Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia

Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)

Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus

First published 1676

Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.


Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed

Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear

Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE

Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is

Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil

Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God

Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes

Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically

Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes

Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland

Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR

Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD

Disputatio VI: On Despair

Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is

Disputatio VII: On Presumption

Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin

Disputatio VIII: On Charity

Quaestio I: What CHARITY is

Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is

Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God

Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit

Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species

Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues

Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues

Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts

Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless

Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect

Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how

Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity

Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also

Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY

Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity

Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated

Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY

Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor

Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself

Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves

Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor

Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life

Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another

Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father

Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father

Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children

Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect

Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven

Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved

Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence

Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength

Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love

Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven

Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend

Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST

Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection

Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds

Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD

Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds

Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY

§ I: On Joy

Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue

§ II: On Peace

Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is

§ III: On Mercy

Quaestio I: What MERCY is

Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is

Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity

§ I: De Beneficentia

Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is

§ II: On Almsgiving

Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity

Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished

Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept

Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor

Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor

Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need

Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods

§ III: On Fraternal Correction

Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept

Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret

Disputatio XI: On Hatred

Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is

Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is

Disputatio XII: On Sloth

Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is

Disputatio XIII: On Envy

Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is

Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is

Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention

Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is

Disputatio XV: On Schism

Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is

Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is

Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS

Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO

Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just

Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war

Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged

Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition

Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What sedition is

Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal

Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is

Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin

Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal

Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil

Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom

Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is

Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift

Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God

Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings

Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom

Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom

Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom

Disputatio XX: On Prudence

Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is

Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue

Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE

Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE

Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost

Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE

Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy

§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels

§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations

§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy

§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers

§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy

Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues

Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel

Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is

Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind

Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven

Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel

Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence

Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION

Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS

Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY

Quaestio IV: On Negligence

Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh

Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS

Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)

Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD

Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things

Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future

Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE

Disputatio XXIII: On Justice

Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE

Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is

Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists

Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues

Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed

Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE

Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just

Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative

Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution

Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is

Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation

Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE

Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed

Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss

Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution

Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made

Quaestio V: What ought to be restored

Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way

Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body

Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made

Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul

Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored

Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored

Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored

Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored

Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored

Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored

Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored

Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored

Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding

Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention

Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties

Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute

Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored

Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it

Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution

Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution

Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor

Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor

Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority

Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made

Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made

Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made

Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices

Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence

Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges

Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors

Disputatio XXV: On Homicide

Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it

Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes

Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated

Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.

Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor

Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief

Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications

Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death

Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls

Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus

Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide

Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial

Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws

Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation

Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful

Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another

Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine

Quaestio I: What Dominion is

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things

Quaestio III: What THEFT is

Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft

Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious

Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave

Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another

Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious

Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold

Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters

Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours

Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves

Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts

Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE

Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise

Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins

Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment

Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge

Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly

Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE

Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation

Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation

Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition

Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused

Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal

Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven

Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others

Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy

Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution

Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned

Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered

Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge

Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself

Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when

Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES

Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness

Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial

Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses

Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses

Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate

Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office

Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate

Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault

Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing

Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity

Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts

Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion

Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion

Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely

Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises

Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies

Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction

Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it

Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly

Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal

Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused

Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments

Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself

Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing

Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering

Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery

Quaestio III: On Cursings

Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general

Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required

Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract

Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract

Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts

Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract

Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting

Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired

Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made

Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians

Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures

Disputatio III: On Promise

Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION

Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice

Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds

Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted

Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause

Disputatio IV: ON DONATION

Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what

Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations

Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling

Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are

Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell

Quaestio III: Which things can be sold

Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things

Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum

Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down

Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful

Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing

Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer

Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.

Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful

Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury

Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin

Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice

Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money

Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer

Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)

Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold

Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law

Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS

Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES

Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law

Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something

Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself

Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss

Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful

Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just

Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful

Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud

Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is

Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is

Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XI: On Testaments

Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open

Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs

Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato

Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable

Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake

Disputatio XII: On Legacies

Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how

Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed

Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is

Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them

Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general

Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is

Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue

Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue

Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend

Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary

Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one

Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION

Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio III: ON PRAYER

Quaestio I: What Prayer is

Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER

Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary

Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer

Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded

Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray

Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to

Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray

Quaestio X: How one ought to pray

Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours

Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept

Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it

Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour

Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins

Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies

Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions

Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself

Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies

Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies

Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour

Disputatio IV: ON ADORATION

Quaestio I: Whether Latria is in the genus of some virtue

Quaestio II: Whether Latria is distinct from Dulia

Quaestio III: On Sacred places, destined for adorations

Disputatio V: ON SACRIFICE

Quaestio I: What a SACRIFICE is

Quaestio II: What is required that a SACRIFICE be right

Quaestio III: Whether Sacrifice is of natural law

Quaestio IV: Whether besides Sacrifice, first-fruits are to be offered

Disputatio VI: On Tithes

Quaestio I: Whether Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio II: From which things tithes are to be paid

Quaestio III: To whom, and by whom tithes are to be paid

Quaestio IV: Where, and when, Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio V: By what authority the payment of tithes is to be exacted

Tractatus IV: E VOTIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VOW

Quaestio I: What a VOW is, and what its conditions are

Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW

Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow

Quaestio IV: Whether a Votive promise is made to God alone

Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness

Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid

Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow

Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good

Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good

Quaestio X: Whether a VOW about a thing that can have a good, and an evil, outcome is valid

Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is

Quaestio XII: Whether the immature are bound by Vows

Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS

Quaestio XIV: On the power of the Prelates of Religious to invalidate VOWS

Quaestio XV: Whether a husband can invalidate all the Vows of his wife, beyond the Vow of chastity

Quaestio XVI: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vow of Chastity emitted by his wife without license, the marriage standing, and to be fulfilled then

Quaestio XVII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted without his license, to be fulfilled at the time the marriage is dissolved

Quaestio XVIII: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife, emitted before marriage

Quaestio XIX: *Whether the Vows of a wife, made without the license of the husband, revive when the marriage is dissolved.*

Quaestio XX: *Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife emitted by his license: the Vow of Chastity excepted.*

Quaestio XXI: Whether a husband can revoke the Vow of Chastity of his wife, emitted by his license

Quaestio XXII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted under the preceding dominion of a father, or first husband

Quaestio XXIII: Whether a Wife can invalidate certain vows of her husband, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether parents, or Tutors, can invalidate all the Vows of their immature Sons

Quaestio XXV: Whether a Father, and Curator, can invalidate the personal Vows of their adolescent sons

Quaestio XXVI: Which real, or mixed, Vows of adolescents can be invalidated by the father

Quaestio XXVII: To whom the faculty of invalidating the Vows of adolescents, and the immature, belongs

Quaestio XXVIII: Which Vows of servants the Lords can invalidate

Quaestio XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from Vows

Quaestio XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which

Quaestio XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of Vows is to be made

Quaestio XXXII: Whether commutation requires a cause

Question XXXIII

Disputatio II: SECOND. ON THE STATE OF RELIGION, OR ON SOLEMN VOWS

§ I: On the vows of Religious in common

Quaestio I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

Quaestio II: Whether solemn VOWS are necessary for the state of a Religious

Quaestio III: Whether, and how, this state is Holy

Quaestio IV: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio VI: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio VII: On NOVICES

Quaestio VIII: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio IX: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio X: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XI: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XII: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio XIII: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio XIV: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio XV: On Novices

Quaestio XVI: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio XVII: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio XVIII: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XIX: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XX: On Religious to be expelled

Quaestio XXI: Whether every Religious is bound to all the counsels

Quaestio XXII: Whether Religious ought to teach, preach, etc.

Quaestio XXIII: Whether Religious ought to labor with their hands

Quaestio XXIV: Whether it is lawful for Religious to transact secular business

Disputatio III: On the Vow of OBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: Whether the vow of obedience is chief among the Religious vows

Quaestio II: What obedience is promised in Religion

Quaestio III: Whether Religious are bound to obey Prelates in all things

Quaestio IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the Prelate

Quaestio V: Whether all the statutes of Religious Orders bind under sin

Disputatio IV: On the Vow of Poverty

Quaestio I: On the essence of this Vow

Quaestio II: Which Poverty is more excellent

Quaestio III: Whether mendicancy befits Religious Poverty

Quaestio IV: Whether Religious, on account of Poverty, ought to be clothed in mean garments

Quaestio V: Whether austere fare is owed to Religious Poverty

Quaestio VI: How Poverty is violated

Dubitatio I: Whether Prelates can concede to Religious an annual peculium

Dubitatio II: Whether a Religious, having superfluities by license of his superior, is a proprietor

Dubitatio III: Dubitatio III

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Legacy stands for a Religious, as pertaining to him precisely

Quaestio VII: On the penalties, and marks, of a Proprietor

Disputatio V: On the Vow of CHASTITY

Quaestio I: What difference there is between Cloistered, and Clerical, chastity

Quaestio II: From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage

Quaestio III: Whether one vowing Chastity solemnly dissolves a marriage, whether consummated, or ratified, and by what law, and at what time this began to be done

Quaestio IV: By what law, and at what time, Religious Chastity began to be sealed with cloister

Quaestio V: By what means cloister is violated

Quaestio VI: Whether dispensation can fall upon Religious chastity, and who can dispense in cloister

Disputatio VI: On the Oath

Quaestio I: What an OATH is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to swear by GOD

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures

Quaestio IV: What is required for an Oath

Quaestio V: Whether, and how, it is a Sin to swear without Truth

Quaestio VI: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH made without justice

Quaestio VII: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH lacking judgment

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and how, a custom of swearing is evil

Quaestio IX: When precisely one swearing incautiously from custom sins mortally

Quaestio X: What sin it is to swear dolosely

Quaestio XI: Whether it is lawful to require an Oath from a perjurer

Quaestio XII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to require an Oath from an Idolater

Quaestio XIII: On the obligation of a promissory Oath in itself

Quaestio XIV: Whether dolous Oaths bind

Quaestio XV: Whether an Oath extorted by injury, as of paying usuries, binds

Quaestio XVI: Whether an Oath extorted by fear binds

Quaestio XVII: Whether someone's Oath, by fraud, or error, or ignorance, is void

Quaestio XVIII: Whether an incautious promissory Oath binds

Quaestio XIX: Whether an Oath confirms contracts that could otherwise be voided

Quaestio XX: On the means of removing the obligation of an Oath

Quaestio XXI: On the Penalties imposed upon Perjuries

Disputatio VII: On Adjuration

Quaestio I: What ADJURATION is, and by what means it is made

Quaestio II: Whom it is lawful to adjure

Disputatio VIII: On Divine Praises

Quaestio I: NICA. On the Nature, and quality, of Divine praises

Disputatio IX: On the Observance of Feast Days

Quaestio I: On the origin of FEAST days

Quaestio II: Whose it is to institute FEASTS to be observed under mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether mortal sins on a Feast are forbidden by this precept

Quaestio IV: Whether licit liberal work becomes servile because it is done for gain

Quaestio V: Which are servile works, forbidden on the Feast day

Dubitatio I: Which works are forbidden by Canon law on a feast

Quaestio VI: That a time of servile labor induces a grave transgression of the FEAST

Quaestio VII: On the causes excusing from violation of the Feast

Quaestio VIII: Whether, having merely heard a SACRED (sermon), it is forbidden to idle the whole Feast day

Disputatio X: On Superstition

Quaestio I: SUPERSTITION, what it is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On Divination by the Stars

Quaestio III: On Divination by the Elements, and other mixed things

Quaestio IV: On Divination from Dreams

Quaestio V: On Sortileges

Quaestio VI: On superstitious observances for works

Quaestio VII: On the malefices of Witches

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to consult Witches, that at least the malefices be removed

Quaestio IX: On the penalties of Witches, etc.

