Palladium theologicum, Tomus quintus: De virtutibus
Gaudenzio da Brescia (1612–1672)
Reuerendi patris Gaudentij Bontempi, ... Palladium theologicum, seu Tota theologia scholastica in septem tomos distributa. Ad intimam mentem d. Bonauenturae seraphici doctoris ... Tomus quintus, De virtutibus
First published 1676
Bontempi's Palladium theologicum (Lyon 1676) is a complete scholastic theology composed ad mentem D. Bonaventurae, arranged in seven tractatus on the order of the Secunda secundae. This fifth volume, De virtutibus, treats the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity, with their gifts, beatitudes and fruits), the cardinal virtues and their opposite vices, and the states and offices of men (religious and prelates, bishops, princes), including the extensive disputations on contracts, religion, vows, fortitude, temperance and the judicial process. It is a significant example of the Bonaventurian scholastic school and a counterpart to the Thomist manuals of the period.
Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON FAITH
Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is
Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is
Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex
Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false
Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically
Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way
Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible
Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles
Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time
Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light
Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude
Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is
Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides
Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means
Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept
Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when
Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect
Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form
Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY
Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE
Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE
Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues
Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit
Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH
Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found
Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object
Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH
Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH
Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation
Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone
Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.
Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith
Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge
Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost
Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things
Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative
Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.
Disputatio II: On Unbelief
Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is
Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins
Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH
Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth
Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason
Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites
Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it
Disputatio III: On Heresy
Quaestio I: What HERESY is
Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic
Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy
Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY
Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer
Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH
Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books
Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics
Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics
Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics
Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics
Disputatio IV: On Hope
Quaestio I: What HOPE is
Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is
Question III
Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for
Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue
Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless
Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits
Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity
Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is
Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed
Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD
Dubitatio I: UNICA. Would this precept bind one to whom certain damnation had been revealed
Disputatio V: On the Gift of Fear
Quaestio I: Whether FEAR is a Habit distinct from HOPE
Quaestio II: What the object of FEAR is
Quaestio III: Whether worldly Fear is always evil
Quaestio IV: Whether servile Fear is honorable, and a Gift of God
Quaestio V: Whether servile Fear is cast out when grace comes
Quaestio VI: Whether Initial and Filial Fear differ specifically
Quaestio VII: Whether, as Charity grows, Fear diminishes
Quaestio VIII: Whether gratuitous Fear remains in the fatherland
Quaestio IX: Whether Poverty of Spirit corresponds to the GIFT OF FEAR
Quaestio X: On the Effects, and the precept, of the FEAR OF GOD
Disputatio VI: On Despair
Quaestio I: UNICA. Of what power DESPAIR is an act, and what sin it is
Disputatio VII: On Presumption
Quaestio I: What PRESUMPTION is, and what kind of sin
Disputatio VIII: On Charity
Quaestio I: What CHARITY is
Quaestio II: What the object of Charity is
Quaestio III: Whether Charity is properly the friendship of God
Quaestio IV: Whether Charity is a created Habit
Quaestio V: Whether Charity is one special Virtue
Quaestio VI: Whether Charity is of a most special species
Quaestio VII: Whether Charity is the most excellent of the virtues
Quaestio VIII: Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues
Quaestio IX: Whether besides infused Charity there is another charity, acquired by our own acts
Quaestio X: Whether Charity can be formless
Quaestio XI: Whether CHARITY increases, and how
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, CHARITY in this life is perfect
Quaestio XIII: Whether Charity can be lost, and how
Quaestio XIV: What is the proximate subject of Charity
Quaestio XV: Whether God alone is to be loved out of Charity, or the neighbor also
Quaestio XVI: Whether Charity is to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XVII: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XVIII: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XIX: Whether a man ought to love himself out of CHARITY
Quaestio XX: Whether a man ought to love his own body out of Charity
Quaestio XXI: Whether sinners are to be loved out of Charity
Quaestio XXII: Whether it is necessary to love enemies out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXIII: Whether we are bound to show the effects of CHARITY toward enemies, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether Angels are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXV: Whether Demons, and the Damned, are to be loved out of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVI: Whether it is fitting that four things to be loved out of CHARITY are enumerated
Quaestio XXVII: Whether God, and the neighbor, are loved with the same habit of CHARITY
Quaestio XXVIII: Whether there is order in CHARITY
Quaestio XXIX: Whether GOD is to be loved more than the neighbor
Quaestio XXX: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love God more than himself
Quaestio XXXI: Whether Nature inclines more to loving GOD than to loving ourselves
Quaestio XXXII: Whether a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor
Quaestio XXXIII: Whether the eternal salvation of the neighbor is to be loved more than our own life
Quaestio XXXIV: Whether one neighbor is to be loved more than another
Quaestio XXXV: Whether a Son is to be loved more than a Father
Quaestio XXXVI: Whether a man ought out of CHARITY to love his Mother more than his Father
Quaestio XXXVII: Whether a man ought to love his spouse more than his parents, and Children
Quaestio XXXVIII: Whether the order of CHARITY is considered in the affection, and in the effect
Quaestio XXXIX: Whether the order of CHARITY remains in heaven
Quaestio XL: Whether it is more proper to Charity to love than to be loved
Quaestio XLI: Whether Love is the same as Benevolence
Quaestio XLII: Whether, and whether he can, GOD must be loved in the way with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
Quaestio XLIII: Whether some measure is to be kept in Divine love
Quaestio XLIV: Whether Charity ought to be enlarged in heaven
Quaestio XLV: Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than a friend
Quaestio XLVI: Whether a man, constituted in however small CHARITY, is bound to undergo death for CHRIST
Quaestio XLVII: Whether those having perfect CHARITY are bound to fulfill the things that are of perfection
