Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Dubitatio I: What a Lie is

What a Lie is.

A Lie is opposed to Truth, simulation, Hypocrisy, Boasting, and Irony, as St. Bonaventure teaches. 3rd part. Centil. section 44. and in the Declaration of Theological Terms, and book 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 37. D. Thomas, question 110, art. 2. and question 112. For either a falsehood is signified by words or by deeds according to the mind of the one conceiving it. If by deeds, it is simulation, or in a certain matter hypocrisy. If by words, it is a lie strictly taken. Which again, if it concerns the exceeding morals of the speaker, is called boasting: if by defect, it is called Irony.

These vices seem however to coalesce into one, because they are all opposed to truth, and one thing is essentially opposed to one; but they differ in modes. Hence St. Augustine, book against lying, cap. 3. He lies, who has one thing in his mind, and declares another by words, or by any significations whatsoever. The same is indicated by St. Thomas, question 111, art. 1.

A lie is defined by St. Augustine, book against lying, cap. 12: A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving. But to lie is explained by the same St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 18, thus: He lies, who speaks against what he perceives in his mind, with the will to deceive.

Where it is to be known from St. Bonaventure that a twofold falsity is found in a lie; the material, which is the false saying, and the formal, which is the intention of deceiving. Tanner adds, disp. 6, question 2, num. 8, together with Bassaeus, V. Mend., an effective falsity on account of the will to deceive. But considered in its effect, once obtained, it belongs to the lie per accidens, for a lie can exist without anyone being deceived, as he himself admits; but he says that even the material of the lie, namely the false assertion, belongs per accidens to the lie. The same seems to be the mind of St. Thomas, question 110, art. 1, in the body, and ad 1, with the Thomists.

On the contrary, St. Bonaventure, in 3. d. 38, dub. 3, of the text, and question 1, with the Master, holds that falsity is also required for a lie, although one may lie even if he says the truth, intending nevertheless to deceive.

It is proved first from the Holy Doctor in both places from the definition of a lie, given by St. Augustine, in which he requires for a lie a false signification and the intention of deceiving: But to lie, according to him, requires only the intention of deceiving, as I have reported; for one is said to lie, as it were, to go against the mind.

It is proved second from St. Bonaventure out of the same St. Augustine, cap. 3 against lying, where he opposes the lie to truth as darkness to light; but darkness is formally the privation of light: Therefore also a lie is the privation of truth.

It is proved third from St. Bonaventure: As true being and a lie are related in a man; so in speech are truth and a lie related; but these two are incompossible in the same man at once and together, namely that he be truthful and a liar: Therefore they will likewise be incompossible in speech: Therefore it is impossible that the same speech be at once true and false. If therefore a lie cannot compare itself with truth, it seems that it carries with it an inseparable falsity.

It is proved fourth from the Holy Doctor: Every true thing is from the first truth, But no lie is from the first truth: Therefore no lie is true: Therefore it is false.

They object first from St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 18, where he says: He lies, who speaks against what he perceives in his mind, with the will to deceive: Therefore a lie stands in the will to deceive alone.

The Holy Doctor answers that more is required for a lie than for lying, as I said; for a lie is referred both to the deceiving will and to the false thing; but lying regards only the deceit which the will undertakes, even if he were saying what is true, which he thinks is false.

They object second. As speech disagrees with the intention when one denies what he knows, so also it disagrees when he affirms what he does not know, and about which he doubts; and then it is a sin; but only of a lie: Therefore a lie can fall upon an unknown truth.

The Holy Doctor answers that in the assertion of a doubtful or unknown truth there is a lie secundum quid, and it is more properly called lying.

They object third. A right intention makes right, and an oblique one makes oblique: Therefore in him who speaks the truth with an intention of deceiving, the whole utterance is made oblique; but this happens only in a lie: Therefore.

The Holy Doctor answers that the oblique intention falsifies the saying, not according to every account, but only according to the account which it has in respect of the speaker; but that respect alone does not suffice for the account of a lie.

They object fourth. As sin is related to goodness; so a lie to truth: but he who does a good work with an evil intention commits a sin: Therefore he who says something true, with a perverse will to deceive, incurs a lie. It is confirmed; for it implies that some saying is both true and false.

The Holy Doctor answers first, that a good thing done with an evil intention is not evil simply, but only to him who acts with an evil intention; as he who gives alms with an evil intention does not fall into sin in the alms given, but only in himself who gives by reason of the intention; so also in the present case.

