Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Quaestio I: What an OATH is, and of how many kinds

What an OATH is, and how manyfold.

An OATH is said from ius (law), because it must be held as the equivalent of law, whence it is called Iusiurandum.

To SWEAR is to call God to witness, as D. Bonaventure teaches in 3. dist. 39. dub. litt. and in the opuscule, first part. Concil. sect. 12. D. Thom. 2. 2. loco cit. and the others follow them: An Oath, therefore, is the invocation of the Divine name in testimony; but this invocation consists in this, that the swearer, as far as in him lies, or rather, manifests to God that which he confirms by oath, as that which is known to God himself, and true, and this either in this or in the other life, as Valencia notes 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 1. Sanchez lib. 3. in Decal. cap. 1. and this D. Bonaventure intimates loco cit. Centil. defining, to Swear is to invoke God as witness of one's utterance; and more clearly in 3. dist. 39. art. 2. quaest. 1. in fundamentis.

It is called the Invocation of God, because whether we name God or creatures, God is always brought in as witness, at least indirectly, inasmuch as he is the author of the creature. For one swearing by a creature does not bring it in as witness, since that would be blasphemous, attributing to the creature the first infallible truth, the firmament of all truths, and an inviolable witness, as D. Bonaventure teaches in 3. dist. 39. art. 2. quaest. 2. D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 6. whom the rest follow, cited by Bassaeus 1. num. 5.

It is called the Invocation of God in witness, to distinguish it from prayer, which is an invocation of God to obtain something. But this invocation of the oath need not be expressed in words, in order to bind before God. So D. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 1. whom others follow in the external forum of the soul. Some, however, deny that words are necessary. So Sanchez lib. 2. de matrimonio, disp. 31. num. 5. and lib. 3. Decal. cap. 1. n. 2. citing Couar. de pactis, p. p. initio, num. 4. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 44. Suarez Tom. 2. de Religione, lib. 1. de Iuramento, cap. 11. Clavis Regia lib. 5. cap. 1. Bassaeus num 4.

OTHERS assert that words are necessary, at least in those speaking. The Authors are reported by Couar. loco cit. and Zauallo quaest. 406.

QUOAD D. Bonaventure indeed seems to think with these in the third place presently indicated, with the third and fourth: but if it be read attentively, he wants those signs to suffice by which the certainty of the contract shines forth in the external forum.

But whether the touch of some sacred thing be required, for instance the Gospels, S. Bonav. in 3. dist. 39. art. 2. q. 2. in corpore, indeed concedes that it is more frequently customary to swear by the Gospels; as those in which the Divine truth shines forth most; but he does not admit that the touch is necessary: Couar. de pactis 1. part. §. primo. Zauallus quaest. 407. Sanchez loco citato, num. 3. follow him.

From these you have that an Oath is formally a single thing, because it is the bringing in of God as witness, and on that account it has the nature of an oath, as Cajetan notes ad art. 1. of D. Thomas, and Valencia disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 2. after D. Bonaventure loco citato Centil. where he proves it; for perjury is a lie confirmed with God brought in as witness. Therefore the Oath also according to its essence is the Divine truth brought in as testimony, which governs in all oaths, as Sanchez notes num. 9. with others cited, and therefore it is not to be distinguished in confession.

MATERIALLY, however, it can be divided, both on the part of the truth, or enunciation, which it is applied to confirm; and also on the part of the mode of signifying that interior invocation of the Divine testimony.

On the part of the invocation the Oath is divided into Promissory and Assertory. So D. Bonaventure loco cit. Centil. and in sermon 3. on the Decalogue, and in 3. dist. 39.

It is ASSERTORY when the Divine testimony is invoked to confirm an enunciation about the present or the past. But when it is invoked to confirm an enunciation about the future, it is called Promissory. Hence D. Gregory of Nyssa homil. 4. in Cant. says there is a double operation of the oath; for either it makes faith in the truth, or it confirms the faith of a promise, as is said in Ps. 131.: The Lord hath sworn to David in truth, and he will not frustrate it.

OBSERVE here that the promissory oath is so called because, although we may either propose or promise to do something, yet it mostly has a promise joined to it. Or say that even the proposal of doing something has something of a bargain, which differs from a vow, because it brings God as witness of that proposal; and this sense seems more to the mind of D. Bonaventure, who says the promissory oath is that by which we promise something.

On the part of the mode S. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 39. 7 dub. litt. divides it into an Oath by simple contestation, which lightly, or with moderation, brings God in as witness, inasmuch as it has the nature of a principle, as I swear by God; or as it has the nature of a principle, and of one who knows; as God is my witness, or may he be: And into the oath which invokes God as witness, as one who rewards, either with good things, as God is my witness, who grants life, or as one who rewards with punishments in vengeance, as: May God do so to me, and add more: thus it exhibits one's own will, or oneself, to the Divine vengeance, if it is invoked falsely; and this is called the execratory Oath, which sometimes can be mixed, as was that of the Apostle 2. Corinth. 1. I call God to witness upon my soul. Whence the execratory perjury does not include two faults, one of perjury, the other of the malediction invoked; because one who is justly to suffer imprecates the malediction upon himself, as Valencia notes loco citato, although Tannerus holds the opposite disput. 5. quaest. 5. num. 4. But this kind of oath was frequent in the times of the old law; because then God was a God of revenges, and because the law was one of fear, as D. Bonaventure notes loco citato.

NOTE, however, that it is commonly divided into simple and execratory, because that formula by which God is invoked as rewarding good things is recalled to the simple form of an oath, unless it is so uttered as to include the contrary malediction: As: So may God help me: So may God do good to me, give me glory, etc. For in this formula is understood: May God deprive me of these good things, if this is not true; So Cajetanus loco citato, Sylvester V. Iuramentum, 1. quaest. 1. Sotus lib 8. de iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 1. Nauar. summa, cap. 12. Aleozer cap. 15. Lessius lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. dub. 2. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 2. Sanchez lib. 3. summa, cap. 2. num. 36. Therefore this oath will be execratory; but if all execration be removed, and God is not brought in as witness, it will not be an oath, as if I were to say: I would have as many golden coins as are those which I say. So Sanchez num. 39.

FINALLY, one oath is simple, another solemn; one judicial, another extrajudicial. So D. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 39. art. 1. part. 3. in resolutione.

CONCERNING the modes and formulas of swearing, something must be noted.

FIRST, the intention must be regarded, whether it was to swear in those words or signs. So D. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 1. in fundamentis, et resp. ad ultimum, notes that the common usage of that country must be observed, whether those words signify an oath. Valencia follows this rule 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 2. col. 1. Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 2. Suarez lib. 1. de iuramento, cap. 12. Bassaeus V. Iuramentum, 1.

SECOND, that the word I swear is not necessary for an oath, but that the word, or sign, calling God to witness is sufficient, as By God, etc. So S. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 39. in dub. litt. and in the questions, passim, and in the opuscula in the places cited, whom the Abbas follows cap. etsi Christus, num. 3. de iureiurando, Sylvest. under the word iuramentum, 1. Covarr. de pactis 1. part. num. 7. Sanchez same lib. 1. cap. 13. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 1. Sanchez loc. cit. num. 2.

¶ THIRD, that it is not necessary for a true oath that the thing brought in as witness be truly such, but it is enough that it be such in the estimation of the swearer; and accordingly the heathens swearing by their Gods truly swear, because they think they bring the true God in as witness, although they err materially. So D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 39. art. 2. quaest. 3. where he also proves it from the oaths described in scripture, made by heathens, Genes. 31. by Laban to Jacob. primo Machab. 8. by the Romans to the Jews.

THEN he proves it from D. Augustine epist. 154., and it is reported cap. Movet, 22. quaest. 1. the Gloss follows cap. movet V. sociat. Sylvest. V. iuram. 4. quaest. 4. Covarr. de pactis 1. part. §. 1. num. 10. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 1. Seraphinus de privilegio iuramenti prim. 30. Azor. T. 2. lib. 11. cap. 2. quaesito 1. and cap. 11. quaesito 11. Petrus Ledesma Tom. 2. summae, tract. 11. cap. 1. d. 1. Philiarc. de offic. Sacerd. Tom. 1. quaest. 2. lib. 3. cap. 13. against many whom Sanchez follows, and cites lib. 3. cap. 2. num. 5. where he does not answer the Scriptures cited by D. Bonaventure.

¶ BUT it is OBJECTED that an oath brings in the true God as witness.

IT IS ANSWERED that it suffices if one intend to bring in the true God. Thus the gentiles intend, although they wander astray; just as if one were to swear upon a profane book, thinking it to be the Gospel, he truly swears.

Sanchez ANSWERS that it is not similar, because here one intends to swear by the true Gospels, nor does he attribute anything to that book.

BUT it is not to the point that the worship of latria is not paid to it; for then it is an invocation in witness, although subordinate; the thing, however, is diverse, as D. Bonav. notes loc. cit. because it suffices that the heathen judge and intend the true God.

THEREFORE if a Christian were to swear by false Gods, he would not be bound by the religion of an oath, because the creature is brought in as witness from knowledge and intention. Whence I wonder that some, cited by Sanchez numero 6. have said this. Therefore to swear falsely by BACCHUS is not perjury; but to swear by him seriously is blasphemy.

¶ FOURTH, it is to be noted that it makes no difference in an oath whether the thing brought in as witness be invoked by the preposition In, or by the preposition Per; as I swear in God, or by God. So D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 39. dubio litt. num. 5. at the end, whom Sylvest. V. Iuram. 1. quaest. 5. Aragon: 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 1. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo, tract. 1. cap. 1. Valencia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 2. Azor. Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 3. quaesito 1. Manuel 1. Tomo summae, cap. 19. Suarez lib. 1. de Iuram. cap. 13. num. 14. Clavis Reg. lib. 5. cap. 1. num. 13. Lessius lib. 2. de iust. cap. 42. dub. 1. Sanchez, with others cited loc. cit. num. 8. follow. Thus Matth. 5. it is said: Swear not at all, neither by heaven, nor by the earth.

¶ FIFTH, note from D. Bonaventure in that dist. art. 2. quaest. 2. in corpore, and ad argumenta; that an oath by creatures, asserting them to be infallible witnesses of truth, is blasphemy, and consequently a species of Idolatry; but truly to swear by creatures, as they are effects of the Creator, whom we bring in as witness, is an oath, of which we shall treat quaest. 3. So all.

But Sanchez NOTES num. 10. that only those creatures brought in as witnesses form an oath, in which the majesty of God shines forth specially, as man, heaven, etc. Unless God be added to the others, as by the field of God: He cites Sylvester for himself. V. Iuram. 1. quaest. 4. Nauar. in summa, cap. 12. Suarez lib. 1. cap. 13. num. 23. and others.

BUT D. Bonaventure in the place cited ad ultimum says one also swears by a stone, which he proves first from Matth. 5. where swearing by the earth is prohibited, which nevertheless is the lowest corporeal substance, in which the Divine goodness does not shine forth for a special reason. For it will be the same as to swear by stones, etc.

THEN he proves the same thing ex dist. 2. 2. quaest. 1. which see.

FROM these follow the solutions of many difficulties, which Sanchez reports from num. 13.

FIRST, it follows from the fourth Notando, that the oath is the same whether you say: By God it is so; and in God it is so; for Paul used this second mode of swearing, Rom. 9. I say the truth in Christ, I lie not. So D. Bonaventure and others cited there.

¶ SECOND, I deduce from the first Notando that, although these words sound: I vow to God a vow, yet by usage they are to be judged an oath. The same must be said of these: I promise God, although considered in themselves they are a vow, not an oath; which indeed I readily concede to Valasco consil. 99. num. 14. Say the same of these: as I have the Christian faith, both by usage; and because, in the opinion of D. Bonav. and others, being certain of the truth of faith, I have true faith: Otherwise it seems of these: as I am baptized, a religious, upright; because it seems that only the fidelity and truth are brought in as witness, which a Christian, a Religious, or an upright man is bound to profess. But these: God knows: God sees that it is so, some say are oaths, as D. Augustine epist. 89. and serm. 28. de verbis Apostoli. And it is reported cap. si peccatum. 22. quaest. 1. and D. Thom. loc. cit. ad 3.

BUT D. Bonaventure dist. cit. in dub. litt. holds that God must necessarily be invoked as witness, as knowing, in order that it be an oath. Wherefore if it be simply enunciated, it will not be an oath, as Sanchez notes num. 20. and this D. Augustine holds. So also teach Cajetanus ad 3. Tabiena under the word iurare, quaest. 32. Sorus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 1. Suarez lib. 1. de voto, cap. 13. num. 7. Less. lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 2. d. 2. Clauis Regia lib. 5. cap. 1. Pedeaza summa, praecepto 2. §. 1. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 1. Manuel 1. Tomo summae, cap. 191. Valencia d. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 2. § a V. Iuram. Petrus Ledesma 2. tom. tract. 11. cap. 1. whom Sanchez cites and follows num. 20. Therefore these words: God knows, sees, can be simple enunciations; but this must be determined by usage and the intention of the swearer. But these words: God is my witness, S. Bonaventure asserts loc. cit. to be an oath. So also D. Thomas, Sotus, Aragon, Manuel, cited just above, Sylvest. V. iuramentum against Sanchez num. 21. and Azorius loco citato, who say they are equivocal words, like the former ones: God knows, and so can be uttered both invocatively and enunciatively.