Quaestio XLVIII: How, and when, the precept of the love of GOD binds
Quaestio XLIX: Whether a man is bound at the first instant of the use of reason to be converted to GOD
Quaestio L: How, and when, the precept of the love of the neighbor binds
Disputatio IX: On the internal effects of Charity, JOY, PEACE, and MERCY
§ I: On Joy
Quaestio I: Whether JOY is an Effect of Charity, and of what kind
Quaestio II: Whether JOY is a virtue
§ II: On Peace
Quaestio I: UNICA. What PEACE is
§ III: On Mercy
Quaestio I: What MERCY is
Quaestio II: Which, and what kind of Virtue, MERCY is
Disputatio X: On the external effects of Charity
§ I: De Beneficentia
Quaestio I: UNICA. What BENEFICENCE is
§ II: On Almsgiving
Quaestio I: Whether to give ALMS is an act of Charity
Quaestio II: Whether the kinds of ALMS are fittingly distinguished
Quaestio III: Whether ALMS is a matter of precept
Quaestio IV: Whether it is a precept, in common necessities, to give superfluities to the poor
Quaestio V: Whether anyone is bound at some time to give alms from things necessary to his state, apart from the extreme necessity of the neighbor
Quaestio VI: Whether alms is owed out of justice to one in extreme need
Quaestio VII: Whether Alms ought to be given from justly possessed goods
§ III: On Fraternal Correction
Quaestio I: Whether FRATERNAL CORRECTION is a matter of precept
Quaestio II: Whether the order of fraternal correction, even in Religious Orders, is a matter of precept, so that the correction first be made in secret
Disputatio XI: On Hatred
Quaestio I: What the object of HATRED is, and what it is
Quaestio II: What, and what kind of sin, hatred is
Disputatio XII: On Sloth
Quaestio I: What ACEDIA is, and what its object is
Disputatio XIII: On Envy
Quaestio I: What ENVY is, and what its object is
Quaestio II: How perverse ENVY is
Disputatio XIV: On Discord, and Contention
Quaestio I: What DISCORD is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What kind, and how great, a sin Contention is
Disputatio XV: On Schism
Quaestio I: What kind of sin SCHISM is
Quaestio II: How great a sin SCHISM is
Quaestio III: What punishments are owed to SCHISMATICS
Disputatio XVI: DE BELLO
Quaestio I: Whether any war can be just
Quaestio II: What conditions are required for a just war
Quaestio III: By whom BELLUM (war) may be waged
Disputatio XVII: On Quarreling, and Sedition
Quaestio I: What RIXA (quarreling) is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio II: What sedition is
Disputatio XVIII: On Scandal
Quaestio I: What, and of how many kinds, SCANDAL is
Quaestio II: Whether SCANDAL is a special sin
Quaestio III: What is to be done, and what omitted, to avoid scandal
Quaestio IV: Whether it is lawful to persuade one resolved upon a great evil into a lesser evil
Disputatio XIX: On the Gift of Wisdom
Quaestio I: What kind of gift WISDOM is
Quaestio II: What is the usefulness, and necessity, of this Gift
Quaestio III: By what means is the GIFT OF WISDOM obtained from God
Quaestio IV: On the illumination that Wisdom brings
Quaestio V: On the spiritual delights of Wisdom
Quaestio VI: How Folly is opposed to Wisdom
Quaestio VII: Whether the seventh Beatitude corresponds to the gift of Wisdom
Disputatio XX: On Prudence
Quaestio I: What PRUDENCE is
Quaestio II: Whether PRUDENCE is a virtue
Quaestio III: Which are the offices of PRUDENCE
Quaestio IV: Who are the participants in PRUDENCE
Quaestio V: How Prudence is acquired, and lost
Quaestio VI: On the parts of the Virtue of PRUDENCE
Quaestio VII: How certain rules of prudence, applicable to the Monastic and Political state, are drawn from the Angelic Hierarchy
§ I: On the Prudence that men bound by solemn vows claim for themselves from the first choir of Angels
§ II: On the Governance of the Prelates of the Church, from the Second Hierarchy of the First Choir, likened to the Dominations
§ III: On the Prudence of Judges, compared with the Virtues, from the second order of the second Hierarchy
§ IV: On the governance of Princes, and similar Powers
§ V: On the Prudence of individuals, from the lowest Hierarchy
Quaestio I: Whether there is one PRUDENCE for all the moral virtues
Disputatio XXI: On the Gift of Counsel
Quaestio I: What the gift of COUNSEL is, and what its office is
Quaestio II: How the GIFT OF COUNSEL orders the mind
Quaestio III: Whether the Gift of COUNSEL remains in heaven
Quaestio IV: Whether the fifth Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Counsel
Disputatio XXII: On the Vices contrary to Prudence
Quaestio I: On PRECIPITATION
Quaestio II: On INCONSIDERATENESS
Quaestio III: On INCONSTANCY
Quaestio IV: On Negligence
Quaestio V: On the prudence of the flesh
Quaestio VI: On ASTUTENESS
Quaestio VII: On CRAFT (dolus)
Quaestio VIII: On FRAUD
Quaestio IX: On solicitude for temporal things
Quaestio X: On solicitude for the Future
Quaestio XI: On the precepts of PRUDENCE
Disputatio XXIII: On Justice
Quaestio I: Whether Ius (right) is the object of JUSTICE
Quaestio II: What JUSTICE is
Quaestio III: Whether JUSTICE is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: In what subject JUSTICE consists
Quaestio V: Whether JUSTICE is the most excellent of the moral Virtues
Quaestio VI: What kind of sin INJUSTICE is, and how it is committed
Quaestio VII: Whether Judgment is an act of JUSTICE
Quaestio VIII: By what means the public Judgment of a Judge is just
Quaestio IX: In what way private judgment about the neighbor is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether Distributive JUSTICE differs in species from Commutative
Disputatio XXIV: On Restitution
Quaestio I: What RESTITUTION is
Quaestio II: Whether RESTITUTION is necessary for salvation
Quaestio III: Who is bound to RESTORE
Dubitatio I: Whether he is a true cause of loss without whom the loss would still have followed
Dubitatio II: On the indirect causes of loss
Dubitatio III: Whether one who has promised three or four times to restore, and has not restored, is to be absolved before restitution
Quaestio IV: To whom RESTITUTION is to be made
Quaestio V: What ought to be restored
Dubitatio I: Whether the goods of fortune are to be restored in the same way
Dubitatio II: In what manner RESTITUTION is to be made for goods of the body
Dubitatio III: Whether, and how, RESTITUTION of Fame, and Honor, is to be made
Dubitatio IV: On the restitution of goods of the soul
Dubitatio V: When a thing acquired by contract is to be restored
Dubitatio VI: When things acquired by donation ought to be restored
Dubitatio VII: When things acquired by prescription are to be restored
Dubitatio VIII: When a thing acquired as wages for the function of an office is to be restored
Dubitatio IX: Whether the wages of harlotry are to be restored
Dubitatio X: When things acquired by fowling, fishing, and hunting are to be restored
Dubitatio XI: When things acquired by the use of common things are to be restored
Dubitatio XII: Whether things acquired in illicit games are to be restored
Dubitatio XIII: Which things are to be restored on account of finding
Dubitatio XIV: On the restitution of goods impeded by violence, fraud, or evil intention
Dubitatio XV: Whether anyone is bound to restore defrauded customs duties
Dubitatio XVI: What form is to be observed in a just tribute
Quaestio VI: How much is to be Restored
Quaestio VII: When restitution is to be made, and the causes excusing from it
Dubitatio I: Whether entrance into Religion excuses from Restitution
Dubitatio II: Whether cession of goods excuses from restitution
Dubitatio III: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the creditor
Dubitatio IV: On the causes excusing from restitution on the part of the debtor
Dubitatio V: On the causes excusing from Restitution on the part of the public authority
Quaestio VIII: Where restitution is to be made
Quaestio IX: How restitution is to be made
Quaestio X: In what order restitution is to be made
Quaestio XI: What Acceptance of Persons is, and what kind of sin
Quaestio XII: Whether, and how, it is a sin of acceptance of persons to choose the unworthy, or less deserving, for benefices
Quaestio XIII: Whether Acceptance of persons has place in the showing of honor, and reverence
Quaestio XIV: Whether acceptance of persons finds a place in the sentences of Judges
Dubitatio I: Whether a JUDGE can, without the note of acceptance of persons, adhere to the Favor of friends, when the law is doubtful among the Doctors
Disputatio XXV: On Homicide
Quaestio I: What Homicide is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: On homicide from deliberately, insidiously, and treacherously intending it
Quaestio III: Whether one who commands is to be burdened with the same guilt, and punishment as the one who executes
Quaestio IV: Whether an attempt at homicide, and other crimes, is to be punished with the same penalty as the crime consummated
Quaestio V: What are the punishments of voluntary Homicide
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to kill a man with the moderation of blameless defense, for the defense of himself or his goods
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to kill someone to preserve honor, not by fleeing etc.
