Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia

Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus

Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)

Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus

First published 1676

Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.


Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed

Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear

Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE

Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is

Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil

Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God

Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes

Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically

Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes

Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland

Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR

Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD

Disputatio VI: On Despair

Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is

Disputatio VII: On Presumption

Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin

Disputatio VIII: On Charity

Quaestio I: What CHARITY is

Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is

Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God

Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit

Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species

Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues

Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues

Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts

Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless

Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect

Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how

Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity

Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also

Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY

Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity

Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity

Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated

Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY

Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor

Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself

Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves

Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor

Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life

Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another

Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father

Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father

Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children

Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect

Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven

Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved

Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence

Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength

Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love

Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven

Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend

Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST

Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection

Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds

Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD

Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds

Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY

§ I: On Joy

Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue

§ II: On Peace

Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is

§ III: On Mercy

Quaestio I: What MERCY is

Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is

Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity

§ I: De Beneficentia

Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is

§ II: On Almsgiving

Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity

Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished

Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept

Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor

Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor

Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need

Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods

§ III: On Fraternal Correction

Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept

Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret

Disputatio XI: On Hatred

Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is

Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is

Disputatio XII: On Sloth

Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is

Disputatio XIII: On Envy

Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is

Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is

Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention

Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is

Disputatio XV: On Schism

Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is

Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is

Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS

Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO

Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just

Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war

Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged

Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition

Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio II: What sedition is

Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal

Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is

Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin

Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal

Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil

Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom

Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is

Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift

Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God

Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings

Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom

Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom

Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom

Disputatio XX: On Prudence

Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is

Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue

Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE

Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE

Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost

Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE

Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy

§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels

§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations

§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy

§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers

§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy

Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues

Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel

Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is

Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind

Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven

Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel

Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence

Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION

Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS

Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY

Quaestio IV: On Negligence

Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh

Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS

Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)

Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD

Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things

Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future

Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE

Disputatio XXIII: On Justice

Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE

Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is

Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists

Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues

Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed

Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE

Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just

Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative

Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution

Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is

Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation

Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE

Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed

Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss

Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution

Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made

Quaestio V: What ought to be restored

Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way

Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body

Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made

Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul

Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored

Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored

Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored

Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored

Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored

Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored

Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored

Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored

Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding

Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention

Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties

Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute

Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored

Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it

Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution

Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution

Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor

Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor

Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority

Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made

Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made

Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made

Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin

Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices

Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence

Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges

Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors

Disputatio XXV: On Homicide

Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it

Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes

Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated

Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.

Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor

Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief

Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications

Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself

Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death

Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls

Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus

Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide

Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial

Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws

Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation

Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful

Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another

Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine

Quaestio I: What Dominion is

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things

Quaestio III: What THEFT is

Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft

Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious

Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave

Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another

Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious

Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold

Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters

Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours

Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves

Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts

Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE

Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise

Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins

Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment

Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE

Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge

Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly

Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE

Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation

Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation

Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition

Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused

Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal

Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven

Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others

Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy

Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution

Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned

Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered

Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge

Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself

Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when

Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES

Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness

Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial

Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses

Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses

Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate

Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office

Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate

Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault

Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing

Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity

Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts

Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion

Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion

Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely

Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises

Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies

Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction

Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin

Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it

Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly

Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal

Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused

Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known

Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments

Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself

Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing

Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering

Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery

Quaestio III: On Cursings

Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general

Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required

Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract

Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract

Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts

Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract

Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting

Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired

Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made

Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians

Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures

Disputatio III: On Promise

Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION

Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice

Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds

Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted

Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause

Disputatio IV: ON DONATION

Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what

Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations

Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling

Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are

Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell

Quaestio III: Which things can be sold

Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things

Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum

Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down

Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful

Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit

Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing

Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer

Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.

Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful

Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury

Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin

Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice

Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money

Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit

Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution

Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer

Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)

Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold

Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law

Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS

Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES

Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law

Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something

Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself

Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss

Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful

Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just

Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership

Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful

Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud

Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is

Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is

Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XI: On Testaments

Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open

Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs

Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato

Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable

Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake

Disputatio XII: On Legacies

Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how

Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed

Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is

Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them

Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general

Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is

Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue

Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue

Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue

Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend

Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary

Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one

Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION

Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio III: ON PRAYER

Quaestio I: What Prayer is

Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER

Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary

Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious

Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer

Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded

Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray

Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to

Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray

Quaestio X: How one ought to pray

Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours

Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept

Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it

Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour

Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins

Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies

Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions

Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself

Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies

Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies

Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour

Disputatio IV: ON ADORATION

Quaestio I: Whether Latria is in the genus of some virtue

Quaestio II: Whether Latria is distinct from Dulia

Quaestio III: On Sacred places, destined for adorations

Disputatio V: ON SACRIFICE

Quaestio I: What a SACRIFICE is

Quaestio II: What is required that a SACRIFICE be right

Quaestio III: Whether Sacrifice is of natural law

Quaestio IV: Whether besides Sacrifice, first-fruits are to be offered

Disputatio VI: On Tithes

Quaestio I: Whether Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio II: From which things tithes are to be paid

Quaestio III: To whom, and by whom tithes are to be paid

Quaestio IV: Where, and when, Tithes are to be paid

Quaestio V: By what authority the payment of tithes is to be exacted

Tractatus IV: E VOTIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VOW

Quaestio I: What a VOW is, and what its conditions are

Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW

Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow

Quaestio IV: Whether a Votive promise is made to God alone

Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness

Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid

Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow

Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good

Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good

Quaestio X: Whether a VOW about a thing that can have a good, and an evil, outcome is valid

Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is

Quaestio XII: Whether the immature are bound by Vows

Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS

Quaestio XIV: On the power of the Prelates of Religious to invalidate VOWS

Quaestio XV: Whether a husband can invalidate all the Vows of his wife, beyond the Vow of chastity

Quaestio XVI: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vow of Chastity emitted by his wife without license, the marriage standing, and to be fulfilled then

Quaestio XVII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted without his license, to be fulfilled at the time the marriage is dissolved

Quaestio XVIII: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife, emitted before marriage

Quaestio XIX: *Whether the Vows of a wife, made without the license of the husband, revive when the marriage is dissolved.*

Quaestio XX: *Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife emitted by his license: the Vow of Chastity excepted.*

Quaestio XXI: Whether a husband can revoke the Vow of Chastity of his wife, emitted by his license

Quaestio XXII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted under the preceding dominion of a father, or first husband

Quaestio XXIII: Whether a Wife can invalidate certain vows of her husband, and which

Quaestio XXIV: Whether parents, or Tutors, can invalidate all the Vows of their immature Sons

Quaestio XXV: Whether a Father, and Curator, can invalidate the personal Vows of their adolescent sons

Quaestio XXVI: Which real, or mixed, Vows of adolescents can be invalidated by the father

Quaestio XXVII: To whom the faculty of invalidating the Vows of adolescents, and the immature, belongs

Quaestio XXVIII: Which Vows of servants the Lords can invalidate

Quaestio XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from Vows

Quaestio XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which

Quaestio XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of Vows is to be made

Quaestio XXXII: Whether commutation requires a cause

Question XXXIII

Disputatio II: SECOND. ON THE STATE OF RELIGION, OR ON SOLEMN VOWS

§ I: On the vows of Religious in common

Quaestio I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

Quaestio II: Whether solemn VOWS are necessary for the state of a Religious

Quaestio III: Whether, and how, this state is Holy

Quaestio IV: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio VI: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio VII: On NOVICES

Quaestio VIII: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio IX: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio X: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XI: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XII: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion

Quaestio XIII: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows

Quaestio XIV: Who are to be received into Religion

Quaestio XV: On Novices

Quaestio XVI: What is required for profession in Religion

Quaestio XVII: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection

Quaestio XVIII: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken

Quaestio XIX: On passing to another Religion

Quaestio XX: On Religious to be expelled

Quaestio XXI: Whether every Religious is bound to all the counsels

Quaestio XXII: Whether Religious ought to teach, preach, etc.

Quaestio XXIII: Whether Religious ought to labor with their hands

Quaestio XXIV: Whether it is lawful for Religious to transact secular business

Disputatio III: On the Vow of OBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: Whether the vow of obedience is chief among the Religious vows

Quaestio II: What obedience is promised in Religion

Quaestio III: Whether Religious are bound to obey Prelates in all things

Quaestio IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the Prelate

Quaestio V: Whether all the statutes of Religious Orders bind under sin

Disputatio IV: On the Vow of Poverty

Quaestio I: On the essence of this Vow

Quaestio II: Which Poverty is more excellent

Quaestio III: Whether mendicancy befits Religious Poverty

Quaestio IV: Whether Religious, on account of Poverty, ought to be clothed in mean garments

Quaestio V: Whether austere fare is owed to Religious Poverty

Quaestio VI: How Poverty is violated

Dubitatio I: Whether Prelates can concede to Religious an annual peculium

Dubitatio II: Whether a Religious, having superfluities by license of his superior, is a proprietor

Dubitatio III: Dubitatio III

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Legacy stands for a Religious, as pertaining to him precisely

Quaestio VII: On the penalties, and marks, of a Proprietor

Disputatio V: On the Vow of CHASTITY

Quaestio I: What difference there is between Cloistered, and Clerical, chastity

Quaestio II: From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage

Quaestio III: Whether one vowing Chastity solemnly dissolves a marriage, whether consummated, or ratified, and by what law, and at what time this began to be done

Quaestio IV: By what law, and at what time, Religious Chastity began to be sealed with cloister

Quaestio V: By what means cloister is violated

Quaestio VI: Whether dispensation can fall upon Religious chastity, and who can dispense in cloister

Disputatio VI: On the Oath

Quaestio I: What an OATH is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to swear by GOD