Disputatio XI: ON THE TEMPTATION OF GOD

Quaestio I: What TEMPTATION is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XII: ON SACRILEGE

Quaestio I: What Sacrilege is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XIII: ON SIMONY

Quaestio I: What SIMONY is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: How Simony is recognized on the part of the object

Quaestio III: In what way Simony is committed on the part of the act of exchange itself

Quaestio IV: On the Penalties of Simoniacs

Disputatio XIV: ON THE OTHER VIRTUES ANNEXED TO JUSTICE

§ I: ON PIETY

Quaestio I: What PIETY is, and what kind of Virtue

Quaestio II: What reverence is to be shown to Parents

Quaestio III: What obedience is to be shown to Parents by Sons

Quaestio IV: How, and when, Sons are bound to relieve Parents

Quaestio V: On the obligation of Parents toward Sons

Quaestio VI: In which cases Parents can disinherit Sons

Quaestio VII: Whether Sons can ever refuse aliment to Parents, and disinherit them

Quaestio VIII: To what a Woman is bound, who has a Son from adultery, or has substituted one

Quaestio IX: On the mutual obligation of Servants, and Masters

Quaestio X: On the obligation of Brothers toward Brothers, and Sisters, and conversely

§ II: On Observance, Reverence, and Dulia

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On Dulia

§ III: ON OBEDIENCE, and DISOBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On DISOBEDIENCE

§ IV: ON GRATITUDE, and VINDICATION, and the Vices opposed to them

Quaestio I: On GRATITUDE

Quaestio II: On INGRATITUDE

Quaestio III: On Vindication

§ V: On Truth, Friendship, Liberality, Epikeia, and the vices opposed to them: On the gift of Piety, and the Precepts of the Decalogue pertaining to Justice

Quaestio I: On TRUTH

Quaestio II: On the LIE

Dubitatio I: What a Lie is

Dubitatio II: Of how many kinds is a Lie

Dubitatio III: Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Lie is mortal of its genus

Dubitatio V: Whether every Lie is mortal for perfect men

Dubitatio VI: Whether among the degrees of Lie there is a most grave, and a most light

Dubitatio VII: On the others that are reduced to Lying

Quaestio III: On Friendship

Quaestio IV: On Liberality

Dubitatio I: On Avarice

Dubitatio II: On PRODIGALITY

Quaestio V: On EPIKEIA

Quaestio VI: On the GIFT OF PIETY

Tractatus V: E VIRTUTE FORTITUDINIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON FORTITUDE

Quaestio I: Whether FORTITUDE is a Virtue, and which

Quaestio II: On the GIFT OF FORTITUDE

Quaestio III: On Martyrdom

Dubitatio I: Whether MARTYRDOM confers first grace

Dubitatio II: Whether the Baptism of infants can be supplied by martyrdom

Quaestio IV: On the precepts of Fortitude

Quaestio V: On the Vices opposed to Fortitude

Disputatio II: On the Virtues joined to Fortitude

Quaestio I: On Magnanimity

Quaestio II: On the Vices opposed to MAGNANIMITY

Quaestio III: On MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio IV: On the Vices opposed to MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio V: On PATIENCE

Quaestio VI: On the Vices opposed to PATIENCE

Quaestio VII: On PERSEVERANCE

Quaestio VIII: On the Vices opposed to PERSEVERANCE

Tractatus VI: E TEMPERANTIA

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: Which Virtue Temperance is, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Which Vices are contrary to TEMPERANCE

Quaestio III: On the parts of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio IV: On Shamefastness

Quaestio V: On Honesty

Quaestio VI: On Abstinence

Dubitatio I: What FASTING is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: In what way natural Fasting is broken

Dubitatio III: Whether Fasting of itself is a good work, and a precept

Dubitatio IV: From what one must abstain in the Ecclesiastical Fast

Dubitatio V: On the evening collation

Dubitatio VI: On the hour of refreshment on the Fast day

Dubitatio VII: Who are bound to fast

Quaestio VII: On SOBRIETY

Quaestio VIII: On CHASTITY

Quaestio IX: On Virginity

Dubitatio I: Whether Virginity is a Virtue

Dubitatio II: Whether Virginity excels conjugal Continence

Dubitatio III: Whether the reward of Virginity is the Aureole

Quaestio X: On CONTINENCE

Dubitatio I: On MILDNESS

Quaestio XI: On CLEMENCY

Quaestio XII: On MODESTY

Quaestio XIII: On HUMILITY

Disputatio II: On the Vices opposed to the Virtue of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: On GLUTTONY

Quaestio II: On Drunkenness

Quaestio III: On LUST

On LUST.

LUST is a fire devouring even unto consumption, as is said Iob 31., like Greek fire, of which the holy Doctor relates in Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 9.; for there, once kindled, it is extinguished only when covered with sand and vinegar; so the flesh, kindled with the flames of lust, is scarcely checked unless it be long pricked with the austerity and acrimony of penitence, and seriously and often meditate on the emptiness of the world; which two things are figured by vinegar and sand. It is also a fire, namely, consuming whatever beauty it encounters; for those who are more beautiful, whether men or women, not rarely serve as it were as food for lust. I shall treat, therefore, here of Lust and its manifold species; handling indeed an ungrateful subject, I shall run through it with such a choice of words as to describe most shameful things with honest terms (as far as it will be fitting).

Dubitatio I: What LUST is, and of how many kinds

What LUXURY is, and how many ways it is divided.

LUxury is defined by D. Bonaventure in the aforesaid Centiloquium sect. 24. and in the Diaeta tit. 1. cap. 9. and in the declaration of theological terms and in the Compendium of Theology, part III. cap. 21. and in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 3. D. Thomas, quaest. 153. Luxury is the vice opposed to chastity, whereby the mind is inordinately disposed toward venereal pleasures, the reason of the definition is taken from the opposite virtue of chastity, as St. Bonaventure notes, loc. cit. Centil.

I assert that Luxury is a capital vice. Its daughters are eight, from D. Gregory, lib. XXXI. moral. cap. 17. Blindness of mind, Inconsiderateness, Inconstancy, Precipitancy, Self-love, Hatred of God, Affection for the present world, Horror, or despair of the world to come. So D. Bonaventure, loc. cit. Centiloquii.

It is proved, because a capital vice is one that has an end excessively desirable, so that man, in pursuing it, proceeds to commit many sins, which are all said to arise from that vice; now the end of Luxury is the pleasure of venery, which is both the greatest and the most desirable according to the sensitive appetite, both on account of the vehemence of the pleasure and on account of the connaturality of that pleasure and concupiscence, as the Saintly Doctor argues, lib. III. Compend. Theol. cap. 14. and 21. and in the other places cited.

The generation of these daughters from Luxury is explained as follows. Since the inferior powers are affected toward their objects, it follows that the higher powers are impeded and disordered in their acts; but through luxury the inferior appetite is greatly affected by the delightful object: Therefore the higher powers, Reason and Will, are consequently disordered.

And this happens specifically as follows: For there are three acts of practical reason. The first is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good; and this act Luxury impedes, by making the object of Luxury seem good, as is said Dan. 13. Beauty hath deceived thee, and concupiscence hath subverted thy heart, and behold blindness of mind.

The second act is counsel about the means to be chosen, and this is impeded in Luxury, which impedes the exact comparison of the means with one another, as Terence says in the Eunuch; and behold precipitancy, whereby one attacks everything impetuously, as the Saintly Doctor says, loc. cit. Centiloquii.

The third act is judgment about what is to be done, which is impeded by Luxury, diverting the mind from the consideration of the things that are fitting, according to that text Dan. 13. They have perverted the sense, and turned away their eyes, that they might not see heaven, nor remember just judgments; and behold inconsiderateness, which refuses to foresee what is to be done, as the Saintly Doctor says. On the part of the will also there follows a twofold inordinate act: One in order to the end, and in this respect there is self-love in excessive pleasure, and hatred of God who forbids: The other is the appetite for the things that are toward the end, and there is set down affection for the present world, in which one desires to enjoy pleasure; and horror of the future, fleeing spiritual things. Hence Osee 4. Fornication, and wine, and drunkenness take away the heart. So discourses the Saintly Doctor, loc. cit. Centiloquii.

Nor yet does Isidore speak badly, cited by D. Thomas, art. 5., looking especially at inordinate speech, accustomed to arise from luxury, when he enumerates four effects, Turpiloquy, Scurrility, Jesting, and Foolish speaking. Indeed in speech a fourfold disorder can be observed: The first on the part of the matter; and behold turpiloquy, for, Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh, as is said Matth. 12. The second on the part of the cause; because luxury drives one headlong, therefore inconsiderateness precipitates one into scurrilous talk. The third on the part of the end, because the luxurious person intends pleasure, and therefore breaks out into jesting words. The fourth as regards the sense of the words, and so luxury, on account of the blindness of mind it causes, pours itself out into foolish speech. See D. Bonaventure, loc. cit.

I assert secondly that the species of Luxury are six, Fornication, Stuprum, Rape, Incest, Adultery, and the Vice against nature, which is subdivided into several species. For either the pollution causing venereal pleasure is procured without intercourse, and this is mollities (softness), Gal. 5. and 2. Cor. 12. Or there is intercourse with brutes, and this is Bestiality. Third, there can be intercourse with the sex not due, male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle says, Rom. 1. and it is called Sodomy. The fourth and fifth is, if the manner of coupling is not observed, either as regards the instrument, or vessel not due, or as regards other monstrous and bestial manners of coupling, which, if they obstruct generation, are mortal sins even in spouses. Which the Apostle detests as abominable, Rom. 1. 1. Cor. 6. and 12. Galat. 5. Ephes. 5. and Heb. 12.

That these are sins specifically distinct is proved by Cajetan, art. 11. Tanner, disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 3. num. 149. from the diversity of motives, for they have different motives of pleasure: For the first have only venereal consummation; the second, a thing of another species; Sodomy, the person of the sex not due, etc.

But to say that the aforesaid five sins are not mortal, specifically distinct, nor so far to be necessarily declared in confession, as some recent authors have insinuated, is not only not safe, as Tannerus says, num. 149. but erroneous, and it was condemned in the year 1665 by the Sacred Congregation by the Decree of Alexander VII, of most holy memory, as we saw, tom. 4. disp. 17. quaest. 10. ad proposit. 14.

All these species are so intrinsically deadly that they are never lawful, except the manner of coupling in marriage from some necessity, provided the vessel be preserved and generation not be impeded, as Tannerus noted, num. 150.

For a threefold cause God forbade Luxury, as the Saintly Doctor says in the Diaeta, tit. 3. cap. 5. First, because it is pernicious, like a pestilence. Second, because it gathers many together at once in sin. Third, because it is the broad way to hell. See the Saintly Doctor. Add that Generation is the way to the production of a most noble creature, namely man created to the image of God; wherefore it will be impious to abuse it with foul and illicit couplings.

To these species are reduced, as dispositions, others contained in this verse, cited from D. Bonaventure, loc. cit. Centiloquii. The look, and speech, touch, and the kiss, This last is the consummation of the whole sin.

Note that the Seraphic Doctor, in the Confessional, cap. 2. particula 14., places grave fault in conjugal copulation. First, if it is done from the impulse of lust through wanton endearments: Second, when it is done against the natural use: Third, in the prohibited time: Fourth, in a filthy place: Fifth, when one approaches a menstruating woman. But of this, Tract. de matrimonio. The Saintly Doctor teaches these things from Allen, and warns that one must proceed cautiously in questioning in confession. These species are to be treated in the following dubitations.

Dubitatio II: Whether in the genus of Lust there is parvity of matter

Whether in the genus of Luxury there be parvity of matter.

I treated this question in my Disput. de Virtutibus Iustitiae adnexis, sect. 4. de Veritate, et Mendacio, quaest. 2. dubitatione 4. ad argumenta; where, with D. Bonaventure, I upheld the negative opinion, and there I laid down the rule for discerning when there is parvity of matter in sins. But again I find in the Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3. cap. 28. that the Saintly Doctor openly upholds the negative opinion ex professo.

That parvity of matter exists in these matters was asserted by Sanchez de matrim. lib. 9. d. 46. Zanchus in the Directorium Confessariorum part. 1. de Sacram. matrim. cap. 41. quaest. 28. Salas, prima secundae d. 6. sect. 21. num. 149. Villalobos, tom. 2. tract. 40. dub. 9. See also Seraphinus Freitas in the addit. ad tract. de confess. sollic. quaest. 7. num. 33. Sanctius in select. d. 11. and Maldonatus says it is probable speculatively, p. 2. quaest. 74. art. 10.

Along with these go those who hold that touches and kisses, by reason of merely sensible delectation, without any other intrinsic circumstance, are not mortal. So Franciscus Sylvius, 2. 2. quaest. 154. art. 4. and others cited by him. I add Comitoli, resp. moral. lib. 4. quaest. 20. Ioannes Salas, prima 2. quaest. 74. tract. 13. dub. 6. sect. 20. num. 139. Lessius, lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 8. num. 58. Lublinus, verb. osculum.

But as to touches and kisses, Diana dissents, and deservedly, part. 4. Tract. 4. Miscell. resol. 136. with Filliuccius, tom. 2. tract. 30. cap. 9. num. 119. Sanchez, in summa, tom. 2. lib. 5. cap. 6. Rebellus, p. 2. lib. 3. quaest. 19. sect. 3. wherefore the other opinion was condemned by Alexander VII, as we saw in the place cited below.

And that in general there is no parvity of matter in these things the Saintly Doctor teaches, loc. cit. whom followed Tanner, prima 2. d. 4. quaest. 8. num. 109. Castro Palao, in opere moral. tom. 1. tract. 2. d. 1. part. 10. §. 2. Basil Ponce, de matrim. lib. 10. cap. 16. §. 2. Lessius, lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 15. num. 109. Rebellus, loco supra citato, and Claudius Acquaviva, the Father General, in the year 1612 commanded this opinion to be taught in the Society of Jesus.

Therefore Sanchez in summa, tom. 2. lib. 5. cap. 6. asserts this, singing his palinode, and Diana warns that it must be asserted outright, part. 3. tract. 5. resol. 1.

The reason used by Rebellus, Diana, and others is that of D. Bonaventure here; for these things are induced by nature as dispositions to the act of generation, to inflame the flesh with the fire of pleasure in order to copulation and semination: Therefore it is an enormous perversion when they are employed toward pleasure amid dissolutions.

Another reason is brought forward by the Saintly Doctor, because this is the difference between the nutritive and the generative power; the latter is more material, more corrupt, and so rushes headlong, not so the nutritive; whence in gluttony it is more easily venial.

I confess that I tremble with my whole being when I see the danger there is in touches and kisses: Therefore I teach that this opinion must altogether be held. Nor does the Spanish Emphasis move me, whereby Villalobos cries out Los tocamientos leves paruidad de materia.

As to kisses, it was defined by Alexander VII that they are mortal; as is clear from the Decree of 18 March 1666. and as I proved, tom. 4. disp. 17. quaest. 10. sect. 37.

Dubitatio III: On FORNICATION

On FORNICATION.