It is answered second, by denying the parity, because sin denotes a privation of goodness; but goodness denotes an ordination to the end, which indeed has its being through a right intention, and therefore the right intention removed, the account of goodness perishes, and it is a sin; but a lie denotes a privation of truth, which consists not only in the comparison to the intention, but also to the very thing itself, and therefore, if the thing is true, it is not a lie, except secundum quid.

Dubitatio II: Of how many kinds is a Lie

Of how many kinds a Lie is.

It is to be noted first, that a lie is commonly divided into the Officious, the Jocose, and the Pernicious. So the Holy Doctors after St. Augustine, ad 5. Psal. in the Gloss. For since a lie has as its formal element the deceiving, according to the intention of the liar himself it is divided into species: But he who lies either intends to benefit; and it is an officious lie; or to delight, and behold, the jocose: or to harm, and behold the Pernicious. But he can harm spiritually, or temporally. And then either he harms one so as to benefit another, and according to this there are three differences of the pernicious lie. The first consists in a lie of the doctrine of Religion handed on, and this works to the harm of a spiritual good, namely, faith. The second consists in this, that the lie harm simply. The third, that it harm one; and benefit another.

¶ But if he lies in order to delight, it is thus jocose, and this can be in two ways, either that he delight another, and thus it is simply jocose. Or that he delight himself by lying, and thus it is libidinous, which properly contains the lust of lying, and the malice, which is placed in the readiness for lying, according to Aristotle, 4. Eth. cap. 7. where he says, that a lie, because such it is by habit, rejoices in the lie itself.

But if he lies that he may benefit simply, not that he may harm; or that he may benefit with regard to the goods of fortune, as money, etc. Or to avoid death: Or to avoid impurity, or to preserve chastity, or holiness safe and sound, the lie is officious.

¶ Hence you have that division of a lie into eight members, by reason of the intention, and mode, which St. Augustine brings forward, l. de mendacio, cap. 14. and with him our Holy Doctors. The first, which is done in the doctrine of Religion, as to say that Christ is not born of the Blessed Virgin. The second, which benefits no one, and harms someone, as a lie of detraction. The third, which harms one, that it may benefit another, as a false witness in a pecuniary cause. The fourth, which is done out of the mere lust of lying: The fifth, which is done with the will of delighting by pleasant speech, as flattery. The sixth, whereby one lies for the sake of preserving money. The seventh for the sake of life. The eighth for the sake of preserving chastity. See St. Bonaventure, p. p. Centil. sect. 12.

AGAINST this three-membered division the Holy Doctor objects certain arguments to himself, and solves them.

¶ First. That which is per accidens ought not to denominate; but it is per accidens for a lie to benefit: Therefore the species of the officious lie ought not to be assigned.

He answers, that an act takes its species from the intention, and because the officious is ordered by the intention that it benefit; therefore it can take its species from that.

He objects second. The same lie can benefit and at the same time harm: Therefore by this many differences of a lie are not rightly divided; for opposite differences never belong to the same thing.

He answers, that a lie takes its species from the intention, which either tends that it benefit, or that it harm, and thus the same lie never contains both formally, even though materially, as the falsity is.

¶ He objects third against the second difference. We also jest in other sins, and yet no species of sin is drawn from that: Therefore neither in a lie.

The Holy Doctor answers first, that denomination is not taken from things that happen rarely; but rarely do we jest in accomplishing other things, as in a lie. He answers second, that if other works take their species from the intention, speech above all is denominated from it, and because a lie is in speech, hence it is that a jocose lie is more denominated.

¶ He objects fourth: A lie is a false signification of the voice with the intention of deceiving, according to St. Augustine, cap. 12 against lying, but he who jests does not intend to deceive: Therefore there is no jocose lie.

The Holy Doctor answers, that to deceive is the same as to say what is false, but not the same as to deceive [someone]; whence the sense of the definition is, with the intention of saying what is false, and this belongs to the jocose lie, though less completely, than to the pernicious.

He objects fifth, against the third difference: To be pernicious is common to every sin.

The Holy Doctor answers, that the pernicious is assigned as a difference opposed to the officious, which is proper to a lie; but other genera of sins are not divided thus into officious, etc.

He objects sixth: If the pernicious lie is distinguished from the others; this is either by reason of the matter, or by reason of the will. Not the first, because in any matter whatsoever a man can lie gravely and perniciously, if he lies out of malice. Nor by reason of the will, because in any genus of lie whatsoever the will can be moved inordinately, and bring perdition into the liar.