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures

Quaestio IV: What is required for an Oath

Quaestio V: Whether, and how, it is a Sin to swear without Truth

Quaestio VI: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH made without justice

Quaestio VII: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH lacking judgment

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and how, a custom of swearing is evil

Quaestio IX: When precisely one swearing incautiously from custom sins mortally

Quaestio X: What sin it is to swear dolosely

Quaestio XI: Whether it is lawful to require an Oath from a perjurer

Quaestio XII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to require an Oath from an Idolater

Quaestio XIII: On the obligation of a promissory Oath in itself

Quaestio XIV: Whether dolous Oaths bind

Quaestio XV: Whether an Oath extorted by injury, as of paying usuries, binds

Quaestio XVI: Whether an Oath extorted by fear binds

Quaestio XVII: Whether someone's Oath, by fraud, or error, or ignorance, is void

Quaestio XVIII: Whether an incautious promissory Oath binds

Quaestio XIX: Whether an Oath confirms contracts that could otherwise be voided

Quaestio XX: On the means of removing the obligation of an Oath

Quaestio XXI: On the Penalties imposed upon Perjuries

Disputatio VII: On Adjuration

Quaestio I: What ADJURATION is, and by what means it is made

Quaestio II: Whom it is lawful to adjure

Disputatio VIII: On Divine Praises

Quaestio I: NICA. On the Nature, and quality, of Divine praises

Disputatio IX: On the Observance of Feast Days

As God is immense, so He bound His worship to certain places, namely temples, so that it is unlawful without sin to perform anything profane in them: so too, though He is Eternal, He commanded that certain days be kept free for Him and rested from every servile work. But just as God ordained many other things in the law of grace so as to leave their execution to His Church according to place and time, so too the sanctification of the feast day, though it has a Divine origin, nevertheless has its determination of time from the Church, as will appear from what follows immediately.

Quaestio I: On the origin of FEAST days

The observance of feasts is enjoined by the third precept of the Decalogue. And indeed, insofar as it assigns the Sabbath day, it is a ceremonial precept, which pertained to the Jews, not to us; but insofar as it assigns some day or time in which one is to be free for sacred things, it is moral, pertaining also to Christians. So D. Thom. prima secundae, quaest. 100. art. 3. ad 3. and 2. 2. quaest. 122. art. 4. Tannerus Tom. 2. disp. 5. q. 1. dub. 2. etc. Tom. 3. disp. 5. q. 5. dub. 1. and others after D. Bonav. serm. 4. in decem praecepta, and in 3. dist. 37. dub. 3. where he adds a certain mixture of the moral and the ceremonial.

For first it commands sanctification at some time, and indeed so that at that time we be free from servile works; for to sanctify the Lord is moral, of which first Peter 3. Sanctify the Lord in your hearts: but to cease from works at that time is moral, insofar as one is freed from those works that stand in the way of the worship of God; but it is also figurative, insofar as we are given to understand that we must abstain from every sin, which is a foul servile work.

Moreover, the keeping of the Sabbath day was ceremonial, to signify God's rest from the works of six days, and the future rest of Christ in the sepulchre, to call men back from death. See S. Thomas.

From this you will easily draw out by what right the institution of the Lord's day for sanctifying God was made.

There were those who said it was introduced by Divine right. So the Author of the supplement to the summa Pisana, v. Dominica, Sylvester there quaest. 1. where he adds also the Nativity of the Lord, Easter, Pentecost, Ascension, Epiphany, the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, and others, Abbas on cap. Licet de feriis, and nearly Angelus V. feria. Whence they infer that it cannot be taken away by any custom.

The true opinion, however, is that not only the other feasts, but also the Lord's day, were introduced by Ecclesiastical law. So D. Bonavent. serm. 4. in decem praecepta, and in 3. dist. 37. around the text, D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 122. art. 4. ad 4. Caietanus there, Antonin. 2. part. tract. 9. cap. 7. Sotus lib. 2. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. and others at Bassaeum here, and at Fagundez de praeceptis Ecclesiae, lib. 1. cap. 2. Suarez Tom. primo de Relig. lib. 2. cap. 4. Tannerus loco citato. So also D. Augustinus serm. 151. de tempore, and Catech. Rom. on the third precept of the Decalogue.

I assert with this opinion, that the institution of feast days is of Ecclesiastical law.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure, because on this there is only Ecclesiastical institution. For all other things, besides the Sacraments and the Sacrifice and faith, were left to the disposal of the Pastors, as Fagundez also notes n. 3. and it is commonly held. It seems indeed to have been handed down by the Apostles, as many Fathers teach, and afterwards confirmed by Canonical law, cap. Primo, c. Sabbatho de consecr. dist. 3. cap. Quoniam, and cap. licet, and cap. conquestus de feriis; and the Emperors confirmed it, as appears under the title de feriis, especially l. 2. and l. omnes dies.

Eusebius also lib. 4. de vita Constantini, cap. 18. and 19. reports that Constantine, embracing the great Apostolic tradition, religiously observed this day and commanded it to be observed.

D. Ignatius epist. 3. ad Magnesianos: In place of the Sabbath every Christian is to celebrate the feast of the Lord's Day, the Royal, and the eminent above all days, of the Resurrection. And D. Clemens libro 7. Const. cap. 71. says: On the day of the resurrection, which we call the Lord's, assemble without any interruption of the assembly for giving thanks to God, and for professing the benefits with which God has favored us through Christ. These indicate human law.

You will object. It would follow that it can be changed by the Church; but it has never yet been changed, which the Doctors commonly teach to be an indication of Divine right, ad cap. licet, and ad cap. conquestus, de feriis.

It is answered, that it can be changed by the supreme Pontiff; nevertheless it has not been changed, because the reason was not present, and besides, the observance is so ancient and perpetual that it would have to be denied even to the guilty, that the Sabbath was instituted by Divine right as a moral precept, for then it would be immutable by the Church. But say that, as to the time, it is now left to the Church, since the ceremonial signification has been fulfilled. See Suarez and Fagundez.

For the reasons of this perpetual and so firm observance of the Lord's day you have many in D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 37. art. 3. and serm. 4. de decem praeceptis, and serm. 2. Sabbati sancti, Suarez Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 4. Azorio Tom. 2. Institut. moral. lib. 1. cap. 2. quaest. 4. Sayro lib. 7. cap. 1. Fagundez loco citato, num. 8. The sixth Synodus Constantinopol. cap 8. comprehends them excellently, and they are reduced to seven. First, because on it God created light. Second, because on it He rained manna on the Hebrew people in the desert. Third, because on it Christ was born, adored by the Magi, baptized by John, on it He rose, and on the same day the Holy Spirit was sent upon the Apostles; Therefore the holy Synod concludes: So great must be the observance of the Lord's day, that besides the prayers and the solemn Masses, and those things which pertain to eating, nothing else be done. You will find nearly these reasons in D. Leone epist. 81. S. Augustino serm. 54. de tempore. S. Thomas adds, that the worship directed to God, which was exhibited on this first day alone, was consecrated to Him by the Pagans. If the feast of the Lord's day is of human law, much more the others, as the Doctors cited above teach.

Quaestio II: Whose it is to institute FEASTS to be observed under mortal sin

Whether FESTIVALS may be instituted to be kept under pain of mortal sin.

I assert first that it belongs to the supreme Pontiff to institute feasts throughout the whole world.

The reason is, because he is the universal supreme Pastor, to whom all the sheep have been entrusted: Ioan. 21. as I showed in the first part, Tract. 1. Disp. on the supreme Pontiff. It is the common doctrine, as Fagundez notes lib. 1. de praeceptis Ecclesiae, cap. 3. num. 2. Ballaeus V. Festum 1. num. 3.

I assert second, that Bishops can institute, in their own dioceses only, feasts of Saints already Canonized or Beatified; and as to Canonized saints, this they commonly teach, as gathered at Fagundez num. 3. Suarez indeed lib. 2. cap. 21. extends it even to the beatified, who adds with Fagundez that there is no need of the Pope's confirmation; and as to the Beatified subscribe Bellarminus lib. 1. de beatitudine sanctorum, cap. 7. Fagundez num. 15.

Yet they cannot impose such feasts by right without the consent of clergy and people, cap. conquestus, de feriis, and cap. Pronunciandum, de consecr. dist. 3. So Azor Tom. 2. Instit. cap. 26. quaestio 3. Suarez num. 8. Fagundez num. 8. who nevertheless adds that it can be done by custom, at least for some occasion. But by custom it has been introduced that it be done by the sole consent of the Clergy. Suarez de Relig. lib. 2. cap. 11. Sa V. fest. Sanchez lib. 1. moral. cap. 43. Azor part. 2. lib. 1. cap. 26. quaestio 4. Diana 4. part. tract. 4. resol. 178.

I assert third, that a secular Prince cannot institute feasts to be observed; and if Kings do this without the consent and authority of the Church, it is of no avail, both as to guilt and as to penalty. So Suarez Tom. 1. de religione, cap. 12. Azorius 2. part. Instit. moral. lib. 1. cap. 26. quaestio 5. Fagundez cap. 5. num. 2. Nor can they punish those who labor with the Bishop's license. So the S. Congreg. decreed, as at Diana part. 4. tract. 1. resol. 94.

I assert fourth, that feasts can be abrogated by custom. See Fagundez cap. 6. yet the consent, at least tacit, of the Bishop must be added. So Fagundez num. 7. For the introduction of a feast day, therefore, a custom of ten years suffices; but for abrogation, one of forty years.

