inseparable, by the respect to the created will. For it is one, for God, in the same instant of duration, at once with our will consenting, and freely concurring, to predetermine the matter of sin; but another, for God, in us without us, without our assent, to elicit wicked motions, that he may allure to the fall.

Nor ought we pass over: that the argument drawn from the repugnance of moral causality to disprove the physical predetermination of the substrate of malice presses also against the immediate physical causality of God concerning the matter of sin; as we made plain under num. 85.

Wherefore, although it does not stand against the nature of the essential innocence of God, that, for the office of the first physical agent, he contract to such an individual of an action (and consequently to the species, since a physical species does not subsist without its individual), as we treated in the preceding things; it contradicts nevertheless the sanctity of God, that he concur by alluring morally. For to the mere and precise function of a physical agent it does not belong to forestall whatever of moral deformity accrues to the action from another co-principle deficient, but that, for the office of the first mover, he be at hand to the second agent which operates, as moving with motion, or, as moving under God, as the more celebrated speak from the ancient Theologians; the Alensis, transcribed under num. 69, and Bonaventure under n. 56 of this article.

But the moral agent — such as the first cause would be renounced, if it enticed to the substrate of sin by the undeliberate motions of apprehensions and appetitions — ought to attend with care, lest any of the morality annexed accede which is deviant from the rule of reason; even though the physical action, as it flows forth from the first principle, cannot be deficient. For if it belonged to the offices of the physical agent not to concur to an operation connexed with malice, just as it belongs to the function of the moral cause not to cooperate to evil morally; it would follow that the first cause did not concur to the matter of sin; concerning which see the pronouncement of the Alensis in n. 89.

This is also confirmed by the probable opinion of Theologians, who hold that an act supernatural as to its substance can be vitiated by an affection, or motive, of vainglory, or of some temporal advantage, which determines the will composed of supernatural principles to elicit an act supernatural as to its substance.

For example, given that hypothesis on which the will, for some priority of nature, is antecedently aroused by the help of preventing grace and set at liberty to itself, or equipped with a faculty executing its operation, together with an infused supernatural habit and according to its demand; and that the will, in such a disposition, determines itself to act through a vicious affect reflected from another motive of vainglory. Then in that meeting, according to the authors of the aforesaid opinion, although preventing grace and the supernatural habits elicit as to their substance an act to which moral deformity is annexed, they do not morally attain the deformed act; but rather by a kind of physical necessity, on account of the provision of the co-principles supernatural constituted in the last extremity of the physical order for acting. For neither does preventing grace allure morally to a supernatural act insofar as it expresses the relatedness to the extrinsic motive by which it is vitiated, and consequently neither does the supernatural habit morally flow into that act insofar as it is compared to the deficient principle; although the supernatural habit concurs by a physical determination, now contracted to such an act supernatural, to which deformity, vicious and from without, accrues.

It comes about therefore that the physical causality of the supernatural principle is not obstructed by the fact that moral deformity accompanies it; because a physical cause, in virtue of its own physical duty, is not bound to avoid the moral lapse that accompanies it. Which happens otherwise in the moral cause, which, if it be intrinsically straight, cannot allure to an act to which crookedness is compounded; since to a moral cause consulting, or alluring, toward an action to which malice is annexed, such malice is attributed, but not to a merely physical principle: otherwise to a supernatural habit concurring physically in a vitiated act such crookedness of the act would be attributed. That a supernatural act can be vitiated, Ripalda contends, de ente supernaturali lib. 3. disp. 50. sect. 2. praecipue n. num. 7. et 8. where he quotes and follows several authors.

To the other objection Ruiz answers under the same n. 17; that since in the causes of sacred Scripture, among the authors, and in all the summit Pontiffs, founders of the sacred canons, and in the Catholic and universal Church there is no moral propensity toward ensnaring the souls of the faithful through the spirit of lying and of error (which we cannot so much as utter without loathing), therefore if per impossibile God should determine the pillar of truth and the organs of the Holy Spirit to deceiving the souls of men, when he performed it, it would not be according to the exigency of free will demanding concourse toward so execrable lapses, but by his power driving men to ruin: then God would be declared a cause necessitating to sin, and it would be equally implied that God premoves the Church, the pillar of truth, into heresy, just as that he be the author of sin.

To the argument from n. 18, that if God did not concur in any oblique operation, not even in the lightest and venial sin (since the negation of such concourse is not something supernatural, just as neither is the positio of concourse toward the substrate of sin), it would happen that without any supernatural gift man could pass his whole life innocently without the perpetration of deadly and venial sin — that argument would press the adversaries too if the concourse of God toward the matter of sin were supposed immediate.

We say therefore that, just as if God were to deny concourse toward the lapse to our will, according to its labile proneness demanding concourse toward the matter of sin, that could not be done without miracle and a preternatural reason; and accordingly it would be a benefit most singular, beyond all the laws of the order of grace, for God not to concur toward the lapse according to the exigency of the lapsed will; so it would be a benefit most great that man, tending into evil according to the internal and spontaneous impulse of his inclination, should not be premoved by God concurring toward the actual influx; since such premotion is not after the manner of an operating principle, but only after the manner of concourse, as we have shown.

To that frivolous objection, then, about the father taking away his own life and the slaying of his sons. We say: that if the sinner were morally hurtling toward those horrid deeds and close at hand girded for the work, so that God, in virtue of his duty as first cause, ought to be at hand to such a man for concourse, then it would be a miracle for God, by withholding himself, to restrain himself from such causality and influx, so that he should never offer concourse toward sins of this kind; but otherwise if the sinner does not assault for such concourse according to the force of diabolical scheming and the propensity of wicked nature — whence it comes about that the argument proceeds equally against predetermination and against concourse, and consequently it ought to be dissolved by the adversaries, just as it is torn up by us.

The testimonies of Scotus are treated, which are objected against our opinion concerning the predetermination of God toward the matter of sin.

93 The oppositions of the recent writers having been discussed; there remains to be treated certain testimonies of Scotus which are objected against us. And first that one from num. 19, where he teaches. Quòd Deus dando voluntatem liberam, dedit antecedenter opera recta, quae sunt in potestate voluntatis, et ideò quantũ est ex parte sui dedit rectitudinem omni actui voluntatis: si ipsa voluntas quaecunque actum elicitum rectè ageret ex parte sui.

From which assertion Hugo Cauellus produced the position that according to the mind of Scotus there is no premotion toward the matter of sin; because if, with no operation of ours foreseen, he had actually established a depraved act, he would not, as far as in himself, be prepared to elicit a right act.

But the inference is weak, and it tells with equal force against the opposing opinion. For among the adversaries it is an axiom that God provides the readiest concourse toward right action for one to whom a congruent vocation is not given, on the basis of foreknowledge of future consent. Why, then, is concourse toward the good offered to someone who is known not to be going to elicit a right act? Hence, just as those authors earnestly maintain that God offers concourse toward either alternative in first act, so that the laws of liberty are preserved and free choice is left in its own hand of counsel, as a principle proximately and morally equipped toward either alternative in first act—even though God foreknows that, with an incongruent vocation, it will not perform a right act—so too, although God predetermines together with free choice the other side of the contradiction, for example dissent, he also provides concourse in first act toward assent, so as not to violate the rights of liberty.

That he presses the same in the opinion of Soarius, and of others asserting that God absolutely predefines good acts before the absolute science of our cooperation; which authors, although they sustain the aforesaid prestitution, or predefinition, of good acts, receive a concourse furnished in act first toward either of two. Whence the testimony of Scotus cited above does not impair predetermination; since it only establishes the doctrine concerning the provision of the divine concourse in act first toward contraries, and contradictories, which we treated under nu. 80 and 82.

In this, however, we disagree from Suárez and his followers, in that although we establish as the mind of Scotus the provision of divine concourse toward either of two in act first — which indeed the aforesaid testimony of Scotus obtains, with which we are confronted: Deus dando voluntatem liberam dedit antecedenter opera recta, quae sunt in potestate voluntatis; et ideò quantùm est ex parte sui dedit rectitudinem, etc. — yet, such composition of the divine power with created free choice toward either of two in act first being supposed, we defend premotion in act second through the very action of God flowing in concourse; on which we treated above against Cauellus in the present dist. ar. 2 in the Digression, an voluntas possit necessitari à Deo sub n. mar. 58. and 59.

The reason, therefore, why we compose premotion concursive in act second with the provision of concourse toward either of two in act first, is that the liberty of the created will may remain intact in the sense of division, before the exercise of the concourse of God; and that the cooperation of free choice may be conceived to issue forth, for any sign, from the will itself and the power of God determined to such species and individuation of influx; since it would be implied that from a principle indeterminate in act exercised a determined action should proceed, as we evidently showed from Aureolus against Suárez and his followers.

94. Whence from what has been said it follows that weak also is that inference of Hugo Cauellus: Voluntas diuina ideò non causat semper bonam, quia creata id nõ vult; ergo creata ad malum determinat. For although the oblique operation is always thrown back upon the created will as deficient, for the reason which we have often outlined; yet not because the created will determines the first cause toward evil; but because God cannot premove our will, as a matter of simple possibility, after the manner of actual cooperation, with the created will not cooperating, and yielded and consenting to the motion; whence if the will itself did not pursue evil, neither would God premove toward evil.

Which is verified in whatever concausality of several principles concurring by natural sympathy toward the production of the same effect, without however any premotion, or presupposition of the influx of one concause toward the influx of the other; as is evident in the intelligible species, and in the possible intellect, with respect to the generation of the mental word.

For true is that assertion: Species intelligibilis est expeditum principium ad productionem verbi, si intellectus concurrat ad generationem illius; ita vt negatio concursus in facultate intellectiua sit ratio sufficiens, ob quam species intelligibilis siue impressa non concauset verbum mentis. But in no sense can it stand: Quòd intellectus determinet speciem intelligibilem ad generationem verbi, vel speciei expressa repraesentatiuae talis obiecti; eò quòd intellectus sit pura potentia in genere intelligibiliū; et determinetur ab obiecto, et à motione intentionali obiecti per speciem, ad productionem verbi; et nõ è contra intellectus moueat obiectum, vel speciem intelligibilem (quae est agens vicarium obiecti, et semen informationale eius,) ad generationem talis verbi et imaginis obiecti, et non alterius.

This reasoning presses against Cauellus in the case of all co-causes that converge by natural sympathy upon one and the same individual influx without any priority of nature, even though the removal of the influx of any co-principle is sufficient reason for the effect to cease.

From what has been said follows the right understanding of that pronouncement of the authors, who, predetermination having been admitted through an absolute decree, hold that by premotion it entails conditioned necessity; which they judge to be no other than the necessity of consequence, as it is opposed to the necessity of the consequent. So Ioan. de S. Thoma, professor at Complutum, 1. p. quaest. 14. disp. 20. ar. 7. §. igitur cum it was objected to us in Congregation 38. Where, recounting how the Dominicans diluted the objection of the Jesuits in the congregation held at Rome concerning the controversy de auxiliis, contending that premotion through the decree of God takes away liberty, and favours Calvin; he subjoins.

Confutatio erroris Calvini. Calvin denied that distinction de necessitate consequentis tollente libertatem, et de necessitate consequentia salvante libertatem; because, as Driedo says, every heretic has denied that distinction by which all the sophisms of the heretics are dissolved; for that the necessity of consequence, or conditioned, does not injure liberty is the doctrine of the saints, etc. Where the aforesaid author sustains that the absolute proposition imports conditioned necessity.

Qualiter praemotio inferat necessitatē conditionatam, cum sit decretum absolutum. This conditioned necessity, therefore, arising from the decree, or from the fact that the predetermining decree imports the condition of accompanying cooperation of free choice in the same instant in which, must be so understood; not that the decree composes the divine power toward indeterminate concourse, and that free choice purifies the condition, contracting the concourse of God toward such a species of influx, as Suárez wills and his followers. But that the premoving decree is asserted to import in that sense the condition of the cooperation of free choice: because although it premoves by concourse contracted toward such a species and individuation of action, yet it is not prior by a priority of separation than the operation of free choice, as is evident from what we hand down below under n. mar. 100, outlining that celebrated pronouncement of Scotus. Dico; quod prioritas, quae includit, ea posse esse sine se invicem absque contradictione, non est ordo in causis, vt causant effectum communem; sed simul causant.

Firmatur doctrina accidens. If, therefore, the absolute decree implies without the accompanying operation exercised of free choice, in such wise that if per impossibile the operation of free choice did not exist, neither would such a premoving decree, after the manner of concourse, be at God's service; thence it accrues that such a decree imports this condition of accompanying, which is placed in the necessity of inseparability of simple possibility, which is the necessity of consequence.

Datur in arsu intectu spẽs impressa. In which sense the concourse of the intelligible species toward the generation of the word, although it be contracted toward such a species of intelligible diction, and issue from the species contracting the intellect toward such a species of influx, can be called conditioned on account of the accompanying connexion with the concourse of the intellect; insofar as if the influx of the intellect toward the diction of the word did not exist, there would not be at the service of the intelligible species (although moving and contracting the intellect) an actual and exercised influx toward the generation of the word.

Firmatur auctoritate Scoti de contrahente praecedente Scotus. And so also is Scotus to be understood, in 1. sent. dist. 39. q. unica. §. ad auctoritates omnium sanctorum sub n. 35., where he has: Per hoc concedo, quòd contingentia relata ad diuinam scientiam sunt necessaria necessitate consequentia; hoc est, ista consequentia est necessaria; si Deus scit illa esse futura, illa erunt: non tamen sunt necessaria necessitate absoluta, nec necessitate consequentis.

95 From what has been said it follows that even from the camp of Scotus there has fallen away a certain newfangled follower of his, Theod. Smisingius, tom. 1 de Deo uno. tract. 3. disp. 3. de voluntate divina. q. 3. in resp. ad argumenta. sub n. marg. 81.; where he says that the determination of the created will is the formal reason contracting the divine will toward such a species of causality; by a like reason as the substantial form is asserted to be the formal determinative in the physical composite; and subsistence is the formal reason of incommunicability in the supposit; just as in metaphysics the specific difference is the formal reason of the specific metaphysical composite: and hecceity the formal reason of the individuum.

Th. Smisingius falls away from Scotus.

The opinion is refuted. This doctrine must not be admitted; for, apart from the fact that to say the divine will is contracted by the created will is plainly to diverge from Scotus’s school, as is clear from the preceding article’s physical excursus, the examples adduced by that author demonstrate the falsity of such a pronouncement.

Another assault on the opinion of Smisingius. For metaphysical differential grades are asserted as formal determinative reasons of the metaphysical composite toward such a species of being; because they can be conceived as prior to the composite which they constitute. Which is more perspicuous in physical forms, in which there appears the undeniable supposition of the form to the physical composite; just as also the hypostasis precedes by a priority of nature the supposit which it constitutes. Therefore if our determination were the formal and contracting determinative of the community, or quasi-potentiality, of the divine faculty executing, it would come about that our operation could be conceived as prior to the influx of God as exercised, and actually determined to our operation; and accordingly as immediately independent of God; the falsity of which assertion is evident from what has been said, and will be brought forward more manifestly in the following distinction, weighing the truth of conditioned futures.

96 To the second testimony of Scotus from n. 20, it is answered that there he did not assert that the first cause is determined by the action of the second cause, but that God is determined by the particular agents. Which contraction does not belong to the genus of efficient cause, but to the genus of quasi final cause; because God, on account of the operation congruous to the natures of the agents, or on account of the end of the operation congruous, or conformed to the condition of the agents, premoves second causes toward a free or necessary influx.

But that such a determination of God by created agents ought not to be so assumed that the premotion of God, that is, the causality anteceding our operation by a priority of nature, be disapproved, Francis. Aretinus hands down in comment. on the locus cited. under the words: aliqua causa potest dici mediata, vel immediata. where he says.

Observe, nevertheless, that God has causality in these inferior things in a fourfold way; first, because he gives the power of operating to other causes. Second, because he conserves the power of those causes, and makes them and their effects operate. Third, because they are moved by God; for before by nature God moves the celestial orbs, and particular causes, toward acting; although all concur together in the operation, nor is there given an instant in which God operates without causes, or conversely, etc. But that, according to Scotus, the purpose of the divine will is not contracted by the determination of the created will; see above in this art. under nu. 62. and below. under numer. 100.

Testimonies of Maior and of other followers of Scotus for premotion toward the substance of sin; and how there stands the priority of nature between the premotion of God and the operation of free choice in the sense of Scotus.

97 VErily, besides the followers of Scotus whom we cited above from nume. 48. up to 55., who thunder that the indetermination of our will as toward all acts must be contracted by the absolute will of God: even of such a pronouncement the express assertor is Jac. Malafossa of Bergamo in 1. sent. dist. 39. under the word: vel aliter. where he says.

Around the present matter I set down many conclusions. The first conclusion is this: that the contingent, before it is put in existence, is determined to one side of the contradiction by a determination of simple possibility.

Second conclusion: that the future contingent, if it must be determined to one side, it is necessary that it have an extrinsic cause determining it; because as far as from itself it is indifferent, etc.

Then under the sixth assertion the aforesaid author subsribes. Sixth conclusion: that the first extrinsic cause determining the future contingent to one side is the divine will. What could be more open?

98 Vltimately let the host of the Scotists be closed by that most illustrious auditor of Scotus, Francif. Maionius, on account of the splendor of his wisdom called the Doctor Illuminatus by the Parisian school, who in 1. sent. dist. 39. q. 4. whether future contingents have a determinate truth? §. as to the second. has it thus:

*As to the second, it is to be seen whether they have determinate truth in themselves. It is said by some, that because future contingents are not yet, hence it is that they do not have such a deter-*minate truth; because the truth of contingents is together with their existence.

And if it be said; that although they are not in their presence, nevertheless they are in their futurition. He says; that to be future is not except secundum quid to be.

From this it appears that they concede sufficiently to the proposition: namely, that in themselves they have determinate truth in some manner; but when they will be simply created, they will have determinate truth, just as they now have presence.

But that the future have such a determination is evident, for this is simply true: Antichristus erit; and this is simply false: Antichristus non erit. Hoc ego probo primò sic, satis euidenter.

To every active production there necessarily corresponds some passive; but the divine will actively produces those future contingents into willed existence, which is nothing other than actively to determine them: therefore necessarily something is produced.

Not something which is in God formally; therefore necessarily something which is in the creature, or in the future contingent: but the very same is produced into willed existence: therefore it is determined passively.

It is confirmed; because as the productive requires the producible, so the determined productive the determined producible; and in the same manner, as the determinative requires the determinable, so the determining the determined. But the divine will is determining: therefore something is determined: and that can be nothing except the future contingent.

99 Where, around the doctrine of Maionius, it should be observed that it occurred to him as so perspicuous that no other reason of determinate sciibility or truth is fitting to the future contingent which, posited, is not in production into willed existence, that he judged it evident; for he says: Hoc ego probo satis euidenter: productio autem rei in esse volito, in the phrase of Scotus, sounds of nothing else than mutationem obiectivam, in the common manner of speaking.

Moreover; since the objective mutation, which draws a possible being from the immutable decree toward futurition, is posterior to the decree itself, as is manifest; thence it accrues that the truth of any future contingent ought to be posterior to the free determination of God; and consequently also that, without the decree as existing, no determinate truth, or sciibility, can be assigned.

On account of which reason, in the following distinctio concerning the foreknowledge of conditionals, the assertion of the recent writers will be disapproved, holding that without a conditioned decree, which is actually in God, there is given determinate truth of futures under a condition.

100 To the third testimony of Scotus from n. 17, where he seems to deny the priority of nature between the motion of God and the causality of the creature.

It is answered; that Scotus disapproves only that priority which is called of separation, or from which there cannot be a consequence of subsisting; in such wise that the positio of the prior infallibly does not accompany the existence of the posterior. For such a priority between the causalities of the first and second cause is altogether exploded; for otherwise there could be given a premotion of the concourse of God without the cooperation of the creature, which is absurd.

And there would follow that which we have often taxed in Scotus; that God would premove the created free choice in act first, if the premotion of God could subsist with the cooperation exercised of the creature not existing in the same instant in which; therefore the premotion of the concourse of God is not prior by that priority from which there cannot be a consequence of subsisting in the operation of the creature; whence God premoving by concourse entails the necessity of consequence.

Yet the priority of dependence (prioritas in quo) between the causality of God and the causality of the created cause is not refuted; it stands together with the necessity of consequence, without absolute necessity or the necessity of the consequent. Scotus’s words plainly report this: “I say that a priority which entails that they can be without one another without contradiction is not an order among causes insofar as they cause a common effect; rather, they cause simultaneously.”