Dubitatio II: Whether one who is attacked is bound in some case to kill the aggressor
Dubitatio III: Whether it is lawful, in defense of one's own goods, to kill a thief
Dubitatio IV: Whether, in defense of Chastity, it is lawful to kill the Assailant
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, MONOMACHIA (dueling) is illicit
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful for a Husband to kill a Wife caught in adultery, and a father his daughter, and a brother his Sister, together with the seducer
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio I: Whether it is lawful to shorten our life by mortifications
Dubitatio II: Whether, to avoid a sin or another evil, it is lawful to kill oneself
Dubitatio III: Whether, for the life of the neighbor, it is lawful to give oneself over to death
Dubitatio IV: When we are bound to die for the salvation of souls
Quaestio X: Whether a pregnant Mother may, to save her own life, procure the abortion of the fetus
Quaestio XI: On accidental Homicide
Quaestio XII: Whether a JUDGE can condemn an innocent man to death who has been proven guilty in the trial
Quaestio XIII: Whether Princes can grant license to kill outlaws
Quaestio XIV: On the Restitution owed on account of homicide, or mutilation
Quaestio XV: Whether the mutilation of a limb is ever lawful
Quaestio XVI: Whether it is lawful to imprison or beat another
Disputatio XXVI: On Theft, and Rapine
Quaestio I: What Dominion is
Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to have private dominion over things
Quaestio III: What THEFT is
Quaestio IV: What quantity is required for mortal sin in Theft
Dubitatio I: What is the grave quantity of theft for Sons, Wives, and Religious
Quaestio V: Whether Theft is mortal when, from many tiny thefts, there supervenes a particle making the thing grave
Quaestio VI: Whether in extreme, or urgent, necessity it is lawful to take what belongs to another
Quaestio VII: On the Thefts of Religious
Quaestio VIII: Whether men can be reduced to slavery, and sold
Quaestio IX: Whether slaves can wrest themselves from their Masters
Quaestio X: Whether it is lawful, by private authority, to recover what is ours
Quaestio XI: On the punishment of Thieves
Quaestio XII: On the restitution of thefts
Disputatio XXVII: On the JUDGE
Quaestio I: Whether power is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio II: Whether a JUDGE ought to follow the truth, and therefore be wise
Quaestio III: Whether the acts of a JUDGE who has not a true but only a putative title are valid, such that not even he sins
Quaestio IV: Whether the POPE can subject himself to someone's judgment
Quaestio V: Whether goodness is necessary in a JUDGE
Quaestio VI: On the external purity of the hands of the Judge
Quaestio VII: Whether excommunicated JUDGES sin in judging, and judge invalidly
Quaestio VIII: On the order to be observed by a JUDGE
Dubitatio I: On the mode of proceeding by Denunciation
Dubitatio II: On the mode of proceeding by Accusation
Dubitatio III: On the mode of proceeding by Inquisition
Disputatio XXVIII: On the Accused
Quaestio I: On the bringing of the Accused to the Tribunal
Quaestio II: Whether the Accused is bound to confess a crime half-proven
Quaestio III: Whether an ACCUSED, infamed for one crime, can be interrogated also about others
Quaestio IV: Whether one convicted of a crime can be interrogated about hidden accomplices, of whom there is no infamy
Quaestio V: Whether an Accused, unjustly denying a true crime for which he was to be condemned to a pecuniary penalty, is bound to pay, and whether he is subject to restitution
Quaestio VI: Whether a Reus, unjustly denying the truth, is bound to retract before the end of the Trial, when he is to be condemned
Quaestio VII: Whether, if the Accused is interrogated again, he can give only a relative answer, saying: as I answered
Quaestio VIII: How the ACCUSED ought to conduct himself in the examination, when pressed by the Judge's iniquitous interrogations
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful for the ACCUSED to appeal to another Judge
Quaestio X: Whether, and how, the ACCUSED can defend himself
Quaestio XI: Whether the Accused can flee, and how, and when
Disputatio XXIX: ON WITNESSES
Quaestio I: Whether anyone is sometimes bound to bear witness
Quaestio II: Who can be WITNESSES in a trial
Quaestio III: On the Injustice of false Witnesses
Quaestio IV: What penalties are established for false Witnesses
Disputatio XXX: On the Advocate
Quaestio I: Who can, and ought, to exercise this office
Quaestio II: On the sins of a wicked Advocate
Quaestio III: Whether an ADVOCATE is bound on account of light fault
Quaestio IV: Whether an Advocate, engaged by the year, is worthy of his fee in that year in which he did nothing
Quaestio V: Whether an Advocate is bound to defend a Client gratis in grave necessity
Quaestio VI: Whether an Advocate can receive gifts
Disputatio XXXI: On the Notary and the Tabellion
Quaestio I: On the Justice, or Injustice, of the Notary and the Tabellion
Disputatio XXXII: On Contumely
Quaestio I: What Contumely is, and whence it arises
Quaestio II: How a Christian ought to conduct himself when assailed by contumelies
Disputatio XXXIII: On Detraction
Quaestio I: What Detraction is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether detraction is a mortal sin
Quaestio III: Whether it is mortal to reveal a hidden crime to one, or two prudent men, who will keep silent about it
Quaestio IV: Whether material Detraction, which comes from talkativeness, is deadly
Quaestio V: Whether to be silent about a good that has been blackened is mortal
Quaestio VI: On the various cases in which detraction seems to be excused
Quaestio VII: Whether it is ever lawful to defame another with a falsehood, or to open his hidden crime
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to narrate a crime, notorious in one place, in another, where it is not known
Quaestio IX: Whether it is lawful to open someone's hidden crime to spare him torments
Quaestio X: Whether anyone can defame himself
Disputatio XXXIV: On Whispering, Mockery, and Cursing
Quaestio I: On the malice of Whispering
Quaestio II: On the malice of Mockery
Quaestio III: On Cursings
Tractatus II: E CONTRACTIBUS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: FIRST. On CONTRACTS in general
Quaestio I: What a CONTRACT is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether for the validity of a Contract the intention of contracting, and of binding oneself, is required