I assert fifth, that the time during which feasts last depends on the custom of the place, province, etc. namely whether from Vespers to Vespers, or from midnight to midnight. So commonly, as at Fagundez cap. 6. num. 2. according to the Roman manner indeed, as to servile works, it begins from midnight to midnight, leg. more Romano, ff. de feriis.

Quaestio III: Whether mortal sins on a Feast are forbidden by this precept

Whether mortal sins are forbidden on the feast day by this precept.

The observance of the feast day is called the sanctification of that time to the honor and worship of God and the veneration of the saints. So Scripture speaks, Exodi 20.: Remember that you sanctify the Sabbath day. Therefore it adds: you shall not do any work in it, because this consecration is made through cessation from servile works. So S. Bonavent. 3. dist. 37. dub. 3. litt. and in serm. 4. de decem praeceptis, D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 122. art. 4. ad 3. Suarez Tom. 1. de Relig. lib. 2. de diebus festis, cap. 2. Azor Tom. 2. cap. 1. Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 3. Since therefore the feast day is ordered to the worship and sanctification of God, the question arises: whether mortal sin is prohibited by this precept, in such a way that to sin lethally on that day be called a transgression of the feast.

The first opinion is affirmative. So expressly D. Thom. loco cit. Ales. 3. part. quaest. 32. memb. 3. art. 2. ad ult. and memb. 5. art. 2. Albertus memb. 3. dist. 37. D. Antonin. 3. part. tit. 9. cap. 7. §. 3. and 5. part. tit. 14. cap. 19. §. 7. and tit. 17. cap. 17. §. 4. and 5. where Lyranus cap. 20. Exodi, where the same is taught by Abulensis quaest. 11. and 12. Medina Cod. de oratione, quaest. 10. and 19. Maior 4. dist. 14. quaest. 4. Angelus V. feria, num. 36. and V. Interrogationes circa tertium praeceptum. and V. Praeceptum, Rosella V. confessio, 2. num. 7. Catherinus lib. 5. contra Caietanum, Corduba lib. 1. quaest. 6. who says the opposite opinion is not safe, and he brings forward many.

The same hold Scotus, and Gabriel. 3. dist. 15. and the same Gabriel in 4. dist. 17. quaest. 1. conclusione 4. Angestus in moral. cap. 8. Nidet in 3. praecepto, cap. 1. and cap. 9. The same seems to be the sense of D. Ambrosius on Lucae 13. as at D. Thom. D. Augustinus epist. 119. and lib. de decem chordis, cap. 5. and cap. consideret. initio de poenit. dist. 15. v. In tempore, and V. orationi conflicto: And it seems to be the approved opinion in the Council of Cologne, convoked in the year of the Lord 1536. In the Tractate on exterior penance, fol. 180. where it teaches that he sins twice who spends the Lord's day with harlots and quarrels, fistfights, and obscenities. Fagundez says it is probable lib. 1. cap. 9. bringing forward also D. Bonaventuram in 3. dist. 37. dub. 3. litt. and in speculo animae, cap. 1. Add also serm. 4. de decem praeceptis. Therefore if the Seraphic Doctor is led to it, all the ancient and illustrious Theologians have it as patrons.

The second opinion, on the contrary, denies that the precept of the observance of the feast day specially forbids all mortal sins. So Suarez Tom. 1. de relig. lib. 2. de diebus festis, cap. 18. Azor tom. 2. cap. 28. quaestio 10. Caietanus prima secundae, quaest. 7. art. 1. and 2. 2. quaest. 122. art. 4. and in summa v. festorum violatio, and in opuscul. quaest. 27. quod, 10. Sotus in 4. dist. 18. quaest. 2. art. 4. lib. 2. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 4. Victoria in summa, de sacram. tit. de confess. num. 195. Abulensis in 4. dist. 17. quaest. 1. Sylvester V. Dominica, quaest. 8. dist. 4. and in Rosa aurea casu 65. where he says the most learned men of his order commonly hold thus. Navarras in cap. consideret, num. 22. and Manuali Lat. cap. 6. num. 9. Fumus V. Fevia, num. 12. Tabiens ibi, num. 47. Angles in floribus, quaest. 9. de confess. pag. 288. Couar. in cap. Alma mater, part. 1. §. 5. num. 3. and lib. 3. var. cap. 19. Guttierr. lib. 1. can. qq. cap. 31. Fagundez num. 1. who brings forward also D. Thom. 4. dist. 32. art. 5. quaest. 1. and in 3. dist. 37. art. 5. quaest. 2. ad 2. Bonacina puncto 2. Bassaeus 1. num. 3.

AS TO D. Bonaventure, he indeed seems clearly for the first opinion. Yet if it be thoroughly considered, he asserts indeed that the end of this Precept is the sanctification of the soul through good works, so that for that reason he wills that abstention be made from servile and worldly labors, that we may be free in quiet for the service of God; and so to act against the end intended by God is to yield, for he indeed does not labor in servile physical works, but only in works of sins, which indeed are metaphorically servile, and therefore he says that he does worse who applies himself to sins, frequenting theaters, luxury, drunkenness, than he who labors on the feast, because such a one, although he esteems one mean of being free for God from distracting servile works, yet operates other means contrary to the end, and more diametrically opposed to the Divine law, as overturning the end; and therefore in the places cited, and serm. 2. Sabbathi sancti, he complains with D. Augustinus that thus the Sabbath is not observed to the end intended by God; nevertheless he does not seem to impose anything except that we be free from physical servile works, and so he alleges the precept of the Divine law Exodi 20. and 35. and Levit. 23. and in 3. dist. 37. he says that cessation from servile works is imposed, and to signify that one must abstain from the servile works of sin, and as such it was significative, not only moral, and wittily for the full impletion of the other morals. And he says that especially by this precept servile works are forbidden, especially those directed to gains. Nor only these, but indeed more and more diligently carnal works, drunkenness, luxury, etc. and he adds the testimony of D. Augustinus saying: Not to keep the feast day according to the mind of God, in which manner the Jews observe it with carnal idleness; for they will to observe it for their trifles and luxuries; and therefore it would be a lesser evil on feasts, if they labored, than to dance all day impudically at the neomeniae. And explaining the testimony of D. Augustinus, he says: But he says this, not because one must cease on solemn days from the business of exterior acts; but because the Prelates of the Church, whose it is to institute these feasts, and to determine how and in what manner one must cease from exterior work, must rather call back from those things which offer a greater occasion of sinning. Whence to avoid idleness, or unfit solace, Augustine says that they ought rather to exercise themselves in works of piety than to apply to disordered and lascivious businesses: On which account on those days they ought to frequent the Churches, hear Masses, etc.

HENCE I gather quite soundly, that that precept of sanctifying the feast by abstaining from sins is indeed not the end of the precept, but only imposes a means of abstaining from servile works; and of applying oneself to some work of Religion, which is deputed in the Mass; Moreover it falls more to the Prelates to call the peoples back from sins.

He says in serm. 4. cited that this is truly the perfect vacation, which has joined to it a good operation, and forbids the servile one. Where he seems to intend the perfection indeed of the vacation of the feast, but not to constitute its essence in good works and the turning aside from sins. Therefore it is not so clearly for the first opinion. Which more, in the third argument, I will show from his words, with which he seems to me to embrace the second.

I ASSERT first, that the former opinion can be defended with probability, namely that mortal sins committed on the feast add a circumstance of malice.

It is PROVED by the authorities brought for it. First indeed by D. Bonav. from D. Augustino epist. 119. and lib. de decem chordis: The Jew would do better on the Sabbath something useful in his field; than if he were seditious in the theater. And their women would do better to work wool on the Sabbath day, than to dance all day impudically at the neomeniae.

Yet it can be answered that the S. Father intends only that the works of mortal sin against the law of nature are more against the end intended by God in the sanctification of feasts, than servile labors against the human precept of the feast day.

It is PROVED second from cap. Consideret. initio 15 de poenit. dist. 1. §. under the word In tempore, and the word orationi constituto, where it is prescribed that we confess the circumstance of the feast time in mortal sin.

Yet it can be answered with Navarro ibi num. 32. Guttierr. lib. 1. de qq. can. cap. 31. Suarez loco cit. num. 17. Fagundez n. 7. that this is a counsel, not a decree commanding, as appears from the tenor of the words.

The Council of Cologne above is also brought forward, but it was Provincial, not confirmed by the Apostolic See, and erring even in the matter of justification, as Fagundez notes num. 12. with Guttier. num. 36.

It is PROVED third by D. Bonavent. serm. 2. de Sabbatho sancto, and other places from Levit. cap. 16. It is the Sabbath of rest, and you shall afflict your souls, and you shall be cleansed from all your sins, and cap. 23. You shall afflict your souls, etc. You shall do no servile work on this day; every soul that shall not be afflicted on this day shall perish from its people, that the Lord may be propitious to you.

Guttierr. num. 33. Cano, and Couarruvias answer, to whom Fagundez subserves himself num. 12. from D. Bonavent. sermone 4. cited, where he says: But if we understand, as the Jews, who say that a universal cessation must be made from every servile work, so it is insinuated to the Christian that he must abstain from every sin, and so it is figurale. If we understand, that we must abstain from certain things, so it is moral, not as in the precept, and as in the bene esse, and it remained as in the Ecclesiastical institution it is a precept: I say servile works, mechanical works, etc. These things S. Bonaventure, by which he shows that there the sermon was about propitiation, or ceremonial sanctification; but that to abstain from sin is indeed signified by the precept of vacation from servile works, not commanded: For sin is servitude only metaphorically, as Suarez notes num. 7. Fagundez num. 3.