The Holy Doctor answers, that it is distinguished principally by reason of the will, and by reason of the intention does this differentiate this species from the others per se. It can be said also by reason of the matter with regard to that species of lie in the matter of the doctrine of Religion.

Dubitatio III: Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin

Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin.

MANY of the ancients asserted that it is lawful to lie in grave necessity for the sake of a great good. St. Augustine reports them, book against lying, and refutes them.

Into this opinion the following seem to have inclined: St. Jerome, on the Epistle to the Galatians, and Epistle 89, which is the eleventh among the Epistles of St. Augustine. Chrysostom, homily 53 on Genesis. Cassian, conference 17, cap. 17 and 20. Dorotheus, sermon 9 on lying.

The MOST TRUE opinion nevertheless is, that every lie, whether by deed or by word, is so evil that it is never lawful; and that it is never dispensable, not even by God himself. So the Holy Doctors, whom all Theologians and Canon Jurists have followed.

I ASSERT with this opinion that it is never lawful by any right whatsoever to lie.

IT IS PROVED first from the Holy Doctor against the arguments, from the consensus of the Scriptures, where every lie is excluded, Lev. 19: You shall not lie, nor shall anyone deceive his neighbor. Sap. 1: The mouth that lieth, killeth the soul. See the Holy Doctor there in his commentary. Eccl. 7: Be not willing to lie, Ephes. 4: Putting away lying, Coloss. 3: Lie not. Where, since a lie is prohibited by a negative precept, it binds always, and it is forbidden.

THE SAME opinion seems defined by Innocent III, cap. super eo, de usuris, where it is said, By the precept of the divine word it is forbidden that anyone lie, even to save the life of another, as Vasquez also notes, prim. 2. d. 182. cap. 4. n. 30. Tanner, d. 6, question 2, d. 1. Fagundez, in 8. praecept. c. 5. n. 3. where he refers to this also Aristotle, 4. Eth.

IT IS PROVED second from the Holy Doctor, Phar. lib. 3. c. 3. §. De mendacio, and the Holy Fathers.

From Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 22. and against lying, cap. 1, 2. and de vera Relig. cap. 33. and lib. 1. de Doctrina Christiana, cap. 36.

HE ALSO ADDUCES St. Gregory, l. 11. moral. cap. 13. and lib. 26. cap. 3. Isidore, in the Synonyms, lib. 11. and de bono, lib. 3. cap. 59. The same is the mind of St. Basil, reg. 76. from the briefer ones.

IT IS PROVED also by illustrious reasons taken from St. Bonaventure out of the Holy Fathers.

THE FIRST reason is. That which is intrinsically evil cannot be rectified; such is a lie: Therefore. The minor is proved. That which in its formal element includes malice is altogether intrinsically evil; but a lie is such according to St. Augustine above; for it has its falsity in the perverse intention of deceiving, or of not speaking the truth, but the false; without which it would not be a lie: Therefore, this evil will standing, which gives form to the lie, there can be no dispensation.

THE SECOND reason is taken from St. Augustine, in the places lately first cited, especially in the Enchiridion. That which destroys nature is intrinsically perverse; such is a lie: Therefore. The major is certain, because the first and principal law is the law of nature, which is always right in itself, since it is from God, nor can it be perverse, as nature. The minor is proved, because words are signs instituted by nature for human communication and society, and while we abuse the signs instituted to express the mind, we destroy society; for no one would wish to contract with others by whom he knows he is deceived. But this is to destroy the nature of man, which is a sociable animal.

THE THIRD reason is taken from St. Augustine, lately cited from the De Doctrina Christiana. To violate faith is intrinsically evil; but a liar violates the faith, and the tacit pact between himself and the hearer, which is that, because he speaks the truth, he is to be believed.

THE FIRST reason is CONFIRMED, in the body, because the essence of a lie, since it stands formally in the perverse intention, can never be rectified, and thus, although it may not be mortal in its genus, it nevertheless has a malice more inseparable than theft and homicide, which were dispensed in the Israelites for carrying off the treasures of the Egyptians, for killing the Chanaanites, and are dispensed even now in Judges for putting the guilty to death; in those unjustly invaded, for defense, and in the wretched suffering famine at the last extremity. From this you have the solution to the argument which is urged, that if these are dispensed, a lie also can be dispensed, which is a lesser sin.