Fornication is defined by D. Bonaventure, in the aforesaid Coemilianum sect. 24. and 2. part. sect. 32. and sermon 6. on the ten commandments: it is the luxury by which an unmarried man knew an unmarried woman in the natural use. But he adds, loc. cit. de decem praeceptis, if one sins with a wandering prostitute, it is called meretricium, as with a woman not public it is called concubinage.

To fornicate is essentially to practice prostitution, and thus harlots were so called because they were formerly accustomed to place themselves in arcades and vaulted places, that they might ply their shameful trade, as Toletus testifies, lib. 5. cap. 10. Fagundez, in 6. Praecept. lib. 6. cap. 1. num. 2.

The Saintly Doctor observes, loc. cit. dub. praec. in the Compend. Theol. verit. that not only the deed is forbidden, but also the will with respect to the external deed, which the Saintly Doctor proves with Fagundez, num. 4. from that text Matth. 5. But I say to you: that whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart: It is cited in cap. Qui viderit, 32. quaest. 5. and cap. Unum §. criminis 25. dist. and cap. Omnis de poenit. dist. 1. Whence it is not enough to say in confession that one has sinned by the sin of Luxury, but it is necessary to explain the condition of the persons sinning.

Fornication therefore is a sin intrinsically against the law of nature: It is certain of faith from the Clementina, Ad nostram de haeret. and it is had in 1. Cor. 6. Galat. 5. Ephes. 5. The same all the Fathers teach, and D. Thomas, 2. 2. quaest. 153. et 154.

It is proved by the Saintly Doctor on Psal. 72. from that text, Thou hast destroyed all them that fornicate from thee. and Heb. 13. God will judge fornicators and adulterers.

It is proved by reason, because, as the Saintly Doctor teaches in de decem praecep. serm. 6. and in the aforesaid Centil. sermon 24. and in the Diaeta tit. 1. cap. last and in the Compend. Theol. ver. lib. 3. cap. 21. and in 4. d. 33. quaest. 1. Fornication is a grave disorder of reason, as one approaches one not his own, he is precipitated into the agitation and depravation of the mind, as Solomon, and into the other enumerated evils, dub. 1. the soul is subjected to the vileness of the flesh, as the Jews to Pharaoh in mud and clay; it is against the end of the union of male and female; for since it is ordained not only to generating offspring but to educating it, the uncertain sons of fornication are left without a certain educator. See the Saintly Doctor, especially in 4. loc. cit.

THERE are those who think that the concubinage of a Christian with an infidel is not simple fornication; Diana subscribes to them, part. 3. tract. 4. resol. 138. But I do not see a specific change in this kind of case.

THERE are those who say that the fornicator is bound to withdraw himself before the emission of seed, even if it were outside the vessel, Sanchez, de matr. lib. 9. d. 19. num. 7. Lessius, lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 7. num. 55. Diana, part. 3. tract. 4. resol. 227. Bonacina, de matr. quaest. 4. punct. 10. n. 17. Bassaeus, V. fornicatio, num. 4.

THIS opinion displeases me, because that is a new sin against nature, graver than fornication.

THEY ANSWER, that it is beside the intention; in itself, indeed, it is a withdrawal from an evil act.

ON THE CONTRARY, because it implies that the natural emission, which necessarily follows, is not willed; for whoever wills something, wills also that which in itself necessarily follows it, as the Saintly Doctor often argues.

SUBDUBITATIO I. On CONCUBINAGE.

THIS is the concubinage of a man with an unmarried woman, whom one keeps at home as his own. So commonly the Doctors, cited by Farinaccius, tom. 4. quaest. 138. For concubinage in civil law these conditions are required. First, that the woman and the man cohabit together: Second, that it be in his own house: Third, that they consort frequently: Fourth, that the woman be unmarried: Fifth, that she be one only: Sixth, that she be kept as a wife.

But in canon law it is thus described: It is the concubinage of a man with an unmarried woman, whom one retains either in his own house or elsewhere; and to whom he has recourse frequently and by custom, whether he keeps her as a concubine, or as a servant, or in any other manner whatsoever.

IT is however a grave sin, or rather a state of sin. Whence such men are not to be absolved before they have cast the woman out of the house; or if they keep her elsewhere, one must first see whether they have withdrawn from that state, as Fagundez notes, lib. 6. cap. 2.

PENALTIES are imposed by the Council of Trent, sess. 24. de reform. cap. 8. decreeing a threefold admonition, after which they are to be excommunicated, and if they persist obstinately for a year, they are to be punished at the judgment of the Bishop: But the woman, if admonished and not departing, is to be expelled from the city, or even from the diocese.

THESE penalties are imposed on public concubinaries. These are they whose concubinage is notorious, either by sentence, or by confession lawfully made, or by the evidence of the fact, which cannot be concealed by any evasion, as Fagundez notes, num. 7. with D. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 13. quaest. 4. ad argumenta.

NOTORIOUS also is that concubinary whom Farinaccius calls, num. 8. loco cit. who keeps in his house a woman suspected and defamed of incontinence, and, when admonished, does not cast her out; but the Saintly Doctor wills that of itself this is not enough; however the Holy Council of Trent, sess. 25. de reform. cap. 14. declares as public concubinaries those Clerics who keep women of this kind suspected of incontinence, and condemns them to penalties.

IT is asked, moreover, what penalties are due in canon law to Clerics who are public concubinaries.

THE FIRST opinion is, that they are suspended by the very fact by law, and become irregular, if while under the same suspension they celebrate, or exercise an act of sacred Order. So Toletus, lib. 1. sum. cap. 47. Sylvester, verb. Concubinarius, Navarrus, man. cap. 25. Julius Clarus, §. fornicatio, Azor, lib. 6. cap. 7. quaestio 5. and others, cited by Fagundez, in 6. praecept. lib. 6. cap. 2. num. 9.

THE SECOND opinion denies that they are suspended by the law itself, nor become irregular, if etc.; yet they can be suspended by the Bishop, if thrice admonished they do not withdraw. So Suarez, de censuris, disp. 31. sect. 4. and Tom. 3. de sacram. disp. 18. sect. 1. Sayrus, de censur. lib. 4. cap. 16. Rodriguez, tom. 1. cap. 67. Medina, lib. 1. cap. 11. Enriquez, lib. 9. de excom. cap. 25. §. 13. ad marg. litt. P. and others, whom Fagundez follows, n. 10. and Bassaeus, V. Concubin. num. 5.

THE opinion of D. Bonaventure, in confessionali, c. 5. particul. 50. et 52. is, that they are suspended by the law itself, until they do penance. He proves it from cap. Vestra de cohabit. Cler. and from cap. Quaesitum, under the same title. He holds the same more clearly in 4. dist. 13. quaest. 4.

AND indeed in cap. Vestra, it is concluded: Without doubt hold it certain, that from Clerics and Priests, even though fornicators, as long as they are tolerated and have not the evidence of the deed, the divine mysteries may lawfully be heard, and the Sacraments received. This text the Saintly Doctor urges, in 4. dist. 13. quaest. 4. ad argumenta, and other Doctors of our opinion, among whom add Maiolus, de irregul. lib. 5. cap. 37. Firminus, V. Concubinarius, num. 5. and V. Clericus, num. 13. Vivaldus, in candelabro, tit. de suspen. num. 19. Vega, in sum. 2. part. cap. 108. casu 3. Rebuffus, in concordatis, tit. de public. concubinariis, in the first, third, and ninth penalty, Villadiego, de irregul. cap. 3. Guido Papa, decis. 558. Farinaccius, in 4. quaest. 138. de delictis carnis, num. 55. Innocent, Hostiensis, Butrio, the Archdeacon, in cap. Vestra, in cohabit. Clericorum, et mulierum, where with D. Bonaventure they understand the text of the Decree in the same way, Decianus, in tract. crim. lib. 5. cap. 21. n. 10. Vivius, opin. 123. Ludovicus Lopez, 2. part. Instruct. cap. 23.

Fagundez answers, that these are condemned in cap. Vestra in the same way as in cap. Clerici, where they are not suspended, but it is commanded that suspension be imposed by the Bishops, and as in cap. Quaesitum, where they are not suspended, but the faithful are only charged not to receive the Sacraments from them, because they are scandalous; for the Pontiff says: It has been asked concerning clerics fallen into fornication, whether their offices are to be attended. Truly, although anyone is held to be suspended on account of a mortal sin as regards himself, he ought nevertheless not to be shunned in the divine offices: unless a sin of this kind be notorious, by sentence, or by confession made in law, or by the evidence of the fact, which cannot be concealed by any evasion.

Therefore Fagundez says, that no suspension is imposed on these; for, he says, public concubinaries are equated with occult ones, and as the occult one is improperly suspended, insofar as he is unworthy, so also the public one.

BUT these are trifles, as the Saintly Doctor saw; for the law does not equate them, but lays down an exclusive rule of true suspension, unless they are notorious.

SECONDLY, from the Concil. Trid. sess. 25. cap. 14. where concerning these it says: As regards the ordinaries, and also delegates of the Apostolic See, it shall be at their judgment whether they be suspended, and if, being thus suspended, they do not expel them, etc. let them be deprived of whatsoever ecclesiastical benefices, portions, pensions, and offices, etc.

Fagundez says, num. 10. that these words serve his purpose excellently, as if the Council commanded the Bishops to suspend them, but not to declare them suspended. But the words of the Council have another sense, namely, that they remain suspended, according to the ancient laws, until they be absolved by the Bishops, by the Bishops, etc.; which words are clear. It is confirmed, for in sess. 24. cap. 14. the Council confirms the ancient laws, saying: The other penalties of the law remain in their force. Nor let Fagundez say that these are to be imposed by mandate in those words, sess. 25. cap. 14. otherwise, let them be punished with the penalties imposed by the sacred Canons, or the statutes of the Churches. For these words speak of temporal penalties, deprivations of distributions, etc. as I said.

Fagundez answers, n. 12. that those laws have been abrogated by custom.

But on the contrary, for they are confirmed by the Holy Council, notwithstanding any custom whatever. It is confirmed evidently from the declaration of the Most Eminent Cardinals, the Interpreters of the Holy Council, to whom alone it is permitted to interpret the Council, but not to Fagundez or other Doctors of the opposing opinion; there, however, they decide: Concubinary Clerics are even today, if they be notorious, suspended by the law itself from the divine offices, just as they are also in the old law.

This declaration utterly overturns every solution of the adversaries.

What the Canons understand concerning public concubinaries, they understand also concerning public fornicators, as the Saintly Doctor notes, in the places cited, and it is had in the canons alleged, as Toletus notes, lib. 1. cap. 47. Sylvester, V. concubinarius, Fagundez, num. 15. Now a public fornicator is one who, wandering about, abuses now this woman, now that.

The difficulty is: whether in our opinion, which Fagundez confesses to be very probable, numero 9. under the name of Cleric there are also understood those constituted in Minor Orders; and indeed the Canon Vestra names Clerics separately from priests: Therefore it includes all, as the Saintly Doctor relates, loco cit. in 4. Farinaccius agrees, loco cit. Diaz, cap. 79. and others. They seem, however, not to be included, because it speaks in relation to the exercise of solemn Order, and this is not in the Minor Orders, and accordingly irregularity is not incurred. So Fagundez, num. 16.

Fagundez also notes, num. 17. that these are not excommunicated by the law itself, for in those laws no mention is made of excommunication.

In civil law no certain penalty is established for these, as Fagundez notes, num. 19. yet the administration of their goods may be interdicted to them by secular judges, just as the same faculty is impeded to women living luxuriously; it is clear from the leg mulier, ff. de curatore furioso. The reason is, because one who lives luxuriously is called a prodigal in morals, the Gloss, in leg. si quis cum iure, ff. de usucap.

Hence many have said that it is a crime of the spiritual forum only. So Clarus, quaest. 37. Portius, consil. 21. Tuschus, de visitatione, lib. 2. cap. 21. Ancharanus, ad cap. Cum sit, de foro compet. the Abbot, ibi num. 25. Soncinus, num. 24. Aretinus, num. 15.

Others, however, distinguish: as regards penalties, at present, the secular judge alone is Judge for secular persons; but for future amendment, Bishops and others can discharge that function.

It is proved from cap. penult. de cohabit. cler. et mulier. and the Council of Trent, sess. 24. cap. 8. and sess. 25. cap. 14. and in the former place it speaks of secular persons, and for their emendation it commands that a threefold admonition be prefixed, which is called the competent admonition, as the Saintly Doctor observes, in Confess. loco cit. See Fagundez, num. 20.

Some have said falsely, that the concubines of Clerics cannot be punished by the secular forum. For why should these secular women not be punished for a secular crime, or enjoy a forum?

There are some saying that concubines are not forbidden, but approved by civil law, leg. 3. ff. de concubinis, from Genes. 21. et 22. Iud. 19. 3. Reg. 11. where holy men kept concubines.

But these were wives, though they had a lesser dignity than the others, as the Saintly Doctor proves, 4. dist. 33. q. 1. and I shall show in the 3. part. Tract. de matrim. see what I have said of these, tom. 4. disp. 17. quaest. 10. sect. 30.

Dubitatio IV: On STUPRATION

It is defined by D. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 24. and in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3. cap. 21: Stuprum is lust by which the incorruption of Virgins is violated, or they are deflowered. He defines it thus also in 4. dist. 41. dub. 4. littera, where he compares stuprum with adultery, and says adultery is the greater by reason of the injury, or injustice, inflicted on the spouse and on the Republic; nevertheless on the other side stuprum is graver, because it violates the virginal enclosure.