Moreover, that servile work which is forbidden by this precept is mechanical, as D. Bonav. says here, D. Thom. and others at Fagundez. From which you have that the Seraphic Doctor seems to be for the first opinion.

It is PROVED fourth by S. Thomas in the places cited, and D. Thom. loco cit. by the argument which the others use: the end of the law is the soul of the law: But the end of the law of sanctifying the feast is the application of man to the service of God. To this mortal sins are more repugnant than manual mechanical works. If therefore by these the feast day is violated, much more is it violated by mortal sins.

It is ANSWERED, that not only by this precept is the end of the law, which is Charitas, not commanded, but neither every means; but only that which is properly expressed, which is to be free from servile labor, by which we are distracted; but sins are sufficiently forbidden always by the individual precepts. But if by this precept all impediments were forbidden, we would now be bound to be free the whole day for prayer and other pious works; to avoid walks, conversations, etc.

I ASSERT second, that the second, negating opinion is more probable.

It is PROVED first from D. Bonavent. in the cited sermon, in the words brought, by the reason which is the chief foundation, as Fagundez says num. 2. for that precept forbids only truly servile works, for Exodi 20. it is thus had: Remember that you sanctify the Sabbath day. Six days shall you labor, and shall do all your work. But on the seventh day you shall not do all your work, you, and your son, and your daughter, your manservant, and your maidservant, your beast of burden, and the stranger that is within your gates; for in six days God made heaven, and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them, and on the seventh day He rested. Therefore He blessed and sanctified it. Scripture has similar things cap. 12. 16. and 23. where under the name of servile work mechanical works are explained.

From these words S. Thomas draws that the work forbidden by this precept is that which is with the middle labor of the seven days of the week, with the aid of servants, maidservants, or beasts of burden; but this is not sin, but they are mechanical works, which he enumerates as seven, and they are referred to the following quaest.

It is CONFIRMED; for that rest is to commemorate the work of the making of the world. Therefore S. Thomas proves it deeply from the law itself.

S. Thomas DEDUCES moreover at the end, that one is bound to abstain from servile works, not only the lord himself, but to bring it about that also those abstain who are under his power, as sons, wife, maidservants, servants, and beasts of burden. But he intersperses some excellent Mystical things, which see there.

It is confirmed, because the work of sin, as sin, is not a servile work, as I showed.

It is PROVED second from D. Bonavent. in the places cited. The extrinsic end of the precept is not precepted, but only the expressed means, as they teach commonly with D. Thom. 1. 2. quaest. 100. art. 9. and 1. 2. q. 44. art. 1.

It is CONFIRMED, for neither was it ever understood by the Jews that by this precept all sins were forbidden, since they are sufficiently forbidden by their own precepts: Therefore much less to the Church, for to it many things are conceded which were not lawful to the Jews, as to walk, etc. as D. Bonavent. notes in 3. loco cit.

Corduba strives to overturn these most solid foundations.

Quaestio IV: Whether licit liberal work becomes servile because it is done for gain

Whether a lawful liberal work becomes servile because it is done for gain.

The FIRST opinion is that the extrinsic end of the worker makes liberal works servile, and that they are forbidden on the feast day. So hold many interpreters of Canon and civil Law on cap. 1. de Feriis, and on leg. omnes Iudices, Cod. de Feriis, and others, as Angel. and Rosella, Tabiena V. Feria, Richardus 3. dist. 37. art. 2. quaest. 4. Sylvester under the word Dominica, quaest. 4.

The SECOND opinion is that no liberal work directed to gain thereby becomes servile. So hold very many: Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 122. art. 4. and in summa, v. Festorum violatio, Sotus lib. 2. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 4. Navar. in manuali lat. cap. 13. Tolet. lib. 4. summa, cap. 24. Sayrus lib. 7. cap. 2. Philiarchus part. 2. lib. 3. cap. 23. Fum. V. fest. num. 23. Medin. Instruct. lib. 1. cap. 24. quaest. 1. Lopez Instit. p. p. cap. 52. Bonacina tom. 2. disp. 5. quaest. unic. puncto 2. num. 25. Laym. lib. 4. tract. 7. cap. 2. num. 3. P. Eligius Bassaeus V. festum, 2. num. 8. Azor 2. part. Inst. lib. 1. cap. 28. quaestio 1. Suarez tract. 1. de Rel. lib. 2. de festis, cap. 19. Fagundez on the first precept of the Church, lib. 1. cap. 10. This is the opinion of D. Bonaventure sermone 4. in decem praecepta, about the middle, where he adds that some mechanical works too are lawful for pleasure, and that no servile work is forbidden if elsewhere necessity or a just excusing cause occurs: to this Suarez subscribes.

I ASSERT with this opinion that a liberal work, with gain superadded, does not for that reason become servile.

It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure loco cit. and in 3. dist. 37. dub. 3. and in serm. 2. Sabbathi sancti: For God professes to forbid only work servile by its very nature: but an extrinsic end does not make servile that which is not intrinsically such; otherwise all the sciences and liberal arts would at once become mechanical from the end of the one who knows or learns them, which is exploded by the Philosophers. For the reason of liberality is taken from the end of the art, not from the extraneous end of the craftsman.

The ARGUMENTS on the contrary side collapse, by denying that those works become servile from an extrinsic end of mechanical gain. See Fagundez.

Quaestio V: Which are servile works, forbidden on the Feast day

What servile works are forbidden on a feast day.

A servile work can thus be described by St. Bonaventure, serm. 4. in decem praecepta, et in 3. dist. 37. dub. 3. litt. D. Thom. ibidem art. 5. quaest. 2. ad 2. whom Suarez follows, Tom. 1. de Relig. lib. 2. de diebus festis, cap. 10. Fagundez in primum Eccl. praeceptum, lib. 1. cap. 10. num. 6. Servile works are those to whose exercise the mechanical arts are directed, distinct from the liberal arts. Others add, besides these, that we are accustomed also to employ and assign servants. D. Bonaventure: etiam servos adhibere, et deputare solemus. — "we are accustomed also to employ and assign servants."

THEREFORE not all bodily works are servile, but only those exercised by the mechanical arts, and those which are habitually done by servants, according to some; but of this I shall speak below.

The holy Doctor admirably enumerates the mechanical arts, and their sufficient enumeration, in the Opusculo, Reductio artium ad Theologiam, et serm. 4. in decem praecepta, together with Hugh of St. Victor lib. 2. Didasc. cap. 22.

SEVEN therefore are counted: wool-working, armor-making, agriculture, hunting, navigation, the theatrical art, medicine.

He sets out their sufficiency thus: every mechanical art is either for solace, whether to banish sadness or need; or for utility, whether it benefits or delights. If it is for solace and delight, then it is the theatrical art, which is the art of games, containing every kind of game, whether in songs, or in instruments, or in images, or in gestures of the body.

But if it is ordered to utility, or the profit of the outward man, this can be either with respect to covering, or with respect to nourishment, or with respect to both supports. If it is with respect to covering: either that is of soft and gentle material, and so it is wool-working, linen-working, and silk-working; or it is of strong material, and so it is armor-making, or the smith's art of all arms for defense and offense, whether of metal, or wood, or stone, as ramparts, towers, etc. walls, citadels, houses. But if they help with respect to nourishment, this can be twofold, because we are fed by vegetables and by sentient things. If with respect to vegetables, it is agriculture. If with respect to sentient things, then it is hunting, fishing, fowling. Or in another way: because helping with respect to food can be twofold, either with respect to the generation and multiplication of foods, and so it is the cultivation of fields; or with respect to the preparation of foods, and so it is hunting, fowling, fishing, and every preparatory art of foods; such as are those of bakers, cooks, innkeepers. All these are included under the name of hunting, on account of its preeminent excellence in preparing choice and abundant fare. But if toward both supports, this is twofold: either by supplying a lack, and so it is navigation, under which is contained all commerce, whether of things pertaining to covering or to nourishment; or by removing impediments, such as harms; and so it is medicine, whether that which consists in the compounding of electuaries, potions, ointments by the apothecaries (who also prepare spices and the like for the wholesome seasoning of foods;) so too surgery is ordered to the care of wounds, incision, etc. But the theatrical art is unique. This St. Bonaventure sets forth in the cited opuscule.

From which the holy Doctor deduces that not only those works are mechanical which we are accustomed to perform through servants, but also certain others, such as hunting, fishing, fowling, which are also practiced by nobles, to which add playing musical instruments, preparing foods, etc., as Fagundez also concedes cap. 11. num. 1. Wherefore he does not rightly place, cap. 10., in the definition of a mechanical work, that it is exercised by servants. Better are almost all mechanical works called servile, because servants are employed for them, at least for some of them. So in hunting, stretching the nets, etc.; rather are they called mixed and common. There are also certain others which are reduced to works of the soul, such as reading, writing, studying, and transcribing: there are yet others, though not servile, nevertheless forbidden by the Church, namely markets and the exercises of the forum.

Of all these I shall treat briefly here.

The holy Doctor asserts first, serm. 4. citato, that merely servile works are forbidden, necessity being set aside.