INDEED Sanchez confesses that these have a greater likeness of an oath, and are oaths by usage. So also Suarez eo cap. 13. num. 7. But Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 2. Less. cap. 42. dub. 2. num. 8. place among oaths these words: God be my witness. I call God to witness, I testify, which S. Bonaventure says are the same as the foregoing: God is my witness; for since he called must be a witness, that the witness be legitimate, by the very fact that God is said: He is witness, he is invoked.

¶ But these words: As God lives, are placed as an oath by D. Bonaventure loc. cit. whom Sylvester V. iuramentum follows, Sotius de iuramentorum abusu, cap. 4. and lib. 8. de iust. quaest. 1. art. 1. col. 6. Azor. Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 3. quaesito 1. Suarez eo cap. 13. n. 6. against Petrus de Ledesma loc. cit. n. 20. who places them among ambiguous words, as he also places these: God is truth, which is so in fact; in this Suarez favors him loco citato.

IT IS ALSO DEDUCED that there are oaths by the life of God, or of the Saints, by any members of Christ, or of the Saints. So S. Bonav. loc. cit. and art. 2. quaest. 2. But to swear by certain members of God absolutely, D. Bonav. proclaims blasphemous¹ ad 2. which he proves from the decree of Pope Pius, which is had in 22. quaest. 1. where it is said: If anyone shall have sworn by the hair of God, or by his head, etc. if he is in the ecclesiastical order, let him be deposed; if a layman, let him be anathematized. But they are blasphemies, as D. Bonaventure notes in the place cited, if it be believed that the members truly are in God; or that the members of Christ are to be divided, as for example by the head of Christ, by the life of Christ; for this is execratory, as if one said: May God, or Christ, be able to lose life, if it is not so.

SIMILARLY, to swear by the shame-parts of Christ, or of the Saints, is blasphemy, because although they had those members, it was not to contumely, as things to be vituperated; and this S. Bonaventure also indicates in the place cited, with whom very many Doctors agree in all these things, cited by Sanchez lib. 2. sum. cap. 32. from num. 25. to 30.

SIMILARLY, to swear by the life, or safety, or soul of ourselves, or of our neighbors living together, is a true oath, as S. Bonaventure notes 3. dist. 39. art. 2. quaest. 2. in corpore. Thus Joseph swore by the life and safety of Pharaoh, Genes. 42. The reason is, because God is brought in as author of life, of the soul, etc., which are noble things, in which the Divine majesty shines forth: this is clear even in the opinion of the adversaries whom I reported in Notando quinto. So teach Sylvester V. Iuram. 1. quaest. 5. Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 1. Pedraza summa, praecepto 2. §. 1. Azorius tract. 1. lib. 11. c. 3. quaest. 1. Petrus Ledelma 2. Tom. tract. 11. cap. 1. dub. 1. Suarez eo cap. 13. num. 22. against others whom Sanchez reports num. 29. who nevertheless, against Ledesma, says it is not execratory. But it will be the same, as I said above: In my soul, unless perhaps you wish to say only: I assert what I have within; for then it will not be an oath, as Sanchez notes.

SIMILARLY it will be an oath: My soul lives, or yours, as D. Bonaventure notes in that dub. litt. because God is brought in as author of life. So Sanchez num. 29. Sylvester V. Iurament. 1. quaest. 1. Azor loco cit. But these words by my conscience, or in my conscience; many assert to be an oath, whom Sanchez reports num. 30. But rather it seems to be said only recitatively: I assert what I feel in conscience. So Sanchez, Sotus de Iuramentorum abusu, cap. 41. Petrus Ledesm. 2. Tom. tract. 11. cap. 1. dub. 1. Suarez eo cap. 13. num. 22. Sayrus eo cap. 1. num. 13. Lessius eo dubio citato. It will be the same: My conscience is my witness; for conscience testifies of itself naturally, as D. Bonaventure notes in 2. dist. 39. quaest. 1. ad ultimum, and so it is marked: This my conscience dictates to me.

But those words: In my faith: A fe da quel che son; I think, with Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 79. num. 28., are not an oath, setting aside the peculiar intention of the speaker, who by those words would understand Divine faith; for the sense is: By my fidelity, the human truth by which human words are grounded in the ordinary mode of speaking, as Cajetan notes; and so neither will it be an oath: In truth it is so. So many, with Sanchez num. 34.

But the rude, confessing that they have sworn, are to be questioned as to what they said, as Bassaeus warns.

Quaestio II: Whether it is lawful to swear by GOD

Whether it be licit to swear by GOD.

VERY many heretics deny altogether that an Oath is licit. Among these are the Manichaeans, whom D. Bonav. reports here, and the Apostolici, according to D. Bernard homil. 66. in Cant. and the Cathari, by the testimony of Guido, and the Pauperes de Lugduno according to the same, and the Fraticelli, by the testimony of Turrecremata lib. 4. summae de Ecclesia part. 2. cap. 37. Vuiclephus error 43. from the condemned in the Council of Constance sess. 8. who said that one ought not to swear to confirm human contracts; so also the Anabaptists, according to Cochlaeus against the same, and Erasmus ad 5. Matthaei.

I ASSERT, however, that the Oath is licit.

It is PROVED from D. Bonav. first from 5. Matth. But thou shalt render to the Lord thy oaths. The same is had in Deuter. 6. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt swear by his name, and cap. 21. where the Magnates of the neighboring places, in which a man had been found slain, are commanded to purge themselves by oath, and Psalm. 62. All shall be praised who swear by him, and Heb. 6. where it is said: An oath is the end of all controversy, as S. Bonaventure rightly notes serm. 3. Decalogi, and loco cit. after D. Augustine serm. 28. de verbis Apostoli.

It is PROVED secondly from D. Bonaventure. That which has God and the Saints as exemplars is not sin: But the oath was instituted by God, and the Saints: Therefore. The minor is proved, Genes. 22. By myself I have sworn, saith the Lord. Psalm. 119. The Lord hath sworn. Heb. 6. He swore by himself. Besides, as often as in the old testament he said: I live, and in the new: Amen, amen, (which is frequent) God swore, as D. Jerome rightly notes also ad 16. Ezech. Chrysostomus homil. 11. in epistolam ad Heb. Oecumenius in cap. 3. ad Heb. and it is had cap. Etsi Christus, extra de iureiur.

SIMILARLY also the Saints swore: thus Abraham Genes. 21. Jacob and Laban Genes. 31. Moses and Jethro Exodi 2. David 1. Reg. 20. second, Reg. 1. the Apostle Rom. 1. second, Cor. 1. Philip. 1. and in other places, as S. Bonaventure reports serm. 3. Decal. and in 3. dist. 39. passim and in the Bibliis Pauperum, cap. 18. Therefore. It is the argument of D. Augustine loco cit. and lib. 19. cap. 23. contra Faustum, and of other Fathers.

It is PROVED thirdly. That by which honor is shown to God is licit: such is the oath: Therefore. The minor is proved by D. Bonaventure from the Gloss in 5. Matth. because while we bring God in as witness of the truth, we confess that God is the first infallible truth, on whom we lean, in whom we hope for the truth to be unfolded, whom we fear, whom we love, and therefore we remit ourselves wholly to him. These things Suarez pursues at length lib. 2. de religione, Tract. de iuramento, lib. 1. cap. 4. and 7.

It is PROVED fourthly from D. Bonaventure. That which has a holy object and end is licit; such is the oath, which has for object the Divine invocation, to unfold the truth, to promote good, to preserve fidelity, to promote peace, to curb malice, to settle controversies, duly to purge infamies, as is had in Heb. 6. Deuter. 21. cited above: Therefore. See D. Bonaventure.

D. Bonavent. also serm. 3. Decal. et loco cit. Gentil. On these arguments lean Suarez loco cit. Valencia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 3. Castro lib. 8. contra haeres. V. Iuram. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 2.

You will object first Matth. 5. Christ says: But I say to you, not to swear at all.

D. Bonaventure answers ad primum, and serm. 3. in Decalogum, that Christ did not prohibit the oath universally, but only prohibited that we should swear too easily in every affair. For therefore he did not say: I say to you not to swear at all, which would render a universal negative: but he says: I say to you not to swear at all, that is, not always, and so easily. For a negation placed before the sign of universality is equivalent to a particular negative. Thus: Not every man runs, is a particular negative: But the negation placed after makes it universally true, as: Every man does not run. Azor receives this response Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 3. quaestio 5.

Valencia loco citato, after Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. rejects this response, because the sentences of Sacred scripture are not to be measured by the rules of the Dialecticians, and it is certain that under the same form of speaking there stands in Scripture a universal prohibition, as Exodi 20. Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor any likeness.

¶ But what harm does this acute observation of the Seraphic Doctor do, that these men should attempt by no reason to overturn it utterly? Moreover I show it solid: For often, and ever more often, Scripture is expounded by these rules, as is everywhere seen in the SS. PP., especially Augustine; for the rules of Dialectic were handed down to find the truth of propositions; and in this case the text was translated word for word from the Greek, which sounds altogether thus, as is read in the text. But we know that the Greeks use these Aristotelic rules. So also we very often see sacred scripture using figures and Tropes.

Indeed the Example brought forward by Valencia is for us: For there not all images are prohibited universally, for God himself commands the Cherubim to be woven, others to be sculpted; but only those to which the honor of latria is paid, or by which it is paid to other creatures, as Valencia himself confesses 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 11. puncto 6. col 1461. where he says this is the irrefragable sense of all Catholics. Wherefore that is a particular negative proposition.

Other responses therefore having been rejected, Valencia answers from D. Thom. art. 2. ad 1. and D. Augustine lib. 19. contra Faustum, cap. 23. and lib. de mendacio, cap. 15. that Christ the Lord prohibited the facility, and accordingly the temerity, in swearing, with which the Pharisees abounded. But that this was Christ's Scope he proves from the beginning of the sermon: Unless your justice abound more than that of the scribes, and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.

Moreover, for this exposition he could bring forward also S. Bonaventure loco cit. ad secundum, and in corpore. But the reason which Valencia adds from his own store is a frivolous invention; for Christ sufficiently assigned the more abundant justice necessary in this respect, blunting their use of swearing by creatures, on this pretext, that swearing by them is not an oath. But that he rather prohibited too great facility in swearing, whence an oath could lack truth also through inconsideration; or prohibited that they should not swear in every light matter without necessity, as S. Bonaventure says in the former exposition, is not gathered even by a word. Add that in the former exposition of D. Bonaventure this second is contained, namely, that it is prohibited that at every third word, from any slight occasion and slight little cause, we precipitately and inconsiderately swear.

You will object secondly, Iacobi 5. But above all, my brethren, do not swear.

S. Bonaventure answers in corpore, and ad 2. from D. Augustine ad Publicolam, that it forbids the facility of the oath because of the danger of perjury from inconsideration of the truth. So Valencia also answers loco cit. The same response from D. Bonaventure ad secundum, he gives to the Fathers who frequently inveigh against swearers.

S. Bonaventure adds that the Divine James intends also to remove the excessive affection toward oaths; therefore he says: Do not, because of the danger which follows from the affection of frequenting the oath without the due conditions; for too great frequency is evil. From which, however, it does not follow that the oath is absolutely evil: As the habit of laughing and playing is evil; yet sometimes to play and laugh moderately is the virtue of Eutrapelia. Whence S. Bonaventure refutes that argument: Every act whose habit is evil, is itself evil; but the habit of swearing is evil: Therefore also the act simply. He adds therefore for this reason that the Oath is not among those goods to be sought for themselves, but that it is licit to use it in necessity alone, which he proves from D. Augustine de serm. Domini in monte, lib. 1. cap. 30. and it is reported, cap. Ita ergo, 22. quaest. 1. and D. Thom. art. 5. has the same.

You will object thirdly, that it is perverse to invoke God as witness of profane and human things as though it were licit.

S. Bonaventure answers serm. 3. Decal. from the Apostle Heb. 6. That this is judged right by God; for peace is a most weighty good, necessary unto salvation, but controversies having been settled, peace is preserved. Therefore the invocation of God is not ordered, as to the last end, to profane affairs, but the end of controversies is peace, which returns into God, and is terminated in him. In the same way answers Valencia loco cit. and Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 3. quaestio 5. and Iurisconsult. leg. 1. ff. de Iureiurando.

Quaestio IV: What is required for an Oath

What is required for an Oath.