YOU OBJECT first, Genesis 22. Abraham told his servants that he would return with his son, when nevertheless he intended to kill him on the mountain and sacrifice him to God.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Abraham, even if he intended to sacrifice his son, nevertheless believed that his son was to be raised by God; for he firmly held that God stands by his promise: In Isaac shall thy seed be called to thee, as we have in Heb. 11.

YOU OBJECT second, Genesis 26. Isaac called Rebecca his sister; whereas she was his wife, not his sister.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Rebecca was his cousin-sister, and therefore he spoke the truth, although he concealed that she was his wife.

YOU OBJECT third. Joseph said, Genesis 42 and 44, that his brothers were spies, knowing this to be false. Likewise he said that he was skilled in auguries, when nevertheless it was not true.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that he spoke those words not by affirming, but by testing. Whence they are rather to be understood interrogatively than assertively. But when he said that he was skilled in the science of auguring, he takes augury for the prediction of things to come. Then too he said it while expressing the hunger of the people.

YOU OBJECT fourth, Jacob, Genesis 27. feigned himself Esau, and to his blind father asserted that he was Esau his firstborn, and this with the intention of deceiving his father.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, dub. 4. litt. d. 38. that Jacob did not lie; for he feigned himself Esau with respect to the mystery, as St. Ambrose teaches, de Iacob et Esau, and St. Augustine, against lying, cap. 10.

But that he said he was Esau the firstborn, he spoke the truth in the sense intended by God, because such he was with regard to the right of primogeniture from the revelation made by God to his mother. Nor did he wish to deceive, but to express the truth.

YOU OBJECT fifth. In Scripture many things are said, according to the intention of the letter, that are false, as Judges 9: The trees went, to create a king for themselves, and many false things are proposed there by the disputants; but Scripture is to us the rule of morals: Therefore a lie is not intrinsically a sin.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that the things which are expressed transumptively by figures and tropes are to be understood tropically; as is that apologue of the Council of the trees for creating a King, and thus they are true in that sense.

HENCE St. Augustine, against lying, cap. 5 and 10, says that whatever is said or done figuratively is not a lie; otherwise all Metaphors and figures would be banished. But in disputes it is not a lie to propose false things in order to lead out or examine the truth. For in disputes the propositions are more interrogations and dubitations than assertions, unless perhaps in doctrinal disputes, in which the learner must believe, where only true things are proposed or preached, according to Aristotle, primo Elenchorum, c. 2.

YOU OBJECT sixth, the simulations, which are lies; for even actions done to deceive are lies, because they are falsified signs. Thus Joshua, cap. 8. deceived the citizens of Hai. David deceived King Achish, feigning himself mad, 1. Reg. 27. Jehu simulated himself a worshipper of Baal, in order to deceive the worshippers of Baal, 4. Reg. 10. And these did not sin, nay, they are commended. Thus also Christ, at the end of Luke, feigned to go farther.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that the caution of Jehu in deceiving is praised; but not the lie itself uttered by him, as I said in the Tract. de fide, disp. 1. quaest. 16.

But DAVID acted cautiously and rightly, in order to escape death; for he did not say he was mad, for actions are not principally instituted to signify the internal concept, as words are instituted. Thus also Joshua prudently feigned flight, that he might reduce the citizens of Hai to straits and take them out of the midst, for he was fighting at God's command: But Christ feigned to go farther for the sake of doctrine, that he might teach hospitality. These simulations indeed are not evil; but the simulation of hypocrisy and duplicity, which by a sign show themselves to be good, are lies.

YOU OBJECT seventh. Theft and homicide are a greater sin than a lie: But in these a dispensation is granted, as is clear in the Judges, who put the guilty to death, and in the Hebrew people, dispensed in order to kill the Chanaanites and to carry off the treasures of the Egyptians: Therefore.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that these graver things were done with an evil will and an evil end; but because they can be separated from the evil end, therefore they can be well done: not so, however, in a lie, because it intrinsically denotes an evil deceiving will.

YOU OBJECT eighth. A dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the second table, as St. Bernard says, de praecepto, et dispensatione: But a lie is against the second table: Therefore.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that a dispensation cannot be granted in the disordination of the will, which is intrinsic to a lie, even though it could be granted in the acts, the disordination of the will removed, and the matter changed.