Quaestio III: How Error, or fraud, vitiates a Contract
Quaestio IV: How fear voids a Contract
Quaestio V: On conditional Contracts
Quaestio VI: On the obligation that results from a valid Contract
Quaestio VII: Which persons can enter into a Contract, and which cannot
Quaestio VIII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to withdraw from a contract, the other party objecting
Disputatio II: On the acquisition of Dominion over Persons, and other things, through the Division of things Acquired
Quaestio I: By what right the first division, and subjection, of things was made
Quaestio II: On the acquisition of DOMINION over Barbarians
Quaestio III: On the acquisition of DOMINION over irrational creatures
Disputatio III: On Promise
Quaestio I: What a PROMISE is, and how it differs from a DONATION
Quaestio II: Whether a simple PROMISE, once accepted, binds in justice
Quaestio III: Whether a merely internal PROMISE, made to a man, binds
Quaestio IV: Whether an external Promise binds before it is accepted
Quaestio V: Whether a PROMISE binds when made for a base cause
Disputatio IV: ON DONATION
Quaestio I: What DONATION is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Who can donate, and what
Quaestio III: On the revocations of donations
Disputatio V: On Buying, and Selling
Quaestio I: What EMPTIO (buying), and VENDITIO (selling), are
Quaestio II: Which persons can buy, and sell
Quaestio III: Which things can be sold
Quaestio IV: Of how many kinds is the price of things
Quaestio V: Whether, for certain causes, it is lawful to reduce below the minimum price, or raise above the maximum
Quaestio VI: Whether on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss, the price can be raised above the maximum
Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to sell more dearly above the top price, awaiting payment, than with money paid down
Quaestio VIII: Whether Stocolia and Barocolia (Italian), Stocch (Spanish, MOHATRA) are lawful
Quaestio IX: To what extent Buying, and Selling, in Monopolies is illicit
Quaestio X: Whether the seller is bound to disclose a grave defect of the thing
Quaestio XI: Whether a thing sold, not yet delivered, perishes to the buyer
Quaestio XII: On the rescission of a sale, and purchase, on account of fraud etc.
Quaestio XIII: Whether a sale with a pact of buying back is lawful
Disputatio VI: On the loan and Usury
Quaestio I: What MUTUUM (loan) and USURY are, and why the latter is a sin
Quaestio II: Whether it is USURY to lend so that, when I have need, you lend back to me, or buy from me at a just price
Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to lend with the pact that the one who receives the loan confer an office, or ecclesiastical benefice
Quaestio IV: Whether it is USURY to receive, beyond the principal, any other gain whatever besides the money
Quaestio V: Whether, and what, the lender can receive on account of danger, and ceasing profit
Quaestio VI: Whether it is lawful to lend wheat, or something else, with the pact that it be restored in the same measure, even if the price has risen at the time of restitution
Quaestio VII: Whether, and how, gain acquired from Usury is to be restored
Quaestio VIII: Whether it is lawful to seek a loan from a Usurer
Disputatio VII: ON CENSUSES (annuities)
Quaestio I: What a Census is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether a Census can lawfully be sold
Quaestio III: From which things a CENSUS can be sold by natural law
Quaestio IV: Until what time a CENSUS can be sold
Quaestio V: What conditions are required for a CENSUS
Disputatio VIII: ON EXCHANGES
Quaestio I: What CAMBIUM (exchange) is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether in petty exchange it is lawful to receive something above the value of the coin fixed by law
Quaestio III: Whether in local exchange, or by letters, when the first Campsor receives, so that he may restore elsewhere, he can gain something
Quaestio IV: Whether CAMBIUM is lawful, when for the Campsor a Procurator of the Campsor answers with the moneys of the Campsor himself
Quaestio V: Whether the said Recambia are lawful only on account of ceasing profit, or emerging loss
Quaestio VI: Whether the solutions, and provisions, that Money-changers receive are lawful
Disputatio IX: On the Contract of Partnership
Quaestio I: In what the CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP consists, and what is required that it be just
Quaestio II: Whether, and how, other contracts can be united with the Contract of Partnership
Quaestio III: Whether the contract by which, for secure capital, some certain gain is received annually is lawful
Disputatio X: On Emphyteusis, Letting, Hiring, and the Feud
Quaestio I: What EMPHYTEUSIS is
Quaestio II: What Locatio (letting) is
Quaestio III: What a FEUDUM (fief) is, and of how many kinds
Disputatio XI: On Testaments
Quaestio I: What a TESTAMENT is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: What solemnity is required for a Testament, closed and open
Quaestio III: Who can, and ought, to make testaments, or be instituted heirs
Quaestio IV: Whether an heir instituted in a testament invalid through defect of solemnity by civil law can pursue the inheritance in the forum of conscience, despoiling the heir succeeding ab intestato
Quaestio V: By what means a Testament is revocable
Quaestio VI: What obligation Heirs instituted by testament undertake
Disputatio XII: On Legacies
Quaestio I: What a Legacy is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether legacies ought to be paid to all those for whom they are made, and how
Quaestio III: Which things can be bequeathed
Quaestio IV: What a Pious, or Privileged, Legacy is
Quaestio V: By what means legacies are caducous, such that the Heir is not bound to pay them
Tractatus III: E RELIGIONE
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: FIRST. On RELIGION in general
Quaestio I: What the Virtue of RELIGION is
Quaestio II: Whether Religion is a Virtue
Quaestio III: Whether LATRIA, or RELIGION, is a special virtue
Quaestio IV: Whether RELIGION is a Cardinal Virtue
Quaestio V: How widely the acts of Religion extend
Quaestio VI: Whether RELIGION is necessary
Quaestio VII: Whether true RELIGION ought to be one
Disputatio II: ON DEVOTION
Quaestio I: What Devotion is, and of how many kinds
Disputatio III: ON PRAYER
Quaestio I: What Prayer is