Some, however, define stuprum thus: It is the intercourse of a man by force with a Virgin woman.

Hence, when the Virgin consents spontaneously, they say it is not stuprum. So Peter Navarr. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 3. num. 433. Sotus in 4. dist. 18. quaest. 2. art. 4. Vasquez prima secunda, disp. 112. cap. 2. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 10. dub. 1. Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 14. Fagundez lib. 6. cap. 4. Suarez de poenit. disp. 22. sect. 4. Coninch. disp. 7. num. 19. It is the more common opinion and seems to be gathered from the decretal of Gregory extra de adulteriis, apud D. Bonav., to be cited, where it is said: Falix deceived a certain Virgin by stuprum, but deception is equivalent to force, as I shall say in dub. 10. See Bass. V. stuprum.

The opposite opinion, however, is that even if she consents spontaneously, it is stuprum. So D. Bonaventure locis adductis, D. Thom. art. 4. Cajetan quaest. 154. art. 6. Henriquez lib. 2. de poenit. cap. 8. Filliucius tract. 3. in 6. praecepto, cap. 3. de stupro, Azor cap. 11. quaestio 5. Tolet. lib. 3. cap. 18. Rodriquez tom. 1. sum. cap. 28. Guttier. lib. 1. qq. can. cap. 37. Farinacius Tom. 4. quaest. 146. Graff. lib. 2. cap. 79. Bonacina de matrim. quaest. 4. puncto 17. Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 154. art. 6.

These, indeed, nearly all take the reason from the injury inflicted on the future husband, and especially on the parents, under whose power she is.

I argue ad hominem. Every act to which the laws impose penalties is evil, having a special malice: But voluntary stuprum of a girl is punished by Civil and Canon law, as the adversaries concede: Therefore. The major is evident, for a special penalty is inflicted for a special fault. The minor is proved from the Laws.

By Canon law the ravisher of a violated Virgin is compelled to endow her and to take her to himself in marriage, even if he is unwilling to marry her after the constitution of the dowry; he is beaten with rods through the streets of the city, cap. 2. de adult., and many teach this with Fagundez num. 21., and D. Bonav. reports it in Confessionali, cap. 3. particula 56. Excommunication to be imposed is added, and confinement in a monastery.

But if the deflowerer is married, he will be bound to endow her, and will be beaten with cudgels, or punished with a fine at the judge's discretion. If he is a Clerk in Holy Orders, he will be bound to endow her, and will otherwise bear penalties at the judge's discretion, such as suspension, deposition, etc. That this penalty for the ravisher of a spontaneous Virgin obtains in the use of all tribunals of both fora, Fagundez num. 27., Julius Clarus §. stuprum, Farinacius tract. 4. quaest. 147. teach.

IN CIVIL law, if the ravisher is noble, half his goods are published (confiscated); if of humble station, he is beaten with rods and punished with exile, according to the text in §. Lex Iulia, Institut. de public. Iudic. Now, however, only the Canonical penalty is in use in the whole world, as Fagundez num. 27. Farinacius, Clarus, and others above say.

NOW indeed this condition is no longer imposed, that she be under the power of her father, or wish to marry. Therefore it is a sign that it is given on account of the violated enclosure of the Virgin.

I ADD the penalties imposed on a violent ravisher, which by civil law are capital punishment, leg. 1. §. finali, ff. de extraord. crim. §. qui puero, where the ravisher of a boy and of a girl are treated as equal. See Farinacius Tract. 4. quaest. 147. and others apud Fagundez num. 28.

The same penalty the civil laws inflict on one who violates an honest widow by force.

BUT IF an honest widow consents spontaneously, she is punished according to some with a pecuniary penalty, as many say apud Fagundez num. 31., but others teach that no penalty is due.

MOREOVER, the deflowerer of a consenting virgin is held in conscience to restore to her parents the loss resulting from it, by supplying the increase of the dowry: It seems so to D. Thom. quaest. 154. art. 6., Cajetan there, Abulensis in cap. 5. Matth. quaest. 201. Many sustain it expressly apud Fagundez lib. 6. cap. 5. num. 3. Others, however, cited by him num. 5., say he is not held, unless he has defamed her.

BUT IF he violated her with a prior promise of marriage, he is bound to take her, or to repair the loss. So many apud Fagundez num. 3.; much more if he deflowered the Virgin by force, fraud, or importunate entreaties; for he is held in conscience either to marry her or to repair the loss; but it suffices if he only add in gifts as much as she needs, because she is corrupted. So Nauar. summa, cap. 16. Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 1. Valentia 2. 2. disp. 9. quaest. 3. puncto 3. §. an, et quando, Lessius Tom. 1. de iust. lib. 2. cap. 10. dub. 1. Sylvester V. luxuria, quaest. 5. Some say this is true if the entreaties are joined to threats, or reverential fear.

BUT IF the girl, deflowered in the manner said, finds marriages equally advantageous, and consequently suffers nothing, I judge with Lessius num. 15. Fagundez num. 8. that nothing is owed, because restitution is for a loss inflicted.

BUT IF he corrupted her under the hope of marriage, or by a promise.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he is held to marry her, provided the disparity is not so great that it would persuade the contrary. So D. Thom. in 4. dist. 28. quaest. unic. art. 2. ad 4. Lessius Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 10. de iniuriis per stuprum, dub. 3. Sanchez lib. 1. de matr. disp. 10. num. 6. Sayrus lib. 11. cap. 1. Sotus 4. dist. 27. quaest. 1. art. 3. Nauar. sum. c. 16. Richardus 4. dist. 28. art. 1. quaest. 3. Palud. q. 1. art. 2. D. Antonin. p. p. tit. 5. cap. 6. Rosella V. matrim. 4. Angel. V. stuprum, 1. Sylvester V. Luxuria, quaest. 5. Tabiena verbo restit. quaest. 22. Armilla num. 22. Victoria sum. de matrim. num. 266. Ledesma 2. part. 4. quaest. 18. art. 2. Veracruz 3. part. speculi, art. 19. Corduba in summa, quaest. 50. et lib. 1. qq. quaest. 13. Beia sum. casu 18. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 76. Rodriquez tom. 1. cap. 208. Copua lib. 2. decis. cap. 78. Spino spec. rest. glos. 15. Fagundez in 6. praecep. lib. 5. num. 12. cum D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 28. quaest. 1. See also Bassaeus.

THE REASON is, because it is a contract, and when she on her part has fulfilled the contract, the other party is held too; whence by that union she acquired a right.

IF, however, there is a grave disparity, which she herself knew, and could judge to the contrary, he is not held. So Sanchez cited num. 6. Rodriquez tom. 1. cap. 208. Sylvester V. matrim. 4. Fagundez num. 15. and others apud these.

BUT IF she was ignorant of the disparity, and had no external cause for suspecting fraud, the deflowerer will be bound to marry her. So Lessius Tom. 1. de Iust. lib. 2. cap. 10. Petrus Nauar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 5. from num. 444. Sanchez lib. 1. de matrim. disp. 10. Fagundez num. 14.

IF stuprum is not a species distinct from fornication, it would not be necessary to specify it in confession; but say the opposite with D. Bonaventure.

Dubitatio V: On INCEST

INCEST is a congress committed against consanguinity, affinity, or compaternity. So D. Bonavent. p. p. Centil. sect. 24. Or: It is the union by which the bond of consanguinity, or affinity, or compaternity is corrupted, as D. Bonavent. lib. 3. Compend. cap. 21. says. It is a sin distinct from fornication, as in 1 Cor. 5: Fornication is heard among you, such as is not even among the Gentiles, so that one has his father's wife.

THE REASON is, because beyond the deformity of fornication it has another against the honor owed to parents, whence within the forbidden degrees arises an impediment of marriage; and it is a greater sin with consanguineous relations than with affines, because with the former there is a greater conjunction, as D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 41. dub. 3. litterali. notes.

THE FORBIDDEN degrees are four; and indeed affinity is contracted by lawful union up to the fourth degree, but by illicit union up to the second, as is found in the Council of Trent sess. 24. cap. 4. de reform. matrimonii; but beyond these degrees there will be no incest.

The degrees, however, are numbered by remove from the stock, this aside. Thus sisters and brothers are in the first degree; sons of brothers in the second, and so of the rest; but these things are treated in the Tract. de Matrimonio.

IT IS CERTAIN, however, that the first degree of ascendants and descendants is forbidden by natural law for marriage, as between parents and children; for it has turpitude, as is said in Levit. 18. As to the others, there are various opinions, of which there will be discussion when I treat of Matrimony.

MANY say that all degrees of consanguinity are distinct in species. So Nauar. man. cap. 16. Valent. tract. 3. disp. 9. quaest. 3. puncto 3.

OTHERS will that all degrees and incests are of the same species. Diana de Circumst. resol. 31. part. 1. and part. 4. resol. 234. Caietan. 2. 2. quaest. 154. art. 9. Bonacina de matrim. quaest. 4. puncto 16.

OTHERS hold that the degrees of consanguinity differ in species from the degrees of affinity, of legal and of spiritual cognation; but that the degrees of consanguinity are not distinguished among themselves. The same they say of the degrees of affinity among themselves, Lessius lib. 4. cap. 3. dub. 11. num. 79. Azor 3. part. lib. 3. cap. 9. quaestio 1. Filliucius tract. 30. cap. 5. num. 96. Bassaeus num. 3.

However it may be, the degrees of incest are to be specified, as Sayrus lib. 8. cap. 4. says, with others there.

YOU WILL ASK, whether with the consanguinean of one's wife in a ratified marriage there is incest.

THOSE ASSERT who place affinity from ratified marriage; as D. Thom. 4. dist. 41. Sot. there quaest. 1. art. 2. Sylvester V. matrim. 8. quaest. 14.

D. Bonaventure DENIES, 4. dist. 41. quaest. 1. Tolet. lib. 7. cap. 11. Ledesma de matrim. quaest. 55. art. 4. Conrad. quaest. 151. Henriquez lib. 2. de matr. cap. 16. Sanchez lib. 7. disp. 64. Fagundez in 6. praecep. lib. 6. cap. 6. It is proved by D. Bonaventure from 35. quaest. 3., where it is decreed that affinity requires copulation and emission. Nay, they require the emission of both, Sanchez lib. 7. disp. 83. Praeposit. 3. part. de matrim. disp. 9. n. 81. Diana 4. part. tract. 2. resol. 43. and others apud Bassaeum num. 6. In the external forum, however, copulation is presumed to have taken place, Sanchez disp. 15. lib. 7.

¶ FROM ratified marriage, however, there arises nonetheless the perpetual impediment of public honesty, cap. fraternitatis, dist. 34. cap. 7. That between confessor and penitent there is no incest, Filliucius tract. 30. numero 105. Sa V. Confess. 25. Caspens. tom. 1. tract. de pecc. dub. 2. num. 56. Diana part. 2. tract. 5. misc. resol. 11. Azor 3. part. lib. 3. cap. 9. quaesito 5. Bonacina loco cit. num. 89. Caramuel num. 1015. Sancius select. disp. 11. Rodriquez tom. 2. qq. reg. quaest. 27. art. 1. 2. Naldus V. confessar. num. 26. teach.

OTHERS, however, apud Bassaeum num. 5. assert [it]. See Diana p. p. De Circumst. resol. 12. and 56., where others assert it. Certainly there is some aggravating circumstance, for by Canon law it is punished, apud D. Bonaventure in Confessionali, cap. 3. partic. 3. If, however, he used confession to solicit, let him be denounced to the Holy Inquisition. See Diana 4. part. tract. 5. throughout.

¶ But if she was baptized by him, it is incest of spiritual cognation, as all confess apud Bassaeum, and the S. Doctor indicates loco cit.

FROM the union of sodomy in the first and second degree incest arises. So Azor part. 3. lib. 3. cap. 18. quaesito 5. Graff. de arbitr. cons. lib. 2. cap. 34. and commonly apud Bassaeum num. 1.

It is not, however, a reserved case by the force of incest. So Diana part. 3. tract. 4. resol. 101. and part. 1. tract. 7. resol. 31. and part. 7. tract. 12. resol. 18.

NAY, Sanchez denies incest between these, lib. 7. de matr. disp. 67. num. 8. Sancius sel. disp. 40. num. 21. Similarly many admit no affinity from this source. See Diana part. 7. tract. 12. resol. 17.

INCEST is of the mixed forum, and so it is punished by the laws of both fora. So the DD. apud Fagundez num. 36.

By Canon law, besides the penalty of impediments to marriage, those who knowingly contract incestuous marriages in the forbidden degrees are excommunicated ipso facto, Clem. 1. de consang. et affinit. An incestuous Clerk is by Canon law to be deposed, as Covarruvias notes, 4. decretal. Julius Clar. §. Incestus, Farinacius tom. 4. quaest. 149. But he who is copulated with a stepdaughter or his wife's sister is to be separated, 32. quaest. 7. from the Council of Mainz apud D. Bonavent in Confess. cap. 3. part. 45.

By CIVIL law they are deported, or cast into exile to the Islands, Texts in leg. si quis viduam, ff. de quaest.; and because the penalty of deportation is not in use at this time, they say this penalty is discretionary, Bald. consil. 429. ad finem leg. 5. Iul. Clar. lib. 5. sent. §. Incestus, Menoch. de arbitr. qq. lib. 3. casu 501.

