Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Quaestio I: What PIETY is, and what kind of Virtue

What PIETY is, and what kind of Virtue.

THE Saintly Doctor notes, in book 3 here, and dist. 9, article 2, question 1, ad 3, from D. Augustine, book 10, de civitate, cap. 1, and in other places, that Piety is taken in many ways.

FIRST, indeed, it signifies the worship of God, and the very virtue of Religion, by which God is worshiped, which the Greeks call EUSEBIA. On this account, wishing to commend someone for his Religion, we call him pious.

SECOND, it signifies the virtue of mercy, as Hugh also writes, de claustro, and D. Bonaventure, de dono Pietatis, and D. Gregory, book 1, moral. cap. 2. S. Augustine gives the reason for this, at the place cited, because the works of mercy are commanded by God in a special manner, whence it has come about by custom that God himself is called pious.

THIRD, it signifies the special gift of the Holy Spirit, as you have in Isaiah 11.

MOREOVER, in another way it is taken here for the Virtue by which due worship is rendered to one's country, parents, kindred, and fellow citizens. The Saintly Doctor defines it thus, part 3 of the Summa contra Gentiles, sect. 42, and Opusc. declaratorio terminorum Theol., and in the Compend. Theol. verit., book 5, cap. 37, from Cicero, book 2, de Inventute: Piety is that by which dutiful service and diligent worship are rendered to those joined by blood and to a benevolent country.

The REASON is the one Tanner gives, disp. 6, question 1, dub. 1, from D. Bonaventure, book 3, dist. 35: because natural law dictates affection toward one's principle, in a special way, and therefore by a special virtue. Just as we are moved toward God in a special way, as our principle, by the virtue of Religion. For parents and country are those from whom we have arisen and been nourished, secondary principles for us after God.

IN the worship of parents, indeed, is included the honor due to ascendants and the other kindred, since they belong to our parents either as principles, or as effects, or as joined to them, as S. Bonaventure teaches, in the places cited, from Aristotle, book 8, Eth. cap. 12. Likewise, in the worship of one's country is included the worship of all fellow citizens and of all the friends of the country.

THIS virtue is an eminent potential part of Justice, as the Saintly Doctor teaches, sect. 1 of D. Thom., art. 3, and others, since it is directed to a special object, namely, to parents and country, as principle begetting and governing. For although to love all belongs to Charity; yet affection toward parents under this aspect is the special Virtue of Piety. So also, although legal justice is directed to the country as the common good; yet insofar as it is the principle of our being and lasting, it belongs to the special virtue of Piety.

The duty of this virtue is of itself indeed to render to parents, and therefore to country, and so to fellow citizens, honor and reverence; but per accidens, and in a case of necessity, also the duty of aid and sustenance. So D. Thomas, art. 102, ad 1, D. Bonaventure, sermon 5, on the ten commandments, and commonly in Fagundez on the fourth commandment. He proves both from the fourth precept of the Decalogue, Honor thy Father and thy Mother, which Christ explains, Matthew 15, reproaching the Pharisees for hindering sons from sustaining their parents. And Cicero taught this above, in the definition of Piety, where he says the object of Piety is the duty which is referred to the service of aid, and the worship, which is directed to reverence; for as D. Augustine says above, we are said to worship those men whom we frequent with honorific remembrance or presence.

The reason of D. Bonaventure, in the cited sermon, is that if we are bound by Charity to come to the aid of others in necessity; much more are we bound in a special way to aid parents, and others joined to us by blood, and our benevolent country.

Parents indeed are bound to lay up treasure for their children, not children for their parents, as the Apostle says, 2 Corinth. 12, because children ought to succeed their parents; yet in sustaining parents out of necessity, the obligation of children toward parents is greater.

But the Saintly Doctor brings forward a most excellent reason, in the cited sermon, from Ecclesiasticus 13, where it is said: He that feareth God shall honor his father and mother, and shall serve them as a master them that begat him, since indeed children are parts precisely of their parents, the whole is more owed to them than to each part the whole. The Saintly Doctor gravely proves this from Ephesians 6, where he says that it pertains to justice: Children, obey your parents: for this is just. Where, with the Apostle, he observes that he is called to the first commandment in promise, because to him is promised a long dwelling on the earth, whereas with the other precepts no promise of any good is added. Longevity, moreover, does not sound merely length of days (for many good sons die), but value, as the Saintly Doctor says, at the place cited, as it is said in Ecclesiasticus 3, as below.

The Saintly Doctor shows the same also from that passage of Ecclesiasticus 3: Son, support the old age of thy father, and grieve him not in his life: He that honoreth his father shall enjoy his children, and in the day of his prayer he shall be heard. He that honoreth his father shall live a long life: and he that obeyeth his father shall be a comfort to his mother. He that feareth the Lord, honoreth his parents, and shall serve them as masters them that begat him. In work, and word, and all patience honor thy father, that a blessing may come upon thee from God, and his blessing may remain in the latter end. See the Saintly Doctor, at the place cited, expounding these things most excellently.

He adds, however, that if the service of parents draws us away from the worship owed to God, then the worship of parents is no longer to be insisted upon against the worship of God, as Christ also taught, Luke 14, and there the Saintly Doctor comments most excellently: If anyone comes to me, and hateth not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple; and the same is found in Matthew 10. Whence in praise of James and John it is said, Matthew 4, that they, leaving their nets and their father, followed Christ; and in praise of the Levites, Deuteronomy 33: Who said to his father, and to his mother: I know you not; and to his brethren: I see you not: and their children they knew not. These kept thy word, and observed thy covenant, as the Saintly Doctor observes, on chapter 9 of Luke, toward the end, on these words: Suffer the dead to bury their dead.

