Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia

Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)

Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus

First published 1676

Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.

Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed

Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear

Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE

Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is

Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil

Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God

Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes

Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically

Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes

Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland

Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR

Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD

Disputatio VI: On Despair

Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is

Disputatio VII: On Presumption

Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin

Disputatio VIII: On Charity

Quaestio I: What CHARITY is

Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is

Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God

Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit

Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species

Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues

Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues

Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts

Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless

Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect

Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how

Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity

Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also

Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY

Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity

Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated

Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY

Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor

Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself

Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves

Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor

Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life

Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another

Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father

Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father

Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children

Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect

Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven

Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved

Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence

Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength

Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love

Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven

Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend

Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST

Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection

Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds

Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD

Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds

Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY

§ I: On Joy

Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue

§ II: On Peace

Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is

§ III: On Mercy

Quaestio I: What MERCY is

Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is

Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity

§ I: De Beneficentia

Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is

§ II: On Almsgiving

Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity

Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished

Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept

Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor

Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor

Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need

Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods

§ III: On Fraternal Correction

Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept

Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret

Disputatio XI: On Hatred

Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is

Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is

Disputatio XII: On Sloth

Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is

Disputatio XIII: On Envy

Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is

Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is

Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention

Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is

Disputatio XV: On Schism

Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is

Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is

Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS

Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO

Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just

Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war

Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged

Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition

Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What sedition is

Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal

Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is

Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin

Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal

Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil

Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom

Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is

Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift

Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God

Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings

Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom

Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom

Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom

Disputatio XX: On Prudence

Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is

Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue

Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE

Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE

Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost

Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE

Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy

§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels

§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations

§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy

§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers

§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy

Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues

Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel

Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is

Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind

Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven

Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel

Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence

Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION

Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS

Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY

Quaestio IV: On Negligence

Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh

Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS

Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)

Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD

Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things

Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future

Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE

Disputatio XXIII: On Justice

Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE

Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is

Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists

Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues

Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed

Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE

Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just

Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative

Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution

Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is

Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation

Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE

Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed

Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss

Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution

Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made

Quaestio V: What ought to be restored

Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way

Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body

Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made

Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul

Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored

Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored

Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored

Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored

Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored

Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored

Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored

Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored

Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding

Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention

Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties

Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute

Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored

Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it

Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution

Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution

Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor

Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor

Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority

Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made

Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made

Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made

Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices

Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence

Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges

Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors

Disputatio XXV: On Homicide

Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it

Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes

Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated

Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.

Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor

Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief

Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications

Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death

Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls

Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus

Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide

Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial

Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws

Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation

Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful

Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another

Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine

Quaestio I: What Dominion is

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things

Quaestio III: What THEFT is

Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft

Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious

Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave

Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another

Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious

Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold

Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters

Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours

Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves

Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts

Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE

Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise

Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins

Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment

Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge

Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly

Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE

Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation

Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation

Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition

Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused

Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal

Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven

Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others

Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy

Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution

Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned

Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered

Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge

Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself

Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when

Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES

Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness

Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial

Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses

Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses

Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate

Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office

Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate

Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault

Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing

Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity

Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts

Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion

Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion

Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely

Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises

Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies

Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction

Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it

Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly

Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal

Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused

Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments

Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself

Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing

Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering

Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery

Quaestio III: On Cursings

Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general

Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required

Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract

Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract

Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts

Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract

Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting

Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired

Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made

Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians

Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures

Disputatio III: On Promise

Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION

Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice

Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds

Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted

Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause

Disputatio IV: ON DONATION

Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what

Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations

Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling

Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are

Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell

Quaestio III: Which things can be sold

Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things

Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum

Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down

Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful

Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing

Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer

Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.

Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful

Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury

Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin

Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice

Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money

Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer

Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)

Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold

Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law

Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS

Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES

Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law

Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something

Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself

Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss

Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful

Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just

Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful

Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud

Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is

Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is

Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XI: On Testaments

Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open

Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs

Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato

Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable

Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake

Disputatio XII: On Legacies

Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how

Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed

Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is

Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them

Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general

Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is

Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue

Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue

Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend

Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary

Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one

Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION

Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio III: ON PRAYER

Quaestio I: What Prayer is

Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER

Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary

Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer

Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded

Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray

Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to

Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray

Quaestio X: How one ought to pray

Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours

Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept

Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it

Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour

Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins

Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies

Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions

Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself

Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies

Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies

Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour

Disputatio IV: ON ADORATION

Quaestio I: Whether Latria is in the genus of some virtue

Quaestio II: Whether Latria is distinct from Dulia

Quaestio III: On Sacred places, destined for adorations

Disputatio V: ON SACRIFICE

Quaestio I: What a SACRIFICE is

Quaestio II: What is required that a SACRIFICE be right

Quaestio III: Whether Sacrifice is of natural law

Quaestio IV: Whether besides Sacrifice, first-fruits are to be offered

Disputatio VI: On Tithes

Quaestio I: Whether Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio II: From which things tithes are to be paid

Quaestio III: To whom, and by whom tithes are to be paid

Quaestio IV: Where, and when, Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio V: By what authority the payment of tithes is to be exacted

Tractatus IV: E VOTIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VOW

Quaestio I: What a VOW is, and what its conditions are

Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW

Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow

Quaestio IV: Whether a Votive promise is made to God alone

Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness

Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid

Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow

Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good

Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good

Quaestio X: Whether a VOW about a thing that can have a good, and an evil, outcome is valid

Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is

Quaestio XII: Whether the immature are bound by Vows

Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS

Quaestio XIV: On the power of the Prelates of Religious to invalidate VOWS

Quaestio XV: Whether a husband can invalidate all the Vows of his wife, beyond the Vow of chastity

Quaestio XVI: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vow of Chastity emitted by his wife without license, the marriage standing, and to be fulfilled then

Quaestio XVII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted without his license, to be fulfilled at the time the marriage is dissolved

Quaestio XVIII: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife, emitted before marriage

Quaestio XIX: *Whether the Vows of a wife, made without the license of the husband, revive when the marriage is dissolved.*

Quaestio XX: *Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife emitted by his license: the Vow of Chastity excepted.*

Quaestio XXI: Whether a husband can revoke the Vow of Chastity of his wife, emitted by his license

Quaestio XXII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted under the preceding dominion of a father, or first husband

Quaestio XXIII: Whether a Wife can invalidate certain vows of her husband, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether parents, or Tutors, can invalidate all the Vows of their immature Sons

Quaestio XXV: Whether a Father, and Curator, can invalidate the personal Vows of their adolescent sons

Quaestio XXVI: Which real, or mixed, Vows of adolescents can be invalidated by the father

Quaestio XXVII: To whom the faculty of invalidating the Vows of adolescents, and the immature, belongs

Quaestio XXVIII: Which Vows of servants the Lords can invalidate

Quaestio XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from Vows

Quaestio XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which

Quaestio XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of Vows is to be made

Quaestio XXXII: Whether commutation requires a cause

Question XXXIII

Disputatio II: SECOND. ON THE STATE OF RELIGION, OR ON SOLEMN VOWS

§ I: On the vows of Religious in common

Quaestio I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

Quaestio II: Whether solemn VOWS are necessary for the state of a Religious

Quaestio III: Whether, and how, this state is Holy

Quaestio IV: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio VI: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio VII: On NOVICES

Quaestio VIII: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio IX: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio X: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XI: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XII: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio XIII: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio XIV: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio XV: On Novices

Quaestio XVI: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio XVII: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio XVIII: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XIX: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XX: On Religious to be expelled

Quaestio XXI: Whether every Religious is bound to all the counsels

Quaestio XXII: Whether Religious ought to teach, preach, etc.