And that Scotus disapproved the priority of nature between the action of God, and the action of the creature, only in that usurpation of priority, which implies a separation that can survive without contradiction in the composite sense of the premotion of concourse; yet not in that acceptation of the priority of nature, which indicates the priority à Quo, or of the dependence of the action of the creature upon the action of God: is plain from the very words of the context, which is opposed to us, and is transcribed there.

Sicut enim loquendo de diuersis generibus causarum non priùs natura materia materiat, quã efficiens efficiat; quasi sine contradictione possit esse materiatum, et non effectum, vel è converso.

Which objection from the comparison of material cause and efficient, without a priority of nature in the sole sense of the separation of the material causality from the efficient, and with the undeniable presupposition of the dependence of any material and efficient cause in its own order of causing; manifestly demonstrates that Scotus did not deny the priority from which or of dependence of the action of the created cause upon the action of God.

But that God is not drawn by the creature toward the species of act, is expressly handed down by Scotus in 4 senten. distinct. 49 quaest. 6. sub num. margin. 15. Non repugnat sibi (that is, to the will) quòdcontingentia eius non ponat contingentiam ex parte effectus simpliciter, quantùm est ex parte causae superioris; quia causa superior non determinatur ab ipsa.

Indeed the created will is determined by God; as is evident from the context there. Non est autem contra naturam eius determinari à causa superiori; quia cum hoc stat, quòd sit causa in suo ordine.

Which elucidation of the Scotist text I take from Guliel. Rubion. in 2. distin. 34. q. 2. in resp. ad tertium argumentum, where he says:

Toward the third; when it is said, that if the uncreated and the created will concur toward the same effect; either the uncreated acts before, etc.

It is answered; that the uncreated acts before by a priority of perfection; yet both act together with a simultaneity of generation. Nor does it follow from this, that it is inferred; namely that the created does not depend upon the uncreated. For of several concurring toward the same effect with a simultaneity of generation, the more imperfect can depend upon the more perfect; because neither does the uncreated and the created will concur without all order, etc.

Where Gulielmus, admitting the simultaneous concourse in the same instant in which, which he called the instant of generation, professes nevertheless an order of dependence, and consequently a priority of dependence; since it implies the dependence of this upon another in concurring without an opposition of posteriority in the dependent with respect to that from which it depends; for those perspicuous pronouncements of Gulielmus bring it forward. Nec sequitur, quòd creata non dependeat ab increata. And below: Non concurrunt sine omni ordine voluntas increata, et creata.

Similar things Peter Tartaretus has, in 2 sent. dist. 37. q. unica. §. Et vt clariùs dicatur. where he says:

Toward that, that God of a prior nature gives rectitude, or deformity, to the act, before the created will; one must distinguish concerning the prior. One thing is prior by a priority of separation; another is prior by a priority of perfection. An example of the first: the Sun illuminates before it warms; and therefore illumination can be separated from calefaction. An example of the second; as the Sun generates the horse before the horse, that is in a more perfect mode. Similarly, God produces volition before the will; because God independently, and the will dependently; therefore God acts in a more perfect mode.

And when it was argued; that God, in the first instant, in which he gives rectitude to the act; either makes the act right, or not right: and consequently it is not to be imputed to the will?

I say; that the argument proceeds from a priority of separation, such as is not in that action. etc.

Other objections against God’s premotion toward the material aspects of sinful acts are refuted here; the reason is also given why, despite premotion, the sin of omission is not attributed to God.

But you will object from Vázquez, 1. p. disp. 99. cap. 4. n. 25., that the decrees of God establishing the operation of the created will absolutely, and not involving a hypothesis, or condition, of the cooperation of our will, necessarily import a priority, not only from which, but also in which; unless we wish to mock the controversy with words.

It is pressed from Vazquez. For if God absolutely preordains the assent of our will, with the science of our cooperation not awaited; therefore by himself alone, for any sign, he predecrees the futurition, or objective mutation toward being about to be, of our assent; without calling upon our will, or assuming it into partnership of such absolute preordination: for if God did not establish from eternity the consent of the created will by wrapping within the hypothesis that it will, he would therefore exclude the partnership of the will in that eternal and absolute predefinition of the assent of free choice.

The objection is refuted. It is answered; that as God, not by himself alone, but together with the creature in the same instant in which, or of duration, elicits our assent, so also from eternity he preordains that such a species and individuate act be made by such a power; so that that internal definition (as from eternity it in-dwells in the divine will) should be set forth thus: I will with that will to produce such an act of assent, or dissent. Although the simultaneity of the instant in which being supposed, there must be necessarily sustained a priority from which, or of nature; because God concurs as a principle contracting the indetermination of the created will toward such a species and individuation of acts, and the contracting reason is essentially prior to the contracted reason; since he bears himself as that from which with respect to it.

It is driven against Vazquez himself. If, however, the objection of Vazquez pressed, it would also touch the common doctrine concerning the decree of concurring toward such an act of created volition. Wherefore just as God absolutely establishing that he concur toward such a species of act, for instance assent, does not predecree by himself alone that the existence of such an assent be rendered, but assumes the created will into partnership of cooperation; so it must also be pronounced of God predetermining toward assent. Since such predetermination is only concourse in the same instant in which; and not anteceding after the manner of a principle.

The pretence is closed in the decree of concurring. Unless Vazquez wished that which we refuted in Suárez and Herice (in artic. 5. of this distinctio. from numer. 19. up to 22.), that the will of concurring toward such a species of influx involve a condition to be purified by free choice. Which thing supposed, the presupposition of the operation as flowing forth from free choice appears inevitable, if it should purify with a conventional application of so operating according to the nod of the created will.

Another objection, that the will of concurring involve a condition. 102 You will press further; that from what has been said it is inferred that the will of God preordaining our operation is not absolute, but importing a condition of our will cooperating; if God call our will and assume it into the partnership of the predetermination of the acts of the created will.

It is treated, in what way the will of concurring can be called conditioned? It is answered; that then the will of God would not decree absolutely the acts of our will, if it premitted the science of the cooperation of the created will; or if it were composed with free choice toward the effecting of its acts, wrapping within a condition, if free choice wills, and offering an indeterminate concourse toward a species of act, contractible by the created will toward such a species. But since in the preordination of the acts of our will God does not so bear himself, but absolutely (with the science of our cooperation not awaited) decrees to concur with that will toward such an act; therefore such a proposition of God is not conditioned, but simply absolute.

A fuller elucidation of the preceding doctrine. In which sense, however, it can be called conditioned, we showed above in this art. under numer. margin. 94., insofar as such a necessity is not that necessity which from the Theologians is called the necessity of consequence bursting forth from a principle affixed to one, and without a moral power toward the opposite, in the sense of division and of separation from a merely concursive motion; but that necessity (which the premotion concurring imports) is a conditioned and respective necessity, that is, a necessity of consequence, from the hypothesis of the sole concursive motion, and in the same instant in which with the composition of the created will toward its cooperation premittent the absolute power of the will toward the opposite in act first. Whence, although the premoving decree in act second and after the manner of the sole causality concursive is not conditioned in that sense, that it import a concourse contractible at the arbitrament of the will toward such a species of causality; but absolutely establish such a species and individuate influx; yet it is conditioned, because it refers and entails a conditioned and respective necessity, from the hypothesis of the sole motion of the concourse exercised premittent the absolute power of the first act indeterminate, and proximately valid toward either of two, before the causality exercised of the concurring divine decree.

103 If, however, you press a third time: Objection, that predetermination entails the necessity of inference. That accompanying, that of the created will and the divine, if the act of the created will be absolutely established without the foreknowledge of our cooperation, can rightly be called of the necessity of inference; because the will of God infallibly, with a stronger energy, infers the assent, and as it were binds the created will to the preordained act.

Satisfaction to the objection. I say; that if by necessity of inference be understood the emanation of the consequent from the antecedent necessarily, that is, affixed after the manner of a first act toward one side of the contradiction, in such wise that in the proximate power, or outset, it be not after the manner of a principle toward the opposite, in the sense of division and of separation from all exercised motion; the necessity of simple possibility, that is, the connexion of accompanying (which intervenes between the causalities of the first cause and of the second), must be denied to be a necessity of inference. NOTA. But if by necessity of inference only the infallible accompanying be meant, on account of the unimpeded simultaneity of simple possibility and of fact, and of the coherence in the composite sense, of our cooperation with the premotion concursive of God, it ought to be admitted: for in such an acceptance the necessity of inference would sound the same as the necessity of consequence, which receives the common consent of the Doctors; concerning which, in this contro. distinct. 3. de Praescientia conditionatorum. art. 4. de Causalitate, et necessitate conditionalis praescientiae. from n. mar. 4. up to 7.

104 To the fourth testimony of Scotus from numer. 22, to the 4. testimony of Scotus which takes away predetermination after the manner of a first act. It is answered that there he only tears up predetermination after the manner of a principle, and in act first; but does not defeat the priority of nature after the manner of actual concourse. For if the created will were predetermined by God through composition, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, of an operative virtue in act first, it would manifestly happen that without that premoving form there would not be left to our will a proximate and equipped principle toward either of two. For if the created will, that it be valid proximately toward right operation, demands a form pertaining to the first act of acting; therefore without such a form our will is not proximately and morally potent toward acting well; and consequently before it actually operate evil, it is left by God as it were affixed toward evil, since there is not at its service a proximate power after the manner of a principle toward good.

Wherefore, and consequently, Scotus denied that the causality cooperative, or concursive, of God is prior than the causality of the creature by a priority of separation, or by that priority from which there cannot be a consequence of subsisting; in such wise that the motion of the first cause being posited, there could of fact and of simple possibility not be posited the cooperation exercised of the creature. For there would be left the created will not expediting itself toward the act second, and consequently in act first; and accordingly the motion and determination of the divine will upon the created will, as in act first, would fall; and consequently the created will would be contracted in act first, and consequently would not be in act first indifferent toward either of two.

Wherefore, we also used this same testimony of Scotus in the present distinction, art. 2, On the Foreknowledge of Future Things in Their Causes, under no. 19, to show that, given such a premotion, sin is not imputable to our will, nor is the sufficiency preserved of the aid called sufficient because it readily enables the eliciting of a holy act. Why predetermination of free choice in first act is repugnant. For if, beyond the indeliberate motions of holy illuminations on the part of the intellect and inspirations on the part of the will, another form or operative power belonging to the species of a potency is required so that the will is constituted proximately able to act in first act, then, once that premoving form is removed as a principle, sufficient aid is no longer left sufficient.

But if the premotion pertains not to the act first, but to the exercised and actual concourse, as the will is asserted (as it antecedes the act second of our cooperation) to be proximately able toward either of two, toward contraries and contradictories; since the premotion of the concourse does not bear a priority with respect to the instant in Which, but from Which. Hence it comes about, that our will is not conceived in act first as contracted and affixed to one side of the contradiction; and consequently neither as necessitated by an antecedent necessity.

From these same considerations, the objection that is brought against our position from the sin of omission can also be dissolved; it presses thus.

If the predetermination of God, antecedent by priority-from-what (à Quo) to our operation, which is the fulfilment of the precept, is necessarily demanded for the fulfilment of the affirmative precept; then the sin of omission ought to be referred to that principle, which first and of itself removes the positing of the act that would fulfil the law. But that principle which does not concur by priority-from-what, contracting the potentiality of the created will and applying it to influx, removes the observance of the law beforehand; therefore the sin of omission ought to be ascribed to God.

It is answered in like manner: that the sin of omission could then be referred to God, when something possessing the character of a principle required for acting existed before there was any exercise and actual influx from the will omitting the fulfilment of the precept. But the predetermination of God does not come to the aid of the created will that omits, for the reason that actual concourse for the good is denied to the created will when it does not do the good. The same reasoning holds for the will of not predetermining as for the will of not concurring, since all predetermination in our account is constituted in the very execution of the concourse. Wherefore, just as the will in God of not concurring, when the fulfilment of the precept presses upon the creature, is imputed only to the deficient principle; so also the will of not predetermining, which is not distinguished from concomitant motion.

Whence, when it is urged: if God had predetermined to the observance of the precept, the created will would not have refused. If this objection obtained anything, it would also act against the causal character of the concomitant concourse of the first cause; because if God had furnished the concourse, the created will could not on that hypothesis fail to fulfil the precept, since such supposition involves the compound sense of the cooperation of free choice. We establish the same concerning the predetermining will, since such premotion takes place not by the mode of a principle forestalling the exercised cooperation, but by the mode of concourse.

But if you object further: that therefore free choice is not excused in the sin of omission on the ground that God does not furnish concourse to the observance of the precept; because God therefore does not concur because the creature does not will to act;

Or you could be met thus: that since among the adversaries God and the creature are composed for acting in the same sign of nature, neither is God before the creature, nor the creature before God — as is asserted — therefore, just as it may be objected that God does not concur because the creature does not cooperate, so it could equally be objected that the creature therefore does not cooperate because God does not concur: since neither concourse (if it does not forestall the other by priority of nature) could be renounced as the reason of the other, as regards both the positing and the negating of it.

Whence also Scotus consistently refers the knowledge of the sin of omission to an infallible medium on the side of the object, not to a knowledge of the failure of some principle required for the power to be proximate, that the precept might be fulfilled; but to the sheer negation of the determination of the concourse, which looks merely to the negation of the second act; while in 1. senten. dist. 41. q. unica. § sed adhuc contra istud instatur. num. margi. 13. he subjoins, dissolving the objection.

» But this God foreknows, because he wills » to cooperate with it, if there is a commission » of sin; or he foreknows that he will not cooperate to » some act, if he does not will it, and to have » known this is the first act of the sin of omission: » and in knowing that he will cooperate to » such a substance of act without the due » circumstances, or that he will not cooperate » to a necessary act, and consequently, which » he will omit, he will know him about to sin. » So that he knows this one about to sin, » not only because he knows that he will permit; but » also because he knows that he will cooperate with him to the substance of an act not circumstantiated; and consequently this man will commit it, or will not be one to cooperate with him for the act that is necessary, and consequently this man will omit.

Vindication of the opinion of Scotus from the criminations of the adversaries, that it favours the fall of Calvin and of the Novatians.

105 To the last objection, drawn from the doctrine of Scotus under margin num. 13, which argued that Scotus seems a favourer of the fall of Calvin and of the Novatians, because, through the absolute purpose of the divine will, God, when he exerts his causal character towards the outside, contracts our will to one side of the contradiction, so that it is not within their right to strive in the opposite direction.

It is answered: the heretics deny the proximate equipment and expedition of the divine concourse to either alternative by force of the decree; wherefore they blaspheme that our will is compelled by the decree of God, while with great clamour they rail that our proximate power for contraries and contradictories is not equipped by the divine will as by an extrinsic principle, but that the will is impeded by the purpose of God in first act, before actual cooperation, or in the sense of division, or separation from exercised concourse. Which is altogether alien from the mind of the Scotists, who assert that our will is therefore left in the hand of its own counsel because, before actual cooperation is entered upon, there is supposed a concourse proximately forthcoming to either alternative, even by force of the decree, appearing to either alternative in firstact; and that it sustains only a necessity of inesse, that is, one involving the compound sense of equal cooperation, or of the premotion of concourse; but not an antecedent necessity by the mode of a principle and in the sense of division, which is a necessity simply.

But that this was the assertion of the ancient assectators and auditors of Scotus, it is evident from Guilelmus de Rubione in the place cited, ex 2. sentent. distinct. 34. quaest. 2. in respon. ad tertium arg. ubi inquit.

To the authority of Sacred Scripture I say: that therefore man is said to be in the hand of his own counsel, because although he supposes a cause determining him to one side with a determination of inesse; nevertheless he does not necessarily follow such a determination; nay, he could not follow it as possible, although he follows it de facto.

And therefore when it is said, that if man could not of himself choose what he wills without some cause determining him; he would not be in the hand of his own counsel, but of the cause determining him.

I concede, if man could not act contrary to that to which he is determined. Just as because fire is so determined by the first cause, and any other natural agent whatever, to act upon a passible thing disposed and approximated to it; and now to this fire, now to another, that it can neither not act when a passible thing is at hand, nor act otherwise than upon that to which it is determined; therefore neither it nor any other natural agent acting is in the hand of its own counsel, but rather of the first cause determining it: but so it is not with man, nor with any other free agent.

The like has Bassolius, transcribed by us above in this article under margin num. 48, where to that objection; That the sinner would sin with equal necessity as fire heats. He answers; Bassolius: That is true as regards this, that just as, the divine will standing that fire heat when combustible matter is present, it is impossible that fire not heat; so by necessity of consequence it is impossible that this man not sin. Yet he does not sin naturally, nor from a natural principle as fire, but from a free principle, which indeed is determined to sinning not naturally, but freely.

From which words of Bassolius: Which indeed is determined to sinning not naturally, but freely. It is plainly evident in what the Catholic assertion differs from the fall of the heretics the Novatians.

Those who deny that free choice is expedited by God in act first to either of two, but is driven, or affixed, by the eternal statute of God to one side of the contradiction, so that the power to the opposite is not supplied to it, nor in the sense of division and separation from the exercised concourse: whence also they disapprove the virtue of sufficient help, as we showed above in this article under n. 67, at the end.

Wherefore they also deny that celebrated distinction of the theologians between necessity of consequence and of the consequent; concerning which, for the doctrine of Scotus and Bonaventure, elucidated by us below in the following distinctio, de praescientia contingentium conditionatorum. art. 4. de necessitate, et causalitate conditionalis praescientiae. n. mar. 6. et 7.

And that it may appear the more deeply in what the Catholic assertion differs from the heresy of the Novatians, I transcribe the fall of Calvin from Martinus Becanus. tomus 1. opusculorum. Opusculo 3. de authore peccati. cap. 8. nu. marg. 1. Thus therefore Calvin has it, lib 1. institutionum. cap. 18. §. 1. By tergiversating, therefore, they seek an escape, that this is done by the mere permission of God, not also by his will. But that men accomplish nothing except by the secret nod of God, nor deliberate upon anything except what he has already decreed within himself. And the same Calvin, lib. 3. institutionum cap. 23. §. 9. subjoins, impiously blaspheming and babbling. The reprobate will be held excusable on account of sinning, because they cannot escape the necessity of sinning, especially since such a necessity is imposed upon them by the ordination of God. We indeed deny that they are rightly excused from this, seeing that in the ordination of God (by which they complain themselves destined to destruction) there stands his equity, unknown indeed to us, but most certain.

See how Calvin openly denies power (in the sense of division, or of separation from exercised concourse) except towards that side of the contradiction which has been set forth by the secret nod of God; wherefore he also takes away sufficient grace for the opposite. Observe, too, that he explodes permission with regard to malice, and the causality of approbation with regard to the entitative substrate of goodness, spewing out, that to tergiversate and to contrive escapes of insanity belongs to Catholic authors, when by the permission of God they refer the formal element of sin to it; and that he compares the will and causality of God to the substrate of sin, as is clear from those words: By tergiversating, therefore, they seek an escape, that this is done by the mere permission of God, not also by his will.

Next, that deliberation is not to the purpose for free power to act, even in the sense of division and before exercised cooperation, but that the created will in first act is contracted to one thing by the eternal decree of God — this is evident from those words: Nor do they deliberate upon anything except what he has already decreed within himself. Whence he does not distinguish between necessity of the consequent and of the consequence, by which the machinations of the heretics are cast down: but he asserts an inevitable necessity of sinning, as is clear from that impious pronounce ment; They cannot escape the necessity of sinning, especially since such a necessity is imposed upon them by the ordination of God. Which supposed, it is evidently inferred that the action of God is as much the betrayal of Judas as the conversion of Paul, by an absolute necessity injected from an extrinsic principle, without power to the opposite; whence Calvin moreover holds and ridicules our deliberations as if void and superfluous.

Finally, at length, against Calvin I object against him that utterance of Scotus which I transcribed under number 100 of this article. That it is not against its nature (that is, of the created will) to be determined by a superior cause; because this is its state, that it be a cause in its own order. That it stands so far from the truth that the determination or premotion of the concurrent decree takes away the exercised liberty of the second act of the cooperation of the created will; that rather the liberty of exercised appetite is drawn from the concurrent decree as from a principle, or that the will expatiate itself and exercise itself towards an operation congruent to its nature in its own order of causing, namely as a free agent; just as from the will of God (which is the very executive faculty of it towards the outside) there flows forth as from a principle the impulsive faculty, or the volitive power with indifference to either alternative. Whence as it does not obstruct the liberty of the will in act signed, or of the impulsive faculty, that it should break forth from the extrinsic principle of the divine will as from the fountain of all participated and participable indifference; so neither does it contradict the liberty of exercised impulse, that it should be effected by the divine will as by the principally moving and determining agent, not only to the substance of the act, but even to the mode of its indifference.