The Saintly Doctor also brings forward that saying of D. Jerome, epistle 1, to Heliodorus: Go forth, trampling underfoot thy father, go forth, trampling underfoot thy mother, and fly to the standard of the Cross: The highest kind of piety is to have been cruel in this matter. The reason of the Saintly Doctor is that we are more bound to worship God than our parents, and we must obey God rather than men, Acts 5.

Yet that he infers the same — that we must often omit some spiritual goods for the sake of aiding parents, and that we are not bound to enter religion, because this is a good of counsel; but to aid parents in necessity is a precept, as the Saintly Doctor teaches, on chapter 1 of the Rule, and S. Thomas here, art. 4.

Here certain questions occur, which I shall resolve. I shall set forth, however, that the name of son in Greek Φίλος indicates Philo, that is, friend.

For since children are held to exhibit three things to their parents: Love with reverence, Obedience, and Beneficence, or, as D. Bonaventure says, in the cited sermon, a threefold honor is owed to parents, of Reverence, Obedience, and Beneficence; from this threefold head they contract special obligations.

As to the first, they are bound to love their parents in a singular way, not only inwardly, but also outwardly, so that hatred toward parents, or contempt, is a graver sin than toward others; for they offend not only against charity, but also against piety. Therefore this circumstance is to be explained in confession, just as one who killed his father would be bound to explain that circumstance. So D. Bonaventure, serm. cit., Bass., V. Filius 2, Toletus, book 5 of the summa, c. 1, Navarre, in manuali lat. c. 24, Azor, tract. 2, lib. 2, cap. 2, question 2, Sylvester, V. filius, question 22, Tabiena, there, question 26, Fagundez, lib. 4, c. 2. They are also bound to behave reverently toward them.

As to the second, they are bound to obey their parents in their governance.

As to the third, they are bound to come to their aid in necessities; but many doubts can occur in these matters.

Quaestio II: What reverence is to be shown to Parents

What reverence is to be exhibited to Parents.

I ASSERT first, that children are bound not to hurl insults, or to inflict grave injuries upon their parents. It is the common opinion, with D. Bonaventure, serm. 5, on the ten commandments. So also Navarre, man. cap. 14, Tolet., lib. 5, c. 5, Richard., in 3, dist. 37, Alens., 3 p. dist. 4, praecepto, Sylvester, V. filii, q. 22, Molseus, tract. 2, c. 18, Bassaeus, at the place cited.

Yet it is never licit to lay hands upon parents, unless the children are forced to it to defend their life, or their country. So Azorius, tract. 2, cap. 11, q. 9, 10. Hence neither is it licit to kill a proscribed father. So Julius Clarus, in praxi, lib. 5, §. Homicidium, Bonac., de contract. dub. 2, q. ult. sect. 1, p. 2, Diana, part. 5, tract. 4, resol. 25.

I ASSERT second, that children sin mortally who despise their parents, and contemn them on account of poverty.

The Saintly Doctor reports, at the place cited, a horrible case of this matter, of a certain son who, at the persuasion of his wife, a noble, talkative, and wanton woman, despised his father and hid from him his food. One day the wretched old man arrived, and they scarcely brought him beans; but as he withdrew, they brought out from the chest a fat cooked capon, which, turned into a monstrous toad, leaped upon his face, and pressing the nose with two feet and also the two eyes with two, oppressed his whole face, and could not be torn away by any diligence or force. A physician was summoned, and applied remedies of surpassing power; then the venomous toad, fixing its terrible eyes upon the man in the middle, fell down as if terrified; but soon it miserably killed the impious young man. The Saintly Doctor testifies that he heard this from a certain man worthy of trust, who had known the man slain.

If, however, grave harm should befall them by acknowledging them, it will not be a fault to refuse to recognize them, provided you show reverence and come to their aid. So Toletus, lib. 5, cap. 5, Navarre, man. cap. 14, Fagundez, lib. 4, cap. 5.

I ASSERT third, that children accusing their parents in judgment sin gravely, and are not to be admitted. Yet it is licit for a son to ask that sustenance unjustly denied by his parents be exhibited. It is licit also in the crime of heresy and lèse-majesté. See the Doctors in Fagundez.

The REASON is that the public good, by natural law, is to be preferred to the private. Which reason seems to prove only that one is bound even when heresy can be pernicious to others, but not if it were secret; nor does it appear that she would teach it, as Fagundez says, with others, to be cited in Diana; but I say with D. Paul that every heresy creeps like a cancer. Therefore I assert that in such a case the son is bound. So Farinacius, de haeresi, quaest. 197, Suarez, de fide, disp. 20, sect. 4, Azor, part 2, lib. 2, cap. 2, question 13, Diana, p. p. Tract. de Denunc. resol 4. I say the same of a husband against a wife, and conversely. See Diana, resol. 5. In cases, however, where heresy is doubtful, many deny this, as in Diana, resol. 6.

Quaestio III: What obedience is to be shown to Parents by Sons

What obedience is to be shown by Children to their Parents.