Quaestio XXIII: Whether Religious ought to labor with their hands

Quaestio XXIV: Whether it is lawful for Religious to transact secular business

Disputatio III: On the Vow of OBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: Whether the vow of obedience is chief among the Religious vows

Quaestio II: What obedience is promised in Religion

Quaestio III: Whether Religious are bound to obey Prelates in all things

Quaestio IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the Prelate

Quaestio V: Whether all the statutes of Religious Orders bind under sin

Disputatio IV: On the Vow of Poverty

Quaestio I: On the essence of this Vow

Quaestio II: Which Poverty is more excellent

Quaestio III: Whether mendicancy befits Religious Poverty

Quaestio IV: Whether Religious, on account of Poverty, ought to be clothed in mean garments

Quaestio V: Whether austere fare is owed to Religious Poverty

Quaestio VI: How Poverty is violated

Dubitatio I: Whether Prelates can concede to Religious an annual peculium

Dubitatio II: Whether a Religious, having superfluities by license of his superior, is a proprietor

Dubitatio III: Dubitatio III

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Legacy stands for a Religious, as pertaining to him precisely

Quaestio VII: On the penalties, and marks, of a Proprietor

Disputatio V: On the Vow of CHASTITY

Quaestio I: What difference there is between Cloistered, and Clerical, chastity

Quaestio II: From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage

Quaestio III: Whether one vowing Chastity solemnly dissolves a marriage, whether consummated, or ratified, and by what law, and at what time this began to be done

Quaestio IV: By what law, and at what time, Religious Chastity began to be sealed with cloister

Quaestio V: By what means cloister is violated

Quaestio VI: Whether dispensation can fall upon Religious chastity, and who can dispense in cloister

Disputatio VI: On the Oath

Quaestio I: What an OATH is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to swear by GOD

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures

Quaestio IV: What is required for an Oath

Quaestio V: Whether, and how, it is a Sin to swear without Truth

Quaestio VI: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH made without justice

Quaestio VII: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH lacking judgment

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and how, a custom of swearing is evil

Quaestio IX: When precisely one swearing incautiously from custom sins mortally

Quaestio X: What sin it is to swear dolosely

Quaestio XI: Whether it is lawful to require an Oath from a perjurer

Quaestio XII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to require an Oath from an Idolater

Quaestio XIII: On the obligation of a promissory Oath in itself

Quaestio XIV: Whether dolous Oaths bind

Quaestio XV: Whether an Oath extorted by injury, as of paying usuries, binds

Quaestio XVI: Whether an Oath extorted by fear binds

Quaestio XVII: Whether someone's Oath, by fraud, or error, or ignorance, is void

Quaestio XVIII: Whether an incautious promissory Oath binds

Quaestio XIX: Whether an Oath confirms contracts that could otherwise be voided

Quaestio XX: On the means of removing the obligation of an Oath

Quaestio XXI: On the Penalties imposed upon Perjuries

Disputatio VII: On Adjuration

Quaestio I: What ADJURATION is, and by what means it is made

Quaestio II: Whom it is lawful to adjure

Disputatio VIII: On Divine Praises

Quaestio I: NICA. On the Nature, and quality, of Divine praises

Disputatio IX: On the Observance of Feast Days

Quaestio I: On the origin of FEAST days

Quaestio II: Whose it is to institute FEASTS to be observed under mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether mortal sins on a Feast are forbidden by this precept

Quaestio IV: Whether licit liberal work becomes servile because it is done for gain

Quaestio V: Which are servile works, forbidden on the Feast day

Dubitatio I: Which works are forbidden by Canon law on a feast

Quaestio VI: That a time of servile labor induces a grave transgression of the FEAST

Quaestio VII: On the causes excusing from violation of the Feast

Quaestio VIII: Whether, having merely heard a SACRED (sermon), it is forbidden to idle the whole Feast day

Disputatio X: On Superstition

Quaestio I: SUPERSTITION, what it is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On Divination by the Stars

Quaestio III: On Divination by the Elements, and other mixed things

Quaestio IV: On Divination from Dreams

Quaestio V: On Sortileges

Quaestio VI: On superstitious observances for works

Quaestio VII: On the malefices of Witches

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to consult Witches, that at least the malefices be removed

Quaestio IX: On the penalties of Witches, etc.

Disputatio XI: ON THE TEMPTATION OF GOD

Quaestio I: What TEMPTATION is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XII: ON SACRILEGE

Quaestio I: What Sacrilege is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XIII: ON SIMONY

Quaestio I: What SIMONY is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: How Simony is recognized on the part of the object

Quaestio III: In what way Simony is committed on the part of the act of exchange itself

Quaestio IV: On the Penalties of Simoniacs

Disputatio XIV: ON THE OTHER VIRTUES ANNEXED TO JUSTICE

§ I: ON PIETY

Quaestio I: What PIETY is, and what kind of Virtue

Quaestio II: What reverence is to be shown to Parents

Quaestio III: What obedience is to be shown to Parents by Sons

Quaestio IV: How, and when, Sons are bound to relieve Parents

Quaestio V: On the obligation of Parents toward Sons

Quaestio VI: In which cases Parents can disinherit Sons

Quaestio VII: Whether Sons can ever refuse aliment to Parents, and disinherit them

Quaestio VIII: To what a Woman is bound, who has a Son from adultery, or has substituted one

Quaestio IX: On the mutual obligation of Servants, and Masters

Quaestio X: On the obligation of Brothers toward Brothers, and Sisters, and conversely

§ II: On Observance, Reverence, and Dulia

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On Dulia

§ III: ON OBEDIENCE, and DISOBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On DISOBEDIENCE