If, however, incest is joined with adultery, he will incur the penalty of death which is enacted for adulterers in civil law. So the Glossa in leg. si adulterium, ff. ad leg. Iuliam, de adult. Menoch. casu 502. Clarus num. 3. supra, and others apud them.

By CIVIL law also the goods of those who contract incestuous marriages are published, Auth. de incestuosis nupt. A declaration of the judge, however, is required, as Sanchez warns lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 9. Fagundez loco cit. num. 42.

Dubitatio VI: On ADULTERY

On ADULTERY.

Adultery is a sin of Lust by which conjugal fidelity is violated, and access is made to another's bed. So D. Thom. art. 8. D. Bonavent. p. p. Centil. sect. 14. and part. 2. sect. 32.

GRAVE is this sin, as the S. Doctor proves 4. dist. 38. dub. 7. and 8.

FIRST from Deuter. 22., where the penalty of stoning was imposed on adulterers, and Levit. 20: If anyone commit adultery with his neighbor's wife, he shall surely be put to death, both the adulterer and the adulteress.

IT IS grave, moreover, because, as the S. Doctor argues dub. 8., it is against concord and peace, against the good of the Republic in legitimate successions, and from it arise innumerable evils, because against justice the honor, succession, and other goods of a spouse are harmed. Whence Iob 31: For this is a wickedness, and iniquity most great.

HENCE you have that this sin has a special malice, distinct from fornication.

IT COMES about, however, in three ways. First, if a married person couples with an unmarried one. Second, if an unmarried person with a married one. Third, if both are in marriage; and certainly it is graver for a married woman with an unmarried man than for a married man with an unmarried woman; for it is worse for a woman to be with many men than for a man with many women; nevertheless on some account a man sins more, because he is bound, by reason of the greater use of reason, to abstain; also he is excused on another ground, because he is urged more to lust by the abundance of heat, and is not so ashamed as a woman. Therefore they stand as the exceeding and the excess; as the S. Doctor notes 4. dist. 35. dub. 2. litt.

From these it follows that there is adultery with the spouse of another already ratified, because the handing over of the body has been made; but not with a betrothed de futuro, because the handing over has not yet been made. See Sanchez lib. 1. de matrim. disp. 2., who proves it from Pope Gelasius.

TRULY COMPARING adultery, stuprum, and incest, adultery is graver than stuprum; the reason is, because by adultery the Justice owed properly to the innocent party is violated, nor is it sufficiently vindicated except by death in civil laws, and it corrodes the soul like a devouring fire, as is said in Iob. 31. But by stuprum the honor of the parent of the ravished virgin is not harmed, except through the will and consent of the virgin, as Fagundez cap. 7. num. 13. says; whence I gather that he is compelled to hold that stuprum is a distinct sin, even if the virgin consents, when she is under the power of her parents. Then, by adultery the Republic is harmed more in its successions, and greater infamy arises, as the S. Doctor says 4. dist. 41. dubio 4.

¶ BUT COMPARING adultery with Incest, the latter is graver at least in the first degree of ascendants and descendants, in which there is a monstrous deformity.

YOU WILL ASK: Whether one abusing his wife sins more gravely than one abusing a harlot.

D. Bonav. ANSWERS dist. 38. dub. 9., and with him others, that one sins more gravely with one's spouse, who is to be treated more honorably, and the union is to be directed to the goods of matrimony.

Wherefore it is adultery, because he does not chastely keep his body for his spouse, as Bassaeus num. 10. says. The S. Doctor calls this meretricious in Comp. Theol. lib. 3. cap. 1.

Hence that this is to be explained in confession, Caiet. quaest. 155. art. 1. Sot. 4. dist. 31. quaest. unic. art. 4. Sanchez de matrim. lib. 9. disp. 18. Petrus Ledesma de matrim. quaest. 49. art. 6. dub. 2. Diana part. 7. tract. 12. resol. 23. teach, where he reports those who say it suffices to confess that one committed the sin of Sodomy; Mazuchellus subscribes.

The penalties of adultery are inflicted by CANON and CIVIL law.

By canon law the adulteress loses her dowry, cap. Plerumque de donat. inter virum. She forfeits the earnest money, and loses the right to the debt, from D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 35. art. unic. quaest. 3. D. Thom. quaest. unic. art. 3. and the common sense of the TT. Both are excommunicated and thrust into a monastery, cap. Gaudemus, de divort. A notorious adulterous Clerk is deposed, cap. Si quis Clericus, cap. Romanus, 81. dist. 70. cap. Significasti, de adult. See Farinac. quaest. 141. num. 31. Tom. 4.

By the law of the Code the penalty of death is inflicted, leg. 1. Quamvis, 2. in fine, Cod. ad Legem Iul. de adult., and there the Jurists, apud Farinacium 4. quaest. 141. Nor is the wife excused on account of poverty or the cruelty of her husband, leg. Palam, §. Non est ignoscendum, ff. de ritu nupt. cap. ex litt. cum ibi not. de divort. Menoch. consil. 31. Clarus lib. 5. sentent. §. adulterium, num. 45. Parisius consil. 23. Nay, even if the marriage is false, but presumed true, leg. si uxor, §. Divus, ff. ad leg. Iul. Bartol. Alberic report this there, and Gomez ad leg. 80. Tauri, num. 48.

They also incur infamy, leg. 2. §. Miles, ff. de his, qui not. inf. See Farinac. loco cit.

It pertains to the civil judge for laypersons; yet the Ecclesiastical can compel them to desist, cap. cum sit generale, de foro comp.

An adulterer certainly knowing that she is his own offspring is held to re-endow for the loss inflicted on his legitimate sons. So Azor part. 3. lib. 5. cap. 6. quaestio 6. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 10. num 43. Marquez de test. cap. 5. §. 2. num. 22. Nauar. cap. 16. num. 40. Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. quaest. 7. Bonacina de matrim. quaest. 4. puncto 15. num. 13. Malder. 2. 2. tract. 3. cap. 4. dub. 9. Rodriquez sum. cap. 205. Bassaeus num. 5. Whatever Diana may say, part. 2. tract. 3. miscel. resol. 55.

The reason is, because naturally from adultery there follows a spurious child, bringing loss.

They answer that this is a remote cause, when he willed only the lust; wherefore the loss is not to be imputed to him, just as homicide would not be imputed to him if the woman procured the abortion of the infant begotten by him.

These things are slight, although to Bassaeus, Diana, and others they seem solid. For birth follows per se and naturally from the union, from which abortion is not caused effectively. In doubt, however, whether she is his own offspring, he is not held, as Lugo warns in de iust. tom. 1. disp. 13. sect. 2., because it is presumed for marriage.

What the adulteress is held to, I said in the disp. de Restitutione.

This also I shall defer still further to the 3. part. Tract. de matrimonio.

Dubitatio VII: On SACRILEGE

On SACRILEGE.

Sacrilege, insofar as it is a species of Luxury, is thus defined: It is a sin of Luxury by which a sacred person, or a holy place, is violated. So D. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 3, §. around the passage on touch. and p. p. Censil. sect. 24. and in the Compendium of Theology, lib. 3, cap. 21. D. Thomas art. 10. and others.

Therefore, whether a sacred person with a non-sacred one; or a non-sacred person with a sacred one; or anyone whatsoever is defiled in a sacred place, the sin of sacrilege is committed. By reason of persons, indeed, even kisses, touches, and thoughts are sacrileges: But whether spouses, joined together in a sacred place, are sacrilegious.

The first opinion is that this is always sacrilege. So Navarrus man. lat. cap. 57. num. 252. Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 16. Cajetan sum. verb. Matrim. and others cited by Fagundez in the 6th precept, lib. 6, cap. 3, num. 9. Candelab. p. p. de matrim. num. 262. Sylvius in suppl. quaest. 64, art. 7.

The second opinion holds that it is only venial. So the Gloss. on cap. Ecclesiis de cons. nor does it displease Soto 4. dist. 32. art 3. quaest. unic.

The third opinion is that it is licit if done for a cause, and secretly, Angl. flor. p. p. de matr. quaest. 6. Poncius de matr. lib. 10. cap. 10. num. 15. Casp. de pec. disp. 2. n. 20. Rodriq. tom. 1. sum. cap. 242. n. 19. Vega tom. 1. sum. lib. 1. cap. 78. casu 1. Diana tom. 1. Tract. de circuns. resol. 19 and 26. Vasquez prima 2. quaest. 72. ar. 9. disp. 92. num. 6. Lopez p. p. Instr. cap. 82. Sanchez de matr. lib. 9. disp. 15. num. 10. Caramuel in reg. D. Benedicti, n. 1017. and he says it is the opinion of all Doctors of good name.

The fourth opinion is that there is no fault in a case of necessity, or a just cause; nor is the Church defiled, if it is done secretly; even if afterward it begins to become public; but if it is done without cause, it is always mortal, even if secret; and if it begins to be spread abroad, the Church is to be considered defiled. So Sylvester V. conssecr. 2, §. 5. Sa V. Debitum, coniug. num. 12. Rebel. 2. part. lib. 3. num. 5. Couar. 2. part. de sponsal. cap. 7, §. 2. Lessius tom. 1. lib. 4. cap. 3. dub. 10. Toletus lib. 5. cap. 12. Castro lib. 1. de potestate leg. poenalis, cap. 3. docum. 2. Fagundez lib. 6. cap. 3. num. 11.

As to D. Bonaventure, in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 3, §. around the passage on touch, when enumerating the sins occurring in marriage, he does not list copulation in a sacred place; yet soon after, defining sacrilege, he says: Sacrilege is committed when Virgins or widows dedicated to God are known carnally, or such things are carried out in a sacred place. Nor does he seem to be speaking of copulation, which is by its nature licit within marriage.

In truth, in the Compendium of Theological Truth, lib. 3, cap. 21. he holds it to be a sin, without explaining whether it is mortal if done in a sacred place out of an impulse of lust; and indeed, if it is done for a just cause, he does not judge it to be sacrilege. The same the holy Doctor sets forth in the Confessional, cap. 2. part. 14. where he says it is mortal if done from mere impulse of lust; but I see that he is speaking in the sense of Alexander of Hales.

Therefore, if it is done for a just cause, and secretly, there will be no fault, or violation of the Church; but otherwise if it is done publicly — for which it is enough that a bed has been publicly erected in the Church.

Nor is the reception of offspring, or sensible delight, a just cause. So Tolet. lib. 5. sum. cap. 12. Sylvester V. the conjugal debt, num. 5. Fagundez n. 12. Yet it is excused when rendered, as Lessius notes, Tom. 1. lib. 4. cap. 3. dub. 12. Fagundez at the place cited.

A LEGITIMATE cause will be the danger of incontinence, or the avoidance of imminent pollution; for this is a spiritual good. Likewise a long siege in that place.

TOUCHES, however, kisses, and looks in the Church, outside the danger of pollution, are not sacrileges. So Sanchez lib. 9. de debito coniug. disp. 15. Cajet. tom. 1. opusc. tract. 17. opusc. 31. Navarrus on cap. Consideret. num. 20. and others with him, as Diana p. p. Tract. 17. resol. 23. who calls the opposite view scrupulous. Ledesma nevertheless adds, on the sacrament of Penance, cap. 19. unless obscene words have been uttered aloud; for then the sacred place is injured.

Now a SACRED place is a Church, whether blessed or consecrated. And indeed, if it is consecrated, it cannot be purified except by the Bishop of the place, or by another Bishop with his license, cap. Aqua on the consecration of Churches; nor can it be committed to a simple priest, except by the supreme Pontiff, according to the Gloss on cap. Aqua, Sylvester V. consecratio 2. quaest. 8. and it must be reconciled with water with wine, and blessed ash. But if it is not consecrated, it can be purged by a simple Priest with blessed water. And when the Church is violated, the cemetery also is violated, because the accessory follows the principal.

The QUESTION is also: whether one who is at once a priest and a professed religious is defiled by a twofold sacrilege.

The FIRST opinion is that it is a double sacrilege, because they are circumstances specifically diverse. So Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 3. Peter Ledesma on the sacrament of Penance, cap. 10. Paludanus 4. dist. 36. quaest. 4. art. 1. and others; and those also are held to assert this who say that the obligation of chastity in sacred orders arises from precept, not from vow: these are Valentia 4. part. disp. 9. quaest. 5. puncto 5. Sanchez lib. 7. de matr. disp. 29.

The SECOND opinion is that it is one sacrilege with an aggravating circumstance: So Azor cap. 27. quaest. 9. and Caramuel num. 998. Bassaeus V. Sacrileg. 2. num. 2.

The THIRD opinion is that there is only one, and therefore it is enough to confess the one. So Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 27. Lessius tom. 1. lib. 4. cap. 3. dub. 12. Corduba sum. quaest. 3. Cajet. 2. 2. quaest. 186. art. 9. Lud. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 29. Ovandus in 4. dist. 25. q. un. Rodriq. tom. 1. sum. cap. 53. Henriq. lib. 5. cap. 5.

As to the holy Doctor, I judge him to be with this opinion; for he says that the priest and the Religious sin the same sin in the Confessional, cap. 2. particula 20.