I ASSERT first that children are bound to obey their parents in matters concerning the governance of the household. Thus for children not to obey their parents commanding the son to guard against some mortal sin, or its near occasion, so that he not go out by night, nor walk with criminals, so as to flee forbidden games, harlots, and the like, is mortal. So St. Bonaventure serm. 5. in decem praecepta, Toletus lib. 5. cap. 1. Navarr. man. cap. 14. Fagundez in 4. praeceptum, cap. 4.

I ASSERT second, that children are not bound to obey their parents in unjust matters, and in this sense Christ commands hatred toward parents, as I said quaest. prima. So D. Bonaventure loco cit. Toletus lib. 5. cap. 5. Navarr. Fagundez loco cit.

I ASSERT third, that children are not bound to obey their parents in those things which pertain to taking on a state of life, as religion or matrimony. For each one ought to be free in this, as the holy Doctor observes on those words of the rule, cap. 2. Si qui voluerint hanc vitam accipere. He proves it by that passage of Matt. 19, Si vis perfectus esse, etc. The same is noted by Fagundez num. 3. with others. The same the holy Doctor shows from the liberty of vocation to these states in 1. dist. 29. quaest. 3.

I ASSERT fourth, yet supposing that the children wish to marry, that it is mortal not to take, at the father's command, a worthy bride, so that the enmities may be lulled to sleep, says Fagundez with Toletus and Navarrus to be adduced, and Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 6. et this is the common opinion, and it is D. Bonaventure's, to be cited below. But I would add that it be understood, if that please, and there be no danger, as often happens, of perpetual estrangement, or of the dishonor of marriage, so that he turn aside to harlots. For this is a law of perpetual servitude: so the Doctors commonly, as at Hurtado de matr. d. 6. diff. 10. num. 35. Diana part. 4. tract. 4. resol. 132.

A GRAVE question however presses: whether a son sins gravely, unwilling to marry a worthy woman at his father's command, and taking another worthy one without a reasonable cause, by his mere will.

The FIRST opinion is that he sins gravely. So Guttierrez lib. 1. qq. can. cap. 20. Barbosa 4. part. lib. 1. ff. soluto matrimonio, num. 33. Veracruz in speculo coniugali 3. part. art. 20. They cite also both Sotos, Menochius, and others; Fagundez follows them lib. 4. cap. 4. num. 4. it seems to Navarr. in summa Lat. cap. 4. num. 15.

The SECOND opinion denies it: So Toler. lib. 5. cap. 1. Molina de primog. lib. 2. cap. 13. D. Thomas is also cited 2. 2. quaest. 104. art. 5. in corpore, Corduba casu 171. Victoria §. 267. Couarr. cap. 3. § 8. Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 6. Bassaeus V. Filius, num. 5. provided however no grave cause of forbidding be present for the Father.

The THIRD opinion teaches that he is indeed bound to consult his parents, yet not to obey their counsel. So Sanchez lib. 4. de matrim. d. 23. adducing others, especially D. Thomas and Guttierrez, but wrongly.

The SENTENCE of D. Bonaventure in 4. d. 29. quaest. 1. is this, that a father cannot command a son to take some woman in marriage, unless a reasonable cause urges, as if they have enmities, nor can they otherwise be reconciled. Or unless charity urges, as if he commands that he not contract with a wicked woman. Or unless the son himself has promised, or contracted espousals. Wherefore the holy Doctor is with the second opinion, which I maintain.

It is PROVED first by the holy Doctor, because in that in which we are equals, one is not bound to obey the other; but with respect to the right of marriage all are equals, unless another precept of the same natural law presses from above: Therefore the command of a father, as father, does not compel.

It is PROVED second by the holy Doctor: With the father commanding marriage, the son can vow chastity: Therefore he is not bound to obey his father.

It is PROVED third by the holy Doctor; if a son wishes to enter religion, he is not bound to obey his father determining or forbidding, because the vow is spontaneous: Therefore likewise the promise of marriage.

It is PROVED fourth by the holy Doctor: No one can destine me to perpetual servitude. But a man, by the fact that he contracts with a wife, gives her perpetual power over his body: Therefore.

It is PROVED fifth by the holy Doctor: If a father can compel: Therefore espousals contracted by parents without the son's consent are valid.

YOU WILL OBJECT however first. Isaac commanded his son Jacob not to take wives of the Chanaanites, Genes. 28. Therefore a Father can forbid this.

The holy Doctor RESPONDS, that he commanded this both because those women were wicked and contagious. For of them the Lord said: Certissime avertent corda vestra. Then because this kind of men was to be destroyed by God's command, and this is intimated in the text to have been known to Isaac.

YOU WILL OBJECT second, Coloss. 3. we have: Filii obedite parentibus per omnia. The Gloss adds, quae non sunt contra Dominum: But marriage is not against God: Therefore.

The holy Doctor RESPONDS, that that distribution is understood only of those things which pertain to the honorification of parents and to the governance of the family. As to the rest, it is only counsel, which the Gloss intimates, saying: Placet Deo, si per omnia obediatis, ita tamen, si Domino obediatis.

YOU WILL OBJECT third. As the spiritual Father stands with respect to spiritual matrimony, so the carnal father with respect to carnal: But the Lord Pope can command under excommunication that someone espouse himself to the Church by spiritual marriage, by accepting a Bishopric: Therefore.