§ IV: ON GRATITUDE, and VINDICATION, and the Vices opposed to them

Quaestio I: On GRATITUDE

Quaestio II: On INGRATITUDE

Quaestio III: On Vindication

§ V: On Truth, Friendship, Liberality, Epikeia, and the vices opposed to them: On the gift of Piety, and the Precepts of the Decalogue pertaining to Justice

Quaestio I: On TRUTH

Quaestio II: On the LIE

Dubitatio I: What a Lie is

Dubitatio II: Of how many kinds is a Lie

Dubitatio III: Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Lie is mortal of its genus

Dubitatio V: Whether every Lie is mortal for perfect men

Dubitatio VI: Whether among the degrees of Lie there is a most grave, and a most light

Dubitatio VII: On the others that are reduced to Lying

Quaestio III: On Friendship

Quaestio IV: On Liberality

Dubitatio I: On Avarice

Dubitatio II: On PRODIGALITY

Quaestio V: On EPIKEIA

Quaestio VI: On the GIFT OF PIETY

Tractatus V: E VIRTUTE FORTITUDINIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON FORTITUDE

Quaestio I: Whether FORTITUDE is a Virtue, and which

Quaestio II: On the GIFT OF FORTITUDE

Quaestio III: On Martyrdom

Dubitatio I: Whether MARTYRDOM confers first grace

Dubitatio II: Whether the Baptism of infants can be supplied by martyrdom

Quaestio IV: On the precepts of Fortitude

Quaestio V: On the Vices opposed to Fortitude

Disputatio II: On the Virtues joined to Fortitude

Quaestio I: On Magnanimity

Quaestio II: On the Vices opposed to MAGNANIMITY

Quaestio III: On MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio IV: On the Vices opposed to MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio V: On PATIENCE

Quaestio VI: On the Vices opposed to PATIENCE

Quaestio VII: On PERSEVERANCE

Quaestio VIII: On the Vices opposed to PERSEVERANCE

Tractatus VI: E TEMPERANTIA

Proemium I: Prooemium

TEMPERANCE requires the whole man, since it has Touch, which it moderates, in the whole body, and Taste in the tongue, which it has more frequently to bridle. Hence the Argument of this treatise will turn chiefly upon Fasting and Chastity; since the latter restrains illicit Touch; the former forbids excess in Taste beyond due measure according to the reason of time: But among the other virtues, this is the more difficult of experience, inasmuch as it above all emulates the mean of all, and consists rather in the mode of action than in the very substance: For man has a vehement and innate appetite for preserving himself in the being of an individual by nutrition, and in the being of the species by generation; if he were to abstain from these entirely, he would without doubt unjustly invert the right of nature: Yet since nutrition is supremely necessary to each one for the being of the individual, but not so generation for the being of the species — since the species has been propagated everywhere most diffusively by many abstaining from all time — hence it is that the obligation of preserving one's own individual is greater in each one than that of propagating his species, although the titillations of pleasure are greater toward this than toward that; whence it is clear that the virtue which moderates Touch is more excellent than that which moderates Taste, since it is occupied about a thing more arduous. Moreover TEMPERANCE can be considered, either as it is a political virtue, or as purgatorial, or finally as of the purged soul; according to the first, nothing requiring repentance is sought, as I shall say below; according to the second, it abandons all things necessary for the use of the body, as far as nature permits; but inasmuch as it is the virtue of the purged soul, it forgets all these things; as the Seraphic Doctor has it, to be cited below, where he heaps up the several parts of Temperance, which we shall enumerate here, quaest. 3.

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

THAT Temperance is a Cardinal, and at the same time a Moral virtue, is sufficiently clear from what was just said; since Virtue is in the mean, and moral matters are chiefly regarded in the mode, and in both, TEMPERANCE, not like the other virtues, ought not to be turned into doubt by anyone, that it is no common virtue; of which Bl. Bernard says excellently, in the holy Doctor, in the place to be cited presently: "Hold the mean, if you do not wish to lose the measure," indicating that both the mean and the measure are to be specially kept in it; which can also be said with equal right of the other virtues annexed to it: for the bashful man is suffused with a beautiful blush of shame, the presence of a shameful thing pressing upon him; Modesty likewise so composes the graceful voice, and countenance, with gestures and garments, that it may express the adornment of the soul in the body, and so avoid excess of adornment in all things that it affects nothing but what befits it: Say the same of Humility, Mildness, Clemency, and the other virtues which temper excess and sedulously keep the mean, of which I shall treat below in their proper places; in the meantime I shall inquire what, and of what sort, this virtue is, which is here disputed; then, with some things premised, I shall spread myself more broadly, discoursing on the precept of fasting; and last of all I shall weigh, with my usual brevity, Chastity with the manifold vice opposed to it.

Quaestio I: Which Virtue Temperance is, and of what kind

What Virtue Temperance is, and of what kind.

IT IS DEFINED by St. Bonaventure in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 8: Temperance is to desire nothing whence repentance must follow, in no way or measure; to exceed no law; to subdue cupidity under the yoke of reason. This is rather a description, which he repeats de septem itineribus, itinere 7. dist. 5, and in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 5. cap. 35, and p. p. Centil. loco citando.

IN the Declaratorio of Theological terms he says: Temperance is the taming of lusts and of all evil motions, preserving man uncorrupted for God.

AT OTHER TIMES he brings more proper definitions, varying only in words: 3. part. Centil. sect. 42: Temperance is the firm and moderate dominion of reason over lust and over the other disorderly impulses of the soul; from Aristotle, lib. 2. de invent.: Temperance is the dominion of reason over lust and over inopportune motions; from the same Cicero, de off. lib. 1. cap. 15.

From these you have that the object of this virtue is the moderation of the sensitive appetite with regard to those things which most allure man, namely the delectable things according to touch, and the concupiscences of food and drink, as Aristotle teaches 1. Eth. cap. 10, and Cicero lib. 2. de Invent., and St. Thomas art. 3. and 4.

THAT IT IS ASSERTED, I gather thence also that it is a virtue.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor in the places cited here, and in 3. dist. 33. quaest. 4: The office of the moral virtues is to moderate the passions, especially those which move more vehemently toward changeable goods; but Temperance labors in curbing the most vehement cupidity, which draws away from the eternal good to the created, which are the delectations of the material senses: Therefore. Just as therefore fortitude, because it turns away from the flight of sensible evils to the pursuit of reason, is a virtue; so also Temperance, which calls away from carnal goods to spiritual things, will be a virtue.

NOR indeed is a precise virtue required for curbing spiritual delectations; for these are of themselves according to reason, and only one of them is to be moderated per accidens, when it withdraws from another more due one, as St. Thomas says art. 4.