Answer to the foundations of Aureolus, rejecting the immediate concourse of God to the matter of sin; and another vindication of Aureolus from the rigid censure of the Neoterics; with the crown of noble theologians also joined, who subscribe to Aureolus.

106 The arguments of Aureolus against the foreknowledge of future contingents in the determination of the divine will we dissolved above from number 64 up to 74; there now remains, with contracted pen as it were, to break down the objections against the immediate concourse of God to the matter of sin.

And first, to the pronounce ment of Aureolus under num. 24, affirming; that God does not act immediately in the act of the will deformed by sin, nor is there need that he act immediately upon every creature. Where Aureolus attempts to establish, that the effecting of a created being does not conflict with the absence of an immediate efflux from the divine faculty exercising. Besides the reasons of Scotus, with which we dealt under number 35, that production involves the implication of some created being which should not depend immediately upon God; firm enough is that one which is drawn from the indetermination of the created cause to the production of this individual rather than another. We asserted that this potentiality of operating stood in need of the contraction of the first cause in such a manner, that if God did not predetermine the created cause, it could not act; which argument, with the assectators of Scotus against Aureolus, Gregory of Rimini, transcribed by us, forms under num. 77.

107 To the other argument of Aureolus, under number 25, where he contends, that if God were the cause of the substrate of moral malice, he would also be held a necessary principle of its very deformity, on account of the unimpedible sequence and concomitance of the privation of due rectitude with the positive substrate; this objection was assailed from margin num. 68 and onwards.

Moreover, because we contend to free Aureolus from the note of censure, insofar as he asserted; that the substrates of depraved acts do not issue from God immediately. It must be noticed that Gabriel Vázquez 1. part. disp. 99. cap. 4. nume. margin 19. candidly confesses, that he has read no one among the Fathers, besides Anselm, who asserted the immediate concourse of God to the matter of sin; to whom Didacus Ruiz subscribes, Tomo de Voluntate Dei, disp. 31. sect. 4. to which he prefixed such a title; The Fathers speak not only of malice, but even of the material operation, when they say that it is not made by God. Where he turns over many testimonies of the Fathers, especially of Augustine, and of his followers Fulgentius and Prosper, which seem to assert, that God concurs neither to the substrates of malice.

108 But because Didacus Alvarez lib 3. de Auxiliis. disp. 24. numer. marg. 16 et 17. attempts to persuade that it belongs to the mind of Augustine, not only immediate concourse, but also physical premotion to the substrate of sin; lest anyone should rave on canonical authorities of Augustine cited tortuously for physical predetermination, as our Francis Coriolanus also seems deceived in the place cited, for the purpose of confirming the opinion of physical predetermination — it will be to the purpose briefly to weigh such pronounce ments, which Alvarez judged to be plainly of the mind of Augustine.

The first testimony is, ex tom. 1. lib. 2. de libero arbitrio. cap. 20. where when Augustine had objected to himself: But perhaps you will seek to know, since the will is moved, when it turns itself away from the unchangeable good to a changeable good, whence this motion arises to it? Which motion is indeed evil, although the will is free, because without it no one can live rightly, it ought to be numbered among the goods. For if this motion, that is, the aversion of the will from the Lord God, is without doubt a sin, can we not say that God is the author of sin? Therefore this motion will not be from God.

Which objection he dissolved thus. But every good is from God; therefore there is no nature which is not from God. Therefore that motion of aversion, which we confess to be sin, since it is a defective motion, and every defect is from nothing: see to what it belongs, and doubt not that it belongs to God.

From which authority of Augustine Alvarez argues thus. In the aforesaid testimony, the motion, as defective, and as importing nothing, namely the privation of due rectitude, is distinguished from the substrate of sin, which in the character of being is pronounced good, and as such to be from God. But the ly to be from God expresses not only the immediate causality of God with respect to the substrate of sin, but also that the indetermination of our will to the matter of sin is contracted by God; therefore the aforesaid pronounce ment of Augustine establishes not only the immediate concourse of God to the substance of the depraved act, but also that our will is determined by God to the matter of sin.

109 But that you contend not, that God conducts himself with respect to the substrate of sin only permissively, of the mind of Augustine; but not predeterminatively. The aforesaid evasion is shut out by the other testimony of Augustine, ex Tom. 7. lib. 5. contra Iulianum Pelagianum. cap. 3. where August. thus lashes Julian.

But what is it that you say; (when they are said to be given over to their desires, they are to be understood as left by the divine patience, not compelled to sins by power) as if the same Apostle had not put these two together, both patience and power, where he says: (So then, God willing to show his wrath and to demonstrate his power, brought with much patience vessels of wrath, which are perfected unto destruction.)

But which of these, nevertheless, do you say that is which is written; (And if the Prophet shall have erred and spoken, I the Lord seduced that prophet, and I will stretch forth my hand upon him, and I will exterminate him from the midst of my people Israel;) is it patience, or power? Whichever you choose, or confess both, you see nevertheless that the sin, and the punishment of the sin, is that of the false prophet. Or will you say even here, when he says: (I the Lord seduced that prophet,) that it is to be understood deserted, that by his own merits seduced he erred? Do as you will; nevertheless he is punished for sin in this manner, that he sins by prophesying falsely.

Where Augustine, when he assails Julian, seems thus to distinguish between permission and promotion to evil with respect to the material and substrate; so that the permission, through which God holds himself merely negatively with respect to the formal element of sin, is referred to the patience of God; but the premotion or physical contraction of our will to the substrate of sin is ascribed to the power of God, because by a strong and sweet energy he moves positively to the material things of depraved acts, in punishment of preceding falls.

110 But the aforesaid pronounce ments of Augustine do not press; for the first testimony cited by Alvarez burst forth from an errant press; because in the accurate correction of the works of Augustine edited by the Doctors of Louvain, there is not read: That motion of aversion, see to what it belongs, and doubt not that it belongs to God. (but) And doubt not that it does not belong to God. So that corruptly and mendaciously the negative particle (non) has been removed.

Wherefore Gabriel Vázquez 1. 2. disput. 129. cap. 2. sub nume. 6. confirms by the same testimony of Augustine, that God does not concur immediately to the matter of sin; nay, that Augustine defended that opinion, Vázquez attempts to show, as often as Augustine asserts that God concurs to every nature of beings. Where by the name of nature, he understands not the operation of a thing (to which, in depraved acts God does not operate, of the mind of Augustine, Vázquez judged) but the substance of the created being; see Gabr. Vázquez in the place cited, and especially 1. part. disput. 99. capit. 4. num. 19.

Nor does the other testimony of Augustine, distinguishing between the patience and the power of God in the causality of sin, press more; because as the Doctors of Louvain optimally observed in their annotations upon the aforesaid passage, sub numero. 23. Augustine does not reprehend Julian the Pelagian, because the Pelagian denied that the giving over of the sinner to a reprobate sense is a physical causality with respect to the substrate of sin; but that he asserted a merely negative permission; for Augustine abstained from these minutiae of scholastic disputation.

But the Doctor of the Saints taxes Julian for this reason; because the giving over to a reprobate sense is ascribed to the patience of God; whereas the patience of God does not intend the punishment of the sinner, but rather makes manifest the magnificent benefit of the divine charity awaiting the repentance of the sinner, until he should come to his senses and return with his whole heart; wherefore the giving over to a reprobate sense is to be ascribed to the divine power; not to patience.

But indeed this giving over (say the cited Louvanists,) is a heavy vengeance, descending from his great wrath, by which it comes to pass that, with a marvellous obduration of mind, sins of ever greater and greater weight are committed daily. Moreover, what is here added concerning the power of God, by which some seem to be compelled to sins, is not to be taken as if God were the author of sinning to anyone, or compel anyone to sin who is so disposed; but that by great calamities and punishments, in which he declares his power and virtue in a marvellous manner, he sometimes severely afflicts certain proud men, such as Pharaoh once was; by which they are so little corrected, that from the occasion they are obdurate more and more against God. Concerning which power of a surety the Apostle speaks, citing that testimony of Exodus concerning this same Pharaoh: (Because for this very thing have I raised thee up, that I might show in thee my power, and that my name might be announced in the whole earth.)

If therefore of the mind of the Fathers there is not an immediate concourse of God to the matter of sin, nay, and Augustine himself seems to declare the opposite most expressly. Tomo 5. lib. 5. de Ciuitat. Dei. cap. 8. where he has it. From whom are all powers, although from him are not the wills of all.

Where he seems to have distinguished the power of the will, or the will as power in first act, from the second and exercised act of the will, when he asserts; that although from God are the impulsive and volitive faculties, yet not the volitions and exercised impulses. And cap. 9. next following. For as he is the creator of all natures, so is he the giver of all powers, not of wills; for evil wills are not from him, because they are contrary to nature, which is from him. It follows therefore, that Aureolus can be excused from the note of rashness, if he imitated the footsteps of Augustine.

But one thing remains to be observed; that it is not so perspicuous that Augustine taught that which Aureolus willed; that God does not concur immediately to a depraved operation, (as Vázquez, Hurtado, and Ruiz opine in the places cited) since the opposite is deservedly defended by Leonardus Coqueus in his Commentaries upon the books de Ciuitate Dei; for thus it is, in Commentar. capit. 9. libro 5. sub numero. 9. upon those words. The giver of the powers of all, not of wills. where he says.

He speaks of the actions and motions of the will itself, not of the faculty itself; for thus he writes libr. 12. confess. cap. 11. this alone is not of thee, which is not of thee; and the motion of the will from thee, who art, to that which is less, because such a motion is a fault and a sin. And the book de spiritu, et litera capi. 31. We read (he says) there is no power except of God, but we do not read, there is no will except of God, and rightly is it not written; because it is not true. Therefore some will is not of God.

But in what sense? Whether because he does not concur to it? Nay, since it has real being, it necessarily hangs upon the concourse of God. Perhaps because God did not compel that will, nor command, nor morally move it, etc.

Add also, for the purpose of freeing Aureolus from the note of censure with respect to the negation of immediate concourse to the matter of sin; that Nicolaus Bonetus, a theologian of the highest note in libr. 7. Naturalis Theologiae cap. 3. where he inquires, whether the first cause be productive of an effect deformed and morally vitious? Thus he answers. Those who posit the necessity of the concourse of the first cause with second causes, would with difficulty escape, that he be the cause of every moral effect, since he be the cause of the substrate, and of the positive entity of the defectuous act itself, to which the deformity of the moral act follows necessarily. Therefore it must be said otherwise. To which pronounce ment he had premised another in the same capit. 3. saying. But when you say further, therefore he is the effective cause of all things: I answer, there is no need that he be the immediate cause, but it suffices that he be the mediate cause, giving the entity to those second causes.

There is added also from among our theologians Pelbartus, a man of signal learning. in Rosario Theologico. tom. 2. sub verbo Malum. §. 7. where he connects himself with the argumentation of Aureolus vanquished above. Therefore it can be said, that concerning the substrate of the act of hatred of God, since it is of itself and secundum se evil: to hate God has no place, the aforesaid position (namely that which is said, that God acts immediately upon every act of ours); but well in other things, which are not of themselves evil.

Peter Aquilanus also gives his suffrage, in 2. sent. dist. 37. where when the foundation of Aureolus had been objected to himself; remitting himself to those things which he had premised as probable, that the will be the sole proximate cause of the free action deformed, in the same, 2. sent. dist. 34. q. 1. He answers in dist. 37. in these words. Perhaps the opinion which in the second article of distinction 34 is the truer.

Nor does Cardinal. Constantius Sarnanus dissent from among recent theologians, in summa Theologica libr. 2. where he teaches. That God is not the proximate and immediate cause, but only the remote and mediate cause of the depraved act.

This noble crown of theologians therefore have we joined to Aureolus, all of whom are of the Franciscan Order, that we might either buttress the placitum of Aureolus, or free him from censure.

112 To the other argument of Aureolus under num. 27. we concede, that God predecrees and premoves the created will to the matter of sin, in such a manner that the causality of God, by priority of nature, precedes the influx of our will; but that supposing such priority there does not follow that God ought to be held the author of sin — this we have sufficiently made clear in the foregoing. As also that the will of God, for inflowing into the substrate of sin, should not be able to furnish a medium on the side of the object of the infallible foreknowledge of future contingents, if such a will be not absolute and predefinitive; or that it involves a condition on the side of the object, so that the divine will passes from the conditioned into the absolute, by reason of the knowledge of vision of the cooperation of our will.

Exposition of the placitum of Ambrosius Machinus concerning the concourse of God to the matter of sin.

113 From which it follows that Ambrosius Machinus does not stand consistent with himself. 1. parte. disp. 32. secti. 3. conclud. 3. where he asserts, that God knows infallibly all future contingents of depraved acts in the efficacious decree, whereby he causes the physical entity of sin: Because the efficacious decree of God concerning the furnishing of concourse to the matter of sin is by nature prior to the very futurition of sin.

For the aforesaid pronounce ment of Machinus does not cohere with another of the same author, in the same section, the second opinion. where he says. This opinion is most false, if it should speak of a decree predetermining every free determination of the will; because in some sins there is an intrinsic malice, so that the material element thereof cannot be embraced without sin.

From which it is plain that this author spoke inconsequentially; because the decree of God concerning the matters of wicked acts is asserted by all to be predeterminative for no other reason than that by an efficacious absolute volition it anticipates the futurition of the wicked act; for if the futurition of our cooperation goes before, it premits for some sign of nature the efficacious will of God; therefore by priority of nature God efficaciously predecrees our oblique operation before it is itself conceived as future. And hence, before the absolute foreknowledge of our consent into a base object, the divine will is not apprehended merely as preparing, or offering, concourse to either of two, or as decreeing the substrate of sin out of a condition; but as contracted efficaciously and absolutely to one part of the contradiction.

Because therefore there is supposed the divine will with that quasi-potentiality and community of concourse; because that contraction, among the adversaries, is sought from our depraved determination, as from the determining reason of such indifference; therefore, although our determination, as infallibly future, is not by nature prior to the absolute contraction of the divine will to such a species of oblique causality; yet it ought not to be by nature posterior to the divine will, as terminated efficaciously and absolutely to the depraved act; because otherwise it could not hold itself as that-by-which (Quo), and as the reason of such contraction, as is evident.

For it is the same in the present case, for the will of God to be efficacious, and to be absolute; since the will of God does not intend efficaciously the matter of sin, unless purified of the condition from the consent of the created will; and supposing the foreknowledge of the cooperation of free choice, the divine will passes from the conditioned into the absolute and efficacious.

NOTA

Therefore not the will efficacious and absolute for concurring to the matter of sin can be the first reason of foreknowing such a future; since rather the will of God, as efficacious and absolute, antecedes such a fall with foreknowledge; on which account it passes from the conditioned into the absolute.

Therefore the contrary: if the efficacious divine volition precedes by priority-from-what or of nature the absolute and efficacious futurition of our determination; God efficaciously decrees the depraved act sooner than it be future; and accordingly he has established, predecreed, and predeter mined our operation; and is not determined and contracted by it.

Moreover; that that efficacious decree of concurring either involves the condition of the cooperation of free choice, and accordingly it would come to pass that, without the absolute knowledge of such cooperation, the determination of God could not furnish a medium on the side of the object for infallible knowledge — since, not purified of its condition, it posits nothing in the being of a conditioned complexion. Or the efficacious decree does not imbibe the condition, which must necessarily be pronounce d, that such a purpose, absolute and simply, may avail as the reason of foreknowledge, as it were, because it does not await the purification of some condition; and there would be inferred in full clarity, that such a decree is predeterminative.

114. Wherefore Suárez and other authors, who sustain the predefinition of good acts with only a conditioned foreknowledge of the future consent, judge that a predefinition (even by the mode of an internal purpose in God) which should determine the material things of depraved actions is not to be sustained with only a conditioned fore knowledge; but to the efficacious and absolute will there is necessarily pre-required the knowledge of vision of the cooperation of free choice, contracting, as it were, the community and indifference of the divine will, exhibited of itself towards either alternative; concerning which see Suárez opus. 1. de diuina motione. lib. 2. cap. 3. n. marg. 17.

Therefore God does not set upon an absolute purpose of the futurition of the depraved act, which as a natural presupposition would precede the futurition of the depraved action; since the absolute futurition of the sinful action, and the knowledge of vision of the existence of the substrate of sin, for such difference of time holds itself as that-by-which (Quo), or as it were the form, contracting the indifference of the divine will to concurring to the matter of sin.

Wherefore those authors, who reject the determination of God to the matter of sin, consequently teach; that God does not foreknow such objects in a decree, but in the truth of the objects themselves. So that they hold Vázquez to be deficient from the consequence of his doctrine, insofar as, the predetermination exploded, he asserted that the decree is the cause, although a remote one, sufficient for the foreknowledge of future things. But for the sharp assault of Machinus concerning the contraction of the power of God by free created choice, for concourse to the matter of sin, seek from n. 75 of this art.

But how Machinus also is deficient from the consequence of his doctrine; we show again below, treating of the foreknowledge of conditioned depraved acts, in distinct. 3. of this controversy, which is de scientia contingentium conditionatorum ar. 2. n. mar. 45.

115. But if you answer in behalf of Machinus, ex 1. part. q. 22. art. 4. disput. 45. sect. 5. §. Ad hanc difficultatem respondeo. that although the wicked cooperation of free choice is posterior in the genus of efficient cause to the absolute and efficacious volition of God, the cooperation of free choice is nevertheless prior in the aspect of term to the efficacious and absolute volition of God, inasmuch as from the foreknowledge of the cooperation of free choice, as flowing from the deficient will, the will of God is as it were contracted so as to be efficacious and absolute. By a similar reasoning, that although practical cognition, or cognition productive of its own object, is prior to its object in the genus of efficient cause; it is nevertheless posterior to the term in the genus of formal cause, because it is specified by the term.

But this doctrine is assailed with the same blows with which we impetuously attacked Suárez, in this ar. sub n. 62. Because that will, which is contracted by the knowledge of the cooperation of free choice, either is a will composed to concourse in first act only; and accordingly it would come to pass, that a determined cooperation of free choice could be conceived without the exercised concourse of the first cause. Or it is a will composed by exercised concourse; and accordingly it implies a contradiction, that it be conceived as indeterminate to either alternative, or as awaiting contraction from the operation of free choice as from a term, whether it be of knowledge or of the will of God.

Next, because if the divine will is contracted by the knowledge of the cooperation of free choice; I ask from which knowledge, whether absolute or conditioned? Not conditioned; because with the same author, in disp. 34. sectio. 2. § secundus modus. he asserts a decree conditioned only on the side of the object and not on the side of the act. The conditioned futures are known by God in an absolute free purpose on the side of the act, which is the reason of the determinate truth of such futures; and consequently those objections of his would be turned back against Machinus, that God, without regard to the knowledge of our cooperation, should predefine the material things of depraved acts by an efficacious decree on the side of the act, although conditioned on the side of the object.

Or the will of God is contracted by the knowledge of vision of the cooperation of free choice; and there would be inferred that absurdity which presses upon Suárez, namely, that the operation of free choice can be conceived in the being of absolute futurition, with dependence upon the sole will of God composed to either alternative in first act, and under that aptitudinal and signed comparison of causality, by which it is referred to other operations of free choice, which will never exist.

At length I add, against similar flights, that that occupation and shutting out is insurmountable, which we drew from Aureolus; namely, that there would follow, that the influx of free choice (which, since it is from God, is the action of God among the adversaries) either would proceed from God as determined to one side of the contradiction, and accordingly would not determine God even in the character of the term, as Machinus wills; since indeed any habitude of absolute futurition and existence in the term imbues an essential comparison of dependence upon a God not undetermined. Or if under some sign of nature the cooperation of free choice could be compared to God as an undeter mined principle towards either alternative; it would come to pass, that the action would issue from the agent as undeter mined in the sense of composition with respect to the action.

116 Next; the aforesaid author subjoins other pronounce ments concerning the foreknowledge of depraved acts, which, although they be true, yet do not appear so necessary for dispatching the matter. For he teaches in conclus. 1. that the decree of permitting sin, insofar as it imports a mere negation of special grace, furnishes a sufficient medium on the side of the object for the infallible foreknowledge of depraved acts; which, by reason of the gravity of temptation, cannot be avoided without special grace. Which assertion rests upon the common consent of theologians, asserting, that man in the state of fallen nature, agitated by the most troublesome temptation of the demon, would fall, unless he be prevented by the special help of God. Therefore, although permission does not imbibe a positive causality, which would premoveto the substrate of such a depraved action: on account of the merely permissive decree alone, which refers a mere negation of the bestowal of such special grace, the futurition of such oblique operation will be made infallible; and accordingly there will intervene that objective determination which is exacted for infallible foreknowledge, although the permissive decree holds itself merely negatively with respect to the object.