Quaestio II: Of how many kinds is PRAYER
Quaestio III: Whether PRAYER is necessary
Quaestio IV: Whether Prayer is not only petitory, but also satisfactory, and meritorious
Quaestio V: What conditions are required for perfect Prayer
Quaestio VI: What is to be sought in Prayer: where the petitions of the Lord's Prayer are expounded
Quaestio VII: Who ought to pray
Quaestio VIII: Who is to be prayed to
Quaestio IX: For whom one ought to pray
Quaestio X: How one ought to pray
Quaestio XI: On that mode of praying, the Canonical Hours
Dubitatio I: Whether Attention is necessary for the Office to be recited by precept
Dubitatio II: Whether one reciting the Office satisfies by reciting another for it
Dubitatio III: Whether to interrupt the parts of the same Hour
Dubitatio IV: Whether one omitting all the hours of one Day commits more sins
Dubitatio V: Whether one reciting the Divine office in Choir with voice very much lowered, so that he is not heard, satisfies
Dubitatio VI: Whether Canons conversing in Choir are capable of distributions
Dubitatio VII: Whether one who recites the office privately ought to hear himself
Dubitatio VIII: Whether one who says the office with a notable cutting off, or truncating, of syllables satisfies
Dubitatio IX: Whether one who says a great part of the office with the mind not intending to satisfy satisfies
Dubitatio X: What is the gravity of the matter in the omission of a Canonical Hour
Disputatio IV: ON ADORATION
Quaestio I: Whether Latria is in the genus of some virtue
Quaestio II: Whether Latria is distinct from Dulia
Quaestio III: On Sacred places, destined for adorations
Disputatio V: ON SACRIFICE
Quaestio I: What a SACRIFICE is
Quaestio II: What is required that a SACRIFICE be right
Quaestio III: Whether Sacrifice is of natural law
Quaestio IV: Whether besides Sacrifice, first-fruits are to be offered
Disputatio VI: On Tithes
Quaestio I: Whether Tithes are to be paid
Quaestio II: From which things tithes are to be paid
Quaestio III: To whom, and by whom tithes are to be paid
Quaestio IV: Where, and when, Tithes are to be paid
Quaestio V: By what authority the payment of tithes is to be exacted
Tractatus IV: E VOTIS
Proemium I: Prooemium
Disputatio I: FIRST. ON THE VOW
Quaestio I: What a VOW is, and what its conditions are
Quaestio II: What deliberation is required for a VOW
Quaestio III: Whether one promising something to God, and knowing the obligation, yet having the intention of not binding himself, is bound by Vow
Quaestio IV: Whether a Votive promise is made to God alone
Quaestio V: How error, or ignorance, concerning a VOW causes involuntariness
Quaestio VI: Whether fear inflicted makes a Vow invalid
Quaestio VII: Whether a necessary thing can be the matter of a Vow
Quaestio VIII: Whether a VOW is only about some good
Quaestio IX: Whether a VOW is only about a better good, or truly also about a lesser good
Quaestio X: Whether a VOW about a thing that can have a good, and an evil, outcome is valid
Quaestio XI: Whether any obligation arises from a VOW, and what it is
Quaestio XII: Whether the immature are bound by Vows
Quaestio XIII: What, and what kind of, is the power of invalidating VOWS
Quaestio XIV: On the power of the Prelates of Religious to invalidate VOWS
Quaestio XV: Whether a husband can invalidate all the Vows of his wife, beyond the Vow of chastity
Quaestio XVI: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vow of Chastity emitted by his wife without license, the marriage standing, and to be fulfilled then
Quaestio XVII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted without his license, to be fulfilled at the time the marriage is dissolved
Quaestio XVIII: Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife, emitted before marriage
Quaestio XIX: *Whether the Vows of a wife, made without the license of the husband, revive when the marriage is dissolved.*
Quaestio XX: *Whether a husband can invalidate the Vows of his wife emitted by his license: the Vow of Chastity excepted.*
Quaestio XXI: Whether a husband can revoke the Vow of Chastity of his wife, emitted by his license
Quaestio XXII: Whether a Husband can invalidate the Vows of his Wife, emitted under the preceding dominion of a father, or first husband
Quaestio XXIII: Whether a Wife can invalidate certain vows of her husband, and which
Quaestio XXIV: Whether parents, or Tutors, can invalidate all the Vows of their immature Sons
Quaestio XXV: Whether a Father, and Curator, can invalidate the personal Vows of their adolescent sons
Quaestio XXVI: Which real, or mixed, Vows of adolescents can be invalidated by the father
Quaestio XXVII: To whom the faculty of invalidating the Vows of adolescents, and the immature, belongs
Quaestio XXVIII: Which Vows of servants the Lords can invalidate
Quaestio XXIX: Whether in the Church there is power to dispense from Vows
Quaestio XXX: Whether a cause is required for a dispensation, and which
Quaestio XXXI: Whether, and how, the commutation of Vows is to be made
Quaestio XXXII: Whether commutation requires a cause
Question XXXIII
Disputatio II: SECOND. ON THE STATE OF RELIGION, OR ON SOLEMN VOWS
§ I: On the vows of Religious in common
Quaestio I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows
Quaestio II: Whether solemn VOWS are necessary for the state of a Religious
Quaestio III: Whether, and how, this state is Holy
Quaestio IV: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion
Quaestio V: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows
Quaestio VI: Who are to be received into Religion
Quaestio VII: On NOVICES
Quaestio VIII: What is required for profession in Religion
Quaestio IX: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection
Quaestio X: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken
Quaestio XI: On passing to another Religion
Quaestio XII: Whether the three vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience are essential to Religion
Quaestio XIII: Whether the Pontiff can dispense in solemn Vows
Quaestio XIV: Who are to be received into Religion
Quaestio XV: On Novices
Quaestio XVI: What is required for profession in Religion
Quaestio XVII: Whether, and how, Religious are bound to perfection
Quaestio XVIII: Whence the greater perfection of Religion is to be taken
Quaestio XIX: On passing to another Religion
Quaestio XX: On Religious to be expelled
Quaestio XXI: Whether every Religious is bound to all the counsels
Quaestio XXII: Whether Religious ought to teach, preach, etc.