I ASSERT secondly, that Temperance is a Cardinal Virtue. So St. Bonaventure in 3. loc. cit. and St. Thomas art. 7. and 8.

IT IS PROVED: A Cardinal Virtue is one which exercises some principal office for rational direction. But such is temperance, which is concerned with moderating the most difficult passions of the concupiscible, and the most vehement delectations of touch, taste, and smell, and of sight. But this moderation is principal among the things necessary for leading a life consonant with reason.

OBSERVE, however, with St. Bonaventure lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 35, that Temperance is concerned not only with delectable things according to touch, but also according to the other senses; yet because the delectable things according to sight, hearing, and smell, since they are not so material, have not the moral goodness and malice that the delectable things according to touch have — which are therefore not forbidden in the Decalogue except sometimes per accidens, insofar as they can be referred to appetitions or actions concerning the delectable things of touch, or concerning the objects of other passions — as the Holy Doctor gathers from St. Augustine lib. 10. confess. cap. 32, and Aristotle teaches 3. Eth. cap. 10, where he says: For those who rejoice in things perceived by sight, such as colors and pictures, are called neither temperate nor intemperate. In like manner must we speak of those things that pertain to hearing: nor of those who rejoice in odors, except per accidens.

FURTHERMORE, the rule for judging whether the appetition and delectation concerning things of this kind, which are the matter of Temperance, is such as right reason prescribes, and accordingly has that moderation which Temperance prescribes, must be taken from the necessity and utility of these things for human life. So teaches Aristotle 3. Eth. cap. 11, St. Jerome on cap. 44. Ezech., and St. Augustine lib. de moribus Ecclesiae, cap. 21, St. Isidore de summo bono, lib. 2. cap. 44, and in synonim. cap. 26, and other Fathers cited by St. Bonaventure lib. 2. Pharetrae, from cap. 35 to 38.

THE REASON of this is, because delectable things are not goods per se and to be sought, but only insofar as they are ordered to relieving some necessity of this life for the end. Whence Aristotle says 3. Eth. cap. 11: The temperate man desires delectable things for the sake of health, or of good condition, as Valentia disp. 9. quaest. 1. puncto 1, and Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 1. num. 6, also note, with St. Thomas quaest. 141. art. 6.

THAT TEMPERANCE is inferior to the other Cardinals I showed above; and it is confirmed: For Justice is ordered to the public good; likewise fortitude. Prudence indeed rules all, but Temperance regards only the particular good per se. Add that it is concerned with curbing concupiscence, the lowest of the powers that obey Reason.

Quaestio II: Which Vices are contrary to TEMPERANCE

TWO Vices are opposed to this Virtue. One by defect, and is called Insensibility; the other by excess, and is called Intemperance. So St. Thomas art. 1. and 2., from Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 7.

FOR since Temperance stands in the mean in regard to those things that serve life according to the sense of touch, of food, etc., it can fail on one side, if one be insensible, as was that Xenocrates, who was called a log; and Carneades, who did not eat, forgetful of himself, unless his wife opportunely threw food into his mouth.

BY excess, however, one sins if one gives too much attention to the delectations of touch and taste, more than is necessary.

INTEMPERANCE is truly called a childish vice by St. Thomas here and Aristotle 3. Eth. last cap.: for like children it intentures itself in sordid concupiscence; and because, like children, it grows into obstinacy if not curbed; Hence Eccl. 30: A remiss son will become headstrong. Thirdly, because it must be coerced by discipline, as children are corrected.

MOREOVER Intemperance is a disgraceful vice, because it inclines man to brutal delectations. But of these proper vices there will be a discussion place by place.

Quaestio III: On the parts of TEMPERANCE

THREEFOLD are the parts of Temperance, as of the other Cardinal virtues. Some are integral; some subjective; some potential.

THE quasi-integral parts are two, namely Shamefacedness, by which one shuns the baseness contrary to temperance: and Honesty, by which the beauty of Temperance is loved.

SHAMEFACEDNESS is described by St. Bonaventure 3. part. Centil. sect. 42: Shamefacedness is to preserve honesty in gesture and word. And opusc. declarat. terminorum Theol.: Shamefacedness is the observance of honesty in gesture and word. He describes it from the Fathers in S. Ductor lib. 4. Pharetrae, cap. 14.

HONESTY is described by St. Bonaventure loc. cit. 12 Centiloquii: It is neither to seek daintier foods, nor to give pains in outward show. He means to say that it is that affection toward honesty, or toward the works of temperance worthy of honor. But the works of temperance are called honest, or worthy of honor, because they are opposed to the disgraceful and infamous sins of intemperance.

THE subjective parts of the Virtue of Temperance, which are diverse by object, are four. For the delectations of touch, in curbing which Temperance is engaged, are divided into two kinds: some are ordered to nourishment, and in these, as regards food, there is Abstinence; as regards drink, Sobriety. Some indeed are ordered to the generative power, and in these, as regards the principal delectation of coition itself, there is Chastity; as regards the delectations surrounding it, such as looks, kisses, touches, it is called Pudicity. Yet it is the same as chastity; and it is called Pudicity inasmuch as shame is wont to be present about the use, as St. Augustine says 14. de Civit. cap. 17. and 18, and Aristotle 2. Rhet. cap. 6. Whence St. Thomas says that Pudicity is chastity as affected by shame even about the signs themselves. So Valentia disp. 9. quaest. 1. puncto 2, Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 6.

IN Chastity the principal place is held by Virginity, which keeps itself untouched from every venereal act, as St. Ambrose says lib. de Virginibus: Virginal chastity is an integrity devoid of contagion. By integrity of the body, however, I understand that which has been violated by no voluntary obscenity, as St. Augustine admonishes lib. 1. de Civitate Dei, cap. 18. and 25; but once corrupted it cannot be restored, as St. Jerome has it epist. 22. cap. 2, and St. Thomas quaest. 152. art. 1.

INFERIOR indeed is abstinence from illicit coition; which is twofold: conjugal; and widowed. See all this in St. Bonaventure 3. part. Centil. sect. 42, and the other places to be cited quaest. 9. and 10.

THE potential parts of Temperance are certain virtues which are engaged in moderating delectable things; yet they fall short of the perfection of Temperance, because they labor not about things so difficult, such as the delectable things of touch; and these are eight, namely Continence, Mildness, Clemency, Modesty, Humility, Studiosity, Eutrapelia, Parsimony, or simplicity, or moderation.

CONTINENCE is the virtue restraining the exorbitant motions of the will, which usually arise from the impulse of the passions of the sensitive appetite, moving the will toward things contrary to right reason. On this St. Thomas quaest. 155, and Aristotle, 7. Ethic.