117 Machinus further adds, in his second assertion, that a permissive decree does not provide a medium on the side of the object for foreknowledge of sins that can be avoided without special aid. He also derives this from the common axiom of theologians: special grace is not necessary to avoid, in the divided sense, those sins where no grave assault of the devil presses. Therefore a permissive decree that involves the denial of assisting grace does not make the fall infallible once positive causality by way of premotion—which Machinus rejects—is excluded.

Wherefore we rightly premised, that the effort of Machinus is not to the purpose, while he labors that God, in the permissive decree with the negation of a special help, can foreknow the sins in which a more troublesome suggestion of the devil presses; but not those which are perpetrated without a grave incursion of the demon. Since in the present we investigate a universal medium on the side of the object of the foreknowledge of all futures; and Machinus assigns only a particular medium in the permission of sin with a grave invasion of the demon, but not with a light one.

ARTICLE VII

Whether the certitude of the foreknowledge of future things stands together with our liberty, according to the principles of Scotus?

SUMMARY.

The opinion of the recent ones; that the medium of foreseeing future things in the determination of the divine will does not stand together with liberty. Num. 1.

Other objections from Suárez against the conciliation of liberty with the extrinsic premotion of the absolute decree. Num. 7.

The placitum of Anthony of Corduba conciliating liberty with foreknowledge; for the reason that our operation is prior in nature than the absolute determination of God. Num. 12.

The placitum of Corduba is refuted; yet it is defended from the note of the error of the Semi-Pelagians; further, also, the vindication of Scotus from the teasing of Corduba. Num. 16.

The text of Scotus, and its transcription. Num. 19.

The accurate observation of Scotus explaining why the judgment of God is simply infallible, even though the object is brought forth absolutely, and is simply contingent as to being about to be, and not about to be? Numer. 28.

Response to the foundations of the adversaries against the conciliation of liberty with the foreknowing of Scotus. Nu. 32.

It is shown that that argumentation presses no more, by which he argues from the absurdity of injured liberty, given the priority from God in concursive premotion, than the denied priority of nature on the part of the action of free choice contracting, as it were, the potentiality of the divine will toward either alternative. Num. 36.

For the enervation of the last objection, it is weighed against Vázquez that the will does not necessarily follow a more expressive, or more tempered, proposition of the object. Num. 42.

What is the supernatural predetermination according to Scotus? and by which co-operating grace is it bestowed, intrinsic; or extrinsic? Nu. 48.

Satisfaction to the objections of Aureolus Hurtado and of the more recent ones asserting the action of God toward ad extra to be a created thing. Num. 50.

OMnes the Jesuit writers hold that the liberty of the created will cannot be conciliated with foreknowledge, if the unique medium of foreseeing future things be the determination of the divine will. For the reason that such determination, that it may be able to be asserted as a sufficient medium on the side of the object for foreseeing future things; ought to be an absolute proposition unimpededly destined toward the futurition of the act of the created will, not involving the hypothesis of the co-operation of the created will to be purified by the nod of the created will.

Which the adversaries have so constantly asserted, that they set aside, as a useless escape, the common doctrine of the ancient theologians, which seeks the concord between the acts of the divine preordination and the motions of the created will from the efficacious energy, and the strong and gentle motion, of the divine will; which excites our will so that it act infallibly, the right of its intrinsic indifference nevertheless being saved. According to that of Wisdom, chapter 8: Attingit à fine, vsque in finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suauiter. Where Lyranus: Disponit omnis suauiter, quia das omnibus creaturis formas, et inclinationes, per quas mouentur connaturaliter ad actus, et fines suos.

2 Wherefore Gabriel Vázquez 1. part. disp. 99. cap. 3. num. 7. when he had cited Saint Thomas, Durandus, Driedo, Opusculo de Concordia liberi arbitrij, et praedestinationis, and other ancient scholastic authors drawing the conciliation of the divine preordination with our will from the unimpedible energy of the divine will reaching, not only the motions of our will, but also the mode of their indifference and liberty; afterward under num. 8. asserts; that the aforesaid axiom of the ancient Theologians does not serve that the mouths of the reviling Neoterics be closed. Which he thus shows.

Because, that the will of God, or its executing faculty, be infinite, that likewise be directed by unbounded science; it cannot serve to this, that God effect that which involves implication. But it repugns, that God freely move the created will, if the absolute proposition of the divine will anticipate the foreknowledge of our cooperation: for it would already refer an antecedent supposition, which by our will could by no means be impeded, for the reason that it predecrees the absolute futurition of our assent, not involving the condition if the created will wills.

Therefore, just as it is implicative that, with the supposition of antecedent necessity, God freely concur to the acts of the created will; so also our liberty of cooperation contradicts the foreknowledge of God, if a unique medium of such foreknowledge be assigned, the absolute proposition of the divine will, not importing the condition, or hypothesis, of our cooperation, to be purified by the arbitrament of the created will.

3 That which has been asserted concerning the antecedent supposition is confirmed from Anselm to. 3. lib. de concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis. §. Quòd sit praedestinatio, et quòd praedestinatio nihil inferat necessitatis libero arbitrio. where he says. Pariter igitur quãuis necesse sit fieri, quae praescitutur, et quae praedestinãtur; quaedã tamẽ praescita, et praedestinata, non eueniũt ea necessitate, quae praecedit rem, et facit, sed ea, quae rem sequitur, sicut supra diximus. Nõ enim eã Deus, quãuis praedestinat facit voluntatẽ cogendo, aut voluntati resistendo, sed in sua illa potestate dimittendo.

From which words of Anselm the following objection is instructed against the opinion of Scotus. With Anselm that is the antecedent supposition infringing the rights of liberty which precedes the thing, and makes it: but that is the supposition not inferring necessity; which follows the thing. But the decree of God, inasmuch as it is the medium on the side of the object for foreseeing future things, precedes the objective immutation, which is drawn from the decree, in which with Scotus is placed the whole determination of the knowability, or truth, of the future; therefore such determination is the antecedent supposition inferring force upon the will.

Whence it is gathered; wherefore the foreknowledge of the future contingent according to the doctrine of Anselm ought not to be said with an antecedent supposition; as the determination of the divine will, which is asserted to be the reason of the whole truth and of the objective determination of the future contingent. For foreknowledge follows the thing in objective being, it does not precede the thing and make it, because it premits the objective immutation sought from the decree; and accordingly it is not the practical reason of the truth and determination of the future contingent, but rather the speculative intuition of that determination, which flowed forth from the absolute proposition of God.

On the contrary, indeed; the decree precedes the thing and makes it in willed being, according to the phrase of Scotus, or immutates the thing objectively with all determination to exist for such a difference of time; so that the decree supplies to science that object, which it effects in objective being determined, as it were, as the practical reason of such a determined knowability; therefore it is the antecedent supposition.

Nor does it avail to meet with the objection; that although the created will be fastened to one part of the contradiction in the composite sense, or from the hypothesis of the decree; yet it remains indifferent in the sense of division.

Because, as Vázquez objects z at the place cited under n. 13., it would be to slip into the error of Melanchthon and of the other innovators; which is, that they indeed repudiate the absolute necessity which Wycliffe ascribed to our works, yet they assert that, from the extrinsic definition of God, the rights and functions of free choice are impeded. Wherefore, although a predetermination of this kind be asserted, what reason of spontaneity can be defended, which is even found in the motions of brutes, and which the acts of free choice receive, Calvin calling it a servile will, and blaspheming, lib. 2. suarum institutionum, capi. 5. §. 14. et 15.? Yet the liberty of contrariety and contradiction, which must necessarily be sustained by Catholics, seems altogether banished from the functions of the created will.

4 But more subtly Scotus fights for Vázquez in 2. sent. dist. 37 q. 2. §. Ex prima via arguitur dupliciter, sub num. marg. 2. where, arguing for the opinion which Aureolus afterward followed, that God does not concur immediately to free operations; he also combats concursive premotion on behalf of Vázquez. Whence also I infer that which I have not once observed in contending against adversaries; that their arguments, (especially against concursive premotion determined to the matter of sin,) also assail the immediate concourse of God: so, therefore, has Scotus in the place cited.

» No power has perfectly in its power the effect, which cannot be caused by it immediately; nor by any other cause whose causation is not in the power of that power. But the causation of God is not in the power of the created will, as is plain; just as neither is the virtue of the superior agent in the power of the inferior agent: therefore if God necessarily concur immediately as the immediate cause with respect to the created volition, the created will does not fully have that volition in its power.

» The greater proposition assumed is plain; because that which has the effect perfectly in its power, either can, from itself alone, be toward it; or the causation of any concurrent is in its power, namely, that it causes it, or does not.

» An example from the intellect; which, if it concur to causing the volition, according to the third opinion of dist. 25. of this book, nevertheless does not cause except by the voluntary causing: so that its causation is in the power of the will.

But the force of the argumentation of Scotus consists in this; that if the created free choice would exert itself in free operations by the immediate concourse of God, such operations would not be free; for the reason that the immediate and exercised concourse of the first cause would not rather be in the hand of free choice, nor subjected to its motion, in respect of this, that such an influx could, by the arbitrament of the created will, be posited, or taken away, of in-esse and of fact.

Nor do Vázquez, Suárez, and their partisans escape the force of this proof; insofar as they assert that a concourse is prepared for free choice toward either alternative, and contractible by the nod and vote of the created will. Because, as we showed broadly and pressingly in the preceding article, the created will cannot so contract and determine the divine will, that such an exercised impulse of the created will, for any sign for which it is conceived as going forth from the created will, so as to determine the power of God, is also understood to hang upon God, as from a principle, and therefore from God as determined to such a species of action; since it is implicative that, from an agent, as actually acting, and composed to the action, the action proceed, if the agent, as in an exercised act, be indeterminate. Therefore, either the exercised impulse of the created will, which contracts the composition of the divine power toward such a species of influx, does not hang upon God immediately, as Aureolus willed; or if it hangs immediately upon God, it goes forth from him as determined to such a species of influx. And then the argumentation which we transcribed from Scotus presses; that it is not in the hand of the created free choice, that God concur immediately in this way or in that; and therefore neither could the impulse of the will, hanging upon the exercised concourse of the first cause, be free.

See how that argumentation, which assails concursive premotion from the absurdity of injured liberty, also with equal force assails the immediate concourse of God to all free operations: for which reason Scotus used that proof against the immediate concourse of God to all free operations.

Then, for the commentary on the proof of Scotus, this remains to be noted; that he used a sharp and acute instance of free operation, in that hypothesis, that intellection concur to eliciting the impulse of the will, as some hold, asserting; that the volition tending toward Peter do not go forth effectively from the will alone, but also from the intellection, and the express image of Peter.

With that opinion given, therefore the volition, or prosecution, of Peter would be free, because the express image of Peter would be subject to the nod of the will in respect of the effecting of such an impulsive prosecution; whence also Scotus aptly infers, that the operation of the will would not be free, if it hung immediately upon such a determined concourse of God, and such a concourse were not subject of in-esse or of fact, so that it could be taken away or posited by the arbitrament of the created will; since it implies that the divine will be contracted by the exercised created volition.

It is argued, third, for the antecedent supposition; which seems to burst forth from the doctrine of Scotus. Because the determination and causality of God, by the force of which either the act of our will is immutated objectively from eternity, so as to exist for such a difference of time; or in time he extracts the same acts from the eminence and virtuality of causes; that is, which would befit God for the same reason on the part of the effect, or of our cooperation, if God were an agent altogether necessary, and not free, as we showed above concerning the mind of Scotus; which clearly demonstrates, that God, according to the doctrine of Scotus, is not concerned with the laws of free choice, nor composed with the second cause for acting, intending the indemnity of the liberty of the created will.

For if God should prepare a concourse for free choice, as for a principle indifferent toward either alternative, and therefore not anticipating its determination, but rather involving the condition: Volo talem actum, si liberum arbitrium velit. Although God were an agent altogether necessary, the functions of free choice would not be injured, since he would decree nothing except by the vote and arbitrament of our will. Therefore, if on the contrary Scotus has asserted; that the second cause acts thus, as moved by God, that if God were a necessary mover, and not free, our will would act necessarily, and not freely; this demonstrates evidently, that the motion of God, as asserted by Scotus, is by no means concerned with the indifference of free choice toward either alternative, but rather that free choice is fastened to one part, as it were, with an iron force, by an antecedent necessity and supposition.

Nor do you escape the force of the argument by fleeing to extrinsic determination; that therefore the supposition of the decree ought not to be estimated as that antecedent supposition which prostrates the rights of liberty; for the reason that it is not the influx of some intrinsic form impressed upon our will, but only the extrinsic premotion of our will, which does not immutate the internal condition and indifference of operating in the will.

For that indeed seems said gratuitously; for the reason that to necessitate the inferior and subject powers, the immission, or impression, of some intrinsic virtue is not necessary; but the absolute and efficacious proposition of the will alone suffices, on account of the natural sympathy of the powers in operating. For the will, without the impression of some intrinsic form in the intellect, necessitates it, or captivates it by its sole precept, so as to render assent to the credible object: similarly it necessitates the locomotive power to motion, without the impression of something physical upon such a power.

But our will no less obeys God, nor is it less subjected to him, than the inferior powers are subjected to the will; therefore just as those are necessitated by the antecedent supposition, on account of the only extrinsic efficient statute of our will, so the created will is necessitated by the extrinsic decree of God, with an antecedent supposition and necessity.

Other objections from Suárez against the conciliation of liberty with the extrinsic premotion of the absolute decree.

It is argued, fourth, from Suárez in rei resolutione quaestionis de concursu, et efficaci auxilio Dei sub num. 13., which is contained in tomo opusculorum.

Because the assertors of physical premotion seem to raise the arcane forces of the helps of grace; and to measure the necessity of the helps not from the fragility of fallen nature, as the Fathers speak, so that from some general subordination of the second cause to the first, without necessity; we use the term of predetermination.

For we do not assert the necessity, as it were, of an adequate and formal predetermination toward good from perfection and the use of supernatural things; or from the debility, or proneness, of free choice toward evil; but we pronounce from the indetermination, and potentiality, of the second cause toward such an individuum of action, on account of which it necessarily postulates the contraction and determination of the divine will.

Whence it comes about, that the contraction of such potentiality be, as it were, the formal reason, and adequate, of constituting premotion; but the reason, as it were material, and inadequate, of the necessity of the supernatural help physically premoving the will, be sought from the elevated series of supernatural things; which necessarily demands even a motion of an order exceeding the bounds of the whole of nature.

So that if the premotion be not bestowed by the influx of some intrinsic form, but by the extrinsic volition of God, so as to exercise the office of causality toward ad extra of the divine executing faculty, as Scotus wills; the divine will, inasmuch as it moves and determines our will to acts above the forces of the whole of nature, be asserted as the supernatural help, or the extrinsic supernatural premotion of God. Wherefore, although the necessity of such premotion, as supernatural, be drawn from the condition of the supernatural agent; yet the adequate and formal reason demanding the premotion of God is the indetermination of the second cause toward such an individuum of action foreseen.

But this necessity would persist, even though human nature were not prone to evil; nor the will harassed by diabolical invasions; therefore the marvelous and recondite energy of the helps of grace, and the, as it were, formal necessity of supernatural premotion, is recalled into that physical assertion concerning the indetermination of the second cause with respect to such an individuum of action in preference to another: which, since it is doubtful and is disapproved by weighty theologians, seems to elevate the necessity and the majesty of the helps of grace.

8. Lastly it is argued; because the doctrine of Scotus concerning the predetermination of God, by the extrinsic form of his volition, seems to take away liberty, while it enervates the force of sufficient help; so that our will, without the premotion of the divine will, be left necessitated toward evil, while it does not obtain sufficient help toward good.

Which is opened rather thus; because the decree of God, as it is the principle of our supernatural cooperation, is so necessary for assenting, that although man be anticipated by the indeliberate motions of holy illuminations on the part of the intellect, and inspirations on the part of the will, he cannot by any means burst forth into assent; unless the absolute determination of God accede, by way of execution, or of the external use of the divine executing faculty, which would determine our will to assenting.

Therefore that anticipating grace, which is called sufficient, is not sufficient for operating without the absolute proposition of God, or the anticipating decree; and accordingly, while God does not premove our will to right operation by the absolute determination of his will, he, as it were, necessitates the will toward a depraved work; since he does not confer an expedited and proximate principle for acting rightly.

9. Nor does it avail to say; that although our will, without the motion of the divine will, does not actually operate good; yet it avails proximately for operating holily on account of the anticipation of sufficient help.

Because, as Suárez objects in the aforementioned brief resolution of the question concerning the concourse, and efficacious help of God, under num. 21. and 22. the aforesaid response involves implication. Because since God does not command man that he may be able to operate, but that he actually operate good; he ought to enrich with that virtue of operating, which confers proximately, not only toward being able, but also toward the exercise of the act: but since the composition for operating of sufficient help with the absolute will of God premoving toward supernatural cooperation is not subjected to the nod of man; thence it comes about that neither is it in the power of man to use sufficient help, as sufficient, or as composed to the divine will, so as to exercise the office of external causality, or motion.

Because he who neither has, nor can have, that which is necessarily required for operating actually, lacks not only the exercise of the operation, but also the moral, and proximate, power for effecting, although he may obtain some remote, fundamental, and physical power, such as that which is available to the power of vision for seeing, while it lacks light; and to fire for lighting, if it be deprived of divine concourse.

10 Wherefore, neither does it evacuate the force of the argument; that the premotion of the divine will, which we assert, does not pertain to being able to operate; but to actual cooperation. Whence it comes about that, to sufficient help not composed with the divine premotion, nothing is lacking for the proximate power, morally expedited, for acting; but only for actually operating.

For the aforesaid escape is barred by that instance of fire deprived of the actual influx of God for acting. Because although the actual concourse of God pertains to the exercise of the operation; yet the second cause is asserted to avail proximately to the act by the habitude, and connotation, of the divine influx offered to itself for acting; so that if God had denied such a concourse, fire would not be the principle proximately availing, or standing in the last readiness, for lighting.

But the concursive premotion which we asserted is not in the hand of the counsel of man; or it is not in the power of our will to compose sufficient help with that premotion by way of concourse, or of actual motion; therefore neither does man obtain sufficient help, while he is not given by God that extrinsic determination of the divine will, which exercises the office of external premotion.

11 Whence the Jesuit authors, that they may save the reason and operative virtue of sufficient help; defend that sufficient help ought to expect nothing of physical premotion, so as to operate actually: because otherwise it would come about, that in the will not cooperating, while sufficient help is not composed with physical premotion, that help would not be proximately, and morally, ready for the act, and therefore would not be sufficient help.

Wherefore they also asserted; that the virtue of the help ought to be such, that it be sufficient; that, with every parity in physical being given, (in respect of every virtue pertaining to the first act of operating, and to every gift really condistinct from the assent of the obeying will,) in the will resisting, and assenting to the vocation; one in fact resist, the other assent. Although that which obeys receive a greater benefit in the genus of morality; for the reason that it is given with a congruous vocation, or with the supernatural indeliberate motions of illuminations, and inspirations, from the conditioned foreknowledge of the future assent. But the rebellious will, although it have obtained a supernatural motion of equal physical intensity, is not esteemed given with such a vocation in moral being, or in the reason of benefit; for the reason that it has not received from God a congruous vocation, or from the foreknowledge of the future assent.

The placitum of Anthony of Corduba conciliating liberty with foreknowledge; for the reason that our operation is prior in nature than the absolute and efficacious determination of God.

12 Moved by the aforesaid reasons, our Anthony of Corduba, otherwise a theologian of good note, in the Theological Questionary libr. 1. quaestion. 55. dub. 10., where he inquires: Whether with the efficacious will of God, and with his concourse standing immediately and sufficient, but at the same time our liberty of will, and contingency in things, is posited; but the difficulty. But it is to be noted, secondly. He says, namely, that no conciliation of our liberty with the concourse and causality of God can even be assigned, unless we assert a free cause determining itself beforehand by nature, as regards the species and individuation of the act; so that the determination of the created will precedes by priority of nature the determination of God. For so the aforesaid author has it.