YOU OBJECT ninth. It can be that someone lie in order to preserve the chastity of another, as that soldier who, that he might deliver that holy Virgin from violation, exchanged clothes with her and taught her to flee from prison. Therefore it can be done out of Charity, which does not act perversely.

The Holy Doctor answers that Charity does not move to that which is evil, as it is the will of deceiving by words; whence Bernard says of dispensation, For a laudable work truth is required in the election, and Charity in the intention, and because truth is not preserved in the utterance of a lie, hence a lie cannot be said to be done out of Charity. For as out of Charity evil cannot be knowingly chosen so that it remain evil; so neither can the false be chosen. For as the operative power serves the affective; so the interpretative power serves the intellective, and as the end of the affective is the good; so the end of the intellective is the true. Therefore as no work can be done out of Charity unless one intend the good, and that work be ordainable to the good; so also no speech can be uttered out of Charity unless in the utterance of that speech the true be intended. And because a lie is ordered to the false by the intention of the one uttering it, therefore it cannot be done out of Charity.

But that soldier only exchanged clothes as a precaution, nor is it a lie, because clothes are not principally ordained to signify the concept of the mind.

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Lie is mortal of its genus

I assert that a lie, by its genus, is not mortal. So the unanimous consensus of the Theologians.

It is proved first from St. Bonaventure from the Gloss; second from St. Gregory, book 18 of the Morals, chapter 2, where, speaking of the lie of the Egyptian midwives, he says: We easily believe this kind of sin to be relaxed.

Third, because there is no intrinsic lust, or contempt, involved in it.

Fourth, because I knew not sin, but by the law, as the Apostle says; yet no law condemns under mortal sin the jesting lie, by which a falsehood is told in the telling of a fable.

Fifth, because the tongue is far too unsteady, and it seems far too severe to condemn to hell every defect of the tongue, with the removal of which man is perfect, as is said in James 3.

St. Bonaventure adds that it can become mortal by reason of the harm it inflicts on someone through lying, or by reason of contempt, or by reason of a lust ready for every lie, even one pernicious to one's neighbor, etc.

He objects first from Psalm 5: Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie, where the Gloss says: To destroy is more than to hate. But God hates no one except one sinning mortally: Therefore.

St. Bonaventure answers that the Gloss is speaking of all who tell pernicious lies. Hence the universal particle is referred to persons lying perniciously, not to lies. Therefore the argument is fallacious in consequence, according to the figure of speech.

He objects second from Wisdom 1, where it is said: The mouth that lieth killeth the soul. Treating this passage, St. Augustine, in the book on the conflict of virtues and vices, says: Neither by an officious lie, nor by a simple word, ought anyone to be deceived, because in whatever way one lies, he kills his soul.

St. Bonaventure answers that the discourse there is about a pernicious lie: And if you say that it is expounded by St. Augustine of every lie, chapter 5 of On Lying, the holy Doctor answers that he is speaking of every lie pernicious in matters of religion, as is gathered from what immediately follows.

He objects third the Gloss of Augustine on the same Psalm 5: Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie, where he says: If anyone does not wish to betray a man to death, let him keep silent about the truth, but let him not utter a falsehood, lest, for the body of another, he kill his own soul. If, therefore, the soul is killed by an officious lie, which is the least of all, much more by the others.

The holy Doctor answers first, that that saying tends only to the perfect, who lose perfection gradually even through venial sins. He answers second, that it speaks of abstaining from lies advisedly, because they dispose to mortal sins, which are the death of the soul.

He objects fourth. That which is a peremptory act against truth is mortal: Such is a lie, which is repugnant to truth as fornication is to chastity.

The holy Doctor answers that not every lie is contrary to the habit of truth, which is rather a will to speak the truth as expedient than the actual utterance of every truth; and although every lie is repugnant to the act of speaking the truth, it is not therefore repugnant to the habit of truth, which shrinks from the pernicious lie; nor is it the same with fornication, which is opposed to a gravely preceptual virtue and mortally defiles it.

He objects fifth. Whoever acts against conscience builds hell for himself; such is a liar: Therefore.

The holy Doctor answers that the major is true of one acting against a conscience dictating that the thing is grave.

He objects sixth. Where there is full consensus, there the thing is lethal; such is the case in lying: Therefore.