The QUESTION concerns the requirements of the Divine natural law for the lawful manner of swearing. The constant sentiment of the Theologians is that three things are required, as it were companions, from Jeremiah 4, Thou shalt swear: The Lord liveth in truth, and in Judgment, and in justice. So St. Jerome expounds it, and it is cited caus. 22. quaest. 2. et cap. ultimo 22. quaest. 4. St. Thomas has this 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. St. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. et in dub. lit. where he observes that an Oath is compared to three things, namely to the one swearing, from whom it proceeds: to the thing, or matter of the oath, about which one swears: and to the cause for which, or through which one swears. In the one who swears (he says) judgment is required, that is, discretion, and a certain prudence necessary for every one swearing. These three things are required, says Valencia. The first is, that what we affirm with an oath cannot be sufficiently proved without the oath; for then it would be an abuse of the oath; for the institution of swearing ought to be referred to contingent and hidden facts alone, which need the proof of Divine testimony, before whose eyes all things are naked and open. The second is, that some pious cause for swearing be present. The third is, that the one about to swear diligently foresee whether what he is about to swear be true or false. But the second condition seems to be reduced to justice by St. Bonaventure. Yet I do not think it so, as I shall say below.

IN order, however, to the thing about which one swears, truth is required, at least according to the reasonable judgment of the one swearing. Yet Truth is required differently in an Assertory oath and in a Promissory one; for in a Promissory oath a twofold truth is required; one consists in the concordance of the promissory word and the interior intention of doing in its own time what is promised: the other truth is the concord also of the effect, or of the thing promised, with the promise, and this is properly the truth of a promissory oath. But the truth in an Assertory oath is the union, that is, the concord of the assertion with the deliberate mind, as I said.

IN order to the cause, through which, or about which one swears, justice is necessary, namely that the act of swearing be just, that is, not against the laws, and be done for a just cause. And indeed in a Promissory oath justice is required not only in the act; namely that it not harm one's neighbor, but also in the matter of the oath; namely that it be a just work, reducible to some virtue, even if indifferent in itself, as I shall say quaest. 13. But in an Assertory oath justice is not required on the part of the matter; for the crime of one's neighbor is often lawfully uncovered by an oath; but justice is required in the act of swearing alone, namely that it harm no one. St. Bonaventure indicates this, when he says that justice is required, that it be done for a just cause, not on account of a just cause, which pertains to the judgment of discretion; and therefore he says prudently also that justice is required in the cause about which, that is, in the matter of the oath, insofar as it formally has the character of the cause of the oath in the Promissory; and in the act, insofar as it is productive of the oath in the Assertory.

From the lack, therefore, of any of these circumstances the oath is rendered unlawful; for if justice is lacking, the one swearing makes God, as far as in him lies, a cooperator of evil, and the Oath is called iniquitous, or unjust. If truth is lacking, God is made either ignorant or wicked; for it is necessary that he who is the witness of falsehood be one or the other, and then the oath is called false, or perjury properly speaking. Finally, if judgment is lacking, irreverence is inflicted upon God, since he is dragged forth in testimony without cause, and the oath is called heedless and rash. See St. Bonaventure, especially sermone 3. in Decalogum.

From these is resolved the first question of St. Bonaventure, namely whether in every perjury there is a lie.

For there can be perjury because it was rashly uttered; yet not a lie, since the one swearing thought from inconsideration that it was true. St. Bonaventure proves this in corpore, from St. Augustine serm. 23. de verbis Apostoli. Therefore from the defect of the judgment of discretion there arises a perjury which is not formally a lie.

FURTHERMORE the defect of an oath can come from injustice, as if someone should swear to commit murder, rape, or another crime with the intention of fulfilling it; it will not be a lie, and yet it will be perjury broadly; It will nevertheless be a lie, if he swears not with the intention of fulfilling the promise. So St. Bonaventure loco cit.; for that is properly perjury which properly opposes the end of the oath, which is to establish truth. Therefore, if only justice is lacking, it will be perjury in the broad mode, as Sanchez notes cap. 8. num. 5.

The REASON, therefore, of a lie stands in the defect of Truth, if the falsehood uttered by voice is intended; but if you intend to say what is true, and say what is false from inconsideration, there will be rashness, as I said; for a lie formally ought to be directly voluntary; nevertheless a falsehood uttered also from rashness is in some way a lie, at least broadly.

From these you have that, taking a lie broadly, in every perjury, as opposed to an assertory oath, there is a lie; but if a lie be taken properly and strictly, it is not found in every promissory oath; nor in every assertory one. See Valencia quaest. 14. puncto 1. Tanner disp. 5. quaest. 8. dub. 1. Fagundez in 2. Praec. lib. 2. cap. 51. Clarum lib. 5.

The Holy Doctor CONCLUDES, therefore, from the testimony of Jeremiah and Jerome cited, that there is properly a lie from the violation of the second condition alone, that is, of Truth, but not from the violation of Judgment, or of Justice;

Of Justice; yet from each of them singly it comes about that one sins against the law of the oath, which requires those three conditions. So also in the opusc. declaratorio terminorum Theol.

Quaestio V: Whether, and how, it is a Sin to swear without Truth

Whether, and in what way, it is a Sin to swear without Truth.

I ASSERT first, that an assertory oath in any matter whatsoever, even a very small one, is a mortal sin if it be false, and it can only be excused from mortal sin by a defect of full deliberation. So D. Bonav. question 3, in the body, and to the third objection, whom Cajetan follows, summa, V. Periur. cap. 1. Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 3. Toletus lib. 4. summa, cap. 21. Couar. cap. variarum, cap. 1. n. 2. and de pactis 1. p. §. 1. Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. lib. 3. de Iur. cap. 4. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 4. num. 15. and 16. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 4. quaest. 1. Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 3. Sanchez in summa, lib. 3. cap. 4. num. 6. who says all the others follow him. Nor does any holy end excuse it, nor fear, as Suarez, Sayrus, Sotus, Toletus teach loco cit. Navar. summa, cap. 12. Sanchez loco cit. after D. Thom. art. 3. ad 1. D. Bonavent. quaest. 2. ad ultimum, which he proves, both from the canon in Decr. lib. 2. tit. 24. cap. 15. de Iureiur. Quod si quis periurat pro vita corporis servanda, quia magis dilexit corpus, quam animam, ieiunet tres quadragesimas; and because perjuring is intrinsically evil, so that it can never be rendered honorable. So Sanchez argues, num. 7. with others.

The FIRST part of the assertion is proved by D. Bonavent. quaest. 5. from D. Augustine serm. 28. and 30. de verbis Apostoli.

SECOND, it is proved by D. Bonav. argument 3, which Valencia, Sanchez, and the rest use: because to bring God as a witness to a falsehood is a great contempt of the Divine truth. For thus God is made either ignorant or wicked, as Bassaeus also urges, V. Iuram. 2. num. 3.

HENCE it follows, first, that the Jurists were not right — whom Angelus reports, V. Periurium, teaching that their opinion is probable — in saying that a false oath told in jest is venial. Rather it is a greater sin, because it is a greater contempt, as D. Bonavent. teaches, ad 3. D. Thom. quaest. 98. art. 3. ad secundum, whom the others follow, as adduced by Sanchez num. 7.

Yet S. Bonaventure and S. Thomas ADD that it can be excused from mortal sin if the oath is sworn in jest, which removes deliberation; for then the jest is not a grave contempt of the Divine truth.

It follows SECOND, that he equally sins mortally if he swears to a matter doubtful and uncertain to himself, because he exposes himself to the danger of speaking falsely and of perjuring himself; indeed he perjures himself by bringing God as a certain witness to an uncertain matter, as Sanchez argues, num. 8. from D. Bonavent. quaest. 1. ad 1. Then, because, as S. Bonaventure says, quaest. 2. ad 1. the Divine truth is rashly brought forward and contemned, while it is called as a certain witness to an uncertain thing.

S. Bonaventure ADDS another reason, loco citato, quaest. 1. ad 3. because that which is sworn is sworn from a culpably erroneous conscience, which in matters of morals does not excuse a wicked deed. See Bassaeus 3. num. 3.

For the truth of an assertory oath it is NOT necessary that the matter be so in fact, but it is sufficient, and necessary, that the matter, prudently considered, be so firmly judged. So S. Bonav. in the cited question, whom Azorius follows, Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 2. quaest. 5. Valentia disp. 6. q. 7. punct. 3. col. 5. Suarez in the same lib. 3. cap. 5. num. 3. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 42. dub. 4. num. 17. Sanchez loco cit. num. 10. Hence he infers, with Valencia col. 11. and D. Bonavent. q. cit. ad argumenta, that one who lightly judges that what he swears is true is not excused from perjury, since he does not sufficiently provide that he swears truly, and it follows as true only by accident. Therefore, even if it be true, he is not excused from mortal sin if the negligence in investigating the truth was grave; but if it was light, the fault will be light also, because such as is the cause, such is the effect, as S. Bonaventure hinted, quaest. 3. ad argumenta, and many affirm with Sanchez num. 14. and with Bassaeus loco cit.

But the OTHER part of the assertion, namely that assertory perjury is excused from mortal sin by indeliberation. It is proved by D. Bonav. quaest. 3. in the body, because the slipperiness of the tongue is great, which often can, through a slip, not follow the command of the will, and render the act non-human, or imperfectly such; Sanchez uses this reasoning at num. 15. So also think D. Thom. art. 3. citato, ad 2. Cajetan there, Sylvester V. Iurament. 2. quaest. 6. Navar. summa, cap. 12. Valencia, Suarez, and others cited above.

I ASSERT second, that a promissory oath, by defect of the concordance of the will to fulfill with the promise uttered — which is called truth of the present — is wicked. So D. Bonav. quaest. 3. body, and to the third, whom Sylvester follows, V. Iuram. quaest. 1. Armilla there, Cajetan 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad 1. and q. 98. art. 2. and 3. and in summa, under the word Periurium, c. 2. and 3. Sotus 8. de Iust. q. 1. art. 7. and quaest. 2. art. 1. and 3. Navar. in summa, cap. 12. Valencia loco cit. puncto 3. concl. 2. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 11. c. 4. q. 1. Suarez lib. 3. citato, c. 15. Clavis Regia lib. 5. cap. 4. n. 27. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. c. 42. dub. 4. num. 18. Sanchez loco citato, num. 16. Bassaeus n. 1.

It is PROVED by D. Bonav. argument 3, quaest. 3. and quaest. prima ad 1. because thus the Summa Truth is brought forward as a witness to a known falsehood, and so the gravest injury is inflicted upon God by swearing a lie.

HENCE it follows that one also sins mortally who swears to give a thing which he is in doubt whether he can fulfill: likewise to promise with a doubting mind of fulfilling, or to promise a thing which he believes he cannot fulfill. It is proved by D. Bonavent. quaest. 1. ad 1. because he certainly swears to an uncertain thing, and therefore lies, as I said above concerning the assertory oath, with Sanchez.

The GREATER difficulty is when the truth of the future is lacking, namely, in not giving the promised thing, which one swore with the intention of giving. And indeed, when the matter is grave, all maintain it to be mortal. The question is when it is light, which I shall treat in disp. de Periurio, q. 3.

The FIRST opinion is that it is always mortal. So Valencia disp. 6. q. 7. puncto 3. concl. 3. Gabriel in 3. dist. 39. q. 2. art. 2. concl. 4. Cajetan sum. v. Periurium, cap. 2. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 42. dub. 5. num. 25.. Bassaeus 4. num. 3. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 24. Reg. lib. 18. num. 9.

The SECOND opinion distinguishes: if the matter is wholly trifling, it is mortal; but if partial, it is only venial. So Cajetan 1. 2. q. 87. art. 7. dub. 1. Navar. summa, c. 12. n. 10. and c. 18. n. 4. Covarr. lib. 1. variarum lect. c. 1. Philiarc. Tom. 1. p. 2. lib. 3. c. 3. Corduba summa, q. 188. as it seems, Tabiena V. iurare, q. 10. n. 11. Armilla V. Iuram. n. 12. Pedraza praecepto 2. §. 5. But Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 4. expressly, with Sylvius q. 89. art. 3. See Diana part. 4. tract. 4. resol. 70. and part. 5. tract. 5. resol. 4.