It is proved from Exodus 20, Levit. 23 and other passages cited, quaest. 4. There follow D. Thom. 1. 2. quaest. 122. art. 4. ad 3. D. Antonin. 2. part. tit. 9. cap. 7. §. Quantum ad tertium, Alens. 3. part. quaest. 32. memb. 4. art. 4. Richardus 3. dist. 37. art. 2. quaest. 5. Angel. and Tabien. see Feriae, Sylvester see Dominica, quaest. 3. Toletus lib. 4. cap. 24. Clavis Reg. lib. 7. cap. 1. Suarez Tom. 1. de relig. lib. 2. de diebus Festis, cap. 20. Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 11. and commonly the rest, collected by Bassaeus, see Festum 2.

He asserts secondly that certain servile works are permitted on a feast day on account of ordinary necessity, such as cooking and preparing foods. Although so many labors in the seasoning and preparation of foods were not in use in ancient times, yet they are now permitted by custom, as Suarez notes cap. 21. Fagundez cap. 10. in fine, et cap. 11. a num. 19. The reason of D. Bonaventure is, because necessity is not bound by laws; these are natural works, not simply servile, and necessary for living.

In the same way, and advancing further, are the works necessary in the medical art.

Nor do other works of nature press less, such as eating, drinking, clothing oneself, undressing, washing oneself, etc. So also Suarez num. 2. Fagundez num. 9. cap. 11. Bassaeus loco cit. and others among them.

Likewise making a journey is necessary, not servile, whether on foot or on horseback. So Angel. see Feriae, num. 15. Rosella num. 26. Azor below, Suarez loco cit. num. 27. Diana part. 4. tract. 4. miscel. resol. 221. Per accidens, however, it can be forbidden, if it is done with great labor in procuring a horse, a carriage, etc. So Azor Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 27. quaesito 8. Suarez loco cit. and others: and Caietanus quaest. 121. art. 4. Sà in Aphorism. see Festum, say these are servile works; but permitted by custom; and Sà adds, when accompanied by much baggage: Fagundez indeed num. 9. says this is to be understood when a Prince or Prelate makes the journey. Diana moreover adds p. p. tract. 15. resol. 36. et part. 2. tract. 1. miscellaneor. resol. 36. et 4. part. tract. 4. resol. 221. that grooms and the like can, without mortal sin, having heard Mass, lead laden beasts of burden, indeed even load them. Nevertheless, if in loading they spend a notable time, which must exceed two hours, it will be a mortal sin. So also others with Bassaeus num. 10.

But sweeping the whole house for many hours is forbidden, says Fagundez.

The holy Doctor asserts thirdly that certain mechanical arts instituted for mere pleasure are licit on a feast. But he calls these the moderate theatrical art, such as song and instrumental music. The reason is, because the Church permits them on account of our infirmity. So also Fagundez cap. 10. Tolet. lib. 4. cap. 24. Tannerus disp. 5. quaest. 6. num. 7. and others among them, and Bonacina punct. 2. num. 25. Bassaeus 2. num. 10.

IT IS DOUBTED: Whether on these days fishing, hunting, fowling, and the like are licit.

The first opinion is that such works are liberal, if done on feast days for recreation. So Angelus, see Feriae, num. 26. Sylvester, see Dominica, numero 7. Sotus lib. 2. de Iustitia, quaest. 4. art. 4. Rosella, see Feriae, num. 15. and others collected by Azor part. 1. lib. 1. cap. 27. quaesito 7. But Granado 2. 2. tract. 12. disp. 14. sect. 7. num. 65. following Medina, Navarro, and Lopez adds, that neither hunting done for gain, etc. is a servile work, and says that only that fishing is servile which consists in carrying nets, rowing, and performing similar labor. Filliucius indeed teaches tom. 2. tract. 27. cap. 9. num. 172. that hunting and fishing as an office, which consist wholly in the weariness of the body, are servile, not that which is devoted to recreation. Azor loco cit. subscribes; all are cited by Diana part. 4. Tract. 4. miscell. resol. 222. and he attends to those who disagree. Almost subscribes Bassaeus num. 12.

The second opinion judges altogether that hunting, etc. is a servile work. So Suarez cap. 28. Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 11. num. 16. Yet by reason of custom it is licit to hunt, but not to fish, unless on account of urgent necessity. Toletus indeed lib. 1. cap. 24. Caietanus art. 4. quaest. 122. Sotus above, all say that by custom all are licit.

The holy Doctor serm. citato, better than all, says that hunting, etc. is indeed a servile and forbidden work, yet that with respect to those things ordered to sustenance it is licit, for instance, to catch a hare on that day.

That they are servile works is proved from Dialectic, where among the mechanical arts even servile ones are counted. It is confirmed, because they consist in great labor. That they are also illicit is proved from cap. licet, de feriis.

That they are licit with respect to sustenance is proved, because just as seasonings for preparing are licit, so is preparing what is to be seasoned. For they are natural works, necessary in this respect.

IT IS DOUBTED secondly: Whether barbers may shave beards on feasts.

Diana answers p. p. Tract. 15. miscell. resol. 54. that on account of the parvity of matter they do not sin if they shave the beard of one or another, and he cites Graffius decis. part. 1. lib. II. cap. 23. Navarr. cap. 13. Vega Tom. 1. cap. 114. casu 2. Rodriguez tract. 1. c. 21. Sayrus lib. VII. cap. 2. Molfesius Tom. 1. tract. 11. cap. 17. num. 68. Azor lib. I. cap. 28. quaestio 5. Tom. 2. He adds, if they shave all who come, they are excused by reason of custom, if it exists; for since the things forbidden on a feast day were introduced by human custom, nothing prevents their being removed by a contrary custom, tolerated by prelates, as Sotus and Caietanus note, cited by Reginaldus tom. 2. lib. XIX. cap. 3. and others, cited in the Clavis Regiae lib. VII. cap. 2. Fernandez adds, in exam. part. 1. cap. 7. that they are also excused for another reason, namely cessation of gain, because on weekdays, on account of occupations, they do not come for haircutting; and he relies on cap. licet, where the Pontiff grants fishing for herrings on feasts for this cause: But I say with Reginaldus Tom. 2. lib. XIX. cap. ciu. num. 51. Suarez cap. 33. Diana above, that the reason is unlike; for that fishing is granted because it occurs at a fixed season of the year and passes; but it is not the same with daily hair-cutting; otherwise it will be licit to frequent almost all servile works.

Indeed Fagundez lib. I. cap. 14. with others says, that one hour will be light, if they cut hair on one or another feast; but if they continue on every feast, it will be lethal, by reason of the continuation of matter. But this is not proved to me, for the time of one hour of this Sunday is not continued with the hour of the future Sunday.

IT IS DOUBTED thirdly: Whether it is licit to paint on a feast day.

Ludovicus Lopez p. p. Institut. cap. 25. Medina Instruct. lib. I. cap. 14. assert that it is licit even for gain.

Others deny that it is licit for gain, but only without gain. So Azor Tom. 2. lib. II. cap. 27. quaestio 6. Sylvester, see Dominica, quaest. 5. Armill. see Festum, Angelus, Rosella, Tabiena, under the word feria, Saytus lib. VII. cap. 2. num. 16. and others cited by Pasqualigo decis. 142.

Suarez cap. 26. Caietanus art. 4. Fagundez cap. 11. num. 10. judge the art of painting to be mechanical and altogether forbidden; who, num. 13., proclaims it altogether prohibited, even gratis. And so they reprehend this license: for painting is a mechanical art in itself, nor does it change its nature from an extrinsic liberal end, as I said above, as Fagundez notes loco citato, and Bassaeus num. 7.

Nor does it help that certain nobles sometimes exercise it; for this is per accidens.

You will ask fourthly: Whether fighting (bellari) is forbidden on a feast day.

It is answered, that it is a mechanical work. So Suarez cap. 28. Fagundez num. 12. with D. Bonaventure serm. 4. citato, and the Opusc. Reductio artium ad Theol. For the military art is mechanical, as is clear from Dialectic. Yet it seems to have been introduced by custom, that the art of fencing may be licitly learned on feast days.

Yet acts of warring can be licit on account of necessity, as is clear from cap. Quod non licet, de reg. iuris, in 6. where among the things not licit on a feast day is placed military action, unless on account of necessity. See the Doctors in Bassaeus num. 13.

A truly defensive war is licit, of which is understood leg. omnes Iudices, Cod. de feriis, et leg. Divus, ff. de feriis. But an aggressive one is not ordinarily licit, unless through Epikeia in a just war there be an occasion of victory.

You will ask fifthly: Whether transcribing is forbidden on a feast.

It is answered, that transcribing is not a servile work, even if done for gain. So Suarez cap. 25. Medina Instruct. lib. I. cap. 14. §. 8. Ludovicus Lopez p. p. cap. 52. Sà see Festum, Sayrus lib. VII. cap. 2. num. 14. Fagundez lib. I. cap. 11. num. 7. Diana p. p. Tract. 15. resol. 35. citing others with Bassaeus l. num. 8.

It is proved, because this action is in itself liberal and mental: therefore from the extrinsic end of gain it does not become mechanical. Others, however, judge it a servile work, but not liberal. As also arranging types for the printer. See Bassaeus loco cit. contra Dianam part. IV. tract. 4. resol. 62.

Dubitatio I: Which works are forbidden by Canon law on a feast

Which works are forbidden by Canon law on a feast.