The holy Doctor RESPONDS by denying the parity, because the spiritual Father has ampler power in governance than the carnal; and the more so because it pertains to the public good, which prevails over the private. Then a heavier yoke is imposed by carnal marriage, which is inseparable; whereas a Bishopric can be dispensed, laid down, etc.

He ADDS that of so great a parent it is presumed that, inspired by the Holy Spirit, he governs the Church, and accordingly commands for the public good, and therefore is to be obeyed. Wherefore the holy Doctor explodes the opinion of those saying that the Pontiff cannot command this. That one can, he says, refuse, if he knows certainly that he is unequal to the burden, and therefore that the Bishopric is dangerous for himself.

In our matter much more can the son, who is oppressed by his father, whether because he is not nourished, or not according to his station, or is sent farther away, that he not marry, marry with a worthy woman against his father's will; even if of inferior condition: So almost all grant, from the liberty of the state of marriage, Fagundez num. 5. Molina lib. 2. de primog. cap. 13. and others, as at Bassaeus loc. cit.

From which I also deduce, that such a son or daughter does not lose a legacy left under this condition, that she marry with her father's consent. So Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 6. Gamma decis. 314. Emmanuel Acosta l. cum tale, §. si arbitratus, ff. de condit. et demonst. Molina lib. 2. de primog. cap. 13. Sanchez Tom. 1. de matrim. lib. 1. d. 34. Molina the Theologian Tom. 1. de Iust. d. 207. Manuel Rodrig. tom. 1. summae edit. prima, cap. 133. Sylvest. verbo Concilium, Mencacha, controv. cap. 5. Fagund. num. 6. and others commonly among these authors.

The SAME must be said of the right of primogeniture and the like, if they are established under such a condition. For there is one and the same reason on both sides, as Molina, Iustisconsultus, and Fagundez note.

The FOUNDATION is, because such a condition impedes the liberty of marriage, and therefore must be judged as not appended; for although it is honorable for children to follow the will of their parents in contracting marriages, nevertheless the laws, wishing to favor altogether the liberty of marriage, reject conditions repugnant to this liberty, and judge them as not appended. Certainly such conditions weaken the liberty, which ought to be full, as we have cap. Gemma mulieri, de sponsal. Second, because this case must be decided according to l. filia suae, ff. de condit. et demonst. et l. cum tale, §. si arbitratu.

MANY however of those cited ADD that it avails, if a condition be appended of consulting parents or others, without denying the liberty not to carry out the counsel.

This however Acosta impugns loc. cit. referring to others who hold the same as himself.

YET I think the legacy avails, if it be left under that condition, that she marry a certain kind of noble persons, because it invites by a reward and compels toward better things. So Henriquez loc. cit. and Fagundez num. 9.

Quaestio IV: How, and when, Sons are bound to relieve Parents

How, and when Children are bound to come to the aid of their Parents.

I HAVE said in the first question, in expounding the definition of Piety, that children are bound to supply their parents with food and clothing in their necessities. But certain difficulties occur.

The FIRST is; whether children are bound to nourish heretical parents, and some assert it. So Azorius Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 3. quaestio 2. Glossa 12. cap. 1. verbo fidelis, d. 30. Castro lib. 2. de iusta haeret. punit. cap. 7. who says that a heretical father is to be preferred to a Catholic stranger.

The SECOND opinion asserts in extreme necessity, but not in grave. So Cara l. 6. quis a liberis, §. et si impubes, ff. de lib. agnosc. Sardus de alim. tit. 7. Sanchez lib. 2. decal. cap. 24. Fagundez lib. 4. cap. 2. num. 6.

NAY, Fagundez adds, nor are they bound in extreme necessity, if the parents try to lead them into error against the faith, and refuse to desist. So it seems D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 101. art. 4. ad 1. expounding Lucae 14. Si quis venit ad me, et non odit patrem suum, etc. non potest meus esse discipulus. The same S. Bonaventure indicates in his Commentary on that passage.

MOREOVER the holy Doctor asserts in 4. d. 18. part. 2. quaest. 5. in corpore, that aid must be brought not only to excommunicate parents of whatever kind, but even to strangers in necessity, when they have nothing by which to be sustained. This seems to require extreme necessity, yet not clearly; for it can also be understood of grave necessity.

I ASSERT first, that it is more probable that a son is bound to nourish heretical parents only in extreme necessity.

It is PROVED first. Fathers are bound to their sons by a stronger bond of natural law than sons to fathers; for nature descends from parents to children, not the reverse: But Catholic fathers are not bound to nourish heretical sons, unless they be in extreme need, as Surdus proves tit. 7. quaest. 2. Therefore.

It is PROVED second, because a Father can deprive a heretical son of the inheritance, as is clear from Authent. Ut cum, de appellat. cognosc. §. causas, et l. Regia Hispanae 7. tit. 7. part. 6. et l. Lusitana, l. 4. novae recopil. tit. 88. Now it is the common opinion, as at Molina de primog. lib. 2. cap. 16. Azor. tom. 2. lib. 2. quaestio 6. cap. 5. Sanchez, and Fagundez loc. cit. that in all cases in which parents can disinherit their children, they can also, apart from extreme necessity, deny them maintenance: Therefore.

From this understand what the l. Hispana 8. tit. 23. part. 1. infers, defining that a needy heretical father is to be preferred to a Catholic stranger, in the alms to be bestowed by the son; for it is understood in extreme necessity, as Surdus notes tract. de alim. tit. 1. quaest. 18. et 19. and as the holy Doctor indicates in corpore, loc. cit. when he places first the parents, then the excommunicate pilgrims, when they have nothing by which to be sustained.