The THIRD opinion is that it is only a venial fault, even if that matter be wholly trifling. So Sanchez lib. 3. summae, cap. 4. num. 23. D. Antoninus 1. part. tit. 10. cap. 4. Angelus V. Iuramentum, 5. num. 41. Sylvester V. iuramentum, 4. quaest. 1. Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 7. dub. 1. Navar. in summa, cap. 12. and cap. 18. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. fol. 1061. Azor Tom. 1. lib. 5. cap. 27. quaestio 2. and lib. 11. c. 5. quaestio 3. Enriquez lib. 5. de poenitentia, cap. 20. num. 4. Manuel 1. Tomo summae, c. 192. Peter Ledesma 2. Tom. tract. 11. c. 3. dub. 1. Tolet. lib. 4. cap. 21. Diana part. 2. tract. 15. resol. 25. dragging many along with him, saying the opposite opinion is the more severe one. Sà V. Iuram. num. 7. Suarez de Iurament. lib. 3. cap. 16. from num. 9. and they say it is probable — Alcozet summa, cap. 15. fol. 52. Corduba summa, q. 188. at the end. Tanner. indeed, disp. 5. quaest. 5. dub. 1. says, if the thing is very small, some tiny part of what was promised, the oath is judged to be kept; but if it is the whole thing, it is mortal, because God is called as a witness to a falsehood. Finally he says, as probable, that it is only venial. Bassaeus loco cit. says all are probable.

D. BONAVENTURE seems to me to be with the first opinion. First, because at art. 1. quaest. 3. he places therein the reason for mortality in perjury, because the Divine truth is rashly or falsely brought forward as a witness, and he excuses only by indeliberation. Then, serm. 3. in Decalogum, he places the end of the promissory oath in truth, though ordered to peace, etc. And in speculo animae he asserts universally that there is an obligation of fulfilling in the promissory oath; otherwise he would call the transgressor a transgressor of the precept absolutely, but he would not say that if he sinned only venially, because he holds that a venial sin is not against a precept.

Moreover, in prima parte Centil. sect. 12. after making the division of the oath into Assertory and Promissory, he defines Perjury to be a lie confirmed by oath. Or: Periurium est falsa, vel perversa iuratio. And he calls it perverse from a defect of justice; false from a defect of truth. Therefore he will be a perjurer who does not exhibit what he swore to promise.

I ASSERT that a promissory oath, with the exhibition of anything sworn of light matter failing, is mortal.

It is PROVED first by the argument of D. Bonavent. quaest. 3. That which is the cause that God is brought forward as a witness to falsehood inflicts a grave injury upon God: But the failure of the rendering of the thing, even a very small one sworn, is the cause that God has been brought forward as a witness to falsehood: Therefore. The major is proved from D. Bonavent. locis adductis, because this gravely obstructs the end of the oath, which is to bring faith to the divine testimony; and what gravely repugns the end of the oath is mortal, as Cajetan disputes, 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 2. and 3.

It is CONFIRMED. For to be the cause that God has testified a falsehood is just the same as to make God be judged to testify falsely: But to be the cause that God testifies a falsehood is certainly a grave injury: Therefore. Hence D. Bonavent. wisely condemns both in the same way, without distinction, from this one chapter, because the Divine truth is contemned. The minor is proved, because since man has brought the Lord into testimony to confirm himself in promises he is about to make, already, as much as lies in him, he renders the testimony of God false, not to say empty.

It is CONFIRMED by Valencia from D. Bonav. because Perjury is against the religion of the oath, whose essence is to take God as a witness to truth: Therefore, the truth being violated, the oath is gravely injured, even if the matter promised by oath is very small; for it makes no difference to the formal reason of the Divine truth whether it is brought forward as a false witness of this or that thing, great or small. Otherwise, if the matter is to be considered, the same will hold in the assertory oath.

It is CONFIRMED second; for only then does the gravity or levity of the matter pertain to the gravity of the sin, when it is the immediate object of its transgression, as is evident in theft, and indeed also in a vow, in which, because its reason stands in the exhibition of that matter made to God, therefore the gravity or levity of the transgression is taken from it, which stands in denying to God that that thing has been transferred to His service; but in an Oath that matter promised to a man is not the matter of an act of religion when the oath is fulfilled: Therefore neither is it the object of transgression. The consequence is proved, because virtue and sin, its contrary contrary to truth, are concerned with the same object. The antecedent is proved by Valencia from D. Thom.

BUT I prove this from D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 38. quaest. 1. at the end, for the promissory oath has as the object of its promise the thing promised to a man, whence that thing promised does not pertain to religion: But a vow regards as its object a thing as sacred to God, and therefore the act is specified by it, or is afterward recognized as specified. Likewise the end of the oath is to establish and confirm the truth by Divine testimony: but the end of a vow is to increase goodness by the exhibition of a new good work. Finally even the means is different, because one swears by God; but one vows by promise. Whence if anyone, while fulfilling what was sworn and promised, should wish to abstract from the circumstance of the divine glory, which redounds from the observance of the oath, and should wish only to execute the work promised, as such a work is, without doubt he would satisfy the oath; provided indeed he made true what he swore: Therefore the thing promised, or the promised act, does not pertain to the virtue of religion: Therefore neither will the opposite deformity be against religion, inasmuch as it is a negation of the exhibition of the thing, but only inasmuch as God has been brought forward as a false witness.

SANCHEZ n. 23. tries to enervate these arguments. He supposes, however, that failing a promise is not properly a lie, but infidelity; because he who promises something, if he has the mind of doing what he promises, does not lie, since he does not speak against what he holds in his mind. Then, because to lie is intrinsically evil, in such a way that it is never lawful: but not to fulfill a promise is sometimes lawful.

Moreover, although he renders the promise false, nevertheless he does not lie, and so neither does he bring God in as a witness to a falsehood, but he is unfaithful under Divine authority. Therefore, although the defect of primary truth, when he promises but his mind does not accord, is a lie; yet the defect of fulfillment is not a lie; and thus although in the former no smallness of matter can be allowed, yet it can be allowed in the latter.

It is CONFIRMED, because while a man is brought in as a witness to a promise, he intervenes only as a witness of a present contract: but with respect to execution he is not brought in as a witness, but in order to lend authority by way of suretyship: Therefore the same must be said of God. Finally, because in any matter gravely evil that is sworn, the first truth of the oath fails, it is always mortal, as if you swear to a homicide without the intention; but to fail a promise of a thing, even venially evil, is no fault: Therefore this truth is not to be considered independently of the matter promised, as happens in the former truth, but just as when the matter is evil there is no sin, so it will be only venial when the matter is licit but light.

YET these reasons are frivolous; for I do not say that he lied in the first truth, if he had the mind of promising; but I say that he lies, while the sworn promise still stands virtually, and he inwardly intends not to fulfill it, and for this concordance he brought God in as a witness; for he did not bring God in as a witness that he then said in his mind what he spoke, but that he would accord in deed, or by the exhibition of the thing, with what was promised; and therefore he brought God in as a witness that he would preserve that conformity of mind and promise up to the exhibition of the thing; and therefore he is a liar as often as in his mind he discordes from the promise; and therefore that malice, which will never be licit, always endures. Nor indeed ought the excision from lying be made, as Sanchez wrongly takes it, alleging a difference, because lying is never lawful; but failing a promise is often lawful: for he ought to take that defect of execution as grounded in the lie of perjury, and thus it will never be lawful, just as lying itself is not lawful.

But what he says of the man who assists as a witness to a contract, and surety of execution, is not to the point, for God, as supreme Lord and searcher of hearts, is brought in as a witness to that truth which in the accord of mind with voice is to endure up to the exhibition, etc.; therefore another contracts this security, and God does not intervene as one from whom the creditor could satisfy himself in the case where the debtor fails, but only that He may be a witness; for it is truly a promissory oath, as all confess. Moreover it is defined by all as Vocatio Dei in testem, as Sanchez confesses lib. 3. cap. 1.

BUT, even should God assist as surety by His authority, still the injury is grave, because whatever authority in the least truth, even materially opposed to fidelity, is taken from God, the reason of Deity is taken away, and He is rendered false.

But what he says of matter gravely evil, which if deceitfully promised makes perjury; but that if evil light matter in the enunciation is not fulfilled, there is no sin — is not to the point; he ought to have compared both under the same reason; and then I say: just as it is no sin not to fulfill an act venially evil that was sworn, so much less to fulfill an act gravely evil.

Nor ought he to pass from an evil act to a good act; therefore it is no sin to fail a promise of a thing venially evil, because this is not legitimate matter of an oath, and therefore it did not obligate at the outset; indeed an injury was inflicted upon God by that oath, because justice is lacking, as I shall say quaest. 6. But a good thing, which we now have at hand, is legitimate matter of an oath; and therefore just as from the truth in the promise it is owed, so also in the exhibition, while that obligation of the accord of intention with the promise endures up to the exhibition of the thing. Therefore, even if he repents having invoked God as a witness, he is still guilty, because the invocation already past perseveres, which cannot not have been.

Moreover, our reasons are not on that account shaken, because he was bound to prove that that exhibition of the matter, not only as it constitutes the act, but as it regards that matter, is the object of religion, so that from thence he might prove that the levity or gravity of the matter increases or diminishes the fault of the violated promise. Note, however, that some very small things are sworn which excuse, as when a Father swears to punish his son; for these things are sworn for terror, or from an inordinate affection of vengeance. See Valencia.

From these things, therefore, it is also deduced that he who swears to do many very small things daily for men sins mortally every day by violating the promise; but not so he who vows very small things daily, because the vow regards that matter as the object of religion. Therefore that very small matter will make a small defect against religion.

Quaestio VI: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH made without justice

Whether, and in what way, an OATH made without justice is a sin.

I ASSERT first, that if the thing promised is gravely evil and deadly, the oath will be mortal against religion from a defect of justice, against the second precept of the Decalogue, besides the mortal sin of the purpose of fornicating, killing, and the like. So teach D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 1. argumento secundo fundamenti, whom they commonly follow, as Sanchez cap. 4. num. 26. Valencia puncto 3. citato, Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 19. a num. 9.; for it is a grave injury to God to invoke Him as a witness to the perpetration of a crime against His law; for it is a great contempt of the Divine majesty, and perjury from a defect of justice, as S. Bonavent. says loco citato, and after him the rest.

It will be mortal, however, EVEN IF the intention of fulfilling is not present, because God is brought in as a witness to a falsehood; yet it will be a single sin: but when the mind of fulfilling is present, it will be twofold, namely, perjury from injustice, and the purpose of sinning. So Navar. summa, cap. 12. num. 13.

I ASSERT second, that one who swears to commit a venial fault, with the intention of fulfilling, sins mortally from a defect of justice, and thus it will be a twofold sin; so Suarez lib. 3. cap. 4. Sanchez num. 33. against Bassaeus 5. num. 3. and others there.

It is PROVED, because therefore one who swears to sin mortally sins deadly, because he makes, as far as in him lies, God a cooperator of that deadly thing; but to make God guilty even of a venial fault is a grave offense contending with the Deity: Therefore.

Sanchez num. 28. OBJECTS, because it is not a grave irreverence to God.

It is ANSWERED from our argument, that it is a grave offense to make God cooperate in a venial fault, for this implies a contradiction with the Deity; nor could God sin venially except by losing the Deity, which is said to be the perfection of infinite goodness. So Valencia judges it probable.

HENCE also, it will be mortal to fulfill, by reason of the oath, a thing venially culpable. The reason is the same, because God is asserted to hold the oath as ratified and just. So Hugo holds, as reported by Angelus V. Iuram. 5. who laughs with Soto lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. articulo 7.

I ASSERT third. If anyone swears not to observe some counsel, e.g. to enter religion, it is probably only venial. So Sanchez cap. 4. num. 30. Valencia loco cit. and others. Although others say it is mortal, among whom is Sylvester loco cit. q. 7. whom I wonder asserted that to observe a sworn venial thing is only venial: and to commit a venial sin upon oath is only venial. So V. Iuram. 4. q. 1. For it is worse to swear a venial sin, and to observe it by oath, since these render God, as far as in them lies, a cooperator of evil.

I ASSERT fourth, that to swear an indifferent thing is venial, from a defect of justice, because it is not apt matter for an oath. So commonly, with Sanchez num. 31.

I ASSERT fifth, that a defect of justice exists also in an assertory oath, as if anyone uncovers, and confirms by oath, the sin of someone undeservedly, or boasts of himself concerning some mortal sin. So Sotus lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 3. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. Peter Ledesma Tomo 1. summae, Tract. 11. cap. 2. dub. 4. Toletus lib. 4. summae, cap. 20. num. 10. and it seems so to D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 39. dub. 1. where: He gravely requires justice in every oath, that it be done for a just cause, which D. Thom. also confesses 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. ad 2. and there Cajetan, Valencia puncto 3. col. 5. Suarez lib. 1. de Iurament. cap. 3. num. 6. and lib. 3. cap. 2. num. 5. and cap. 12. num. 7. Sanchez loco citato, num. 33. Yet these two last hold that a defect of justice in an assertory oath is only venial, because it is not opposed to the end of the oath, nor does it make God the witness of a lie, but of a wicked thing, which of itself is not a grave injury. Likewise, because it is accidental to the testification of truth, in which the reason of the oath is situated, to narrate the truth with sinning or without sinning. Therefore they conclude that an oath is mortal only then, when it is assumed as an instrument of that sin, for instance, that the infamy of one's neighbor become more probable, asserted by that assertory oath; because it is a grave injury done to God.