MILDNESS is the virtue establishing moderation in the appetite for vengeance. So St. Thomas quaest. 157.

CLEMENCY is the virtue applying a measure convenient to right reason in external punishment, and thus it belongs to superiors toward subjects, as St. Thomas teaches loco citato.

MODESTY is the virtue placing moderation in the external actions of the body.

HUMILITY is the virtue curbing by fear the motions of daring and of hope, so that one should not wish anything beyond one's merit attributed to oneself.

STUDIOSITY is the virtue prescribing a measure to the appetite in the desire of knowing.

EUTRAPELIA is the virtue placing a measure in honest recreations and jests.

PARSIMONY is the virtue that makes use in moderation of external things pertaining to the body, such as ornament, clothing, etc. See this in St. Bonaventure sermone 5. Hexaëmer., and the other places alleged. It is also had in 3. part. Centil. sect. 43.

Quaestio IV: On Shamefastness

On SHAMEFACEDNESS.

SHAMEFACEDNESS properly is not a virtue, although it is a certain laudable passion. So St. Thomas art. 1, Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 7, and lib. 4. last cap.

THE REASON is, for Virtue is an elective habit, or one operating by election, and if it has the perfect state it excludes in the agent the fear of a base and disgraceful thing, as of an evil difficult and arduous to avoid; nor does it actually admit anything base, wherefrom disgrace would be feared. But Shamefacedness, since it is nothing else than fear of some base and disgraceful thing, properly is not a habit but a passion; nor is its motion by election, but from a certain impulse of passion; nor does it exclude the fear, or opinion, of a base thing as possible, arduous, or difficult to avoid, but rather includes it.

BUT its subject is not the old, nor the wicked, nor the perfect. For since shamefacedness is the fear of some baseness, two things are required for it: that the baseness be held evil by you, and that to the one feeling shame it be esteemed difficult to avoid. From defect of the former condition wicked men lack shamefacedness, of whom Hierem. 3: Thou hast the forehead of a harlot, thou wouldst not blush. From defect of the second condition the old and the perfect lack shamefacedness, who are nevertheless so disposed that, if anything base were in them, they would be ashamed, as Aristotle says 4. Eth. last cap.

WHENCE St. Ambrose, lib. 1. off. cap. 18: Beautiful is the virtue of the young, shamefacedness, and its sweet grace, which is seen not only in deeds but also in their very words. See St. Bonaventure lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 30.

AND St. Jerome epist. 14, cited by St. Bonaventure lib. 4. Pharetrae, cap. 14: Let shamefacedness adorn prudence, and let modesty, which has ever been the chief thing in women, surpass all virtues in thee.

AND St. Bernard serm. 86. in Cant.: Shamefacedness is the special glory of conscience, the first-fruits of the virtues, and the mark of all honesty.

HE also there recites many Fathers admitting shamefacedness even in perfect men, not in order to evil, or present baseness, but to what is past, inasmuch as it is present in memory and has imminent evil effects.

IN 4. dist. 16. part. 1. dub. 11. he places shamefacedness unto repentance in great sinners. Again he confirms this from the Fathers, loc. cit. Pharetrae. But no wonder: for they no longer have the character of the wicked, while they repent of their sins.

Quaestio V: On Honesty

On HONESTY.

IN MANY ways Honestum is taken. First, for what is exterior in the prosperity of fortitude, and the dignity of nobility; and a person worthy of honor is called honest; and for the seemliness of morals in exterior conversation, and for all things which have an external semblance together with honesty, as St. Bonaventure notes in primo, dist. 1. art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 4, and on those words of Wisd. 10: Honored him; it is taken also for seemliness in the face of men; thus an impediment of public honesty is placed by betrothal for contracting with the relatives of the spouse. It also signifies every good desirable per se. Simply, however, Honesty regards the good of virtue, as the Holy Doctor admonishes p. p. Centil. sect. 9.

THEREFORE Honestum, says St. Thomas quaest. cit. art. 2, from St. Augustine lib. 83. qq. quaest. 30, is spiritual comeliness. For that is beautiful and comely which has its parts proportionately disposed, from St. Dionysius c. 4. de div. nom. part. 1. Thus therefore spiritual comeliness is placed in this, that the life and morals of a man be well proportioned according to the spiritual clarity of right reason, which pertains to the character of the honest, and of virtue.

HONESTY therefore is called an integral part of Temperance by way of a certain condition which shines in Temperance itself with a special reason. So St. Thomas, from Macrob. lib. 1. in somn. Scip., Ambrose lib. 1. de off. c. 43.

THE REASON is, because, although honesty is common to every virtue, yet it is ascribed to Temperance by a certain special reason, which repels from man that which is most base and most unseemly, namely brutal voluptuousness; which indeed is the condition, or affection, of the virtue of Temperance.

Quaestio VI: On Abstinence

On ABSTINENCE.

I ASSERT first, that Abstinence is a special virtue. It is proved from the first of the second of Peter chapter 1, where in that science which virtue is, he commands abstinence to be observed.

IT IS PROVED secondly, for it has a special honesty in moderating the appetite concerning food, as St. Bonaventure teaches in the places alleged in the preceding questions.

IT IS PROVED thirdly. That which is consonant with reason in a special manner, and consists in a mean, is a virtue; such is abstinence; for it is a special mode of temperance, contributing very much to perfection; see St. Thomas ad 3.

Hence God commanded abstinence to those whom he destined for undertaking arduous things; thus of St. John the Baptist it is said Lucae 1: He shall be great before the Lord; wine and strong drink he shall not drink. By the name of sicera, moreover, is understood every kind of liquor by which drunkenness can be incurred, as the Holy Doctor notes in Apologia Pauper. cap. 2. resp. 2, where he gives the reason of this precept; for it befits a vessel enslaved to heavenly grace to abstain from the enticements of the world; which reason can be applied to all men in praise of this virtue, since all are vessels capable of divine grace, and destined to receive it.

I pass over many examples of saints who applied themselves with particular study to abstinence; you have them adorned with various reasons and festive discourses in the Seraphic Doctor in the place cited. But since the principal reason of abstinence stands in fasting, I shall now treat of it; and having briefly finished this capital question, I shall the better weigh the great doubts it contains.

On Fasting.

Heretics, whose God is the belly, so hunger after gluttony that not only do they abolish every precept of fasting, but moreover fasten upon it the charge of superstition; thus, being carnally wise, after they have lost all sense of Chastity and modesty, they beslaver themselves with the delicacies of foods, and, captivated in their eyes, they cannot see the clearest testimonies of sacred Scripture, which extol the merit of fasting; because they will not.