Our will not only modifies the universal divine will as to manner, so that it freely concur with it; but also determines it as to the species of acts, and as to the singular acts of the will. So that not first in the order of nature does the divine will (even from eternity) will, or determine itself, to concur actually at such a time with our will in the third sign for producing this or that particular act. Not first, I say; but after our will in the second sign has been foreseen, or foreknown, as about to determine itself at such a time to willing, or to nilling; or to producing this or that act.

Then in the second sign, and not before, the divine will determines itself from eternity to will to concur in the third sign, at such a time, with our will to those same particular acts, as often and whenever our will shall have willed; and to cease from such concurrence, as often and whenever it has been foreseen that it will freely cease. And the reason of this is: because unless God had from eternity decreed so to do, as has been said, our liberty of will together with the divine concurrence would by no means be well saved.

13 The doctrine which the aforesaid author extends to the works of grace, he thereby subverts. I say, secondly. Where he says:

So in the matter at hand God bears Himself toward us: for in the first sign He wills to move our will, and to give it virtue, and this operation of His is prior. In the second sign He wills to be determined in time by our will; and in this determination our will is prior. In the third sign, together are the concurrence of God, and the operation of our will, and the act; as was said above.

And the same holds of the concurrence of the special divine help to the works of grace, or supernatural works, and to loving God above all things, where the aforesaid three signs are to be posited in His concurrence with our will, so that all things may be well understood.

14 But I judge that Anthony of Corduba consequently opined that our determination precedes by priority of nature the absolute purpose of the divine will; supposing that he maintained that the divine will is composed to operate with the created will, involving the condition, if the latter will. For as often as two agents so agree to operate that the one does not begin to act except at the wish and arbitrament of the other; then the other cause, the condition being discharged, must be judged to operate by priority of nature; inasmuch as it contracts the potentiality and indetermination of the other; and accordingly bears itself as the quo, and as the reason of the contraction of the other, as a co-cause. On which we speak at length and expressly in ar. 5 of this distinction, from nu. 20 to 24.

Wherefore, if it were true that the will of God does not contract the created will as regards the species and individuation of the act; but, on the contrary, that the divine will is determined by our will; then the priority of nature would also have to be sustained on the side of the determination of the created will, as is clear from those things which we seriously weighed in the preceding ar. 6, under nu. 61 and 62.

But if the divine and the created will concur equally first to the free operation, without any presupposition of a sign of nature, or of a quo; no reason appears why it should rather be asserted that the divine will is contracted, or determined, by the created will, than, on the contrary, that the created will is by the divine? Since neither can bear itself as the quo, or as the reason of the contraction of the other; for as much as it is established in all philosophy that that is prior by nature to another which bears itself as the quo, and as the reason of the other, in some grade of being, or series of causing.

15 Then again, there is also inferred from what has been said that there is retorted against the Jesuit writers, (supposing that they deny a priority of nature on the side of the determination of the created will,) that objection which they magnify, and on which they principally rely for disapproving the opinion of Scotus: namely, that our will would not be a free principle of its own determination, if the motion of God were prior by nature to the determination of our will; for the reason that such predeterminative causality would not be beneath the nod of free choice, nor in the hand of its counsel.

For the same reason fights against the adversaries, supposing that the determination of the creature is not prior by nature to the concurrence of God; because if God and the creature equally first influence the free act, then there is no stronger reason why the divine will should be asserted to be contracted to such a species and individuum of action by the created will, than, on the contrary, the created will by the divine will? And accordingly, the will of God would not be subjected to the nod of the created will, if the divine will, as contracting itself at will to such a species and individuum of action, did not follow our determination as preceding it, and as discharging the conventional application, or the condition of operating in such a way, if the created will wills. On which shortly below, in the answer to the arguments, under number 28 of this article.

The placitum of Corduba is refuted; yet he is defended from the note of the Semi-Pelagian error; further, also, the vindication of Scotus from the teasing of Corduba.

16 Moreover, the assertion of Corduba concerning our operation preceding by priority of nature the determination of God, we premise as manifestly refuted in the preceding ar. 6, under nu. 61 and 62. Because, as we there showed, if our determination could be prior by nature to the actual and exercised determination of God, it would come about that, with a merely aptitudinal and signed termination of the divine will, and one that had been present to God concerning objects which can never be understood to be loved as created, the object would be not only objectively unchanged as regards its own absolute loving, but also truly and really placed outside the act, and virtually and eminently in the manner of causes; which, as being absurd, we cut away in like measure at the place cited, and especially under num. 62.

Then again, the aforesaid opinion is specially impugned in supernatural acts. For although Corduba manifestly confesses that our will, determining itself beforehand by nature to supernatural operations, presupposes prevenient grace, through indeliberate supernatural motions of illuminations and inspirations; yet, according to his principles, he must assert that the determination of our will is prior by nature to the will of God as it is the principle of cooperating grace; and accordingly prior also to cooperating grace itself.

Inasmuch as he conciliates liberty with grace, and with the concurrence of God, to supernatural acts by no other reason than that our will first by nature contracts itself to such a species and individuum of influence, which seems in some way to derogate from cooperating grace. For since our will, in order to consent, or to cooperate, needs not only exciting but also cooperating grace, it is therefore falsely asserted that, for some sign of nature, the supernatural cooperation of our will can be conceived with a mere relation to exciting grace, without an immediate and exercised dependence upon cooperating grace.

Then we attack Corduba, (as also Vázquez, Herice, and the other Jesuit authors, who deny the predefinition of supernatural operations against Suárez and others who admit it,) from Corduba's own pronouncements. In the second sign he wills to be determined in time by our will, and in this determination our will is prior. And from the following. And the same holds of the concurrence of the special divine help to the works of grace, or supernatural works: from which I here press the Cordubans, thus affected. Because if the divine will does not absolutely predefine supernatural operations, but is only composed conditionally with free choice into a concourse contractible, at the arbitrament of our will, to good or to evil, to a natural and to a supernatural act; so that, the composition of the divine power to concurrence in the first act being premised, and the apparatus of exciting and prevenient grace, which precedes the second act of the cooperation of the created will, being at hand; the will and power of God are still understood to import a composition to a concurrence conditionally contractible at the nod and wish of the created will, and therefore to be purified by the cooperation of free choice, operating well or ill, naturally or supernaturally.

Therefore, since the cause taking away and purifying the condition is prior to the other concausa, which only conditionally composes itself to the concourse contractible at the nod of the other as comprincipiate, it would follow that free choice and its cooperation, as bursting forth from free choice, would be the ratio of contracting God's will and power — from itself indeterminate — to exercise and efficacious influx; whereas, before the science of the cooperation of the created will, as actually effluent from free choice, it is conceived only as indifferent to either, and in first act contractible at the arbitrament of the created will to a good or evil act, natural or supernatural.

Therefore, just as it is ascribed to the liberty of the will that it contracts God's will and His power — indeterminate of themselves — to concurring in works good or evil, natural or supernatural, in such wise that the operation of free choice, as effluent from its liberty, purifies the conditional composition of the divine power for bestowing supernatural concourse, or cooperating grace, if free choice wills; it will come about, then, that the human will obtains cooperating grace from its own liberty, and not conversely that grace is rather the ratio on account of which it obtains liberty of supernatural operation — against the famous saying of Augustine, from Tom. 7, book De correptione et gratia, ch. 8; which text of Augustine we shall transcribe and explain below, in the following distinction on conditional foreknowledge, art. 4, On the causality and conditional necessity of foreknowledge, marginal nums. 11 and 12.

Wherefore we have always deemed the aforesaid pronouncement of the Corduban improbable, since from it flow these less-proved assertions: Because I believe, God wills me to believe; because I yield to the supernatural excitation, God wills me to assent by concomitant or cooperating grace.

17 Yet, though these things are so, nor can we acquiesce in those who lash the Corduban more sharply than is due, fastening on him the note of Semi-Pelagian error. Since it is far from Semi-Pelagianism that the aforesaid author asserts; for although supernatural operation, by a priority of nature, precedes the determination of the divine will as the principle of cooperating grace, he has always professed Catholicly that no instant in Quo, that is, of duration, can be assigned in which supernatural cooperation exists without God's willing cooperation through grace toward supernatural assent.

Wherefore they wander entirely from the sky who ascribe to the Corduban the lapse of the Semi-Pelagians, since these expressly asserted that an act of the mere order of nature is the positive disposition on whose regard God bestows the gifts of exciting and cooperating grace. On which we treat at length in the general controversy on predestination, inquiring whether the works of free choice alone are the cause of our predestination. But on the Corduban, cleared of the note of error, read Vázquez at the place cited, 1. p. disp. 99. cap. 5, where under num. 28 he recites many authors subscribing to the Corduban.

18 But, while we vindicate the Corduban from the note of censure, we cannot but charge him with a trifling and intemperate license in carping at Scotus; for thus the Franciscan — himself a Corduban — falls upon the Subtle Doctor of the Franciscan order, the literary antesignanus, under §. Secundo ex supra dictis, where he says:

From what was said above the falsity, or insufficiency, of the opinion of Scotus is plain, who says; that the divine intellect, turned toward the divine will, and seeing it determined; thence clearly and determinately knows all future contingents, and our volitions freely future, before they are.

But that this is false, at least as regards the knowledge of our future volitions, is proved. For, as is plain from what has been said, our will in that second sign determines the divine will, and is prior to it thus determined; and yet then, and even before, that present and future determination of our will is known by the divine intellect: therefore that clear and determinate knowledge of our volitions, future contingents, does not depend upon, nor is it had from, a subsequent determination of the divine will.

From these it manifestly appears how sluggishly Corduba attacks Scotus; since without proof he assumes that which Scotus often explodes as altogether false; namely, that the divine will is contracted by our will to the species and individuation of acts; whereas we have shown more than once that the opposite is the mind of Scotus, and of his ancient followers.

Then, without any impugnation, confidently and sleepily he censures in Scotus that which is received by his whole school; namely, that future contingents of the acts of the created will do not obtain determinate knowability, or truth, before the absolute determination of the divine will. For although they can be conceived by the divine intellect before the decree as neutral with respect to truth, or falsity, (at the nod of the will of God prestituting one part of the contradiction,) or as indeterminate to being, or not being, about to be; yet not as contracted to one part of the contradiction.

From which principle we produce with the best consequence: that our cooperation cannot be prior by nature to the absolute determination of God, (as Corduba willed,) if our determination could in no way be foreknown by God before the absolute volition of God, so as to excite God to undertake such a determination; and accordingly neither could the foreknowledge of our determination be the reason why God contracted the community, or as it were the potentiality, of His will to such a species of influence.

The text of Scotus, from which we draw the reason for conciliating liberty with foreknowledge, and it is weighed, that a necessity de inesse stands together with an absolute and simpliciter contingency.

Scotus, in 1. Sententiar. distinct. 39. quaest. unica, where he treats of the knowledge of future contingents, under the fourth quaesitum, inquires: Whether God necessarily knows every condition of existence; and then under the fifth quaesitum he asks: Whether with the determination of His knowledge there can stand some contingency on the part of things in existence? But of these two doubts I do not transcribe the whole text, but only submit, as is my custom, those fragments which either contain a special doctrine, or call for discussion. Thus, then, Scotus has it, objecting against his own opinion. §. To the fourth question I argue, sub n. 5, where he says.

Moreover; whatever can be in God, can be the same as God; and consequently God. But whatever can be God, is God of necessity; because God is immutable: therefore whatever can be in God, is God of necessity. But to know A can be in God; therefore it is God of necessity, and consequently He knows A by simple necessity.

20 Moreover, every perfection simply absolute is in God of necessity; but to know A is a perfection simply; because otherwise God would be imperfect, if He did not formally know A; and He would not be imperfect except on account of the lack of a perfection simply: therefore He necessarily knows A.

21 Then, against the fifth quaesitum, Scotus objects thus. §. To the fifth question sub n. 6, where he argues against the conciliation of liberty and foreknowledge.

Moreover, everything known by God to be going to be will necessarily be: A is known by God to be going to be: therefore, etc. The major is true as it is of the necessary, since the predicate is in the subject of necessity. But the minor is of simple inesse, because true for all eternity; hence the conclusion follows of the necessary.

22 Which objections Scotus diluted. On the arguments of the fourth question, where he has:

To the second proof I say: that in the understood, or willed esse, which of itself is secundum quid, it is not necessary that every possibility which contradicts necessity ex se formally should conclude muta-bility. For that esse is not real esse, but is reduced to the esse of some real being neces-sary in itself; on account of the necessity of which other, muta-bility cannot be here.

And yet the necessity of that other does not of itself befit this one formally; therefore this is not ex se formally neces-sary; because it has not the esse of an extremity, which it refe-rences really. Nor yet is it mutable, be-cause according to that diminished esse it references an immutable extremity; and mu-tation in a thing, inasmuch as it references another, cannot be without mutation in that other.

23 To the third I say: that no perfe-ction simpliciter in God depends on a cre-ature; nor yet does simple necessary esse of itself require a creature in any esse whatever.

And therefore that God know B, as it is under-stood not only to know absolutely, but also as it passes over B itself, is not a perfection simpliciter; but a perfection sim-pliciter with an addition which necessarily accom-panies a perfection simpliciter. Then I say: that the major of that argument is true of the perfection of that science taken abso-lutely; but thus the minor is false, etc.

24 To the arguments of the fifth question I say: that that mixture avails nothing unless that minor be of simple inesse; and this not only that it be true for every time, but that it be necessarily true.

*Et quòd hoc requiratur, patet in ista instantia; omne quiescens de necessi-tate non mouetur; lapis in centro terrae est quiescens: ergo de necessitate non mouetur. Conclusio non sequitur: et ta-men minor semper est vera, non ta-*men necessariò vera.

Ita est in proposito; licet illa minor de inesse sit simpliciter vera, non tamen est necessariò vera; potest enim Deus non scire A, sicut potest non velle A, propter cotingentiam, quae primò est in voluntate ad obiecta secundaria, et ex hoc concomi-tanter in intellectu, sicut prius exposi-tum est.

25 On which letter of Scotus, and for conciliating the infallibility of the divine foreknowledge with the liberty of our coop-eration, it is to be observed from the text which we propose under num. 23, that the science of vision (and the same holds of the free act of the divine will), as it is re-garded as importing a predicate uvable, and intrinsic, of the form apprehend-ing and pursuing the object, and as such, is a necessary form in God — not only speaking of de inesse necessity, or ex suppositione, but even of necessity sim-pliciter; for the reason that free vision and appetition considered intrinsically are the very substance of the Deity, and accordingly pre-carry in their esse the same necessity which the quiddity of God, necessary by es-sence, imbibes.

If, however, vision and free vo-lition be considered as they connote that termination of them to the object, which as it flowed into God li-berally, so it also could not be; while as such it imports only the connotation of the extrinsic extremity, that is, of the object of such science, or of free vo-lition, so it expresses that same necessity which the object imports, which is the only necessity de inesse or ex hypothesi, yet not absolute and simpliciter.

Wherefore, just as that enunciation: Peter will answer the vocation, passes from neutral, or indeterminate, to being about to be, or not about to be, to determinately being about to be, on account of the objective mutation which accrues to it from the decree; and that mutation is only necessary de inesse, yet not simpliciter and absolutely, inasmuch as it could have not been about to be, if God had prestituted the opposite part of the contradiction; for example: Peter as not about to answer the vocation: hence it comes about that the knowledge and volition of God, as it puts on termination to the future object, is not more necessary than is the futurity of that very same object. Wherefore, just as the futurity of that thing, or the objective mutation to being about to be, is only necessary ex hypothesi, and not simpliciter; so the knowledge of God, as it expresses termination to the object, is necessary only ex hypothesi, yet not absolutely and simpliciter. For the reason that just as Peter, objectively changed to assent, could absolutely and simpliciter have dissented, so also God so foreknows Peter as about to assent, that He could have foreknown him as not about to assent, if God had preordinated the opposite concerning the assent of Peter. Hence it comes about that neither the knowledge, nor the free volition, which affords the medium of foreknowing future things, imports necessity into things; since it claims for itself only that necessity de inesse, and ex hypothesi, which the things themselves, destined as congruent to futurity, carry together with an absolute, and simpliciter, indifference to the opposite.

26 From what has been said is drawn the legitimate interpretation of the text proposed under num. 22, where Scotus had asserted that the thing, inasmuch as it has esse cognitum and volitum (which, according to Scotus's phrase, sounds nothing other than what, according to the common mode of speaking, is called objective esse with a habitude to a determinate existence for such a difference of time) imports necessity, and immutability — not simpliciter, and primary, but secondary, or accessary — for the reason that there accrues to the created being, by the decree, objectively, the immutable thing, mutating in its own right, an immutability and necessity not simpliciter, but ex hypothesi.

Which those words of Scotus sufficiently untangle: Nor yet is it mutable; be-cause according to that diminished esse it references an immutable extremity; mutation in a thing, inasmuch as it references another, cannot be without mutation in that other.

Where he demonstrates that objective esse (which he calls diminished, for the reason that it is not being simpliciter and really existent, but only objectively mutated so as to exist for some difference of time) acquires an immutability de inesse and secundum quid — because if that diminished esse, or the objective esse destined to be, were mutated into not being about to be, then also the absolute proposal of the divine will would be subjected to mutation, which kindles the thing under that objective mutation, which is asked of the decree.

27 It is to be noted further, in the text under num. 21, that in order to dilute that opposition which Scotus had formed against the conciliation of liberty and foreknowledge — which was such: Everything known by God to be going to be will necessarily be: A is known by God to be going to be (for instance, that Petrus will consent to the vocation); therefore Petrus will neces-sarily respond to the vocation — in order to escape and lay flat that aforesaid attack, he constituted the best constituting rule: that no mixture of premises, one of simple necessity simpliciter and the other necessary only ex hypothesi or de inesse, concludes a necessity simpliciter in the conclusion; but he demands necessity simpliciter in both premises, that the conclusion come out simpliciter necessary.

Which Scotus elucidates by the aforesaid instance: Omne quiescens de necessitate non mouetur; lapis in centro terrae est quiescens; ergo de necessitate non mouetur. Conclusio non sequitur, et tamē minor semper est vera, non tamen necessaria vera.

Where his point is, that the conclusion inferring that the stone is not moved of necessity simpliciter does not obtain, because that minor — the stone in the center of the earth is at rest — imports necessity not simpliciter but de inesse, that is, ex hypothesi. That is: while the stone is in the center, it is not moved; because nev-ertheless absolutely and simpliciter it can be drawn out from the center, and so absolu-tely and simpliciter it can fail to be at rest.

So in the case at hand (says Scotus): although that minor of inesse (for instance, Petrus will respond to the vocation) be simpliciter true, yet it is not necessarily true; for God can fail to know A (for instance, that Petrus will consent to the vocation) as He can fail to will A (namely, the assent of Petrus), on account of the contingency which is first in the will and concomitantly in the intellect.

Because, since with Scotus there is no other ratio of determinate scibility in a future cōtingent than the objective mutation which flows from the decree; just as God, objectively mutating Petrus to assent by a determination de inesse, availed to mutate the same Petrus to dissent, so that enunciation about the future, Petrus will consent, which is true de inesse, could absolu-tely and simpliciter have failed to acquire a determinate truth and scibility, and consequently have been not fore-known by God; although it is necessarily fore-known in the sense of composition, or ex hypothesi of the decree, just as the enunciation is determinate ex hypothesi and de inesse.

A careful observation of Scotus, explaining why the judgment of God is simpliciter infallible, even though the object is granted absolutely and simply contingent to being about to be, and about not to be?

28 BUT you oppose against Scotus: that the proposition about a future contingent will be so de inesse that absolutely and simpliciter it could have failed to be; therefore also the foreknowledge of God, although in the sense of composition it be true, could nev-ertheless have been falsified, on account of the mutation of the object.

It is answered: that then a judgment is falsified when, the same termination of the judgment to the object remaining, the object is otherwise than the complexion expresses it. Yet, given that supposition — that Petrus, objectively mutated de inesse to assent, should dissent (as absolutely and simpliciter is possible, although in the sense of composition it be implicatory) — just as then the termination of the decree and of the science of God would be other, to a distinct object, namely to dissent; so neither could deception or falsification creep into that very termination of the divine will on account of the mutation of the object. For other indeed would be the termination of the divine will.

For in that supposition, just as the free ordination of the divine will, which supplies to the foreknowledge the medium of perceiving the future contingent, would not have decreed the assent of Petrus but his dissent; so also the science of vision would not have terminated in assent but in dissent; and consequently it could not be deceived either, because it would not be the same termination of the science to an object otherwise disposed, but a distinct termination to a diverse object.