But who does not see that all these things are confirmed by oath, that they may be rendered more certain? For why would anyone swear that he perpetrated that deed, for instance with that woman, that he committed that crime, unless to persuade it? Therefore, since this is the ordinary end of such swearing, they are to be condemned.

But let us grant that it is sworn only so that those crimes are asserted simply by oath, since God is invoked as a witness of a gravely evil thing, will it not be a grave injury to God? For if to bring God in as a witness to a thing to be done against His law is mortal, as Sanchez confesses num. 26. why will it not be mortal to bring God in as a witness to a mortal thing already perpetrated, since a grave offense to God intervenes here also? Nor does Sanchez answer sufficiently, that that oath is accidental to the deed; for against him is, first, that in the promissory oath also it is accidental, for one can swear without the intention of not doing, and yet whether the mind of fulfilling be present or not, the oath will be mortal, as Sanchez teaches num. 34.

Moreover, the assertory oath falls upon a past crime just as the promissory upon the future.

Quaestio VII: Whether, and what sin, is an OATH lacking judgment

Whether, and in what way, an OATH lacking judgment is a sin.

I assert first, that an oath lacking judgment as to the necessary cause of swearing, and reverence, is judged venial. So Valencia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaestio 7. puncto 3. Suarez lib. 3. cap. 12. Sayrus eodem cap. n. 32. Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 42. dub. 3. num. 17. D. Antonin. 2. part. tit. 10. cap. 7. §. 1. Angel. V. iuram. 3. num. 7. Sylvester 2. quaest. 8. eodem titulo, Navar. sum. cap. 12. Sanchez cap. 4. num. 35. after D. Bonavent. art. 1. q. 3. For it does not seem a grave injury.

I assert second, that if the judgment of due inquiry, gravely omitted, is lacking, it is mortal: So S. Bonavent. loco cit. Sanchez, and Valencia, and the rest, in the places adduced.

It is proved by Valencia loco cit. and Sanchez num. 14. from D. Bonavent. dist. 39. quaest. 1. ad argumenta, and quaest. 3. ad ultimum, because he exposes himself to the danger of bringing God in as a witness to falsehood.

Sanchez notes, however, num. 36. that these are not perjuries in a confession necessarily to be distinguished — whether he lied, or swore in doubt, or intending not to fulfill; for it is enough to say: I swore falsely so many times.

He notes also num. 38. that it is worse to swear what is true by false gods, than mendaciously by the true God, because the former pertains to Idolatry and blasphemy, which is worse than perjury, as D. Thom. testifies prima secundae, quaest. 13. art. 3. ad 2. So holds Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 3. concl. 1. Covarr. de pactis, p. p. §. 1. num. 10. Suarez cap. 3. num. 6. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 3. num. 18. Azor tract. 1. lib. 11. c. 12. quaestio 12. Whence D. Augustine epist. 154. and it is reported cap. movet, 22. quaest. 1. signifying the opposite is meant, as Azor well explains loco citat. quaestio 12. when a Christian swears by false gods, while he judges them false with the sole intention of deceiving; for he, if he does not keep faith, indeed deceives, but is not a perjurer: but one who swears falsely is a perjurer, and thus sins gravely. Or as Sotus says, dic, it is graver in the reason of perjury; for to swear falsely by the true God is properly perjury, for a falsehood is said; but by false gods, it is secundum quid, while truth is said, as D. Thom. testifies 1. 2. quaest. 98. art. 1. ad 2. Sanchez has this from D. Bonavent. in 3. dist. 39. dub. list. num. 6. and lib 3. Phar. cap. 3. at the end, where he reports the testimony of D. August. epist. 154. ad Public. Tom. 2. and gives the reason.

Quaestio VIII: Whether, and how, a custom of swearing is evil

Whether, and how, the habit of swearing is evil.

The habit of swearing is not in itself a sin distinct from the very acts of swearing that are frequent. For it is the very act frequently repeated, as Aristotle teaches in 2 Ethics; but the effect of the acts, which is a certain habit of swearing, resulting from frequently repeated acts, inclines to evil, and so far is vicious; nevertheless it cannot be a sin, which ought to be found in the acts. So Soto lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 2. art. 3. concl. 7. Suarez lib. 3. cap. 6. Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 5. num. 4. Yet that habit of swearing can be a proximate occasion of mortal sins, and for that reason can place one in a state of mortal sin. The question, therefore, is when this happens.

¶ The first opinion is that any habit whatsoever of swearing, even if it is not one of lying under oath, makes one guilty of mortal sin. So Soto de cavendo iuramentorum abusu, cap. 11. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 9. num. 8. where he says that such persons are not to be absolved unless they propose to root out the habit.

The second opinion is that a habit of swearing joined to a habit of lying without an oath places one in danger in this state, and so far is one mortally wounded. So Gregory of Valencia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 3. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo summae, tract. 11. cap. 5. dub. 5. dicto 2.

The third opinion is that such a habit of swearing is [evil] when one swears with attention to the oath, but not to the truth or falsity of the thing sworn; but otherwise when one attends to neither, and the emission of the oath outruns the full attention of reason. So Azorius Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 3. quaestio 3. and Bassaeus V. Iuramentum 4.

The fourth opinion is that of Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 5. a num. 9. where he says five things. First, that a habit of swearing with due attention to the truth of the thing sworn does not place one in a state of mortal sin; and in this part he has as assertors Scotus 3. dist. 39. quaest. unic. art. 1. Gabriel quaest. 2. art. 1. notab. 2. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 5. Medina lib. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 4. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 25. et cap. 42. SECOND, Suarez says that neither a habit of lying joined to a habit of swearing what is true is mortal. For this he also cites Suarez lo. co citato, num. 6.

THIRD, he says that a habit of swearing indifferently, whether what is true or what is false, is mortal. He also cites Suarez cap. 6. num. 6. et 8. Petrus Ledesm. 2. Tomo, tract. 11. cap. 5. dub. 4. Valentia loco cit. Vega loco citato.

FOURTH, he says that when there is a habit of swearing inattentively regarding the truth of the thing sworn, it is mortal. He also cites Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. dub. ultimo, Suarez loco cit. num. 9. Petrus Ledesma cap. 5. dub. 4. Azorius Tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 3. quaestio 3.

FIFTH, the same must be said when the habit is of swearing without attention, whether one swears or not, against the third opinion; and he also cites Suarez num. 8.

AS REGARDS St. Bonaventure, in the following assertions I shall state what he thought about this matter.

I ASSERT first, that the habit of swearing is then lethal when it is a proximate occasion of mortal sin, namely, of swearing what is false, or rash, according to what was said in the preceding question.

It is PROVED from St. Bonaventure in 3. dist. 39. quaest. 3. in fine, and serm. 3. in Decal. from that text of Ecclesiasticus 23: Let thy mouth be not accustomed to swearing, for there are many falls in it. A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity.

HENCE it follows that not every habit whatsoever of swearing is of this kind, for instance swearing what is true out of slight necessity, or small reverence. For these are habits evil only venially. It is proved from Scotus. For a habit draws its whole malice from the acts from which it is generated; and so it cannot be worse than the acts themselves. If, therefore, the acts are venial, such also will be the habit.

I ASSERT next, that a habit of swearing, through inattention to a known false matter, in such a way that one deliberates only about the simple lie, but the oath slips out besides, is mortal: because that inattention, once known and foreseen, becomes voluntary in whatever act; and so far it is mortal perjury. And this is what St. Bonaventure says quaest. 3. in corpore: if one deliberates about the saying only, and not about the oath added over it, it can be venial, but it comes very near to the mortal; that is, if one deliberates only to speak a lie in his saying, not attending that he confirms it by an oath, it can be venial, namely a simple lie; yet it can become mortal, if that heedless slip of an oath passes into a habit that is known, or is foreseen.

It is PROVED, because inattention, whether regarding the oath, or regarding the truth, is a grave defect of judgment, as we said in question 7, and it exposes one to the danger of perjury, which according to St. Bonaventure in the place there cited, and others, is a grave injury done to God.

THEREFORE if a habit involves the danger of grave lapses against the oath, according to what was said in questions five and the following, it will also be a habit gravely evil. Because such a habit is such as are the acts produced by it: but if the acts produced, or resulting from it, are venial from the defect of some reverence, it will itself also be lightly evil, as St. Bonaventure indicates quaest. 3. ad 3.

HENCE it follows that one is bound to root out a habit that is the cause of perjury; otherwise one sins by the sin of omission. Therefore absolution must be denied to him if he does not propose to extirpate a habit gravely evil; not so the man who abounds in a light habit, who is improperly a perjurer, with judgment failing, or justice failing but lightly.

Quaestio IX: When precisely one swearing incautiously from custom sins mortally

When one who swears rashly out of habit sins mortally.

IT IS ASKED here whether rash oaths, emitted out of habit without full investigation of the truth, are mortal.

IT IS ASSUMED, moreover, that oaths of this kind arise from a habit that has not been retracted; for if you have the resolve to uproot it, the oaths are not judged to remain formally out of habit, but only materially, and involuntarily, and hence it matters nothing for culpability. So notes Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 5. Suarez lib. 3. de Iuram. cap. 6. num. 8. Manuel primo Tomo summae, cap. 191. n. 12. et others with Bassaeus V. Iur. 4.

THE FIRST opinion says that such oaths are lethal, because, if they are false, they are perjuries of themselves; and if they are true, this is still only per accidens; and as far as the swearer's side is concerned, they were undertaken with the danger of falsity. So Francis, and Didacus Victoria, in certain rules of the confraternity of the name of Jesus, Alcozer cap. 15. fol. 50. Medina lib. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 4. Manuel primo Tomo summae, cap. 191. num. 11. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo, tract. 11. cap. 3. dub. 4. dicto 2. Lopez, citing Ioannes de Penna p. p. Instruct. cap. 42. Raphael de Turri 2. 2. quaest. 88. art 3. dub. 3. Tannetus hic, num. 10. et disput. 1. quaest. 8. dub. 7. Azorius tract. 1. lib. 11. cap. 3. quaest. 3. et others cited by Diana; Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 3. Navar. summae, cap. 12. num. 6. Valentia 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 3. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 5. num. 10. Armilla V. Periurium, ubi et Caietanus, et Angles flor. 2. part. quaest. unica de voto, art. 1. diffic. 3.

THE SECOND opinion is that oaths of this kind, by force of habit, are not mortal. So Maior 3. dist. 39. quaest. 4. Scotus there quaest. unic. art. 1. Pitigianus there art. 7. Angel. V. Iuram. 3. Sylvest. V. blas. quaest. 4. Antonin. p. p. tract. 10. Sotus de abusu iuram. cap. 12. Suarez lib. 3. cap. 7. de Iuram. Reginald. tract. 2. lib. 18. cap. 6. sect. 3. num. 85. Sanchez sum. Tom. 1. lib. 3. cap. 5. num. 28. Ioan. Sancius select. dub. 10. who bring forward D. Thom. quaest. 98. art. 3. ad 2. Durandus 3. dist. 39 q. 5. Richardus there art. 3. quaest. 2. Paludanus quaest. 2. art. 1. Rubio quaest. 1. art. 2. et others, whom Diana heaps up part. 3. tract. 5. miscell. resol. 62. ubi ait, a grave burden falls, not only on penitents, but also on confessors of the opposite opinion. And they assert the same entirely also of one who blasphemes out of habit. For my part I would not refuse this, if some displeasure at least had preceded, as with Layman lib. 5. tract. 1. cap. 3. Tanner in the place cited, and Bassaeus above.

AS FOR D. Bonaventure, first, he speaks thus in the place cited: There is a certain kind of oath that is not deliberate, as when one swears in common speech, not attending to whom he invokes, nor to what, but out of a certain habit; thus it is not a mortal sin but venial, because of this, that the tongue is set on slippery ground. So the Holy Doctor in the body of that question. But in the reply to the third, where the number 24 is marked, he says: When someone swears out of a certain habit, or in jest, not deliberating about the excellence of the truth in testimony of the one invoked, he does not properly contemn, because there it is rather a due omission of honor, and a certain negligence, than the infliction of insult.

WHENCE D. Bonaventure seems to intend only that one is then excused from mortal sin by reason of habit, when one swears because of a slipperiness partly natural, partly contracted, and of such a kind that it cannot morally be retained. Thus he also seems to understand dist. 28. quaest. 3. in corpore, where he explains the slipperiness of the tongue by that saying of D. James 3: He who offends not in word, the same is a perfect man. Thus D. Thomas also seems, who says: He who swears falsely from a slip of the tongue, if he does not advert to it, does not seem to have the intention of swearing, and therefore is excused from the crime of perjury. Thus both seem to be for the first opinion.

THEREFORE I ASSERT with the first opinion that such oaths are mortal.