Many works which are not servile, indeed very many works of the soul, otherwise licit, are forbidden by this law.

Of the former kind, two such works there are: markets and the forum, cap. 1. et ultimo de feriis, as Suarez notes cap. 29. Fagundez cap. 12. sic et in the Council of Macon II cap. 1. judicial actions are forbidden; and in the Council of Tours cap. 40. markets and pleadings are interdicted.

This prohibition accords with the old civil law, for leg. ult. ff. de feriis, it is said that festivals are to grant vacations from forensic business. So they are forbidden also by the newer law, Cod. de feriis, leg. 1. 2. 3. et ult.

The reason is, that on account of quarrels and contentions men are distracted from the service of God, and because those clamors draw to sin, as Suarez noted cap. 29. with the Panormitan cap. ult. de feriis.

The first forbidden work, therefore, is the market, and by this name the law understands contracts of purchases, leases, etc. which are indeed valid, but illicit on a feast; judicial acts, however, are both illicit and invalid, if done on a feast.

Yet custom now renders these contracts licit; not so judicial acts. So Suarez cap. 30. Fagundez cap. 12. num. 1. and others among them.

¶ First, therefore, public fairs are forbidden, which are celebrated once or twice a year: yet custom renders them licit, as Navarr. man. Lat. cap. 13. art. 4. Fagundez lib. I. cap. 12. num. 4. and others with Bassaeus num. 15. teach. For custom can abrogate things which are of human law, as the Doctors commonly teach.

Yet custom cannot, while the feast remains, remove the obligation of Mass, as Fagundez notes num. 6. Suarez cap. 29. Navarrus, Toletus above, and others.

There are also other markets, often celebrated, and they are illicit by law; yet they can be removed by reasonable custom. Bassaeus, however, warns that custom be not extended to these, urged by private authority.

To the third kind of market belong daily contracts, with shops open, which are interdicted by Canon law, which is in vigorous observance. So Navarr. loco cit. Fagundez 8. Sylvester, see Dominica. Others, however, do not condemn rustic contracts on a feast day, with whom Diana subscribes, p. p. Tract. 15. resol. 34. Bass. loco cit. if they can hardly be done on other days.

Yet it was never, nor is it, forbidden to buy necessaries for the sustenance of that day. So Caietanus art. 4. Suarez loc. cit. Fagundez num. 8. with St. Bonaventure, serm. 4. in Decal. Bassaeus num. 15. Indeed they say that not even to sell shoes is a sin. So Suarez and Fagundez. Yet in all other things the holy Doctor warns, in the Speculum animae, cap. 2., that it must be observed whether by universal custom each of them is permitted by the Church.

The other kind of works forbidden on a feast is the work of pleading, or the forensic judgment. For in canon law all actions constituting a forensic judgment are signified by the name of a work of pleading, as Suarez notes cap. 19. Fagundez num. 9. For strictly, placitum signifies an election of the will. Hence also the object applied to the will is called placitum, Genes. 24. A Domino egressus est sermo : Non possumus extra placitum eius quidquam aliud loqui. ("A word came forth from the Lord: we cannot speak anything else besides His decree.") It also signifies a decree of the mind. Thus the opinions of Philosophers and Physicians are called Placita. And in this way things decreed by God or the Prince are called Placita, Prou. 10. Labia iusta considerant placita. ("The lips of the just consider pleasing things.") And Ioan. 8. Quae placita sunt ei facio, ("I do the things that are pleasing to him,") as the holy Doctor observes there. Also a term appointed for defining is called a Placitum, 2. Reg. 10. Moratus est extra placitum, quod ei constituerat Rex. ("He delayed beyond the term which the king had appointed him.") Since, therefore, in a forensic judgment, according to the will and arbitration of the judge regulated by the laws, either a term for appearing is appointed, or decrees and sentences are pronounced, therefore the whole cognizance of a forensic cause is called a pleading, cap. 1. de feriis, 15. quaest. 4. et cap. ultimo.

In a judgment many persons intervene, who are bound to keep the feasts with respect to forensic actions.

The parts of a judgment are: the inception of the cause, which begins with the citation, the formation of the process, and the term of the judgment, or the pronouncing of the sentence. And all these are void of themselves on feast days, cap. ultimo de feriis. So the Doctors commonly teach, Suarez cap. 30. Fagundez cap. 12. num. 12. and others among them.

Yet judicial acts done with the consent of the parties are valid on rural holidays introduced for the gathering of the fruits, as Suarez, Fagundez loc. cit. and Maranta note part. 4. ord. iud. dist. 16. num. 83.; but not on the feasts of festival days in honor of God.

Yet if judicial acts are done for the public peace, for piety, for urgent necessity, they are valid even on God's holidays. See Fagundez num. 12. Bassaeus num. 16. where he allows that in wills it is licit, where otherwise they would not be fitting.

Acts of voluntary jurisdiction are also valid: to emancipate, to adopt, to free slaves, to establish tutors, to make wills, and instruments of manumission. So Sylvest. see Dominica. Maranta 6. part. ord. iud. and others, cited by Fagundez num. 14. Bassaeus num. 14.

First, therefore, invalid is a citation made on a holiday in honor of God, indeed even, according to some, if they are cited for a feast day: yet others say they are bound to appear on the following day. See Fagundez cap. 13.

Second, neither can suits be promoted, witnesses examined, etc. And indeed it is certain that on a feast day a juridical oath cannot be exacted. But whether witnesses can be examined on a feast day, provided they have sworn on a non-festal day, the negative part seems more certain. See Fagundez cap. 13. Suarez cap. 30. Bassaeus num. 20. Some limit this in a spiritual cause, such as matrimony. So Caietanus, citing D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 10.

Others likewise limit, that this prohibition does not proceed to the presentation of a libellus against a party already cited. So Maranta part. 6. titulo isto. But Baldus and many Canonists hold the opposite, cited by Fagundez num. 20. who nevertheless inclines to the former opinion.

Third, a sentence passed on a feast day is illicit and invalid, cap. ultimo de feriis, where we read: Nec processus habitus teneat, nec sententia ; ("Nor shall the process had hold, nor the sentence;") and it is confirmed by l. ult. C. de feriis.

Similarly execution is forbidden on a feast day, as Felin. teaches in cap. ultimo de Iud. Suarez cap. 30. The reason is, for by cap. 1. de feriis, et l. ult. C. de feriis, cited, all things pertaining to the contentious forum are forbidden. Fagundez approves cap. 13. num. 23.

Yet an appeal can be intimated. So it is to be held without doubt, says Fagundez num. 24. citing very many. Indeed Bassaeus num. 18. says it is absolutely licit, by the more common opinion.

A grave doubt is: whether the sentence of an arbitrator is valid on a feast day.

Arbiter and Arbitrator differ, for the latter is a friendly composer, compromiser, and mediator of peace, as Suarez says cap. 30. and he can decide on a feast day. But the Arbiter is he who, by the consent of the parties, is chosen as judge, so that, with the order of law preserved and the process made, he may pronounce sentence, and to whom the parties are bound under a stipulated penalty, as Fagundez notes num. 26. cum Maranata 4. parte, tit. Iudicium arbitrarium, and Suarez loc. cit. and he is bound to preserve the order of a judgment, and therefore, although a compromissum can be made on a feast day, because it is a contract, nevertheless he cannot pronounce sentence on a feast day.

There is also another Judge, who is called Arbiter iuris, who is chosen by necessity of law, e.g. when a judge is alleged to be suspect, and he is bound to provide, with the order of law preserved, and he cannot pronounce sentence on a feast day.

Inquisitors of the faith can pronounce sentence against heretics on a feast day, justly and validly. So Fagundez num. 28. citing others.

I conclude with D. Bonaventure in speculo animae, cap. 2. that in all the things said above universal custom and the permission of the Church must be attended to; for it hangs on the mind of the Legislator. But if the Church still gravely forbids, then one must abstain, he concludes, from vacations, markets, etc. Add: from annual reckonings without necessity. See Bassaeus num. 23. Pasqualigo decis. 150. but Sylvester, Tabiena, Medina, and others approve.

Quaestio VI: That a time of servile labor induces a grave transgression of the FEAST

A notable part of the day, for mortal sin, they say is one hour. So Azorius part. 2. lib. 1. cap. 28. quaestio 5. Bonacina Tract. de legibus, d. 5. quaest. unica, puncto 3. Reginaldus Tom. 2. lib. 16. cap. 3. num. 53. Fagundez indeed, so that avarice may creep in, adds a quarter of an hour lib. 1. de primo praecepto Ecclesiae, cap. 14. citing Azorius, as if he thought one hour insufficient for grave matter; but he is cited falsely.

Suarez indeed says Tom. 1. de Relig. lib. 2. de diebus festis, cap. 31. that the time of one hour is too narrow; just as, on the contrary, too lax is the opinion of certain jurists, who say that the quantity of time is not to be taken in itself, but in comparison with the whole day, and therefore that a third part of the day is not grave matter. Fagundez rejects them num. 2.

On the same foundation Diana part. 1. Tract. 15. primo Miscell. resol. 36. says that two hours are a light part. So also Philiarch. Tomo 2. tract. 27. cap. 11. num. 105. Then p. 2. loco citando, he adds also Granado controv. 6. tract. 2. d. 2. sect. 6. num. 54. But Marchant. cap. 3. q. 2. says even three hours are light matter.