29 Scotus resolved the matter with wondrous erudition in the aforesaid dist. 39, sole question, sub num. 27, §. similis est ratio in mixtione de contingenti, et de inesse, where he says:

For it does not follow: God cannot be deceived; and A can fail to be about to be; therefore God does not know A to be about to be. But it follows: that He does not necessarily know A to be about to be.

Which is apparent, because if my intellect always followed the mutation in the thing, so that with you sitting I were of the opinion you sit, and with you rising, that you rise, it could not be deceived. And yet from these: you sit for A, and I cannot be deceived, it does not follow; therefore I necessarily know you to sit for A.

So in the case at hand: although the divine intellect does not follow things as the effect does the cause, yet there is there the concomitant, that just as the thing can fail to be, so the divine intellect can fail to know; and therefore it never follows that the divine intellect knows the thing otherwise than it is; and therefore those requisites for deception can never stand together.

But just as the known thing can be, so God can know it; and just as the known thing can fail to be, so God can fail to know it, and if it will not be, He does not know it.

30 From what has been established of the mind of Scotus, we produce the best rationale for conciliating liberty with the free acts of the will, and the divine science, in this way.

The science and will of God, as they undergo a free termination to contingent objects, do not bear necessity simpliciter, but only ex hypothesi and de inesse; therefore neither do they import necessity simpliciter, but only in the composite sense of the motion of concourses, which does not take away the functions of free choice. The antecedent is patent from the words of Scotus trans-cribed under n. 24.

Although that minor of inesse be simpliciter true, yet it is not necessarily true; for God can fail to know A, as He can fail to will A, on account of the conti-ngency which is first in the will toward secondary objects, and on this account concomitantly in the intellect, as was exhibited before. Ex which pronouncement of Scotus, elucidated by us under n. 27, I form the following proof.

For although the science and will of God, inasmuch as they express the intrinsic predicates of apprehensive and appetitive vitality, imbibe in their esse the same necessity which the very substance of the Deity imports; yet as they involve an extrinsic termination to contingent objects, they connote only that necessity of not-being, and ex hypothesi, which the things themselves pre-carry to their immutable futurity. But such a determination is only de inesse of the actual concourse, and in the sense of composition, premising the preparation of the motion of God to either in first act; and not a contraction pertaining to the order of power, or by the mode of a first act, as we have laid open in the foregoing; therefore free choice is necessitated only in the composite sense, or ex hypothesi of its cooperation and the pre-notification of the con-course, which does not come before that very prior assent by a priority of separation, yet not from the presupposition of some form, or quasi-form of acting, which would contract in the sense of division, or of separation from the act, by which free choice exercises itself and unfolds into the second act.

Which rationale of conciliating liberty with predetermination Peter of Lorca hands on, 1. 2. tom. 2. sect. 6. de Gratia. disp. 21. under §. Explicatur concordia libertatis cum auxilio efficaci, where he has:

It is not to be deemed that this aid is some quality by way of a first act determining the will, as certain men philosophizing perversely say. For this would take away liberty. Because, under whatever rationale the will be understood as determined before the operation itself, liberty is taken away, no less than if it operated in sleep; but this aid is an actual motion to operation, which constitutes nothing in the will but the very action; which, however, is from God previously, not by a priority of the instant in which, but of the agent from which. Since, therefore, this aid does not determine the will through anything other than through the operation itself, it induces no other necessity than that which actual operation is wont to import, which is that whereby that which is, when it is, is of necessity. But this is necessity secundum quid, which by no rationale is opposed to contingency; otherwise no act would be free; for whenever the will operates, this necessity is induced by the operation itself, and by it is determined to one. So far Peter of Lorca.

Where, about those words Necessitas operatione ipsa inducitur, and likewise about their antecedents, cùm igitur hoc auxilium non per aliud determinet voluntatem quã per operationem ipsam, it is to be observed that, if the aforesaid author should wish that under the name of aid, or of divine motion, there be understood the very operation of our will as from God — by which rationale the action of God would not differ, before understanding, from the operation of the creature — such a mode of predetermining does not smile on us physically. For we judge it implicatory that the second act of created free choice should physically and really premote its own principle, so as to effect really and physically the same second act, as proceeding from free choice. On which we treated in this distinction, on the science of absolutes of contingents, art. 2, under marginal num. 7 and 26.

If, however, by the predetermination of God concurring is understood that concursive premotion which is pre-carried by the divine volition inasmuch as it performs the office of action and concourse to the outside; such pretermination is sustained of the mind of Scotus, who asserted that the action of God is His volition as terminated to the outside. In which we also have Saint Thomas concurring, as is patent from that testimonial transcribed by us in this dist. art. 1, under marginal num. 12, where we also showed that the real presence of the created term from eternity, which certain latter-day Thomists produce, is not gathered, for the reason that with Saint Thomas the action of God is the very eternal substance of the Deity.

31 But you object: that in the aforesaid proof we take as certain the very point over which the chiefest dissertation with the adversaries intercedes; since we call it necessity secundum quid, which with them is seriously asserted to be necessity simpliciter, and the antecedent, not the consequent, supposition; for the reason that with us the volition of God, which does not involve the hypothesis of the cooperation of the created cause — to be purified by free choice — but absolutely pre-establishes the futurity of the acts of our will, affords the medium of foreknowing futures. But this is the supposition of the cause, and which is not subjected to the nod of free choice; therefore it is the antecedent supposition; or, with Anselm, that is the antecedent supposition which is the supposition of the cause.

It is answered that, as is patent from what we have drafted at length in the preceding article, since the divine determination, contracting our will to one part of contradiction, presupposes the concourse of God in first act expedited to contraries and contradictories — therefore it is far from taking away the power simpliciter to either, so much the rather it contracts free choice, arrayed close at hand to either, by way of actual cooperation. But that the determination of God, by way of concourse, is not subjected to the secondary cause as purifying the condition of cooperating if the created will wills, so that it can be posited or removed de inesse and de facto at the arbitrament of the created will: that pertains to the majesty and independence of the first cause, and further to the condition essential of participated being; otherwise the first cause would not be first, but rather a created cause taking away or purifying the condition. Moreover, the exercised operation of free choice, which would purify the condition of the divine power only conditionally applied, would not be understood to issue from God at least in that first sign of the purification, and contraction of the divine power conditionally applied; as we demonstrated from Aureolus in the preceding article.

Answer to the foundations of the adversaries against the conciliation of liberty with the determination of the first cause, according to the sense of Scotus.

32 WHEREFORE to the first argument of Vázquez we say: that the supposition of the divine volition pre-establishing one part of contradiction, at the same time in that very instant in Quo, that is, of duration, with the created will, and the concourse offered and expedited to either, is not the antecedent supposition which would hurt liberty; otherwise the will also about bestowing the concourse to such a determined act would impede the functions of free choice; that this is false is abundantly enough established from what was said against Vázquez in the preceding article from number 101 up to 103, and will stand also from what is to be said below; although the will to concur in the exercised act imports a determined concourse.

33 To the second argument, from Anselm: that there, under the name of the antecedent supposition which he condemns, he understands the supposition of a form, which would precede the thing by way of a first act, fastening our will to one part of contradiction; he did not, however, reject the form of the divine volition, determining the created will extrinsically by way of concourse; otherwise Anselm would also expel as contrary to liberty the volition of God, not premoving, but bestowing the exercised and contracted concourse — since this volition does not follow the thing (as Anselm speaks) but rather makes the thing; and the volition of bestowing the exercised concourse cannot be the decreed composing a concourse, indetermi-nate, to various species, as we showed under n. 38.

Whence, to the objectional instance, we discriminate the difference which intercedes between the decree, which is the ratio of the practical truth and determination of the future contingent, and the science of vision, which is the merely spec-ulative intuition of the same truth.

We say that we confess the disparity, as to the point that the free determination of God does not premise the truth of the future contingent, as the science of vision presupposes it; but we deny that the supposition of the decree, by way of concourse, suffices for importing a force absolutely and simpliciter upon the will, if there is premised the proximate expedition of free choice in the ratio of first act to either.

To the other instance, which Vázquez brings from the lapse of the heretics insinuating that we are driven to evil by the extrinsic good-pleasure of God. We say that the heretics reject the proximate power to either of our will, and also the expedited apparatus of the divine concourse in first act to contraries and contradictories before the exercised influx, and in the sense of division or of separation from the second act. Wherefore they most shamelessly call free choice servum arbitrium, and driven or fastened to such operation, for the reason that before the exercised operation God would not be at hand to the created will for the opposite; but they asserted free choice to be necessitated in first act from an extrinsic principle. We, however, Catholicly sustain the proximate array of free choice to either, as also the expedition of the divine concourse in first act to either before the entrance of the exercise upon one part of contradiction, as is patent from what was said in the preceding article under num. 105.

Moreover, because the Adversaries cavil that the predetermination of the concourse by the absolute proposal of God favors Calvin; let them know that they may thus be re-challenged, inasmuch as from the pronouncement they deny — that liberty stands with the will of God antecedently efficacious to the act — the following assertions burst forth. Liberty does not stand with the will of God antecedently efficaciously moving; but in man there is true liberty: therefore in God is not admitted a will proueniens efficax. The conclusion is that of Pelagius; but the minor is of faith — namely, that free choice is given; whence it appears to be inferred that the major proposition is not to be admitted.

Similarly from that major proposi-tion, Liberty does not stand with the Divine will antecedently and efficaciously moving: thus it can be argued for Calvin. Liberty of created choice does not stand with the divine will premoving antecedently and efficaciously; but God excites the created will by eficacious preventing grace: therefore free choice is not given.

The conclusion is that of Calvin; the minor is of faith; therefore the major proposition cannot absolutely be admitted.

More sharply John of Saint Thomas descends upon the Adversaries, transferring a fragment of the disputation held before the Supreme Pontiff, and by him assigned to the judges of this controversy; as is to be seen with the aforesaid author, 1. par. quaest. 14. disp. 20. ar. 7. — but in this matter we must speak temperately and cautiously.

34 To the third argument it is patent from what was premised in art. 5 of this distinct. from num. 32 up to 34 inclu-sively, where at length we showed that if God did not absolutely pre-establish the motion of our will, but offered a concourse contractible at the wish and arbitrament of the created will — even though God were a necessary agent, the created will could yet operate freely. There also we treated that our will, in that hypothesis in which it would be necessitated by God, would be otherwise disposed on the side of the actual influx — both as to the physical and intrinsic mutation of the act, and as it behaves now, when it freely flows — although otherwise disposed on the side of the first act; and also as to the second act, on account of the moral and extrinsic dissimilitude which the necessary act, or the freely elicited one, expresses. But how with these the liberty of our cooperation stands, we referred there: see those pages, lest we be compelled to inculcate the same things.

To the confirmation. It is answered: that God, by His extrinsic will, without the intrinsic mutation of the created will, could necessitate it, or affix it in the first act to one part of the contradiction; (if He should immediately supply by His own power the effective causality of that quality of the species of a power, which in the first act would drive, or affix, the created will to one part of the contradiction;) but in that hypothesis God would not expedite the concourse in the first act, bestowed upon contraries and contradictories, as in fact He furnishes it. And accordingly God premoving our will by way of the second act greatly differs from the motion of the created will while it captivates the intellect to assenting to the credible object, or necessitates the locomotive power to motion. For the will so conquers and binds the powers subject to it, that it does not offer, through a free proposal, the motion to either in the first act and in the sense of division, as the divine will, by force of a free decree, prepares and expedites the concourse in the first act, indifferent to contraries and contradictories before the exercised influx; because although free choice is determined by God, yet it is contracted by that very concursive motion, and therefore the power is not contracted to the opposite before the cooperation exercised upon one part of the contradiction.

But if you obtrude that hypothesis in which the created will, by its own free proposal, would expedite the motion to the subjacent powers to either; and afterward through another decree would affix the powers, and quasi-captivate them to one of the opposites.

161 Respondetur, omnino commentitiam esse apparationem huiusmodi motionis voluntatis respectu subiectarum potentiarum, quae cum non sint agentia libera,sed necessaria, non vẽdicãt compositionẽ imperij volũtatis ad vtrumlibet, sed ad determinatum actum sibi ab imperio voluntatis praescriptum.Deinde quòd cùm voluntas contrahat subditas potentias prout sunt in actu primo,vel in sensu diuisionis,vel separationis talium potentiarum ab exercitio suarum operationum;si voluntas appararet motionem ad vtrumlibet,et etiam per imperium contraheret determinatè ad vnum,darentur duo proposita ex aequo pugnãtia circa potentias subditas,vt existunt in actu primo, et in statu diuisionisetseparationis ab operatione exercita;quod est implicatorium, et chymaericum. Quod aliter sit in compositione potentiae diuinae cum libero arbitrio creato ad vtrũlibet in actu primo(quae compositio attinet ad actum primum,dum liberum arbitrium existit diuisum ab exercitio cooperationis) et in praemotione concursiua, quae non contrahit nisi in sensu compositionis ad operationem exercitam, et ideò non contradicit apparationi cõcursus ad vtrumlibet in actu primo,et in sensu diuisionis.

162 35 To the fourth argument, from n. 7, we say: if it had any weight, it would strike even the adversaries, since they seek the congruity of the vocation from the preparation of the concourse of God with a conditional foreknowledge of consent. Which manner of reasoning, taken over in that whole universality of influx that abstracts from natural and supernatural causality, agrees even to our will, even though it had lapsed into evil; nay, it is in fact found in the influx of God to acts of the natural order's honesty from the foreknowledge of consent; and, further, it could be extended to the concourse toward the matter of wicked acts from the conditional foreknowledge of our cooperation as well.

163 Wherefore, just as Suárez does not trace out the congruity of the vocation of the preventive supernatural aid back to the sole preparation of the concourse of God with the foreknown cooperation of the created will, but to such a rationality of operating supernaturally from the foreknowledge of our cooperation; so also we, although we do not seek the concursive premotion as such, insofar as it prescinds from the natural and supernatural premotion of the order, from the fragility of fallen nature or from the condition of the supernatural principle, but from the rationality of the participated agent, that is, the second cause; yet the supernatural premotion we measure from the indigence and lability of nature for overcoming the assaults of the demon and for the elevation of the series of supernatural operation.For the dilution of the last objection it is shown, that no less does it press as a violation of liberty, with the priority (à Quò) between the concourse of God and the creature presupposed, than when the priority of nature is denied on the side of the action of free choice contracting, as it were, the potentiality of the divine will toward either alternative; or in the will of bestowing an exercised concourse.

164 36 TO the last argument, from n. 5, I marvel that the adversaries thrust it upon us with such contention, since it presses them equally in the congruous vocation, without which the sufficient aid will not in fact operate, although the force and excellence of such aid for the supernatural act are sustained by the adversaries in a Catholic manner; because it can contribute proximately to it, even though without a congruous vocation it is never reduced to act. Concerning which I spoke in the aforesaid art. 5. sub n. 31.; but I like to touch this matter again, which Vázquez handles. 1. p. disp. 98. cap. 8.

165 For it can be objected: a disparate rationality lies beneath the sufficient aid lacking the physical premotion of God, and the sufficient aid deprived of a congruous vocation. Because it is not within our power to compose the indeliberate motions of holy illuminations and inspirations with a physical premotion to operate; whereas it is within our discretion that our vocation be congruous or incongruous. For since the congruity of the vocation is drawn from the conditional foreknowledge of consent; but the certainty of foreknowledge from the determination of the futurition of the thing; and yet the futurition of the assent is subjected to the nod of free choice — from there it follows that it is within our power to operate congruously or incongruously, just as it belongs to the pleasure of the created will that the thing be to be, or not to be.

166 Answered: even if conditional futuritions had in them a determinate truth that did not flow from a free conditional decree, antecedent to the truth and determination of such objects — which proposition we reject as false in the following dist. concerning the knowledge of conditionators — still it can by no means be defended that the congruous or incongruous vocation is subjected to the nod of man. For since the sufficient aid with which we are gifted by God consists in indeliberate acts of illustration on the side of the intellect, and of inspiration on the side of the will, which therefore are said to be done in us without us, because they are done indeliberately by the vital powers with the supernatural concourse of God: just as the first-first motions are not subject to free choice, so neither can those indeliberate motions of preventive grace with a congruous vocation be subject to it. Which is so certain that it cannot be refuted by the adversaries.

167 Wherefore Vázquez, loco citato, sub numero. 50., candidly professes the point, saying: Esse vocationem congruam, aut non congruam, ex libero pendet arbitrio, sicut rem fore, aut non fore; tametsi ex eo non pendeat, eam vocationem nobis concedi, quae in nobis congrua futura est.

168 37 If, therefore, it is not within the nod of free choice to be gifted by God with a congruous vocation; and without a congruous vocation one will never respond, or hear the voice of him that calls, however loudly he may intone, and however he may strive to overcome the sinner's affected deafness; then, just as it is not within the power of free choice to compose the sufficient aid with the congruity of the vocation, so neither will it be in the hand of its own counsel that the sufficient [aid] be able to strive proximately toward the supernatural operation. Behold how the adversaries see themselves entangled in the same wiles with which they would entangle us.

169 Wherefore, just as they are forced in a Catholic manner to protect the proximate excellence of the sufficient aid for operating, although without a congruous vocation it never operates in act; so also we defend the force of the sufficient aid, although it is not within our power to be premoved thus or thus by God, and, premotion set aside, no sufficiency of the aid contributes to the actual influx, although it could contribute proximately to it.

170 33 But come now; since the premotion which we assert is not by the mode of a first act, but an actual concourse, if, on account of the priority from-Which, or of nature, it could be asserted that it is not thus tempered to free choice, or does not preserve liberty; because it is not, with full right, subject to the pleasure and arbitrament of our will as concerns its affirmation and negation, so that it could be removed from being in essence, or in the exercised act and the compositional sense: although otherwise it were asserted that the premotion is afforded by God according to the demand of free choice thus circumstanced, with contingency of the possible, and in the sense of division — it would follow either that our determination would be prior in nature to the influx of God, as Córduba wished; or that the actual concourse of God is not subject to the arbitrament of the created will; which I thus judge.

171 For, upon this count alone could the cooperation of the divine will be conceived as subject in a manner to free choice, that it could be removed from essential and also factual being according to our nod: if the determination of our will preceded the divine will; for then, from the hypothesis of the pact of concurring, there would follow — by the motion of our will antecedent with priority from-Which — the undoing of that antecedent absolute proposal of the divine will to bestow such, and not another, concourse. So that the pact entered into by God with the free cause of concurring would be thus expressed: I will such an act, if you will it; therefore this composition, for operating, of the created and uncreated cause (as one which involves a condition that must be purified by the free cause) demands an operation of the creature preceding the influx of God by a priority of nature; according to what we did against Suárez and Herice in art. 5. of this dist., from n. 20. up to 22. inclusively.

172 But if God and the creature were composed, or agreed, to operate thus, equally first and without any presupposition of an order of reasoning (from-Which, or of nature): by what reasoning will the divine will be able to be conceived as contracted by our operation to such a determinate and absolute intention and execution of this causality ad extra, if the created will cannot so determine itself without such a concourse of God, and God concurs thus of his own arbitrament, not excited by the cooperation of free choice, nor subjecting his concourse to the antecedent excitation or contraction of free choice? For our determinate operation cannot be understood to stand as the from-Which, and as the rationality of such a contraction, since it is not conceived as prior to such a contraction of the divine will; just as it is also contradictory that our determination be apprehended as existing without an immediate dependence upon the actual and exercised termination of the divine will cooperating to the effecting of that same thing. And since the sole assigned and aptitudinal tendency of the divine will in first act — which tendency could inhere in God concerning things that will never exist at any difference of time, as we said in the present art. sub num. 16., where the texts I cited from art. 6. sub num. 61. et 62. must be utterly handled: wherefore many Jesuit authors, assailed by the force of this reasoning, deny that God is contracted by a deficient free choice to the concourse toward the matter of sin, as is evident from the preceding article at marg. n. 78..

173 Wherefore Luis Dolanus, Capuchin, sharply assailing physical predetermination and the immediate concourse of God to free acts, rightly infers against those assertors of middle knowledge who, with Lessius, hold that God is neither excited nor contracted by the science of the cooperation of free choice to such a species of concourse: that the liberty of free choice is harmed no less by an assigned premotion than by an immediate composition given equally to operate between God and the created free choice. So it stands in his Quadripartite disputation, p. 2. capit. 3. near the end.