Quaestio XXIII: Whether Religious ought to labor with their hands
Quaestio XXIV: Whether it is lawful for Religious to transact secular business
Disputatio III: On the Vow of OBEDIENCE
Quaestio I: Whether the vow of obedience is chief among the Religious vows
Quaestio II: What obedience is promised in Religion
Quaestio III: Whether Religious are bound to obey Prelates in all things
Quaestio IV: Whether one doubting whether the thing commanded is lawful is bound to obey the Prelate
Quaestio V: Whether all the statutes of Religious Orders bind under sin
Disputatio IV: On the Vow of Poverty
Quaestio I: On the essence of this Vow
Quaestio II: Which Poverty is more excellent
Quaestio III: Whether mendicancy befits Religious Poverty
Quaestio IV: Whether Religious, on account of Poverty, ought to be clothed in mean garments
Quaestio V: Whether austere fare is owed to Religious Poverty
Quaestio VI: How Poverty is violated
Dubitatio I: Whether Prelates can concede to Religious an annual peculium
Dubitatio II: Whether a Religious, having superfluities by license of his superior, is a proprietor
Dubitatio III: Dubitatio III
Dubitatio IV: Whether a Legacy stands for a Religious, as pertaining to him precisely
Quaestio VII: On the penalties, and marks, of a Proprietor
Disputatio V: On the Vow of CHASTITY
Quaestio I: What difference there is between Cloistered, and Clerical, chastity
Quaestio II: From what time the solemn vow of Chastity began to dissolve a subsequent marriage
Quaestio III: Whether one vowing Chastity solemnly dissolves a marriage, whether consummated, or ratified, and by what law, and at what time this began to be done
Quaestio IV: By what law, and at what time, Religious Chastity began to be sealed with cloister
Quaestio V: By what means cloister is violated
Quaestio VI: Whether dispensation can fall upon Religious chastity, and who can dispense in cloister
Disputatio VI: On the Oath
Quaestio I: What an OATH is, and of how many kinds
Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to swear by GOD
Quaestio III: Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures
Quaestio IV: What is required for an Oath
Quaestio V: Whether, and how, it is a Sin to swear without Truth
Quaestio VI: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH made without justice
Quaestio VII: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH lacking judgment
Quaestio VIII: Whether, and how, a custom of swearing is evil
Quaestio IX: When precisely one swearing incautiously from custom sins mortally
Quaestio X: What sin it is to swear dolosely
Quaestio XI: Whether it is lawful to require an Oath from a perjurer
Quaestio XII: Whether, and when, it is lawful to require an Oath from an Idolater
Quaestio XIII: On the obligation of a promissory Oath in itself
Quaestio XIV: Whether dolous Oaths bind
Whether deceitful oaths bind.
IN the tenth question we saw the malice of a deceitful oath, and the kinds of deceit; see them there.
BECAUSE deceit either consists in this, that the mind does not correspond to the words of the one swearing; or in this, that, although words and mind agree with each other, he deceives the recipient with equivocal words, and does not respond to the sense of the hearer. Now the voice can depart from the sense in three ways. First, if the mind does not intend to swear. Second, when he does not will to give, and therefore not even to promise. Third, when the will to swear is present, but not the will to bind himself, as I said there.
AND first indeed, when the intention of swearing is lacking, all concede, alleging that it is not an oath, and therefore under that aspect it does not bind. The reason of D. Bonaventure in the foundations is, because since the interior intention is as it were the soul of the words, giving them their being (for words are by their own nature ordered to expounding the mind), if the interior intention of swearing is lacking, the oath will be fictitious. It is confirmed by D. Bonaventure, because the obligation of an oath is a certain law which each one imposes upon himself; but no one is deemed to impose a law upon himself unless he wills it; therefore since he does not will to swear, neither will he will to bind himself. He gives the example in Sanchez num. 4. from D. Bonaventure: just as marriage contracted externally without interior consent is fictitious and induces no obligation, so neither is an oath.
WHEN indeed the will to fulfill is lacking, since neither is the will to bind oneself or to promise present, the same must be said as of one swearing without a will to bind himself.
THE FIRST opinion on this is that such an oath binds. So the Angelic Doctor V. iuram. 4. Sylvester 3. quaest. 2. Cajetan 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad 4. Soto lib. 8. de Iustitia, art. 7. quaest. 1. ad 4. Covarruvias de pactis, 1. part. §. 5. Gutierrez in Canonical Questions, lib. 2. cap. 22. num. 31. Lud. Lopez p. p. instructory, cap. 42. Manuel in the first Tomus, cap. 192. num. 7. Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. fol. 108. Henriquez lib. 11. de matrim. cap. 13. Suarez lib. 2. de Iuram. from num. 11. Valencia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4. Lessius lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. d. 8. num. 38. Sayrus lib. 5. ap. 6. num. 8. and he says it is the safer view; Tabiena V. iurare, quaest. 11. They add that it has force also in conscience even in invalid contracts; so Diana part. 4. Tract. 4. Miscel. resol. 25. and others cited by him, and others with Baffizio quaest. 10.
THE SECOND opinion is that then the oath does not bind; so D. Bonaventure here, whom Gabriel follows eadem dist. 39. tertii, quaest. 1. art. 2. concl. 5. Almain ibi quaest. unica. Richard ibi, art. 2. quaest. 1. et 2. Antonius cap. si vero, num. 5. de iure iurando and there the Abbot at the end, Nemo num. 37. Imola at the end. Fortunius de ultimo fine, illatione 22. num. 477. D. Antoninus 2. part. tit. 10. cap. 6. Rosella V. iurare, num. 19. Angelus under the word Iuram. 5. num. 8. et 10. et 32. Sylvester qq. q. 7. 17. et 19. Armilla num. 14. Felinus on that cap. Si vero, num. 8. Ioan. a Medina Tract. de Confess. quaest. de dispens. a reuelanda confess. ad 7. Palac. 4. d. 29. d. 1. fol. 665. Navarrus ad cap. Humanae aures, quaest. 3. num. 6. Philiarchus de off. Sacerd. Tom. 1. part. 2. lib. 3. cap. 16. Seraphinus de privil. iur. privil. 110. num. 16. Gutierrez de Iuram. p. p. cap. 57. num. 20. and Azorius asserts it as probable Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 4. quaestio 2. and Lessius also says it is common loc. cit. supra num. 37. and Tabiena there: D. Thomas favors it 3. d. 39. quaest. 1. art. 3. quaestiuncula 3. Selva de iureiurando 3. part. quaest. 1. num. 34. et 37. Sanchez lib. 3. summa, cap. 10. num. 8. Hostiensis holds the same cap. Ad audientiam, and there Ioannes Andr. num. 4. citing authorities for the opposite view, whom Imola there num. 5. says must be understood as binding only in the forum of the Church, not in the forum of conscience. Hostiensis wills the same, as is clear to the reader, and the same think others after D. Bonaventure, who in the body asserts the same in the forum of the Church.