From these things it follows that a Religious who fornicates need only say that he violated his vow of chastity; for solemnity is only an aggravating circumstance, not a necessary one, in the opinion of St. Bonaventure; this follows Filliucius tract. 30. on the sixth precept of the decalogue, cap. 7. Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 27. num. 27. nor does Fagundez refuse it, lib. 6. cap. 7. num. 11. Henriq. lib. 2. de poen. cap. 5. num. 6. with the commentary litt. C. Corduba summa, quaest. 3.

THUS if they have a solemn and simple vow, it will be enough to say that they acted against the vow. So Sanchez, Henriquez at the places cited, and Fagundez num. 14.

The PUNISHMENTS of sacrilege are most grave. One who carnally knows a nun is punished with death; it is clear from the text in the Authentics on the most holy Bishops, § penult. and from the text in l. si quis in hoc genere, at the beginning of the Codex on Bishops, and Clerics. and cap. Si quis rapuerit, 27. quaest. 1. See Farinacius Tom. 4. quaest. 146. Clarus §. fornic. num. 14. Menoch. de arbitr. qq. num. 2. casu 389.

The goods also of the violator are applied to the monastery of that nun, as Farinacius notes, num. 9. and Fagundez num. 19.

By canon law, a layman is excommunicated, cap. Si qua monacharum 27. quaest. 1. yet not ipso facto, nor reserved to the Bishop, except after sentence passed; a cleric can be deposed, deprived of benefice, and thrust into a monastery. See Farinacius.

Dubitatio VIII: On sins against nature

On sins against nature.

A SIN of this kind is thus defined: It is a sin of Luxury by which the order prescribed by nature for generation is perverted. It is gathered from St. Thomas art. 11. St. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 24. where he says thus: The sin against nature is a luxury by which the natural use of copulation between male and female is dissipated. He speaks in a similar way in the Compend. Theol. lib. 3. cap. 21.

THE SIN against nature has five species. The first is Sodomy: the second, Softness: the third, Bestiality: the fourth, congress with a Demon: the fifth, an unnatural manner with a woman, from which generation cannot follow.

THESE are however specially against the orders in generation, for nature demands five things for this. First, that there be a conjunction of different sex, male and female, in a fitting vessel, from whose defect arises sodomy. Second, that there be a conjunction of two, from whose defect arises softness. Third, that there be a conjunction of two of the same human species, for if it is done with a brute animal, it will be Bestiality. If with a demon, it will be a diabolic congress. Fourth, that the vessels and organs be fitting, and from the defect of this there will be an imperfect sodomy. Fifth, that the due manner be kept, from which generation can follow, from whose defect arises Unnaturality. So Fagundez lib. 6. cap. 9. with St. Bonaventure de corruptela peccati, in Compend. Theol. lib. 3. cap. 21.

OTHERWISE, and more briefly, Cajetan here gathers these five species, Lessius tom. 1. lib. 4. cap. 3. dub. 13. from St. Bonaventure in the speculo animae, cap. 3.: there are many motives against the order instituted for generation for satisfying lust, and therefore many sins; for moral acts vary according to their motives.

THE FIRST is, when pleasure is intended in emission, and behold, softness. The second, if it is sought with a thing of another nature, as with a beast, and it is called bestiality; or with a demon, and it is called a diabolic congress. The third, if it is sought with a person of the wrong sex in the wrong vessel, and it is properly sodomy. The fourth, if it is sought with a woman in an undue manner, and it is unnaturality. The fifth, if it is without the instruments instituted by nature, and it will be a congress of a woman with a woman, which manner is reduced to imperfect sodomy, or complete pollution, according to the manner of lying together and of satisfying lust.

ALL these are most grave sins.

CONCERNING sodomy it is established in Levit. 18. et 20. where the punishment of death is fixed for it, Rom. 1. where the Apostle execrates it, and Genes. 19. it is called a most wicked crime, as St. Bonaventure notes.

CONCERNING the others, however, it is established from the grave disorder, which is why they are called by St. Paul uncleanness Galat. 5.

THEY ARE also of diverse species, as the Saintly Doctor teaches in the places cited, and elsewhere, Lessius tom. 1. de iustitia, lib. 4. cap. 3. de speciebus luxuriae dub. 13. num. 90. Filliucius tom. 2. tract. 30. in 6. praecepto, Decal. cap. 8. num. 141. Fagundez lib. 6. cap. 9. num. 6. Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 6. num. 149. wherefore without doubt these faults are held to be specifically distinct, and to say the opposite is erroneous, already condemned by the most holy Alexander VII. in the sacred Congregation, in the year 1665, as also we have proven more fully in tom. 4. tract. de actibus humanis, disp. 17. quaest. 10.

THE REASON is, because they have diverse motives to which lust tends, and therefore they are of diverse moral species; as was said in the place already cited.

On SODOMY.

THIS unspeakable vice is named from the miserable Pentapolis, and it designates carnal copulation of the same sex.

THEY ASK first: whether it is Sodomy when a man is coupled with a woman in a perverse vessel.

THE FIRST opinion asserts that it is: so Julius Clar. lib. 5. sentent. §. sodomia, Decius in leg. si qua mulier, Cod. de secundis nuptiis, Sanchez lib. 10. de matrim. dub. 4. and St. Thomas art. 5.

THE SECOND opinion, the common one, teaches that it is not properly Sodomy; so broadly the Saintly Doctor seems to take it in the Compend. Theol. lib. 3. cap. 21. Yet this is certain, that all those copulations against nature enumerated above, whether with a male or with a female, suffice for divorce. It is not however reserved. So Diana part. 2. tract. 1. miscel. resol. 29.

In which sense the name of fornication is understood in Matth. 19. because they divide the flesh which God has joined together. So St. Jerome understands it ad 19. Matth. and it is reported in cap. dixit Dominus 32. quaest. 1. And this sentence and reason they commonly follow with St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 31. quaest. 1. ad 5. St. Thomas ibi quaest. unic. art. 1. ad 4. whom Sanchez reports lib. 10. de matrimon. disp. 4. num. 3. Fagundez in 6. praecep. lib. 6. capite 9. num. 8.

HENCE also the copula of a woman with a woman, or of a female with a man in perverse ways, or with a beast, are sodomies improperly: yet it would be a reserved case, if a woman should emit seed in that vessel, not so if in the natural vessel. See Diana part. 7. tract. 12. resol. 13.

THE PUNISHMENTS of sodomy are death in both accomplices leg. cum vir nubit in foeminam, Cod. de adulter. ad leg. Iuliam, there armari iura gladio ultori, and in the text in Authent. Ut non luxurietur cont. naturam, §. propterea. But if the emission, or commingling, is in the hands, or the like, he is not condemned by this punishment, as they commonly teach, in Fagundez num. 9. But if, the copula having been completed, he emits seed outside, he is still to be killed, as Farinacius says quaest. 148. Cremation is imposed on the dead by the municipal laws.

MINORS are indeed bound, with a reservation of non-carnal crimes, as homicide, blasphemy, but not of carnal ones, since these they ordinarily do not complete cap. 1. de delict. puer. and this even if he suffers it from one of age, as Bassaeus says num. 21. v. Luxur. See Diana part. 7. tract. 12. resol. 13.

THEIR GOODS are also confiscated, but it is not received by custom. So Farinacius quaest. 148. Sodomites are also intestable. See Farinacius q. 148. Baiardus addit. ad Iul. Clar. §. sodomia.

It is a crime of the mixed forum, and it can be punished by censures even in a layman.

BUT a CLERIC convicted is deprived of his benefice, deposed, and thrust into a monastery, according to the text. cap. de clerici, de excess. Prael. Indeed they teach that he can even be degraded and handed over to death and to flames: Vivianus opinione 727. Menoch. de arbitr. qq. quaest. 286. Bermon. de publico concubinatu, rubric. de sodomia, num. 29.

THEY DOUBT whether he is suspended by that very fact. The Legists of both laws commonly assert it, in Fagundez num. 17.

THE OPPOSITE, however, is truer. So the Lateran Council extra de excess. Praelat. says: let them be cast down from the clergy, as St. Bonaventure reports in Confess. cap. 3. particula 5. nor is he suspended by the new law of Pius V., but the sentence of a judge is required beforehand; for only the punishment of excommunication carries with it its own execution of the crime, so that it is incurred by that very fact without any declaring sentence of the crime or of the fact; but the remaining punishments require a sentence. So Suarez Tom. 5. de cens. disp. 30. sect. 1. Hieron. Gabriel confil. 196. et confil. 187. Sylvestet V. affasinos, Fagundez in 5. praecep. Decal. cap. 2. num. 9. et in 6. praecep. lib. 6. cap. 9. num. 18.

NOTE truly that the Decree of Pius V. does not include any sodomite whatever, but one who exercises it habitually, as they note: Navar. sum. cap. 27. num. 249. Rodriquez qq. Regul. lib. 1. quaest. 29. art. 12. argumento, §. Illud, ff. de aedilitio edict. by which text Bartol. in prooem. Panormit. in cap. 1. de iudic. say that neither a merchant, nor an artisan, nor a harpist is called such who strikes or trades once or twice, but frequency is required, so that he be held such by common opinion; and Navarrus says that in this sense it was explained to him by the Datary, in the name of the Supreme Pontiff. Wherefore Farinacius departs num. 30. saying that one can be handed over for a single fall, etc. Where note that another Bull had been published before by Pius V. in the year 1566, in which he does not put exercentes, but perpetrantes; but I observe that it is a frequentative word, which Fagundez does not notice n. 20. Then I say that in the year 1568 another was published saying exercentes, which tempers the preceding one.

NEVERTHELESS the opinion of Farinacius is also probable, because the word exercising signifies to commit in the first act, according to the text. Item leg. Iulia de adult. et Instit. tit. de public. iudic. Then because the Bishop of Septimacensis tract. de discept. cap. 33. says that the same Pius V. understood it thus, as he received from his own utterance.

On BESTIALITY.

BESTIALITY is defined by St. Bonaventure in the places cited, in the preceding dubium: It is a sin of Luxury committed with a brute animal; whence it is most grave in this genus (except the congress with a demon). The punishment of death is claimed for this crime, and burning after death.

MANY, however, SAY that he is condemned by this punishment even if he does not complete the emission of seed. So Boer. decis. 316. Roland. confil. 7. Clatus §. fornicatio, num. 21. Menoch. de arbitariis quaest. lib. 2. casu 586. Petrus Gregorius syntagmate iuris, lib. 36. cap. 14.

YET I judge the OPPOSITE true with Fagundez and others cited by him num. 9. and he proves it most forcefully ex leg. 1. §. finali, ff. de extraordin. crimin. there: Perfecto flagitio punitur capite; imperfecto, — I stop — the guilty party is deported to an island. This text is illustrious.

By the Canonical law, however, seven years of penance is imposed, as the Saintly Doctor reports Confess. cap. 3. particula 46.

On copulation with a Demon.

OF ALL, this crime is the most wicked in this genus against nature, since it has with a spirit a carnal copula of the body, and with a body merely apparent, not however a true one.

FOR it is CERTAIN that demons do not have connatural bodies; otherwise the legion could not have stood in the one body of a man, as is related in Lucae 8. and St. Bonaventure argues there; and I have said enough in the Tract. de Angelis.

MERITELY Innocent VIII. commands the Inquisitors of the Faith to take notice of these persons; for these have joined to them also other abominations: Idolatries, blasphemies, abuses of sacred things, etc., and in the very venereal act there is the vice of superstition and irreligiosity, as Filliucius notes Tract. 30. in 8. praecep. Decal. cap. 8. num. 162.

YET WE DO NOT deny that demons can infuse seed received from elsewhere and cause generation, but that generation must be attributed to the man from whom the seed was emitted. So was Merlin the prophet begotten in England, as the Conimbricenses report de Gener. lib. 1. cap. 4. quaest. 10. art. 3. and concerning Homer Plutarch reports from Aristotle lib. 3. Poët. et Angel. Politianus praefat. in Homerum, and concerning Luther Genebrardus reports lib. 4. canonic. cap. 9.

On POLLUTION.

IT MUST BE NOTED from St. Bonaventure in speculo animae, cap. 3. §. Circa tactum, et opusc. de puritate conscientiae, cap. 7. et 8. that pollution can occur in various ways and from various causes. For it can occur either in sleep or in waking, voluntarily, which is defined: Voluntary emission of seed.

THE NOCTURNAL, or in sleep, is sometimes wholly in sleep, and then it is not a sin, because it is not voluntary. So the Saintly Doctor in the places adduced, St. Thomas art. 5. Cajetan. ibi, Navar. cap. 16. Tolet. lib. 5. summae, cap. 13. Azor. tom. 3. cap. 24. quaestio 1. Fagundez in 6. praecept. lib. 6. cap. 9. num. 17. But this is understood provided it was not procured beforehand in waking, or you consent in the same waking.

SOMETIMES it is partly in sleep, partly in waking, as if the movement of the flesh and the decision of seed happen in sleep: but the emission of seed in waking, in which you have full power of restraining, or half-full.

If the movement and decision happen in dreams, and the emission in half-waking, there is no sin.

THE QUESTION, however, is whether, if the emission happens in full waking, it is culpable.

THE FIRST opinion is that it is mortal not to repress it. So Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 13.