174 Si Deus decerneret absolutè se cōcursurum identificato influxu in negationē Petri; vel id faceret expectata determinatione, et cōsulta volūtate Petri, idest nō priùs determinādo cuius modi cōcursū daturus esset, quā per scientiam conditionatam praeuidisset aliquid in eiusmodi volūtate, vnde rationabiliter excitaretur ad deserendum exhibendumque concursum vnum potiùs quā oppositum. Vel id faceret eadem Petri volūtate non expectatâ nec consulta, sed omnino antecedentter ad illam, quia nō potest dari alius modus concurrendi identificato concursu; siquidem cōcurrere cōsultā, et concurrere non consulta voluntate contradictoriè opponuntur. And a little after, having set aside the excitation of God, and his being contracted to such a determinate rationality of concurring by the foreseen absolute cooperation of free choice — since it is not established by the common opinion asserted, that such a way of thinking — the exercised determination and cooperation of the created free choice without actual dependence upon the divine will, not as indifferent to either alternative, but contracted to one side of the contradiction — is contradictory; for it implies that from an indeterminate principle (indeterminate in the second act, and in the compositional sense toward the action) there should go forth the determinate exercised dependence of the cooperation of free choice upon God, as we clearly showed more than once out of Aureolus: afterward Dolanus subjoins against the opinion admitting the immediate concourse of God to free acts with simultaneity of nature, not explored by God through the absolute foreknowledge of the cooperation of free choice. Si verò decerneret cõcurrere nõ expectata, nec consulta voluntate Petri, non esset illi libera, nec cõsequenter imputaretur illi ad culpam, sed soli Deo.

175 For which reason we are in that sense (as we have often observed) that if the endeavors of the adversaries obtained anything for the right of liberty against the concourse of God, antecedent with priority from-Which, or of nature, to the cooperation of free choice, they would thereby wrench away even the immediate concourse of God, not only toward the matter of wicked acts, but toward all free operations: therefore either the adversaries adhere to Aureolus, or let them abstain from the criminations of violated liberty against the assertors of concursive premotion alone. See on this what we did out of Scotus in this art. at marg. n. 4., turning the reasoning back against Vázquez and his followers.

176 Moreover I persist against that manner of composing equally the power of God for concourse with created free choice: because God, so composing himself for concourse, offers only a causality determined to such a species; and it would follow that he would predetermine free choice by an immediate concourse just as by a concursive premotion, as Suárez expressly admits, transcribed by us below, at n. 57. of this art., and as we also showed out of Scotus in marg. n. 4.

177 Or he offers a concourse appearing indeterminate toward the several species; and it would follow that such a concourse would be potential, and signed, yet not contracted and exercised, since free choice cannot exercise itself actually at once and simultaneously toward contraries and contradictories; and accordingly there would be inferred the very thing which we inferred against Suárez: that free choice could explicate itself to the exercise of influx with a merely aptitudinal and signed dependence upon the power of God, and which could subsist concerning other species of operations that are not in fact elicited.

178 There would follow, moreover, that which we pressed against Suárez at sub number 57. of this article: that God would not concur immediately to the substrate of sin; because the action of God ad extra is identified really with the operation of the creature according to Suárez and his followers, and the concourse determined to such a species (however the concourse of free choice issued) and the indeterminate concourse cannot be identified.

179 Wherefore that reasoning which fights against concursive premotion also grazes the concourse of God with a free cause; because either it must be pronounced of necessity (that the action of God be subjected to the power of the created will, in the sense intended by the adversaries) that our will determine itself first, with a priority of order, or of nature, and contract God to such a rationality of acting, as Córduba wished, refuted above; or, if the concursive causality should flow out from God and the creature equally and simultaneously, without any presuppositional order, the reason does not appear why the contraction to such a species of act should be left to the arbitrament of the creature rather than to the nod of God — unless the creature antecede the action of God with a priority from-Which, as the rationality of such a determination.

180 As for Scotus, however, it is manifest that he openly judged that the contraction of the first cause, removing contingency to non-being in the second act and in the compositional sense, is not against the reason of liberty; although a contraction from an inferior cause, removing contingency to non-being, is against the reason of liberty. As is evident from the text transcribed in this dist. art. 2, at marg. num. 15, at the end of the same number.. At the instance made from n. 10., concerning fire deprived of an actual aid, or concourse, for enkindling fire: that which is simply and proximately efficacious for acting ought not to be renounced, but only remotely, although the actual concourse does not contribute to the power of operating, but to actually acting. Because the proximately operative virtue of any second cause carries with it the connation and habitude to the premotion of the first cause, so that without that, that which is proximately suited for acting ought not to be had, but only remotely. Therefore, even if actual premotion were thought not to pertain to the power of acting in a free cause, still the free agent must be judged to be without a moral and proximate power of acting, in that it is not within its power to be premoved thus or thus.

181 Answered: there obtains an altogether disparate rationality between the two principles, the natural and the free, in that hypothesis in which God would deprive fire of an actual concourse. For if God, by his sole nod, and not with the inclination of the second cause demanding it, nay, against its inclination, were to decree that he not concur with fire in the second act for acting; nor would even the power of God, or the faculty executing it, be composed with fire in the first act for operating. For vain would be that will of preparing a concourse to fire in the first act of itself, if it had preordained the negation of the concourse in the second act — of itself, I say, and not with the condition of the second cause demanding it, nay, against its inclination, affixed and determined in the first act to one. But since the proximate power of every necessary created cause, as demanding toward acting, connotes the composition of the executive power, determined to one by the mode of a first act; if such a junction of the proximate divine virtue for operating with a necessary agent were removed, then the proximate power also must of necessity be removed in the created cause.

182 But when God does not actually premove a free cause toward such a species of act, for instance toward the moral good, but predetermines toward the substrate of the sinful action, on account of the demand of the lability of the free principle: such a will, actually denying the premotion to the good on account of the defectibility of the free principle, would not oppose that same divine will composing its power, or its executive faculty, in the first act with a free cause toward either alternative. For it is well established that God, so far as in him of himself, is ready for the created will toward either alternative in the first act, and that the created will in the second act contracts him to one side of the contradiction: thus demanded by the bent of free choice, whose depths and compass God knows with his comprehensive science. Just as it is established with the will of concurring determinately to one, that God is ready toward either alternative in first act; which must be received in the sentiment of Scotus, who, before the exercised premotion of the created free choice, openly professes that a concourse toward either alternative in the first act is afforded to free choice, so that free choice not be necessitated in the first act by an extrinsic principle.

183 Foundations for paralysing the last instance of the Adversaries, where it is treated against Vázquez, that the will does not necessarily follow a more expressive, or better-tempered, proposal of the object.

184 SINCE, for the confirmation of the last reason ad oppositum which we premised at n. 11: that — so that the assertors of the opposite opinion might defend that the force and excellence of the sufficient aid for operating should persist without any physical premotion — they consequently attempted that the virtue of the sufficient aid ought to be such (that it be absolutely and simply sufficient and able to contribute proximately toward obtaining supernatural cooperation) that in him who obeys the vocation nothing of physical supernatural premotion accrues.

From this they also infer that sufficient aid is such that, given an omnimodal physical equality genuinely distinct from the second act of actual cooperation by free choice, one will could in fact refuse while the other obeys. The force of the proposition of the objection presses, so that we touch these things briefly, without the din of dissertations, or all but hail them from afar: with only that composition of the divine motion with free choice in view, which could subsist even within the series of the free operation of the natural order; the examination of the special energy of the aids of grace being suppressed. Wherefore we do not fall upon the adversaries with Sacred Scripture, nor with the testimonies of the Fathers, nor do we assail them with other excursions, which would be drawn from revealed principles; but only with that rationality of concursive premotion, by the mode of a mere action, which could be expert in the operations of the natural order: every predetermination through an impressed created form being set aside; which we grant for the consequence of the doctrine, as far as it is lawful to call these things into discussion. For there is no lack of difficulty in what, according to the principles of Scotus, ought to be held with firmness, especially concerning the predetermination of the will by a supernatural motion (insofar as it can be gathered from the natural subordination of the second cause): by which cooperating grace is it bestowed; intrinsic, or extrinsic?

190 40 WHEREIN first of all must be established as certain that which we touched above: namely, that the dispute about the physical equality of the form, which is to be distinguished really from the created cooperation of free choice, proceeds in the volition consenting, and dissenting. For if that equality could include the supernatural impulse of the cooperating will, the supposition of the equality of the aid in the renouncing, and obeying, will would utterly fall; since the obedient will is gifted with an accompanying aid, or cooperating grace; and the dissenting will is not so gifted, as is evident. Wherefore that hypothesis about the equality of the aid in the will renouncing the vocation, and bestowing consent, can proceed only in that infusion of the gifts of grace, or composition, intrinsic or extrinsic, of the aids, which would be distinct really from the supernatural impulse of the assenting will: these things being presupposed.

191 41 All those authors who asserted that our will is predetermined by God through the infusion of some virtue, or quality, of the species of a power, constituting the created will in the proximate readiness for acting, or completing it in the being of the proximate principle of the supernatural cooperation; consequently reject that supposition of the physical equality in the obeying, and renouncing, will; because they deem it contradictory, from the hypothesis, or in the compositional sense, that the will, physically premoved by God in the first act proximate to assent, should struggle. Whereupon they consequently proceed to their own opinion, whose foundations we proposed in ar. 2. of this dist. n. 6. and 7., and stitched together there from number 19. up to 22. inclusively; wherefore I let these go, and hasten to other things.

193 42 Gabriel Vázquez, 1. part. quaestion. 23. disp. 98. per totam, although he denies physical predetermination, by which our will, with the sufficient aid, is either proximately completed for operating, or applied; nevertheless asserts that he who in fact converted receives from God not only a greater gift in the line of a benefit; because that excitation is conferred upon man by a God willing and foreknowing, to which the will will infallibly consent (for he gives nothing freely, who has not the science of the value of the benefit presented); but because he who obeys receives a more expressive thought of the good than he who resists.

195 Explanatio n of the said judgment of Vázquez

196 Which greater expression is not placed in this, that the indeliberate supernatural illustration, which is directed to the preventive, or excitative, grace, be more intense in the assenting man than in the renouncing one (for it can happen that a more intense representation be less congruous); but in a special mode of the expression of the object, which better befits enticing a will thus affected to the prosecution of the good, or flight from evil.

Thus Vázquez holds, 7. sub num. 46, who relies on that pronouncement which is so familiar to the aforesaid author as to be a pious axiom: namely, that every sinner necessarily suffers some defect of consideration in the intellect. Whence it comes about that, an equal expression, and illumination, being given on the part of the intellect suggesting the good, and an equal proposition also given of the foul object inciting to evil, it cannot come about that the one will obey, the other resist.

200 S. August. Objection. 43 Which Vázquez confirms with the authority of Augustine. Tomo 7. lib. 2. de peccatorum meritis, et remissione. cap. 17, where, after he had asked: Cum voluntate humana, gratis adiuuante diuina, sine peccato in hac vita possit homo esse, cur non sit?

201 Solution Augustine subjoins: Possem facillimè ac veratissimè respondere; quia homines nolunt. Sed si ex me quaeritur, quare nolint? Imus in longum. Veruntamen etiã hoc sine praeiudicio diligentioris inquisitionis breuiter dicam.

202 See for the opinion of Vazq. Nolunt homines facere quod iustum est; siue quia latet, an iustum sit? Siue quia non delectat. Tantò enim quidque vehementiùs volumus, quantò certius quàm bonum sit, nouimus, eoque delectamur ardentiùs.

203 Arg. of Vázquez out of Augustine From which Vázquez argues thus with the testimony of Augustine: if, with Augustine, a defect of consideration in the intellect were not required beforehand for the lapse of the will, he would have rendered no other reason of the prevarication of men than the free will tending to fail. But Augustine teaches that he must go further, while he assigns such a cause; whereas on the contrary he would, as it were, have settled the matter briefly, if he had intimated the defect on the side of consideration: here, therefore, that [defect] necessarily intervenes for the prevarication of the will; and accordingly it cannot come about that, an equal expression of the good presupposed, and an equal suggestion of the evil also given, one will obey, and the other resist.

204 No physical distinction is required on the side of the proposition of the object presented to the intellect, that the will assent or dissent 44 Moreover, that we may quickly dispatch ourselves of these, in whose refutation Suárez is at length in tom. Opusc. libr. 3. de Auxilijs diuinae gratiae. capit. 21.: the thesis of Vázquez can thus briefly be refuted:

205 Because, an omnimodal equality being given in the consenting, and renouncing, will, as much on the side of the supernatural illustration alluring to the good, as on the side of the proposition leading to the most foul object, yea even with a more expressive apprehension of the foul object in the will obeying the vocation, than in the one resisting; the composition of either will with any apprehension, whether the more expressive, or the more intense, which entices toward the good, or the evil, is not such as would infer a necessity simply, and in the first act, or fix our will to assent by an antecedent supposition, or contract it in the first act before the operation is entered upon, and in the sense of division, and separation, from the actual, and exercised, assent; but rather leaves it indifferent toward contraries, and contradictories: therefore our will, with the lesser supernatural illumination, and with the more vehement aggravation of the demon, will in fact assent, when the other will, excited by a greater vocation, shall dissent.

206 Because, since no proposition of the foul object, nor any composition whatever of the circumstances inviting to the lapse, or resisting the vocation, is such that by its own intrinsic force and power it should overwhelm, or annihilate, the excellence of the sufficient aid, and impede it in the first act, or in the sense of division, before the exercised lapse (otherwise the sufficient aid would not be left sufficient, or proximately conducive to salvation): thus, whatever coalition of impediments be given, it will remain intact for our will, to assent to God calling; and accordingly, with an inferior excitation, the will will be able to consent in essential being, and in the compositional sense toward such thought, although the other resists.

207 These were argued against Vázquez. 45 And I press the reasoning against Vázquez, from what he delivers loco citato, cap. 7. §. at obijciat aliquis sub num. 46. vbi inquit.

208 The will can avert the intellect from the more efficacious apprehension. *Respondeo; proposita cogitatione efficaciori, et minus efficaci, esse in potestate voluntatis absque nouo dictamine, ab efficaciori mentem auertere, et applicare intellectum vt efficacius oppositum consideret; et ideo si efficaciori cogitationi consentit, liberè consentire. Tamen repugnat vt in id consentiat, quod minus cogita

Hence I argue thus in the case of Vázquez: because our will does not so cohere with the more efficacious proposition of the intellect that, without a new dictate, it cannot avert the mind from the more efficacious judgment of some object, and apply the intellect that it intend the contrary object more efficaciously; therefore the will is not borne necessarily into the object preferred to it by the intellect, since, the preference of the more efficaciously proposed object standing, the will is able to avert itself from such an object, while, knowing and willing, it turns the intellect so that it bear itself remissly about that which it had before proposed efficaciously.

211 And accordingly, just as it is intact for the will, without a new judgment of the intellect, to prefer the object inefficaciously expressed to the object more efficaciously proposed, while it commands the intellect to make the change; so also it will be free for the will, to pursue the object insinuated sluggishly and tepidly, and to repudiate the one vehemently proposed.

212 46 Nor is the objection, from number 43., which Vázquez forms out of the authority of Augustine, of any strength; which is clear from that very testimony of Augustine, which Vázquez opposes to us. Nolunt homines facere quod iustum est, siue quia latet an iustum sit, siue quia non delectat. Therefore not only on account of the defect of consideration, which Augustine comprehends under that word (latet), but also on account of the tepidity of the will, as is established from those words: siue quia non delectat.

213 Which we can also show from the same letter of the context, which, when it had proposed, Quòd tantò quidque vehementiùs volumus, quantò certiùs quàm bonum sit nouimus, eoque delectamur ardentiùs., afterward subjoins: Ignorantia igitur et infirmitas vitia sunt, quae impediunt voluntatem, ne moueatur ad faciendum opus bonum, vel ab opere malo abstinendum. Vt auté innotescat quod latebat, et suaue fiat, quod non delectabat, gratia Dei est, quae hominū adiuuat voluntates.

214 From which it is established that it was in the mind of Augustine to assert: that sloth, and negligence in knowing those things which one is bound to know for instituting one's life piously, are impediments to salvation; likewise that the infirmity of the human condition is in play, why the will pursue the good not fervently. Yet Augustine never pronounced that the will cannot embrace that which is proposed to the will less efficaciously by the intellect.

215 Which is evident even from this, that not only did Augustine assert that we pursue more vehemently that which we know more certainly, but also that by which we delight more ardently; wherefore he prays God even, that that good be made sweet to us which, on account of the infirmity of our condition, is flat, and unsavory. And since delight pertains not to the insinuation of the intellect, but to the impulse of the appetitive faculty, as is perspicuous; it may be, as Augustine teaches, that therefore we do not embrace the good, because we do not delight in it: not hinting a defect of the intellect, as if the principal cause of not adhering to God, but the tepor of the effect, whereby the things spiritual grow cheap to us.

216 47 Third, at length, in this matter is that way of holding it which Suárez takes loco citato ex libr. 3. de Auxilijs. capit. 20. et 21., and, with Suárez, the whole School of the Jesuits establishing: that, an omnimodal equality of the aid being given in physical being, which is really distinguished from the act of the cooperation of free choice, in the renouncing, and obeying, will; it conduces to the sufficiency of the aid, that, without any physical premotion, as much by the mode of a first act, as by the mode of a second act, it in fact obtain the assent in the obeying will, and be left inefficacious in the resisting will. Although in him who assents to the vocation, an aid equal in physical being, is the greater in moral being, or in the line of a benefit; because the free supernatural motions from thence, which are directed to the preventive, or excitative grace, and are produced by us without us, are equalled by God to the obeying will out of the conditional foreknowledge of a future consent.

Wherefore, Valentine de Herice. 1. par. tract. 3. disp. 23 cap. 8. num. 88. maintains; that efficacious aid is not severed in physical species from sufficient aid; and that this was more than once evidently demonstrated by his own; inasmuch as efficacious aid adds nothing physical, really co-distinct from sufficient aid, by which the sufficient aid is contracted to the actual operation.

219 He thinks congruity to be an accident separable from the physical substance of the Vocation

220 Which he also delivers in the same tract. 3. disput. 39. capit. 2. numer. margin. 32.; and consequently he judges, at the place cited of disp. 23. cap. 8. sub numer. 92., that the congruity by which the sufficient aid is contracted to efficacious operation is a mere accident, which can be, and be absent, without the destruction of the aid as reviewed, as regards every physical rationality of it.

221 He assails Vázquez

222 Whence, at sub num. 95., he refutes Vázquez; because, although Vázquez rejects the physical predetermination, he nevertheless admits a physical discrimination between the sufficient, and the efficacious, aid; insofar as the efficacious aid imports a more expressive representation of the object; as is evident from the said things, at sub num. 42.

223 The same is carried by Pet. Arrub.

224 The same opinion — that sufficient, or preventive, grace is not distinguished in physical species from the efficacious aid, or grace — is delivered broadly by Petrus Arrubal. 1. parte. disput. 85. capit. 3. numer. 6. et capit. 4. à numer. 10. vsque ad 15. inclusiuè., where, an omnimodal equality in the physical being of the sufficient, and efficacious, aid being premised; he grants that the will assents, on account of the greater aid in moral being, or of a benefit, on account of the foreknowledge of the future consent: these things at his number 15. So far even that he asserts that, if the sufficient, and efficacious, aid should diverge in physical species, the sufficient aid would not be truly sufficient in him who resists, on account of the denial of some physical virtue really co-distinct from the cooperation, or motion, of the created will.

225 Which opinion of Suárez, Arrubal, Herice, and the Jesuits, is underpropped by those proofs which we touched in the foregoing, composing the foreknowledge with our liberty as regards the acts of the natural order; so that nothing new occurs to be dispatched; as far as it be permitted to draw out, line by line, the disputation about the aids of divine grace.

226 Brief observation concerning the consequence of the doctrine: what is the supernatural premotion with Scotus; and by which cooperating grace is it bestowed; intrinsic, or extrinsic?

227 The true opinion of Scotus: efficacious vocation adds nothing extrinsic to the first act.

228 48 THESE things premised: the last opinion, which we judge true, asserts that, the equality of the exciting, or preventive, grace being presupposed, as regards every that rationality of operating, which could be conceived by the mode of a principle, or in the line of a first act (only the actual cooperation being set aside), either will can in fact consent, and the other struggle. Although that will which obeys the vocation is contracted physically by the cooperating grace, antecedent with a priority of nature to the determination of the created will.

229 Two points of this assertion

230 Which assertion contains two pronouncements, which, although sufficiently perspicuous from those things which we unfolded above, may be weighed briefly for the sake of clarity, and as the complement of the doctrine.