I ASSERT that an oath uttered without a will to bind oneself does not bind in conscience.
IT IS PROVED by D. Bonaventure, first from D. Gregory 28. moral. cap. 7. and it is had in cap. Humanae aures 22. quaest. 5. The words serve the intention, and God judges such words as those which are uttered from the inmost depths: Therefore if a man does not intend to bind himself, however much he may speak inwardly, God does not deem him bound.
SECOND, because in 1 Kings 16. it is said: Man judges those things that appear: but God beholds the heart: Therefore God weighs the obligation of an oath according to the measure of the intention.
THIRD, Those things which profess voluntary obligation, and spontaneously prescribe a law, depend for their prescription upon the will of the one prescribing: But an oath is a particular law which a man freely imposes upon himself: Therefore it depends upon the will of the one imposing.
Valencia loc. cit. col. penultima, num. 1417. ANSWERS with Cajetan and Soto, that the obligation, by reason of the oath, does not rest upon the will of the swearer; but that by natural law it is per se attached to the oath; whence it is not in the power of the swearer to separate it from the oath.
BUT Valencia is mistaken, because a promissory oath has two intrinsically distinct elements: One is the invocation of the Divine witness: The other is the promise; and in this it differs from an assertory oath, and without it cannot subsist, so that if it is taken away, the essence, or (granted) an intrinsic passion of it, is removed. Therefore if anyone swears, invoking God, he does not forthwith remain bound, if he intends not to bind himself, for he appends an implication by which the rationale of the oath is destroyed; since he removes that without which the rationale of a promissory oath cannot subsist, as even the adversaries confess. But this does not follow from the nature of the thing, namely that the oath taken alone, as it is the invocation of God as witness of my intention, should thus remain. Just as it does not follow in the assertory oath that the thing is true, of which God is brought in as witness.
HENCE the holy Doctor draws out the ultimate foundation, because an obligatory oath requires the truth of the obligation, which is the inseparable companion of a promissory oath; for he does not will to say that an oath lacking truth is simply invalid.
IT IS PROVED fourth by D. Bonaventure in the body, by the argument by which Sanchez and others chiefly rely. External things which depend upon the internal do not have their being without it: But an oath is an external obligating act, depending upon the internal: Therefore. The major is proved by St. Bonaventure in the body. Marriage, even if it is entered into by word of mouth; if nevertheless the will is absent of binding oneself to that life with its consequent necessary properties, it is invalid; so also a vow, unless the intention of binding oneself is present, does not avail. The same the holy Doctor notes in the third argument. Likewise one uttering heresy, if inwardly he rightly holds in faith, is not a heretic, because these depend upon the internal. Similarly, therefore, one swearing a promissory oath, not intending to promise, does not swear; for he appends an implicative, destructive condition, namely being unwilling to promise and to bind oneself, and so destroys the rationale of the oath, insofar as it is the invocation of God as witness of my promise. For of two things, one positive, one destructive, equally concurring, the destructive is more powerful to destroy than the positive is to posit, because good is from an integral cause; but evil from any defect whatsoever, as D. Bonaventure is often accustomed to say, adding that negation is a devouring fire consuming all things.
The adversaries ANSWER that one truly swearing by that very fact calls God as witness to the promise and to the future truth to be fulfilled, and therefore to the promise; otherwise he would not be a perjurer, having no will to fulfill: Nor can the obligation be separated from a true promissory oath, but it implies that one have an intention of swearing by a promissory oath, and not of promising and binding oneself.
NOR are the examples to the point, because in acts whose substance consists in obligation, the will to bind oneself destroys their substance, as happens in a vow, in marriage, and in contracts; but when the substance of the act does not consist in obligation, but this is a following effect, then whether he wills or not, one exercising the act remains bound. As one killing a man, whether he wills or not, is subjected to eternal and temporal punishment by the laws enacted.
SINCE therefore such is the substance of a promissory oath,1 as has been said, that it does not consist in obligation, but this is a following effect, because the rationale of the oath consists in bringing God in as witness; it follows that one truly swearing is subjected to the consequent obligation of fulfilling, whether he wills or not, nor can he by his own will impede this effect. It is confirmed, for this comparison of the swearer with the sinner is from D. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 2. foundation 3. just as (he says) the sinner is necessarily destined to eternal punishment; so also one truly swearing promissorily is bound necessarily to keeping the truth, nor can it depend upon the will.
NEVERTHELESS these things are refuted by our foundations, as Sanchez notes num. 8. for a promissory oath differs from an assertory one in this, that the latter is directed to present truth: but the former to future truth; yet for both God ought to be brought in as witness. Therefore just as one destroying present truth by swearing, but unwilling to bind himself to telling the truth, would not truly swear; because he would append an incompossible condition; so in a promissory oath, one appending the condition of not binding himself destroys the rationale of an obligatory oath; nor is the example of the homicide to the point, because it does not depend upon the intention of the killer, which would be such as to have no effect; but in our case, even if we grant that the obligation of executing is an effect of the oath, or its passion, it depends upon the intention; and thus all concede that it can be null if the intention of swearing is lacking: Therefore likewise when he does not will to swear absolutely, but with an incompatible condition, namely not to contract an obligation; for although, if an oath of swearing absolutely is uttered, the obligating effect follows; nevertheless, if in the act of swearing a condition contrary to the nature of the oath itself is appended, as it is obligatory for the future thing to be fulfilled, it will not be a true, but a fictitious oath, as such it is.
TO what is objected from D. Bonaventure it is answered, that the argument was taken from the holy Doctor by the adversaries, but not to the point: For St. Bonaventure compares the sinner with one truly swearing, insofar as he intended to bind himself out of fear. Thus the arguments of the adversaries collapse.
I ASSERT secondly, that in the forum of the Church he remains bound.
IT IS PROVED by D. Bonaventure, first from D. Isidore lib. 2. sent. as related by the Master in 3. dist. 39. cap. By whatever artifice of words anyone swears, God receives it just as he to whom the oath is sworn understands it, that is, wills it to be received by the Church.
SECOND, because fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one; otherwise human commerce, contracts, assurances of fidelity, etc., would be abolished. For since we cannot penetrate the minds of others, it is necessary that I be secure in a human way in entering into contracts.