A QUESTION arises: Whether the fisc is bound to maintain the alimony of Catholic children from goods devolved to it from a heretical Father. Of this great controversy Peregrinus treats de iure fisci, lib. 5. tit. 1. Farinacius tom. 1. part. 1. tit. de delictis, et poenis, quaest. 24.

The FIRST opinion is that, in the goods of the father being made public, the alimony cannot be computed, nay not even the children's legitima. Many among those cited follow it, to whom I add Guilielmus, Benedictus, citing Raynutius under the word, et uxorem, decis. 5. num. 286. de testam. It seems D. Bonaventure's in 4. loco citato.

The second opinion teaches that children can be denied alimony from their father's published goods by the Inquisitors and the fisc, on account of these two crimes only, namely heresy, and the crime of lèse-majesté. Fagundez says it is today the common one lib. 4. cap. 1. referring to many, with Sanchez lib. 2. Decal. cap. 16.

I assert that the first opinion is probable, namely that the children's alimony is not to be computed in the Father's goods.

It is proved first by the argument of S. Bonavent. 3. with the explanation of the body added. The fisc succeeds to the father's goods: But a father cannot deny his son alimony in extreme necessity. And certainly it seems barbarity, toward infant children, after the inheritance and legitima have been snatched away, finally to deny them even alimony, and to punish the sins of parents in children against Divine law.

Nor let Fagundez say that only the Father is punished. For let it be that the father too is punished as to the patrimony of the inheritance; yet as to the denying of alimony, it is rather the son who is punished. For if any penalties whatever could be imposed to terrify delinquents, it would be lawful also to burn children alive.

It is confirmed, for on account of the crime of heresy of the son himself, his castrensial or quasi-castrensial goods, which belong entirely to the same son himself, cannot be proscribed, as very many teach, whom Sanchez cites lib. 2. cap. 15. to whom I add Diana part. 4. Tract. 8. de Inquisit. resol. 61. Sanctarellus de haeresi, cap. 18. d. 1. and it is clear from l. si filius, C. de bonis damn. Therefore much less, on account of the father's offense, are the son's alimony and maintenance, which are owed to the son by natural law more than castrensial goods, to be proscribed.

You will object first. A parent can subject all his goods to a mortgage by contract: Therefore much more by offense.

It is answered first, by denying the Antecedent; for this would be impious, even if valid; for it is against the law of natural piety.

You will object second, cap. Vergentis, de haereticis, where the Pontiff takes away entirely all succession from the children as to the goods of heretical fathers, and commands, with them wholly disinherited, that all the goods be made public.

It is answered, that odious laws are not to be extended. Now the Pontiff commands that the inheritance be proscribed, but not that alimony be taken from the children, because that would be against natural law.

I confess however that the opposite opinion is also probable.

¶ Under what law then are children bound to minister alimony to their parents; I say they are bound by natural law, as the Theologians commonly teach, with D. Bonavent. serm. 5. in decem praecepta, and in other places adduced quaest. 1. It is proved by S. Bonaventure because nature there binds more strongly, where there is the greater debt; but children owe more to their parents, from whom they have being, than parents to children. And they say this is by natural law: Therefore. See on this matter Fagundez loc. cit. and Rebellius de oblig. iust. part. 2. lib. 5. quaest. 8.

And it is so true, that in extreme necessity children are bound more to their parents than to their own children, as the Theologians teach, with D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 26. art. 8. ad 3. and D. Bonavent. as I showed, Tract. de charitate, de ordine charitatis, where I also discussed what is to be done in grave necessity.

But in either necessity of parents it is not lawful for children to abandon them and enter religion. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 101. art. 4. ad 4. Toletus lib. 5. summae, cap. 1. Alens. 3. p. quaest. 33. m. 4. quaest. 2. Angelus verb. Religio, num. 32. Rosella 2. num. 7. Sylvest. quaesito 7. Azor. tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 3. quaesito 5. with D. Bonavent. serm. 5. in 4. praecept. et loco cit. in 4. This also is true, if such a necessity begins during the novitiate, as is clear. But in doubt whether the necessity be grave and otherwise not removable, it seems to be in the son's discretion to choose either. See the Doctors also in Bassaeus, V. filius, num. 7.

For one who has a vow of entering religion ought not to enter, while the necessity of his parents lasts: yet if he enters and makes profession, he will sin; nevertheless his profession will be valid; for no law annulling it is found, as Fagundez notes num. 10.

But the grave doubt is: whether, in the necessity of his parents, a son who has made profession in religion is bound to leave it, when he cannot come to their aid in Religion.

In extreme necessity certainly all confess they are bound, as is seen in Sanchez lib. 4. Decal. cap. 20. Bassaeus num. 8. Fagundez num. 21. nor does D. Thom. quaest. 101. art. 4. ad 4. contradict this, as Fagundez thinks.

The question then is in grave necessity, if, remaining in religion, he cannot come to their aid.

The FIRST opinion is that he is bound, the faculty asked, even if not obtained. So Ancona de potestate Papae, quaest. 5. art. 1. Henriq. quaest. 6. quaest. 6. Iansen. in concord. Euang. cap. 60. Viguer. lib. 6. Instit. moral. cap. 6. §. 7. Corduba in Reg. Minorum, cap. 2. quaest. 6. art. 2.