IT IS PROVED first from D. Bonaventure lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 3. in fine from D. Augustine lib. contra mendacium, cap. 15. where he says: I say to you, do not swear at all, lest by swearing once, one comes to facility in swearing, from facility to habit, and from habit falls into perjury.

THE LIKE things are had from D. Chrysostom homil. 14. ad populum, where he says: it is evident that one who swears much will of necessity fall into perjury; D. Isidore lib. 10. Synon. cap. 10. where he says: Assiduity in swearing makes perjury, and lib. 2. de summo bono, cap. 31. While we make use of the habit of swearing, we incur the crime of perjury. D. Bernard Libro de modo bene vivendi serm. 31. where he says: The use of swearing leads a man to perjury.

FINALLY D. Bonaventure, at the end of the question cited, appends that of Ecclesiasticus 23: Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it are many falls.

IT IS PROVED secondly. Those sins that are willed in their cause are infected with their natural malice, if they have been foreseen, or ought to have been foreseen: and their malice is increased even by the subsequent evils; as I showed in the first part of the second part concerning sins committed in drunkenness, Tract. 3. disput. 1. quaest. ultima: but willed perjuries are in a habit which the swearer does not will to uproot: Therefore they have the malice of their perjury, which is a sin mortal by genus. The minor is proved, because he voluntarily deprives himself of due discretion, and of the necessary examination and scrutiny of the truth, and so exposes himself to the danger of perjury; and consequently, even if he says the truth, he is still guilty of perjury, according to the rules handed down with Sanchez quaest. 7.

SANCHEZ num. 28. answers our argument, and from it erects his own reason; for these rash oaths are not directly voluntary, as is clear, because that inadvertence was invincible; for if it were vincibilis, it would by no means excuse even him who swears not out of habit, which is false; nor are they voluntary indirectly, for what is indirectly willed he seeks, so that one can and is bound to avoid it: but at the time at which one swears inadvertently, he cannot avoid it.

THEN, sins arising from ignorance culpable at the beginning, and foreseen in their cause, as happens in the foreseen sins of drunkards, are affected with no new malice, but are denominated evil by sole extrinsic denomination from their cause. So also these inconsiderate oaths have malice only in their own cause.

BUT these do not solve the problem; for that inadvertence in customary swearing is vincibilis, being foreseen, and can be removed together with the habit itself itself, and so it draws from it new malice, as we said of the sins of drunkards, and proved at length in the first part of the second part, in the place adduced. Therefore he who is accustomed to swear thus, and does not care to uproot that habit of swearing inadvertently, wills that inadvertence; and the perjury that follows from it; as the drunkard wills the loss of the use of reason, and fornication, blasphemies, and other things committed inconsiderately in it, which, since they were foreseen, or ought to have been foreseen, add new malice to drunkenness, as I said in the place cited. And so it follows that it is a mortal sin, if the willed habit of swearing be the whole cause, or gravely influencing, while, adverting to the habit, he does not try to uproot it, does not grieve, does not resolve to abstain. Indeed, that I may grant the opposite opinion for the quiet of conscience, I shall admit it in the dispute on Perjury, quaest. 3.

Quaestio X: What sin it is to swear dolosely

He NOTES first, from D. Bonaventure in the body, and the end of the question, that one swears deceitfully in two ways. First, when the mind does not accord with the words of the oath. Secondly, when they do not accord with the will of him to whom the oath is given, in that we elude by amphibologies, or by windings of words, although the words and the mind of the swearer accord among themselves.

He NOTES secondly, that the mind is wanting in three ways. First, if you swear with the mind of swearing, and not of giving, and consequently also not of promising; for if you have the mind of promising, you have also the mind of giving, as is gathered from D. Bonaventure, who constituted a single defect from these two. And Valentia notes this disput. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4. col. 1415. against Sotus lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 7. Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 3. et cap. 10. num. 2. who distinguish these two: to have the mind of promising, but not of fulfilling; and the mind of promising and of fulfilling. And indeed Sanchez cap. 10. num. 5. places this distinction also as the mind of D. Bonaventure art. 3. quaest. 2. because he says, the Church does not compel oaths extorted by fear, because it presumes that they were emitted with the mind of escaping danger, not of fulfilling the oath. But Sanchez does not show this for that reason, because the Holy Doctor presupposes it, absque animo even of obligating himself; nevertheless I judge this mode possible, which is the same according to what was handed down in the preceding question.

The SECOND mode is, if the mind of swearing is absent. The third, if the mind of obligating oneself is absent, even if you wish to swear; yet this mode, which Sanchez posits, suffers some difficulty; for he who wishes to undergo an oath, and knowingly wills it, knowing its bond, seems necessarily to will also the consequence of the bond of obligation. That such a one does not swear, Azor teaches p. p. lib. 11. cap. 4. quaestio 2. Sanchez lib. 5. cap. 11. num. 8. Sylvius quaest. 89. art. 7. quaestio 3. cap. 1. Sylvester V. Iuram. 4. quaestio 20. Bonacina de Iuram. puncto 7. nor does Bassaeus refuse it V. Iuram. 2. num. 2.

Valentia adds a FOURTH mode, when the swearer has neither the mind of swearing, nor of obligating himself by the oath. But this mode too is superfluous, for by the very fact that he does not swear, nor obligates himself by the oath; the will excluding swearing excludes also obligating oneself, which is the effect of the oath.

The FIRST mode indeed makes perjury mortal by the consent of all. So D. Bonaventure in the body, and others cited by Sanchez cap. 4. num. 16. for he truly deceitfully brings forward God as witness.

AS FOR the second mode, some judge it mortal. So Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. Armilla V. Periurium, num. 3. Couar. de pactis 1. part. §. 5.

The SECOND opinion is that to utter words sounding an oath, with the mind of not swearing, is then mortal, when that oath concerns false matter, whether of the present, or of the future: Next, if it concerns true matter, and the oath is legitimately required, whether by a Judge, or by a contracting party; but if it concerns true matter, yet is not legitimately required, it is not, he says, mortal, but a simple lie. So Sotus lib. 8. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 7. ad 4. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad 4. concl. 6. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tom. tract. 11. cap. 3. dub. 6. Lessius lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. et 43. Suarez tom. 2. de religione Tract. de iuram. lib. 3. cap. 17. and although Sotus speaks of one compelled to swear, yet his reason proves it of everyone not obligated to swear.

The THIRD opinion is that of Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4. toward the end; where, in the case in which one is not obligated to swear, but the oath is unreasonably extorted, he thus distinguishes: If the swearer speaks the truth, then he sins only venially, when he wills to signify that he has the mind of swearing; because it is a lie not pernicious, as the Authors of the second opinion also say; otherwise if he does not will to signify this, but something else disparate; then there is no fault. But if he swears falsely, and wills those external words of the oath to be referred to ratifying false matter, it is mortal. This the Authors of the first opinion teach: but if he does not refer those words to false matter, nor can anyone think this, and take scandal from it; but only uses his right, usurping those words to signify something true in his mind; or he usurps them only materially, willing to confirm nothing by them; it will be only venial. Indeed Sanchez num. 10., following Valentia, adds that it is not even venial, which Soto also holds, when one unjustly compelled usurps those words materially.

AS FOR D. Bonaventure, he seems in quaest. 1. art. 3. to speak only of one truly swearing, without the mind of obligating himself; yet concerning this too he seems to infer consequently, that it is not indeed a true oath, yet it is lethal; for by the very fact that there is the mind of not obligating oneself, there is also present the mind of swearing not truly, but with the mouth only, as Sanchez notes num. 7. cap. 4. Therefore the same seems to be said of both. And quaest. 2. he seems to infer it also of him who is compelled to swear: But in Distinction 38. quaest. 3. in corpore he teaches that even a simple lie, by reason of scandal, can become mortal; much more if it appear confirmed by an oath. Finally, in d. 39. quaest. 3. he excuses one who professes oaths from sole invincible incaution from falsity.

THUS therefore, if the swearer speaks the truth, it will be only venial, unless it is justly required; for then he is bound to swear, and to swear truly, as D. Bonaventure teaches loc. cit. in corpore, so that the sole external utterance of what is false before a judge renders one infamous, as is had in 6. quaest. 1. cap. infames, and D. Thomas also reports it quaest. 98. art. 3. argumento 3. The same is to be said in legitimate contracts. But if he swear falsely, it will be mortal. And thus D. Bonaventure seems to approach the second opinion, and in some degree the last opinion.

I ASSERT first, that words sounding an oath, uttered without the mind of swearing, if they are true (and are not justly required), are a venial fault.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure loc. cit. quaest. 3. in the last argument, because it is only a superfluous invocation of the Divine name, which is not of itself mortal. Nor is there contempt of the Divine testimony, since God does not then require that honor. For thus it would be mortal, if I were to feign saying a prayer of supererogation, as Sanchez notes num. 9. Nor is any loss brought to the end of the oath, as the authors of the first opinion cry out, because the obligation is observed for the due times of human contracts, of lawsuits, and of decrees, as I said.

I ASSERT secondly, that such words are mortal, when the oath is legitimately required.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure in the body, because then justice is gravely injured, and the offense of this oath is occasioned.

I ASSERT thirdly, that if the words of the oath fall upon false matter, and cannot be saved by equivocation, they are mortal, since they are ordered to confirming that falsity.

It is CONFIRMED by the Doctors of the first opinion: For that external worship of latria, which sounds an oath, is exhibited to undue matter, namely a false thing. And so it is mortal, just as to exhibit the external worship of latria to idols.

The SAME is proved also of one compelled to swear; for, as D. Bonaventure teaches art. 3. quaest. 2. ad 3. Those things that are evil of themselves cannot become good through fear. For concerning these the Holy Doctor says the Divine precept must be observed: Fear ye not them that kill the body. But rather fear him that can cast both body and soul into hell.

AS FOR the third mode indeed, in which one swears, but deceitfully, without the mind of obligating himself: First, the Abbot cap. si vero, num. 10. holds, when the oath is unjustly extorted, that perhaps in a perfect man it is a venial fault; but in the imperfect, none. But of one swearing of himself, he says nothing. But others then excuse the compelled one when he adds some condition by which the oath be true, as one swearing to a robber that he will give the money (understanding) if he ought.

The COMMON opinion is that in every event it is mortal. So Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. ad 4. D. Antonin. 2 part. tit. 10. cap. 6. casu 5. Armilla verb. Iuram. num. 14. et V. Periurium, num. 3. Tabiena V. Iurare, quaest. 11. num. 12. Scotus in 3. d. 39. quaest. unica, art. 3. Nauarr. summa, cap. 12. Couarr. de pactis, p. p. §. 5. num. 3. et 4. Decret. 2. part. cap. 3. §. 5. num. 3. Alcozia sum. cap. 15. fol. 51. Salzedo additione ad regulam, num. 584. Bernardus Diaz, Aragon. 2 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. Less. lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. dub. 8. num. 42. Suarez de relig. Tract. de Iuramento, lib. 3. cap. 17. num. 10.

OTHERS thus distinguish: If the oath is reasonably required, it is venial; but if unreasonably, and the swearer does not intend to signify to the other that he wills to obligate himself by that oath, there is no sin; but if he wills to signify it, it is venial. So Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4.

Sanchez ADDS num. 6. that he must necessarily be understood, when in that oath there is present the mind of fulfilling the thing promised by the oath (although he himself does not explain it), since if that mind were wanting, he must necessarily say it is a mortal perjury, since he himself holds it to be a true oath, and as such to obligate.

BUT Sanchez did not see that Valentia d. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4. col. 1415. and quaest. 6. puncto 1. col. 1330. asserts these to be so connected, that if the mind of doing is wanting, the mind of promising is also wanting; and conversely it follows, If he has the mind of not promising, and of obligating himself by the oath, he does not have the mind of fulfilling the thing by the force of that oath. But what someone might say: I swear, but although I do not will to be obligated by this oath, I will give this; such a restriction is per accidens to the oath.

Therefore we, with D. Bonaventure, are bound to assert the same that we asserted of him who swears without the mind of swearing, namely, that it is mortal in an oath justly exacted, with the things said in the preceding question preserved proportionally.

I ASSERT first, that one swearing without the mind of obligating himself sins mortally, if the oath is justly required. So those cited above, and others, with whom almost the whole of Bassaeus subscribes loc. cit.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure quaestione prima articuli tertii in corpore, because he unjustly deceives his neighbor in a grave matter, and to this end uses, as an instrument of the oath, an external act (for it is not truly an oath, as I shall say in question 13.); he invokes therefore externally the name of God after the manner of an oath, and so gravely abuses the means of naming God vainly under the formula of an oath, mocking God himself, and to the ruin of the human race, for the preservation of whose peace oaths were instituted; and he enervates the faith owed to an oath. Very many use this reason; among whom those are judged to be related in the preceding question for the first opinion.

I ASSERT secondly, that one swearing without the mind of obligating himself (if the oath is unreasonably extorted) sins only venially, if he does not apply the words to confirming a false promise.