The holy Doctor answers that the major is true where the object is gravely depraved, or in acts simply forbidden, as in the sin of the flesh. From these words I gather that the holy Doctor does not admit parvity of matter in the sin of the flesh, which today is the common opinion, as at Diana, part 5, tract. 5, resol. 5, where it is related that Clement VIII defined it, and Claudius Aquaviva ordered his Society to teach the same. Diana relates the authors at part 3, tract. 5, resol. 1, where he concludes that the opposite opinion is dangerous. He defines the same especially about kisses, part 4, tract. 4, miscell. resol. 136, and tract. 5, resol. 4, where he concludes that a soliciting confessor, even in a light touch, is to be denounced. So Alexander VII defines concerning kisses. But the general rule for knowing when parvity of matter is granted is taken from St. Bonaventure here against the arguments, which Baldellus uses, Tom. 1, lib. 3, disp. 14, num. 13, Diana, part 5, tract. 5, resol. 1. For acts are specified by their objects according to book 2 of the Soul, text. 33; if, therefore, from the very reason of the object in the first order per se there arises a notable opposition to virtue, and the gravity of malice, there cannot be in that object parvity of matter and lightness of fault. But if the notable opposition and gravity of fault arise from the reason of the object in the second order per se, and not from the reason per se first, it will be granted entirely. So, because theft is forbidden by reason of the thing, as another's; therefore unless the damage to another is grave, the fault will not be grave; on the contrary, because infidelity is forbidden as denying the Divine truth, therefore every infidelity is grave. See also Sanchez, sum., tract. 1, lib. 1, cap. 4; Suarez, de leg., lib. 2, cap. 18, num. 68. But Castropalao holds that from the common consensus of the Church the gravity of things is to be determined. And this consensus is indeed founded on the natures of things: for some things are so ordered that they are reckoned most grave, such as any idolatry, Simony, Infidelity, Despair, any perjury, hatred of God and any contempt of him, any mockery of the Sacraments, any pollution, fornication, etc.; these constitute a grave judgment, and do not vary in any matter; on the contrary, however, the holy Doctor infers against the arguments, because a lie in jesting and pernicious matter gravely varies in judgment, therefore it can be light and grave.

Let us grant at last that a lie gravely pernicious is lethal, because it is opposed to Charity; So St. Bonaventure here, and St. Thomas, question 110, article 4.

Dubitatio VI: Whether among the degrees of Lie there is a most grave, and a most light

Whether among the degrees of Lying there be a most grave and a most light.

The holy Doctor asserts, with St. Augustine (On Lying, chapter 21), that the degrees of lies follow the order of things, so that there is a greatest and a least, because, as the Philosopher says (3 Topics, cap. 4), if the maximum in one genus exceeds the maximum in another genus, this genus simply exceeds that one. Hence, for one genus to exceed another, it is not necessary that each member of that genus exceed each member of the other genus, but that the highest in that genus be greater than all absolutely of the other genus. Since, therefore, among all lies that is the greatest in which one intends to harm another in the way of truth and salvation, because it inflicts on him an uncompensatable spiritual harm with respect to the greatest goods; hence a lie in the doctrine of religion is the greatest among the others. On the contrary, because one cannot be moved to lie by a more urgent cause than to preserve a spiritual good, or one attached to the spiritual: hence that lie is the lightest which is committed to preserve chastity, or a similar thing, and thus one ascends and descends by degrees, so that the closer it approaches the first, the graver it is; and the closer to the least, the less it is; and the holy Doctor proves this also in the Pharetra, lib. 3, cap. 3, De mendacio, from St. Gregory, lib. 8 of the Morals, cap. 4.

He objects first against these degrees. Let one say that Christ did not ride upon the ass out of a certain jesting wit; he sins in the first genus of lie. Let another, by a lie, impose a false crime on his neighbor, so that he be killed; he sins in an inferior genus of lie, and yet this is graver: Therefore the degrees of lies are badly ordered.

The holy Doctor answers that the most grave lie is that which asserts a falsehood out of malice for the subversion of religion; but such is not he who says for that reason that Christ did not ride upon the ass.

He objects second. He who tells a lie sowing schisms sins more gravely than he who sows false doctrines in religion; and yet the latter sins in the first genus of lie.

The holy Doctor answers that the former is graver; for if the falsity of doctrine induces schisms and other evils.

He objects third. One can lie in the first genus out of infirmity, and in the second genus out of malice; then this latter will sin gravely, because he sins against the Holy Spirit.

The holy Doctor answers that he who lies against the truth of religion is not supposed to err out of infirmity.

He objects fourth, that the supreme genus of lie is against faith; but the inferior one, pernicious to one's neighbor, is against Charity, which is the greater virtue.