THE SECOND opinion is that there is no sin, but that it is enough not to take pleasure in it. So Sà verb. Luxuria, Filliucius tom. 1. tract. 30. in 6. praecep. cap. 8. Navar. sum. cap. 16. Graff. lib. 2. decis. cap. 81. num. 14. Azor tom. 3. cap. 24. Cordub. quaest. 23. Soto in 4. dist. 12. quaest. 1. art. 2. Sanchez lib. 9. de matrim. disp. 17. Fagundez in 6. praecep. lib. 6. cap. 9. with St. Bonaventure in the places cited.

MY REASON is, because the seed once decided is naturally and necessarily carried outside. For whether seed is generated in the vessels of the testicles, as the learned Vesalius and Bartolinus teach, which I assert — for it has often been observed in cadavers, as Dodoneus writes observ. 39. Hofmannus de gener. cap. 18. Carpus Riolanus in Bartolinus lib. 1. de infirmo ventre, cap. 22. — or whether it is not generated in them, as Fallopius, Cabrolius, Posthius, Casp. Hofmannus, Caesar Cremoninus, Adr. Spigelius, Regius and others in Bartolinus will; certainly there are vessels of Seed, beginning from the testicles, ending at the root of the penis, by which they carry it, and with force ejaculate the seed, prepared in the testicles, or elaborated above in the spermatic vessels. Wherefore indeed it can restrain it for a time, but yet the seed will without doubt come forth at last.

BUT it CAN, even occurring in sleep, be culpable in its cause. First in the desire for pleasure, second in the procuration, third in not removing the foreseen cause.

IT IS ASKED whether it is lawful to wish for pollution in sleep for health, or for a moderation of lust.

Valentia disput. 9. quaest. 3. puncto 3. Sot. 4. dist. 12. quaest. 1. art. 7. Lopez part. 1. cap. 74. Syluius 2. 2. quaest. 154. art. 5. DENY it; otherwise it would be lawful to procure it.

THEY GRANT that to wish for it, although not to procure it, is lawful: for thus it is lawful to wish for the death of a tyrant king, but God forbid procuring it: Sayrus lib. 8. cap. 5. Navar. sum. cap. 16. Angelus, and Sylvester V. Pollu. Sa V. Luxur. Toletus lib. 5. cap. 13. D. Anton. 2. part. tit. 6. cap. 6. Vasquez 1. 2. disp. 115. cap. 3. Sanchez sum. cap. 2. Filliucius tom. 2. tract. 30. cap. 8. num. 144. Fagundez cap. 9. num. 31. Bassaeus V. Luxur. num. 14. with St. Bonaventure in the places cited.

FOR THAT REASON it is lawful to rejoice, as they teach: Diana part. 3. tract. 5. misc. Resol. 21. et 87. Sanchez select. disp. 21. num. 35. Tannet. prima secunda, disp. 4. quaest. 8. num. 145. Fernand. part. 4. cap. 2. §. 4. Cruz part. 1. praecep. 6. art. 8. dub. 10.

TO PROCURE, however, is always lethal, as they teach with St. Bonaventure, in Sanchez lib. 9. de matrim. disp. 17. num. 16. Fagundez num. 31. who brings forward many reasons of disparity, not very strong. For if it is lawful to cut off a member for life; why not sperm, which is almost an excrement? Because, you say, the members are destined first for the conservation of the individual, therefore it is lawful to expose them for life; but not the seed, which is ordered to the propagation of the species — this, I say, is weak, even though it is commonly brought forward, because also the testicles are ordered to the species, and nearer still the very embryo inanimate, and yet it is lawful to tear these away for the health of the individual.

EXCELLENT is the reason of St. Bonaventure in Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. ult. which Sanchez uses de Matrim. in the place cited: for the emission of seed by excessive pleasure overwhelms reason, and reduces the will to a deplorable servitude. Wherefore nature granted it only for generation; but the mutilation of members, compensated by pain, man does not pursue. Fagundez brings the same reason num. 33. with Tostatus quaest. 184. in cap. 5. Matth. on these words: It is expedient for you that you lose one of your members rather than that your whole body be cast into hell, which passage the Saintly Doctor turns to this purpose, loc. cit. St. Bonaventure indicates this reason also in 4. d. 31. art. 2. quaest. 3.

As regards foreseen pollution occurring in dreams.

It is the opinion of many that you are bound under pain of mortal sin to avoid the causes from which you know pollution will come, or which you know morally, for example eating such foods, lying in such a position, provided however you are not morally certain, that it is only venial. So Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 13. Sylvest. verb. pollutio, Less. tom. 1. lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 14. Sotus 4. dist. 12. quaest. 1. art. 7. Fagundez in 6. praec. lib. 6. cap. 9. num. 34. They add the condition for mortal sin, if it can easily be avoided, for example by taking other foods, etc.

In truth Diana p. p. Tract. de circumstan. aggrav. resol. 65. judges that foreseen pollution, but not intended, and not only in ordinary foods and eating, but in mortally lethal ones, for example drunkenness, is not mortal. He adduces Villalob. tom. 2. tract. 40. d. 16. Vasq. prima 2. d. 115. cap. 3. Sanchez de matrim. tom. 3. l. 9. d. 45. num. 17. Granado 3. part. 2. controv. 6. tract. 4. d. 6. Sancium fol. d. 21. num. 15. et d. 23. num. 29. who further adds that no cause is given efficacious of itself for polluting in dreams, whether the sights or touches be foul; for if they do not cause it while they are present, much less when absent. Therefore no cause is to be confessed unless one be given by the intention of willing that pollution; but then only the intention is to be confessed, not the pollution. Bassaeus praises this doctrine V. Luxur. num. 15. although he adds, from Sanchez lib. 9. d. 45. num. 30. that the pollution itself is also to be confessed. He adduces also Vasquez prima 2. d. 125.

This doctrine of Sancius stinks to me, for it too much conflicts with the practice and with confessions received from confessants of secular priests, whom I have consulted: why, however, those objects materially absent act more in dreams is, because wherever they are moved intentionally, those species agitated in the quiet of the other senses are stronger by a power there united, and in a manner reflected.

I will say, however, with Diana, that foreseen pollution, but not intended, from actions sinful only venially in the genus of luxury, is not mortal. He alleges Suarez, Henriquez, Sanchez, Villalob. Less. and others, whom Tanner. adduces 2. part. d. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 6. num. 123. whose opinion he judges probable in num. 126.

From these Sancius also says, num. 12. that one is not bound otherwise to lie in bed, even if one can conveniently do otherwise: and num. 18. that one is not bound to leave the bed, even if one feels delectation with an alteration of the private parts. Diana reports him p. p. Tract. 16. resol. ult.

Many say it is lawful to procure the expulsion of corrupt seed by friction, even if by accident the emission of true seed follows. So Sanchez, and Villalobus. But here in the fifth edition he expunged this; the latter retracted it, because it is truly a false opinion, although Bonacina follows it de matrim. quaest. 4. p. 10. num. 11.

It will indeed be lawful for a Surgeon to handle the private parts of a sick man in need of turning, for the sake of the cure, with the danger of pollution. So Vasquez prima 2. Tom. 1. d. 115. num. 9. Less. lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 14. Ioan. de la Cruz in direct. praec. 6. d. 9. and others in Diana.

So neither is a runner forced to go on foot, even if he has experienced that he suffers pollution by riding. So many, with whom Diana concurs.

Much less will it be a sin not to abandon grave duties from which pollution follows, as confessions, studies, schools. Fagundez admits this also num. 35. adducing others.

There is also pollution procured, occurring in waking, which is called softness, and it is a grave offence, as is had in 1 Cor. 6. Therefore of these it is said: The soft shall not possess the kingdom of God.

For it is against the special order of nature, as St. Bonaventure notes in the place adduced above.

Therefore Physicians sin most gravely who persuade this to the sick, or provoke it with medicines, as Fagundez notes; nor are those excused from mortal sin who obey them. So they teach Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 13. Lessius lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 14. num. 94. and others in Fagundez. It can however be provoked per se, or with another, which are to be expressed in confession, as St. Bonaventure teaches, Speculo, cap. 3. and others.

To procure a great movement of the genital spirits is lethal; it is truly known to be great, if it gravely disturbs reason, as Bassaeus says with Sanch. num. 19. He says otherwise where a slight distillation and movement of the spirits is procured by reason of the patency of the matter ceasing, with the danger of pollution, and he adduces Sanch. de matr. and Bonacina: But I did not admit the patency of the matter, quaest. 3. disp. 1.

Dubitatio IX: On the lust of spouses

I presuppose that the use of marriage for the sake of offspring is lawful. Likewise, to avoid the danger of incontinence, as D. Bonaventure teaches in 4 d. 31, art. 2. The reason for the first is that this is the first end of the institution of marriage. The institution, moreover, is from God, as is said in Genesis 1 and 8, Matthew 19, John 2.

The other, however, is conceded in 1 Cor. 7: Again return together into the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence. So teach Rebello, 2 part. de oblig. iust. lib. 3 de imped. matrim. quaest. 19; Cajetan, sum. verb. usus matrimonii; Soto, 4 d. 32, art. 4; Fagundez, lib. 6, cap. 3; Diana, p. 2, Tract. 4, resol. 115, with others; or at most it is venial, as D. Bonaventure asserts, quaest. 2, with others cited by Sanchez, Tom. 3 de matrim. lib. 9, d. 11. One may also licitly use marriage for health's sake. So Rebello, sect. 1; Cajetan, tom. 1, opusc. tract. 12, quaest. 3; Henriquez, lib. 11 de matrim. cap. 17, num. 7; and others cited in Diana, resol. 218.

I presuppose also that the union of spouses from mere delight is venial. So D. Bonaventure, quaest. 3, from D. Augustine, lib. 1 de nupt. cap. 15, and de bono coniug. cap. 6 and 7; Rebello, loc. cit.; Fagundez, num. 5; Cajetan, verb. usus matrimonii; and this the Saintly Doctor calls a disordination with respect to the final cause. The reason is that marriage makes honorable the union, yet it still retains some disordination. Many, however, with Diana, p. 2, Tract. 4, resol. 116, excuse it even from venial sin.

The Saintly Doctor adds there, and in the Speculum animae, cap. 3, whom others follow: if from such concupiscence one is carried toward the spouse with a meretricious affection, so that he would wish, even if she were not his wife, or in the act should imagine another, it is mortal, and he is held to declare the condition of her whom he imagines, whether she is sacred, or married, or betrothed, or a virgin. But of these we must treat in the Tractate on Marriage.

The Saintly Doctor adds in the Speculum animae that a disordination of manner, of time, etc. may accompany the conjugal act.

With respect to manner, it is certain that it is a most grave sin if one defiles one's wife Sodomitically, as D. Bonaventure notes.

D. Bonaventure here; D. Thomas, quaest. 154, art. 11; either between the thighs, or in any other way by spilling the seed outside the natural vessel, as D. Bonaventure says and as is commonly held, with Sanchez, lib. 9 de debito coniugali, d. 17. The reason is that it is opposed not only to the general but to the special order of nature, as the Saintly Doctor argues in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 21, and with him Fagundez, lib. 6, cap. 3, num. 17. Understand, however, that this is so if it is done advertently, as Fagundez notes, num. 20.

They ask, however, whether a man who begins the conjugal act Sodomitically with his wife, in order to complete it in the proper vessel, sins mortally.

The first opinion is that it is not mortal, provided the danger of pollution is absent. So Navarrus, lib. 5 consil. tit. de paen. et remiss. num. 7; Ovando, 4 d. 31, quaest. unic.; Angelus, V. debitum 25; Zerola, in praxi paen. cap. 12, quaest. 25; Graffius, tom. 1, lib. 5 de adulterio, conf. 3; Gambacurta, de casibus reser. casu 2; Zancharda, in direct. part. 1, Tract. de matrimonio, cap. 4, § 10.

But that it is not lawful teaches Bonacina, de matrimonio, quaest. 4, punct. 11, num. 12; Sanchez, lib. 9, d. 17; Rodriguez, sum. tom. 3, cap. 88; Basil Pontius, de matrimonio, lib. 10, cap. 11 — whom Diana reports, p. p. Tract. 17, resol. 37. I add Fagundez, in 6 praec. lib. 6, cap. 3, num. 18, who calls it an absurdity to concede this. And I subscribe: for that act is not ordered by nature to that vessel, but is initiatory of an execrable abomination, and is accordingly reduced to it. If, however, he inserts his fingers into the woman's vessel, or his member into her mouth, they deny that it is a mortal sin — Sanchez, de matrim. tom. 3, lib. 9, d. 17, num. 5; Diana, loc. cit.; but Fagundez, loc. cit. num. 19, says it is mortal, as also to rub the member about the unnatural vessel. Diana, part. 3, Tract. 4, resol. 204, condemns this with Pontius, and deservedly, for they can have no order, but are brutish.

They ask further: when the man is sowing and withdrawing his member, may the wife, gravely aroused, excite herself with touches.

They say it is lawful: Sanchez, num. 12; Fagundez, num. 21; and very many others cited in Diana, p. p. tract. 17, resol. 38 — who nevertheless, with Rodriguez, summ. part. 3, cap. 88, condemns such an act.

To me the prior opinion seems more probable. The reason is that it is the consummation of the conjugal union, ordered to generation. For the seed of the woman, though not necessary, nevertheless according to many contributes greatly to generation, as Sanchez proves, num. 8.