The SECOND opinion is, that he is bound, if the necessity existed before his profession, but not if it came afterward. So Nauar. in man. cap. 14. Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 1. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 34. Rodrig. tom. 1. summae, cap. 6. Cucus lib. 3. Instit. maiorat. tit. 1. num. 126. Bassaeus num. 8. Sanch. summ. lib. 4. cap. 20. num. 14.

The THIRD opinion is, that he is not bound, whenever the necessity may have arisen; yet he can leave, the faculty asked, even if not obtained. So Sà verb. Religio, num. 2. Rosella ibi verb. Religio 2. num. 7. D. Antonin. 3. part. tit. 16. cap. 2. Armilla verb. Pietas. Tabiena ibi. Corduba in summa, quaest. 141. art. 2. Angles flor. 3. part. quaest. un. de voto, art. 2. diffic. 13. Passarellus de privil. minorum, cap. 42. Rodriguez tom. 2. qq. Regularium. Alens. 3. part. q. 33. m. 4. art. 1. Fagundez num. 27. and others.

To me the first opinion seems more probable, because when several laws concur, the higher law ought to prevail; but to succor one's parents is pure natural law, and the first law in the order of charity toward one's neighbor: Therefore the vows of Religion cannot be made absolutely to the prejudice of that law, but conditionally, unless the bond of natural law be repugnant.

Fagundez answers num. 25. that vows are conditional as to extreme necessity, but not as to grave.

But this author ought here to have recalled that he taught, num. 14. et cap. 5. that even in grave necessity the natural precept of coming to the aid of parents presses.

You will say. Sons are not bound to leave their wife, that they may come to the aid of their parents, nor are clerics bound to take up the name of soldiery, that they may succor them, even if no other way be available: Therefore neither are they bound to abandon Religion, when they have delivered themselves to the power of the Prelates.

It is answered, that these assumptions are beside the point. And first I say that the bond of marriage is indeed of absolute natural right, nor does dissolving the bond of marriage help toward aiding parents. For meanwhile he ought, if he can, to aid his parents, even in marriage.

To what is said of soldiery, I answer, that one can also follow the soldiery, if no other way of aiding his parents be available; and acquire castrensial goods; but what then? Can he not accomplish the same with quasi-castrensial goods in the clerical state? As to the power of the Prelates, it is clear that it is conditional, without prejudice to the precepts of nature.

I ADD also that the habit can be laid aside, if otherwise he cannot exercise the work of piety in this case, as Fagundez num. 28. notes.

It is ALSO ASKED: when parents are in extreme necessity, and the son's creditor, is the latter bound rather to the parents than to the creditor.

I SAY, he is bound rather to the parents, and to himself, for in such necessity the debt of justice ceases, because all things, as to their use, are common leg. 2. §. Cum in eadem, ff. ad legem Rhodiamam de iactu. So also think Azor tract. 2. lib. 12. cap. 8. quaest. 5. Paludan. 4. dist. 15. quaest. 2. art. 1. Sotus lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 7. art. 1. Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 5 ad 4. Tabiena verb. restitut. quaest. 4. Fagundez lib. 4. cap. 2. num. 30. Nay, as to dominion all things are common, as I said.

By the argument cited is also solved the adverse reason of those teaching that a son is bound to his creditors, because he is bound to them by a double bond, namely of Charity, and of justice. For I say the bond of justice ceases.

NOR will he be bound to restore to the creditor, if he should be restored to prosperous fortune.

The reason is, because from the beginning all things were common, and they were divided by the law of nations with this condition, that they return in that part which is necessary in extremity; otherwise the law would have been imprudent and unjust. See Fagundez num. 32.

It is ALSO ASKED: whether elder sons, who have received nothing from their parents beyond the bare right of primogeniture, are bound to pay their parents' debts from the means of the maioratus.

The COMMON answer, as at Fagundez num. 33. is that if the debts were contracted before the institution of the maioratus, those goods could not be bound to them; since they were debts owed to creditors; but if he contracted them after the institution of the maioratus. The true opinion asserts he is bound. So many Jurists, whom he adduces and follows, Fagundez lib. 4. cap. 2. num. 34.

It is PROVED, because those debts of the parents were converted to the utility of the sons, to whom the bound goods and maioratus pertain. Therefore they are bound to pay them, if he is not solvent who received them, leg. ei qui, §. Alioquin, Cod. eum eo, et leg. His solis, ff. de condit. indebit. ut exponit Glossa.

YET I do not deny that the opposite opinion is also probable, as at Fagundez num. 35.

Quaestio V: On the obligation of Parents toward Sons

I ASSERT first, that fathers are bound to provide support to their children in grave necessity. Under the name of support come clothing, food, medicine, lodging, and all those things without which human life cannot go on, as Panormitanus teaches in cap. cum secundum de praebendis, as is clear from cap. non liceat, on the same title: Moreover, by the name of Fathers are understood those ascending along the paternal line, and likewise of the Mother.

IT IS PROVED because he who gives life ought to supply the things necessary to it. It is the common opinion, as Covarruvias shows in Epit. part. 3. cap. 8. §. 6. Azor, tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 4. Sylvester under the word alimenta.

Yet the Father may, for correction, restrict the support given to his son. For he is bound to provide his children with good education and discipline by fitting means. Wherefore, even if by accident he cannot go out to hear Mass, it does not matter, as Fagundez says cap. 1. num 3.