Some also say that the matter of labor is continued over the individual feasts, and thus, if one labored a half hour at servile works on all feasts, he would sin mortally; so Toletus lib. 4. cap. 15. Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 14. num. 3. But others rightly deride this, with Bassaeus 3. num. 4. §. Nota.

I confess that I do not perceive this continuation of matter across feasts that are disjoined, indeed even across contiguous ones. For continuous things are those whose limits are one: but where is here the unity of time?

Hence I argue ad hominem. Fagundez posits that an hour and a quarter is grave matter num. 2.; then num. 3., if on two or three feasts they labor three hours, one hour on each, he excuses them. If they are continued, they are already grave matter. Wherefore I judge, with Diana part. 2. tract. 5. resol. 8., that opinion to be too rigid and without foundation.

He concludes that to labor two hours on individual feasts is not a lethal time, because time must be measured in comparison with the whole day of twenty-four hours: but two hours are a very small part.

Hence Diana infers that he who invites many to a labor of one or two hours does not sin mortally, because the labor of each is slight. So also Bonacina de legibus, d. 5. quaest. unica, punct. 3. Bassaeus loc. cit. §. Sed petes.

They excuse a girl working with the needle on a feast day in order to avoid idleness: Sà, see festum, Ioan. de la Cruz part. 1. praecep. 3. art. 1. d. 1. Villalob. Manuali confessar. cap. 22. num. 99. et in summa, tomo 2. tract. 31. d. 4. num. 10. Others cite for this opinion St. Antoninus, Angelus, and Sylvester. But it is not probable, as Diana himself holds.

It is asked here: Whether those who adorn the walls of churches with tapestries and hangings can do this on feast days.

Conradus answers negatively in resp. part. 2. quaest. 233. et alii.

Yet Diana asserts here with Bonacina d. 5. quaest. unica, punct. 3. de legibus, citing Caietanus, Suarez, and Toletus, to whom Fagundez is added praecepto 1. lib. 1. cap. 14. num. 1.

Quaestio VII: On the causes excusing from violation of the Feast

On the causes excusing from violation of a Feast.

At the outset they excuse from sin certain works done for the worship of God. These are found in a threefold distinction. The first is immediate, as playing organs, ringing bells, carrying Crosses, and these proceed on a par unharmed with Divine worship. So Suarez Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 21. et alii.

There are, however, some works that could be prepared on the preceding day, as cooking the sacrificial animals, decorating the altars, and these are not yet condemned under mortal sin. Toletus lib. 4. cap. 25. Suarez num. 11. Azorius Tom. 2. lib. 1. cap. 28. quaestio 5. Caietanus quaest. 122. art. 4. et in summa, V. festorum violatio.

Similarly other works among these are not so close to the worship of God, as sweeping the temples with brooms, hanging the walls with tapestries, adorning them with hangings, preparing the public roads for processions; nor do Suarez, Azorius, Toletus, Caietanus above, and Fagundez lib. 1. cap. 14. num. 4. condemn these under mortal sin.

In the second kind are other servile works, more remote from the worship of God, as carrying tables, making flooring, erecting scaffolds for the Theatre of the Most Holy Sacrament, or of a holy Relic, which if they cannot be done on the preceding days are excused from mortal sin; otherwise if they could have been, as Fagundez says with the others alleged, with whom he says it is lawful even to erect a Theatre for public games, and for public recreation.

In the third kind of works for the worship of God are the tilling of the fields of the Church, building its houses, etc., which are still more remote, and these are mortal sins, unless they belong to some poor Church which can scarcely otherwise be relieved. So the authors alleged in Fagundez num. 4. where he adds others.

The second excusing cause is servile works on feasts done out of necessity, as D. Bonaventure admonishes, serm. 4. de Decalogo. This necessity can be that of oneself, of some neighbor, or of the public, and in whatever way it is, the law does not bind, as the Holy Doctor admonishes, in speculo animae, cap. 2.

Necessity of one's own is that of the poor, who otherwise cannot support themselves and their family. So Toletus lib. 4. cap. 25. Azor. loc. cit. quaestio 4. Suarez cap. 31. Rostella, Sylvester, Tabiena V. feriae, Fagundez num. 7. citing others; and it is found in cap. ult. de feriis there: Nisi Necessitas urgeat, vel pietas. But Suarez and Fagundez admonish that this necessity be laid before the judgment of a prudent counselor. Such also is the necessity of coercion, while they are compelled by grave fear, or danger. Thus the Machabees lib. 1. cap. 2. fought on the Sabbath day. Thus it is lawful for servants to labor when compelled by their Masters, provided they are not forced into contempt of the faith; for then death rather must be undergone. So the authors alleged in Fagundez num. 9. Bass. 3. num. 2.

Thus soldiers are excused on a feast day by throwing up earthworks, carrying military engines, etc. So Suarez cap. 31. Fagundez num. 10. Toletus cap. 25. Bass. 3. num. 2. et apud hos alii.

Farmers are excused who gather, reap, carry away, thresh, harvest the vintage, and sow the grains on account of rains or impending storms, when unseasonable weather is feared. So the authors alleged in Fagundez num. 15. Thus also millers, especially if they do this without great labor; so Bassaeus 1. num. 4. et alii.

Fishermen of certain fish are also excused, the catching of which comes only at certain seasons of the year, as tunnies, herrings, and sardines. So Fagundez num. 13. citing others. For although cap. licet de feriis. speaks only of herrings, or pickled herrings; nevertheless the same holds for the other similar cases. Yet certain outstanding solemnities of the Lord are excepted. But these fishermen ought for this reason to bestow some alms on the Church, though it is not commanded there.

From this cause coopers of bricks, tiles, lime, pots, glass, iron, and other similar things, whose boiling cannot be interrupted without great loss, are excused by Caietan, Suarez above, Fagundez, numero 13. and Soto among them.

From the second cause, the necessity of a neighbor, those are excused who labor so that they may be preserved from imminent dangers of the collapse, fire, flooding of a house, and similar things. So also those who sew garments for a poor man, etc. Toletus cap 25. Suarez cap. 32. Nauarr. Manu. Lat. cap. 13. D. Antonin. part. 2. tit. 9. cap. 7. §. 5. Fagundez num. 16. They prove it from cap. Conquestus de feriis, where it is said: Nisi necessitas urgeat, vel pietas. They also excuse works of piety for relieving Poor men and Pilgrims pressing in, likewise the sick, as by preparing medicines, etc. So also by grinding grain. Yet Bass. 3. num. 11. notes that cap. Conquestus speaks of court sessions, not of servile works.

THOSE SKINNING oxen are also excused, the flayers in the shambles, etc. So the Doctors in Fagundez num. 21.

From the third cause, the public good, those are excused who labor in repairing bridges, roads, public fountains, etc., when it cannot be deferred without great inconvenience. For the Church does not will to oblige to rest with public loss, as is found in cap. Licet. Indeed Suarez loc. cit. and Fagundez num. 23. excuse those laboring in servile works for public gladness, or joy, as on account of the arrival of the King, a coronation, the birth of a Prince, etc.

It seems the Holy Doctor serm. citato stands firm in these and similar cases, where he excuses those things which are done for public, not to say even for private delight.

Those laboring in the erection of a Church, or of a needy Monastery, are also excused, provided Mass has been heard; so Tabiena V. ferie, Fagundez num. 25.

I admonish that the excusing causes hold even without the license of Superiors, provided they are undoubted, so that if a Bishop should pronounce excommunication on those laboring, it would not hold. So Tabiena V. Feriae, num. 44. Nauarr. Mann. Lat. cap. 13. Sylvest. V. Dominica, quaest. 7. Rosella V. ferie, num. 27. Azor. Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 28. quaest. 6. Suarez lib. 4. Decal. Tom. 2. cap. 45. num. 10. Fagundez num. 26.

Bishops, or the ordinaries of places, can also dispense for a cause, among whom are counted the Provincial and local Superiors of the Religious Orders, as the Gloss explains in cap. Quemquam, de usuris in 6. V. loci ordinario; and Azorius quaestio 5. Fagundez num. 28. Bass. 3 num. 7. teach, adding that on feasts instituted by themselves they can dispense without a cause. In a doubtful case, however, he refers to the counsel of a wise man.

Quaestio VIII: Whether, having merely heard a SACRED (sermon), it is forbidden to idle the whole Feast day

Whether, having heard only the HOLY SACRIFICE, it is forbidden to rest the whole day of the Feast.

They ASSERT that it is not, Alens. 3. part. quaest. 32. m. 5. art. 2. ad 4. Sotus in 3. d. 27. §. Quantum ad 2. Angel. V. feriae, num. 36. and V. Interrogationis, num. 6. and V. Praeceptum, num. 5. Rosella V. Confessio, 2. num. 7. D. Antonin. 2. part. tit. 9. cap. 7. §. 3. and 2. part. in 13. cap. 1. §. 1. Lyra Exodi 20. and it seems to D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 122. art. 4. ad 3. and D. Bonavent. 12. 3. d. 37. dub. 3. litt. et serm. 4. in Decal. thus it is reported by Fagundez on the first precept of the Church, cap. 4. num. 29. but already in quaest. 3. I explained the meaning of D. Bonaventure.

To the NEGATIVE opinion have followed all those who in quaest. 3. deny that it is a special sin, not only to rest, but even to commit mortal sins.

I judge this opinion the more probable, which seems to me more according to the mind of our Holy Doctor. Fagundez refers to them again in cap. 14. num. 30.