IT IS PROVED on the foundation of D. Bonaventure, because this is not an oath, but only a simple lie, as I shall say in question 4. and the same was said in the preceding question, in the first assertion, and then he uses his right, using equivocations. So Sanchez in number 10.

Sanchez, moreover, ADVERTS that one can use amphibolic words from a just cause, not only when they admit several senses of themselves, but also from some circumstance, of place, of time, etc.; indeed, when they render the true sense from the mind of the utterer; as if one denies that he has done something that he did (understanding that it is to be concealed). The same hold Syluest. V. Iuram. 4. quaest. 7. Nauarr. cap. Humana aures 12. quaest. 5. in quaest. 2. num. 12. Valentia 2. 2. d. 5. quaest. 13. puncto ultimo. Salon. 1. 2. quaest. 69. art. 2. controu. 11. in quarta ratione, Tolet. lib. 4. summae, cap. 21. num. 9. Manuel de ordine iudicatio cap. 10. num. 4. et primo tomo summae, cap. 191. num. 7. Philiarch. Tom. 1. part. 2. lib. 3. cap. 14. Suarez de Iuram. lib. 3. cap. 11. num. 6. Lessius lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 42. dub. 9. num. 48. Sà verbo Iuram. num. 6. Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 15. D. Bonauent. passim. Vide Dianam part. 2. t. 15. res. 25. et part. 3. tract. 6. miscell. resol. 30. Although Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 89. art. 7. Sotus lib. 5. quaest. 6. art. 2. cap. 7. Malder. opusc. de restrict. ment. cap. 4. et 10. Syluius 2. 2 quaest. 89 art. 7. quaestio 3. Azor. tom. 1. lib. 11. cap. 4. quaestio 5. Henriq. lib. 6. cap. 19. Layman. lib. 4. tract. 3. cap. 13. Coninch. de act. quatern. lib. 1. d. 10. dub. 3. Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. et quaest. 89. art. 7. say it is perjury, unless the amphibolic words obtain that amphibolic sense from themselves; with whom Bassaeus V. Iuramentum 3. num. 10. hesitates, so that he may proceed more safely, although he grants the opposite opinion probable, which I follow.

He is PROVED from the Holy Doctor on cap. 7. Ioan. where Christ says: Go you up to this festival day; but I go not up to this festival day, and yet he ascended. But that utterance was completely true in the mind of Jesus. I go not up manifestly, and for celebrating the solemnity, or for the passion, but that I may instruct some separately in need of it.

SO many note, from D. Chrysostom homil. 47. in Ioannem post medium Tom. 3.

It is PROVED secondly, from D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 38. dub. 1. where from D. Jerome the amphibology of the Hebrew midwives is praised, because of which God is said to have built houses; and the Holy Doctor calls those midwives most spiritual.

THIRDLY it is proved from D. Bonaventure from Genes. 27. ibidem num. 6. from the deed of Jacob, who feigned himself Esau, and said of himself that he was such and such, and had done what the Father had commanded; and yet he is excused by the Holy Fathers Ambrose, Augustine, and others, whom D. Bonaventure reports loc. cit. et post eum Peterius ibi disp. 5.

SIMILARLY Abraham Genes. 22. going up the mountain to immolate his son, said that he would return with the boy. And Genes. 26. concerning his wife he says she is his sister. And cap. 42. et 44. Joseph says that he is a diviner. And Iudic. 9. Ierunt ligna. And 4. Reg. 10. Jehu said that he wished to worship Baal, which examples the Holy Doctor reports in 3. d. 38. quaest. 2.

It is PROVED fourthly from D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 39. art. 1. quaest. 1. with whom D. Gregory also concurs there lib. 26. moral. cit. and it is reported cap. Humana aures 22. quaest 5. ibi: The ears of men judge our words to be such as they sound outwardly. But the Divine judgments hear them to be such as they are uttered from the depths: Therefore he wills that truth be measured by words in their intrinsic seat from the intention of the utterer, not from the external words alone. The same D. Hilary expressed lib. 4. de Trinitate cap. 5. and it is reported cap. Intelligentia, de verborum significatione there, The understanding of words must be taken from the causes of speaking: Because the thing is not subject to the word, but the word to the thing.

It is PROVED fifthly from D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 38. in dub. litt. num. 4. et 5. et quaest. 1. in corpore, et quaest. 2. ad argumenta. To lie is to go against the mind, and so the reason of the lie stands in the habitude of words to the mind. Therefore whether they are true or false in themselves, it is per accidens; but they are to be considered with respect to the mind of the utterer, and in the deformity of the words with respect to it stands the formal reason of the lie. So also Sanchez num. 15. who again confirms it from D. Bonaventure in the quaest. 2. cited, argumento 6. with Bassaeus num. 10.

In this stands a lie, that words are uttered against the institution of their end; but words were instituted for this, that man express what he bears in mind.

But OUTSIDE of necessity it is not permitted to use amphibologies, which is proved from D. Bonaventure in 3. d. 38. quaest. 2. ad tertium argumentum, because man was made that he might contract with others, and live together economically, and politically; but for this it was necessary that they mutually communicate their own intentions and wills in a human manner; but this is done by words. Wherefore in legitimate contracts and fellowship we ought to use words instituted for that end, to signify candidly to our neighbors our conceptions. On this reason many, cited by Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 12. try to prove that it is always true, that never may amphibologies be used; otherwise an approach would lie open to deceits, the commerce of words would be taken away, its assurance, etc.

INDEED, since in the corrupt state we are compelled to live together, and are often assailed by the unjust with questions and malicious speeches, an approach would rather lie open to very many evils than that satisfaction be given to one asking sincerely, with open mind. Therefore cautious prudence is needed. For thus also Christ did not always render oracles at a nod to the Jewish plotters, but with parables rather obscure, by which in several ways he could multiply responses.

From these it is clear, and Sanchez rightly gathers num. 10. that a case can occur in which not only when solicited, but even spontaneously we can rightly use amphibolic sayings, anticipating some evil, or for appeasing a neighbor, for restoring a fame unjustly taken away, etc. The same says Philiarchus de off. Sacerd. tom. 1. part. 2. lib. 3. cap. 14.

The SAME will be in the case in which one guilty has unjustly disclosed his accomplices in the crime, or a witness has unjustly betrayed before the judge a crime of the Accused that was hidden, that he can offer himself to swear that they are not guilty, understanding that they ought not to be disclosed:

So hold Medina lib. 1. summae, cap. 14. §. 33. Navarr. lib. 2. de resti. cap. 4. part. 3. dub. 5. num. 142. Henriquez lib. 5. de Poenitentia, cap. 12. Manuel primo Tomo summae, cap. ultimo. Bannes 22. quaest. 62. art. 2. dub. 8. and there Salonius in controv. 15. saying that Melchior Canus, Mantius, and other most learned men hold the same in their relections. Leonardus lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 11. dub. 10. num. 110. Sayrus lib. 11. cap. 4. num. 27. Petrus Ledaesma 1. Tomo, tract. 2. cap. 7. concl. 3. with Sanchez lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 28.

WHENCE I do not see how from the Doctors alleged, Navarr. in summae, cap. 12. num. 8. Sayrus lib. 5. cap. 4. num. 21. Leonardus lib. 2. de iustitia, cap. 42. d. 9. num. 46. it can be brought that it is not permitted to offer oneself to swear, using these amphibologies; but that only with the requisites is it permitted to use them.

From these many things are resolved, namely that it is permitted to use equivocations if we are asked, even in judgment, about a hidden matter, or by a judge not competent, and to deny, understanding that he is not bound; or if one asked whether he comes from such a place, when the plague has been falsely announced, could deny to the guards of the city that he comes from that place, understanding as if it had not happened. See Sanchez, who num. 4. also brings forward that case which they ascribe to the Holy Father Francis, that, being asked on the way by satellites whether a certain guilty one had passed that way, he answered that he had not passed through here, understanding through the sleeves of his garment, in which he held his hands. Likewise this is permitted for saving life, fame, goods, for repelling adversities, for eluding the enemy in a just war, for avoiding ambushes, for a useful work, etc.

I ASSERT finally, that if he refer those words to confirming a falsehood, he sins. See the third assertion of the preceding question, of which the reason is the same.

Now Perjury is a sin graver than homicide, because it is against the honor of God, as I shall say in the last question.

Quaestio XI: Whether it is lawful to require an Oath from a perjurer

It is CERTAIN that it is not lawful to require an oath in which two companions will be lacking, namely justice, or judgment; since no cause of exacting such oaths can arise, the one exacting will sin with the sin of the one swearing, mortally or venially.

The DIFFICULTY, however, will be if Truth will be lacking.

Concerning the three kinds of persons it may be doubted whether they are legitimate exactors of an oath from a perjurer, and they are: Judges, Plaintiffs, and Private persons.

AS REGARDS the Judge, I ASSERT that he can require an oath, the order of law being observed, from one whom he knows will commit perjury. Thus teach the Alensis, part 3, quaest. 31, m. 2, art. 6, quaest. 1, and both Holy Doctors adduced here, whom follow Richard. in 3, d. 39, art. 3, quaest. 3, Paludanus quaest. 2, Maior. quaest. 3, Gabr. quaest. 2, art. 3, dub. 11, Archid. cap. Ille, num. 2, 22, quaest. 5, ibi, Bellamera, and Turrecrem., Socinus regul. 210, Abulensis quaest. 198 on 5 Matth., D. Antonin. part 2, tit. 10, cap. 7, §. 10 and §. 3, Angel. V. Iuram. 3, num. 11, Sylvest. ibi 2, quaest. 9, Armilla vers. 33, Tabien. ibi quaest. 33, num. 34, and V. Periur. quaest. 3, Sotus lib. 8 de Iustitia, quaest. 2, art. 4, Navarr. summae, cap. 12, Covarr. de pactis, p. p., §. 6, num. 2, Pedraza Summae, on the second precept, §. 7, Alcozer summae, cap. 15, Toletus lib. 4 summae, cap. 21, num. 10, Sayrus lib. 5, cap. 5, Petrus de Ledesma, Tome 2, tract. 11, cap. 5, dubio 6, Azor. Tom. 1, lib. 11, cap. 11, Graff. part 2, decis. lib. 2, cap. 4, num. 5, Suarez de Iuram. lib. 3, cap. 14, num. 13 and 17, Lessius lib. 2 de iustitia, cap. 42, d. 10, num. 49, Philiarc. Tom. 1, part 2, lib. 3, cap. 16, Manuel, first Tome of the summa, cap. 191, whom Sanchez brings forward and follows in lib. 3 summae, cap. 8, numero 2.

SOME restrict it, that the Judge cannot do this of his own accord, but only at the instance of a party. Thus seem to think D. Thom., Richardus, Paludanus, Gabr., Socinus, Abul., D. Antonin., Angel., Sylvest., Tabiena, Navar., Sotus, Sayrus, Petr. Ledesma, Pedraza, Manuel, cited above: but more clearly Archid., Bellamera, Azorius, Maior, and Graffius.

BUT they are to be expounded as follows: when he would do it with no right compelling him, but of his own accord merely to instruct his conscience; but otherwise when the judge is bound ex officio to inquire, as in criminal causes, when he proceeds ex officio, as can be seen in Iulius Clarus lib. 5 receptarum in prac. crimin., quaest. 6, num. penult. Thus Durandus 3, d. 39, quaest. 5, ad 2, and there Paludanus quaest. 2, art. ult., ad 2, Turrecremata cap. Quamvis, num. 2, in solut. ad 3, 22, quaest. 1, Alens. loc. cit., Leonard. and Philiar. cited, after D. Bonavent., quaest. 3, corpore, where he says, if he is a judge, it accords, as far as the order of law goes, to inquire ex officio. Therefore, if he is not compelled to this, he ought not to exact such an oath. See Diana part 5, tract. 7, resol. 9, Bassaeus V. Iuram. 3, num. 9.

THEREFORE the assertion is PROVED from D. Bonaventure at the cited places, because the judge uses his right by reason of his office, has a legitimate cause for exacting, and he follows that oath of knowledge which the judge is bound to follow, in order that the process be legitimate; and if a party presses, he is so much the more bound.

AS REGARDS the Plaintiff, many condemn him, all those who say above that it is lawful for the judge only at the instance of a party, because it is not he himself but the party who is considered to exact. Wherefore they seem to condemn the party itself, and that chiefly because there they absolutely condemn the private person seeking this oath, which the Plaintiff commonly is. With these D. Bonaventure also seems to speak in the places adduced. The reason is, because he seems driven by no necessity to the exaction of such an oath: others, however, seem to excuse it, among whom is D. Bonaventure in dubio quarto litt., where he excludes the private person only when he does it from his mere will without necessity: and in the cited question he affirms that a private person can exact such an oath to establish the truth. And although he speaks of idolatry, and denies it of a Christian committing perjury, insofar as he is considered in perjury alone, and, as perjury, it is private, without witnesses, whence we cannot use it for the truth but for the subversion of the truth; nevertheless from D. Bonaventure's doctrine the same follows, that it is lawful to exact it publicly from a perjurer, if the case should arise, so that we can use that oath for publicly confirming the truth, either per se or per accidens, insofar as truth is drawn out of its falsity, as I shall show also concerning the third assertion.