NOTE that under the name of children are included also illegitimate ones. Wherefore parents gravely sin who, being able to support their spurious children, expose them in churches and hospitals for alms. So Fagundez num. 5. Toledo lib. 5. cap. 1. Navarr. man. cap. 14.

Nor let them excuse themselves by saying that those places of the Hospitals have revenues for this end; they have them for the poor as their children. Therefore they are bound here to restitution, as Fagundez says num. 5. after Sylvester under the word Adulterium. Navarr. man. cap. 16. Rebell. p. p. de obligat. iust. lib. 3. quaest. 10.

Some add that spurious children are not bound to be dowered. So Panormitanus in cap. Pervenit, de arbitr. Vasquez de success. creatu. lib. 2. §. 10. num. 314. Molina Tom. 1. de iust. dub. 223. Fagundez num. 6. inclines to it, though he holds the opposite probable, which many follow.

The reason therefore is that the argument from support to dowry does not hold.

From what has been said it follows that fathers are bound to provide support to their children even if they contract marriage without their consent with some person. So Sanchez lib. 4. de matrim. disp. 27. Decius on the rule nuptias 30. at the end, ff. de reg. iuris, Molina lib. 2. de primog. cap. 16. Fagundez num. 10.

I ASSERT secondly, that parents are bound to provide for the right education of their children, which contains the nourishment of the mind.

THEREFORE they are bound to instruct them in the law of God; to keep daughters from shameless lovers, lest they allow them 'with stibium' etc. to adorn the face wantonly. Say the same of others under whose care they fall.

I ASSERT thirdly, that parents cannot force their children to undertake a state of life, forcing them either to Religion or to marriage; yet for marriage there can be a grave cause. Therefore the Council of Trent session 25. cap. 18. strikes with excommunication those forcing women, girls or widows, to enter Religion, or to take the habit, or to make profession.

Quaestio VI: In which cases Parents can disinherit Sons

NOTE that in all cases in which parents and children can disinherit one another, they can also deny one another a dowry and support, extreme necessity set aside, as the Doctors commonly teach. Azor. tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 5. question 6. Molina de primog. lib. 2. cap. 16. Sanchez lib. 2. Decal. cap. 24. and lib. 4. de matrim. d. 26. Molina Theol. Tom. 1. de Iust. d. 176. Menoch. lib. 4. de praesumpt. 189. Spino in spec. testam. glossa 20. num. 66. Fagundez lib. 4. cap. 3. Therefore, once the cases in which children may be disinherited are seen, it will be clear when support may be denied; you will always except extreme necessity.

The FIRST case is brought forward if a daughter marries before twenty-five years of age without the consent of her parents, or sins against her own body, or chooses a disgraceful life. Authent. ut cum de appellat. cognosc. §. Cansas, as the Doctors commonly expound, as cited by Fagundez cap. 3. num. 8. who nevertheless held that the Authentic speaks there of her who marries before twenty-five years of age.

This cause, however, seems abrogated by canon law to protect the liberty of marriage. So St. Thomas 2. 2. question 124. article 5. and others cited by Fagundez cap. 3. num. 3. Sanchez lib. 4. de matrim. d. 65.

It is nevertheless probable that it has not been abrogated, as Fagundez writes num. 5.; it does not, however, hold for children, as Menochius notes cons. 3. Sanchez lib. 4. de matr. d. 24. Barbosa on l. 1. 4. part. num. 31. ff. solut. matrim.

The SECOND case is, if he lays violent hands on his father or mother: Authent. Ut cum de Appellat. cognosc. §. causas autem: Understand with mortal fault; otherwise if he did it in defense of himself or of his country.

The THIRD case is, if he inflicts grave insults, especially in a public place, or defames his parents. See Fagundez num. 30. who cites only Hispanic law.

The FOURTH case, if against the will of their parents they play the mime and join themselves to actors and persist in that profession, provided nevertheless their parents were not of the same profession. Likewise if a daughter or son becomes a malefactor and lives familiarly with them; understand this copulatively, as Molina expounds Tom. 1. Inst. tract. 2. d. 176. Fagundez num. 31.

The FIFTH case, if they attempt to remove their parents by poison, or give favor, counsel or aid to others doing so. So Covarruvias cap. Raynutius, num. 13. Molina d. 171.

The SIXTH, if they have dealings with a stepmother, or with a concubine reared in the house. So Covarruvias and Molina, and Fagundez num. 34.

The SEVENTH, if he composed a defamatory pamphlet against his father or mother, and was their informer.

The EIGHTH, if the parent is in prison, and the son, though able, refused to become surety when requested by him; Authent. ut Cum, de Appellat.

The NINTH case, if he prevents a parent from making a will. See Fagundez num. 37.

The TENTH, if the other parent falls into madness, and the children deny help or neglect the care. Wherefore if an outsider, seeing the children, grandchildren, and others neglect, and moved by pity, takes the care, with protestation made and the heirs notified in writing, if these neglect and he carries the care through to the end, the whole inheritance is assigned to him by the Judge. Auth. ut Cum de Appellat. cognosc. §. si quis de praedictis. and in Auth. Liberti C. de Episcopali audientia.

The ELEVENTH, if the other parent is a captive, and the children do not care for their liberty.¹ Auth. Ut cum, §. si unum de praedictis.