THE SAME he has in 4. d. 38. question one, next to the last.
THERE arises indeed some question concerning the other mode of deceit, when the swearer, uttering words conforming to his mind, utters them amphibolously, so as to elude the hearer: I have discussed its nature in quaest. 10.
AND indeed, if the swearer in good faith without deceit, but with prudent equivocation, inflicts no injury; the Doctors commonly hold, and chiefly those alleged, that the oath binds in the sense which the hearer perceives, but which the swearer intends. For then he is not bound by justice, since he lacked deceit; nor has he inflicted any injury. Nor even by the Religion of the oath: And this is what D. Gregory says, adduced by D. Bonaventure in the first foundation; and it is had in the canon Humanae aures, 22. quaest. 5. there: Our human ears judge our words as those which sound without: but the Divine judgments hear them as those which are uttered from the inmost depths: But in the external forum, since the intention lies hidden; if the words signify something more, one must stand by that; but if they signify several things equally, one must stand by that sense which prudent men judge. Moreover, the proper sense is always to be preferred, as D. Bonaventure notes at the end of the question, and it is had in cap. ex litteris de sponsal. l. librorum §. Quod tamen Cassius, ff. de legat. 3. and Covarruvias teaches it de pactis 1. part. §. 5. Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 10. num. 11.
BUT if he swore deceitfully to deceive another man of good faith.
SOME say, that the oath binds in conscience according to the sense which the recipient understood. So D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad 4. D. Antonin. 2. part. tit. 10. cap. 7. §. 3. Angelus V. iuramentum 4. Sylvester there 3. quaest. 2. Tabiena there quaest. 13. num. 14. Armilla num. 16. Navar. summa, cap. 12. num. 13. Hostiensis, and others, whom Covarruvias reports and follows de pactis 1. part. §. 5. Parladorus on everyday matters lib. 2. in the final cap., 1. part. §. 4. num. 15.
THE SECOND opinion is, that an oath of this kind does not bind by the religion of the oath beyond the intention of the deceitful swearer, but by reason of the scandal, which would arise from the transgression of his oath. So D. Thomas in 3. dist 39. quaest. 1. art. 3. quaestiuncula 3. Lessius lib. 2. de iustitia, cap. 42. dub. 9. num. 45. Suarez Tom. 2. de religione, Tract. de iuramento, lib. 2. cap. 7. Sanchez num. 13. And in a similar case of a deceitful oath given without the will to swear, namely that it binds by reason of scandal, Cajetan teaches 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. Soto lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 7. Azor Tom. 1. Instit. lib. 15. cap. 4. quaestio 2. Valencia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4. col. ultima, Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo, tract. 11. cap. 3. dub. 5. dicto 2. Covarruvias, Lessius and Suarez in the cited places.
AS TO D. Bonaventure, he opines that this oath by its nature is not valid; that it is nevertheless a sin of deceit even in the forum of God: but that in the forum of the Church the swearer is bound. So ad primum, and at the end of the question. He indeed indicates in the last foundation that he is bound by reason of scandal.
I ASSERT therefore, that such an oath does not bind by Religion.
THE REASON of D. Bonaventure in the body is, because an oath by its law does not bind beyond the intention of the swearer, as I said above; the same is had in cap. Humanae aures cited above.
I ASSERT secondly, that this man is bound by reason of scandal. It is proved by D. Bonav. in the last foundation, because thus contracts, commerce, the security of fidelity would be abolished, and an approach would lie open to a hundred injuries.
I ASSERT thirdly, that this oath binds even in the forum of the Church.
IT IS PROVED by the holy Doctor by the arguments adduced above for the second assertion of the principal question.
THERE occurs a doubt to be solved from what has been said: Whether one swearing falsely in jest sins by that equivocation, say, by saying that the Bishop is in his house, understanding the painted image.
NEARLY ALL condemn him of mortal fault; so the Angelic Doctor, Tabiena, Armilla, Navarrus, Toletus, Sayrus, Philiarchus, Lopez, and others cited by Sanchez Tom. 1. lib. 3. cap. 6. and it seems so to D. Bonaventure quaest. 3. ad 3. where he excuses the jest from mere indeliberation.
THE OPPOSITE Sanchez himself teaches, adducing others, to whom add Bonacina Tract. de leg. d. 4. quaest. 1. puncto 12. Filliuccius tom. 2. tract. 25. cap. 11. num. 331. Diana part. 2. tract. 13. resol. 25. and it is expressly D. Bonaventure here quaest. 3. fund. 1.
His reason is, Perjury occurs when God is brought in as witness to a falsehood; but this ought to be understood seriously. But here he does not bring God in witness to a falsehood, but to guarding his own truth. It is confirmed by the holy Doctor; for not every invocation of God is vain; it is serious, as all confess. This naming of God indeed is without necessity, and a kind of irreverence.
To the passage of D. Bonaventure I say that he excuses the jest from mere indeliberation, so that the word is not jesting, because the man does not will to jest deliberately: But if there should arrive an oath not extracted from the state of venial sin and drawn to mortal, unless the word were to be jesting, because there is no formal advocacy of God as witness if it is not serious, since he is not truly called upon.
You will say that the end of a sacred and grave thing is frustrated, which you abuse.
I say the end of the Oath is to call God as witness, when there is necessity of truth; but here no necessity of truth occurs; therefore it is applied superfluously; yet not against the essence of the principal end of the oath.
You will object first against the first: D. Isidor. lib. 2. sent. cap. 31. and it is related in the canon Quacumque arte 22. quaest. 5. there: By whatever artifice of words each one swears, nevertheless God, who is the witness of conscience, receives it just as he to whom the oath is sworn understands it.
D. Bonaventure ad 1. ANSWERS, whom Sanchez follows num. 13. that God esteems this man for punishment by reason of fault and deceit, because he is bound by justice not to deceive, and by truth not to lie. Therefore in this way God receives the deceit, so that, because the other, deceived, understands it to his own harm, he may punish the deceiver with eternal punishment.
He ANSWERS secondly, that God receives it, understanding causally willing by the Church to receive it in his name in the external forum, so that he wills him to be bound thus in the external forum, even if the oath by its nature does not bind, because it is null.
In the same sense the Regian law prescribes it l. finali tit. 11. p. 5. namely that he be held in the external forum in punishment of the fraud.
You will object secondly. It would follow, that this man derive gain from the fraud.
Sanchez num. 13. ANSWERS, from D. Bonav. ad 3. that he does not derive gain from the fraud, because since he sins mortally, he is punished with eternal punishment; and in the external forum he is compelled to stand by his promises.