232 Therefore the first part of our assertion establishes: that, as regards every that manner of operating which does not conduce to the exercise of the actual, and exercised, cooperation, and which is in the sense of division, or separation, from the concourse, and exercised cooperation — an omnimodal equality of the preventive grace can be assigned in the assenting, and renouncing, will; this pronouncement is clear from the said things.

233 The rationality of the assertion, from the confutation of the premotion through a form which would co-integral the first act.

Because, since the indeliberate supernatural motions, as much on the part of the intellect as on the part of the will, which are directed to the preventive, or excitative, grace, do not excite the will to supernatural cooperation, insofar as they are composed with some form physically premoving the will by the mode of a first act; hence it comes about that, the actual cooperation of our will being set aside, and that premotion which pertains to the actual concourse, an omnimodal physical equality can be assigned, as regards every principle of supernatural cooperation, or gift by the mode of a first act, and in the sense of division of the signed, and first, act from the second, and exercised, act, in the will resisting the excitative grace, and in the will consenting to the vocation.

235 49 But the other pronouncement, constituting a disparity between the will obeying, and the one resisting, on the side of the predetermination through the cooperating grace; is also clear from the said things.

236 Because, as is established from the premises; although God does not predetermine second causes through some form, whether intrinsic, or extrinsic, which would pertain to the first act of operating; yet he premoves them through his will, insofar as he performs the function of the external causality, that is, of the actual cooperation ad extra, of the divine executing faculty.

237 From which doctrine, as it is carried to that rationality of operating which God observes, insofar as he is a supernatural author; it is gathered: that, although God does not predetermine our will by the mode of a first act toward the influx of the supernatural operations; yet he premoves it by his uncreated volition, insofar as he exercises the office of the supernatural motion, that is, of the extrinsic cooperating grace.

238 Because through that same intrinsic supernatural cooperation of the will, insofar as it flows out from God, and as such is called by many authors the motion, and external causality of God: our will cannot be predetermined physically, and really; according to those things which we did above in art. 6. preceding, sub num. 67., and it is evident also from the said things in article 2. of this distinct., at sub number 7. and number 26.. All which look toward this: that it is contradictory that the cooperation of our will, as from God, could determine really our will to the eliciting of that same act, as from the created will; since it implies that that same act determines really, and physically, by number its own efficient principle to the eliciting of that same act; whether in such wise that the same act be drawn forth in the genus of efficient cause out of the eminence of its cause, and the potentiality of it.

239 Whence it comes about that the physical predetermination, which we constantly assert to be bestowed by the cooperating grace, is not drawn from the intrinsic cooperating grace, which is that vital supernatural cooperation of our will itself; but from the uncreated volition of God, insofar as he concurs by the mode of an external execution, above the forces of the whole of nature, toward the effectuation of forms intrinsically supernatural; because, in the sentiment of Scotus, the action of God is not something created, but uncreated, as one that is inexistently intrinsic in the agent: just as action, as such, throughout its whole universality coheres with the agent, and is not passion.

240 But when we assert that the created will is predetermined by God by the mode of a concourse, or of an actual cooperation, yet not by the mode of a first act: we do not mean that the premotion of God should regard only the contraction, or the determination, of the assent, and not the principle for assenting; since we judge that the created will is contracted by God as regards the species, and individuation, of the acts, which also we have often taught: whence it comes about that the action of God bestows not only the determination upon the assent, but also upon the will itself, that it actually assent.

Yet because this concurring contraction, or contraction by way of concourse, does not extend to the first act, or the proximate power of acting (that it may constitute or complete the first act of acting, or the proximate power of that faculty itself), but to the exercise of the operation; therefore in one who rejects the calling, nothing conducive to the first act of operating is lacking, even though the actual concourse of God be absent — not only as determining the operation, but as the very principle composing the operation itself to the operation. On this see what we handled above in this controversy: dist. 2. ar. 2. nume. 19. et 20.

Or, in one word, we say: that free choice is determined by the divine volition, inasmuch as it discharges the office of action, and of concourse; but not by the volition of God, inasmuch as it produces some form constituting the first act of acting. For it is one thing that God contract the created will, that it compose itself to the operation; another, that He determine the created will, so as to constitute it in the character of a first act, by immitting into it some form of the species of power; or by supplying it through a special composition of His power, or of the executing faculty, which may exhibit the office of such an operative, and determining, quality in the first act, and in the sense of division and separation from the concursive premotion of the second act. On which see art. 2. cited of this distinct., from num. 49. up to 55.

Satisfaction to the objections of Aureolus, Hurtado, and more recent authors, who assert that the action of God ad extra is something created; wherein Suárez is likewise refuted in person concerning the immediate concourse to the matter of sin.

50 BUT against the aforesaid doctrine an objection can be urged, not without force, from the opinion of several authors, who contend that God does not act ad extra through an uncreated action, or through the form of His volition as through an external causality, but only as through the principle of acting, or an executing faculty. On this, sharply, Cardinal. Aureolus in 1. sententiar. dist. 42. artic. 2. under §. Quid dicendum sit secundum veritatem, et primò, quod operatio exequens id, quod voluntas diuina imperat, non potest esse idem cum diuina substantia. In this matter the whole school of the Jesuits agreed with Aureolus, as Hurtado reports in his Physics, disput. 10. de causis prima, section. 3. §. 50. and 54.; on which we shall treat at length below, in the controversy on the Omnipotence of God, where we shall weigh whether the action of the executing faculty of God is something created or uncreated. Therefore, from the doctrine of the aforesaid authors, who deny that the action of God ad extra is that very uncreated volition, an objection may be raised against our assertion of God's predetermination through cooperating extrinsic grace.

Because the will of God is asserted to be an extrinsic cooperating grace premoving our will by way of concourse on no other account, than inasmuch as it is the execution ad extra, or the use of the divine faculty executing, inasmuch as the principle of effects above the order of all nature. But the divine will cannot undergo the immediate function of external motion, that is, of the causality of God, so that the concurring action of God should not in any way be distinguished before the intellect from the very action of the creature, which is something formally created.

51 But that that causality of God, which is the concourse with a created agent, must by no means be severed before the intellect from the influx of the creature, Hurtado shows thus at the place cited, §. 55. et 56.:

51 Because the action of God is the dependence of the created effect upon God, just as action as such is the dependence of the effect upon the agent, or the reason on account of which the effect actually hangs upon the agent; but through the influx of the created cause the effect so hangs upon the created agent that it also hangs upon God, as is perspicuous. Since the action of the creature, according to its specific and individual ratio of influx, hangs upon God as Quo; just as it also hangs upon the created agent as Quo, or as the ratio of effecting and of attaining the terminus: therefore such an immediate ratio of influx is ineptly ascribed to the increated volition of God, seeing that the created action is not only the causality of the created agent, but is also an external motion and the causality of God.

Nor do you remove the force of the objection, if you answer that the action of the second cause is attained by God as the effect of God, and by the action of the created agent; but not as the immediate action of God Himself.

Because the action of the creature is attained by God according to the contracted, and specific, character of such an influx; but action under this concept is essentially the effecting, or production, of the term; therefore the action of the creature, as it is the production of the term, hangs from God. And accordingly God effects, through the action of the creature, the term of the action of the same creature; and thus another action, or the external causality of God, is superfluous.

Because, as Hurtado argues: that one action is attained through another does not stand in the way of God's being said, by His uncreated volition attaining the action of the creature, to operate through the influx of the created agent; for if I were by my action to attain the heating of fire, so that the action of the fire depended on me, thus I should heat by the heating of the fire. But God by His uncreated volition attains the created action, inasmuch as it is a production of the term; therefore God acts through the action of the creature.

52 But these points do not compel, and we refute them without difficulty, provided the following be premised. First: what we have more than once intimated about the true sense of that pronouncement, action is the dependence of the effect on the agent; which we have declared must be taken not in the formal, but in the causal sense. Or — which comes to the same — that action is not the intrinsic form of the patient, or of the effect received in the patient, on account of which the effect hangs intrinsically and formally from the agent; but that it is the ultimate actuality of the agent, contracting intrinsically the potentiality of the latter to the exercise of influx, from which, as from a causal reason, is drawn the actual and exercised dependence of the effect on the agent. On this see what we set down by way of preface in controversy 9. on the Vision of God, distinct. 3. on the act of vision, subdist. 1. art. 1. on the vitality of vision, numer. margin. 25. et 32.

Next it must be observed that as from the created agent hangs only the action immediately and through its essence, while the term of the action hangs only mediately, or through the mediation of the action; so it is certain that the action cannot be preserved, nor by the absolute power of God without the agent from which it flows out and hangs immediately; but the term of the action can be preserved without actual dependence on the agent, at least divinely — which I have said on account of the terms of vital actions, which we have often shown can be produced and preserved by God without the elicitive influx of the faculties.

53 From which we draw, by an excellent inference, I believe: that the action of God around the creature must necessarily be really other than the action of the created agent. For if God were only to influence ad extra through the action of the created agent, then by the same reason, or mediated comparison of influx, He would comport Himself toward the term (as it is attained by God, the action of the created agent intervening) as the created agent comports Himself toward the term by the force of the same action.

Wherefore, as the created agent immediately only elicits the action, but attains the term mediately — whence, although the dependence of the action on the created agent, from which it flowed, is unsuppliable, yet the dependence of the term of the action on the agent can be supplied — so, by the same reason, if God were only to influence through the action of the created agent, the action would hang immediately from God, but the term of the action only mediately: and accordingly existence without immediate dependence on God would not be repugnant to a created being, which is absurd.

Because as God, by His free volition, immediately changes objectively unto futuration for such a difference of time not only the actions of the created agent but also its term; so the divine volition, as it performs the function of causality ad extra, or the use of the external divine executing faculty, attains immediately not only the action of the created agent but also its term: since the objective mutation of a participated being, which is from eternity, and to which pertains the real mutation of creatures in time, belongs to the same character of acting in God.

Or thus I draw the reason together from the said things: if God did not attain the effects of created causes immediately through His substance, or through His uncreated volition, inasmuch as it discharges the office of action, but mediately, or with a created action intervening; it would come about that the action would hang from God immediately, or through His essence, and accordingly with an unsuppliable dependence; but the term of the action, (as it would flow forth from God mediately, and not through His essence,) would likewise hang mediately, with a suppliable dependence. So that the existence of the term of the action without the influx of God conserving it would not be repugnant, just as the existence of the term of the action without the influx of the second cause does not contradict; on the contrary, however, the existence of the action of a second cause, without a created agent, is an obstacle, because it flows forth from that agent immediately, and through its own essence.

It is confirmed from the probable opinion of those who hold that living operations do not flow forth from the faculties of living things through media of actions, or influxes really distinct from the substance of vital operations; but that vital operations burst forth immediately from living principles, because they proceed with an unsuppliable connection and dependence, even divinely. Therefore, either the dependence of a created effect on God is suppliable; or every created being is elicited immediately from the substance of God, or His uncreated volition, inasmuch as it bears the function of influx ad extra.

Objection.

54 But you will urge: that in our opinion, which we handed down in contro. 9. de visione Dei. dist. 3. subdist. 1. ar. 1., although a vital action hangs immediately from the living principle, yet the vital quality does not.

It is examined.

It is answered: that we have judged, and therefore consequent upon the more probable and received opinion, that there can be given, and supernaturally preserved, a grammatical operation, as Scotus speaks, or a living quality, without any influx of the vital faculty. For although many and weighty theologians are of the opinion that if a vital quality were produced by God without the elicitive concourse of the living faculty, the faculty would not by that form, sent into it from an extrinsic principle, namely God, attempt to act vitally upon the object by understanding, willing, etc.; yet they do not judge the existence of such a quality to involve the being without influx of the vital principle; because such a quality would not flow forth immediately, and accordingly would not, through its essence, hang from the living principle. Therefore, if the effect of a second cause were not elicited immediately by the uncreated action, nor hung from it through its essence, some created being could be given without the preservation of the first cause: which Aureolus did not dare to sustain even in the conservation of depraved acts, denying that God concurs immediately for the first effecting.

Another objection.

55 But if you should object that the uncreated and immanent volition cannot undergo the offices of temporal influx ad extra:

It is unfolded.

We say that, as in the School of Saint Thomas creation is that very immanent act of the divine will inasmuch as it is terminated at a being out of nothing; and as, in the more probable opinion of the theologians, God can supply through His power and will (so composed in the character of a particular principle) the elicitive concourse of supernatural habits; so we too pronounce every action of God, whether concurring or non-concurring, to be seated in the uncreated volition of God; since, with Scotus, action inexists in the agent.

A caution for our opinion.

When, however, we hold that the creature hangs from God through its essence, we do not speak of the mode of formal dependence, which could be separated from the substance of the creature if it flowed forth from God through a different action, as we handled above in controuersia 9. de Visione Dei, distinct. 3. subdist. 1. art. 1. num. margin. 34.; but we proceed concerning fundamental dependence, as concerning the substance of that participated being itself, which we assert to proceed immediately from the power of God, with no influx really distinct from the substance of the creator intervening; otherwise than the term is attained by a created cause, as becoming the term, or by an influx really distinct, intervening between agent and effect.

Corollary from what has been set forth.

Hence it comes about that the influx hangs immediately from the created principle, but the term only mediately; so that it is not repugnant to the term to exist without the existence, and conservation, of the agent: just as it is an obstacle to the influx (which essentially and immediately hangs from the agent) that its dependence upon such an agent be supplied. Wherefore in the premises we chiefly will this, that it be said in one word: that not only the becoming of the created being, but even the term itself, flows forth immediately from the substance of God: wherefore we judge that not only the executing faculty is not severed from the substance of God; but we assert that not even the execution itself, or the use of the executing faculty, is severed from the substance of God.

A reason in person, that the objects of conditioned science come out after the manner of a tautology. 56 Next, with a theological reason as well, I assault the adversaries in person. For if God were to act ad extra only immediately through the same action of the creature as it is from God, it would follow that conditioned science would regard the same object in the hypothesis or condition and in the event of the consent of free choice which follows the condition; and accordingly He would foreknow nothing of the free event, given such a hypothesis of calling and concourse of God, which He had not penetrated within that very hypothesis: thus the complex coalescing from hypothesis and event would be a mere tautology. Which is evident in this conditioned complex: Si vocauero Petrum tali vocatione, et apparauero illi concursum exercitum ad amorem, amabit infallibiliter. But that that provision, or composition of the divine power with free choice toward influx, ought to be toward an exercised influx, and not toward concourse alone in the first and signed act, I show either thus or from the principles of the adversaries.

The reason in person against the action of God being identified with the action of the creature, is premised. Because the principal adversaries of the adversaries maintain that the composition of the power of God with free choice toward such a species of act, especially toward the matter of sin, is contracted from the absolute foreknowledge of the cooperation of free choice; but the absolute cooperation of free choice is unintelligible with only a dependence on the power of God as indifferent to either, and under that only composition toward concourse in the first and signed act toward contraries and contradictories; or under that aptitudinal comparison under which it is joined to the other species of actions of created free choice, which will never exist in reality. For neither does that composition of the divine power toward concurring with free choice avail, that the exercised operation of free choice be conceived, which is over and above, the exercise of such a species of operation not existing; just as such a composition of the power of God concerning the other species of cooperations subsists, which do not exist, because the created will does not will to so operate.

That repugnance of the doctrine of the adversaries. Then, indeed above all: because if the operation of free choice, as it is from God, is an action of God, it cannot proceed from God as determined to either; since it implies that the action proceed — nay, that it is not even intelligible that it proceed — from an indeterminate principle inasmuch as indeterminate, in the sense of composition toward action, as we have shown more than once from Aureolus. But we shall supply a deeper tracing of this proof below in the following distinction on the science of the conditioned. art. 2. num. marg. 19.

The confronting inference against the adversaries. Therefore, if the composition of the divine power with free choice toward concourse, which the conditioned complex expresses, is a composition toward exercised concourse; and the exercised concourse of God operating ad extra, with the adversaries, is that very operation of the creature as it is from God — it would follow that the conditioned complex coalescing from the hypothesis of such an exercised concourse, and from the following event of the operation of free choice, would be a wholly tautological complex. For instance: if I call Peter, and offer him concourse toward assenting, he will assent — that granted, such science would be useless for conciliating liberty, see the cited num. 19. For such a complex, cointegrated from the exercised concourse of God identified with the consent of created free choice, as it would be identical, so would it be undidactic and altogether useless for theological discussions, whether to resolve or to still.

Suárez's own proper reason concerning the immediate concourse to the matter of sin Suárez against the mediate concourse of God to the matter of sin Moreover I show against Suárez and his followers that, if the action and concourse of God were not really distinct from the cooperation of free choice, it would follow that God would not concur immediately to the matter of sin, Suárez's principles being supposed: namely, that God does not predetermine to the matter of sin, nor offer a determined concourse, nor does He expedite it to the matter of sin alone. But I transcribe Suárez word for word, lest anything seem to be imposed upon him.

Thus therefore he has it in Tomo Opusculorum. Opusculo 1 de Diuina motione. lib. 2. de concursu Dei ad actus ordinis naturalis. cap. 2. §. Assertio ex Tridentino confirmatur sub numer. margin. 22, where, explaining those words of the Canon of Trent, evil works, as well as good, God to work, not permissively only, but also properly and of Himself: so he interprets the ly 'operari, properly and of itself', as condemned by the Council; that neither does God premove to the material of sin; nor offer a determined concourse: take the words of Suárez.

Finally, he signifies, therefore, that God cannot be said to be the proper and of-itself cause of the evil work; because He does not predetermine to it, as the heretics say, nor does He offer a determined concourse to it alone.

57 In which pronouncement of Suárez, this pleases us: that it fights equally against concurring premotion and against the immediate exercised concourse to the matter of sin — which we noted more than once in the preceding article, and in the present one we show from Scotus arguing against his own opinion, while he objects against the immediate concourse of God to our free operations; whose text we transcribed in numer. marg. 4. of this articulate.

But as to the other part of the assertion of the same Suárez, who holds that God does not offer a determined concourse to the matter of sin: besides the arguments with which we overcame Suárez in the preceding article under num. margin. 62, we shall refute him from his own pronouncements; for we now manifestly show in person, from that pronouncement of his transcribed at present, that it follows that God does not concur immediately to the matter of sin. Because the action and concourse of God ad extra with free choice is not distinguished, with Suárez and his followers, from the operation of free choice as it is from God; and the exercised operation of free choice is not indeterminate toward several species of influx, as is evident; therefore also it is evident that God does not concur through an immediate indeterminate influx identified with the determined influx of the deficient creature. Therefore, either the action of God ad extra is really distinguished from the action of the creature, or God does not concur immediately to the substrate of sin: or He concurs to the substrate of sin through a determined concourse, and accordingly also predetermines by concurring premotion — since a determined concourse and concurring premotion are the same and fall back into the same, as we have made plain from Scotus, and for that reason Suárez expressly admits it.

But if you urge for Suárez that, granted the concourse of God be indeterminate, it can be identified with the determined concourse of free choice; just as the degree of animality, which is generic and indeterminate, is really identified with the specific and numerical degree:

That escape we seized upon and blocked beforehand, arguing against Molina in the preceding article on the foreknowledge of depraved acts under num. 58. For otherwise it would come about that the act of hatred of God, inasmuch as it expresses the specific predicate of flight from God, would not hang immediately from God; and accordingly neither could the superior predicates of the same operation hang immediately from God, since the physical influx does not cut off its tending toward the term, but attains all the identified predicates, as is evident and received in every opinion. Therefore, if the act of flight, as flight, hangs from God immediately, and accordingly is an action of God — since the action of God with Suárez is that very operation of the creature, as hanging from God — it follows that, if the concourse in the first act, that is, indeterminate toward the other species which do not exist in fact, cannot be identified with so exercised an operation as the act of flight, God does not concur in the exercised act to the matter of sin, but only in the first and signed act.

58 From what has been set forth — which we shall more fully expound further on in the controversy on omnipotence — the objections of Hurtado are overthrown. For we say that God acts through the action of a second cause; nevertheless by the force of that action the term is attained by God not immediately but mediately: and accordingly the causality ad extra which befits God by the force of His uncreated volition is not superfluous; which, as it objectively changes every created being immediately, so it changes it really immediately through true existence.

But you will stand firm and press further: that the action of the created agent hangs immediately from God; but under that comparison of dependence on God it also attains the term immediately (because the action under the specific and explicit concept of action, under which it is referred to the term, also transcends and imbibes its dependence on God); therefore as the action of the creature depends immediately on God, so the action of the creature, as it is from God, is the immediate action of God.