Now such necessity CAN be, if someone conducts another's cause publicly and would be mocked for infidelity or negligent management; if he needs to uncover the frauds of an adversary, to diminish his fame, and indeed to cast down calumnies. For confirming the contract, and for compelling the one swearing before a judge, who, since he judges of externals, will compel the fulfillment of the oath. Therefore Lessius lib. 7 de Iustitia, cap. 42, d. 10, num. 47, Suarez Tract. de Iuramento, lib. 3, cap. 14, num. 16, Sanchez in the place cited, numero quarto, Bassaeus, Diana, and others above follow D. Bonaventure.

I ASSERT that the Plaintiff can require an oath from a perjurer, to protect his right.

¶ It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure, quaest. cit., because he thus uses his right to confirm what is owed to him by another, nor is he bound to yield his right to avoid perjury proceeding from the malice of another; for he does not exact perjury, but an oath. Thus also Sanchez.

YOU WILL SAY that it is lawful also for the Judge only from necessity: therefore there is no difference, which S. Bonaventure and others posit between the Judge, or another public person, and a private one, that it is lawful for the former, not for the latter.

Suarez answers in that cap. 14, num. 17, and Sanchez num. 7, from D. Bonaventure in the cited question, that the diversity is in this: that for the Judge it accords with his office, so that as often as a juridical reason of using it occurs in this office of his, it is lawful; but not so for a private person, so that ordinarily it is not lawful by his own will, but only in some case of confirming a truth conducing gravely to his right, which rarely happens.

AS REGARDS every private person outside of Judgment, they commonly condemn it as mortal. Thus D. Augustinus serm. 10 de Sanctis, and it is related cap. ille, 22, quaest. 1, and serm. 28 de verbis Domini, and it is related cap. qui exigit, 22, quaest. 5, whom D. Bonaventure adduces and follows, and the authors of the first assertion agree.

BUT S. Bonaventure objects to himself, because it is lawful to require an oath from a Pagan, who swears blasphemously by idols, and sins more gravely than if he committed perjury by the true God, as I said quaest. 7.

The holy Doctor answers from D. Augustinus epist. 154 ad Publicolam that the reason is unequal, for one exacting an oath from an Idolater intends that oath for confirming a contract and establishing the truth. Now it is lawful from necessity to exact from someone something that he can do without sin, yet he will do it by sinning: on the contrary, one exacting from a perjurer acquires no utility from it, but causes only a subversion of the truth, and thus the end of the oath is perverted, and it is not saved by any good intention; as it is saved in the case of the idolater swearing, both because, as I said, it is ordered to establishing the truth, and also because Idolaters reckon themselves obliged to keep oaths made by their gods, just as Christians swearing by the true God.

This doctrine, if rightly weighed, is not sufficiently understood by Sanchez num. 4. For S. Bonaventure does not will that it always be a sin for anyone who is not a judge to receive an oath from a perjurer, but only denies that outside a public action, or judgment, a necessity of exacting can arise; for in judgment, or public action, the covenants of contracts are confirmed, and perjuries serve per accidens, so that those who have sworn to observe them are compelled publicly, and for the other ends related above. But if S. Bonaventure wished that, given an equal cause, it be lawful to exact an oath from a Pagan whom we know will swear by idols (although we do not intend to press him so that he swear by them, which is by no means lawful:) but not lawful to exact an oath from a faithful man whom we know will swear falsely by God; the opposite argument would return again: namely, how is it that what is graver is lawful? Therefore the sense of D. Bonaventure is, that it is lawful in judgment, or in public acts, to exact an oath from an idolater, even if we know he will swear by idols, because such an oath in those acts serves for establishing covenants, pacts, and the truth, as the same S. Bonaventure notes on the first before the second, in which he hands down this doctrine of diversity; but that it is not lawful secretly, privately, at pleasure (as S. Bonaventure says in dub. litt.) to exact from a perjurer, since no utility arises from it, nor can any right end be intended, and only the subversion of truth results. Therefore in solemn acts of contracts and covenants, and much more in judgment, one fulfilling the office of a plaintiff can do this; and such are the cases I related above from Sanchez num. 4 and 7; for if you deal only with the one swearing himself, privately, he will certainly deny to you that he swore, as often as you wish to summon him to execution. And in this way D. Thom. also seems to understand it, quaest. 8, art. 4, ad 4, where he compares both in the bare act of swearing, in which the malicious one seems to sin more by committing perjury by God than by swearing truly to an Idol; nevertheless, as to the cause, if it is present, they teach that we can use evil for the good of that cause; otherwise the argument would not sufficiently solve it, because the idolater, as I suppose, swears worshipping the idol, and is not invincibly and wholly ignorant, and therefore he does worse. The same, I judge, Sotus thinks, lib. 8 de Iustitia, quaest. 2, art. 4, Aragon. 2, 2, quaest. 89, art. 6, d. 2, ad 2, Clavim Reg. lib. 5, cap. 3, num. 20, and cap. 5, num. 1.

I ASSERT that it is not lawful privately to extort an oath from a perjurer.

It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure, whom I alleged above and who is followed, and by Sanchez himself num. 5, from D. Augustinus saying in that Sermon 11 de Sanctis that this exactor of an oath kills his own soul, and the soul also of the perjurer.

It is PROVED secondly from D. Bonaventure, because he is drawn to such perjury without necessity, nor does any good end intervene, as I showed, but only the subversion of truth and contempt of God, which is mortal. From these I conclude that Suarez in that cap. 14, num. 17, and Sanchez num. 7, do not well assign the diversity related above, why it is lawful to exact an oath from one who will swear by idols and not from one who will commit perjury by God, namely because utility and cause are found totally and ordinarily in the case of an oath exacted from a Pagan, not in this one, in which regularly the cause is lacking. For on the contrary, each brings forward more cases in which there is a cause for exacting an oath, even from a perjurer: therefore there is no difference. It is confirmed, for infidels are for the most part barbarous, and lacking in fidelity.

THEREFORE in private acts, lacking witnesses, they are equal, so that it is not lawful to exact an oath from either, indeed less from the idolater. Per accidens, however, it is possible for an Idolater to be morally faithful, and therefore for it to be exacted, if I probably know that he will confirm, if it is necessary, and ratify publicly the oath: which can be promised and presumed with more difficulty of the perjurer, who is of bad faith, and worse than a Barbarian morally faithful, or a man of human fidelity.

NOTE, that in cap. Clericos, de cohabitatione clericorum it is forbidden that an oath of dismissing concubines be sought from clerics, on account of the danger of transgression: therefore when it is probably known that he will not fulfill it, it is not lawful to exact the oath.

OR say, that the Pagan and the Perjurer are compared in the reason of the oath, such that the perjurer is exacted without that whereby his oath could serve, as the oath of the Pagan would serve.

For this comparison is made not ex professo; for thus each ought to be considered in the same condition, whether, and circumstance; but only in this, that, since it is defined that an oath cannot be exacted from a perjurer.

It is objected that if it can be exacted from an Idolater, who sins more gravely, why not also from that one?

It is answered that this one, of whom we speak, insofar as he is in a private act, not however in genus, cannot be exacted from, because it serves for nothing: just as an oath by the gods serves in the way it is exacted from Pagans for confirming covenants; for thus it serves, because it can be proven and sustained for preserving our right.

Tractatus I: PRIMUS DE VIRTUTIBUS THEOLOGICIS

Proemium I: Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON FAITH

Quaestio I: What FAITH signifies, and what it is

Quaestio II: What the object of FAITH is

Quaestio III: Whether the object of FAITH is something complex

Quaestio IV: Whether the object of FAITH can be false

Quaestio V: Whether the object of FAITH can be evident scientifically

Quaestio VI: Whether FAITH is concerned with those things which are seen by vision on the way

Quaestio VII: Whether the articles of FAITH are evidently credible

Quaestio VIII: Whether the things to be believed are rightly arranged according to the articles

Quaestio IX: Whether the articles of FAITH have grown over the course of time

Quaestio X: Whether FAITH has grown as regards light

Quaestio XI: Whether Faith has grown in certitude

Quaestio XII: Whether the articles of Faith are to be expounded by some authority which is an infallible teacher, and what it is

Quaestio XIII: What are the marks of the true Church, in which the authority of expounding FAITH resides

Quaestio XIV: What must be believed by the necessity of means

Quaestio XV: What things are to be believed by the necessity of precept

Quaestio XVI: Whether we are bound to confess FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVII: Whether it is lawful to dispute about FAITH, and when

Quaestio XVIII: Whether Faith resides in the Intellect

Quaestio XIX: Whether Faith is perfected by Charity, as by its form

Quaestio XX: Whether it is certain that FAITH remains without CHARITY

Quaestio XXI: Whether, and how, FAITH is a VIRTUE

Quaestio XXII: Whether FAITH is ONE VIRTUE

Quaestio XXIII: Whether FAITH is the first of the Virtues

Quaestio XXIV: Whether FAITH is more certain than any science, or than any intellectual habit

Quaestio XXV: Whether one can know with certainty that he has FAITH

Quaestio XXVI: In whom FAITH is found

Quaestio XXVII: Whether FAITH is a substantial Gift of GOD

Quaestio XXVIII: Whether the difference between FAITH and other acts, natural as opposed to supernatural moral acts, always arises from the object

Quaestio XXIX: On the effects of FAITH

Quaestio XXX: On the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio I: Whether UNDERSTANDING is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING can coexist with FAITH

Dubitatio III: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING consists in the contemplation of the Creator and of Creation

Dubitatio IV: Whether the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING is found in all who have grace, and whether in these alone

Dubitatio V: What is the necessity and utility of the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

Dubitatio VI: Whether* **the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* **to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING** *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Quaestio XXXI: On the Gift of Knowledge

Dubitatio I: Whether* **KNOWLEDGE** *is a gift of the Holy Ghost

Dubitatio II: Whether knowledge is concerned with Divine things

Dubitatio III: Whether the gift of knowledge is speculative

Dubitatio IV: Whether the third Beatitude corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge: Blessed are they that mourn, etc.

Disputatio II: On Unbelief

Quaestio I: What UNBELIEF is, and what kind of sin it is

Quaestio II: Whether all the works of unbelievers are sins

Quaestio III: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to hear FAITH

Quaestio IV: Whether unbelievers can be compelled to embrace our FAITH, when it has been sufficiently set forth

Quaestio V: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can be compelled to abandon errors or rites contrary to natural reason

Quaestio VI: Whether the rites of unbelievers are to be permitted

Quaestio VII: Whether it is lawful to make agreements with unbelievers about the toleration of their rites

Quaestio VIII: Whether unbaptized unbelievers can retain power over the Faithful, and whether they can be deprived of it

Disputatio III: On Heresy

Quaestio I: What HERESY is

Quaestio II: Whether one who doubts about the articles of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio III: Whether one who gives merely opinionative assent to an article of FAITH is a heretic

Quaestio IV: Whether, and what, Ignorance excuses from Heresy

Quaestio V: What pertinacity is required for HERESY

Quaestio VI: Whether, for one to be deemed a Heretic, it is necessary that he have been baptized and a believer

Quaestio VII: Whether the Church can compel heretics to receive the Catholic FAITH

Quaestio VIII: On the other means the Church uses against heretics, by forbidding their Books

Quaestio IX: Whether we are bound to avoid the conversation of heretics

Quaestio X: What excommunication is inflicted upon heretics

Quaestio XI: On the other spiritual punishments of heretics

Quaestio XII: On the temporal punishments of Heretics

Disputatio IV: On Hope

Quaestio I: What HOPE is

Quaestio II: What the material object of HOPE is

Question III

Quaestio IV: Whether a certain object is set forth for HOPE, and is hoped for

Quaestio V: Whether Hope is a Virtue

Quaestio VI: Whether HOPE is a Theological Virtue

Quaestio VII: Whether HOPE is at times formless

Quaestio VIII: Whether HOPE arises from merits

Quaestio IX: Whether Hope precedes Charity

Quaestio X: What the proximate subject of HOPE is

Quaestio XI: Whether HOPE remains in the Blessed

Quaestio XII: Whether there is a precept of hoping in GOD

Dubitatio VI: Whether* the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *corresponds to the sixth beatitude, namely, Blessed are the clean of heart, etc.

Dubitatio VII: Whether* to the GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING *there corresponds, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, Faith

Dubitatio I: Whether* KNOWLEDGE *is a gift of the Holy Ghost