The holy Doctor answers first, that it does not follow from the fact that Charity is a greater good than faith, that every lack of Charity is a greater evil, for there can be a very small privation of Charity and a maximal privation of faith. The holy Doctor adds that a lie against the truth of religion harms not only faith, but also good works and Charity: e.g. if you say that fornication is not to be avoided, that parents are not to be honored; for in matters of religion not only what is to be believed is taught, but also what is to be done according to each virtue.

He objects fifth against the lowest lie, which is officious for saving chastity, for this has more the character of a lie, since it is serious: Therefore it is graver than the jocose one.

He answers by denying that this officious lie is graver than the jocose one, because in neither does one intend to deceive another; yet in each he intends to utter a falsehood, that he may delight in one case and profit in the other; but less disordered is the intention that wishes to profit than that which wishes to delight, and this is done even in earnest things for the sake of delighting.

He objects sixth, that he who succors in greater necessity sins less by lying: but he who succors in danger of life succors in greater necessity than he who does in danger of chastity, because this cannot be wrested away against one's will, as that can.

The holy Doctor answers that the greater necessity is then for preserving chastity, because this is a spiritual good, and a greater good, which, although it cannot formally be taken away against one's will, is nevertheless taken away as regards bodily purity, joined with the danger of consent and of spiritual ruin. Therefore, although natural piety inclines more to saving life, gratuitous piety inclines more to saving the life of grace.

He objects seventh; he who takes away life takes away the space for penance, not so he who takes away chastity: Therefore the former is the greater evil, and therefore it will be a lesser sin to lie for such a salvation.

The holy Doctor answers; one deprived of life also lacks the space for sinning, and it is not known whether he would have spent his life in sins.

At the end the holy Doctor asks whether, in danger of chastity, one ought to choose to be corrupted, or rather to lie.

The holy Doctor answers that if one can know probably that he will not consent in his will, he ought to suffer corruption rather than lie, because corruption is doubled into a crown, as Blessed Lucy used to say; but if he be imperfect, and fears lest he succumb, then the lesser evil, that of lying, can be chosen to avoid it, and this also to redeem another's.

He asks also: whether it is lawful to lie, so that we may bring another back to the way of salvation.

He answers, negatively, because evil must not be done that good may come, nor does God need our lie to save others; for man is not directed by a lie, but by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of Truth, without whom we preach in vain.

Dubitatio VII: On the others that are reduced to Lying

On the other things that are reduced to Lying.

To lying are reduced simulation, Hypocrisy, Boasting, and Irony. Simulation is defined by St. Bonaventure, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 25, from the holy Fathers: It is a showing, in deed alien from the things that truly are.

Hypocrisy, however, is defined by the holy Doctor there, and in the Centil., sect. 18: It is the will simulating itself fallaciously under the species of sanctity in the open, and acting vilely in secret. Therefore hypocrisy is simulation in a certain matter, namely virtue. See St. Bonaventure, in the cited place of the Pharetra, discoursing most excellently with the Fathers.

Irony is defined by St. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 1: It is a detestation of another by way of the contrary; but this is reduced to pride.

Boasting, however, is said of that by which one enumerates his own goods, that he may appear praiseworthy, as St. Bonaventure says, in the cited place of the Centil. and lib. 3 of the Compend. of Theological Truth, cap. 15. Wherefore it is reduced rather to pride, although when it exalts itself above what is, it has a certain injustice.

These vices are opposed to truth, and have the character of a lie, and accordingly can be both mortal and venial.

From the end, however, as St. Bonaventure says (question above on man), and with him Tannerus (disp. 6, quaest. 2, dub. 1, num. 18), it is gathered when they are grave; for if the end be gravely contrary to Charity, or justice, etc., they will be mortal; if, for example, someone feign sanctity in order to deceive in faith, or chastity, or to steal. But if the end is not opposed to Charity, etc., they will be venial, for instance the mere pleasure in the fiction, of which Aristotle speaks, 4 Ethics, cap. 7.

For to deceive someone precisely is not grave, unless either a bad end, or a grave harm, follows.

So also Boasting from the root of pride is mortal, if it be born of mortal pride, for instance gravely exalting oneself, as is said of the King of Tyre, Ezech. 28: Thy heart was lifted up, and thou saidst: I am God. Or if, in boasting himself, he bursts into the insults of others, like that Pharisee, Luke 18: I am not as the rest of men, rapacious, etc., even as this one.