FIRST of all the Aëtians gave origin to this error, who in the time of the Fasts fed themselves on sumptuous dishes in contempt of the precept; Jovinian followed these, as Bonerius reports from St. Jerome, and St. Augustine in 2. exam. de fidei unitate; then the Manichaeans, Waldenses, and Lollards followed at divers times, and transmitted their heresies, though so often cooked, nevertheless raw, to the most recent sectaries, whom I shall recall and refute in dubitatione 3.

Dubitatio I: What FASTING is, and of how many kinds

What Fasting is, and of how many kinds.

It is to be noted from St. Bonaventure here, that Fasting signifies a certain abstinence.

FIRST, then, in the order of genus it signifies abstinence from all illicit voluptuousness, of which St. Augustine, tract. 17. in Ioan., and Isa. 58: Is not this rather the fast that I have chosen; loose the bands of impiety, etc. Properly, however, it signifies abstinence from food and drink.

SECONDLY, therefore, Fasting is called moral abstinence from foods and drinks according to the common norm of the virtue of Temperance, and this ought to be perpetual.

THE THIRD fasting is called Natural, which consists in abstinence of every kind from food and drink; which fasting is required in those about to receive the Eucharist. Nor is it solved by the receiving of the Eucharist; yet not without the Purification, which would break the natural fast.

THE FOURTH fasting is a certain special moderation, and a longer abstinence; and this is praised in the Scriptures.

Dubitatio II: In what way natural Fasting is broken

In what way the Natural Fast is broken.

THIS fasting means abstinence from any eatable thing by way of food, drink, or medicine, even if modest, de consecr. dist. 1. cap. Sacramenta. Required indeed for such receiving is matter that can be altered in the stomach, as Lugo teaches de Euch. disp. 15. sect. 2. num. 28. If, however, per accidens it be not alterable, he violates it. Required also is the form, which is the vital passage into the stomach; for this gives that matter the being of food. From the varied consideration, surely, of this matter and form arise various opinions on the breaking of the natural fast.

So also they say that noxious things are taken even by way of medicine, as poison. Many comprehend under this whatever is passed outside through the mouth; others deny it.

THEY ASK, then, first, whether if the remains of the food of the preceding day, sticking to the teeth, be voluntarily swallowed, they impede communion.

THAT THEY IMPEDE assert Vasquez in 3. part. tract. 3. dub. 11. cap. 4. num. 30, Filliucius tom. 1. tract. 4. cap. 8. num. 236, Nungus 3. part. Tom. 1. quaest. 80. art. 8, Paludanus in 4. dist. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. concl. 2. It seems to St. Thomas 3. part. quaest. 80. art. 8. ad 4. Layman inclines so lib. 5. tract. 4. cap. 6. num. 18.

YET I hold the opposite, as probable, with Suarez 3. part. tract. 3. disput. 68. sect. 4, Henriquez lib. 8. cap. 50, Ioan. de Cruz in direct. quaest. 5. dub. 4, Mosseius in sum. tom. 1. tract. 3. cap. 10. num. 13, Pitigianensis 4. Tom. 1. dist. 18. quaest. 3. art. 3, Camerata de sacram. tract. 4. cap. 10. dub. 19, Rodriquez in sum. Tom. 1. cap. 103. num. 3, Coninch. de sacram. quaest. 80. art. 8. num. 47, Diana part. 3. Tract. 4. resol. 57 — where, however, he says they should be persuaded to spit them out. The reason is, because they fall not by way of food, but of saliva.

HE ADDS, if anyone draw in a little water through the nostrils, which fall into the stomach, it does not impede him from communion, because it has not been passed by way of food or drink. And he teaches, if anything be drawn in by way of respiration, even if it can nourish or alter, as a fly. So also Fagundez de praecep. Eccles. praecep. 3. cap. 5. num. 14, and others. Bassaeus adds V. Communio: if one swallow blood falling from the head, drops of rain, or any particle of broth passed in unnoticed in the preliminary tasting.

THEY ASK secondly, whether if one swallow paper, chalk, a little piece of wood, or something similar eatable, they break the natural fast and impede the most holy communion.

THAT THEY IMPEDE many bring forward, cited by Diana p. p. 34 Tract. 14. de celebr. miss. resol. 51, and Parte 4. tract. 4. resol. 104. So Henriquez lib. 8 cap. 49, and in the gloss, line O., Nungus tract. 1. in 1. part. quaest. 50. art. 8, Villalobos tom. 1. tract. 7. diffic. 39, Reginaldus tract. 2. lib. 29 cap. 6. num. 118, Naldus V. Euch. num. 10, Layman lib. 5. tract. 4. cap. 6, Scortia de sacrificio Missae, lib. 2. cap. 7.

ABOUT Tobacco, if taken in the mouth it be swallowed, the same teach, Diana part. 5. tract. 13. resol. 1, and others.

AND indeed this opinion is to me the more probable, although they hold the opposite as more probable: Sum. Corona part. 4. cap. 4. num. 65, Ioan. de la Cruz p. 2 de Euch. quaest. 5. dub. 4, Ludovicus de S. Iuan: sum. part. 1. Tract. de Euch. cap. 23. concl. 4, Diana loco cit., and part. 3. tract. 4. resol. 38, who concedes the same of the remainder of yesterday's food, with Tabiena V. commun. §. 42, Tannerus tract. 4. disp. 5. quaest. 8. dub. 4. num. 79, Sanchez select. disp. 41. num. 23, Pasqualig. decis. 312, Ioan. Cruz quaest. 5. dub. 4, Baunius punct. cit. tract. 10. quaest. 22 — namely, that if it be swallowed, it does not impede communion.

Dubitatio III: Whether Fasting of itself is a good work, and a precept

Whether fasting proper is a good work, and commanded.

THE necessity of the fasts used in the Church heretics have attacked, apud Valentiam disp. 9, quaest. 2, puncto 1, Bellarmine lib. 2 de bonis operibus, in particulari, who defend it gravely. Others, however, blame not fasting precisely, but certain of its circumstances, which are employed according to the prescription of the Church.

Thus most recently dogmatize the sectaries, Luther lib. de visione Danielis, Calvin lib. 4 Instit. cap. 12, Kemnitius in fest. 25 Tridentini, and others of this chaff.