The TWELFTH, if they have criminally accused their parents of things that are not against the Prince or the fatherland, or are not heresy. So Mol. d. 176. Fagundez num. 40.

The THIRTEENTH, if the children are heretics Auth. Ut cum, §. citato.

Quaestio IX: On the mutual obligation of Servants, and Masters

First indeed masters are bound out of charity and justice to take care that slaves do not live wickedly, that they keep the commandments of God, as also of the Church. Out of charity indeed, because they are their neighbors; out of justice, however, because as the slave is bound to serve the master out of justice, so the master is bound out of the same justice to give him wages, feed him, and teach him.

They are bound, if they see them incorrigible, to rebuke and cast them out. So Navarr. Man. cap. 14. num. 21. Fagund. lib. 4. cap. 14.

They are bound also not to impede the marriages of slaves; they may, however, refuse their consent; the slaves, however, may contract marriage against the will of their masters, as St. Bonaventure teaches 4 d. 36. question 1. St. Thomas there, in the single question, art. 2. and all the Thomists, Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. d. 21. Fagundez lib. 4. cap. 14. The rest I shall say in the Tract. de matrimonio. In the meantime I shall indicate that doubt: whether a slave ordered by his master to accomplish something, and called by his wife to render the debt, being involved in both, is bound rather to the master.

It is answered that if he entered marriage with the master's consent, he is bound rather to his wife, because whoever grants something necessarily grants also what is connected with it. So St. Bonaventure loc. cit. St. Thomas ad 3. and commonly, as cited by Fagundez lib. 4. cap. 14.

But Sanchez lib. 7. d. 21. says the service of the master is always to be preferred; but of this in part 3, loc. cit.

I say also that if a master has hired a servant for a fixed time, say for a year, and dismisses him without cause after a month, or even before, the master is to be compelled to pay the whole wage. So commonly the Doctors, as cited by Fagundez cap. 15. num. 20. The reason is that it did not lie with him. And say the same of a slave, if he is dismissed for his own fault; or if he runs away before the prescribed time, he is worthy of no wage.

A servant hired for wages is bound also for damage done to the master himself through his own fault, at least light. So commonly the Doctors, as cited by Fagundez num. 22.

Likewise he is bound for damage inflicted on the master himself by another in a thing that was under his custody, and this out of justice, and so he ought to make restitution; but if the thing was not under his custody, he was bound only out of charity, and therefore he is not compelled to restitution. So Azor. 3. part. lib. 8. cap. 13. question 8. Molin. tom. 2. de Iust. d. 506. Fagund. loc. cit. num. 23.

There occurs the case of slaves committing petty thefts under the appearance of just compensation from the master.

NOTE that if they are so ill treated that not even the lowest usual price is given for their servitude, or if, hired for food alone, they do not have necessaries, they can usurp something. See Fagundez from num. 31. and Molina loc. cit.

Quaestio X: On the obligation of Brothers toward Brothers, and Sisters, and conversely

First I say, that these owe one another support out of justice in extreme indigence.

So Azor. Tom. 2. lib. 11. cap. 40. question 1. Fagund. lib. 4. cap. 16. For if they are bound to outsiders, much more to brothers and sisters.

In grave necessity also, when they have not wherewith to live according to their state, rich brothers are bound in either forum to provide support, and the Judge, when appealed to, is bound to bind them to it.

A poor sister by both parents a brother is bound in either forum to support and dower. It is the common opinion, as cited by Fagundez cap. 16.

Say the same of a sister by the same father, but a different mother; we have leg. cum plures, §. Cum tutor ff. de administr. tutorum, which excludes only uterine sisters, as Bartholomew notes there in the final §. It excludes, however, as to dowering according to her opulent state, unless she is heir of the mother's goods; they are bound, nevertheless, always to support her. So Barthol. loc. cit. and others, as cited by Fagundez num. 4. He is bound, however, always to dower her to the measure of support, namely, in place of a dowry, by setting aside what would have been expended on support.

So conversely rich sisters are bound to dower poor sisters, and brothers to support them together with them. It is clear from the rule of correlatives. So Barbosa Tom. 1. part. 4. leg. 1. ff. soluto matrim. Fagundez cap. 16. num. 14.

Clerics are bound also to support their parents, brothers, and sisters that are poor from the revenues of the Church. So many, as cited by Fagundez cap. 17. num. 1.

The reason is that the fruit of a benefice is for the uses of the poor, much more of one's own household. If in cap. Pervenit. the contrary seems to be said, understand it of rich kinsmen, to whom the fruits of the benefice are not to be communicated, but rather to outside paupers.

I say also that one may dower needy daughters or sisters from the fruits of a benefice, but is not bound to. See Fagundez num. 2.

The question here demands: whether sons who gravely squander their goods beyond the others are bound to bring them to the collation with their brothers, and to recall their own legitimate portion.

Indeed I have seen very many holding such to be at fault, and I judge them bound. So Navarr. summa, cap. 17. Sylvester under the word peculium, 2. question 9. Antonius Gomez ad leg. 29. Tauri; nevertheless Navarrus, with St. Antoninus 2. part. tit. 1. cap. 15. excepts unless the father while living forgave it; but this does not please me, because he is bound to bring to partition even those things which the father gave.

Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio VI: Whether* the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Dubitatio I: Whether* KNOWLEDGE *is a gift of the Holy Ghost