Irony, by which one preaches lesser things of himself against the truth, is a lie, yet lighter than Boasting, as St. Thomas teaches, quaest. 113, art. 1 and 2, after Aristotle, lib. 4 of the Ethics, cap. 7.

The reason is, because Boasting arises, for the most part, from a baser motive, namely from the appetite of gain, or honor; but Irony from the fact that one shuns, though inordinately, being burdensome to others by self-exaltation; yet if one humbles himself in order to deceive deceitfully, it can be grave, of which Eccl. 19: There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit.

Boasting and irony can also concur in the same act, if one casts himself down with false humility, that he may be esteemed, as Christ says, Matth. 6: For they disfigure their faces, that they may appear unto men to fast, as the holy Doctor observes in the Diaeta, tit. 2, cap. 6, where he assails them, saying that these feed a double adversary.

It is also usually doubted concerning figurative words. It is answered that these are free of lying, as St. Augustine teaches, On Lying, cap. 2, and lib. against Lying, cap. 10. For they have truth in their own genus, according to the institutions of the Rhetoricians.

Likewise amphibological enunciations are without the note of a lie, if the speaker does not intend to deceive, as Tannerus notes, disput. 6, quaest. 2, number 25.

It is also doubted concerning mixed speeches, namely those which have their sense partly in the voice, partly in the mind, as when to one asking 100 florins you say: I will give them to you; but understanding, if I owe them.

The first opinion is that these are lies. So Sotus, lib. 8 de Iust., quaest. 1, art. 7; Cajetan, quaest. 89, art. 7; Azor, tract. 1, lib. 11, cap. 4, question 5; Aragon there, and others. The reason is, because that speech, taken as a whole as uttered, is false.

The OPPOSITE others teach; whom Valencia follows, disput. 5, quaest. 15, point 2, and disput. 6, quaest. 7, point 4; Toletus, lib. 4, cap. 21, and lib. 5, cap. 58.

The TRUE opinion, therefore, admits equivocations in this sense, when we are illicitly asked to say something, as Tanner notes, num. 31. For thus Christ, Mark 13, according to the truer sense of the Fathers, says: But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the Angels in heaven, neither the Son, namely that he reveals it to others, or knows not, that is, makes not to know; or knows not so as to reveal, as St. Bonaventure teaches, in 4, dist. 48, quaest. 4, and with him Tanner, num. 31. So the holy Doctor expounds it with Chrysostom, homil. 47, on John 7: Go you up to this festival day, but I go not up, understanding, not now with you; for afterwards he went up. Similar is that of John 11: Lazarus sleepeth, when he was dead, and that of Luke 8: The girl is not dead, but sleepeth, as the holy Doctor observes in his commentaries, and with him Tannerus in the place cited.

We HAVE also the example of the holy Father Francis, at Navarrus, cap. Humanae aures, Tanner, num. 32; for being asked whether a certain man had passed that way, the holy Father, holding his hand in his sleeve, said: He did not pass this way. And although Sotus, on concealing a secret, memb. 3, quaest. 3, says that St. Francis was deceived in that opinion, yet he is to be esteemed of more worth than Sotus, as Tanner warns, num. 32.

So also Samuel, 1 Kings 16, said: I am come to sacrifice to the Lord, when he had come to anoint David king. Which equivocations St. Gregory praises there, for warding off the violence of the tyrant.

EXCLUDING, however, a grave cause, it is not lawful to use equivocations; for by the remaining truth we are bound, otherwise all human society would be done away, as St. Thomas argues, quaest. 114, art. 2, ad 1, and St. Bonaventure, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 3, § De mendacio. Therefore the holy Fathers there alleged assail it gravely. So St. Isidore in the Synonyma, cap. 11: Beware of a lie in all things, for by a lie faith is taken away; and St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 22: Assuredly words were instituted not that men might deceive one another by them; but that each one might by them convey his thoughts into another's knowledge; and lib. 1 of Christian Doctrine, cap. 36: No one lying keeps faith in that wherein he lies. For this he assuredly wishes, that he to whom he lies should believe him, which faith he nevertheless does not keep by lying to him. Tanner, in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 2. St. Bonaventure condemns suspect and equivocal locutions in contracts. On these, with an oath added, I treated in disp. on Oaths, quaest. 10.

Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio VI: Whether* the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Dubitatio I: Whether* KNOWLEDGE *is a gift of the Holy Ghost