FIRST, then, it is certain that fasting, as it is an act of Temperance for taming the flesh, is a good, even if one abstains from foods which otherwise one might lawfully use.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor in Diaeta, tit. 2, cap. 6, Exodi 24, where Moses fasted forty days; 3 Reg. 19, where Elias likewise spent the same number of days in fasting. Ioel. 2: Convertimini ad me in ieiunio, etc. Iudith. 8, where the almost perpetual fasts of this holy widow are praised.

From the New Testament, Matth. 6, where Christ hands down the manner of fasting; Marci 9, where he says: Hoc genus daemoniorum non eiicitur, nisi in oratione, et ieiunio.

IN 2 Lucae the Holy Doctor proves it by the example of Anna, quae non discedebat de Templo, ieiuniis, et obsecrationibus serviens; Tob. 12: Bona est oratio cum ieiunio.

SERM. 4 prima Dominicae, he brings forward. The fast of Christ, to which he was led by the Holy Spirit. The fast of the Ninevites, praised Ionae 3. The fast of Moses Deuter. 9, and the others brought forward above.

IT IS PROVED by the Holy Doctor in the cited places, from the Fathers, whom see there.

IT IS PROVED there by reason. That which stands in the place of arms for taming the passions, insofar as they impede salvation, is useful and holy: Such is fasting: Therefore. The reason is from SS. Basil de laudibus ieiunii, Athanasius de virginitate, Cyprian serm. de Ieiunio, Ambrose lib. de Elia, et ieiunio, cap 4, Leo serm. 7 de ieiunio septimi mensis, and D. Augustine de utilitate ieiunii, of which Possidonius makes mention in the Indice operum Augustini, where he has an elegant similitude; for if I were to mount a horse which, being ferocious, could easily throw me headlong, would I not strive to tame it, by withdrawing the stronger foods from its fierceness and putting in hay? So too now.

IT IS CERTAIN also that fasting is useful for other holy ends. First, for rendering prayer more efficacious: So it is had in Tob. 12, prima ad Corinth. 7, Act. 13 et 14.

SECOND, for stirring up penance the more, as is intimated Ioel 2 et Ionae 3 supra.

THIRD, for a readier contemplation, as is said of Daniel; for the lean bird is the swifter of flight. So it is compared by D. Chrysostom homil. 2 in Genes.

FOURTH, for avoiding the scandal of the infirm Rom. 14, prima Corinth. 8.

FIFTH, for withdrawing the food of the pot of covetousnesses; for it is said: Luxuriat raro non bene pasta caro; Subtrahe ligna foco, si vis extinguere flammam.

SIXTH, for curing sickness a diet is advised.

SEVENTH, for putting the wolves to flight from the wood, as is said Marci 9.

EIGHTH, for storming the town in which a strong man armed keeps guard; for a siege wears down the defenders Lucae 11. See these and other things in D. Bonaventure Diaeta tit. 2 cap. 6.

IT IS CERTAIN, thirdly, beyond controversy: Fasting, although of itself it is not an evil, when referred to the aforesaid ends, yet if it have not joined to it other good works also, which are necessary, and indeed, unless it be propped up by the grace of God, is unprofitable unto salvation. The Holy Doctor proves it by that Isa. 58: Hoc est ieiunium, quod elegi; Dissolve colligationes impietatis, etc. Nolite ieiunare sicut usque ad hanc diem.

This the SS. Fathers warn of, Jerome lib. 2 cont. Iovin, Gregory homil. 16 in Evang, Maximus homil. prima de ieiunio.

FOURTHLY it is certain, if we abstain from certain foods as being defiled by their nature, the fast will not be holy, but impious. For this was the error of the Tatianists, as D. Augustine relates lib. de haeresibus, cap. 25.

OUR controversy, therefore, with the heretics is: Whether fasting is rightly taken up as a command of the Church, binding under pain of mortal sin.

For the sectaries, raising up the heresy of the Aërians, which Epiphanius records haeresi 75, boast that this kind of fast is superstitious.

Yet the Catholic Church declares this holy command.

IT IS PROVED first by the arguments by which I showed p. p. Tract. 1 disp. 5 proaemiali, et prima secundae, Tract. de legibus, disp. 5 that the Church can make laws binding in Conscience.

Moreover this law of Fastings is proved from many Councils, especially Gangr. can. 19, where it is said: Si quis ieiunia, quae communiter custodiuntur ab Ecclesia, dissolvit, sit anathema. In the Council of Tiburtina can. 35 it is said, Irasci Dominum, si quis Quadragesimae, aut ieiuniorum diebus non coerceatur a ieiunando; and in the Fourth Council of Carthage can. 63: Statuitur ut clericus, qui tempore ieiunii absque inevitabili necessitate, ieiunium rumpit, inter minores habeatur; and in the Council of Agde can. 12 it is commanded ut omnes Ecclesiae filii in Quadragesima ieiunent; and in the Council of Mainz under Charlemagne can. 35 those are anathematized who dissolve the appointed fast; and in the Eighth Council of Toledo: Frangentes ieiunium Quadragesimae, privantur in Paschate communione; and in the sixth Synod cap. 56 it is had: Visum est, ut omnis Dei Ecclesia, quae est in universo terrarum orbe, unum ordinem sequens, ieiunium perficiat, et abstineat, sicut ab omni mactabili, sic ab ovis, et caseo. Si autem hoc non servaverint, si sint quidem Clerici, deponantur; si autem Laici, segregentur. See also other authorities prima secundae, disp. 17 de consc. quaest. 10, where the propositions condemned by Alexander VII are treated of.

The SS. Fathers pursue this truth with abundant arguments, calling heretics those who deny it, especially Epiphanius haeresi 75, Augustine lib. de haeresibus, cap. 53.

YOU OBJECT first, that to abstain from foods is the doctrine of devils, which the Lord created to be received 1. Tim. 4 and Matth. 15: Non quod intrat in os, coinquinat, 1. Corinth. 1: De eo, quod in macello venit, manducate.

IT IS ANSWERED, that those ancient heretics are reproved who said one must abstain from foods as unclean by nature; or the Judaizers, who wanted abstinence from foods still to be kept according to the Mosaic ceremonial law. But Matth. 15 wills that one be not defiled of oneself, but only by reason of an external precept, insofar as they are opposed to things intrinsically forbidden. Paul, moreover, shows that one must not inquire too scrupulously whether meats have been sacrificed to idols.

Moreover these commands are had as declared cap. Non oportet, cap. Placuit de consecr. dist. 3, cap. Quadragesima, dist. 5 cap. 1, et cap. Consilium, de observ. ieiun.