It is PROVED, because the precept of feasts only enjoins rest from servile works, and the hearing of Mass: Therefore it obliges to nothing else, even if the intention of the lawgiver directs to the end of keeping holiday for God. The consequence is proved, because the law is not violated even if the end of the lawgiver is not attained, provided the substance of the law be kept, as D. Thomas teaches, prima secundae, quaest. 100. art. 9. ad 2.

The ARGUMENTS on either side were examined in question 3.

Concerning the Precept of hearing the holy Sacrifice, I shall defer it to the 3. part, Treatise on Mass, disp. 12.

Disputatio X: On Superstition

Quaestio I: SUPERSTITION, what it is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On Divination by the Stars

Quaestio III: On Divination by the Elements, and other mixed things

Quaestio IV: On Divination from Dreams

Quaestio V: On Sortileges

Quaestio VI: On superstitious observances for works

Quaestio VII: On the malefices of Witches

Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to consult Witches, that at least the malefices be removed

Quaestio IX: On the penalties of Witches, etc.

Disputatio XI: ON THE TEMPTATION OF GOD

Quaestio I: What TEMPTATION is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XII: ON SACRILEGE

Quaestio I: What Sacrilege is, and of how many kinds

Disputatio XIII: ON SIMONY

Quaestio I: What SIMONY is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: How Simony is recognized on the part of the object

Quaestio III: In what way Simony is committed on the part of the act of exchange itself

Quaestio IV: On the Penalties of Simoniacs

Disputatio XIV: ON THE OTHER VIRTUES ANNEXED TO JUSTICE

§ I: ON PIETY

Quaestio I: What PIETY is, and what kind of Virtue

Quaestio II: What reverence is to be shown to Parents

Quaestio III: What obedience is to be shown to Parents by Sons

Quaestio IV: How, and when, Sons are bound to relieve Parents

Quaestio V: On the obligation of Parents toward Sons

Quaestio VI: In which cases Parents can disinherit Sons

Quaestio VII: Whether Sons can ever refuse aliment to Parents, and disinherit them

Quaestio VIII: To what a Woman is bound, who has a Son from adultery, or has substituted one

Quaestio IX: On the mutual obligation of Servants, and Masters

Quaestio X: On the obligation of Brothers toward Brothers, and Sisters, and conversely

§ II: On Observance, Reverence, and Dulia

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On Dulia

§ III: ON OBEDIENCE, and DISOBEDIENCE

Quaestio I: On Observance, and Reverence

Quaestio II: On DISOBEDIENCE

§ IV: ON GRATITUDE, and VINDICATION, and the Vices opposed to them

Quaestio I: On GRATITUDE

Quaestio II: On INGRATITUDE

Quaestio III: On Vindication

§ V: On Truth, Friendship, Liberality, Epikeia, and the vices opposed to them: On the gift of Piety, and the Precepts of the Decalogue pertaining to Justice

Quaestio I: On TRUTH

Quaestio II: On the LIE

Dubitatio I: What a Lie is

Dubitatio II: Of how many kinds is a Lie

Dubitatio III: Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin

Dubitatio IV: Whether a Lie is mortal of its genus

Dubitatio V: Whether every Lie is mortal for perfect men

Dubitatio VI: Whether among the degrees of Lie there is a most grave, and a most light

Dubitatio VII: On the others that are reduced to Lying

Quaestio III: On Friendship

Quaestio IV: On Liberality

Dubitatio I: On Avarice

Dubitatio II: On PRODIGALITY

Quaestio V: On EPIKEIA

Quaestio VI: On the GIFT OF PIETY

Tractatus V: E VIRTUTE FORTITUDINIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON FORTITUDE

Quaestio I: Whether FORTITUDE is a Virtue, and which

Quaestio II: On the GIFT OF FORTITUDE

Quaestio III: On Martyrdom

Dubitatio I: Whether MARTYRDOM confers first grace

Dubitatio II: Whether the Baptism of infants can be supplied by martyrdom

Quaestio IV: On the precepts of Fortitude

Quaestio V: On the Vices opposed to Fortitude

Disputatio II: On the Virtues joined to Fortitude

Quaestio I: On Magnanimity

Quaestio II: On the Vices opposed to MAGNANIMITY

Quaestio III: On MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio IV: On the Vices opposed to MAGNIFICENCE

Quaestio V: On PATIENCE

Quaestio VI: On the Vices opposed to PATIENCE

Quaestio VII: On PERSEVERANCE

Quaestio VIII: On the Vices opposed to PERSEVERANCE

Tractatus VI: E TEMPERANTIA

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: Which Virtue Temperance is, and of what kind

Quaestio II: Which Vices are contrary to TEMPERANCE

Quaestio III: On the parts of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio IV: On Shamefastness

Quaestio V: On Honesty

Quaestio VI: On Abstinence

Dubitatio I: What FASTING is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: In what way natural Fasting is broken

Dubitatio III: Whether Fasting of itself is a good work, and a precept

Dubitatio IV: From what one must abstain in the Ecclesiastical Fast

Dubitatio V: On the evening collation

Dubitatio VI: On the hour of refreshment on the Fast day

Dubitatio VII: Who are bound to fast

Quaestio VII: On SOBRIETY

Quaestio VIII: On CHASTITY

Quaestio IX: On Virginity

Dubitatio I: Whether Virginity is a Virtue

Dubitatio II: Whether Virginity excels conjugal Continence

Dubitatio III: Whether the reward of Virginity is the Aureole

Quaestio X: On CONTINENCE

Dubitatio I: On MILDNESS

Quaestio XI: On CLEMENCY

Quaestio XII: On MODESTY

Quaestio XIII: On HUMILITY

Disputatio II: On the Vices opposed to the Virtue of TEMPERANCE

Quaestio I: On GLUTTONY

Quaestio II: On Drunkenness

Quaestio III: On LUST

Dubitatio I: What LUST is, and of how many kinds

Dubitatio II: Whether in the genus of Lust there is parvity of matter

Dubitatio III: On FORNICATION

Dubitatio IV: On STUPRATION

Dubitatio V: On INCEST

Dubitatio VI: On ADULTERY

Dubitatio VII: On SACRILEGE

Dubitatio VIII: On sins against nature

Dubitatio IX: On the lust of spouses

Dubitatio X: On ABDUCTION

Quaestio IV: On INCONTINENCE

Quaestio V: On ANGER

Quaestio VI: On CRUELTY

Question VII

Dubitatio I: On the adornment of Women

Dubitatio II: On Immodesty in words, gestures, jokes, and games

Quaestio VIII: On P R I D E

Quaestio IX: LAST. On the other Vices opposed to the potential parts of Temperance

Tractatus VII: E VARIIS HOMINUM STATIBUS, ET OFFICIIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: FIRST. ON STATES, AND PERFECTION IN GENERAL

Quaestio I: What a STATE is, and of how many kinds

Quaestio II: On the state of perfection

Dubitatio I: In what the Perfection of man consists

Dubitatio II: What Perfection can be had in this life

Dubitatio III: Who are in the state of Perfection

Quaestio III: Whether some who are not in the state of perfection perform, by reason of their office, works more perfect than some who are in the state of Perfection

Disputatio II: On the State of the Bishop

Quaestio I: Whether a BISHOP is in the state of perfection

Quaestio II: Of what kind he must be who is assumed to the Episcopate

Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to seek, or refuse, an Episcopate

Quaestio IV: Whether Residence is necessary for Bishops, and by what law

Quaestio V: Whether the Church, and Bishops, have dominion over certain temporal things

Quaestio VI: Whether Bishops, and other Ecclesiastics, have dominion over revenues that are superfluous to their state

Quaestio VII: Whether those Bishops who were formerly Religious are bound to Regular observance

Disputatio III: On the State of Regular Prelacy

Quaestio I: Whether the state of Regular Prelacy in a Religion is necessary

Quaestio II: How the Prelate of a Religion is to be chosen

Quaestio III: How many Prelates there are in one religion, and what order among them

Quaestio IV: Whether it befits a Regular Prelate to remain long in the same office

Quaestio V: Whether a religious Prelate has the power of coercing subjects with penalties, both spiritual and corporal

Quaestio VI: What solemnities a Regular Prelate, acting in judgment, is bound to observe

Quaestio VII: Whether appeal can be made from a Prelate, or Regular Judge

Quaestio VIII: Who is the Judge from Whom, and to Whom appeal is made

Quaestio IX: Whether a Regular Prelate can dispense with his subject, Who, and in what

Quaestio X: What power a Regular Prelate has to absolve, both from sins, and from penalties

Quaestio XI: Whether a Regular Prelate has the Power of administering temporal things, and what

Quaestio XII: Whether, and What, Regular Prelates can do concerning conferring Orders, and blessing things, or places

Disputatio IV: LAST. On the State of the Active, and Contemplative life

Quaestio I: Whether the Division of life into Active, and Contemplative is sufficient

Quaestio II: Which state is more excellent than the other: the state of the Active life, or conversely, the Contemplative

Quaestio III: Whether there is a Mixed Life resulting from the Active, and Contemplative, and which of these is more excellent

Quaestio IV: What are the chief exercises of the Active life

Quaestio V: On the chief Act of the Contemplative life, and how this act differs from Cogitation, Meditation, Speculation, and Intuitive vision

Quaestio VI: Whether Contemplation has certain degrees of its perfection, how many, and which

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