As for variation of position — for instance, if the woman is on top — it is more probably not deadly; for the womb of the woman has a power of attracting and retaining the man's seed, as the stomach has for food. So Sanchez, lib. 9 de matrim. d. 16; Navarrus, man. cap. 16, num. 42; Rodriguez, tom. 1, sum. cap. 143; Fagundez, in 6 praec. lib. 6, cap. 3; Diana, p. p. Tract. de circumstantia aggravante, resol. 35; and others cited by these. The same they say if the union is had unnaturally, or sitting, or from the side — provided, however, there is no danger of spilling seed outside the proper vessel.

But if in an extraordinary manner of union he emits some quantity of seed outside the vessel, and, weary of children, at the end of the act pours out all the seed outside the vessel.

It is answered that the effusion of all the seed outside is deadly, nor can the wife, knowing this, render the debt — whatever Basil Pontius may say, de matrim. lib. 19, cap. 11, as reported by Diana, p. p. Tract. 15, resol. 54.

Thus as often as the husband wishes to exercise the act mortally, the wife is not bound, nor can she render it, as Sanchez notes, lib. 9, d. 16, num. 8; but when it is venial, it is probable that she is bound to render it. So Sanchez, loc. cit.; Peter Soto, de matrim. lect. 16; Cajetan, 2. 2, quaest. 154, art. 1; Fagundez, num. 27; Henriquez, lib. 11, cap. 16, num. 6, in gloss. litt. O; Diana, p. p. Tract. de circumstantia aggravante, resol. 35; and others with D. Bonaventure, in 4, d. 32, dub. 4.

But whether to approach a menstruating woman is deadly.

The first opinion is that it is mortal, and of old it was punished by the penalty of death, Leviticus 18, as S. Bonaventure notes, loc. cit., where he observes that the penalty enjoined was upon the husband asking, or even upon the wife, if she herself be the one asking; yet he must render to the one asking, if he cannot otherwise, because he is bound to render his due to his husband.

He concludes, however, from what has been said, art. 3, quaest. 1, that if the time of the menses is, according to nature, customarily once a month, he ought not to ask, because he has a time to attend to generation, so that offspring may be born without danger of monstrosity or of elephantiasis, as D. Jerome admonishes, cited by the Saintly Doctor.

But if he violently renders, the wife is excused; if, however, he knowingly asks, and renders willingly, he sins; for at that time the man has no power over the body of the woman. But if it is a continuous disease, all concede with the Saintly Doctor that it is lawful to ask; otherwise they would be compelled to be long without their right, nor would a monstrous offspring then be born; even if there were danger of this, it would be better that she be, than not to be. So Navarrus, man. cap. 16, num. 32, and others cited by Fagundez, num. 18.

Some, however, say that to ask during the ordinary time of the menses is only venial. Fagundez says this is the common opinion, num. 29. But these things I shall defer to the Tractate on Marriage. So it is said likewise of the sin of one who approaches a pregnant woman, with danger of abortion.

There remains to be considered whether, on account of sacred time, unions are illicit.

First, when the most holy Eucharist is to be received: it is commonly asserted to be venial, as in Sanchez, lib. 9 de matrimonio, d. 13; Fagundez, cap. 4, num. 51, with D. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 5.

But others say it is not even venial; Fagundez reports them, loc. cit.

On the more solemn principal feasts, the Saintly Doctor judges it venial, loc. cit.; but in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 21 he teaches that it is a sin if it is done from a mere impulse of lust.

In the Confessional, cap. 2, particula 14, he reports the words of Alexander of Hales, who says that the conjugal act is deadly in five ways from mere impetuousness. The first is the cause of satisfying lust through meretricious blandishments; the second, when it is done against the natural use; the third, when it is at a prohibited time; the fourth, in a prohibited place; the fifth, when one approaches a menstruating woman. But in the other passages adduced, and there also before these words, he understands these circumstances of place and time to be mortal if the impulse of lust is grave, preferring delight to God.

For the rest, he judges it not mortal, as I have reported; and it is the common opinion with respect to time; with respect to place, however, I have said enough when the sacrilege was treated.

There are also certain preliminaries to the act. And indeed they ask: whether spouses sin mortally by touching one another and kissing the privy parts for the sake of mere pleasure.

Many assert so. So Paludanus, 4 d. 31, quaest. 3, art. 2; Sylvester, V. debit. coniug. quaest. 7; Rodriguez, tom. 1, cap. 129. But I shall say with Diana, 3 part. tract. 4, resol. 125: woe, woe to the married, if this opinion were true. Therefore he upholds the contrary opinion with Zancharda, de Sacram. matrimonio, cap. 41; Sylvius, 2. 2, quaest. 154, art. 4, concl. 61; Filliucius, tomo 2, tract. 30, cap. 10, num. 195. Diana adds that these men are to be gravely rebuked. Fagundez subscribes, in 6 praec. lib. VI, cap. 3, num. 37, who says they are venial — yet with this condition, that there be no danger of pollution; for then those acts would be deadly.

Dubitatio X: On ABDUCTION

I speak of rape, as it is a species of Lust. It is defined, attending only to Canonical law: It is the violent abduction, or carrying away, of a woman, or of an honest person, from place to place, for the cause of lust. Thus it is defined also by D. Bonaventure in spec. animae, cap. 3. Three things therefore are required for rape. First, abduction; second, violence; third, that it be done for the cause of lust.

And so this abduction must be from place to place, for the cause of ravishing; for if you lead her out from a public open place, and take her through a few steps into a secret place, so that he may sin with her more conveniently, it will be fornication. So Clarus, lib. V sent. § Raptus; and Bertrand, lib. VI consil. 39; Fagundez, lib. VI, cap. 10, num. 2.

For incurring the penalties of the Council of Trent, sess. XXIIU, cap. 6 — as Sanchez notes, lib. VII de matrimonio d. 13, num. 7 — it is not necessary to have conducted the ravished woman to the destined place, but one incurs them at once, as soon as she was ravished.

It is called violent, that is, injurious either to the woman herself only, or to her parents and guardians, or to those who take the place of parents, or to the betrothed or husband, if she is betrothed or married. So Toledo, lib. VII, cap. 17; Fagundez, num. 3. It is also injurious and involuntary not only if done by force, but also if by guile or fraud; for these are equivalent to violence, Leg. un. § siquidem, vers. poenas autem. Leg. de raptu virginum. So commonly the Doctors with Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 12. Likewise if you abduct her with feigned promises. So Sanchez, loc. cit. num. 6; Fagundez, num. 3.

But if she consented with him, it will be rape only with respect to the parents, not with respect to her. And so if she is of her own right (sui iuris), it will not be rape. So Sanchez, num. 10; Clarus, lib. V sent. § raptus.

It is called for the cause of lust. Note, however, that the civil law imposes the penalties for rape done for the cause of lust, and of marriage; but whether the Tridentine does so for the mere liberty of marriage seems more probable. See Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 13; Farinaccius, tom. IV, quaest. 145; Salsedus on the Practica of Bernardus; Diaz, cap. 78; Rodriguez, tom. II sum. cap. 213; Fagundez, lib. VI, cap. 10, num. 4. Wherefore if anyone ravished a virgin for the cause of lust, he can validly contract marriage by reason of the Council of Trent, as many teach with Diana, p. 3, tract. 4, resol. 261; Sanchez, tom. II, lib. VII, disp. 13.

Hence you have that the Council punishes every rape of a woman, even one dishonest, although such rape be ordered to marriage.

The civil law indeed punishes with the ordinary penalty the rape of the honest woman only; yet if the woman be a married harlot, and both she and her husband resist, the rape is punished by the ordinary penalty of death. So Farinaccius, num. 177; Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 12, num. 23. The ordinary penalty of rape is death, leg. 1 C. de raptu virginibus; the same penalty is imposed on accomplices, helpers, etc. Likewise their goods are published (confiscated). See Farinaccius, quaest. cit. num. 7.

By Canonical law they are excommunicated, can. si quis virginem, q. 2, where: If anyone shall have ravished a virgin or a widow without marrying her, with those favoring him, let him be anathema — where excommunication is not imposed ipso facto, but to be incurred, as Sanchez learnedly notes, lib. VII de matrim. d. 17, num. 2; Sylvester, verb. luxuria, quaest. 6; and others with Fagundez, lib. VI, cap. 10, num. 11.

The reason is that the words Anathema sit — let him be excommunicated — never signify a sentence latae sententiae but one to be incurred, except in the matter of heresy and in definitions of faith in Councils, because there it is gathered from other texts that it is imposed by these words: Excommunicatio ipso facto, as Sanchez proves, num. 1.

By Canonical law, the Council of Trent, sess. XXIIU de reformat. cap. 6, punishes ravishers and their helpers and abettors with excommunication ipso facto and by law, and with perpetual infamy, and renders them incapable of contracting validly with the ravished woman as long as she shall be under their power and not established in a free place. Moreover it declares them incapable of every dignity.

And so the law corrects: Si quis virginem; for it imposes excommunication ipso facto, and invalidates the marriage which there was valid.

It can happen that a woman rape a man; but this rape is subject to the arbitrary penalties of the judge, as Clarus warns, lib. V sent. § Raptus; Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 12, num. 25. For since this happens most rarely, it is not defined by the laws, which provide for ordinary cases, not for the rarest. But if a woman rape another woman for lust, many teach, cited by Fagundez, num. 8, that she is to be punished by the ordinary penalty of the law; but others decree an arbitrary penalty.

But if anyone should ravish a boy for lust, without doubt he is to be chastised with the penalty of death. So Clarus, num. 32; Farra, quaest. 145; Fagundez, num. 9; and others cited by these.

You ask whether it is rape if the ravished woman consents, and the parents refuse; or contrariwise.

It is answered briefly that it is rape in either case: if the woman is under another's power and assents, or if the parents assent and she herself refuses. See Fagundez, cap. 11. Nevertheless, if she herself assents, the marriage will be valid, as Diana says with Sanchez above; Filliucius, tom. I, Tract. 10, part. 2, cap. 8, num. 165.

The ravisher, however, will not be punished with the penalties of the Council of Trent in their whole rigor if the woman consents, the parents being ignorant, in whose power she is: the reason is that she is mistress of her own body. So Sanchez, lib. VII de matrim. d. 13, num. 13; Farinaccius, num. 124, quaest. cit.

But if the parents refuse, it is commonly taught that he is to be punished with the whole rigor: but Sanchez, num. 13, alone denies it.

Quaestio IV: On INCONTINENCE

Quaestio V: On ANGER

Quaestio VI: On CRUELTY

Question VII

Dubitatio I: On the adornment of Women

Dubitatio II: On Immodesty in words, gestures, jokes, and games

Quaestio VIII: On P R I D E

Quaestio IX: LAST. On the other Vices opposed to the potential parts of Temperance

Tractatus VII: E VARIIS HOMINUM STATIBUS, ET OFFICIIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON STATES, AND PERFECTION IN GENERAL

Quaestio I: What a STATE is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On the state of perfection

Dubitatio I: In what the Perfection of man consists

Dubitatio II: What Perfection can be had in this life

Dubitatio III: Who are in the state of Perfection

Quaestio III: Whether some who are not in the state of perfection perform, by reason of their office, works more perfect than some who are in the state of Perfection

Disputatio II: On the State of the Bishop

Quaestio I: Whether a BISHOP is in the state of perfection

Quaestio II: Of what kind he must be who is assumed to the Episcopate

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to seek, or refuse, an Episcopate

Quaestio IV: Whether Residence is necessary for Bishops, and by what law

Quaestio V: Whether the Church, and Bishops, have dominion over certain temporal things

Quaestio VI: Whether Bishops, and other Ecclesiastics, have dominion over revenues that are superfluous to their state

Quaestio VII: Whether those Bishops who were formerly Religious are bound to Regular observance

Disputatio III: On the State of Regular Prelacy

Quaestio I: Whether the state of Regular Prelacy in a Religion is necessary

Quaestio II: How the Prelate of a Religion is to be chosen

Quaestio III: How many Prelates there are in one religion, and what order among them

Quaestio IV: Whether it befits a Regular Prelate to remain long in the same office

Quaestio V: Whether a religious Prelate has the power of coercing subjects with penalties, both spiritual and corporal

Quaestio VI: What solemnities a Regular Prelate, acting in judgment, is bound to observe

Quaestio VII: Whether appeal can be made from a Prelate, or Regular Judge

Quaestio VIII: Who is the Judge from Whom, and to Whom appeal is made

Quaestio IX: Whether a Regular Prelate can dispense with his subject, Who, and in what

Quaestio X: What power a Regular Prelate has to absolve, both from sins, and from penalties

Quaestio XI: Whether a Regular Prelate has the Power of administering temporal things, and what

Quaestio XII: Whether, and What, Regular Prelates can do concerning conferring Orders, and blessing things, or places

Disputatio IV: LAST. On the State of the Active, and Contemplative life

Quaestio I: Whether the Division of life into Active, and Contemplative is sufficient

Quaestio II: Which state is more excellent than the other: the state of the Active life, or conversely, the Contemplative

Quaestio III: Whether there is a Mixed Life resulting from the Active, and Contemplative, and which of these is more excellent

Quaestio IV: What are the chief exercises of the Active life

Quaestio V: On the chief Act of the Contemplative life, and how this act differs from Cogitation, Meditation, Speculation, and Intuitive vision

Quaestio VI: Whether Contemplation has certain degrees of its perfection, how many, and which

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