ECCLESIASTICAL fasts, therefore, are had from the ancient practice of the Church, and indeed the fast of Lent was instituted by the Apostles, and is had in can. 68 Apostolorum, as Epiphanius testifies haeresi 75, Jerome epist. ad Marcellam, Leo serm. 6 in Quadrag, and it is gathered from Augustine epist. 118 ad Ioan. et lib. 4 de Baptism. cap. 24.

TELESPHORUS the Pope sanctioned that the clergy should begin the Lenten fast from Septuagesima cap. Quadragesima, dist. 4. But this custom has been abrogated, as Balaeus warns V. Ieiun. 2. By the common law, from Apostolic tradition, as D. Leo notes serm. de Pent, and as Bellarmine proves cap. 19, Baronius anno 57, and as is related cap. statuimus, dist. 76, we have the fast of the four Seasons (Ember days). By the same law one fasts on the Vigils of the Nativity of the Lord and of the Assumption of the B. V. cap. ex parte, de observ. ieiun. Likewise on the Vigils of the Apostles cap. Consilium, ibi. Exceptis SS. Philippi, et Iacobi, ob tempus Paschae, et D. Ioannis ob Nativitatis solemnia.

Now certain vigils of the Apostles were not kept.

The VIGILS of Pentecost, of St. John the Baptist, of St. Laurence, and of All Saints bind by custom alone, as Sylvester notes num. 5, Sylvius quaest. 147 art. 5 quaesito 7, Fagundez cap. 5, apud Balaeum.

There are some who doubt whether this custom has been introduced so as to bind: Pasqualigo decif. 171.

IF the Vigil of St. John the Baptist falls on the feast of Corpus Christi, it is transferred by the precept of Urban VIII, die 15 Oct. 1638 edito.

The Bishop also can transfer vigils falling on some solemnity of a place; and so for other causes. The same holds for regular Prelates with their subjects. For although Pontifical Law does not subject them to itself, yet its prudent execution does.

ABSTINENCE also on Friday and Saturday is had from the ancient practice of the Church.

It is a pleasure to add the saying of D. Jerome epist. 28, apud D. Bonaventure Spec. cap. 3: Unaquaque Provincia abundet in suo sensu, et praecepta maiorum leges Apostolicae arbitretur. See the Holy Doctor also serm. 5 Ciner. et serm. 3 et 5 primae Dom. Quadr.

Dubitatio IV: From what one must abstain in the Ecclesiastical Fast

Dubitatio V: On the evening collation

Dubitatio VI: On the hour of refreshment on the Fast day

Dubitatio VII: Who are bound to fast

Quaestio VII: On SOBRIETY

Quaestio VIII: On CHASTITY

Quaestio IX: On Virginity

Dubitatio I: Whether Virginity is a Virtue

Dubitatio II: Whether Virginity excels conjugal Continence

Dubitatio III: Whether the reward of Virginity is the Aureole

Quaestio X: On CONTINENCE

Dubitatio I: On MILDNESS

Quaestio XI: On CLEMENCY

Quaestio XII: On MODESTY

Quaestio XIII: On HUMILITY

Disputatio II: On the Vices opposed to the Virtue of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: On GLUTTONY

Quaestio II: On Drunkenness

Quaestio III: On LUST

Dubitatio I: What LUST is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: Whether in the genus of Lust there is parvity of matter

Dubitatio III: On FORNICATION

Dubitatio IV: On STUPRATION

Dubitatio V: On INCEST

Dubitatio VI: On ADULTERY

Dubitatio VII: On SACRILEGE

Dubitatio VIII: On sins against nature

Dubitatio IX: On the lust of spouses

Dubitatio X: On ABDUCTION

Quaestio IV: On INCONTINENCE

Quaestio V: On ANGER

Quaestio VI: On CRUELTY

Question VII

Dubitatio I: On the adornment of Women

Dubitatio II: On Immodesty in words, gestures, jokes, and games

Quaestio VIII: On P R I D E

Quaestio IX: LAST. On the other Vices opposed to the potential parts of Temperance

Tractatus VII: E VARIIS HOMINUM STATIBUS, ET OFFICIIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON STATES, AND PERFECTION IN GENERAL

Quaestio I: What a STATE is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On the state of perfection

Dubitatio I: In what the Perfection of man consists

Dubitatio II: What Perfection can be had in this life

Dubitatio III: Who are in the state of Perfection

Quaestio III: Whether some who are not in the state of perfection perform, by reason of their office, works more perfect than some who are in the state of Perfection

Disputatio II: On the State of the Bishop

Quaestio I: Whether a BISHOP is in the state of perfection

Quaestio II: Of what kind he must be who is assumed to the Episcopate

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to seek, or refuse, an Episcopate

Quaestio IV: Whether Residence is necessary for Bishops, and by what law

Quaestio V: Whether the Church, and Bishops, have dominion over certain temporal things

Quaestio VI: Whether Bishops, and other Ecclesiastics, have dominion over revenues that are superfluous to their state

Quaestio VII: Whether those Bishops who were formerly Religious are bound to Regular observance

Disputatio III: On the State of Regular Prelacy

Quaestio I: Whether the state of Regular Prelacy in a Religion is necessary

Quaestio II: How the Prelate of a Religion is to be chosen

Quaestio III: How many Prelates there are in one religion, and what order among them

Quaestio IV: Whether it befits a Regular Prelate to remain long in the same office

Quaestio V: Whether a religious Prelate has the power of coercing subjects with penalties, both spiritual and corporal

Quaestio VI: What solemnities a Regular Prelate, acting in judgment, is bound to observe

Quaestio VII: Whether appeal can be made from a Prelate, or Regular Judge

Quaestio VIII: Who is the Judge from Whom, and to Whom appeal is made

Quaestio IX: Whether a Regular Prelate can dispense with his subject, Who, and in what

Quaestio X: What power a Regular Prelate has to absolve, both from sins, and from penalties

Quaestio XI: Whether a Regular Prelate has the Power of administering temporal things, and what

Quaestio XII: Whether, and What, Regular Prelates can do concerning conferring Orders, and blessing things, or places

Disputatio IV: LAST. On the State of the Active, and Contemplative life

Quaestio I: Whether the Division of life into Active, and Contemplative is sufficient

Quaestio II: Which state is more excellent than the other: the state of the Active life, or conversely, the Contemplative

Quaestio III: Whether there is a Mixed Life resulting from the Active, and Contemplative, and which of these is more excellent

Quaestio IV: What are the chief exercises of the Active life

Quaestio V: On the chief Act of the Contemplative life, and how this act differs from Cogitation, Meditation, Speculation, and Intuitive vision

Quaestio VI: Whether Contemplation has certain degrees of its perfection, how many, and which

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